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#telecommunication — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #telecommunication, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Exposing a Global Smishing Operation Across 19 Countries: Governments, Postal Services, and Telecoms Targeted

    A coordinated smishing operation spanning 19 countries across Europe, the Americas, and the Caucasus has been exposed, originating from fraudulent SMS messages impersonating Romania's government payment portal Ghișeul.ro. Investigation revealed 1,628 malicious URLs linked by a single 128-character campaign identifier, targeting government portals, traffic police departments, postal services including DPD and SEUR, tax authorities, and telecommunications providers like T-Mobile and Vodafone. The infrastructure utilizes 32 backend IP addresses distributed across Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare CDN, and ALEXHOST Moldova. Threat actors employ two distinct phishing templates: a Vue.js single-page application and a Bootstrap-based clone, executing a four-stage credential harvesting process that collects complete payment card details through fabricated traffic fines, toll payments, and delivery notifications.

    Pulse ID: 6a17527240dde65694eed30e
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a175
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 20:22:10

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Americas #CDN #Caucasus #Cloud #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #Europe #Government #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #bot #AlienVault

  2. Exposing a Global Smishing Operation Across 19 Countries: Governments, Postal Services, and Telecoms Targeted

    A coordinated smishing operation spanning 19 countries across Europe, the Americas, and the Caucasus has been exposed, originating from fraudulent SMS messages impersonating Romania's government payment portal Ghișeul.ro. Investigation revealed 1,628 malicious URLs linked by a single 128-character campaign identifier, targeting government portals, traffic police departments, postal services including DPD and SEUR, tax authorities, and telecommunications providers like T-Mobile and Vodafone. The infrastructure utilizes 32 backend IP addresses distributed across Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare CDN, and ALEXHOST Moldova. Threat actors employ two distinct phishing templates: a Vue.js single-page application and a Bootstrap-based clone, executing a four-stage credential harvesting process that collects complete payment card details through fabricated traffic fines, toll payments, and delivery notifications.

    Pulse ID: 6a17527240dde65694eed30e
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a175
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 20:22:10

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Americas #CDN #Caucasus #Cloud #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #Europe #Government #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #bot #AlienVault

  3. Exposing a Global Smishing Operation Across 19 Countries: Governments, Postal Services, and Telecoms Targeted

    A coordinated smishing operation spanning 19 countries across Europe, the Americas, and the Caucasus has been exposed, originating from fraudulent SMS messages impersonating Romania's government payment portal Ghișeul.ro. Investigation revealed 1,628 malicious URLs linked by a single 128-character campaign identifier, targeting government portals, traffic police departments, postal services including DPD and SEUR, tax authorities, and telecommunications providers like T-Mobile and Vodafone. The infrastructure utilizes 32 backend IP addresses distributed across Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare CDN, and ALEXHOST Moldova. Threat actors employ two distinct phishing templates: a Vue.js single-page application and a Bootstrap-based clone, executing a four-stage credential harvesting process that collects complete payment card details through fabricated traffic fines, toll payments, and delivery notifications.

    Pulse ID: 6a17527240dde65694eed30e
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a175
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 20:22:10

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Americas #CDN #Caucasus #Cloud #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #Europe #Government #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #bot #AlienVault

  4. Exposing a Global Smishing Operation Across 19 Countries: Governments, Postal Services, and Telecoms Targeted

    A coordinated smishing operation spanning 19 countries across Europe, the Americas, and the Caucasus has been exposed, originating from fraudulent SMS messages impersonating Romania's government payment portal Ghișeul.ro. Investigation revealed 1,628 malicious URLs linked by a single 128-character campaign identifier, targeting government portals, traffic police departments, postal services including DPD and SEUR, tax authorities, and telecommunications providers like T-Mobile and Vodafone. The infrastructure utilizes 32 backend IP addresses distributed across Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare CDN, and ALEXHOST Moldova. Threat actors employ two distinct phishing templates: a Vue.js single-page application and a Bootstrap-based clone, executing a four-stage credential harvesting process that collects complete payment card details through fabricated traffic fines, toll payments, and delivery notifications.

    Pulse ID: 6a17527240dde65694eed30e
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a175
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 20:22:10

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Americas #CDN #Caucasus #Cloud #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #Europe #Government #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #bot #AlienVault

  5. Exposing a Global Smishing Operation Across 19 Countries: Governments, Postal Services, and Telecoms Targeted

    A coordinated smishing operation spanning 19 countries across Europe, the Americas, and the Caucasus has been exposed, originating from fraudulent SMS messages impersonating Romania's government payment portal Ghișeul.ro. Investigation revealed 1,628 malicious URLs linked by a single 128-character campaign identifier, targeting government portals, traffic police departments, postal services including DPD and SEUR, tax authorities, and telecommunications providers like T-Mobile and Vodafone. The infrastructure utilizes 32 backend IP addresses distributed across Tencent Cloud, Alibaba Cloud, Cloudflare CDN, and ALEXHOST Moldova. Threat actors employ two distinct phishing templates: a Vue.js single-page application and a Bootstrap-based clone, executing a four-stage credential harvesting process that collects complete payment card details through fabricated traffic fines, toll payments, and delivery notifications.

    Pulse ID: 6a17527240dde65694eed30e
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a175
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-27 20:22:10

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Americas #CDN #Caucasus #Cloud #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #Europe #Government #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #bot #AlienVault

  6. Middle East Malicious Infrastructure Report: 1,350+ C2 Servers Mapped Across 98 Providers

    Between February and May 2026, over 1,350 active command-and-control servers were identified across 98 infrastructure providers spanning 14 Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia's STC hosted 981 C2 servers, representing 72.4% of all regional malicious infrastructure, the largest concentration globally. C2 infrastructure dominated at 96.8% of detected activity, with IoT-focused botnets like Hajime, Mozi, and Mirai, alongside offensive frameworks including Tactical RMM, Cobalt Strike, and Sliver representing the primary malware families. The infrastructure supported diverse operations from state-sponsored espionage campaigns like Eagle Werewolf targeting state entities, to Malware-as-a-Service platforms, cryptomining operations, and destructive attacks such as DYNOWIPER. Key providers included SERVERS TECH FZCO in UAE, OMC in Israel, Türk Telekom, and Regxa in Iraq, demonstrating how telecommunications giants and specialized hosting services enable both commodity cybercrime and advanced persistent threat op...

    Pulse ID: 6a0f8f36422c8adb515a9804
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a0f8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-21 23:03:18

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CobaltStrike #CryptoMining #CyberCrime #CyberSecurity #Espionage #InfoSec #IoT #Israel #Malware #MalwareAsAService #MiddleEast #Mirai #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #SaudiArabia #Sliver #Telecom #Telecommunication #UAE #bot #botnet #AlienVault

  7. Middle East Malicious Infrastructure Report: 1,350+ C2 Servers Mapped Across 98 Providers

    Between February and May 2026, over 1,350 active command-and-control servers were identified across 98 infrastructure providers spanning 14 Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia's STC hosted 981 C2 servers, representing 72.4% of all regional malicious infrastructure, the largest concentration globally. C2 infrastructure dominated at 96.8% of detected activity, with IoT-focused botnets like Hajime, Mozi, and Mirai, alongside offensive frameworks including Tactical RMM, Cobalt Strike, and Sliver representing the primary malware families. The infrastructure supported diverse operations from state-sponsored espionage campaigns like Eagle Werewolf targeting state entities, to Malware-as-a-Service platforms, cryptomining operations, and destructive attacks such as DYNOWIPER. Key providers included SERVERS TECH FZCO in UAE, OMC in Israel, Türk Telekom, and Regxa in Iraq, demonstrating how telecommunications giants and specialized hosting services enable both commodity cybercrime and advanced persistent threat op...

    Pulse ID: 6a0f8f36422c8adb515a9804
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a0f8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-21 23:03:18

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CobaltStrike #CryptoMining #CyberCrime #CyberSecurity #Espionage #InfoSec #IoT #Israel #Malware #MalwareAsAService #MiddleEast #Mirai #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #SaudiArabia #Sliver #Telecom #Telecommunication #UAE #bot #botnet #AlienVault

  8. Middle East Malicious Infrastructure Report: 1,350+ C2 Servers Mapped Across 98 Providers

    Between February and May 2026, over 1,350 active command-and-control servers were identified across 98 infrastructure providers spanning 14 Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia's STC hosted 981 C2 servers, representing 72.4% of all regional malicious infrastructure, the largest concentration globally. C2 infrastructure dominated at 96.8% of detected activity, with IoT-focused botnets like Hajime, Mozi, and Mirai, alongside offensive frameworks including Tactical RMM, Cobalt Strike, and Sliver representing the primary malware families. The infrastructure supported diverse operations from state-sponsored espionage campaigns like Eagle Werewolf targeting state entities, to Malware-as-a-Service platforms, cryptomining operations, and destructive attacks such as DYNOWIPER. Key providers included SERVERS TECH FZCO in UAE, OMC in Israel, Türk Telekom, and Regxa in Iraq, demonstrating how telecommunications giants and specialized hosting services enable both commodity cybercrime and advanced persistent threat op...

    Pulse ID: 6a0f8f36422c8adb515a9804
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a0f8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-21 23:03:18

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CobaltStrike #CryptoMining #CyberCrime #CyberSecurity #Espionage #InfoSec #IoT #Israel #Malware #MalwareAsAService #MiddleEast #Mirai #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #SaudiArabia #Sliver #Telecom #Telecommunication #UAE #bot #botnet #AlienVault

  9. Middle East Malicious Infrastructure Report: 1,350+ C2 Servers Mapped Across 98 Providers

    Between February and May 2026, over 1,350 active command-and-control servers were identified across 98 infrastructure providers spanning 14 Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia's STC hosted 981 C2 servers, representing 72.4% of all regional malicious infrastructure, the largest concentration globally. C2 infrastructure dominated at 96.8% of detected activity, with IoT-focused botnets like Hajime, Mozi, and Mirai, alongside offensive frameworks including Tactical RMM, Cobalt Strike, and Sliver representing the primary malware families. The infrastructure supported diverse operations from state-sponsored espionage campaigns like Eagle Werewolf targeting state entities, to Malware-as-a-Service platforms, cryptomining operations, and destructive attacks such as DYNOWIPER. Key providers included SERVERS TECH FZCO in UAE, OMC in Israel, Türk Telekom, and Regxa in Iraq, demonstrating how telecommunications giants and specialized hosting services enable both commodity cybercrime and advanced persistent threat op...

    Pulse ID: 6a0f8f36422c8adb515a9804
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a0f8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-21 23:03:18

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CobaltStrike #CryptoMining #CyberCrime #CyberSecurity #Espionage #InfoSec #IoT #Israel #Malware #MalwareAsAService #MiddleEast #Mirai #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #SaudiArabia #Sliver #Telecom #Telecommunication #UAE #bot #botnet #AlienVault

  10. Middle East Malicious Infrastructure Report: 1,350+ C2 Servers Mapped Across 98 Providers

    Between February and May 2026, over 1,350 active command-and-control servers were identified across 98 infrastructure providers spanning 14 Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia's STC hosted 981 C2 servers, representing 72.4% of all regional malicious infrastructure, the largest concentration globally. C2 infrastructure dominated at 96.8% of detected activity, with IoT-focused botnets like Hajime, Mozi, and Mirai, alongside offensive frameworks including Tactical RMM, Cobalt Strike, and Sliver representing the primary malware families. The infrastructure supported diverse operations from state-sponsored espionage campaigns like Eagle Werewolf targeting state entities, to Malware-as-a-Service platforms, cryptomining operations, and destructive attacks such as DYNOWIPER. Key providers included SERVERS TECH FZCO in UAE, OMC in Israel, Türk Telekom, and Regxa in Iraq, demonstrating how telecommunications giants and specialized hosting services enable both commodity cybercrime and advanced persistent threat op...

    Pulse ID: 6a0f8f36422c8adb515a9804
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a0f8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-21 23:03:18

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CobaltStrike #CryptoMining #CyberCrime #CyberSecurity #Espionage #InfoSec #IoT #Israel #Malware #MalwareAsAService #MiddleEast #Mirai #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #SaudiArabia #Sliver #Telecom #Telecommunication #UAE #bot #botnet #AlienVault

  11. Four Suspects Arrested In Parañaque City For Cable Theft And Illegal Tapping

    Recently in the City of Parañaque, local police officers apprehended four suspects for the theft of communication cables and illegal tapping, according to a Manila Bulletin news report.  

    To put things in perspective, posted below is an excerpt from the news report of the Manila Bulletin. Some parts in boldface…

    Police arrested four men allegedly involved in illegal tapping and theft of communication cables during an early morning police operation in Parañaque City on Friday, May 16.

    The suspects were identified only as Rommel, 28; John Zedrick, 18; John Rose, 27; and Rodel, 32.

    Personnel of Parañaque City Police Substation 5 were conducting routine patrol operations at around 4 a.m. along Dr. Arcadio Santos Avenue in BF Homes when they spotted three men opening a Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) manhole.

    Police said one of the suspects entered the manhole and later emerged carrying copper cables, while the other two acted as lookouts.

    Upon noticing the approaching policemen, the suspects fled aboard an aluminum van. A brief chase followed, leading to the arrest of three suspects in the Bicutan area.

    Authorities said a fourth suspect later appeared at the police substation and claimed ownership of the getaway vehicle. He was positively identified by police officers as the group’s alleged backup driver and was also placed under arrest.

    Recovered from the suspects were two pieces of PLDT copper cable, a bolt cutter, a chain, a steel bar, a metal saw, four improvised steel hooks, and various construction gear allegedly used as disguises during the operation. Police also impounded a white Foton Tornado van believed to have been used in the crime.

    Let me end this post by asking you readers: What do you think about this recent development? If you are a resident of Parañaque, who do you think is the mastermind behind the illegal tapping and the theft of cables? Do you think Parañaque will be a hot spot for cable thieves?

    You may answer in the comments below. If you prefer to answer privately, you may do so by sending me a direct message online.

    +++++

    Thank you for reading. If you find this article engaging, please click the like button below, share this article to others and also please consider making a donation to support my publishing. If you are looking for a copywriter to create content for your special project or business, check out my services and my portfolio. Feel free to contact me with a private message. Also please feel free to visit my Facebook page Author Carlo Carrasco and follow me on Twitter at @CarloCarrascoPH as well as on Tumblr at https://carlocarrasco.tumblr.com/ and on Instagram at https://www.instagram.com/authorcarlocarrasco

    For more South Metro Manila community news and developments, come back here soon. Also say NO to fake news, NO to irresponsible journalism, NO to misinformation, NO to plagiarists, NO to reckless publishers and NO to sinister propaganda when it comes to news and developments. For South Metro Manila community developments, member engagement, commerce and other relevant updates, join the growing South Metro Manila Facebook group at https://www.facebook.com/groups/342183059992673

    #Asia #BagongParañaque #BarangayBFHomes #Bing #Cable #CarloCarrasco #ChatGPT #CityOfParañaque #crime #crimeNews #diversity #DrASantosAvenue #geek #Google #GoogleSearch #Inclusion #Instagram #Investagrams #ManilaBulletin #MetroManila #NationalCapitalRegionNCR #NCR #news #Parañaque #ParañaqueCity #ParañaqueCrimeNews #ParañaqueNews #ParañaqueRenaissance #PhilippineLongDistanceTelephonePLDT #Philippines #PhilippinesBlog #Pinoy #PLDT #SouthMetroManila #SouthSnippets #SoutheastAsia #Southies #telecommunication #Tumblr #Twitter #WordPress #WordPressCom
  12. Operation GriefLure: Dissecting an APT Campaign Targeting Vietnam's Military Telecom & Philippine Healthcare

    A sophisticated spear phishing campaign dubbed Operation GriefLure targeted senior executives of Viettel Group, Vietnam's largest military-owned telecommunications provider, and St. Luke's Medical Center in the Philippines. The operation weaponized authentic legal documents from a genuine data breach dispute involving a Vietnamese citizen and Viettel, alongside fabricated whistleblower complaints targeting Philippine healthcare administrators. Attackers delivered malicious Windows LNK files within nested RAR archives, abusing native ftp.exe as a Living-off-the-Land dropper. Upon execution, the payload assembled polymorphic implants directly on disk from chunked .doc files, establishing persistence while displaying legitimate decoy PDFs. The malware enabled remote access through process injection, credential harvesting from browsers and remote access tools, screenshot capture, and file exfiltration via HTTPS C2 communication to infrastructure hosted on bulletproof Hong Kong servers.

    Pulse ID: 69fc841d0cbc4c199d708315
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fc8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-07 12:22:53

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #DataBreach #HTTP #HTTPS #Healthcare #HongKong #InfoSec #LNK #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #Philippines #Phishing #RAT #SpearPhishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #UK #Vietnam #Windows #bot #AlienVault

  13. Operation GriefLure: Dissecting an APT Campaign Targeting Vietnam's Military Telecom & Philippine Healthcare

    A sophisticated spear phishing campaign dubbed Operation GriefLure targeted senior executives of Viettel Group, Vietnam's largest military-owned telecommunications provider, and St. Luke's Medical Center in the Philippines. The operation weaponized authentic legal documents from a genuine data breach dispute involving a Vietnamese citizen and Viettel, alongside fabricated whistleblower complaints targeting Philippine healthcare administrators. Attackers delivered malicious Windows LNK files within nested RAR archives, abusing native ftp.exe as a Living-off-the-Land dropper. Upon execution, the payload assembled polymorphic implants directly on disk from chunked .doc files, establishing persistence while displaying legitimate decoy PDFs. The malware enabled remote access through process injection, credential harvesting from browsers and remote access tools, screenshot capture, and file exfiltration via HTTPS C2 communication to infrastructure hosted on bulletproof Hong Kong servers.

    Pulse ID: 69fc841d0cbc4c199d708315
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fc8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-07 12:22:53

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #DataBreach #HTTP #HTTPS #Healthcare #HongKong #InfoSec #LNK #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #Philippines #Phishing #RAT #SpearPhishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #UK #Vietnam #Windows #bot #AlienVault

  14. Operation GriefLure: Dissecting an APT Campaign Targeting Vietnam's Military Telecom & Philippine Healthcare

    A sophisticated spear phishing campaign dubbed Operation GriefLure targeted senior executives of Viettel Group, Vietnam's largest military-owned telecommunications provider, and St. Luke's Medical Center in the Philippines. The operation weaponized authentic legal documents from a genuine data breach dispute involving a Vietnamese citizen and Viettel, alongside fabricated whistleblower complaints targeting Philippine healthcare administrators. Attackers delivered malicious Windows LNK files within nested RAR archives, abusing native ftp.exe as a Living-off-the-Land dropper. Upon execution, the payload assembled polymorphic implants directly on disk from chunked .doc files, establishing persistence while displaying legitimate decoy PDFs. The malware enabled remote access through process injection, credential harvesting from browsers and remote access tools, screenshot capture, and file exfiltration via HTTPS C2 communication to infrastructure hosted on bulletproof Hong Kong servers.

    Pulse ID: 69fc841d0cbc4c199d708315
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fc8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-07 12:22:53

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #DataBreach #HTTP #HTTPS #Healthcare #HongKong #InfoSec #LNK #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #Philippines #Phishing #RAT #SpearPhishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #UK #Vietnam #Windows #bot #AlienVault

  15. Operation GriefLure: Dissecting an APT Campaign Targeting Vietnam's Military Telecom & Philippine Healthcare

    A sophisticated spear phishing campaign dubbed Operation GriefLure targeted senior executives of Viettel Group, Vietnam's largest military-owned telecommunications provider, and St. Luke's Medical Center in the Philippines. The operation weaponized authentic legal documents from a genuine data breach dispute involving a Vietnamese citizen and Viettel, alongside fabricated whistleblower complaints targeting Philippine healthcare administrators. Attackers delivered malicious Windows LNK files within nested RAR archives, abusing native ftp.exe as a Living-off-the-Land dropper. Upon execution, the payload assembled polymorphic implants directly on disk from chunked .doc files, establishing persistence while displaying legitimate decoy PDFs. The malware enabled remote access through process injection, credential harvesting from browsers and remote access tools, screenshot capture, and file exfiltration via HTTPS C2 communication to infrastructure hosted on bulletproof Hong Kong servers.

    Pulse ID: 69fc841d0cbc4c199d708315
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fc8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-07 12:22:53

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #DataBreach #HTTP #HTTPS #Healthcare #HongKong #InfoSec #LNK #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #Philippines #Phishing #RAT #SpearPhishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #UK #Vietnam #Windows #bot #AlienVault

  16. Operation GriefLure: Dissecting an APT Campaign Targeting Vietnam's Military Telecom & Philippine Healthcare

    A sophisticated spear phishing campaign dubbed Operation GriefLure targeted senior executives of Viettel Group, Vietnam's largest military-owned telecommunications provider, and St. Luke's Medical Center in the Philippines. The operation weaponized authentic legal documents from a genuine data breach dispute involving a Vietnamese citizen and Viettel, alongside fabricated whistleblower complaints targeting Philippine healthcare administrators. Attackers delivered malicious Windows LNK files within nested RAR archives, abusing native ftp.exe as a Living-off-the-Land dropper. Upon execution, the payload assembled polymorphic implants directly on disk from chunked .doc files, establishing persistence while displaying legitimate decoy PDFs. The malware enabled remote access through process injection, credential harvesting from browsers and remote access tools, screenshot capture, and file exfiltration via HTTPS C2 communication to infrastructure hosted on bulletproof Hong Kong servers.

    Pulse ID: 69fc841d0cbc4c199d708315
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fc8
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-05-07 12:22:53

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #DataBreach #HTTP #HTTPS #Healthcare #HongKong #InfoSec #LNK #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #Philippines #Phishing #RAT #SpearPhishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #UK #Vietnam #Windows #bot #AlienVault

  17. Phoenix Rising: Exposing the PhaaS Kit Behind Global Mass Phishing Campaigns

    Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...

    Pulse ID: 69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-04-29 12:31:58

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Bank #CyberSecurity #ICS #InfoSec #Mimic #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #Telegram #bot #AlienVault

  18. Phoenix Rising: Exposing the PhaaS Kit Behind Global Mass Phishing Campaigns

    Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...

    Pulse ID: 69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-04-29 12:31:58

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Bank #CyberSecurity #ICS #InfoSec #Mimic #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #Telegram #bot #AlienVault

  19. Phoenix Rising: Exposing the PhaaS Kit Behind Global Mass Phishing Campaigns

    Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...

    Pulse ID: 69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-04-29 12:31:58

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Bank #CyberSecurity #ICS #InfoSec #Mimic #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #Telegram #bot #AlienVault

  20. Phoenix Rising: Exposing the PhaaS Kit Behind Global Mass Phishing Campaigns

    Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...

    Pulse ID: 69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-04-29 12:31:58

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Bank #CyberSecurity #ICS #InfoSec #Mimic #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #Telegram #bot #AlienVault

  21. Phoenix Rising: Exposing the PhaaS Kit Behind Global Mass Phishing Campaigns

    Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...

    Pulse ID: 69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1f
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-04-29 12:31:58

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Bank #CyberSecurity #ICS #InfoSec #Mimic #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #Telegram #bot #AlienVault

  22. Hold the Phone! International Revenue Share Fraud Driven by Fake CAPTCHAs

    Threat actors are leveraging fake CAPTCHA pages to trick victims into sending premium SMS messages as part of an international revenue share fraud (IRSF) scheme. Operating since at least June 2020, this campaign uses traffic distribution systems and social engineering to direct users through multi-stage fake verifications requiring SMS messages to international phone numbers across 17 countries with high termination fees. Each CAPTCHA step triggers messages to over a dozen destinations, generating over 60 SMS messages per victim costing approximately $30. The operation employs back button hijacking, sophisticated tracking cookies, and affiliate advertising networks to maximize reach while obscuring the fraud from detection. Both individual victims and telecommunication carriers suffer financial losses through this deceptive scheme.

    Pulse ID: 69ea72429017f495ef581024
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69ea7
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-04-23 19:25:54

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #CAPTCHA #Cookies #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #RAT #SMS #SocialEngineering #Telecom #Telecommunication #bot #AlienVault

  23. 🔥🚀 Oh, the #nostalgia of NaviDial! Dive into a world where enabling #JavaScript and #cookies is your ticket to understanding Japan's ancient #telecommunication relic. 📞✨ It's like needing a flux capacitor to decipher a rotary phone—time travel, just add browser extensions! 😂📟
    tokyodev.com/articles/a-look-i #NaviDial #TimeTravel #HackerNews #ngated

  24. 🚀 Excited to collaborate with Ericsson to explore advanced AI and high-performance computing technologies for the evolution of #5G and future development of #6G networks 📡📶

    Combining global telecom leadership with Jülich’s HPC expertise – including Europe’s #JUPITER⚡exascale system – we aim to develop more efficient, sustainable, and intelligent network technologies 🤖🌐

    More: fz-juelich.de/en/news/archive/

    #FZJ #HPC #exa_JUPITER #Collaboration #AI #Telecommunication

  25. 🚀 Excited to collaborate with Ericsson to explore advanced AI and high-performance computing technologies for the evolution of #5G and future development of #6G networks 📡📶

    Combining global telecom leadership with Jülich’s HPC expertise – including Europe’s #JUPITER⚡exascale system – we aim to develop more efficient, sustainable, and intelligent network technologies 🤖🌐

    More: fz-juelich.de/en/news/archive/

    #FZJ #HPC #exa_JUPITER #Collaboration #AI #Telecommunication

  26. 🚀 Excited to collaborate with Ericsson to explore advanced AI and high-performance computing technologies for the evolution of #5G and future development of #6G networks 📡📶

    Combining global telecom leadership with Jülich’s HPC expertise – including Europe’s #JUPITER⚡exascale system – we aim to develop more efficient, sustainable, and intelligent network technologies 🤖🌐

    More: fz-juelich.de/en/news/archive/

    #FZJ #HPC #exa_JUPITER #Collaboration #AI #Telecommunication

  27. 🚀 Excited to collaborate with Ericsson to explore advanced AI and high-performance computing technologies for the evolution of #5G and future development of #6G networks 📡📶

    Combining global telecom leadership with Jülich’s HPC expertise – including Europe’s #JUPITER⚡exascale system – we aim to develop more efficient, sustainable, and intelligent network technologies 🤖🌐

    More: fz-juelich.de/en/news/archive/

    #FZJ #HPC #exa_JUPITER #Collaboration #AI #Telecommunication

  28. In a survey conducted in June 2025, as many as 65% of #Americans expressed support 👍 for a mission to #Mars 🔴. Technological barriers to Mars are no longer showstoppers - there are seven key challenges: hostile surface environment, human performance, life support, #medical ⚕️ care, #radiation ☢️ exposure, reduced #gravity, and #telecommunication delays 📶⏳nationalinterest.org/blog/tech

  29. Reminder for the coming dark years, if running any kind of #telecommunication service:

    "Do not comply in advance" also holds for implementing #ChatControl.

    Should it get passed, it cannot, and will not be the end of the fight. It will be a new round.

  30. Li Qiang, Revolutionary Engineer, born September 26, 1905

    Li Qiang – not the current Chinese "premier", but Li Qiang, the revolutionary – has been described as one of the great pre-1949 achievers of the CPC. Friday (September 26) will mark the 120th anniversary of his birth in Changshu, Jiangsu Province.

    Additions, updates and corrections to this post are very welcome.

    History books (and articles, narrations, etc.) aren’t always reliable. This is even more true for China. No matter how much the CPC is banging on about science, cooking histor books has been a Chinese tradition since ancient times – for the benefit of those in power, and at the expense of previous (defeated) dynasties, parties, and individuals. It is a living tradition.

    So when the talk is about an exemplary revolutionary, take all the glorious deeds ascribed to him with a bit of salt.

    One of Li Qiang’s first feats was to break with many of China’s traditions and to become a nationalist activist first and then a communist. All that even though his father and grandfather seem to have been rather well-off in "old China" as the country is known in contemporary history books, and deeply rooted in imperial Chinese tradition.

    Li Qiang is said to have been kicked out of traditional school for being disrespectful to tradition himself. Therefore, as a teenager, he became a student at something like a technical or vocational school, the now defunct "Nanyang Railroad and Mining School" in Shanghai. The practical orientation of his lessons would prove useful in his life as a revolutionary cadre – as would the use of English language at Nanyang School, as language of instruction.

    One of Li’s teachers there was a KMT cadre, and Li became a KMT member, too. But he was expelled from the nationalist KMT in 1924, and joined the communists in 1925. In 1927, KMT military leader Chiang Kai-shek &quotpurged" the KMT of whoever he believed to be communists and other internal opponents, opening the years of "White Terror"

    Until then, it had been quite conceivable to be both a communist and a KMT member. The Soviet Union, frequently skeptical of the CPC’s true red color, had cultivated close links with the KMT until 1927.

    The mid-1920s saw Li busy with developing handgrenades and other kinds of useful explosives. This certainly hadn’t been part of his father’s or grandfather’s aesthetic school curricula, not even remotely.

    At the time, even after the beginning of the White Terror, messenging among CPC cadres and operatives continued to depend on couriers, and wireless communication was an obvious answer to this problem, and it would also provide the chance of realtime communication. Li Qiang was transferred from building bombs to studying wireless technology, although he had never worked on radio issues before. Of course, "studying" wasn’t a campus assignment, but practical work to modernise communications among communists in China. He put his English language skills to use as he read American tech magazines and literature. Under his direction – or with his own hands (the narration isn’t explicit here), the probably first-ever CPC-made receiver saw the light of day in late spring, 1929.

    As he became dangerously exposed by the arrest and defection of a close co-worker, Li Qiang was sent to Moscow, out of reach of the Chiang regime, and continued his studies. He had been supposed to study at Moscow Oriental University, aka the Cominterns "Communist University of the Toilers of the East" where both KMT and communist cadres had been trained, at least until 1927. However, be it for real fear of treason, or be it to sideline a competitive comrade, Li Qiang, for his proximity to a defector, was badmouthed to a degree that he started his studies at a particularly radio-focused Russian school instead. He also changed his name, from Zeng Peihong to Li Qiang, as he has been known since.

    Here for something completely different: Li Qiang working on photography in Russia

    Here, we have the choice between two stories about how the rhombic antenna was invented. Wikipedia, via patents, suggests that it was Bell Telephone Laboratories as an organisation, and Harald T Friis as an inventor, in 1931.

    The other story, quoted from Shanghai’s "Pengpai" news portal, goes like this:

    "Li Qiang is no stranger to people working in the field of antenna research and development," a domestic engineer of communications systems told this paper. "I still remember clearly how, during our third year of antenna theory studies, our lecturer, while explaining the rhombic antenna, proudly told us that this antenna had been invented by Li Qiang, our country’s minister of foreign trade, during his young years in the Soviet Union. We also visited the rhombic antenna invented by Li Qiang, on the ground in Qian County, Shaanxi Province.

    Obviously, Li Qiang may have "invented" the rhombic antenna without filing a patent, but chances are that a desire to flatter a party elder, and the nation, was the main driver of this little story. Irreverence towards tradition, as practiced by young Li, had long become a thing of the past: revolutionary history was something to be cherished at all costs.

    For sure, Li Qiang rose to the position of deputy foreign trade minister in 1952, and to Minister of Foreign Trade in 1973. So 1952 marked the third time that he had to learn the ropes of a new trade. He retired in 1981, and died on September 29, 1996.

    When Li Qiang is mentioned in the context of radio, one should not think of broadcasting, but rather of high-frequency telecommunications. Communist broadcasting in China is another story, and it most probably begins on December 30, 1940, from the village of Wangpiwan, about 19 kilometers northwest of the revolutionary Yan’an base.

    But both telecoms and broadcasting, and frequencies as resources, are significant in China. Propaganda keeps the public aware of their importance, not least for current technological developments. Obvsiously, communication, besides guns and grenades, matters as a means of persuasion.
     

    #China #Russia #shortwave #technology #telecommunication #USSR

  31. Vous pensiez que les français n’avaient rien de croustillant à raconter côté numérique ? Détrompez-vous. Ils avaient le Minitel, l’ancêtre d’Internet, avec son lot de services pratiques… et ses messageries roses qui faisaient tourner les factures (et les têtes). Le Minitel mérite bien qu’on lui rende hommage avec un sourire en coin.

    #internet #histoire #france #Minitel #telecom #télécommunication #phone #europe #canada #news #computer #terminal #history

    mesplaisirs.com/minitel-la-pet

  32. #voice #telecommunication #media #MassSurveillance

    TelCo companies, the media, and big tech have made a pact with the devil:

    In hell, all recordings of your voice will be played back to you, on loop.

  33. #voice #telecommunication #media #hell

    Beware when leaving a voice message or when someone wants to record you:

    All voice recordings go straight to hell.