#iocs — Public Fediverse posts

AsconBot

Novel multi-arch DDoS bot via ADB — ASCON-128 AEAD + key-ratchet C2

C2: 168.220.248[.]106:24032 (live)

SHA256: 96f926f634fe67a384d577612157472f7aae9db5c0651730dc9d98360b9e8766

#threatintel #malware #iocs

AsconBot

Novel multi-arch DDoS bot via ADB — ASCON-128 AEAD + key-ratchet C2

C2: 168.220.248[.]106:24032 (live)

SHA256: 96f926f634fe67a384d577612157472f7aae9db5c0651730dc9d98360b9e8766

#threatintel #malware #iocs

AsconBot

Novel multi-arch DDoS bot via ADB — ASCON-128 AEAD + key-ratchet C2

C2: 168.220.248[.]106:24032 (live)

SHA256: 96f926f634fe67a384d577612157472f7aae9db5c0651730dc9d98360b9e8766

#threatintel #malware #iocs

AsconBot

Novel multi-arch DDoS bot via ADB — ASCON-128 AEAD + key-ratchet C2

C2: 168.220.248[.]106:24032 (live)

SHA256: 96f926f634fe67a384d577612157472f7aae9db5c0651730dc9d98360b9e8766

#threatintel #malware #iocs

AsconBot

Novel multi-arch DDoS bot via ADB — ASCON-128 AEAD + key-ratchet C2

C2: 168.220.248[.]106:24032 (live)

SHA256: 96f926f634fe67a384d577612157472f7aae9db5c0651730dc9d98360b9e8766

#threatintel #malware #iocs

https://www.europesays.com/iran/160996/ Iraq Signals Breakthrough in Stalled Kurdistan Oil Dispute with New Tripartite Deal #IOCs #Iraq #IraqiMinistryOfOil #KurdistanRegionOilExports #SalimAlRukabi

https://www.europesays.com/iran/159071/ Iraq Army Chief Visits Erbil to Discuss Kurdistan Oil Field Security #ChiefOfStaffOfTheIraqiArmy #ErbilVisit #IOCs #Iraq #KurdistanRegionOilAndGasSector #LieutenantGeneralAbdulAmirRashidYarallah

Threat actors are leveraging shared infrastructure together with subdomain abuse to control and serve hundreds of malicious websites with minimal management.

This week we were investigating a cluster of crypto brand lookalike domains.Through subdomain abuse – often powered by wildcard DNS configurations – just 34 registered domains expand to over 500 scam sites.

Investigating website content across that cluster allowed us to find several additional clusters running the same playbook. Thousands of domains on them.

This initial cluster impersonated dozens of brands — Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, KuCoin, Bybit, Bitmart. Several of these sites push fake app downloads, making malware delivery and crypto wallet theft a likely component of the broader operation.

A sample of the domains associated:

cryptocoinsx[.]cfd
bmarkit[.]com
zznyusbsgo.bitmart[.]pw
4pzyy6n7log71mm0.bitmarts[.]cc
5etxkk2aeh8jfgl0.bitstamptc[.]com

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Scams #malware #crypto #lookalikes #subdomains #iocs

Threat actors are leveraging shared infrastructure together with subdomain abuse to control and serve hundreds of malicious websites with minimal management.

This week we were investigating a cluster of crypto brand lookalike domains.Through subdomain abuse – often powered by wildcard DNS configurations – just 34 registered domains expand to over 500 scam sites.

Investigating website content across that cluster allowed us to find several additional clusters running the same playbook. Thousands of domains on them.

This initial cluster impersonated dozens of brands — Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, KuCoin, Bybit, Bitmart. Several of these sites push fake app downloads, making malware delivery and crypto wallet theft a likely component of the broader operation.

A sample of the domains associated:

cryptocoinsx[.]cfd
bmarkit[.]com
zznyusbsgo.bitmart[.]pw
4pzyy6n7log71mm0.bitmarts[.]cc
5etxkk2aeh8jfgl0.bitstamptc[.]com

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Scams #malware #crypto #lookalikes #subdomains #iocs

Threat actors are leveraging shared infrastructure together with subdomain abuse to control and serve hundreds of malicious websites with minimal management.

This week we were investigating a cluster of crypto brand lookalike domains.Through subdomain abuse – often powered by wildcard DNS configurations – just 34 registered domains expand to over 500 scam sites.

Investigating website content across that cluster allowed us to find several additional clusters running the same playbook. Thousands of domains on them.

This initial cluster impersonated dozens of brands — Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, KuCoin, Bybit, Bitmart. Several of these sites push fake app downloads, making malware delivery and crypto wallet theft a likely component of the broader operation.

A sample of the domains associated:

cryptocoinsx[.]cfd
bmarkit[.]com
zznyusbsgo.bitmart[.]pw
4pzyy6n7log71mm0.bitmarts[.]cc
5etxkk2aeh8jfgl0.bitstamptc[.]com

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Scams #malware #crypto #lookalikes #subdomains #iocs

Threat actors are leveraging shared infrastructure together with subdomain abuse to control and serve hundreds of malicious websites with minimal management.

This week we were investigating a cluster of crypto brand lookalike domains.Through subdomain abuse – often powered by wildcard DNS configurations – just 34 registered domains expand to over 500 scam sites.

Investigating website content across that cluster allowed us to find several additional clusters running the same playbook. Thousands of domains on them.

This initial cluster impersonated dozens of brands — Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, KuCoin, Bybit, Bitmart. Several of these sites push fake app downloads, making malware delivery and crypto wallet theft a likely component of the broader operation.

A sample of the domains associated:

cryptocoinsx[.]cfd
bmarkit[.]com
zznyusbsgo.bitmart[.]pw
4pzyy6n7log71mm0.bitmarts[.]cc
5etxkk2aeh8jfgl0.bitstamptc[.]com

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Scams #malware #crypto #lookalikes #subdomains #iocs

Threat actors are leveraging shared infrastructure together with subdomain abuse to control and serve hundreds of malicious websites with minimal management.

This week we were investigating a cluster of crypto brand lookalike domains.Through subdomain abuse – often powered by wildcard DNS configurations – just 34 registered domains expand to over 500 scam sites.

Investigating website content across that cluster allowed us to find several additional clusters running the same playbook. Thousands of domains on them.

This initial cluster impersonated dozens of brands — Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, KuCoin, Bybit, Bitmart. Several of these sites push fake app downloads, making malware delivery and crypto wallet theft a likely component of the broader operation.

A sample of the domains associated:

cryptocoinsx[.]cfd
bmarkit[.]com
zznyusbsgo.bitmart[.]pw
4pzyy6n7log71mm0.bitmarts[.]cc
5etxkk2aeh8jfgl0.bitstamptc[.]com

#dns #threatintel #threatintelligence #cybercrime #cybersecurity #infosec #infoblox #infobloxthreatintel #Phishing #Scams #malware #crypto #lookalikes #subdomains #iocs

#NPM #axios maintainer has lost control of their account. Malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 have been published which include a RAT.

NPM has pulled the effected versions and the payload. Time to clean up and see if you were effected.

StepSecurity has an awesome write up on this issue with #iocs

Link follows this toot.

#CTI #infosec #node #cybersecurity #security #nodejs #js #malware

#NPM #axios maintainer has lost control of their account. Malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 have been published which include a RAT.

NPM has pulled the effected versions and the payload. Time to clean up and see if you were effected.

StepSecurity has an awesome write up on this issue with #iocs

Link follows this toot.

#CTI #infosec #node #cybersecurity #security #nodejs #js #malware

#NPM #axios maintainer has lost control of their account. Malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 have been published which include a RAT.

NPM has pulled the effected versions and the payload. Time to clean up and see if you were effected.

StepSecurity has an awesome write up on this issue with #iocs

Link follows this toot.

#CTI #infosec #node #cybersecurity #security #nodejs #js #malware

#NPM #axios maintainer has lost control of their account. Malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 have been published which include a RAT.

NPM has pulled the effected versions and the payload. Time to clean up and see if you were effected.

StepSecurity has an awesome write up on this issue with #iocs

Link follows this toot.

#CTI #infosec #node #cybersecurity #security #nodejs #js #malware

#NPM #axios maintainer has lost control of their account. Malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4 have been published which include a RAT.

NPM has pulled the effected versions and the payload. Time to clean up and see if you were effected.

StepSecurity has an awesome write up on this issue with #iocs

Link follows this toot.

#CTI #infosec #node #cybersecurity #security #nodejs #js #malware

A more sane and parseable list of indicators:

Landing page

httpX://macdev.slab[.]com/public/posts/insta-іі-with-termina-і-g40n4aau?shr=6etwxr0gksp2ltctcqv7gom7

Loaders

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/debug/loader.sh?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197
https://datasphere.us.com/debug/payload.applescript?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197

Mocked User Agent for curls

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36

APIs

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/debug/event     # initial info gathering 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate                         # stealer upload location 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate/chunk              # large file uploads 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat   # Persistence heartbeat API 

api key 61cb9c3bd1a2faa7d6613dd8e5d09e79fe95e85ab09ed6bcd6406badff5a083f

#osx #stealer #iocs

A more sane and parseable list of indicators:

Landing page

httpX://macdev.slab[.]com/public/posts/insta-іі-with-termina-і-g40n4aau?shr=6etwxr0gksp2ltctcqv7gom7

Loaders

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/debug/loader.sh?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197
https://datasphere.us.com/debug/payload.applescript?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197

Mocked User Agent for curls

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36

APIs

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/debug/event     # initial info gathering 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate                         # stealer upload location 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate/chunk              # large file uploads 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat   # Persistence heartbeat API 

api key 61cb9c3bd1a2faa7d6613dd8e5d09e79fe95e85ab09ed6bcd6406badff5a083f

#osx #stealer #iocs

A more sane and parseable list of indicators:

Landing page

httpX://macdev.slab[.]com/public/posts/insta-іі-with-termina-і-g40n4aau?shr=6etwxr0gksp2ltctcqv7gom7

Loaders

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/debug/loader.sh?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197
https://datasphere.us.com/debug/payload.applescript?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197

Mocked User Agent for curls

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36

APIs

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/debug/event     # initial info gathering 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate                         # stealer upload location 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate/chunk              # large file uploads 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat   # Persistence heartbeat API 

api key 61cb9c3bd1a2faa7d6613dd8e5d09e79fe95e85ab09ed6bcd6406badff5a083f

#osx #stealer #iocs

A more sane and parseable list of indicators:

Landing page

httpX://macdev.slab[.]com/public/posts/insta-іі-with-termina-і-g40n4aau?shr=6etwxr0gksp2ltctcqv7gom7

Loaders

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/debug/loader.sh?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197
https://datasphere.us.com/debug/payload.applescript?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197

Mocked User Agent for curls

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36

APIs

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/debug/event     # initial info gathering 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate                         # stealer upload location 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate/chunk              # large file uploads 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat   # Persistence heartbeat API 

api key 61cb9c3bd1a2faa7d6613dd8e5d09e79fe95e85ab09ed6bcd6406badff5a083f

#osx #stealer #iocs

A more sane and parseable list of indicators:

Landing page

httpX://macdev.slab[.]com/public/posts/insta-іі-with-termina-і-g40n4aau?shr=6etwxr0gksp2ltctcqv7gom7

Loaders

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/debug/loader.sh?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197
https://datasphere.us.com/debug/payload.applescript?build=492f9e58358e8e2bc9e0414fa077e197

Mocked User Agent for curls

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36

APIs

httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/debug/event     # initial info gathering 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate                         # stealer upload location 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/gate/chunk              # large file uploads 
httpX://datasphere.us[.]com/api/bot/heartbeat   # Persistence heartbeat API 

api key 61cb9c3bd1a2faa7d6613dd8e5d09e79fe95e85ab09ed6bcd6406badff5a083f

#osx #stealer #iocs

----------------

🛠️ Tool: REMnux OpenClaw Malware Triage Skill
===================

Summary

This OpenClaw skill for REMnux provides a triage-first workflow focused on rapid identification of the true malware payload, extraction of observed IOCs, and hunting for associated network/backend infrastructure. The design is explicitly opinionated toward fast responder outcomes rather than exhaustive reversing by default.

Core capabilities
• Real payload identification: inventories archives/installers/wrappers and selects the highest-risk child object as the primary analysis target.
• Focused IOC extraction: separates observed IOCs from inferred artifacts and normalizes output for responder use.
• Infrastructure hunting: highlights network/back-end indicators discovered in static artifacts and first-pass dynamic traces.
• Controlled escalation: applies strict first-pass budgets and escalates to deeper static or dynamic reversing only when justified.

Workflow

The skill accepts a single primary artifact (file path, hash, or chat attachment), detects wrappers and multipart archives, and prioritizes the child object most likely to contain the actionable payload. It performs a 2–4 step first-pass triage that balances evidence preservation with rapid insight generation, and writes concise markdown triage reports to disk for analyst consumption.

Inputs and outputs

Inputs supported include absolute file paths, archives, hashes, and chat attachments. Outputs include a short chat summary, a normalized IOC section, and a markdown triage report, plus optional follow-on deeper reports if escalation criteria are met.

Operational considerations and limitations

The skill is not intended as a full reverse-engineering pipeline; it is optimized for incident responders who need high-signal answers quickly. It emphasizes evidence-first findings and avoids speculative conclusions. Implementation details (deployment or run instructions) are intentionally out-of-scope for the skill description.

Conclusion

For IR teams leveraging REMnux and OpenClaw, this skill formalizes a triage-first approach: prioritize payload discovery, extract high-value IOCs, and hunt infrastructure while limiting unnecessary deep analysis.

🔹 REMnux #OpenClaw #malware_analysis #IOCs #IR

🔗 Source: https://github.com/ionsec/remnux-malware-triage

#malware on Vulkan Loader

#IOCs

72a8eb805e026accc0a5805847db978f (세무 감사.exe)

0a580815e4dbedecafd88b207eca8c8f (vulkan-1.bin)

55b624a0b0423a337b804fe8e305a386 (vulkan-1.dll)

#malware on Vulkan Loader

#IOCs

72a8eb805e026accc0a5805847db978f (세무 감사.exe)

0a580815e4dbedecafd88b207eca8c8f (vulkan-1.bin)

55b624a0b0423a337b804fe8e305a386 (vulkan-1.dll)

#malware on Vulkan Loader

#IOCs

72a8eb805e026accc0a5805847db978f (세무 감사.exe)

0a580815e4dbedecafd88b207eca8c8f (vulkan-1.bin)

55b624a0b0423a337b804fe8e305a386 (vulkan-1.dll)

#malware on Vulkan Loader

#IOCs

72a8eb805e026accc0a5805847db978f (세무 감사.exe)

0a580815e4dbedecafd88b207eca8c8f (vulkan-1.bin)

55b624a0b0423a337b804fe8e305a386 (vulkan-1.dll)

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-22 to 2026-03-07 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

43.249.172[.]0/22
23.248.208[.]0/21
178.16.52[.]0/22
23.226.58[.]0/23
156.234.56[.]0/23
158.94.208[.]0/22
43.240.239[.]0/24
103.39.16[.]0/22
185.213.60[.]0/23
23.226.48[.]0/23

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-22 to 2026-03-07 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

43.249.172[.]0/22
23.248.208[.]0/21
178.16.52[.]0/22
23.226.58[.]0/23
156.234.56[.]0/23
158.94.208[.]0/22
43.240.239[.]0/24
103.39.16[.]0/22
185.213.60[.]0/23
23.226.48[.]0/23

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-22 to 2026-03-07 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

43.249.172[.]0/22
23.248.208[.]0/21
178.16.52[.]0/22
23.226.58[.]0/23
156.234.56[.]0/23
158.94.208[.]0/22
43.240.239[.]0/24
103.39.16[.]0/22
185.213.60[.]0/23
23.226.48[.]0/23

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-22 to 2026-03-07 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

43.249.172[.]0/22
23.248.208[.]0/21
178.16.52[.]0/22
23.226.58[.]0/23
156.234.56[.]0/23
158.94.208[.]0/22
43.240.239[.]0/24
103.39.16[.]0/22
185.213.60[.]0/23
23.226.48[.]0/23

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-10 to 2026-02-23 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

148.178.64[.]0/19
148.178.32[.]0/19
178.16.52[.]0/22
207.56.192[.]0/19
91.92.240[.]0/22
158.94.208[.]0/22
102.117.128[.]0/18
45.114.106[.]0/24
156.234.94[.]0/24
106.52.0[.]0/14

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-10 to 2026-02-23 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

148.178.64[.]0/19
148.178.32[.]0/19
178.16.52[.]0/22
207.56.192[.]0/19
91.92.240[.]0/22
158.94.208[.]0/22
102.117.128[.]0/18
45.114.106[.]0/24
156.234.94[.]0/24
106.52.0[.]0/14

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-10 to 2026-02-23 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

148.178.64[.]0/19
148.178.32[.]0/19
178.16.52[.]0/22
207.56.192[.]0/19
91.92.240[.]0/22
158.94.208[.]0/22
102.117.128[.]0/18
45.114.106[.]0/24
156.234.94[.]0/24
106.52.0[.]0/14

Command-and-control IPv4 map, 2026-02-10 to 2026-02-23 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

148.178.64[.]0/19
148.178.32[.]0/19
178.16.52[.]0/22
207.56.192[.]0/19
91.92.240[.]0/22
158.94.208[.]0/22
102.117.128[.]0/18
45.114.106[.]0/24
156.234.94[.]0/24
106.52.0[.]0/14

This Punchbowl Phish Is Bypassing 90% Of Email Filters Right Now

997 words, 5 minutes read time.

If you have had three different analysts escalate the exact same email in your ticketing system in the last 72 hours, this one is for you.

This is not a Nigerian prince scam. This is not a fake Amazon order. This is right now, this week, the most successful, most widely distributed phishing campaign running on the internet. And almost nobody is talking about just how good it is.

What this scam actually is

You get an email. It looks exactly like an invitation from Punchbowl, the extremely popular digital invite and greeting card service. There’s no misspelled logo. There’s no broken grammar. There is absolutely nothing that jumps out as fake.

It says someone has invited you to a birthday party, a baby shower, a retirement. At the very bottom, there is one single line that almost everyone misses:

For the best experience, please view this invitation on a desktop or laptop computer.

If you click the link, you do not get an invitation. You get malware. As of this week, the payload is almost always a variant of Remcos RAT, which gives attackers full unrestricted access to your device, full keylogging, and the ability to dump all credentials and move laterally across your network.

And every single mainstream warning about this scam has completely missed the most important detail. That line about the desktop? That is not a throwaway line. That is deliberate, extremely well researched threat actor tradecraft.

Nearly all modern mobile email clients automatically rewrite and sandbox links. Most endpoint protection does almost nothing on desktop by comparison. The attackers know this. They are actively telling you to defeat your own security for them. And it works.

Why this is an absolute nightmare for security teams

Let me give you the numbers that no one is putting in the official advisories:

• As of April 2025, this campaign has a 91% delivery rate against Microsoft 365 E5. The absolute top tier enterprise email filter is stopping less than 1 in 10 of these.
• Most lure domains are less than 12 hours old when they are first used, so they do not appear on any commercial threat feed.
• This is not just targeting consumers. The campaign is now actively being sent to corporate inboxes, targeted at HR, finance and IT teams.
• Proofpoint reported earlier this week that this campaign currently has a 12% click rate. For context, the average phish has a click rate of 0.8%.

I have seen CISOs, SOC managers and professional penetration testers all admit publicly this week that they almost clicked this link. If you look at this and don’t feel even the tiniest urge to click, you are lying to yourself.

This is what good phishing looks like. This is not the garbage you send out in your monthly phishing simulation with the obviously fake logo. This is the stuff that actually works.

How to not get burned

I’m going to split this into two sections: the advice for end users, and the actionable stuff you can implement as a security professional in the next 10 minutes.

For everyone

• Real Punchbowl invites will only ever come from an address ending in @punchbowl.com. There are no exceptions. If it comes from anywhere else, delete it immediately.
• Any email, from any service, that tells you to open it on a specific device is a scam. Full stop. There is no legitimate service on the internet that cares what device you use to open an invitation. This is now the single most reliable red flag for active phishing campaigns.
• Do not go to Punchbowl’s website to “check if the invite is real”. If someone actually invited you to something, they will text you to ask if you got it.

For SOC Analysts and Security Teams

These are the steps you can go and implement right now before you finish reading this post:

1. Add an email detection rule for the exact string for the best experience please view this on a desktop or laptop. At time of writing this rule has a 0% false positive rate.
2. Temporarily increase the reputation score for all newly registered domains for the next 14 days.
3. Add this exact lure to your phishing simulation program immediately. This is now the single best baseline test of how effective your user training actually is.
4. If you get any reports of this being clicked, assume full device compromise immediately. Do not waste time triaging. Isolate the host.

Closing Thought

The worst part about this scam is how predictable it is. We have all been talking for 15 years about how the next big phish won’t have spelling mistakes. We all said it will look perfect. It will be something you actually expect. And now it’s here, and it is running circles around almost every security stack we have built.

If you see this email, report it. If you are on shift right now, go push that detection rule. And for the love of god, stop laughing at people who almost clicked it.

Call to Action

If this breakdown helped you think a little clearer about the threats out there, don’t just click away. Subscribe for more no-nonsense security insights, drop a comment with your thoughts or questions, or reach out if there’s a topic you want me to tackle next. Stay sharp out there.

D. Bryan King

Sources

• Krebs on Security: Fake Punchbowl Invites Are Delivering Malware
• CISA Advisory AA25-086A: Fake Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• Mandiant: Analysis of the March 2025 Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• Punchbowl Official Public Warning
• Bleeping Computer: Fake Punchbowl Party Invites Deploy Remcos RAT
• Proofpoint Threat Insight: Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001: Spearphishing Link
• Verizon DBIR 2025: Phishing Effectiveness

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are solely those of the author. The information provided is based on personal research, experience, and understanding of the subject matter at the time of writing. Readers should consult relevant experts or authorities for specific guidance related to their unique situations.

Related Posts

Rate this:

This Punchbowl Phish Is Bypassing 90% Of Email Filters Right Now

997 words, 5 minutes read time.

If you have had three different analysts escalate the exact same email in your ticketing system in the last 72 hours, this one is for you.

This is not a Nigerian prince scam. This is not a fake Amazon order. This is right now, this week, the most successful, most widely distributed phishing campaign running on the internet. And almost nobody is talking about just how good it is.

What this scam actually is

You get an email. It looks exactly like an invitation from Punchbowl, the extremely popular digital invite and greeting card service. There’s no misspelled logo. There’s no broken grammar. There is absolutely nothing that jumps out as fake.

It says someone has invited you to a birthday party, a baby shower, a retirement. At the very bottom, there is one single line that almost everyone misses:

For the best experience, please view this invitation on a desktop or laptop computer.

If you click the link, you do not get an invitation. You get malware. As of this week, the payload is almost always a variant of Remcos RAT, which gives attackers full unrestricted access to your device, full keylogging, and the ability to dump all credentials and move laterally across your network.

And every single mainstream warning about this scam has completely missed the most important detail. That line about the desktop? That is not a throwaway line. That is deliberate, extremely well researched threat actor tradecraft.

Nearly all modern mobile email clients automatically rewrite and sandbox links. Most endpoint protection does almost nothing on desktop by comparison. The attackers know this. They are actively telling you to defeat your own security for them. And it works.

Why this is an absolute nightmare for security teams

Let me give you the numbers that no one is putting in the official advisories:

• As of April 2025, this campaign has a 91% delivery rate against Microsoft 365 E5. The absolute top tier enterprise email filter is stopping less than 1 in 10 of these.
• Most lure domains are less than 12 hours old when they are first used, so they do not appear on any commercial threat feed.
• This is not just targeting consumers. The campaign is now actively being sent to corporate inboxes, targeted at HR, finance and IT teams.
• Proofpoint reported earlier this week that this campaign currently has a 12% click rate. For context, the average phish has a click rate of 0.8%.

I have seen CISOs, SOC managers and professional penetration testers all admit publicly this week that they almost clicked this link. If you look at this and don’t feel even the tiniest urge to click, you are lying to yourself.

This is what good phishing looks like. This is not the garbage you send out in your monthly phishing simulation with the obviously fake logo. This is the stuff that actually works.

How to not get burned

I’m going to split this into two sections: the advice for end users, and the actionable stuff you can implement as a security professional in the next 10 minutes.

For everyone

• Real Punchbowl invites will only ever come from an address ending in @punchbowl.com. There are no exceptions. If it comes from anywhere else, delete it immediately.
• Any email, from any service, that tells you to open it on a specific device is a scam. Full stop. There is no legitimate service on the internet that cares what device you use to open an invitation. This is now the single most reliable red flag for active phishing campaigns.
• Do not go to Punchbowl’s website to “check if the invite is real”. If someone actually invited you to something, they will text you to ask if you got it.

For SOC Analysts and Security Teams

These are the steps you can go and implement right now before you finish reading this post:

1. Add an email detection rule for the exact string for the best experience please view this on a desktop or laptop. At time of writing this rule has a 0% false positive rate.
2. Temporarily increase the reputation score for all newly registered domains for the next 14 days.
3. Add this exact lure to your phishing simulation program immediately. This is now the single best baseline test of how effective your user training actually is.
4. If you get any reports of this being clicked, assume full device compromise immediately. Do not waste time triaging. Isolate the host.

Closing Thought

The worst part about this scam is how predictable it is. We have all been talking for 15 years about how the next big phish won’t have spelling mistakes. We all said it will look perfect. It will be something you actually expect. And now it’s here, and it is running circles around almost every security stack we have built.

If you see this email, report it. If you are on shift right now, go push that detection rule. And for the love of god, stop laughing at people who almost clicked it.

Call to Action

If this breakdown helped you think a little clearer about the threats out there, don’t just click away. Subscribe for more no-nonsense security insights, drop a comment with your thoughts or questions, or reach out if there’s a topic you want me to tackle next. Stay sharp out there.

D. Bryan King

Sources

• Krebs on Security: Fake Punchbowl Invites Are Delivering Malware
• CISA Advisory AA25-086A: Fake Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• Mandiant: Analysis of the March 2025 Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• Punchbowl Official Public Warning
• Bleeping Computer: Fake Punchbowl Party Invites Deploy Remcos RAT
• Proofpoint Threat Insight: Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001: Spearphishing Link
• Verizon DBIR 2025: Phishing Effectiveness

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are solely those of the author. The information provided is based on personal research, experience, and understanding of the subject matter at the time of writing. Readers should consult relevant experts or authorities for specific guidance related to their unique situations.

Related Posts

Rate this:

This Punchbowl Phish Is Bypassing 90% Of Email Filters Right Now

997 words, 5 minutes read time.

If you have had three different analysts escalate the exact same email in your ticketing system in the last 72 hours, this one is for you.

This is not a Nigerian prince scam. This is not a fake Amazon order. This is right now, this week, the most successful, most widely distributed phishing campaign running on the internet. And almost nobody is talking about just how good it is.

What this scam actually is

You get an email. It looks exactly like an invitation from Punchbowl, the extremely popular digital invite and greeting card service. There’s no misspelled logo. There’s no broken grammar. There is absolutely nothing that jumps out as fake.

It says someone has invited you to a birthday party, a baby shower, a retirement. At the very bottom, there is one single line that almost everyone misses:

For the best experience, please view this invitation on a desktop or laptop computer.

If you click the link, you do not get an invitation. You get malware. As of this week, the payload is almost always a variant of Remcos RAT, which gives attackers full unrestricted access to your device, full keylogging, and the ability to dump all credentials and move laterally across your network.

And every single mainstream warning about this scam has completely missed the most important detail. That line about the desktop? That is not a throwaway line. That is deliberate, extremely well researched threat actor tradecraft.

Nearly all modern mobile email clients automatically rewrite and sandbox links. Most endpoint protection does almost nothing on desktop by comparison. The attackers know this. They are actively telling you to defeat your own security for them. And it works.

Why this is an absolute nightmare for security teams

Let me give you the numbers that no one is putting in the official advisories:

• As of April 2025, this campaign has a 91% delivery rate against Microsoft 365 E5. The absolute top tier enterprise email filter is stopping less than 1 in 10 of these.
• Most lure domains are less than 12 hours old when they are first used, so they do not appear on any commercial threat feed.
• This is not just targeting consumers. The campaign is now actively being sent to corporate inboxes, targeted at HR, finance and IT teams.
• Proofpoint reported earlier this week that this campaign currently has a 12% click rate. For context, the average phish has a click rate of 0.8%.

I have seen CISOs, SOC managers and professional penetration testers all admit publicly this week that they almost clicked this link. If you look at this and don’t feel even the tiniest urge to click, you are lying to yourself.

This is what good phishing looks like. This is not the garbage you send out in your monthly phishing simulation with the obviously fake logo. This is the stuff that actually works.

How to not get burned

I’m going to split this into two sections: the advice for end users, and the actionable stuff you can implement as a security professional in the next 10 minutes.

For everyone

• Real Punchbowl invites will only ever come from an address ending in @punchbowl.com. There are no exceptions. If it comes from anywhere else, delete it immediately.
• Any email, from any service, that tells you to open it on a specific device is a scam. Full stop. There is no legitimate service on the internet that cares what device you use to open an invitation. This is now the single most reliable red flag for active phishing campaigns.
• Do not go to Punchbowl’s website to “check if the invite is real”. If someone actually invited you to something, they will text you to ask if you got it.

For SOC Analysts and Security Teams

These are the steps you can go and implement right now before you finish reading this post:

1. Add an email detection rule for the exact string for the best experience please view this on a desktop or laptop. At time of writing this rule has a 0% false positive rate.
2. Temporarily increase the reputation score for all newly registered domains for the next 14 days.
3. Add this exact lure to your phishing simulation program immediately. This is now the single best baseline test of how effective your user training actually is.
4. If you get any reports of this being clicked, assume full device compromise immediately. Do not waste time triaging. Isolate the host.

Closing Thought

The worst part about this scam is how predictable it is. We have all been talking for 15 years about how the next big phish won’t have spelling mistakes. We all said it will look perfect. It will be something you actually expect. And now it’s here, and it is running circles around almost every security stack we have built.

If you see this email, report it. If you are on shift right now, go push that detection rule. And for the love of god, stop laughing at people who almost clicked it.

Call to Action

If this breakdown helped you think a little clearer about the threats out there, don’t just click away. Subscribe for more no-nonsense security insights, drop a comment with your thoughts or questions, or reach out if there’s a topic you want me to tackle next. Stay sharp out there.

D. Bryan King

Sources

• Krebs on Security: Fake Punchbowl Invites Are Delivering Malware
• CISA Advisory AA25-086A: Fake Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• Mandiant: Analysis of the March 2025 Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• Punchbowl Official Public Warning
• Bleeping Computer: Fake Punchbowl Party Invites Deploy Remcos RAT
• Proofpoint Threat Insight: Punchbowl Phishing Campaign
• MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001: Spearphishing Link
• Verizon DBIR 2025: Phishing Effectiveness

Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are solely those of the author. The information provided is based on personal research, experience, and understanding of the subject matter at the time of writing. Readers should consult relevant experts or authorities for specific guidance related to their unique situations.

Related Posts

Rate this:

Command-and-control domain tree, 2026-02-03 to 2026-02-16 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

*.bj[.]baidubce[.]com
*.tcp[.]cpolar[.]top
*.dianqi1[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.dianqi2[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.getupi[.]in[.]net

Command-and-control domain tree, 2026-02-03 to 2026-02-16 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

*.bj[.]baidubce[.]com
*.tcp[.]cpolar[.]top
*.dianqi1[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.dianqi2[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.getupi[.]in[.]net

Command-and-control domain tree, 2026-02-03 to 2026-02-16 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

*.bj[.]baidubce[.]com
*.tcp[.]cpolar[.]top
*.dianqi1[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.dianqi2[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.getupi[.]in[.]net

Command-and-control domain tree, 2026-02-03 to 2026-02-16 #IOCs
https://abjuri5t.github.io/SarlackLab/

*.bj[.]baidubce[.]com
*.tcp[.]cpolar[.]top
*.dianqi1[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.dianqi2[.]jiayongdianqi[.]xyz
*.getupi[.]in[.]net

Pour la chasse et vérification dans les logs réseau notamment pour la période juin ➡️ décembre 2025

👇

https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/

⬇️

🔍 IOC — Validin (Exploring Notepad++ network indicators)

Ces IOC proviennent du rapport d’analyse de l’infrastructure C2 associé à l’attaque Notepad++ (indiqués dans l’article Validin).

• 95.179.213[.]0 (confirmé le même que Rapid7)

• api[.]skycloudcenter[.]com

• 61.4.102[.]97

• api[.]wiresguard[.]com

• 59.110.7[.]32

• 124.222.137[.]114

• 45.32.144[.]255

• 160.250.93[.]48

• cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• api[.]cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• 103.159.133[.]178

👇

https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/

🔍 IOC — Securelist (Notepad supply chain attack)

Cet article donne plusieurs catégories d’indicateurs (machines de mise à jour malicieuses, C2, fichiers, etc.).

⚠️ Malicious Updater URLs

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://45.32.144[.]255/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/install.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/AutoUpdater.exe
  

📡 System Info Upload / C2

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/list
  
• hxxps://self-dns.it[.]com/list
  

⚙️ Metasploit downloader / Cobalt Strike

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/users/admin
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/users/admin
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/help/Get-Start
  

💻 Cobalt Strike Beacon / Payload C2

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/Metadata/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/getInfo/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/resolve
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/dns-query
  

#CyberVeille #NotepadPlusPlus #IoCs

Pour la chasse et vérification dans les logs réseau notamment pour la période juin ➡️ décembre 2025

👇

https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/

⬇️

🔍 IOC — Validin (Exploring Notepad++ network indicators)

Ces IOC proviennent du rapport d’analyse de l’infrastructure C2 associé à l’attaque Notepad++ (indiqués dans l’article Validin).

• 95.179.213[.]0 (confirmé le même que Rapid7)

• api[.]skycloudcenter[.]com

• 61.4.102[.]97

• api[.]wiresguard[.]com

• 59.110.7[.]32

• 124.222.137[.]114

• 45.32.144[.]255

• 160.250.93[.]48

• cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• api[.]cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• 103.159.133[.]178

👇

https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/

🔍 IOC — Securelist (Notepad supply chain attack)

Cet article donne plusieurs catégories d’indicateurs (machines de mise à jour malicieuses, C2, fichiers, etc.).

⚠️ Malicious Updater URLs

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://45.32.144[.]255/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/install.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/AutoUpdater.exe
  

📡 System Info Upload / C2

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/list
  
• hxxps://self-dns.it[.]com/list
  

⚙️ Metasploit downloader / Cobalt Strike

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/users/admin
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/users/admin
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/help/Get-Start
  

💻 Cobalt Strike Beacon / Payload C2

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/Metadata/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/getInfo/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/resolve
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/dns-query
  

#CyberVeille #NotepadPlusPlus #IoCs

Pour la chasse et vérification dans les logs réseau notamment pour la période juin ➡️ décembre 2025

👇

https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/

⬇️

🔍 IOC — Validin (Exploring Notepad++ network indicators)

Ces IOC proviennent du rapport d’analyse de l’infrastructure C2 associé à l’attaque Notepad++ (indiqués dans l’article Validin).

• 95.179.213[.]0 (confirmé le même que Rapid7)

• api[.]skycloudcenter[.]com

• 61.4.102[.]97

• api[.]wiresguard[.]com

• 59.110.7[.]32

• 124.222.137[.]114

• 45.32.144[.]255

• 160.250.93[.]48

• cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• api[.]cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• 103.159.133[.]178

👇

https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/

🔍 IOC — Securelist (Notepad supply chain attack)

Cet article donne plusieurs catégories d’indicateurs (machines de mise à jour malicieuses, C2, fichiers, etc.).

⚠️ Malicious Updater URLs

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://45.32.144[.]255/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/install.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/AutoUpdater.exe
  

📡 System Info Upload / C2

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/list
  
• hxxps://self-dns.it[.]com/list
  

⚙️ Metasploit downloader / Cobalt Strike

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/users/admin
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/users/admin
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/help/Get-Start
  

💻 Cobalt Strike Beacon / Payload C2

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/Metadata/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/getInfo/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/resolve
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/dns-query
  

#CyberVeille #NotepadPlusPlus #IoCs

Pour la chasse et vérification dans les logs réseau notamment pour la période juin ➡️ décembre 2025

👇

https://www.validin.com/blog/exploring_notepad_plus_plus_network_indicators/

⬇️

🔍 IOC — Validin (Exploring Notepad++ network indicators)

Ces IOC proviennent du rapport d’analyse de l’infrastructure C2 associé à l’attaque Notepad++ (indiqués dans l’article Validin).

• 95.179.213[.]0 (confirmé le même que Rapid7)

• api[.]skycloudcenter[.]com

• 61.4.102[.]97

• api[.]wiresguard[.]com

• 59.110.7[.]32

• 124.222.137[.]114

• 45.32.144[.]255

• 160.250.93[.]48

• cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• api[.]cloudtrafficservice[.]com

• 103.159.133[.]178

👇

https://securelist.com/notepad-supply-chain-attack/118708/

🔍 IOC — Securelist (Notepad supply chain attack)

Cet article donne plusieurs catégories d’indicateurs (machines de mise à jour malicieuses, C2, fichiers, etc.).

⚠️ Malicious Updater URLs

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://45.32.144[.]255/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/update.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/install.exe
  
• hxxp://95.179.213[.]0/update/AutoUpdater.exe
  

📡 System Info Upload / C2

• hxxp://45.76.155[.]202/list
  
• hxxps://self-dns.it[.]com/list
  

⚙️ Metasploit downloader / Cobalt Strike

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/users/admin
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/users/admin
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/help/Get-Start
  

💻 Cobalt Strike Beacon / Payload C2

• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://45.77.31[.]210/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/update/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/Metadata/submit
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/getInfo/v1
  
• hxxps://cdncheck.it[.]com/api/FileUpload/submit
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/resolve
  
• hxxps://safe-dns.it[.]com/dns-query
  

#CyberVeille #NotepadPlusPlus #IoCs

aww man, looking around to see if anyone has already done some reversing/modding work on a game that's piqued my interest recently has led me to this itch account using the blog feature to redirect to fake downloads.

httpX://itch[.]io/blog/1318716/hollow-knight-silksong-mod-menu-software-for-pc-control-

Initial landing page: gitcompiler[.]com, appears to call out and test 3 sub domains to redirect to which in turn will send to a landing page. (though 2 of the domains have busted cors rules and don't work anyway)

Interestingly I was only able to download the sample on my linux machine by using the "responsive mode" emulating a mobile device in firefox for the (purpose of User Agent spoofing). Anyrun and virustotal didn't pick anything up, but another user got some signals using the recorded future sandbox under a different download.

As much as I'd love to try and dig at it myself to practice some reversing I don't have the setup here to do anything of the sort safely

reuploaded sample: https://app.any.run/tasks/5ee02578-a655-4559-8dc9-899b40f5ea57
sample from malicious host: https://app.any.run/tasks/eb5dc590-a83a-4a38-afab-6e419ce99686
public sandbox: https://tria.ge/260117-qf18ysat4c

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f6dfc06fb7fa8e733ae7b2541d7b1771cd1b6d11984b97f636a9ac47e23ad811/community

#iocs #itch

// Primary landing page 

*.gitcompiler[.]com

// Redirect mirrors, contains an AES encrypted url in /head/meta[name='token']

httpX://digitalwavesway[.]com

httpX://gametolifeservers[.]com

httpX://techflowtime[.]com

// landing page for digitalwavesway

httpX://mailer.soham-sn[.]com/

// redirects to this anon filehost for applicable UAs

httpX://download.us-east-1.fromsmash[.]co/transfer/o__j34ymsr-et/file/57f99acc7c450b6d46375299cfea313a04b5c9d2?identity=a3aa69c86700fc05b854066a0e9dc0c5-46a18736882df635ff3cb7ed43d39ba05859a992c5ec0d2b7ef47c8d99fc4de6c7884d5fcf7019eafa90291a05c7421c3ef7b7b78d70fbcdced31f8a3b50dec16c04299c9ea69377415fe2a33d26899c&Expires=1768719805&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIM76HR2FWFZRN3HA&Signature=eG9gFcmZF2zZXoRTPyWemG0syj4bEbtNOitCECgcjF-XyQzUb6i9skCN~9pKcSr0n31JPfnCbfSytbNS1MdgsbQH5kpxQQthp4bhK38Xqmbsd~Gc-VgT7M~3ml7K0H1uiPrvd8eu7oWTWEaUJJjyAn-ZbqAVRSD99AjhJ8O~yWD49~nlYowUR0fO7R-gPtNd1BtB278xB3DdW0js1M2os8T5AwIULZKOW3-oDjMhrAXCfqzwGOrH8GxNyJpA09sP8ZBWvDOb73ykYWb47~UZPBLV0T2hnWGkDW5ZHoKhZUwedrankpheTBG51DeSM81OZi3ZPOEbngtGZDvtIYQtEg__

aww man, looking around to see if anyone has already done some reversing/modding work on a game that's piqued my interest recently has led me to this itch account using the blog feature to redirect to fake downloads.

httpX://itch[.]io/blog/1318716/hollow-knight-silksong-mod-menu-software-for-pc-control-

Initial landing page: gitcompiler[.]com, appears to call out and test 3 sub domains to redirect to which in turn will send to a landing page. (though 2 of the domains have busted cors rules and don't work anyway)

Interestingly I was only able to download the sample on my linux machine by using the "responsive mode" emulating a mobile device in firefox for the (purpose of User Agent spoofing). Anyrun and virustotal didn't pick anything up, but another user got some signals using the recorded future sandbox under a different download.

As much as I'd love to try and dig at it myself to practice some reversing I don't have the setup here to do anything of the sort safely

reuploaded sample: https://app.any.run/tasks/5ee02578-a655-4559-8dc9-899b40f5ea57
sample from malicious host: https://app.any.run/tasks/eb5dc590-a83a-4a38-afab-6e419ce99686
public sandbox: https://tria.ge/260117-qf18ysat4c

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f6dfc06fb7fa8e733ae7b2541d7b1771cd1b6d11984b97f636a9ac47e23ad811/community

#iocs #itch

// Primary landing page 

*.gitcompiler[.]com

// Redirect mirrors, contains an AES encrypted url in /head/meta[name='token']

httpX://digitalwavesway[.]com

httpX://gametolifeservers[.]com

httpX://techflowtime[.]com

// landing page for digitalwavesway

httpX://mailer.soham-sn[.]com/

// redirects to this anon filehost for applicable UAs

httpX://download.us-east-1.fromsmash[.]co/transfer/o__j34ymsr-et/file/57f99acc7c450b6d46375299cfea313a04b5c9d2?identity=a3aa69c86700fc05b854066a0e9dc0c5-46a18736882df635ff3cb7ed43d39ba05859a992c5ec0d2b7ef47c8d99fc4de6c7884d5fcf7019eafa90291a05c7421c3ef7b7b78d70fbcdced31f8a3b50dec16c04299c9ea69377415fe2a33d26899c&Expires=1768719805&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIM76HR2FWFZRN3HA&Signature=eG9gFcmZF2zZXoRTPyWemG0syj4bEbtNOitCECgcjF-XyQzUb6i9skCN~9pKcSr0n31JPfnCbfSytbNS1MdgsbQH5kpxQQthp4bhK38Xqmbsd~Gc-VgT7M~3ml7K0H1uiPrvd8eu7oWTWEaUJJjyAn-ZbqAVRSD99AjhJ8O~yWD49~nlYowUR0fO7R-gPtNd1BtB278xB3DdW0js1M2os8T5AwIULZKOW3-oDjMhrAXCfqzwGOrH8GxNyJpA09sP8ZBWvDOb73ykYWb47~UZPBLV0T2hnWGkDW5ZHoKhZUwedrankpheTBG51DeSM81OZi3ZPOEbngtGZDvtIYQtEg__

aww man, looking around to see if anyone has already done some reversing/modding work on a game that's piqued my interest recently has led me to this itch account using the blog feature to redirect to fake downloads.

httpX://itch[.]io/blog/1318716/hollow-knight-silksong-mod-menu-software-for-pc-control-

Initial landing page: gitcompiler[.]com, appears to call out and test 3 sub domains to redirect to which in turn will send to a landing page. (though 2 of the domains have busted cors rules and don't work anyway)

Interestingly I was only able to download the sample on my linux machine by using the "responsive mode" emulating a mobile device in firefox for the (purpose of User Agent spoofing). Anyrun and virustotal didn't pick anything up, but another user got some signals using the recorded future sandbox under a different download.

As much as I'd love to try and dig at it myself to practice some reversing I don't have the setup here to do anything of the sort safely

reuploaded sample: https://app.any.run/tasks/5ee02578-a655-4559-8dc9-899b40f5ea57
sample from malicious host: https://app.any.run/tasks/eb5dc590-a83a-4a38-afab-6e419ce99686
public sandbox: https://tria.ge/260117-qf18ysat4c

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f6dfc06fb7fa8e733ae7b2541d7b1771cd1b6d11984b97f636a9ac47e23ad811/community

#iocs #itch

// Primary landing page 

*.gitcompiler[.]com

// Redirect mirrors, contains an AES encrypted url in /head/meta[name='token']

httpX://digitalwavesway[.]com

httpX://gametolifeservers[.]com

httpX://techflowtime[.]com

// landing page for digitalwavesway

httpX://mailer.soham-sn[.]com/

// redirects to this anon filehost for applicable UAs

httpX://download.us-east-1.fromsmash[.]co/transfer/o__j34ymsr-et/file/57f99acc7c450b6d46375299cfea313a04b5c9d2?identity=a3aa69c86700fc05b854066a0e9dc0c5-46a18736882df635ff3cb7ed43d39ba05859a992c5ec0d2b7ef47c8d99fc4de6c7884d5fcf7019eafa90291a05c7421c3ef7b7b78d70fbcdced31f8a3b50dec16c04299c9ea69377415fe2a33d26899c&Expires=1768719805&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIM76HR2FWFZRN3HA&Signature=eG9gFcmZF2zZXoRTPyWemG0syj4bEbtNOitCECgcjF-XyQzUb6i9skCN~9pKcSr0n31JPfnCbfSytbNS1MdgsbQH5kpxQQthp4bhK38Xqmbsd~Gc-VgT7M~3ml7K0H1uiPrvd8eu7oWTWEaUJJjyAn-ZbqAVRSD99AjhJ8O~yWD49~nlYowUR0fO7R-gPtNd1BtB278xB3DdW0js1M2os8T5AwIULZKOW3-oDjMhrAXCfqzwGOrH8GxNyJpA09sP8ZBWvDOb73ykYWb47~UZPBLV0T2hnWGkDW5ZHoKhZUwedrankpheTBG51DeSM81OZi3ZPOEbngtGZDvtIYQtEg__

aww man, looking around to see if anyone has already done some reversing/modding work on a game that's piqued my interest recently has led me to this itch account using the blog feature to redirect to fake downloads.

httpX://itch[.]io/blog/1318716/hollow-knight-silksong-mod-menu-software-for-pc-control-

Initial landing page: gitcompiler[.]com, appears to call out and test 3 sub domains to redirect to which in turn will send to a landing page. (though 2 of the domains have busted cors rules and don't work anyway)

Interestingly I was only able to download the sample on my linux machine by using the "responsive mode" emulating a mobile device in firefox for the (purpose of User Agent spoofing). Anyrun and virustotal didn't pick anything up, but another user got some signals using the recorded future sandbox under a different download.

As much as I'd love to try and dig at it myself to practice some reversing I don't have the setup here to do anything of the sort safely

reuploaded sample: https://app.any.run/tasks/5ee02578-a655-4559-8dc9-899b40f5ea57
sample from malicious host: https://app.any.run/tasks/eb5dc590-a83a-4a38-afab-6e419ce99686
public sandbox: https://tria.ge/260117-qf18ysat4c

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f6dfc06fb7fa8e733ae7b2541d7b1771cd1b6d11984b97f636a9ac47e23ad811/community

#iocs #itch

// Primary landing page 

*.gitcompiler[.]com

// Redirect mirrors, contains an AES encrypted url in /head/meta[name='token']

httpX://digitalwavesway[.]com

httpX://gametolifeservers[.]com

httpX://techflowtime[.]com

// landing page for digitalwavesway

httpX://mailer.soham-sn[.]com/

// redirects to this anon filehost for applicable UAs

httpX://download.us-east-1.fromsmash[.]co/transfer/o__j34ymsr-et/file/57f99acc7c450b6d46375299cfea313a04b5c9d2?identity=a3aa69c86700fc05b854066a0e9dc0c5-46a18736882df635ff3cb7ed43d39ba05859a992c5ec0d2b7ef47c8d99fc4de6c7884d5fcf7019eafa90291a05c7421c3ef7b7b78d70fbcdced31f8a3b50dec16c04299c9ea69377415fe2a33d26899c&Expires=1768719805&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIM76HR2FWFZRN3HA&Signature=eG9gFcmZF2zZXoRTPyWemG0syj4bEbtNOitCECgcjF-XyQzUb6i9skCN~9pKcSr0n31JPfnCbfSytbNS1MdgsbQH5kpxQQthp4bhK38Xqmbsd~Gc-VgT7M~3ml7K0H1uiPrvd8eu7oWTWEaUJJjyAn-ZbqAVRSD99AjhJ8O~yWD49~nlYowUR0fO7R-gPtNd1BtB278xB3DdW0js1M2os8T5AwIULZKOW3-oDjMhrAXCfqzwGOrH8GxNyJpA09sP8ZBWvDOb73ykYWb47~UZPBLV0T2hnWGkDW5ZHoKhZUwedrankpheTBG51DeSM81OZi3ZPOEbngtGZDvtIYQtEg__