#spearphishing — Public Fediverse posts

Beware of the LegionLoader malware being distributed via the ClickFix method

LegionLoader malware is being distributed through ClickFix tactics using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages. Two primary distribution methods have been identified: one exploits Korea's Newlywed Hope Town Namu Wiki page with malicious URLs, while the other uses spear phishing emails targeting specific companies disguised as internal business system account issuance instructions. When users access these malicious URLs, they are redirected to fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing PowerShell commands, which download and execute LegionLoader. The malware sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files, evaluates the infection environment through display device checks and ASN verification, then executes backdoor malware capable of running various payloads including PE files, shellcode, PowerShell scripts, and MSI files. It also steals Chrome browser credentials and profile information based on C2 server commands.

Pulse ID: 6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-11 13:15:36

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Browser #CAPTCHA #Chrome #Cloud #CyberSecurity #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Korea #LUA #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

Beware of the LegionLoader malware being distributed via the ClickFix method

LegionLoader malware is being distributed through ClickFix tactics using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages. Two primary distribution methods have been identified: one exploits Korea's Newlywed Hope Town Namu Wiki page with malicious URLs, while the other uses spear phishing emails targeting specific companies disguised as internal business system account issuance instructions. When users access these malicious URLs, they are redirected to fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing PowerShell commands, which download and execute LegionLoader. The malware sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files, evaluates the infection environment through display device checks and ASN verification, then executes backdoor malware capable of running various payloads including PE files, shellcode, PowerShell scripts, and MSI files. It also steals Chrome browser credentials and profile information based on C2 server commands.

Pulse ID: 6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-11 13:15:36

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Browser #CAPTCHA #Chrome #Cloud #CyberSecurity #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Korea #LUA #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

Beware of the LegionLoader malware being distributed via the ClickFix method

LegionLoader malware is being distributed through ClickFix tactics using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages. Two primary distribution methods have been identified: one exploits Korea's Newlywed Hope Town Namu Wiki page with malicious URLs, while the other uses spear phishing emails targeting specific companies disguised as internal business system account issuance instructions. When users access these malicious URLs, they are redirected to fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing PowerShell commands, which download and execute LegionLoader. The malware sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files, evaluates the infection environment through display device checks and ASN verification, then executes backdoor malware capable of running various payloads including PE files, shellcode, PowerShell scripts, and MSI files. It also steals Chrome browser credentials and profile information based on C2 server commands.

Pulse ID: 6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-11 13:15:36

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Browser #CAPTCHA #Chrome #Cloud #CyberSecurity #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Korea #LUA #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

Beware of the LegionLoader malware being distributed via the ClickFix method

LegionLoader malware is being distributed through ClickFix tactics using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages. Two primary distribution methods have been identified: one exploits Korea's Newlywed Hope Town Namu Wiki page with malicious URLs, while the other uses spear phishing emails targeting specific companies disguised as internal business system account issuance instructions. When users access these malicious URLs, they are redirected to fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing PowerShell commands, which download and execute LegionLoader. The malware sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files, evaluates the infection environment through display device checks and ASN verification, then executes backdoor malware capable of running various payloads including PE files, shellcode, PowerShell scripts, and MSI files. It also steals Chrome browser credentials and profile information based on C2 server commands.

Pulse ID: 6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-11 13:15:36

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Browser #CAPTCHA #Chrome #Cloud #CyberSecurity #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Korea #LUA #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

Beware of the LegionLoader malware being distributed via the ClickFix method

LegionLoader malware is being distributed through ClickFix tactics using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages. Two primary distribution methods have been identified: one exploits Korea's Newlywed Hope Town Namu Wiki page with malicious URLs, while the other uses spear phishing emails targeting specific companies disguised as internal business system account issuance instructions. When users access these malicious URLs, they are redirected to fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into executing PowerShell commands, which download and execute LegionLoader. The malware sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files, evaluates the infection environment through display device checks and ASN verification, then executes backdoor malware capable of running various payloads including PE files, shellcode, PowerShell scripts, and MSI files. It also steals Chrome browser credentials and profile information based on C2 server commands.

Pulse ID: 6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa3fef84a7f54f4ae325151
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-11 13:15:36

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Browser #CAPTCHA #Chrome #Cloud #CyberSecurity #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Korea #LUA #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

Mind the (Patch) Gap: Multiple Chinese Threat Actors Chain 0-day Exploits in Chrome & Windows

In September 2026, two Chinese threat actors, UTA0560 and JungleBamboo, were observed exploiting an identical Chrome zero-day vulnerability chain targeting NGOs and other organizations. The exploitation leveraged CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491 in Chrome alongside CVE-2026-85880 in Windows kernel. These vulnerabilities had been patched in Chromium source code but not yet released to Chrome users, creating a patch-gap exploitation window. UTA0560 conducted spear-phishing campaigns using financial lures to deliver GRIMWEDGE JScript backdoor for reconnaissance and command execution. JungleBamboo employed generic phishing themes to deploy SUPERSTOMP loader, which installed the LONGTALE Chrome extension designed for credential theft, keylogging, and surveillance. Both actors used byte-for-byte identical shellcode, suggesting a shared exploit supply chain while deploying distinct post-exploitation tools tailored to their operational objectives.

Pulse ID: 6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-10 08:55:12

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#0Day #BackDoor #Chinese #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #Edge #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #SupplyChain #Vulnerability #Windows #ZeroDay #bot #AlienVault

Mind the (Patch) Gap: Multiple Chinese Threat Actors Chain 0-day Exploits in Chrome & Windows

In September 2026, two Chinese threat actors, UTA0560 and JungleBamboo, were observed exploiting an identical Chrome zero-day vulnerability chain targeting NGOs and other organizations. The exploitation leveraged CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491 in Chrome alongside CVE-2026-85880 in Windows kernel. These vulnerabilities had been patched in Chromium source code but not yet released to Chrome users, creating a patch-gap exploitation window. UTA0560 conducted spear-phishing campaigns using financial lures to deliver GRIMWEDGE JScript backdoor for reconnaissance and command execution. JungleBamboo employed generic phishing themes to deploy SUPERSTOMP loader, which installed the LONGTALE Chrome extension designed for credential theft, keylogging, and surveillance. Both actors used byte-for-byte identical shellcode, suggesting a shared exploit supply chain while deploying distinct post-exploitation tools tailored to their operational objectives.

Pulse ID: 6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-10 08:55:12

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#0Day #BackDoor #Chinese #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #Edge #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #SupplyChain #Vulnerability #Windows #ZeroDay #bot #AlienVault

Mind the (Patch) Gap: Multiple Chinese Threat Actors Chain 0-day Exploits in Chrome & Windows

In September 2026, two Chinese threat actors, UTA0560 and JungleBamboo, were observed exploiting an identical Chrome zero-day vulnerability chain targeting NGOs and other organizations. The exploitation leveraged CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491 in Chrome alongside CVE-2026-85880 in Windows kernel. These vulnerabilities had been patched in Chromium source code but not yet released to Chrome users, creating a patch-gap exploitation window. UTA0560 conducted spear-phishing campaigns using financial lures to deliver GRIMWEDGE JScript backdoor for reconnaissance and command execution. JungleBamboo employed generic phishing themes to deploy SUPERSTOMP loader, which installed the LONGTALE Chrome extension designed for credential theft, keylogging, and surveillance. Both actors used byte-for-byte identical shellcode, suggesting a shared exploit supply chain while deploying distinct post-exploitation tools tailored to their operational objectives.

Pulse ID: 6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-10 08:55:12

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#0Day #BackDoor #Chinese #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #Edge #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #SupplyChain #Vulnerability #Windows #ZeroDay #bot #AlienVault

Mind the (Patch) Gap: Multiple Chinese Threat Actors Chain 0-day Exploits in Chrome & Windows

In September 2026, two Chinese threat actors, UTA0560 and JungleBamboo, were observed exploiting an identical Chrome zero-day vulnerability chain targeting NGOs and other organizations. The exploitation leveraged CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491 in Chrome alongside CVE-2026-85880 in Windows kernel. These vulnerabilities had been patched in Chromium source code but not yet released to Chrome users, creating a patch-gap exploitation window. UTA0560 conducted spear-phishing campaigns using financial lures to deliver GRIMWEDGE JScript backdoor for reconnaissance and command execution. JungleBamboo employed generic phishing themes to deploy SUPERSTOMP loader, which installed the LONGTALE Chrome extension designed for credential theft, keylogging, and surveillance. Both actors used byte-for-byte identical shellcode, suggesting a shared exploit supply chain while deploying distinct post-exploitation tools tailored to their operational objectives.

Pulse ID: 6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-10 08:55:12

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#0Day #BackDoor #Chinese #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #Edge #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #SupplyChain #Vulnerability #Windows #ZeroDay #bot #AlienVault

Mind the (Patch) Gap: Multiple Chinese Threat Actors Chain 0-day Exploits in Chrome & Windows

In September 2026, two Chinese threat actors, UTA0560 and JungleBamboo, were observed exploiting an identical Chrome zero-day vulnerability chain targeting NGOs and other organizations. The exploitation leveraged CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491 in Chrome alongside CVE-2026-85880 in Windows kernel. These vulnerabilities had been patched in Chromium source code but not yet released to Chrome users, creating a patch-gap exploitation window. UTA0560 conducted spear-phishing campaigns using financial lures to deliver GRIMWEDGE JScript backdoor for reconnaissance and command execution. JungleBamboo employed generic phishing themes to deploy SUPERSTOMP loader, which installed the LONGTALE Chrome extension designed for credential theft, keylogging, and surveillance. Both actors used byte-for-byte identical shellcode, suggesting a shared exploit supply chain while deploying distinct post-exploitation tools tailored to their operational objectives.

Pulse ID: 6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa2707076e8a9dd36706bde
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-09-10 08:55:12

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#0Day #BackDoor #Chinese #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #Edge #InfoSec #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RCE #ShellCode #SpearPhishing #SupplyChain #Vulnerability #Windows #ZeroDay #bot #AlienVault

BigBear 2.0: la piattaforma di phishing-as-a-service che aggira anche l’MFA di Microsoft 365

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/bigbear-2-0-la-piattaforma-di-phishing-as-a-service-che-aggira-anche-lmfa-di-microsoft-365/

BigBear 2.0: la piattaforma di phishing-as-a-service che aggira anche l’MFA di Microsoft 365

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/bigbear-2-0-la-piattaforma-di-phishing-as-a-service-che-aggira-anche-lmfa-di-microsoft-365/

BigBear 2.0: la piattaforma di phishing-as-a-service che aggira anche l’MFA di Microsoft 365

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/bigbear-2-0-la-piattaforma-di-phishing-as-a-service-che-aggira-anche-lmfa-di-microsoft-365/

BigBear 2.0: la piattaforma di phishing-as-a-service che aggira anche l’MFA di Microsoft 365

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/bigbear-2-0-la-piattaforma-di-phishing-as-a-service-che-aggira-anche-lmfa-di-microsoft-365/

BigBear 2.0: la piattaforma di phishing-as-a-service che aggira anche l’MFA di Microsoft 365

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/bigbear-2-0-la-piattaforma-di-phishing-as-a-service-che-aggira-anche-lmfa-di-microsoft-365/

Half of New Zealand agencies miss email security bar https://www.byteseu.com/2343451/ #AsiaPacific #BusinessEmailCompromise #Compliance #cybersecurity #DigitalIdentity #DigitalTrust #DMARC #EmailSecurity #EnergySector #infosec #MinistryOfDefence(MOD) #NationalCyberSecurityCentre(NCSC) #NewZealand #NewZealand(NZ) #NewZealandGovernment #Phishing #Proofpoint #PublicSector #Risk&Compliance #SpearPhishing #ThreatLandscape #trade

Iranian Hackers Deploy Cross-Platform Malware via Coding Tests

Iranian hackers are using clever tactics to deploy cross-platform malware, disguising it as coding challenges on LinkedIn and other job search platforms to trick developers into installing the threat. This malware, tracked as NodeRabbit and PollCat, can infect Windows, Linux, and macOS workstations, allowing hackers to gain remote…

https://osintsights.com/iranian-hackers-deploy-cross-platform-malware-via-coding-tests?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social

#IranianHackers #Noderabbit #CrossplatformMalware #Spearphishing #Linkedin

Recent Kimsuky spear phishing campaigns abuse remote control tools and AI extensions to target victims in Japan and South Korea. Read the full analysis.

#Kimsuky #CyberSecurity #SpearPhishing #Malware #ThreatIntel

http://securityonline.info/kimsuky-spear-phishing-remote-tools/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

Recent Kimsuky spear phishing campaigns abuse remote control tools and AI extensions to target victims in Japan and South Korea. Read the full analysis.

#Kimsuky #CyberSecurity #SpearPhishing #Malware #ThreatIntel

http://securityonline.info/kimsuky-spear-phishing-remote-tools/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

Recent Kimsuky spear phishing campaigns abuse remote control tools and AI extensions to target victims in Japan and South Korea. Read the full analysis.

#Kimsuky #CyberSecurity #SpearPhishing #Malware #ThreatIntel

http://securityonline.info/kimsuky-spear-phishing-remote-tools/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

Recent Kimsuky spear phishing campaigns abuse remote control tools and AI extensions to target victims in Japan and South Korea. Read the full analysis.

#Kimsuky #CyberSecurity #SpearPhishing #Malware #ThreatIntel

http://securityonline.info/kimsuky-spear-phishing-remote-tools/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

July 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

During July 2026, multiple APT campaigns targeted entities in South Korea primarily through spear phishing attacks utilizing LNK files. Seven distinct attack types (A through G) were identified, each employing different techniques including PowerShell scripts, AutoIt programs, curl.exe downloads, and DLL side-loading. Attackers distributed malware through platforms like GitHub, Google Drive, and Dropbox, often disguised as legitimate documents or resumes. These campaigns deployed backdoors, infostealers, keyloggers, and XenoRAT malware to exfiltrate system information, credentials, virtual asset data, and maintain persistent access through Task Scheduler entries. Communications occurred via PubNub channels with data encoded in Base64. The attacks primarily began with phishing emails containing work-related content designed to deceive specific victims into executing malicious files.

Pulse ID: 6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-28 10:52:45

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Autoit #BackDoor #CyberSecurity #Dropbox #Email #GitHub #Google #InfoSec #InfoStealer #KeyLogger #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

July 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

During July 2026, multiple APT campaigns targeted entities in South Korea primarily through spear phishing attacks utilizing LNK files. Seven distinct attack types (A through G) were identified, each employing different techniques including PowerShell scripts, AutoIt programs, curl.exe downloads, and DLL side-loading. Attackers distributed malware through platforms like GitHub, Google Drive, and Dropbox, often disguised as legitimate documents or resumes. These campaigns deployed backdoors, infostealers, keyloggers, and XenoRAT malware to exfiltrate system information, credentials, virtual asset data, and maintain persistent access through Task Scheduler entries. Communications occurred via PubNub channels with data encoded in Base64. The attacks primarily began with phishing emails containing work-related content designed to deceive specific victims into executing malicious files.

Pulse ID: 6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-28 10:52:45

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Autoit #BackDoor #CyberSecurity #Dropbox #Email #GitHub #Google #InfoSec #InfoStealer #KeyLogger #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

July 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

During July 2026, multiple APT campaigns targeted entities in South Korea primarily through spear phishing attacks utilizing LNK files. Seven distinct attack types (A through G) were identified, each employing different techniques including PowerShell scripts, AutoIt programs, curl.exe downloads, and DLL side-loading. Attackers distributed malware through platforms like GitHub, Google Drive, and Dropbox, often disguised as legitimate documents or resumes. These campaigns deployed backdoors, infostealers, keyloggers, and XenoRAT malware to exfiltrate system information, credentials, virtual asset data, and maintain persistent access through Task Scheduler entries. Communications occurred via PubNub channels with data encoded in Base64. The attacks primarily began with phishing emails containing work-related content designed to deceive specific victims into executing malicious files.

Pulse ID: 6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-28 10:52:45

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Autoit #BackDoor #CyberSecurity #Dropbox #Email #GitHub #Google #InfoSec #InfoStealer #KeyLogger #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

July 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

During July 2026, multiple APT campaigns targeted entities in South Korea primarily through spear phishing attacks utilizing LNK files. Seven distinct attack types (A through G) were identified, each employing different techniques including PowerShell scripts, AutoIt programs, curl.exe downloads, and DLL side-loading. Attackers distributed malware through platforms like GitHub, Google Drive, and Dropbox, often disguised as legitimate documents or resumes. These campaigns deployed backdoors, infostealers, keyloggers, and XenoRAT malware to exfiltrate system information, credentials, virtual asset data, and maintain persistent access through Task Scheduler entries. Communications occurred via PubNub channels with data encoded in Base64. The attacks primarily began with phishing emails containing work-related content designed to deceive specific victims into executing malicious files.

Pulse ID: 6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-28 10:52:45

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Autoit #BackDoor #CyberSecurity #Dropbox #Email #GitHub #Google #InfoSec #InfoStealer #KeyLogger #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

July 2026 Threat Trend Report on APT Attacks (South Korea)

During July 2026, multiple APT campaigns targeted entities in South Korea primarily through spear phishing attacks utilizing LNK files. Seven distinct attack types (A through G) were identified, each employing different techniques including PowerShell scripts, AutoIt programs, curl.exe downloads, and DLL side-loading. Attackers distributed malware through platforms like GitHub, Google Drive, and Dropbox, often disguised as legitimate documents or resumes. These campaigns deployed backdoors, infostealers, keyloggers, and XenoRAT malware to exfiltrate system information, credentials, virtual asset data, and maintain persistent access through Task Scheduler entries. Communications occurred via PubNub channels with data encoded in Base64. The attacks primarily began with phishing emails containing work-related content designed to deceive specific victims into executing malicious files.

Pulse ID: 6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a91687da8e6cd5cc16f64a6
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-28 10:52:45

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Autoit #BackDoor #CyberSecurity #Dropbox #Email #GitHub #Google #InfoSec #InfoStealer #KeyLogger #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #bot #AlienVault

📢 Des hackers soutenus par des États ciblent des hauts fonctionnaires de l'UE via WhatsApp

Le CERT-EU (EU Computer Emergency Response Team) a formellement identifié des campagnes de spearphishing étatique ciblant des hauts fonctionnaires de l'Union européenne via des applications de messagerie, notamment WhatsApp et Signal.

📖 cyberveille : https://cyberveille.ch/posts/2026-08-27-des-hackers-soutenus-par-des-etats-ciblent-des-hauts-fonctionnaires-de-l-ue-via-whatsapp/
🌐 source : https://www.politico.eu/article/hackers-target-eu-officials-whatsapp/
🟢 vérification factuelle haute
#CERTEU #spearphishing #Cyberveille

Inside Kimsuky's Abuse of Legitimate Remote Control Tools Across Northeast Asia

Kimsuky conducted spear phishing campaigns against South Korean and Japanese targets during the first half of 2026, distributing LNK malware through OneDrive share links. The malicious files established scheduled tasks that periodically fetched PowerShell scripts from command-and-control servers to profile systems, exfiltrate Thunderbird and Outlook email data, and log keystrokes. The threat actor installed legitimate remote control software including Chrome Remote Desktop and AnyDesk to evade antivirus detection and maintain multiple access channels. A malicious Chrome extension designed to steal Gmail data exhibited characteristics of AI-generated code, featuring Korean comments, debug strings, and Unicode emoji throughout. The operation employed rotating infrastructure and compromised legitimate Korean servers as command-and-control nodes to impede tracking efforts.

Pulse ID: 6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-20 17:08:37

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#AnyDesk #Asia #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Japan #Kimsuky #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Outlook #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #UK #bot #AlienVault

Inside Kimsuky's Abuse of Legitimate Remote Control Tools Across Northeast Asia

Kimsuky conducted spear phishing campaigns against South Korean and Japanese targets during the first half of 2026, distributing LNK malware through OneDrive share links. The malicious files established scheduled tasks that periodically fetched PowerShell scripts from command-and-control servers to profile systems, exfiltrate Thunderbird and Outlook email data, and log keystrokes. The threat actor installed legitimate remote control software including Chrome Remote Desktop and AnyDesk to evade antivirus detection and maintain multiple access channels. A malicious Chrome extension designed to steal Gmail data exhibited characteristics of AI-generated code, featuring Korean comments, debug strings, and Unicode emoji throughout. The operation employed rotating infrastructure and compromised legitimate Korean servers as command-and-control nodes to impede tracking efforts.

Pulse ID: 6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-20 17:08:37

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#AnyDesk #Asia #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Japan #Kimsuky #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Outlook #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #UK #bot #AlienVault

Inside Kimsuky's Abuse of Legitimate Remote Control Tools Across Northeast Asia

Kimsuky conducted spear phishing campaigns against South Korean and Japanese targets during the first half of 2026, distributing LNK malware through OneDrive share links. The malicious files established scheduled tasks that periodically fetched PowerShell scripts from command-and-control servers to profile systems, exfiltrate Thunderbird and Outlook email data, and log keystrokes. The threat actor installed legitimate remote control software including Chrome Remote Desktop and AnyDesk to evade antivirus detection and maintain multiple access channels. A malicious Chrome extension designed to steal Gmail data exhibited characteristics of AI-generated code, featuring Korean comments, debug strings, and Unicode emoji throughout. The operation employed rotating infrastructure and compromised legitimate Korean servers as command-and-control nodes to impede tracking efforts.

Pulse ID: 6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-20 17:08:37

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#AnyDesk #Asia #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Japan #Kimsuky #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Outlook #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #UK #bot #AlienVault

Inside Kimsuky's Abuse of Legitimate Remote Control Tools Across Northeast Asia

Kimsuky conducted spear phishing campaigns against South Korean and Japanese targets during the first half of 2026, distributing LNK malware through OneDrive share links. The malicious files established scheduled tasks that periodically fetched PowerShell scripts from command-and-control servers to profile systems, exfiltrate Thunderbird and Outlook email data, and log keystrokes. The threat actor installed legitimate remote control software including Chrome Remote Desktop and AnyDesk to evade antivirus detection and maintain multiple access channels. A malicious Chrome extension designed to steal Gmail data exhibited characteristics of AI-generated code, featuring Korean comments, debug strings, and Unicode emoji throughout. The operation employed rotating infrastructure and compromised legitimate Korean servers as command-and-control nodes to impede tracking efforts.

Pulse ID: 6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-20 17:08:37

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#AnyDesk #Asia #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Japan #Kimsuky #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Outlook #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #UK #bot #AlienVault

Inside Kimsuky's Abuse of Legitimate Remote Control Tools Across Northeast Asia

Kimsuky conducted spear phishing campaigns against South Korean and Japanese targets during the first half of 2026, distributing LNK malware through OneDrive share links. The malicious files established scheduled tasks that periodically fetched PowerShell scripts from command-and-control servers to profile systems, exfiltrate Thunderbird and Outlook email data, and log keystrokes. The threat actor installed legitimate remote control software including Chrome Remote Desktop and AnyDesk to evade antivirus detection and maintain multiple access channels. A malicious Chrome extension designed to steal Gmail data exhibited characteristics of AI-generated code, featuring Korean comments, debug strings, and Unicode emoji throughout. The operation employed rotating infrastructure and compromised legitimate Korean servers as command-and-control nodes to impede tracking efforts.

Pulse ID: 6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a873495a873c0ec3c6d9880
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-08-20 17:08:37

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#AnyDesk #Asia #Chrome #ChromeExtension #CyberSecurity #EDR #Email #ICS #InfoSec #Japan #Kimsuky #Korea #LNK #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Outlook #Phishing #PowerShell #RAT #SouthKorea #SpearPhishing #UK #bot #AlienVault

#Cyberkriminelle nutzen #KI nicht nur zur Skalierung von #Phishing Mails, sondern auch zur Individualisierung - kombiniert mit #OSINT ein effektives Instrument, um Social Engineering voranzutreiben.

In einem groß angelegten Feldexperiment mit über 7.700 Beschäftigten der TU Braunschweig haben jetzt Forschende der TU Berlin, von Inria und der Ruhr-Universität Bochum getestet, wie gefährlich automatisiertes #Spearphishing mit Sprachmodellen wirklich ist:

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity26/sec26_prepub_czybik.pdf #cybersecurity

#Cyberkriminelle nutzen #KI nicht nur zur Skalierung von #Phishing Mails, sondern auch zur Individualisierung - kombiniert mit #OSINT ein effektives Instrument, um Social Engineering voranzutreiben.

In einem groß angelegten Feldexperiment mit über 7.700 Beschäftigten der TU Braunschweig haben jetzt Forschende der TU Berlin, von Inria und der Ruhr-Universität Bochum getestet, wie gefährlich automatisiertes #Spearphishing mit Sprachmodellen wirklich ist:

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity26/sec26_prepub_czybik.pdf #cybersecurity

#Cyberkriminelle nutzen #KI nicht nur zur Skalierung von #Phishing Mails, sondern auch zur Individualisierung - kombiniert mit #OSINT ein effektives Instrument, um Social Engineering voranzutreiben.

In einem groß angelegten Feldexperiment mit über 7.700 Beschäftigten der TU Braunschweig haben jetzt Forschende der TU Berlin, von Inria und der Ruhr-Universität Bochum getestet, wie gefährlich automatisiertes #Spearphishing mit Sprachmodellen wirklich ist:

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity26/sec26_prepub_czybik.pdf #cybersecurity

#Cyberkriminelle nutzen #KI nicht nur zur Skalierung von #Phishing Mails, sondern auch zur Individualisierung - kombiniert mit #OSINT ein effektives Instrument, um Social Engineering voranzutreiben.

In einem groß angelegten Feldexperiment mit über 7.700 Beschäftigten der TU Braunschweig haben jetzt Forschende der TU Berlin, von Inria und der Ruhr-Universität Bochum getestet, wie gefährlich automatisiertes #Spearphishing mit Sprachmodellen wirklich ist:

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity26/sec26_prepub_czybik.pdf #cybersecurity

#Cyberkriminelle nutzen #KI nicht nur zur Skalierung von #Phishing Mails, sondern auch zur Individualisierung - kombiniert mit #OSINT ein effektives Instrument, um Social Engineering voranzutreiben.

In einem groß angelegten Feldexperiment mit über 7.700 Beschäftigten der TU Braunschweig haben jetzt Forschende der TU Berlin, von Inria und der Ruhr-Universität Bochum getestet, wie gefährlich automatisiertes #Spearphishing mit Sprachmodellen wirklich ist:

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity26/sec26_prepub_czybik.pdf #cybersecurity

El lado del mal - Cómo los Agentes IA de Red Team hacen ataques de Ingeniería Social con Fake Accounts https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/08/como-los-agentes-ia-de-red-team-hacen.html #IA #AI #AgenticAI #RedTeam #Hacking #Pentest #Pentesting #GitHub #SpearPhishing #IngenieriaSocial

El lado del mal - Cómo los Agentes IA de Red Team hacen ataques de Ingeniería Social con Fake Accounts https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/08/como-los-agentes-ia-de-red-team-hacen.html #IA #AI #AgenticAI #RedTeam #Hacking #Pentest #Pentesting #GitHub #SpearPhishing #IngenieriaSocial

El lado del mal - Cómo los Agentes IA de Red Team hacen ataques de Ingeniería Social con Fake Accounts https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/08/como-los-agentes-ia-de-red-team-hacen.html #IA #AI #AgenticAI #RedTeam #Hacking #Pentest #Pentesting #GitHub #SpearPhishing #IngenieriaSocial

El lado del mal - Cómo los Agentes IA de Red Team hacen ataques de Ingeniería Social con Fake Accounts https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/08/como-los-agentes-ia-de-red-team-hacen.html #IA #AI #AgenticAI #RedTeam #Hacking #Pentest #Pentesting #GitHub #SpearPhishing #IngenieriaSocial

El lado del mal - Cómo los Agentes IA de Red Team hacen ataques de Ingeniería Social con Fake Accounts https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/08/como-los-agentes-ia-de-red-team-hacen.html #IA #AI #AgenticAI #RedTeam #Hacking #Pentest #Pentesting #GitHub #SpearPhishing #IngenieriaSocial

Genians exposed Operation Capsule Vault, an APT37 campaign. The RokRAT malware hides inside a fake PDF to spy on academics and researchers.

#RokRAT #APT37 #Malware #SpearPhishing #NorthKorea

https://securityonline.info/apt37-rokrat-operation-capsule-vault/?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=jetpack_social

Xiamen Empress Information Technology: come Pechino ha affittato account LINE per spiare giornalisti e attivisti a Taiwan

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/xiamen-empress-information-technology-come-pechino-ha-affittato-account-line-per-spiare-giornalisti-e-attivisti-a-taiwan/

Xiamen Empress Information Technology: come Pechino ha affittato account LINE per spiare giornalisti e attivisti a Taiwan

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/xiamen-empress-information-technology-come-pechino-ha-affittato-account-line-per-spiare-giornalisti-e-attivisti-a-taiwan/

Xiamen Empress Information Technology: come Pechino ha affittato account LINE per spiare giornalisti e attivisti a Taiwan

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/xiamen-empress-information-technology-come-pechino-ha-affittato-account-line-per-spiare-giornalisti-e-attivisti-a-taiwan/

Xiamen Empress Information Technology: come Pechino ha affittato account LINE per spiare giornalisti e attivisti a Taiwan

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/xiamen-empress-information-technology-come-pechino-ha-affittato-account-line-per-spiare-giornalisti-e-attivisti-a-taiwan/

Xiamen Empress Information Technology: come Pechino ha affittato account LINE per spiare giornalisti e attivisti a Taiwan

https://insicurezzadigitale.com/xiamen-empress-information-technology-come-pechino-ha-affittato-account-line-per-spiare-giornalisti-e-attivisti-a-taiwan/

Once, during an #awareness session, I brought a jar into the room.

One of those old-school glass jars with a metal lid.

I put it on the table and asked the executives (not the CISOs) to drop a poker chip inside.

Yes, poker chips. Don’t laugh. That’s what I had.

The value of each chip was supposed to reflect two things: perceived risk and willingness to spend.

At the beginning, the jar looked miserable.

Two or three 50s.
One brave 500.
Fewer than ten 100s.

Then came lunch.
Paid for, obviously.
But lunch was also the exercise.

Heavy #socialengineering. Casual conversation. Names, routines, vendors, habits, internal friction, travel plans, tools, weak points, ego, trust.

Then the last two hours began.
Real risk demonstration.

#spearphishing built with information collected during lunch.
Fake WhatsApp chats after recon.
#OSINT before the session even restarted.
QR codes everywhere.

Then we talked about recovery costs.

Regulatory fines.
Production downtime.
Loss of trust.
Reputational damage.
The unpleasant difference between “unlikely” and “not impossible”.

And, magically, the jar filled up with 500 and 1000 chips.

You don’t fucking say.

My #Decoded for #Baited: https://blog.baited.io/2026/cost-of-phishing-shrinking-budgets/

Once, during an #awareness session, I brought a jar into the room.

One of those old-school glass jars with a metal lid.

I put it on the table and asked the executives (not the CISOs) to drop a poker chip inside.

Yes, poker chips. Don’t laugh. That’s what I had.

The value of each chip was supposed to reflect two things: perceived risk and willingness to spend.

At the beginning, the jar looked miserable.

Two or three 50s.
One brave 500.
Fewer than ten 100s.

Then came lunch.
Paid for, obviously.
But lunch was also the exercise.

Heavy #socialengineering. Casual conversation. Names, routines, vendors, habits, internal friction, travel plans, tools, weak points, ego, trust.

Then the last two hours began.
Real risk demonstration.

#spearphishing built with information collected during lunch.
Fake WhatsApp chats after recon.
#OSINT before the session even restarted.
QR codes everywhere.

Then we talked about recovery costs.

Regulatory fines.
Production downtime.
Loss of trust.
Reputational damage.
The unpleasant difference between “unlikely” and “not impossible”.

And, magically, the jar filled up with 500 and 1000 chips.

You don’t fucking say.

My #Decoded for #Baited: https://blog.baited.io/2026/cost-of-phishing-shrinking-budgets/

Once, during an #awareness session, I brought a jar into the room.

One of those old-school glass jars with a metal lid.

I put it on the table and asked the executives (not the CISOs) to drop a poker chip inside.

Yes, poker chips. Don’t laugh. That’s what I had.

The value of each chip was supposed to reflect two things: perceived risk and willingness to spend.

At the beginning, the jar looked miserable.

Two or three 50s.
One brave 500.
Fewer than ten 100s.

Then came lunch.
Paid for, obviously.
But lunch was also the exercise.

Heavy #socialengineering. Casual conversation. Names, routines, vendors, habits, internal friction, travel plans, tools, weak points, ego, trust.

Then the last two hours began.
Real risk demonstration.

#spearphishing built with information collected during lunch.
Fake WhatsApp chats after recon.
#OSINT before the session even restarted.
QR codes everywhere.

Then we talked about recovery costs.

Regulatory fines.
Production downtime.
Loss of trust.
Reputational damage.
The unpleasant difference between “unlikely” and “not impossible”.

And, magically, the jar filled up with 500 and 1000 chips.

You don’t fucking say.

My #Decoded for #Baited: https://blog.baited.io/2026/cost-of-phishing-shrinking-budgets/

Once, during an #awareness session, I brought a jar into the room.

One of those old-school glass jars with a metal lid.

I put it on the table and asked the executives (not the CISOs) to drop a poker chip inside.

Yes, poker chips. Don’t laugh. That’s what I had.

The value of each chip was supposed to reflect two things: perceived risk and willingness to spend.

At the beginning, the jar looked miserable.

Two or three 50s.
One brave 500.
Fewer than ten 100s.

Then came lunch.
Paid for, obviously.
But lunch was also the exercise.

Heavy #socialengineering. Casual conversation. Names, routines, vendors, habits, internal friction, travel plans, tools, weak points, ego, trust.

Then the last two hours began.
Real risk demonstration.

#spearphishing built with information collected during lunch.
Fake WhatsApp chats after recon.
#OSINT before the session even restarted.
QR codes everywhere.

Then we talked about recovery costs.

Regulatory fines.
Production downtime.
Loss of trust.
Reputational damage.
The unpleasant difference between “unlikely” and “not impossible”.

And, magically, the jar filled up with 500 and 1000 chips.

You don’t fucking say.

My #Decoded for #Baited: https://blog.baited.io/2026/cost-of-phishing-shrinking-budgets/

Once, during an #awareness session, I brought a jar into the room.

One of those old-school glass jars with a metal lid.

I put it on the table and asked the executives (not the CISOs) to drop a poker chip inside.

Yes, poker chips. Don’t laugh. That’s what I had.

The value of each chip was supposed to reflect two things: perceived risk and willingness to spend.

At the beginning, the jar looked miserable.

Two or three 50s.
One brave 500.
Fewer than ten 100s.

Then came lunch.
Paid for, obviously.
But lunch was also the exercise.

Heavy #socialengineering. Casual conversation. Names, routines, vendors, habits, internal friction, travel plans, tools, weak points, ego, trust.

Then the last two hours began.
Real risk demonstration.

#spearphishing built with information collected during lunch.
Fake WhatsApp chats after recon.
#OSINT before the session even restarted.
QR codes everywhere.

Then we talked about recovery costs.

Regulatory fines.
Production downtime.
Loss of trust.
Reputational damage.
The unpleasant difference between “unlikely” and “not impossible”.

And, magically, the jar filled up with 500 and 1000 chips.

You don’t fucking say.

My #Decoded for #Baited: https://blog.baited.io/2026/cost-of-phishing-shrinking-budgets/

https://www.europesays.com/si/142358/ Ena pika je bila dovolj: 41-letni računovodja goljufom nevede nakazal 5000 evrov #Business #DirektorskePrevare #Economic #FinančneGoljufije #IzobraževanjeZaposlenih #KibernetskaVarnost #Poslovni #PoslovniSvet #SI #Slovene #Slovenia #Slovenija #Slovenščina #SocialniInženiring #SpearPhishing #VarnostniProtokoli

The New Frontier: Securing Japan’s Hybrid Digital Workforce (2026 & Beyond)

As Japan navigates the mid-point of the decade, its cyb…
#Japan #JP #JapanNews #anti-phishingtraining #cryptolocker #florida #hackers #hacking #kevinmitnick #knowbe4 #news #on-linetraining #phish-prone #phishing #ransomware #securityawarenesstraining #socialengineering #spearphishing #stusjouwerman #tampabay #training
https://www.alojapan.com/1496415/the-new-frontier-securing-japans-hybrid-digital-workforce-2026-beyond/

The New Frontier: Securing Japan’s Hybrid Digital Workforce (2026 & Beyond)

As Japan navigates the mid-point of the decade, its cyb…
#Japan #JP #JapanNews #anti-phishingtraining #cryptolocker #florida #hackers #hacking #kevinmitnick #knowbe4 #news #on-linetraining #phish-prone #phishing #ransomware #securityawarenesstraining #socialengineering #spearphishing #stusjouwerman #tampabay #training
https://www.alojapan.com/1496415/the-new-frontier-securing-japans-hybrid-digital-workforce-2026-beyond/

https://www.alojapan.com/1496415/the-new-frontier-securing-japans-hybrid-digital-workforce-2026-beyond/ The New Frontier: Securing Japan’s Hybrid Digital Workforce (2026 & Beyond) #AntiPhishingTraining #cryptolocker #florida #hackers #hacking #Japan #JapanNews #KevinMitnick #knowbe4 #news #OnLineTraining #PhishProne #phishing #ransomware #SecurityAwarenessTraining #SocialEngineering #SpearPhishing #StuSjouwerman #TampaBay #training As Japan navigates the mid-point of the decade, its cybersecurity landscape is undergoing a fundamental trans

https://www.alojapan.com/1496415/the-new-frontier-securing-japans-hybrid-digital-workforce-2026-beyond/ The New Frontier: Securing Japan’s Hybrid Digital Workforce (2026 & Beyond) #AntiPhishingTraining #cryptolocker #florida #hackers #hacking #Japan #JapanNews #KevinMitnick #knowbe4 #news #OnLineTraining #PhishProne #phishing #ransomware #SecurityAwarenessTraining #SocialEngineering #SpearPhishing #StuSjouwerman #TampaBay #training As Japan navigates the mid-point of the decade, its cybersecurity landscape is undergoing a fundamental trans

Meta Disrupts NSO Group's WhatsApp Phishing Campaign

Meta detected and blocked a sneaky WhatsApp phishing campaign linked to NSO Group, where attackers tried to trick people into clicking malicious links that led to external websites. The company also filed a contempt order against NSO for allegedly violating a court injunction by targeting WhatsApp users.

https://osintsights.com/meta-disrupts-nso-groups-whatsapp-phishing-campaign?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social

#WhatsappPhishing #NsoGroup #SpearPhishing #Meta #1clickPhishing

SideCopy Targets Afghan Finance Ministry with Xeno RAT Malware

Seqrite Labs researchers uncovered a sneaky malware attack, dubbed Operation XENOFISCAL, where the Pakistan-aligned SideCopy group targeted Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance and government officials with a cleverly crafted phishing lure written in Pashto. The attack used Xeno RAT Malware, delivered through a ZIP archive with a malicious…

https://osintsights.com/sidecopy-targets-afghan-finance-ministry-with-xeno-rat-malware?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social

#XenoRatMalware #Sidecopy #Afghanistan #FinanceSector #SpearPhishing