#infobloxthreatintel — Public Fediverse posts

Solicitar senha. Solicitar token. Token inválido. Aguardar.

That's the full operator menu for VX-Pack — a Brazilian-origin AiTM phishing-as-a-service kit targeting banks in Brazil and Portugal. Request password. Request token. Invalid token (ask again). Wait. One operator, one victim, one browser, in real time.

Nearly every AiTM kit — Evilginx, Tycoon 2FA, EvilProxy — is a reverse proxy. It silently relays traffic to the real bank, grabs the session cookie, and that's your 2FA bypass. VX-Pack is a different animal: a replica site, not a relay. The operator watches the victim fill each field over a WebSocket connection, replays the credentials against the real bank themselves, and if the OTP expires mid-attempt — tokeninvalido — the kit asks the victim for another one.

No session cookie theft. No relay fingerprint at the bank. The bank's anti-proxy controls see traffic from the operator's own machine. "It passed the bank's fraud detection" is not the assurance it sounds like.

Active since at least January 2025, sold as PhaaS by one developer to multiple buyers running their own campaigns. Impersonates Banco Santander and more than ten other financial institutions and payment platforms across Brazil and Portugal.

Screenshots below show one of the phishing pages impersonating Banco Santander, as well as screenshots from a walkthrough video recorded by the kit's developer. Victim flow on one side, operator panel on the other.

Phishing domains:
⛔️ pactualapp[.]com
⛔️ pactualpj[.]com
⛔️ pactual[.]live
⛔️ ativarbia[.]net
⛔️ ativarbia[.]com
⛔️ pactualapp[.]live
⛔️ centraldecancelamentos[.]pt
⛔️ verificador-cliente[.]live
⛔️ ativador-login[.]click

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #aitm

💧 🫴 Dropcatching isn't just for domain squatters, it's a goldmine for threat actors looking to hijack established trust. Some registrars make it shockingly easy to snipe high-value domains at auction, even serving up backlink metrics on a silver platter to help buyers find the best targets. A threat actor we track as Sable Squirrel took full advantage of this, spending over 💸 $7 million on dropcaught domains to push malware, run illegal sports streams, and operate a betting ring. That is the highest domain budget we've ever tracked from a single group.

Here's a wild example of what that money buys. In January 2024, they snatched up veinteractive[.]com (previously registered with CSC Digital Brand Services) for $5.7k. It used to belong to a large London-based adtech firm. Sable Squirrel immediately turned it into an ☣️ AsyncRAT C2 and streaming hub. Because of the domain's history, tens of thousands of sites are still reaching out to it, trying to load a legacy tracking script (tag.js) and providing real-time telemetry. If Sable Squirrel was just slightly more creative, they could have easily hosted their malware on that exact URI path and pulled off a massive supply chain attack. And that's just one domain.

We just dropped Part 2 of our series on dropcatching, breaking down Sable Squirrel's entire operation. We're sharing over 10,000 of their domains, including ones that used to belong to the US government, Fortune 100s, and major charities.

Read the full teardown here: https://www.infoblox.com/blog/threat-intelligence/7-million-in-expired-domains-fuel-a-streaming-empire-with-a-malware-secret/

Some Sable Squirrel dropcatch domains:

thebreastcancercharities[.]org
andromda[.]org
d-rev[.]org
churchofreality[.]org
swradioafrica[.]com
americansecuritytoday[.]com
2026worldcupnorthamerica[.]com
poweredbyclear[.]com
fora[.]tv

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #dropcatch #tds #scam #malware #asyncrat #quasarrat #hiddentear #ransomware #rat #vietnam #sportsbetting #gambling #worldcup #streaming #sports #illegal #adtech #backlink

WhatsApp, Japan, and a 500% Traffic Spike! 💹 🚨

To be honest, we thought threat actors were tripping when we saw a new WhatsApp phishing campaign targeting Japanese citizens. Don't they know LINE is the app in Japan? Well, we were surprised because this campaign is actually working…

The campaign doesn't only impersonate WhatsApp through its phishing page, but also through the lookalike domains it uses. Around 2k "WhatsApp" domain name variations are involved. The actor also leverages RDGAs – mostly for subdomains. Domains like web-rka-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn have up to 32 RDGA subdomains!

Upon visiting one of these lookalike domains, the user is fingerprinted and only forwarded to the phishing page if they match the intended profile — otherwise they get redirected to sites like bing[.]com or microsoft[.]com. As we show at the image below (with an AI-translated version), the malicious landing page simulates the WhatsApp login screen and encourages victims to scan a malicious QR code with their phone to log in.

When we found the cluster, we genuinely didn't think this campaign would land in Japan — but we were wrong. In the last 6 months, traffic to these domains has increased more than 500%, and it continues to rise.

What impact would these top quality lookalikes have if the campaigns were directed at countries where WhatsApp is actually the preferred messaging app?

Domain sample:
whatsappweb[.]net
whatapapp[.]com
whatsptapp[.]com
leropaxi-whatsapp[.]com[.]cn

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Quishing #WhatsApp #LINE #Japan #脅威情報 #フィッシング詐欺 #QRコード詐欺 #DNSセキュリティ #Infoblox脅威情報 #WhatsApp #LINEセキュリティ #日本 #サイバーセキュリティ

Trust this “Amazon” phishing email in Japan—and you’re Prime sashimi 🎣 🍣

Looking into our malspam data, we identified an active campaign impersonating Amazon and targeting Japanese citizens. The emails use subjects such as 「至急 Amazonプライム会員情報の確認」 (“Urgent: Confirm Amazon Prime member information”).

The URLs within the emails ultimately lead to an Amazon phishing page, but only after routing victims through a TDS. Interestingly, instead of keeping the TDS step invisible, the actors chose to show it off—repackaging it as a reassuring security check.

Upon clicking the link within the email, victims are first redirected to an RDGA TDS domain, where fingerprinting occurs. If the user does not match the targeting criteria (e.g., connecting from outside Japan), access is blocked. If they do match, potential victims are redirected to a second RDGA domain.
This second and last domain is not a TDS domain, but funny enough, these actors decided they would emulate it anyway!

At that step victims are already at the landing page but instead of immediately displaying a standard Amazon phishing page, the website displays a CAPTCHA and fake console interface simulating environment fingerprinting checks to “make sure your environment and connection is safe” before "proceeding to the landing page". Ironically, part of their message is true: fingerprinting did happen one domain earlier. It just wasn’t for the user’s benefit—it was to make sure the environment was safe… for the scammers. A few seconds later, without added user interaction needed, a fake Amazon login page is displayed.

Domains samples:
qqc10c[.]cyou
51wang11c[.]cyou

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #scam #phishing #amazon #malspam #email #fingerprinting #japan

📱Smishing Slows, Quishing Quickens 🎣

Sick of smishing and those pesky parking/toll texts? Don’t get caught by crafty, counterfeit court QR codes — it’s a scan-and-scam! 💳 🚨

North American cell phone users are being hit with yet another wave of smishing campaigns that now include quishing elements. Likely orchestrated by Chinese-speaking threat actors, this latest campaign builds on previous vehicular violations, evolving tactics while impersonating US courts. 🧑‍⚖️

We’ve recently seen a flurry of SMS messages pushing parking violations — but with a twist: face justice in court… or scan and pay instead!

Delivered as an official-looking image, the actor has begun integrating QR codes into these lures to help mask suspicious phishing URLs, baiting victims into entering personal information, credentials, and ultimately making payments.

For some, this lure may sound better than facing justice for their perceived poor parking. Victims who don't comply are warned that failure to appear or pay could have serious repercussions - a scare tactic designed to push you toward a hasty decision and scanning the QR code! 🫣

We uncovered thousands of these nefarious domains, through their use of Registered Domain Generation Algorithms (RDGAs) and local government impersonation, hosted across a diverse range of hosting providers to evade takedown.

Recent examples:
⛔ ahfgx[.]icu
⛔ euoyq[.]icu
⛔ htpze[.]icu
⛔ mwlaj[.]icu

Friendly reminder - courts don't usually communicate with you via text. That said, we suspect this actor will continue to evolve, expanding their global reach and diversifying lures while improving tradecraft used in smishing and quishing delivery. As for us, we'll take our chances on evading that bench warrant and running from the law. 🏃‍♂️‍➡️

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #phishing #smishing #quishing