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#netsupport — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #netsupport, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. Post-DEF CON Phishing Uses Malicious Google Doc to Deliver Malware

    Following Black Hat and DEF CON conferences, a threat actor targeted attendees through X direct messages, posing as CoinDesk's VP and Head of Marketing to establish trust under the pretext of conference planning. The campaign employed a malicious Google Apps Script embedded in a Google Doc that presented ClickFix-style instructions and manual download options. The attack delivered different payloads based on the victim's operating system: macOS users received AMOS infostealer, while Windows users were infected with NetSupport RAT, a Ledger wallet implant, and a TLS-intercepting proxy. A secondary lure masqueraded as a DocSend installer to deliver additional payloads. The operation demonstrated sophisticated social engineering by leveraging trusted platforms and post-conference networking expectations.

    Pulse ID: 6a85d24a1bf7db5b97a4e9f8
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a85d
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-08-19 15:56:58

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #AMOS #CyberSecurity #Edge #Google #InfoSec #InfoStealer #Mac #MacOS #Malware #NetSupport #NetSupportRAT #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #Phishing #Proxy #RAT #RCE #Rust #SocialEngineering #TLS #Windows #bot #AlienVault

  2. Expanding the Castle: New Campaigns, New Tooling, and the NeedleStealer Connection

    Arctic Wolf Labs has been tracking multiple campaigns built around CastleLoader, a multi-stage shellcode loader that has evolved significantly. Three distinct campaigns were identified: Urutyka, Garrigin, and Noidret. The most significant development is the integration of NeedleStealer framework payloads, marking the first observed use of Rust and Golang tooling in this campaign cluster. NeedleStealer includes a Rust-based desktop cryptocurrency wallet spoofer targeting Ledger, Trezor, and Exodus wallets, and a Golang-based malicious browser extension installer. The campaigns utilize obfuscated PowerShell stagers, IronPython runtimes, and NodeJS-based shellcode injectors. Infrastructure analysis revealed consistent naming patterns, staged domains for future operations, and the use of fraudulently obtained code-signing certificates. The campaigns consistently deploy NetSupport RAT and CastleStealer alongside the new NeedleStealer payloads, suggesting an expansion toward high-value cryptocurrency targeting.

    Pulse ID: 6a682376fe6eac7ecb782129
    Pulse Link: otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6a682
    Pulse Author: AlienVault
    Created: 2026-07-28 03:35:18

    Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification.

    #Browser #CyberSecurity #Edge #Golang #InfoSec #NetSupport #NetSupportRAT #OTX #OpenThreatExchange #PowerShell #Python #RAT #Rust #ShellCode #bot #cryptocurrency #AlienVault

  3. 2026-05-22 (Friday): #SmartApeSG --> Unidentified #RAT --> #NetSupport RAT

    A #pcap of the traffic, associated files, and a list of IOCs are available at malware-traffic-analysis.net/2

    cc: @netresec this is the post that I promised earlier. I'm not able to get the infection chain in any sandbox.

  4. #TDR analysts deep dived into a widespread malicious JavaScript framework injected into 3,800+ WordPress sites to distribute #NetSupport RAT via the #ClickFix social engineering tactic.

    blog.sekoia.io/meet-iclickfix-

  5. 2025-12-29 (Monday): #ClickFix page leads to #NetSupportRAT infection.

    Details at www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/12/29/index.html

    Of note, this is not from the usual ClickFix campaigns that I track. While #SmartApeSG has often pushed #NetSupport #RAT, this is a completely different vector for the initial URL.

    The initial sites.google[.]com URLs for this campaign are sent via email. But I don't have an example for this particular infection chain.

  6. «Медвед» атакует: что мы узнали про фишинговую кампанию группировки, нацеленной на российские организации

    В октябре 2025 года мы, группа киберразведки департамента Threat Intelligence, зафиксировала продолжающуюся фишинговую активность хакерской группировки, которую мы назвали NetMedved. Обоснование выбора данного наименования будет рассмотрено в заключительной части статьи. Атаки хакеров ориентированы на российские организации; в качестве конечной полезной нагрузки используется вредоносная версия легитимного инструмента удалённого администрирования NetSupport Manager (далее — NetSupportRAT). В этой статье расскажем о специфике кампании и связи с нашими предыдущими находками.

    habr.com/ru/companies/pt/artic

    #киберразведка #расследование_инцидентов #кибератаки #хакерская_группировка #хакерские_инструменты #фишинговые_письма #вредоносное_программное_обеспечение #малварь #finger #netsupport

  7. 2025-08-22 (Friday): #SmartApeSG for #NetSupport #RAT (#NetSupportRAT)

    Some sites have injected script that leads directly to the fake CAPTCHA page for #ClickFix instructions.

    Other sites have injected script that redirects to the URL for the fake CAPTCHA page.

    Direct example (compromised site --> script for CAPTCHA page):

    - hxxps[:]//mexicobusiness[.]news/
    - hxxps[:]//clouwave[.]net/ajax/pixi.min.js

    Recirect example (compromised site --> Redirect URL --> script for CAPTCHA page):

    - hxxps[:]//myvocabulary[.]com/
    - hxxps[:]//myevmanual[.]com/d.js <-- 302 found for next URL
    - hxxps[:]//clouwave[.]net/ajax/pixi.min.js

    Either way, you get the same CAPTCHA page.

    IOCs at github.com/malware-traffic/ind

    cc: @monitorsg

  8. 2025-08-20 (Wednesday): #SmartApeSG for fake #CAPTCHA page with #ClickFix instructions that led to an MSI file for #NetSupport #RAT and the #NetSupportRAT infection led to #StealCv2.

    Malware samples, a #pcap, and indicators at www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2025/08/20/index.html

  9. 2025-07-15 (Tuesday): Tracking #SmartApeSG

    The SmartApeSG script injected into page from compromised website leads to #ClickFix style fake verification page. ClickFix-ing you way through this leads to a #NetSupportRAT infection.

    Compromised site (same as yesterday):

    - medthermography[.]com

    URLs for ClickFix style fake verification page:

    - warpdrive[.]top/jjj/include.js
    - warpdrive[.]top/jjj/index.php?W11WzmLj
    - warpdrive[.]top/jjj/buffer.js?409a8bdbd9

    Running the script for NetSupport RAT:

    - sos-atlanta[.]com/lal.ps1
    - sos-atlanta[.]com/lotu.zip?l=4773

    #NetSupport RAT server (same as yesterday):

    - 185.163.45[.]87:443

  10. 2025-07-14 (Monday): #SmartApeSG script injected into page from compromised website leads to #ClickFix style fake verification page. ClickFix-ing you way through this leads to a #NetSupportRAT infection.

    Compromised site:

    - medthermography[.]com

    URLs for ClickFix style fake verification page:

    - lebensversicherungvergleich[.]top/jjj/include.js
    - lebensversicherungvergleich[.]top/jjj/index.php?OtKXgPVX
    - lebensversicherungvergleich[.]top/jjj/buffer.js?4261984971

    Running the script for NetSupport RAT:

    - affordableasphalt-paving[.]com/lal.ps1
    - affordableasphalt-paving[.]com/lotu.zip?l=3526

    #NetSupport RAT server:

    - 185.163.45[.]87:443

  11. 2025-03-26 (Wednesday): #SmartApeSG traffic for a fake browser update page leads to a #NetSupport #RAT infection. A zip archive for #StealC sent over the #NetSupportRAT C2 traffic.

    The #StealC infection uses DLL side-loading by a legitimate EXE to #sideload the malicious DLL.

    A #pcap from an infection, the associated #malware samples, and #IOCs are available at at malware-traffic-analysis.net/2

  12. Важко це визнавати, але рівень технічних спеціалістів серед провайдерів швидко падає.

    І це я пишу не про провайдерів домосєток. 😟

    #ukraine #netsupport

  13. #webshell #opendir #netsupport #rat at:

    https://appointedtimeagriculture\.com/wp-includes/blocks/post-content/

    GatewayAddress=95.179.158.213:443
    RADIUSSecret=dgAAAPpMkI7ke494fKEQRUoablcA

  14. 2024-12-24 (Tuesday)

    #SmartApeSG infection chain starting with we-careu[.]xyz/work/original.js from compromised site.

    Ends with #NetSupport #RAT using the same 194.180.191[.]64 C2 address we've seen since November.

  15. 2024-12-17 (Tuesday): #SmartApeSG injected script leads to fake browser update page, and that page leads to a #NetSupport #RAT infection.

    Just like my last post here, there are 2 injected scripts in a page from the compromised site, one using using depostsolo[.]biz and one using tactlat[.]xyz.

    A #pcap of the infection traffic, associated malware samples and more information is available at malware-traffic-analysis.net/2

    NetSupportRAT C2 for this campaign continues to be 194.180.191[.]64 since as early as 2024-11-22.

    #FakeUpdates #NetSupportRAT

  16. 2024-12-13 (Friday): ww.anceltech[.]com compromised with #SmartApeSG leading to #NetSupport #RAT

    Saw 2 injected scripts, one for jitcom[.]info and best-net[.]biz.

    Pivoting on best-net[.]biz in URLscan show signs of six other possibly compromised sites: urlscan.io/search/#best-net.bi

    Those possibly compromised sites are:

    - destinationbedfordva[.]com
    - exceladept[.]com
    - thefilmverdict[.]com
    - thenapministry[.]com
    - www.estatesale-finder[.]com
    - www.freepetchipregistry[.]com

    I haven't tried them yet to confirm, but that's always been the case when I pivot on the SmartApeSG domains in URLscan.

    #NetSupportRAT C2 for this campaign since as early as 2024-11-22 has been 194.180.191[.]64

  17. 2024-12-11 (Wednesday): Zip archive containing #NetSupport #RAT (#NetSupportRAT) package hosted at hxxps[:]//homeservicephiladelphia[.]info/work/yyy.zip

    The C2 for this NetSupport package is 194.180.191[.]64, which is a known NetSupport C2 active since 2024-11-22, per ThreatFox: threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1346763

    Nothing new on the NetSupport side. I'm sure that hosting URL is part of an infection chain, but I don't know what's leading to it.

  18. The Russian cybercrime group FIN7 ran a network of fake AI undressing sites that delivered credential stealing malware to those who uploaded pictures. I gotta say, this is one group of cybercrime victims that I don't feel sorry for.

    silentpush.com/blog/fin7-malwa

    #FIN7 #Russia #Cybercrime #NetSupport #NetSupportRAT #RAT #Malware #CredentialTheft #AI #Deepfake #Deepfakes #DeepNude #DeepNueds #SilentPush

  19. Want to know the ins and outs of how we craft detection for our customers? Our new blog series covers the technical research that goes into each and every @snort rule, IP block and more. First up, we're covering the #NetSupport RAT blog.talosintelligence.com/det

  20. BattleRoyal's use of email and fake updates to deliver #DarkGate and #NetSupport is unique but aligns with the overall trend Proofpoint has observed of cybercriminal threat actors adopting new, varied, and increasingly creative attack chains  to enable malware delivery.

  21. And here’s an example attack chain observed in late November, also leveraging Keitaro TDS to deliver #NetSupport.

  22. We just published details on a new  activity cluster we are temporarily calling #BattleRoyal. It started distributing #DarkGate using distinct GroupIDs from Sept - Nov, then switched to #NetSupport. Delivery methods include email and fake update lures proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-

  23. Thanks for hosting a great event featuring innovation, collaboration and networking Edutech Europe! 🐧🍎

    Read Linux Professional Institute (LPI) Team Member Massimiliano Roveri‘s recap to learn more about the role of , , and in : lpi.org/qy7y