#smishing — Public Fediverse posts

Stolen phones - and specifically iPhones - have robust anti-theft protections. They are worthless once they're flagged - locked to their owner. So why are millions still being stolen every year?
In this paper, we uncover a thriving underground marketplace focused on unlocking stolen phones. It is powered by:

Lookalike domains impersonating Apple, Xiaomi, Samsung and other brands
Smishing campaigns targeting device owners
Pay‑as‑you‑go “unlocking” tools sold on Telegram
By pivoting on DNS data, we identified 10,000+ malicious domains and a growing ecosystem turning locked devices into profit at scale.

👉 Read how this supply chain works—from theft to resale—and why it’s growing fast. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/lookalike-domains-expose-the-iphone-theft-economy/

#ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #Phishing #MobileSecurity #iOS #Smishing #dns #threatintelligence #cybercrime #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime  #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel

Stolen phones - and specifically iPhones - have robust anti-theft protections. They are worthless once they're flagged - locked to their owner. So why are millions still being stolen every year?
In this paper, we uncover a thriving underground marketplace focused on unlocking stolen phones. It is powered by:

Lookalike domains impersonating Apple, Xiaomi, Samsung and other brands
Smishing campaigns targeting device owners
Pay‑as‑you‑go “unlocking” tools sold on Telegram
By pivoting on DNS data, we identified 10,000+ malicious domains and a growing ecosystem turning locked devices into profit at scale.

👉 Read how this supply chain works—from theft to resale—and why it’s growing fast. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/lookalike-domains-expose-the-iphone-theft-economy/

#ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #Phishing #MobileSecurity #iOS #Smishing #dns #threatintelligence #cybercrime #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime  #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel

Stolen phones - and specifically iPhones - have robust anti-theft protections. They are worthless once they're flagged - locked to their owner. So why are millions still being stolen every year?
In this paper, we uncover a thriving underground marketplace focused on unlocking stolen phones. It is powered by:

Lookalike domains impersonating Apple, Xiaomi, Samsung and other brands
Smishing campaigns targeting device owners
Pay‑as‑you‑go “unlocking” tools sold on Telegram
By pivoting on DNS data, we identified 10,000+ malicious domains and a growing ecosystem turning locked devices into profit at scale.

👉 Read how this supply chain works—from theft to resale—and why it’s growing fast. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/lookalike-domains-expose-the-iphone-theft-economy/

#ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #Phishing #MobileSecurity #iOS #Smishing #dns #threatintelligence #cybercrime #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime  #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel

Stolen phones - and specifically iPhones - have robust anti-theft protections. They are worthless once they're flagged - locked to their owner. So why are millions still being stolen every year?
In this paper, we uncover a thriving underground marketplace focused on unlocking stolen phones. It is powered by:

Lookalike domains impersonating Apple, Xiaomi, Samsung and other brands
Smishing campaigns targeting device owners
Pay‑as‑you‑go “unlocking” tools sold on Telegram
By pivoting on DNS data, we identified 10,000+ malicious domains and a growing ecosystem turning locked devices into profit at scale.

👉 Read how this supply chain works—from theft to resale—and why it’s growing fast. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/lookalike-domains-expose-the-iphone-theft-economy/

#ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #Phishing #MobileSecurity #iOS #Smishing #dns #threatintelligence #cybercrime #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime  #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel

Stolen phones - and specifically iPhones - have robust anti-theft protections. They are worthless once they're flagged - locked to their owner. So why are millions still being stolen every year?
In this paper, we uncover a thriving underground marketplace focused on unlocking stolen phones. It is powered by:

Lookalike domains impersonating Apple, Xiaomi, Samsung and other brands
Smishing campaigns targeting device owners
Pay‑as‑you‑go “unlocking” tools sold on Telegram
By pivoting on DNS data, we identified 10,000+ malicious domains and a growing ecosystem turning locked devices into profit at scale.

👉 Read how this supply chain works—from theft to resale—and why it’s growing fast. https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/lookalike-domains-expose-the-iphone-theft-economy/

#ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #Phishing #MobileSecurity #iOS #Smishing #dns #threatintelligence #cybercrime #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime  #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel

Mi è arrivato un sms truffa molto pericoloso, segnato come Nexi diceva hai chiesto autorizzazione a pagamento di 2500€ se non sei tu contatta questo numero...Ho visto i veri sms nexi erano diversi poi controllando online ho letto di questo tipo di truffa che fa presa sull'immediato bisogno di evitare una truffa contattando questo numero
#smishing

Industrialized Smishing Infrastructure Targeting the UAE and Singapore Transportation, Government, and Logistics Sectors

Pulse ID: 6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Author: Tr1sa111
Created: 2026-05-12 07:39:35

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CyberSecurity #Government #ICS #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Singapore #Smishing #UAE #bot #Tr1sa111

Industrialized Smishing Infrastructure Targeting the UAE and Singapore Transportation, Government, and Logistics Sectors

Pulse ID: 6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Author: Tr1sa111
Created: 2026-05-12 07:39:35

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CyberSecurity #Government #ICS #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Singapore #Smishing #UAE #bot #Tr1sa111

Industrialized Smishing Infrastructure Targeting the UAE and Singapore Transportation, Government, and Logistics Sectors

Pulse ID: 6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Author: Tr1sa111
Created: 2026-05-12 07:39:35

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CyberSecurity #Government #ICS #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Singapore #Smishing #UAE #bot #Tr1sa111

Industrialized Smishing Infrastructure Targeting the UAE and Singapore Transportation, Government, and Logistics Sectors

Pulse ID: 6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Author: Tr1sa111
Created: 2026-05-12 07:39:35

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CyberSecurity #Government #ICS #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Singapore #Smishing #UAE #bot #Tr1sa111

Industrialized Smishing Infrastructure Targeting the UAE and Singapore Transportation, Government, and Logistics Sectors

Pulse ID: 6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a02d9378d3d4adc39e13360
Pulse Author: Tr1sa111
Created: 2026-05-12 07:39:35

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CyberSecurity #Government #ICS #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Singapore #Smishing #UAE #bot #Tr1sa111

Truffe via SMS che simulano celle 2G false: i criminali replicano una torre GSM per intercettare messaggi e iniettare phishing direttamente nel telefono. È affascinante — nel senso più inquietante del termine — quanto il legacy wireless possa ancora essere sfruttato così. La superficie d'attacco non scompare, si nasconde. #infosec #smishing #2G
https://www.tuttoandroid.net/news/2026/05/08/sms-blaster-phishing-sms-reti-2g-come-proteggersi-1152769/

“the message appears to come from institutions, victims are more likely to trust it and tap the link sent to their phones… the targets are then routed to a website designed to steal their credentials or make them pay fraudulent charges. This is called #smishing, and the SMS blaster enables attackers to reach tens of thousands of potential victims directly, without going through official networks… bypass protections put in place by #telecom providers”

#cybersecurity

https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/sms-blasters-were-cruising-canadian-streets-stealing-cellphone-data-and-blocking-emergency-911-calls-project-lighthouse-infiltrated-tens-of-thousands-of-devices-and-caused-13-million-network-disruptions

Phoenix Rising: Exposing the PhaaS Kit Behind Global Mass Phishing Campaigns

Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...

Pulse ID: 69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1fa3e73a0897558593b04
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-29 12:31:58

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Bank #CyberSecurity #ICS #InfoSec #Mimic #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #SMS #Smishing #Telecom #Telecommunication #Telegram #bot #AlienVault

Large Scale Smishing & Credential Harvesting Campaign using Phoenix PhaaS

Phishing as a Service platform called Phoenix provides ready made tools and infrastructure which enables large scale smishing campaigns.

Pulse ID: 69f64e5ad6a8f740297614e5
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f64e5ad6a8f740297614e5
Pulse Author: cryptocti
Created: 2026-05-02 19:19:54

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CredentialHarvesting #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #Smishing #bot #cryptocti

Hackback? 😏

#smishing #phishing #hacker #hackback

Hackback? 😏

#smishing #phishing #hacker #hackback

Show 4: The Digital Con Artist. Phishing today isn’t about hacking your computer it’s about hacking you. In this episode of The Geek and The Detective, Amy Lynn and Detective Derrick Stevens break down how scammers use fake profiles, urgent messages... #TheGeekAndTheDetective #Vishing #Smishing #MFA #CyberCrime #StaySafeOnline #TechSecurity #DigitalPrivacy #CyberAwareness https://www.amylynn.org/thegeekandthedetective

Is Your Bank Really Texting You? 3 Red Flags of a Phishing Message.

2,483 words, 13 minutes read time.

The Psychological Architecture of the Smishing Epidemic

The mobile phone is the most intimate piece of hardware in the modern world, a device that lives in our pockets and demands our immediate attention with every haptic buzz and notification chime. This proximity creates a dangerous psychological feedback loop where the user is conditioned to respond to SMS messages with a level of trust that they would never afford an unsolicited email. While email has decades of junk mail filters and visible header data to warn us of danger, the SMS interface is deceptively clean and stripped of context. When a text arrives claiming to be from a major financial institution, it enters a high-trust environment where the barrier between a legitimate service alert and a criminally organized credential harvest is virtually non-existent. Analyzing the current threat landscape, it is clear that the surge in smishing is not merely a technical failure of our telecommunications infrastructure, but a masterful exploitation of human neurobiology. Attackers understand that by bypassing the corporate firewall and landing directly on a victim’s personal device, they are catching the user in a state of cognitive vulnerability, often while they are distracted, tired, or multi-tasking.

The sheer volume of these attacks indicates a shift toward the industrialization of mobile deception. According to recent data, bank impersonation via text message has skyrocketed to become one of the most reported scams, primarily because the return on investment is staggering compared to traditional phishing. It costs almost nothing for an adversary to blast out thousands of messages using automated scripts and cheap gateway services, yet the potential payoff is total access to a victim’s financial life. This is not a hobbyist’s game; it is a highly refined business model that relies on the trusted screen effect. We have been trained to view our phone numbers as a secure second factor for authentication, which ironically makes us more susceptible to the very messages that seek to undermine that security. Consequently, the first step in defending against these attacks is to dismantle the inherent trust we place in the SMS protocol, recognizing that the medium itself is fundamentally insecure and easily manipulated by anyone with a malicious intent and a basic understanding of social engineering.

Red Flag #1: The False Sense of Urgency and Emotional Manipulation

The most potent weapon in a smisher’s arsenal is not a sophisticated zero-day exploit, but the manufactured crisis. Every successful bank-themed phishing message is designed to trigger a physiological response that prioritizes immediate action over rational analysis. When you receive a text stating that your account has been suspended due to suspicious activity or that a large transfer is pending your approval, the attacker is forcing you into a high-stakes decision window. They know that a panicked user is unlikely to look for the subtle technical flaws in the message because their primary focus is on resolving the perceived threat to their financial stability. This artificial urgency is a deliberate tactic to bypass the critical thinking filters that would otherwise identify the message as fraudulent. In the world of social engineering, time is the enemy of the victim and the best friend of the predator. By imposing a deadline, the adversary effectively shuts down the user’s ability to verify the claim through official channels.

Furthermore, these messages often utilize a push-pull dynamic of fear and relief. The initial fear of a compromised account is immediately followed by the perceived relief of a simple solution provided in the form of a link. This emotional roller coaster is a hallmark of sophisticated phishing kits where the goal is to drive the victim toward a pre-built landing page that mimics the bank’s actual login portal. I see this pattern repeated across thousands of observed samples: the language is always direct, the consequence is always severe, and the solution is always a single click away. Professionals must understand that a legitimate financial institution will never use a medium as volatile and insecure as SMS to demand immediate, high-stakes action involving sensitive credentials. If a message makes your heart rate spike before you’ve even finished reading the first sentence, that is not a customer service alert; it is a psychological exploit in progress. The grit of the situation is that these attackers are betting on your human instinct to protect what is yours, and they are winning because our biological hardware hasn’t evolved as fast as their social engineering software.

Red Flag #2: Deconstructing the Malicious URL and Domain Spoofing

The technical linchpin of a bank impersonation scam is the hyperlink, a digital trapdoor designed to look like a bridge to safety. In a legitimate banking environment, URLs are predictable, branded, and hosted on top-level domains that the institution has spent millions of dollars securing. However, attackers rely on the fact that the average mobile user rarely inspects the full string of a URL on a five-inch screen. To obscure their intent, they leverage URL shorteners or link-in-bio services that strip away the destination’s identity, replacing a recognizable bank domain with a sanitized, high-trust string of characters. When you see a link that begins with a generic shortening service, you are looking at a deliberate attempt to hide a malicious redirection chain. This infrastructure is often backed by sophisticated Phishing-as-a-Service platforms which generate unique, one-time-use links for every target. This makes it significantly harder for automated security filters to flag the domain as malicious because the URL effectively dies after it has been clicked by the intended victim, leaving no trail for threat researchers to follow in real-time.

Beyond simple shortening, more advanced adversaries utilize typosquatting or punycode attacks to create a visual illusion of legitimacy. They might register a domain that replaces a lowercase letter with a similarly shaped number, or they use international character sets that look identical to the English alphabet but lead to an entirely different server in a jurisdiction where law enforcement is non-existent. These spoofed domains are often hosted on legitimate cloud infrastructure, which allows them to bypass reputation-based filters that only look for bad neighborhoods on the internet. Once you click that link, you aren’t just visiting a website; you are entering a controlled environment where every pixel has been engineered to mirror your bank’s actual interface. The gritty reality is that by the time you realize the URL in the address bar is off by a single character, your keystrokes have already been captured by a headless browser or an Adversary-in-the-Middle proxy. Analyzing these landing pages reveals a level of craft that includes working help links and legitimate-looking privacy policies, all designed to keep you in the trust zone just long enough to hand over your credentials.

Red Flag #3: Inconsistencies in Delivery Architecture and Metadata

If you want to spot a fraudster, you have to look at the plumbing of the message itself. Legitimate financial institutions invest heavily in Short Code registries—those five or six-digit numbers that are strictly regulated and vetted by telecommunications carriers. When a bank sends an automated alert, it almost always originates from one of these verified short codes because they allow for high-throughput, reliable delivery that is difficult for scammers to spoof at scale. In contrast, most smishing attacks originate from standard ten-digit Long Codes or, increasingly, from email addresses masquerading as phone numbers via the SMS gateway. If a message claiming to be from a multi-billion dollar global bank arrives from a random area code in a different state or a Gmail address, the architecture of the delivery is screaming that it is a fraud. These long codes are essentially burner numbers, bought in bulk through VoIP providers or generated via automated botnets of compromised mobile devices. The disconnect between the supposed sender and the technical origin of the message is a massive red flag that is hiding in plain sight.

Furthermore, the metadata and lack of personalization provide critical clues to the message’s illegitimacy. A real bank notification is tied to a specific account and a specific customer profile; it will often include a partial account number or use a specific format that matches previous interactions you have had with that institution. Smishing messages, however, are designed for the spray and pray method. They use generic salutations like “Dear Customer” or “Valued Member” because the attacker doesn’t actually know who you are; they only know that your phone number was part of a massive data leak from a social media breach or a compromised e-commerce database. These messages are sent to thousands of people simultaneously, betting on the statistical probability that a certain percentage will actually have an account with the bank being impersonated. This lack of specificity is a hallmark of industrial-scale social engineering. When you receive a text that feels like a form letter with an artificial sense of emergency, it is a clear sign that you are being targeted by an automated script rather than a legitimate service department. The absence of your name or specific account details isn’t just a lapse in customer service; it is a fundamental technical indicator of a malicious campaign.

The Failure of Traditional MFA against Modern Smishing

The most dangerous misconception in modern personal security is the belief that Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) via SMS is an impenetrable shield. While having any MFA is better than none, the grit of the current threat landscape is that smishing has evolved to bypass these secondary layers with ease. Modern phishing kits are no longer static pages that just steal a password; they are dynamic proxies that facilitate Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks. When a victim enters their credentials into a fraudulent bank portal, the attacker’s server passes those credentials to the real bank’s login page in real-time. The bank then sends a legitimate MFA code to the victim’s phone. The victim, thinking they are on the real site, enters that code into the attacker’s portal. The attacker then intercepts that code and uses it to complete the login on the real site, effectively hijacking the session. Within seconds, the adversary has bypassed the very security measure designed to stop them, proving that SMS-based codes are a liability in a world of proxied attacks.

This technical reality necessitates a shift toward more robust authentication standards. Analyzing the successful breaches of the last few years, it is evident that the only reliable defense against smishing-induced MFA bypass is the implementation of hardware-backed security keys or FIDO2/WebAuthn standards. These methods use public-key cryptography to ensure that the authentication attempt is tied to the specific, legitimate domain of the service provider. If an attacker directs a victim to a spoofed domain, the security key will simply refuse to authenticate because the domain signature doesn’t match. Consequently, relying on “text-to-verify” is essentially building a house of cards in a hurricane. We must move toward a zero-trust model for mobile interactions where no incoming text message is considered valid until it is verified through a separate, trusted out-of-band channel, such as calling the official number on the back of your physical debit card or using the bank’s official, sandboxed mobile application.

Hardening the Human and Technical Perimeter

Defeating the smishing threat requires more than just a sharp eye for typos; it requires a fundamental change in how we interact with our mobile devices. The first line of defense is a technical one: treat every unsolicited message as a potential payload. This means never clicking a link in an SMS, regardless of how legitimate it looks or how much pressure the message applies. Instead, the standard operating procedure should be to close the messaging app and navigate directly to the bank’s official website by typing the address into the browser yourself, or by opening the official app. This simple act of “breaking the chain” completely neutralizes the attacker’s redirection infrastructure. Furthermore, users should take advantage of mobile threat defense (MTD) tools and carrier-level spam reporting features. By forwarding suspicious messages to the “7726” (SPAM) short code used by most major carriers, you are contributing to a global database that helps telecommunications providers block these malicious origin points before they reach the next victim.

Ultimately, we have to accept that the SMS protocol was never designed with security in mind; it was designed for convenience. In a professional context, this means that organizations must stop using SMS for sensitive customer communications and move toward encrypted, authenticated in-app messaging. For the individual, it means adopting a mindset of aggressive skepticism. If your bank really needs to reach you, they will use a secure channel or a verified notification system that doesn’t rely on a fragile, easily spoofed text message. The gritty truth is that as long as people keep clicking, criminals will keep texting. By identifying these red flags—the manufactured urgency, the mangled URLs,

Call to Action

The digital battlefield is no longer confined to server rooms and encrypted tunnels; it is in the palm of your hand, vibrating in your pocket every time a predator decides to test your defenses. You can no longer afford to treat an SMS as a “simple text.” In an era where organized crime syndicates use automated botnets to exploit human fear, your only real firewall is a shift in mindset. You have the technical red flags—the artificial urgency, the mangled URLs, and the broken delivery architecture. Now, you have to use them.

Don’t wait until your balance hits zero to start taking mobile security seriously. Audit your accounts today. If you’re still relying on SMS-based two-factor authentication for your primary banking, you are leaving the door unlocked for any adversary with a proxy kit. Switch to a hardware-backed security key or an authenticator app immediately. The next time you receive a “critical alert” from your bank, don’t click. Don’t reply. Delete the message, open your browser, and go to the source yourself. The criminals are betting that you’ll be too distracted to notice the trap; prove them wrong by staying relentlessly skeptical. Your data is your responsibility—defend it like it.

D. Bryan King

Sources

• Verizon 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)
• CISA: Identifying and Mitigating SMS Phishing (Smishing)
• NIST: Behavioral Science and Cybersecurity Phishing Research
• MITRE: Strategies for Stopping Phishing Attacks
• Krebs on Security: The Era of Easy Smishing
• FCC: New Rules on Combating Illegal Robotexts and Smishing
• MITRE ATT&CK: Phishing: Forging Communications (SMS)
• Proofpoint: The Smishing Landscape and Mobile Threat Trends
• Zscaler: The Rise of Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS)
• Microsoft Security: Evolving Trends in Smishing
• FTC: Reports of Phishing Texts Top All Other Impersonation Scams
• Scamwatch: Deep Dive into Bank Impersonation Tactics
• ENISA Threat Landscape: Social Engineering and Phishing Trends

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are solely those of the author. The information provided is based on personal research, experience, and understanding of the subject matter at the time of writing. Readers should consult relevant experts or authorities for specific guidance related to their unique situations.

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That "failed delivery" text isn't a mistake—it's a precision-engineered strike on your bank account. Stop playing guessing games with your mobile security and learn how the $5,000 package scam actually works. 📦🛡️

#CyberSecurity #Smishing #DigitalDefense

https://bdking71.wordpress.com/2026/04/14/the-5000-text-how-to-spot-a-package-delivery-scam-before-you-click/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

Gefälschte Paket-SMS: Wie ein Betrugs-Netzwerk in China Schutz findet

Hunderttausende Opfer gefälschter Paket-SMS gibt es weltweit. Der Schaden geht womöglich in die Milliarden. Recherchen des BR und internationaler Medien belegen: Die Betrüger agieren aus China - und die Volksrepublik lässt sie offenbar gewähren.

➡️ https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/br-recherche/smishing-china-100.html?at_medium=mastodon&at_campaign=tagesschau.de

#Smishing #SMS #Paket #China

SMS della finta richiesta di autorizzazione di pagamento da parte di NEXI

Molto raramente ricevo #sms di #truffa #smishing , stamattina è capitato di ricevere questo tipo di messaggio sms da parte di #nexi , che per me ad oggi era sconosciuta 😂

SMS

NEXI:
E' stata richiesta un autorizzazione di pagamento da €1400,00. Se non sei stato tu contatta il servizio clienti +393452249071

Ovviamente è una truffa , poi.. un azienda non inserisce un numero di cellulare come servizio clienti.

SMS della finta richiesta di autorizzazione di pagamento da parte di NEXI

Molto raramente ricevo #sms di #truffa #smishing , stamattina è capitato di ricevere questo tipo di messaggio sms da parte di #nexi , che per me ad oggi era sconosciuta 😂

SMS

NEXI:
E' stata richiesta un autorizzazione di pagamento da €1400,00. Se non sei stato tu contatta il servizio clienti +393452249071

Ovviamente è una truffa , poi.. un azienda non inserisce un numero di cellulare come servizio clienti.

SMS della finta richiesta di autorizzazione di pagamento da parte di NEXI

Molto raramente ricevo #sms di #truffa #smishing , stamattina è capitato di ricevere questo tipo di messaggio sms da parte di #nexi , che per me ad oggi era sconosciuta 😂

SMS

NEXI:
E' stata richiesta un autorizzazione di pagamento da €1400,00. Se non sei stato tu contatta il servizio clienti +393452249071

Ovviamente è una truffa , poi.. un azienda non inserisce un numero di cellulare come servizio clienti.

📱Smishing Slows, Quishing Quickens 🎣

Sick of smishing and those pesky parking/toll texts? Don’t get caught by crafty, counterfeit court QR codes — it’s a scan-and-scam! 💳 🚨

North American cell phone users are being hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns that now include quishing elements. Likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors, this latest campaign builds on previous vehicular violations, evolving tactics while impersonating US courts. 🧑‍⚖️

We’ve recently seen a flurry of SMS messages pushing parking violations — but with a twist: face justice in court… or scan and pay instead!

Delivered as an official-looking image, the actor has begun integrating QR codes into these lures to help mask suspicious phishing URLs, baiting victims into entering personal information, credentials, and ultimately making payments.

For some, this lure may sound better than facing justice for their perceived poor parking. Victims who don't comply are warned that failure to appear or pay could have serious repercussions - a scare tactic designed to push you toward a hasty decision and scanning the QR code! 🫣

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains, through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and local government impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ ahfgx[.]icu
⛔ euoyq[.]icu
⛔ htpze[.]icu
⛔ mwlaj[.]icu

Friendly reminder - courts don't usually communicate with you via text. That said, we suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving tradecraft used in smishing and quishing delivery. As for us, we'll take our chances on evading that bench warrant and running from the law. 🏃‍♂️‍➡️

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #smishing #quishing

📱Smishing Slows, Quishing Quickens 🎣

Sick of smishing and those pesky parking/toll texts? Don’t get caught by crafty, counterfeit court QR codes — it’s a scan-and-scam! 💳 🚨

North American cell phone users are being hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns that now include quishing elements. Likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors, this latest campaign builds on previous vehicular violations, evolving tactics while impersonating US courts. 🧑‍⚖️

We’ve recently seen a flurry of SMS messages pushing parking violations — but with a twist: face justice in court… or scan and pay instead!

Delivered as an official-looking image, the actor has begun integrating QR codes into these lures to help mask suspicious phishing URLs, baiting victims into entering personal information, credentials, and ultimately making payments.

For some, this lure may sound better than facing justice for their perceived poor parking. Victims who don't comply are warned that failure to appear or pay could have serious repercussions - a scare tactic designed to push you toward a hasty decision and scanning the QR code! 🫣

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains, through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and local government impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ ahfgx[.]icu
⛔ euoyq[.]icu
⛔ htpze[.]icu
⛔ mwlaj[.]icu

Friendly reminder - courts don't usually communicate with you via text. That said, we suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving tradecraft used in smishing and quishing delivery. As for us, we'll take our chances on evading that bench warrant and running from the law. 🏃‍♂️‍➡️

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #smishing #quishing

📱Smishing Slows, Quishing Quickens 🎣

Sick of smishing and those pesky parking/toll texts? Don’t get caught by crafty, counterfeit court QR codes — it’s a scan-and-scam! 💳 🚨

North American cell phone users are being hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns that now include quishing elements. Likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors, this latest campaign builds on previous vehicular violations, evolving tactics while impersonating US courts. 🧑‍⚖️

We’ve recently seen a flurry of SMS messages pushing parking violations — but with a twist: face justice in court… or scan and pay instead!

Delivered as an official-looking image, the actor has begun integrating QR codes into these lures to help mask suspicious phishing URLs, baiting victims into entering personal information, credentials, and ultimately making payments.

For some, this lure may sound better than facing justice for their perceived poor parking. Victims who don't comply are warned that failure to appear or pay could have serious repercussions - a scare tactic designed to push you toward a hasty decision and scanning the QR code! 🫣

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains, through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and local government impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ ahfgx[.]icu
⛔ euoyq[.]icu
⛔ htpze[.]icu
⛔ mwlaj[.]icu

Friendly reminder - courts don't usually communicate with you via text. That said, we suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving tradecraft used in smishing and quishing delivery. As for us, we'll take our chances on evading that bench warrant and running from the law. 🏃‍♂️‍➡️

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #smishing #quishing

📱Smishing Slows, Quishing Quickens 🎣

Sick of smishing and those pesky parking/toll texts? Don’t get caught by crafty, counterfeit court QR codes — it’s a scan-and-scam! 💳 🚨

North American cell phone users are being hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns that now include quishing elements. Likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors, this latest campaign builds on previous vehicular violations, evolving tactics while impersonating US courts. 🧑‍⚖️

We’ve recently seen a flurry of SMS messages pushing parking violations — but with a twist: face justice in court… or scan and pay instead!

Delivered as an official-looking image, the actor has begun integrating QR codes into these lures to help mask suspicious phishing URLs, baiting victims into entering personal information, credentials, and ultimately making payments.

For some, this lure may sound better than facing justice for their perceived poor parking. Victims who don't comply are warned that failure to appear or pay could have serious repercussions - a scare tactic designed to push you toward a hasty decision and scanning the QR code! 🫣

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains, through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and local government impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ ahfgx[.]icu
⛔ euoyq[.]icu
⛔ htpze[.]icu
⛔ mwlaj[.]icu

Friendly reminder - courts don't usually communicate with you via text. That said, we suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving tradecraft used in smishing and quishing delivery. As for us, we'll take our chances on evading that bench warrant and running from the law. 🏃‍♂️‍➡️

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #smishing #quishing

📱Smishing Slows, Quishing Quickens 🎣

Sick of smishing and those pesky parking/toll texts? Don’t get caught by crafty, counterfeit court QR codes — it’s a scan-and-scam! 💳 🚨

North American cell phone users are being hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns that now include quishing elements. Likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors, this latest campaign builds on previous vehicular violations, evolving tactics while impersonating US courts. 🧑‍⚖️

We’ve recently seen a flurry of SMS messages pushing parking violations — but with a twist: face justice in court… or scan and pay instead!

Delivered as an official-looking image, the actor has begun integrating QR codes into these lures to help mask suspicious phishing URLs, baiting victims into entering personal information, credentials, and ultimately making payments.

For some, this lure may sound better than facing justice for their perceived poor parking. Victims who don't comply are warned that failure to appear or pay could have serious repercussions - a scare tactic designed to push you toward a hasty decision and scanning the QR code! 🫣

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains, through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and local government impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ ahfgx[.]icu
⛔ euoyq[.]icu
⛔ htpze[.]icu
⛔ mwlaj[.]icu

Friendly reminder - courts don't usually communicate with you via text. That said, we suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving tradecraft used in smishing and quishing delivery. As for us, we'll take our chances on evading that bench warrant and running from the law. 🏃‍♂️‍➡️

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #smishing #quishing

#mwgic #2026 #Smishing #CyberSecurity

https://www.androidauthority.com/google-messages-sms-blaster-protection-apk-teardown-3647907/

#Smishing ➡️ El SMS con el que no te quieres encontrar ➡️ Los #Ciberataques empiezan con un clic en el lugar equivocado. ¿Qué debemos hacer para protegernos?

#Ciberseguridad #Seguridad #Privacidad 🔏

Fate attenzione!
È in corso una #truffa via SMS #smishing che sfrutta il nome Nexi (ma anche altre agenzie) per esfiltrare dati bancari.

Messaggi allarmanti segnalano falsi pagamenti, invitando a cliccare su link o richiamare numeri per bloccare i (finti) pagamenti notificati. Nella interazione si finisce su pagine di #phishing o a parlare con truffatori che chiedono codici OTP e credenziali.

Non cliccate su niente, non richiamate nessuno, cancellate e bloccate!

Fate attenzione!
È in corso una #truffa via SMS #smishing che sfrutta il nome Nexi (ma anche altre agenzie) per esfiltrare dati bancari.

Messaggi allarmanti segnalano falsi pagamenti, invitando a cliccare su link o richiamare numeri per bloccare i (finti) pagamenti notificati. Nella interazione si finisce su pagine di #phishing o a parlare con truffatori che chiedono codici OTP e credenziali.

Non cliccate su niente, non richiamate nessuno, cancellate e bloccate!

Fate attenzione!
È in corso una #truffa via SMS #smishing che sfrutta il nome Nexi (ma anche altre agenzie) per esfiltrare dati bancari.

Messaggi allarmanti segnalano falsi pagamenti, invitando a cliccare su link o richiamare numeri per bloccare i (finti) pagamenti notificati. Nella interazione si finisce su pagine di #phishing o a parlare con truffatori che chiedono codici OTP e credenziali.

Non cliccate su niente, non richiamate nessuno, cancellate e bloccate!

Fate attenzione!
È in corso una #truffa via SMS #smishing che sfrutta il nome Nexi (ma anche altre agenzie) per esfiltrare dati bancari.

Messaggi allarmanti segnalano falsi pagamenti, invitando a cliccare su link o richiamare numeri per bloccare i (finti) pagamenti notificati. Nella interazione si finisce su pagine di #phishing o a parlare con truffatori che chiedono codici OTP e credenziali.

Non cliccate su niente, non richiamate nessuno, cancellate e bloccate!

⚠️ Smishing alert for Greek citizens. 💳 🚨

Scammers are pushing fake AADE (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) “unpaid taxes” SMS that lead to cloned payment pages designed to steal credit‑card info. If a text suddenly demands urgent payment, treat it like a pop‑up from nowhere—don’t click, don’t trust, don’t pay. Share to protect others.

mycargr[.]com
aadcar[.]com
aadgee[.]com
aadgre[.]com

#CyberThreatIntel #Infoblox #DNS #ThreatResearch #phishing #smishing #Cybercrime #AADE #Greece

⚠️ Smishing alert for Greek citizens. 💳 🚨

Scammers are pushing fake AADE (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) “unpaid taxes” SMS that lead to cloned payment pages designed to steal credit‑card info. If a text suddenly demands urgent payment, treat it like a pop‑up from nowhere—don’t click, don’t trust, don’t pay. Share to protect others.

mycargr[.]com
aadcar[.]com
aadgee[.]com
aadgre[.]com

#CyberThreatIntel #Infoblox #DNS #ThreatResearch #phishing #smishing #Cybercrime #AADE #Greece

⚠️ Smishing alert for Greek citizens. 💳 🚨

Scammers are pushing fake AADE (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) “unpaid taxes” SMS that lead to cloned payment pages designed to steal credit‑card info. If a text suddenly demands urgent payment, treat it like a pop‑up from nowhere—don’t click, don’t trust, don’t pay. Share to protect others.

mycargr[.]com
aadcar[.]com
aadgee[.]com
aadgre[.]com

#CyberThreatIntel #Infoblox #DNS #ThreatResearch #phishing #smishing #Cybercrime #AADE #Greece

⚠️ Smishing alert for Greek citizens. 💳 🚨

Scammers are pushing fake AADE (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) “unpaid taxes” SMS that lead to cloned payment pages designed to steal credit‑card info. If a text suddenly demands urgent payment, treat it like a pop‑up from nowhere—don’t click, don’t trust, don’t pay. Share to protect others.

mycargr[.]com
aadcar[.]com
aadgee[.]com
aadgre[.]com

#CyberThreatIntel #Infoblox #DNS #ThreatResearch #phishing #smishing #Cybercrime #AADE #Greece

⚠️ Smishing alert for Greek citizens. 💳 🚨

Scammers are pushing fake AADE (Independent Authority for Public Revenue) “unpaid taxes” SMS that lead to cloned payment pages designed to steal credit‑card info. If a text suddenly demands urgent payment, treat it like a pop‑up from nowhere—don’t click, don’t trust, don’t pay. Share to protect others.

mycargr[.]com
aadcar[.]com
aadgee[.]com
aadgre[.]com

#CyberThreatIntel #Infoblox #DNS #ThreatResearch #phishing #smishing #Cybercrime #AADE #Greece

Greek police arrested scammers using a fake cell tower for SMS phishing.

Phones were forced onto insecure 2G networks to harvest data and send bank-themed smishing.

https://www.technadu.com/greek-police-arrest-scammers-in-athens-using-fake-cell-tower-for-sms-phishing-operation/618856/

Thoughts?

#Smishing #MobileSecurity #InfoSec

Smishy New Year: Fake Rewards, Real Scams!

Redeemed those "expiring" cell network reward points and awaiting your shiny new iPad or cash rebate?

⚠️📵 Think again. There's a catch - and your payment card details are on the hook! 🎣 💳

Cell phone users in North America are getting hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns, likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors. This campaign builds on previous toll scams, evolving tactics and expanding targets. Over the holidays and well into the New Year, a barrage of SMS messages have posed as banks and cell phone networks, dangling phishing links to bait customers with fake points and high value rewards about to expire.

Talk about FOMO! 💰🤑

But you already know how this one plays out. Victims are prompted to enter payment details for “verification” or “shipping” and the only ones being rewarded are those taking the payments.

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and brand impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ anzrewardsprogram2026d[.]cc
⛔ <brand>.dvqlp[.]icu
⛔ <brand>.outdz[.]icu
⛔ <brand>.xqufa[.]cc
⛔ <brand>rewards.734726[.]com

We suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving the tradecraft used in smishing delivery. As for us, we'll keep tracking til we get that iPad... 🙈

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #smishing #telecom #china

No me ha tocado la #loteriadenavidad , pero sí un #smishing TÓ guapo de #ING

#ojo #nopiques #phishing #caca

Hey Vicky, you're so fine, you're so fine you blow my mind. #smishing #sms

Olha um novo esquema fraudulento sobre supostos desalfandegamentos de encomendas #CTT, por SMS.

Mais alguém recebeu?

#smishing #phishing

Olha um novo esquema fraudulento sobre supostos desalfandegamentos de encomendas #CTT, por SMS.

Mais alguém recebeu?

#smishing #phishing

Just another day and another smishing.

#Scam #Smishing

Coupang CEO Resigns After Massive Data Breach Exposes Millions of Users https://thecyberexpress.com/coupang-ceo-resigns-amid-data-leak/ #SouthKoreaCybersecurity #TheCyberExpressNews #CoupangCEOResigns #Coupangdatabreach #TheCyberExpress #FirewallDaily #BusinessNews #CoupangInc #CyberNews #Features #Phishing #smishing

Krebs On Security: SMS Phishers Pivot to Points, Taxes, Fake Retailers. “Over the past week, thousands of domain names were registered for scam websites that purport to offer T-Mobile customers the opportunity to claim a large number of rewards points. The phishing domains are being promoted by scam messages sent via Apple’s iMessage service or the functionally equivalent RCS messaging […]

https://rbfirehose.com/2025/12/08/krebs-on-security-sms-phishers-pivot-to-points-taxes-fake-retailers/

Links to a fresh set of "road toll" scam websites were pushed out by SMS today, targeting people with mobile phones in #Colorado area codes. The messages tell the recipient that they owe back tolls for driving on a highway in Colorado and purports to link to the Colorado DMV website. The page that loads accurately mimics the Colorado Department of Revenue website appearance, and claims you owe $6.69 in tolls. Needless to say, this is fake. Spread the word: Tolls are not collected directly via SMS message.

This is a continuation of an ongoing, Russia-originated campaign that has been targeting specific states and regions for the past year. I blogged about it in October for @Netcraft - we gave the threat actor the moniker Logger EIO. https://www.netcraft.com/blog/taxpayers-drivers-targeted-in-refund-and-road-toll-smishing-scams

#smishing #phishing #colorado #CODOR #CODMV #DMV #scam #fraud #roadtoll #tollroad #tollscam #LoggerEIO