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#criticalinfrastructure — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #criticalinfrastructure, aggregated by home.social.

  1. 📣 Introducing Claroty Claire™ — the industry’s first CPS-native AI security agent built to help organizations protect mission-critical infrastructure with AI-powered CPS visibility, contextual insights, and agentic action

    Powered by the world’s most comprehensive CPS language model, Claire is a monumental leap forward for CPS security in an AI-driven world.

    📰 Read more: claroty.com/press-releases/cla

    #ClarotyClaire #AI #Cybersecurity #OTSecurity #CriticalInfrastructure

  2. Post 3/3
    The pattern runs across American municipal infrastructure. State actors use the intelligence to refine playbooks for the next target.
    Your insurance policy won't protect your reputation. Free software runs on expensive discipline—and public critical infrastructure collapses without it.
    haunted.lighthouse.co.im/artic

    #CriticalInfrastructure #Cybersecurity #Governance #DigitalSovereignty #LACMTA #Governance #MunicipalSecurity #Infrastructure #DataProtection

  3. Europe's Drone Defense Gap Exposes Critical Infrastructure Risks

    Europe's critical infrastructure is left vulnerable due to a lack of clear governance and rules of engagement, despite having the technology to defend against drone threats. The absence of ownership and jurisdictional clarity hinders the deployment of drone defense systems where they're needed most.

    osintsights.com/europes-drone-

    #CriticalInfrastructure #DroneDefense #Europe #Governance #NationalSecurity

  4. 📯#DigitalHistoryOFK: Zachary Loeb (Purdue University) explores “What’s the worst that could have happened? Y2K and the Risks of the Information Age.” This talk asks how Y2K was treated as a crisis aiming to help us better understand and navigate technological risks today.

    📅Wed ,27 May 2026, 4–6 pm (CET), online
    ℹ️dhistory.hypotheses.org/13480

    #4memory #DigitalHistory #HistoryOfTechnology #CriticalInfrastructure #STS
    @historikerinnen @histodons @digitalhumanities

  5. 📯#DigitalHistoryOFK: Zachary Loeb (Purdue University) explores “What’s the worst that could have happened? Y2K and the Risks of the Information Age.” This talk asks how Y2K was treated as a crisis aiming to help us better understand and navigate technological risks today.

    📅Wed ,27 May 2026, 4–6 pm (CET), online
    ℹ️dhistory.hypotheses.org/13480

    #4memory #DigitalHistory #HistoryOfTechnology #CriticalInfrastructure #STS
    @historikerinnen @histodons @digitalhumanities

  6. 📯#DigitalHistoryOFK: Zachary Loeb (Purdue University) explores “What’s the worst that could have happened? Y2K and the Risks of the Information Age.” This talk asks how Y2K was treated as a crisis aiming to help us better understand and navigate technological risks today.

    📅Wed ,27 May 2026, 4–6 pm (CET), online
    ℹ️dhistory.hypotheses.org/13480

    #4memory #DigitalHistory #HistoryOfTechnology #CriticalInfrastructure #STS
    @historikerinnen @histodons @digitalhumanities

  7. 📯#DigitalHistoryOFK: Zachary Loeb (Purdue University) explores “What’s the worst that could have happened? Y2K and the Risks of the Information Age.” This talk asks how Y2K was treated as a crisis aiming to help us better understand and navigate technological risks today.

    📅Wed ,27 May 2026, 4–6 pm (CET), online
    ℹ️dhistory.hypotheses.org/13480

    #4memory #DigitalHistory #HistoryOfTechnology #CriticalInfrastructure #STS
    @historikerinnen @histodons @digitalhumanities

  8. 🟡 Industrial Accident | 8/10
    🇭🇺

    Explosion at MOL petrochemical plant in Tiszaújváros
    Explosion at MOL Petrolkémia plant in Tiszaújváros during restart of Olefin 1 unit. One killed, several seriously injured.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #Hungary #IndustrialAccident #CriticalInfrastructure

  9. 🟡 Industrial Accident | 8/10
    🇭🇺

    Explosion at MOL petrochemical plant in Tiszaújváros
    Explosion at MOL Petrolkémia plant in Tiszaújváros during restart of Olefin 1 unit. One killed, several seriously injured.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #Hungary #IndustrialAccident #CriticalInfrastructure

  10. 🟡 Industrial Accident | 8/10
    🇭🇺

    Explosion at MOL petrochemical plant in Tiszaújváros
    Explosion at MOL Petrolkémia plant in Tiszaújváros during restart of Olefin 1 unit. One killed, several seriously injured.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #Hungary #IndustrialAccident #CriticalInfrastructure

  11. Europe must make big changes to compete with US, space chief warns – POLITICO

    The war between Russia and Ukraine has illustrated the dependencies. SpaceX — whose dominance in low-Earth orbit through…
    #NewsBeep #News #Space #AU #Australia #Communications #Companies #Connectivity #CriticalInfrastructure #ElonMusk #infrastructure #intelligence #investment #satellites #Science #Ukraine #UnitedStates #warinUkraine
    newsbeep.com/au/685090/

  12. New preprint: UAV-Space Framework 🛰️

    SPARTA/MITRE ATT&CK cover intentional threats to space
    infrastructure. Physical environment vectors — geomagnetic
    storms, SAA transits, SEP events — have no framework.

    UAV-Space fills that gap.

    Empirical basis:
    → 43,848h NASA OMNI2 real data
    → 18.3× anomaly rate during major storms (Kp≥7)
    → Fisher exact p=0.005, χ²=23.66 p<0.0001
    → 8.2× during Solar Energetic Particle events

    Each physical phenomenon modeled as threat actor:
    TTPs, IoCs, advance warning, NIS2 Art.21 playbooks

    Key finding: NOAA SWPC gives 24h CME advance warning.
    No operator today has a procedure to use that window.
    UAV-Space pre-defines the procedures.

    researchgate.net/publication/4

    #infosec #spacesecurity #threatintel #NIS2 #satellite
    #spaceweather #criticalinfrastructure #CRA

  13. New preprint: UAV-Space Framework 🛰️

    SPARTA/MITRE ATT&CK cover intentional threats to space
    infrastructure. Physical environment vectors — geomagnetic
    storms, SAA transits, SEP events — have no framework.

    UAV-Space fills that gap.

    Empirical basis:
    → 43,848h NASA OMNI2 real data
    → 18.3× anomaly rate during major storms (Kp≥7)
    → Fisher exact p=0.005, χ²=23.66 p<0.0001
    → 8.2× during Solar Energetic Particle events

    Each physical phenomenon modeled as threat actor:
    TTPs, IoCs, advance warning, NIS2 Art.21 playbooks

    Key finding: NOAA SWPC gives 24h CME advance warning.
    No operator today has a procedure to use that window.
    UAV-Space pre-defines the procedures.

    researchgate.net/publication/4

    #infosec #spacesecurity #threatintel #NIS2 #satellite
    #spaceweather #criticalinfrastructure #CRA

  14. New preprint: UAV-Space Framework 🛰️

    SPARTA/MITRE ATT&CK cover intentional threats to space
    infrastructure. Physical environment vectors — geomagnetic
    storms, SAA transits, SEP events — have no framework.

    UAV-Space fills that gap.

    Empirical basis:
    → 43,848h NASA OMNI2 real data
    → 18.3× anomaly rate during major storms (Kp≥7)
    → Fisher exact p=0.005, χ²=23.66 p<0.0001
    → 8.2× during Solar Energetic Particle events

    Each physical phenomenon modeled as threat actor:
    TTPs, IoCs, advance warning, NIS2 Art.21 playbooks

    Key finding: NOAA SWPC gives 24h CME advance warning.
    No operator today has a procedure to use that window.
    UAV-Space pre-defines the procedures.

    researchgate.net/publication/4

    #infosec #spacesecurity #threatintel #NIS2 #satellite
    #spaceweather #criticalinfrastructure #CRA

  15. Australia's North Targets Economic Security Boost with Hybrid Zone Model

    Australia's north is poised for an economic security boost with a groundbreaking hybrid zone model that leverages its vast energy, critical minerals, and industrial capabilities. By unlocking the region's potential, Australia can supercharge its national power and create a brighter future.

    osintsights.com/australias-nor

    #EconomicSecurity #NationalSecurity #Energy #CriticalInfrastructure #IndustrialCapability

  16. Everyone's writing about Iran charging for internet cables.

    The actual story: Alcatel just stopped fixing them.

    Iran's fee demands are legally unenforceable and affect less than 1% of global bandwidth, but ASN pausing Gulf repairs while Red Sea cables remain degraded from Houthi damage? That's a real gap with no easy fix.

    Two chokepoints, one repair fleet.

    #geopolitics #osint #subseacables #iran #hormuz #maritimesecurity #criticalinfrastructure

    How realistic is threat of Iran charging to use internet cables under strait of Hormuz?
    theguardian.com/world/2026/may

  17. Everyone's writing about Iran charging for internet cables.

    The actual story: Alcatel just stopped fixing them.

    Iran's fee demands are legally unenforceable and affect less than 1% of global bandwidth, but ASN pausing Gulf repairs while Red Sea cables remain degraded from Houthi damage? That's a real gap with no easy fix.

    Two chokepoints, one repair fleet.

    #geopolitics #osint #subseacables #iran #hormuz #maritimesecurity #criticalinfrastructure

    How realistic is threat of Iran charging to use internet cables under strait of Hormuz?
    theguardian.com/world/2026/may

  18. Everyone's writing about Iran charging for internet cables.

    The actual story: Alcatel just stopped fixing them.

    Iran's fee demands are legally unenforceable and affect less than 1% of global bandwidth, but ASN pausing Gulf repairs while Red Sea cables remain degraded from Houthi damage? That's a real gap with no easy fix.

    Two chokepoints, one repair fleet.

    #geopolitics #osint #subseacables #iran #hormuz #maritimesecurity #criticalinfrastructure

    How realistic is threat of Iran charging to use internet cables under strait of Hormuz?
    theguardian.com/world/2026/may

  19. Everyone's writing about Iran charging for internet cables.

    The actual story: Alcatel just stopped fixing them.

    Iran's fee demands are legally unenforceable and affect less than 1% of global bandwidth, but ASN pausing Gulf repairs while Red Sea cables remain degraded from Houthi damage? That's a real gap with no easy fix.

    Two chokepoints, one repair fleet.

    #geopolitics #osint #subseacables #iran #hormuz #maritimesecurity #criticalinfrastructure

    How realistic is threat of Iran charging to use internet cables under strait of Hormuz?
    theguardian.com/world/2026/may

  20. Everyone's writing about Iran charging for internet cables.

    The actual story: Alcatel just stopped fixing them.

    Iran's fee demands are legally unenforceable and affect less than 1% of global bandwidth, but ASN pausing Gulf repairs while Red Sea cables remain degraded from Houthi damage? That's a real gap with no easy fix.

    Two chokepoints, one repair fleet.

    #geopolitics #osint #subseacables #iran #hormuz #maritimesecurity #criticalinfrastructure

    How realistic is threat of Iran charging to use internet cables under strait of Hormuz?
    theguardian.com/world/2026/may

  21. 📰 Japan Introduces New National Strategy to Defend Critical Infrastructure from Cyberattacks

    Japan unveils a new national cyber defense strategy for its critical infrastructure. 🇯🇵 The plan targets 15 sectors and focuses on AI-driven threats, workforce development, and vendor accountability. #CyberSecurity #Japan #CriticalInfrastructure #P...

    🌐 cyber[.]netsecops[.]io

    🔗 cyber.netsecops.io/articles/ja

  22. 📰 Japan Introduces New National Strategy to Defend Critical Infrastructure from Cyberattacks

    Japan unveils a new national cyber defense strategy for its critical infrastructure. 🇯🇵 The plan targets 15 sectors and focuses on AI-driven threats, workforce development, and vendor accountability. #CyberSecurity #Japan #CriticalInfrastructure #P...

    🌐 cyber[.]netsecops[.]io

    🔗 cyber.netsecops.io/articles/ja

  23. Navigating the complexities of cyber-physical systems (CPS) can feel like an uphill battle, but you don’t have to fight it alone.

    This Champion’s Playbook is a strategic guide designed to help you bridge the gap between IT security and operational reality. It provides the tools and language necessary to move beyond simple tool deployment and build a mature, governed security program that keeps your servers humming.

    📙 Download here: claroty.com/resources/white-pa

    #DataCenter #Cybersecurity #CriticalInfrastructure #OperationalResilience

  24. Navigating the complexities of cyber-physical systems (CPS) can feel like an uphill battle, but you don’t have to fight it alone.

    This Champion’s Playbook is a strategic guide designed to help you bridge the gap between IT security and operational reality. It provides the tools and language necessary to move beyond simple tool deployment and build a mature, governed security program that keeps your servers humming.

    📙 Download here: claroty.com/resources/white-pa

    #DataCenter #Cybersecurity #CriticalInfrastructure #OperationalResilience

  25. Cable Retriever (GB) confirmed on dynamic positioning hold off Tamsui, Taiwan, 8h+ on station as of 5:34 UTC today.

    Coordinating with Ile d'Aix (FR), reported on station since May 9, per open sources.

    Both repairing the Taiwan-Matsu No.3 cable, damaged in April by a Chinese salvage barge.

    This is what the infrastructure war looks like.

    Of course, one can safely assume there is nothing strategically noteworthy about repeated disruptions to critical communications infrastructure in one of the world’s most contested theatres. Merely an unfortunate sequence of maritime coincidences.

    #OSINT #Taiwan #China #Geopolitics #MaritimeSecurity #SubmarineCables #CriticalInfrastructure #GrayZone #IndoPacific #InternetInfrastructure #Security

  26. Cable Retriever (GB) confirmed on dynamic positioning hold off Tamsui, Taiwan, 8h+ on station as of 5:34 UTC today.

    Coordinating with Ile d'Aix (FR), reported on station since May 9, per open sources.

    Both repairing the Taiwan-Matsu No.3 cable, damaged in April by a Chinese salvage barge.

    This is what the infrastructure war looks like.

    Of course, one can safely assume there is nothing strategically noteworthy about repeated disruptions to critical communications infrastructure in one of the world’s most contested theatres. Merely an unfortunate sequence of maritime coincidences.

    #OSINT #Taiwan #China #Geopolitics #MaritimeSecurity #SubmarineCables #CriticalInfrastructure #GrayZone #IndoPacific #InternetInfrastructure #Security

  27. Cable Retriever (GB) confirmed on dynamic positioning hold off Tamsui, Taiwan, 8h+ on station as of 5:34 UTC today.

    Coordinating with Ile d'Aix (FR), reported on station since May 9, per open sources.

    Both repairing the Taiwan-Matsu No.3 cable, damaged in April by a Chinese salvage barge.

    This is what the infrastructure war looks like.

    Of course, one can safely assume there is nothing strategically noteworthy about repeated disruptions to critical communications infrastructure in one of the world’s most contested theatres. Merely an unfortunate sequence of maritime coincidences.

    #OSINT #Taiwan #China #Geopolitics #MaritimeSecurity #SubmarineCables #CriticalInfrastructure #GrayZone #IndoPacific #InternetInfrastructure #Security

  28. Cable Retriever (GB) confirmed on dynamic positioning hold off Tamsui, Taiwan, 8h+ on station as of 5:34 UTC today.

    Coordinating with Ile d'Aix (FR), reported on station since May 9, per open sources.

    Both repairing the Taiwan-Matsu No.3 cable, damaged in April by a Chinese salvage barge.

    This is what the infrastructure war looks like.

    Of course, one can safely assume there is nothing strategically noteworthy about repeated disruptions to critical communications infrastructure in one of the world’s most contested theatres. Merely an unfortunate sequence of maritime coincidences.

    #OSINT #Taiwan #China #Geopolitics #MaritimeSecurity #SubmarineCables #CriticalInfrastructure #GrayZone #IndoPacific #InternetInfrastructure #Security

  29. Cable Retriever (GB) confirmed on dynamic positioning hold off Tamsui, Taiwan, 8h+ on station as of 5:34 UTC today.

    Coordinating with Ile d'Aix (FR), reported on station since May 9, per open sources.

    Both repairing the Taiwan-Matsu No.3 cable, damaged in April by a Chinese salvage barge.

    This is what the infrastructure war looks like.

    Of course, one can safely assume there is nothing strategically noteworthy about repeated disruptions to critical communications infrastructure in one of the world’s most contested theatres. Merely an unfortunate sequence of maritime coincidences.

    #OSINT #Taiwan #China #Geopolitics #MaritimeSecurity #SubmarineCables #CriticalInfrastructure #GrayZone #IndoPacific #InternetInfrastructure #Security

  30. A fast alert with a slow decision is still a slow security system.

    I published “Decision-Centric Security — Part II: The 90-Day Blueprint”.

    A public reference architecture for improving:

    alert → triage → escalation → decision → action → evidence

    SOC workflows · incident response · escalation ownership · MTTD/MTTR/MTTDec · HITL · audit-ready evidence.

    doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20256709

    #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #SOC #IncidentResponse #AISecurity #Governance #CriticalInfrastructure #NIS2

  31. 🟡 Drone Strike | 7/10
    🇦🇪

    Fire near nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi after drone strike
    A fire broke out near a nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi following a drone strike.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #UAE #DroneStrike #NuclearSafety #CriticalInfrastructure

  32. 🟡 Drone Strike | 7/10
    🇦🇪

    Fire near nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi after drone strike
    A fire broke out near a nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi following a drone strike.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #UAE #DroneStrike #NuclearSafety #CriticalInfrastructure

  33. 🟡 Drone Strike | 7/10
    🇦🇪

    Fire near nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi after drone strike
    A fire broke out near a nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi following a drone strike.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #UAE #DroneStrike #NuclearSafety #CriticalInfrastructure

  34. 🟡 CyberAttack | 7/10
    🇺🇸 🇮🇷

    Suspected hack of fuel monitoring systems in US
    US officials suspect Iranian hackers breached automatic tank gauge systems at gas stations across multiple states via unprotected online connections.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #CyberAttack #Iran #CriticalInfrastructure

  35. 🟡 CyberAttack | 7/10
    🇺🇸 🇮🇷

    Suspected hack of fuel monitoring systems in US
    US officials suspect Iranian hackers breached automatic tank gauge systems at gas stations across multiple states via unprotected online connections.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #CyberAttack #Iran #CriticalInfrastructure

  36. 🟡 CyberAttack | 7/10
    🇺🇸 🇮🇷

    Suspected hack of fuel monitoring systems in US
    US officials suspect Iranian hackers breached automatic tank gauge systems at gas stations across multiple states via unprotected online connections.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #CyberAttack #Iran #CriticalInfrastructure

  37. 🟡 CyberAttack | 7/10
    🇺🇸 🇮🇷

    Suspected hack of fuel monitoring systems in US
    US officials suspect Iranian hackers breached automatic tank gauge systems at gas stations across multiple states via unprotected online connections.

    #OSINT #NewsGroup #CyberAttack #Iran #CriticalInfrastructure

  38. Australia's Supply Chains Face Structural Resilience Test

    Australia's supply chains, once optimized for efficiency, are now facing a harsh reality: a world where disruption is the new norm, and resilience is the ultimate test. The intricate link between fuel and fertiliser - a coupled system that drives farming productivity - is buckling under the pressure, threatening economic and…

    osintsights.com/australias-sup

    #SupplyChain #Australia #NationalSecurity #EmergingThreats #CriticalInfrastructure

  39. In case you missed Claroty's PoC session at S4x26, it's now available on YouTube!

    See how xDome identifies the cyber assets in an OT environment, the associated vulnerabilities, and the actions you can take to reduce related risk most effectively.

    ▶️ Watch here → youtu.be/k7RhtjZepEw?si=w7VwJ3

    Want more context? 📖 Read our blog on attaining deep visibility with Dynamic Discovery: claroty.com/blog/attaining-dee

    #S4x26 #OTSecurity #Cybersecurity #CriticalInfrastructure #AssetVisibility #VulnerabilityManagement #RiskMitigation #DynamicDiscovery