#zip — Public Fediverse posts

zip a video into small chunks and rebuild it #zip

https://askubuntu.com/q/1566779/612

7-Zip Archive Compression

https://www.7-zip.org

Packing / unpacking: 7z, XZ, BZIP2, GZIP, TAR, ZIP and WIM

Strong AES-256 encryption in 7z and ZIP formats.

Powerful File Manager #wine

#freebee #zip #opensource #archive

緊急生出演！目黒蓮(Snow Man)×岡田准一がZIP!降臨、5月12日放送でまさかの衝撃発表へ…今田美桜・綾瀬はるかも揃う神回の全貌を先出し網羅 – 9SnowTV https://www.vivizine.com/1190118/ #5月12日 #5月12日放送でまさかの衝撃発表へ…今田美桜・綾瀬はるかも揃う神回の全貌を先出し網羅9SnowTV #9snowTV #johnnys #SnowMan #SnowManダンス #SnowManバラエティ #SnowManライブ #SnowMan新曲 #STARTENTERTAINMENT #ZIP #ZIP出演者 #さっくん #ジーコ #ジャニーズ #しょっぴー #スノ #スノーマン #スノ担 #テレビ出演情報 #ひーくん #ふっか #めめ #ラウ #ラウール #今田美桜 #佐久間大介 #向井康二 #宮舘涼太 #岡田准一 #岩本照 #推し活 #深澤辰哉 #渡辺翔太 #目黒蓮 #目黒蓮岡田准一共演 #綾瀬はるか #緊急生出演！目黒蓮(SnowMan)×岡田准一がZIP!降臨 #舘様 #衝撃発表 #超豪華ラインナップ #速報 #阿部ちゃん #阿部亮平

Donuts and Beagles: Fake Claude site spreads backdoor

A fraudulent website impersonating Anthropic's Claude AI platform has been distributing a previously undocumented backdoor called Beagle through malvertising campaigns. The attack begins when victims download a fictitious tool named Claude-Pro Relay from claude-pro[.]com, delivered as a 505 MB ZIP archive. The infection chain utilizes DLL sideloading, exploiting a signed G DATA antivirus updater to load malicious code. The technique mirrors PlugX delivery methods but deploys different payloads. Beagle supports eight commands including shell execution, file transfer, and directory listing, communicating with C2 servers using AES encryption. Related samples dating to February 2026 have been identified, with some variants delivering AdaptixC2 framework. Additional domains impersonated security vendors like Trellix, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne. The infrastructure spans Cloudflare for distribution and Alibaba Cloud for command and control.

Pulse ID: 69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-05-07 17:05:03

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Cloud #CrowdStrike #CyberSecurity #Encryption #InfoSec #Malvertising #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PlugX #SentinelOne #SideLoading #Trellix #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Donuts and Beagles: Fake Claude site spreads backdoor

A fraudulent website impersonating Anthropic's Claude AI platform has been distributing a previously undocumented backdoor called Beagle through malvertising campaigns. The attack begins when victims download a fictitious tool named Claude-Pro Relay from claude-pro[.]com, delivered as a 505 MB ZIP archive. The infection chain utilizes DLL sideloading, exploiting a signed G DATA antivirus updater to load malicious code. The technique mirrors PlugX delivery methods but deploys different payloads. Beagle supports eight commands including shell execution, file transfer, and directory listing, communicating with C2 servers using AES encryption. Related samples dating to February 2026 have been identified, with some variants delivering AdaptixC2 framework. Additional domains impersonated security vendors like Trellix, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne. The infrastructure spans Cloudflare for distribution and Alibaba Cloud for command and control.

Pulse ID: 69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-05-07 17:05:03

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Cloud #CrowdStrike #CyberSecurity #Encryption #InfoSec #Malvertising #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PlugX #SentinelOne #SideLoading #Trellix #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Donuts and Beagles: Fake Claude site spreads backdoor

A fraudulent website impersonating Anthropic's Claude AI platform has been distributing a previously undocumented backdoor called Beagle through malvertising campaigns. The attack begins when victims download a fictitious tool named Claude-Pro Relay from claude-pro[.]com, delivered as a 505 MB ZIP archive. The infection chain utilizes DLL sideloading, exploiting a signed G DATA antivirus updater to load malicious code. The technique mirrors PlugX delivery methods but deploys different payloads. Beagle supports eight commands including shell execution, file transfer, and directory listing, communicating with C2 servers using AES encryption. Related samples dating to February 2026 have been identified, with some variants delivering AdaptixC2 framework. Additional domains impersonated security vendors like Trellix, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne. The infrastructure spans Cloudflare for distribution and Alibaba Cloud for command and control.

Pulse ID: 69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-05-07 17:05:03

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Cloud #CrowdStrike #CyberSecurity #Encryption #InfoSec #Malvertising #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PlugX #SentinelOne #SideLoading #Trellix #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Donuts and Beagles: Fake Claude site spreads backdoor

A fraudulent website impersonating Anthropic's Claude AI platform has been distributing a previously undocumented backdoor called Beagle through malvertising campaigns. The attack begins when victims download a fictitious tool named Claude-Pro Relay from claude-pro[.]com, delivered as a 505 MB ZIP archive. The infection chain utilizes DLL sideloading, exploiting a signed G DATA antivirus updater to load malicious code. The technique mirrors PlugX delivery methods but deploys different payloads. Beagle supports eight commands including shell execution, file transfer, and directory listing, communicating with C2 servers using AES encryption. Related samples dating to February 2026 have been identified, with some variants delivering AdaptixC2 framework. Additional domains impersonated security vendors like Trellix, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne. The infrastructure spans Cloudflare for distribution and Alibaba Cloud for command and control.

Pulse ID: 69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-05-07 17:05:03

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Cloud #CrowdStrike #CyberSecurity #Encryption #InfoSec #Malvertising #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PlugX #SentinelOne #SideLoading #Trellix #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Donuts and Beagles: Fake Claude site spreads backdoor

A fraudulent website impersonating Anthropic's Claude AI platform has been distributing a previously undocumented backdoor called Beagle through malvertising campaigns. The attack begins when victims download a fictitious tool named Claude-Pro Relay from claude-pro[.]com, delivered as a 505 MB ZIP archive. The infection chain utilizes DLL sideloading, exploiting a signed G DATA antivirus updater to load malicious code. The technique mirrors PlugX delivery methods but deploys different payloads. Beagle supports eight commands including shell execution, file transfer, and directory listing, communicating with C2 servers using AES encryption. Related samples dating to February 2026 have been identified, with some variants delivering AdaptixC2 framework. Additional domains impersonated security vendors like Trellix, CrowdStrike, and SentinelOne. The infrastructure spans Cloudflare for distribution and Alibaba Cloud for command and control.

Pulse ID: 69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69fcc63f1dce161fc2f8380c
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-05-07 17:05:03

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Cloud #CrowdStrike #CyberSecurity #Encryption #InfoSec #Malvertising #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PlugX #SentinelOne #SideLoading #Trellix #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

#WinRAR 7.22 has been released (#RAR / #ZIP / #ZIPX / #7Zip / #7z / #GZip / #zstd / #Zstandard / #FileArchiver / #DataCompression / #DarkMode) https://rarlab.com/

https://www.wacoca.com/media/643837/ 日テレ、『ZIP!』新人スタッフによる情報漏洩で管理体制を再点検 新人スタッフはSNSに関する研修を受けたばかり – オリコンニュース # #television #tv #TVPrograms #ZIP #テレビ #テレビ番組

Analysis of Attack Activities Using SSH+TOR Tunnels to Achieve Covert Persistence

APT-C-13 (Sandworm), also known as FROZENBARENTS, is a state-sponsored advanced persistent threat group conducting global cyber espionage operations. The organization recently deployed malicious campaigns using nested SSH and TOR tunnel infrastructure to establish covert remote access channels. Attackers distribute ZIP archives containing weaponized LNK files via spearphishing emails, which extract and execute payloads that create scheduled tasks disguised as legitimate software. The attack establishes dual-encrypted anonymous tunnels using obfs4 protocol to bypass deep packet inspection, while mapping sensitive ports (SMB/445, RDP/3389) to Onion domains for persistent backdoor access. The campaign leverages sophisticated anti-analysis techniques including sandbox detection, file disguise, and process masquerading to evade detection and maintain long-term unauthorized control over compromised systems for intelligence collection.

Pulse ID: 69f1f50a5410ca637c84368c
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69f1f50a5410ca637c84368c
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-29 12:09:46

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #CyberSecurity #Email #Espionage #InfoSec #LNK #OTX #Onion #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #RAT #RDP #SMB #SSH #Sandworm #SpearPhishing #Worm #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Analyzing a Full ClickFix Attack Chain - Part 1

A sophisticated ClickFix campaign was detected in mid-March 2026, beginning with a malicious webpage impersonating Booking.com's visual identity with a fake CAPTCHA. The attack leverages social engineering to trick victims into executing a PowerShell command that downloads and runs a script directly in memory. The JavaScript code automatically copies malicious commands to the clipboard and intercepts copy events. Once executed, the PowerShell dropper performs system fingerprinting, downloads a ZIP payload from a remote server, deploys it to user directories, establishes persistence through registry keys and scheduled tasks, and executes the final payload. The campaign demonstrates well-structured code with fallback mechanisms and real-time telemetry via Telegram, suggesting the use of a ready-to-use attack kit.

Pulse ID: 69ea2d5cd8732f2d8910fceb
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69ea2d5cd8732f2d8910fceb
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 14:31:56

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#CAPTCHA #Clipboard #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #Java #JavaScript #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PowerShell #RAT #RCE #SMS #SocialEngineering #Telegram #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Malicious Campaign Deploying AdaptixC2 Beacon and VS Code via Trojanized SumatraPDF

On March 12, 2026, a sophisticated attack campaign was identified targeting Chinese-speaking individuals using military-themed document lures distributed through a malicious ZIP archive. The operation employed a trojanized SumatraPDF binary as the initial vector to deploy an AdaptixC2 Beacon and Visual Studio Code on victim systems. The shellcode loader demonstrated significant similarities to the TOSHIS loader previously linked to TAOTH campaigns. Attackers established a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener utilizing GitHub for command-and-control infrastructure. The staging server infrastructure additionally hosted CobaltStrike Beacon and EntryShell backdoor, both previously associated with this threat group. The campaign infrastructure included multiple compromised domains and IP addresses for malware distribution and C2 communications.

Pulse ID: 69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 08:30:50

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Chinese #CobaltStrike #CyberSecurity #GitHub #InfoSec #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #RAT #ShellCode #Trojan #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Malicious Campaign Deploying AdaptixC2 Beacon and VS Code via Trojanized SumatraPDF

On March 12, 2026, a sophisticated attack campaign was identified targeting Chinese-speaking individuals using military-themed document lures distributed through a malicious ZIP archive. The operation employed a trojanized SumatraPDF binary as the initial vector to deploy an AdaptixC2 Beacon and Visual Studio Code on victim systems. The shellcode loader demonstrated significant similarities to the TOSHIS loader previously linked to TAOTH campaigns. Attackers established a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener utilizing GitHub for command-and-control infrastructure. The staging server infrastructure additionally hosted CobaltStrike Beacon and EntryShell backdoor, both previously associated with this threat group. The campaign infrastructure included multiple compromised domains and IP addresses for malware distribution and C2 communications.

Pulse ID: 69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 08:30:50

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Chinese #CobaltStrike #CyberSecurity #GitHub #InfoSec #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #RAT #ShellCode #Trojan #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Malicious Campaign Deploying AdaptixC2 Beacon and VS Code via Trojanized SumatraPDF

On March 12, 2026, a sophisticated attack campaign was identified targeting Chinese-speaking individuals using military-themed document lures distributed through a malicious ZIP archive. The operation employed a trojanized SumatraPDF binary as the initial vector to deploy an AdaptixC2 Beacon and Visual Studio Code on victim systems. The shellcode loader demonstrated significant similarities to the TOSHIS loader previously linked to TAOTH campaigns. Attackers established a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener utilizing GitHub for command-and-control infrastructure. The staging server infrastructure additionally hosted CobaltStrike Beacon and EntryShell backdoor, both previously associated with this threat group. The campaign infrastructure included multiple compromised domains and IP addresses for malware distribution and C2 communications.

Pulse ID: 69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 08:30:50

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Chinese #CobaltStrike #CyberSecurity #GitHub #InfoSec #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #RAT #ShellCode #Trojan #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Malicious Campaign Deploying AdaptixC2 Beacon and VS Code via Trojanized SumatraPDF

On March 12, 2026, a sophisticated attack campaign was identified targeting Chinese-speaking individuals using military-themed document lures distributed through a malicious ZIP archive. The operation employed a trojanized SumatraPDF binary as the initial vector to deploy an AdaptixC2 Beacon and Visual Studio Code on victim systems. The shellcode loader demonstrated significant similarities to the TOSHIS loader previously linked to TAOTH campaigns. Attackers established a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener utilizing GitHub for command-and-control infrastructure. The staging server infrastructure additionally hosted CobaltStrike Beacon and EntryShell backdoor, both previously associated with this threat group. The campaign infrastructure included multiple compromised domains and IP addresses for malware distribution and C2 communications.

Pulse ID: 69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 08:30:50

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Chinese #CobaltStrike #CyberSecurity #GitHub #InfoSec #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #RAT #ShellCode #Trojan #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Malicious Campaign Deploying AdaptixC2 Beacon and VS Code via Trojanized SumatraPDF

On March 12, 2026, a sophisticated attack campaign was identified targeting Chinese-speaking individuals using military-themed document lures distributed through a malicious ZIP archive. The operation employed a trojanized SumatraPDF binary as the initial vector to deploy an AdaptixC2 Beacon and Visual Studio Code on victim systems. The shellcode loader demonstrated significant similarities to the TOSHIS loader previously linked to TAOTH campaigns. Attackers established a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener utilizing GitHub for command-and-control infrastructure. The staging server infrastructure additionally hosted CobaltStrike Beacon and EntryShell backdoor, both previously associated with this threat group. The campaign infrastructure included multiple compromised domains and IP addresses for malware distribution and C2 communications.

Pulse ID: 69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e9d8ba4c0b0df25b764711
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 08:30:50

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#BackDoor #Chinese #CobaltStrike #CyberSecurity #GitHub #InfoSec #Malware #Military #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #RAT #ShellCode #Trojan #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

Analyzing a Malicious Compiled HTML Help File Delivering Agent Tesla

This analysis examines an attack chain utilizing malicious compiled HTML help (.chm) files for initial payload delivery. The attack begins with a 7zip compressed file containing a weaponized CHM file that displays a decoy window while executing obfuscated JavaScript code. This JavaScript launches PowerShell commands that verify internet connectivity by pinging Google, then downloads additional PowerShell code disguised as a JPEG file. The second stage decompresses and loads multiple byte arrays in memory, including a loader DLL and compressed Agent Tesla payload. The final Agent Tesla sample executes through process injection into RegAsm.exe and uses FTP protocol to exfiltrate stolen data including keystrokes, screenshots, and camera recordings to attacker-controlled infrastructure at ftp.videoalliance[.]ru.

Pulse ID: 69e991a65ee2b4802a077236
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e991a65ee2b4802a077236
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-23 03:27:34

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#7Zip #AgentTesla #CyberSecurity #Google #HTML #InfoSec #Java #JavaScript #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PowerShell #RAT #Tesla #Troll #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

March 2026 Phishing Email Trends Report

In March 2026, trojans represented 21% of attachment-based threats, while phishing attacks using fake pages dropped from 42% to 15% month-over-month. Script-based malware increased significantly, with HTML at 14% and JavaScript at 11%. Compressed files including ZIP (14%), RAR (8%), and 7Z (5%) were common distribution methods. Document-based threats utilized PDF (13%), XLS (5%), and DOCX (2%) files. Attackers impersonated courier services like FedEx and DHL, as well as financial institutions including Hana Bank and Woori Bank. Distribution methods included HTML scripts and PDF hyperlinks leading to credential-stealing pages. Notable malware families included RemcosRAT and AgentTesla, with command-and-control infrastructure utilizing Telegram API tokens and external mail servers for data exfiltration.

Pulse ID: 69e8738326fb86b891dd3c1f
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e8738326fb86b891dd3c1f
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-22 07:06:43

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Bank #CyberSecurity #Email #HTML #InfoSec #Java #JavaScript #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PDF #Phishing #RAT #Remcos #RemcosRAT #Telegram #Tesla #Trojan #ZIP #bot #AlienVault

From fake Proton VPN sites to gaming mods, this Windows infostealer is everywhere

Multiple campaigns are distributing NWHStealer through diverse delivery methods including fake VPN downloads, hardware utilities, and gaming modifications. The malware collects browser data, saved passwords, and cryptocurrency wallet information. Distribution occurs via fake websites impersonating legitimate services like Proton VPN, code hosting platforms such as GitHub and GitLab, file hosting services including MediaFire and SourceForge, and links from YouTube videos. Two primary infection methods were identified: one using a free web hosting provider distributing malicious ZIP files with self-injection, and another using fake websites with DLL hijacking that injects code into RegAsm processes. The stealer targets over 25 cryptocurrency wallets and multiple browsers, using AES-CBC encryption for command-and-control communications and employing UAC bypass techniques for privilege escalation.

Pulse ID: 69e27c47d37f66809a367479
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e27c47d37f66809a367479
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-17 18:30:31

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Browser #CyberSecurity #ELF #Encryption #GitHub #InfoSec #InfoStealer #Malware #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RCE #VPN #Windows #Word #YouTube #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

I'm in love with Linux.

It just decompressed a 2GB zip file in 2 seconds.

The same file in Windows is still decompressing 🤣

#Linux #FOSS #OSS #OpenSource #Zip #FileSystem #FileSystems

Direct-Sys Loader and CGrabber Stealer Five-Stage Malware Chain

A sophisticated five-stage malware operation delivers two new malware families: Direct-Sys Loader and CGrabber Stealer. The attack begins with ZIP archives distributed via GitHub user attachment URLs, exploiting a legitimate Microsoft-signed binary (Launcher_x64.exe) for DLL sideloading. Direct-Sys Loader employs ChaCha20 encryption, direct syscall execution, and multiple anti-analysis checks including text file verification, enumeration of 67 analysis tool processes, and hypervisor detection. CGrabber Stealer collects extensive system metadata, browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, password managers, VPN configurations, and application artifacts from over 150 applications and extensions. The stealer excludes CIS region systems and uses ChaCha20 encryption with HMAC SHA256 authentication for data exfiltration via custom HTTP headers. Both families share identical cryptographic implementations, suggesting common development origin and representing operationally mature infrastructure designed for larg...

Pulse ID: 69e1fb9b3bbb36c5db446094
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69e1fb9b3bbb36c5db446094
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-17 09:21:31

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Browser #ChaCha20 #CyberSecurity #Encryption #GitHub #HTTP #InfoSec #Mac #Malware #Microsoft #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #RAT #SideLoading #VPN #Word #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

From fake Proton VPN sites to gaming mods, this Windows infostealer is everywhere

Multiple campaigns are distributing NWHStealer through diverse platforms including fake VPN downloads, hardware utilities, and gaming modifications. The infostealer collects browser data, saved passwords, and cryptocurrency wallet information. Distribution occurs via fake websites impersonating legitimate services like Proton VPN, code hosting platforms such as GitHub and GitLab, file hosting services including MediaFire and SourceForge, and links from YouTube videos. Two primary infection methods are analyzed: one using a free web hosting provider distributing malicious ZIP files with self-injection loaders, and another employing fake websites with DLL hijacking techniques that inject into the RegAsm process. The stealer targets over 25 cryptocurrency wallets and multiple browsers, exfiltrating data to command-and-control servers using AES-CBC encryption and maintaining persistence through scheduled tasks and UAC bypass techniques.

Pulse ID: 69dfb91808e1258915184d6e
Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/69dfb91808e1258915184d6e
Pulse Author: AlienVault
Created: 2026-04-15 16:13:12

Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

#Browser #CyberSecurity #ELF #Encryption #GitHub #InfoSec #InfoStealer #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Password #Passwords #RAT #RCE #VPN #Windows #Word #YouTube #ZIP #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

@CosmickTrigger I'd personally enjoy a #ZIP / #RAR of all mp3s and decide or give you feedback what is best.

Bancamp interface + streaming isn't all bad but I think going for getting music and relationship out there on + offline is best.

= money in the end + without money being the direct jump / big request now

Banks / credit cards also as middle-men stop conscious people using things (another value system to solve).

We need more values between us first and then to circle around it / music.

OSINT для ленивых. Часть 7: Вспоминаем забытые пароли от zip архива за 2 минуты

Что такое хлам? Хлам это то, что хранится годами и ты его выкидываешь, как раз перед тем, как он тебе понадобится. Так иногда получается, что мы храним какие-то данные в zip архиве, а пароль от него забыли напрочь.Как люди грамотные, мы не ставим в качестве пароля свой день варенья или имя своего котика. Но пароль забыть, вспомнить шансов — ноль. Как быть?

https://habr.com/ru/articles/1022076/

#password #zip #osint #it

Zip / gzip Multiplatform Native Plugin #Zip #Gzip #Tar #Bz2 #Compression #Decompression #Multiplatform #Native #Plugin #Unity #AssetStore

https://u3dn.com/packages/zip-gzip-multiplatform-native-plugin-39411

#Bot-Armee #ZIP #Rassismus https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdHZjFrixIk

They keep calling it a crochet kit, it is not a crochet kit, it's obviously knit. The article's photo is of him in a different knit top; the sweater they discuss is colorwork, two fox/ wolf heads, v 1950s.
[1/2] #RyanGosling #movie #zip #cardigan #hand #knit #sweater #pattern #stockinette #garter #stitch #needles #zipper #buttons #frog #closure w #pockets
https://www.usatoday.com/story/shopping/trending/viral/2026/03/31/ryan-gosling-sweater-in-project-hail-mary/89397234007/

They keep calling it a crochet kit, it is not a crochet kit, it's obviously knit. The article's photo is of him in a different knit top; the sweater they discuss is colorwork, two fox/ wolf heads, v 1950s.
[1/2] #RyanGosling #movie #zip #cardigan #hand #knit #sweater #pattern #stockinette #garter #stitch #needles #zipper #buttons #frog #closure w #pockets
https://www.usatoday.com/story/shopping/trending/viral/2026/03/31/ryan-gosling-sweater-in-project-hail-mary/89397234007/

They keep calling it a crochet kit, it is not a crochet kit, it's obviously knit. The article's photo is of him in a different knit top; the sweater they discuss is colorwork, two fox/ wolf heads, v 1950s.
[1/2] #RyanGosling #movie #zip #cardigan #hand #knit #sweater #pattern #stockinette #garter #stitch #needles #zipper #buttons #frog #closure w #pockets
https://www.usatoday.com/story/shopping/trending/viral/2026/03/31/ryan-gosling-sweater-in-project-hail-mary/89397234007/

They keep calling it a crochet kit, it is not a crochet kit, it's obviously knit. The article's photo is of him in a different knit top; the sweater they discuss is colorwork, two fox/ wolf heads, v 1950s.
[1/2] #RyanGosling #movie #zip #cardigan #hand #knit #sweater #pattern #stockinette #garter #stitch #needles #zipper #buttons #frog #closure w #pockets
https://www.usatoday.com/story/shopping/trending/viral/2026/03/31/ryan-gosling-sweater-in-project-hail-mary/89397234007/

From Zip To Nought: The Rise and Fall of Iomega

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/03/24/from-zip-to-nought-the-rise-and-fall-of-iomega/

From Zip To Nought: The Rise and Fall of Iomega

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/03/24/from-zip-to-nought-the-rise-and-fall-of-iomega/

From Zip To Nought: The Rise and Fall of Iomega

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/03/24/from-zip-to-nought-the-rise-and-fall-of-iomega/

From Zip To Nought: The Rise and Fall of Iomega

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/03/24/from-zip-to-nought-the-rise-and-fall-of-iomega/

From Zip To Nought: The Rise and Fall of Iomega

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/03/24/from-zip-to-nought-the-rise-and-fall-of-iomega/

https://www.wacoca.com/media/607906/ 『ZIP!』、新たな曜日パーソナリティー発表 瀬戸朝香は初・朝の情報番組 阿部亮平らは続投 – オリコンニュース # #STARTO #television #tv #TVPrograms #ZIP #テレビ #テレビ番組

Security Week 2612: ненастоящая уязвимость в архивах ZIP

На прошлой неделе исследователь Крис Азиз опубликовал информацию о новом способе обхода систем безопасности, якобы позволяющем протаскивать вредоносное ПО под видом обычного ZIP-архива. В свойствах каждого архива в этом формате есть поле Compression Method. При желании данные в архиве можно вовсе не сжимать, и тогда в этом поле будет прописано 0 (STORED). Обычный сжатый архив имеет свойство DEFLATE compressed. Защитному решению или архиватору данный статус указывает на то, что архив нужно сначала распаковать. «Метод», предложенный Азизом, максимально простой. Устанавливаем в поле Compression Method статус STORED (сжатие отсутствует) для обычного архива со сжатием данных, у которого в норме должен быть флаг DEFLATE Compressed. Собственно, на этом все. Защитные решения доверяют описанию архива и сканируют его как контейнер с несжатыми данными. Так как на самом деле данные заархивированы, вредоносное содержимое не будет прочитано. Что открывает возможность «протаскивания» вредоносного кода на компьютер жертвы с последующим выполнением. Но именно на стадии выполнения вредоносного кода казалось бы стройная идея исследователя быстро рушится.

https://habr.com/ru/companies/kaspersky/articles/1010894/

#иб #zip #cve

GPUでファイル圧縮が高速に！圧縮・解凍アプリ「CoZip」が登場、外部から使えるライブラリも／まずはWindows向けに
https://forest.watch.impress.co.jp/docs/news/2093555.html

#forest_watch_impress #ZIP #CoZip #圧縮_解凍 #圧縮 #Windows #解凍

Is a zip called a zip because it's a zippy way to fasten something?

#zip #AskFedi

[ #VULN ] "Zombie ZIP : cette technique d'évasion rend aveugles les antivirus"
CVE-2026-0866
⬇️
"Découverte par Chris Aziz, chercheur en sécurité chez Bombadil Systems, la technique Zombie ZIP abuse de la confiance accordée aux moteurs d'analyse à l'en-tête des fichiers ZIP. En effet, cette attaque consiste à manipuler l'en-tête du fichier ZIP de façon à altérer le champ déterminant la méthode de compression au sein de l'archive.

La technique Zombie ZIP consiste à indiquer que les données sont stockées sans aucune compression (méthode STORED ou Method=0), alors que c'est faux ! Le fichier malveillant est bel et bien compressé via l'algorithme standard DEFLATE."
👇
https://www.it-connect.fr/zombie-zip-cette-technique-devasion-rend-aveugles-les-antivirus/

(NDR yet another) " #ZIP format confusion technique that evades 98% of #antivirus engines."
⬇️
CVE-2026-0866 | VU#976247 | Published March 10, 2026
👇
https://github.com/bombadil-systems/zombie-zip?tab=readme-ov-file

💬
⬇️
https://infosec.pub/post/43258263

#CyberVeille #CVE_2026_0866

Why I prefer tar to zip – Both.org https://www.both.org/?p=13268 #tar #zip #Linux #technology

A IT-Sec Christmas / New Year again? 🤔

Is this: "Large ZIP files trigger spurious possible zip bomb errors" → https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/unzip/-/issues/3

…this again → https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/

…or not or what? 😬

#zip #itsec #zipcar #itsecurity #compras #opensource #basic #ITbasics #grml #rudimental #issues #itissues #xkcd #zipbomb

Archivierung und Kompression mit tar: Grundlagen, Optionen und Beispiele

https://andreas-moor.de/archivierung-und-kompression-mit-tar-grundlagen-optionen-und-beispiele/

Kompression mit zip: Grundlagen, Optionen und Beispiele

https://andreas-moor.de/kompression-mit-zip-grundlagen-optionen-und-beispiele/

Kompression mit bzip2 Linux: Grundlagen, Optionen und Beispiele

https://andreas-moor.de/kompression-mit-bzip2-linux-grundlagen-optionen-und-beispiele/

Kompression mit gzip: Grundlagen, Optionen und Beispiele

https://andreas-moor.de/kompression-mit-gzip-grundlagen-optionen-und-beispiele/

Vergleich von Archivierung und Kompression unter Linux: tar/star, gzip, bzip2, xz und zip

https://andreas-moor.de/vergleich-von-archivierung-und-kompression-unter-linux-tar-star-gzip-bzip2-xz-und-zip/

Sometimes it is handy to use archive formats that do not confuse our windows friends. Or perhaps you want a quick listing, or to update files without reading and writing the entire thing (i.e. non-solid archives).

Zip or 7z and friends can be handy. The problem is that with their Windows hertitage they do not always (reliably) retain certain UNIX metadata. Here is are some very simple workarounds via the find command.

https://gist.github.com/ruario/3e7ccda93d1c96185f15f5657894bfcb

#ZIP #7zip #7z #linux

enz / unz

UPDATE: added support for zip-compatible symlinks. enz works exactly like zip by default storing linked files, using the -y switch to store links only.

https://github.com/ha1tch/unz

enz and unz are a zip-compatible compressor and decompressor pair that beat zip -9 on source code by 5-10%. Uses smarter pre-processing before DEFLATE.

It's often better than the alternatives for text, source code, structured text files, and markup.

Pure Go. No dependencies beyond stdlib. Output works with standard ZIP tools where possible

Benchmarks available.

#golang #foss #compression #enz #unz #zip #pkzip #7zip