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#humanspaceflightsecurity — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #humanspaceflightsecurity, aggregated by home.social.

  1. The #spacesuits on #Artemis II should be able to sustain astronauts for up to six days. Once Artemis II is on its way to the #Moon 🌙, the mission’s trajectory is designed to bring it back to Earth even if Orion hits a snag.

    Artemis I : During Orion’s return through Earth’s atmosphere, material from the capsule’s heatshield had broken off in chunks. There was a similarly problematic heatshield already installed on the crew capsule for Artemis II planetary.org/articles/whats-k

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  2. The #spacesuits on #Artemis II should be able to sustain astronauts for up to six days. Once Artemis II is on its way to the #Moon 🌙, the mission’s trajectory is designed to bring it back to Earth even if Orion hits a snag.

    Artemis I : During Orion’s return through Earth’s atmosphere, material from the capsule’s heatshield had broken off in chunks. There was a similarly problematic heatshield already installed on the crew capsule for Artemis II planetary.org/articles/whats-k

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  3. The #spacesuits on #Artemis II should be able to sustain astronauts for up to six days. Once Artemis II is on its way to the #Moon 🌙, the mission’s trajectory is designed to bring it back to Earth even if Orion hits a snag.

    Artemis I : During Orion’s return through Earth’s atmosphere, material from the capsule’s heatshield had broken off in chunks. There was a similarly problematic heatshield already installed on the crew capsule for Artemis II planetary.org/articles/whats-k

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  4. The #spacesuits on #Artemis II should be able to sustain astronauts for up to six days. Once Artemis II is on its way to the #Moon 🌙, the mission’s trajectory is designed to bring it back to Earth even if Orion hits a snag.

    Artemis I : During Orion’s return through Earth’s atmosphere, material from the capsule’s heatshield had broken off in chunks. There was a similarly problematic heatshield already installed on the crew capsule for Artemis II planetary.org/articles/whats-k

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  5. The #spacesuits on #Artemis II should be able to sustain astronauts for up to six days. Once Artemis II is on its way to the #Moon 🌙, the mission’s trajectory is designed to bring it back to Earth even if Orion hits a snag.

    Artemis I : During Orion’s return through Earth’s atmosphere, material from the capsule’s heatshield had broken off in chunks. There was a similarly problematic heatshield already installed on the crew capsule for Artemis II planetary.org/articles/whats-k

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  6. RE: mastodon.social/@arstechnica/1

    The way #NASA is assessing and communicating risk for #Artemis II sharply contrasts with how the agency formulated and discussed risk assessments for several recent notable missions.

    Honeycutt and Glaze are not the first NASA officials to question the validity of probabilistic risk assessments, which rely on numerical and statistical inputs, many of which are grounded in assumptions 🔮.

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  7. RE: mastodon.social/@arstechnica/1

    The way #NASA is assessing and communicating risk for #Artemis II sharply contrasts with how the agency formulated and discussed risk assessments for several recent notable missions.

    Honeycutt and Glaze are not the first NASA officials to question the validity of probabilistic risk assessments, which rely on numerical and statistical inputs, many of which are grounded in assumptions 🔮.

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  8. RE: mastodon.social/@arstechnica/1

    The way #NASA is assessing and communicating risk for #Artemis II sharply contrasts with how the agency formulated and discussed risk assessments for several recent notable missions.

    Honeycutt and Glaze are not the first NASA officials to question the validity of probabilistic risk assessments, which rely on numerical and statistical inputs, many of which are grounded in assumptions 🔮.

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  9. RE: mastodon.social/@arstechnica/1

    The way #NASA is assessing and communicating risk for #Artemis II sharply contrasts with how the agency formulated and discussed risk assessments for several recent notable missions.

    Honeycutt and Glaze are not the first NASA officials to question the validity of probabilistic risk assessments, which rely on numerical and statistical inputs, many of which are grounded in assumptions 🔮.

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  10. RE: mastodon.social/@arstechnica/1

    The way #NASA is assessing and communicating risk for #Artemis II sharply contrasts with how the agency formulated and discussed risk assessments for several recent notable missions.

    Honeycutt and Glaze are not the first NASA officials to question the validity of probabilistic risk assessments, which rely on numerical and statistical inputs, many of which are grounded in assumptions 🔮.

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  11. 📆 1983 Mission summary STS-9, Commander John Young* : "Had we then activated the Backup Flight Software, loss of vehicle and crew 💥 would have resulted" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-9#Mi

    * the only astronaut to walk on the Moon and fly on the #SpaceShuttle

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  12. 📆 1983 Mission summary STS-9, Commander John Young* : "Had we then activated the Backup Flight Software, loss of vehicle and crew 💥 would have resulted" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-9#Mi

    * the only astronaut to walk on the Moon and fly on the #SpaceShuttle

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  13. 📆 1983 Mission summary STS-9, Commander John Young* : "Had we then activated the Backup Flight Software, loss of vehicle and crew 💥 would have resulted" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-9#Mi

    * the only astronaut to walk on the Moon and fly on the #SpaceShuttle

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  14. 📆 1983 Mission summary STS-9, Commander John Young* : "Had we then activated the Backup Flight Software, loss of vehicle and crew 💥 would have resulted" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-9#Mi

    * the only astronaut to walk on the Moon and fly on the #SpaceShuttle

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  15. 📆 1983 Mission summary STS-9, Commander John Young* : "Had we then activated the Backup Flight Software, loss of vehicle and crew 💥 would have resulted" en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-9#Mi

    * the only astronaut to walk on the Moon and fly on the #SpaceShuttle

    #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  16. The #Buran also had emergency ejection seats 💺 for all crew members (absent on the #US shuttles) and was free from the specific design flaws that contributed to the destruction 💥 of two shuttles in flight, the #Challenger in 1986 and the #Columbia in 2003 edition.cnn.com/style/article/

    #SpaceShuttle #NASA #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  17. The #Buran also had emergency ejection seats 💺 for all crew members (absent on the #US shuttles) and was free from the specific design flaws that contributed to the destruction 💥 of two shuttles in flight, the #Challenger in 1986 and the #Columbia in 2003 edition.cnn.com/style/article/

    #SpaceShuttle #NASA #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  18. The #Buran also had emergency ejection seats 💺 for all crew members (absent on the #US shuttles) and was free from the specific design flaws that contributed to the destruction 💥 of two shuttles in flight, the #Challenger in 1986 and the #Columbia in 2003 edition.cnn.com/style/article/

    #SpaceShuttle #NASA #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  19. The #Buran also had emergency ejection seats 💺 for all crew members (absent on the #US shuttles) and was free from the specific design flaws that contributed to the destruction 💥 of two shuttles in flight, the #Challenger in 1986 and the #Columbia in 2003 edition.cnn.com/style/article/

    #SpaceShuttle #NASA #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  20. The #Buran also had emergency ejection seats 💺 for all crew members (absent on the #US shuttles) and was free from the specific design flaws that contributed to the destruction 💥 of two shuttles in flight, the #Challenger in 1986 and the #Columbia in 2003 edition.cnn.com/style/article/

    #SpaceShuttle #NASA #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  21. RE: social.heise.de/@heiseonlineen

    #Wilmore had already admitted that the problems were more massive than previously known. He stated that he could no longer control 🕹️ the spacecraft properly before the docking attempt.

    #Starliner #Boeing #NASA #ISS #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  22. RE: social.heise.de/@heiseonlineen

    #Wilmore had already admitted that the problems were more massive than previously known. He stated that he could no longer control 🕹️ the spacecraft properly before the docking attempt.

    #Starliner #Boeing #NASA #ISS #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  23. RE: social.heise.de/@heiseonlineen

    #Wilmore had already admitted that the problems were more massive than previously known. He stated that he could no longer control 🕹️ the spacecraft properly before the docking attempt.

    #Starliner #Boeing #NASA #ISS #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  24. RE: social.heise.de/@heiseonlineen

    #Wilmore had already admitted that the problems were more massive than previously known. He stated that he could no longer control 🕹️ the spacecraft properly before the docking attempt.

    #Starliner #Boeing #NASA #ISS #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  25. RE: social.heise.de/@heiseonlineen

    #Wilmore had already admitted that the problems were more massive than previously known. He stated that he could no longer control 🕹️ the spacecraft properly before the docking attempt.

    #Starliner #Boeing #NASA #ISS #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  26. #NASA indefinitely delays ⏳ return of Starliner. During a pair of news conferences since #Starliner docked to the station officials have downplayed 🙈🙉🙊 the overall seriousness 😱 of the issues. But they have yet to fully explain why they are not yet comfortable with releasing Starliner to fly back to Earth under normal circumstances. arstechnica.com/space/2024/06/

    #Boeing #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  27. #NASA indefinitely delays ⏳ return of Starliner. During a pair of news conferences since #Starliner docked to the station officials have downplayed 🙈🙉🙊 the overall seriousness 😱 of the issues. But they have yet to fully explain why they are not yet comfortable with releasing Starliner to fly back to Earth under normal circumstances. arstechnica.com/space/2024/06/

    #Boeing #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  28. #NASA indefinitely delays ⏳ return of Starliner. During a pair of news conferences since #Starliner docked to the station officials have downplayed 🙈🙉🙊 the overall seriousness 😱 of the issues. But they have yet to fully explain why they are not yet comfortable with releasing Starliner to fly back to Earth under normal circumstances. arstechnica.com/space/2024/06/

    #Boeing #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  29. #NASA indefinitely delays ⏳ return of Starliner. During a pair of news conferences since #Starliner docked to the station officials have downplayed 🙈🙉🙊 the overall seriousness 😱 of the issues. But they have yet to fully explain why they are not yet comfortable with releasing Starliner to fly back to Earth under normal circumstances. arstechnica.com/space/2024/06/

    #Boeing #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  30. #NASA indefinitely delays ⏳ return of Starliner. During a pair of news conferences since #Starliner docked to the station officials have downplayed 🙈🙉🙊 the overall seriousness 😱 of the issues. But they have yet to fully explain why they are not yet comfortable with releasing Starliner to fly back to Earth under normal circumstances. arstechnica.com/space/2024/06/

    #Boeing #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  31. Let's hope they also check the door bolts 🤔
    "...slipped from February to April 2023 as the company works with #NASA to fix lingering technical issues from the #spacecraft's last uncrewed test flight" reuters.com/business/aerospace

    #Boeing #Starliner #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  32. Let's hope they also check the door bolts 🤔
    "...slipped from February to April 2023 as the company works with #NASA to fix lingering technical issues from the #spacecraft's last uncrewed test flight" reuters.com/business/aerospace

    #Boeing #Starliner #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  33. Let's hope they also check the door bolts 🤔
    "...slipped from February to April 2023 as the company works with #NASA to fix lingering technical issues from the #spacecraft's last uncrewed test flight" reuters.com/business/aerospace

    #Boeing #Starliner #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  34. Let's hope they also check the door bolts 🤔
    "...slipped from February to April 2023 as the company works with #NASA to fix lingering technical issues from the #spacecraft's last uncrewed test flight" reuters.com/business/aerospace

    #Boeing #Starliner #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  35. Let's hope they also check the door bolts 🤔
    "...slipped from February to April 2023 as the company works with to fix lingering technical issues from the 's last uncrewed test flight" reuters.com/business/aerospace

  36. Since all launch vehicles are specialized - and literally #RocketScience - the #FAA believes operators are best suited to sniff out root causes and identify corrective actions. The agency estimates that in-house investigations could take the agency 10-20 times longer 🥱.
    As for #HumanSpaceflight / tourism, the industry has been operating under an eight-year “learning period,” where the FAA is restricted from enacting regulations. The learning period is set to expire on 📆 Jan. 1 payloadspace.com/the-gao-calls

    #SpaceRegulation #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  37. Since all launch vehicles are specialized - and literally #RocketScience - the #FAA believes operators are best suited to sniff out root causes and identify corrective actions. The agency estimates that in-house investigations could take the agency 10-20 times longer 🥱.
    As for #HumanSpaceflight / tourism, the industry has been operating under an eight-year “learning period,” where the FAA is restricted from enacting regulations. The learning period is set to expire on 📆 Jan. 1 payloadspace.com/the-gao-calls

    #SpaceRegulation #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  38. Since all launch vehicles are specialized - and literally #RocketScience - the #FAA believes operators are best suited to sniff out root causes and identify corrective actions. The agency estimates that in-house investigations could take the agency 10-20 times longer 🥱.
    As for #HumanSpaceflight / tourism, the industry has been operating under an eight-year “learning period,” where the FAA is restricted from enacting regulations. The learning period is set to expire on 📆 Jan. 1 payloadspace.com/the-gao-calls

    #SpaceRegulation #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  39. Since all launch vehicles are specialized - and literally #RocketScience - the #FAA believes operators are best suited to sniff out root causes and identify corrective actions. The agency estimates that in-house investigations could take the agency 10-20 times longer 🥱.
    As for #HumanSpaceflight / tourism, the industry has been operating under an eight-year “learning period,” where the FAA is restricted from enacting regulations. The learning period is set to expire on 📆 Jan. 1 payloadspace.com/the-gao-calls

    #SpaceRegulation #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  40. Since all launch vehicles are specialized - and literally - the believes operators are best suited to sniff out root causes and identify corrective actions. The agency estimates that in-house investigations could take the agency 10-20 times longer 🥱.
    As for / tourism, the industry has been operating under an eight-year “learning period,” where the FAA is restricted from enacting regulations. The learning period is set to expire on 📆 Jan. 1 payloadspace.com/the-gao-calls

  41. Reaching #orbit means accelerating up to around 28,000kph (22 times the speed of sound). A five-gram #bolt 🔩 hitting at #OrbitalSpeed packs as much #energy 💥 as a 200kg weight dropped from the top of an 18-storey building. The typical #radiation ☢️ dose from one day in #space is equivalent to what you’d receive over an entire year back on #Earth sciencefocus.com/space/space-t

    #SpaceTravel #HumanSpaceflightHealth #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  42. Reaching #orbit means accelerating up to around 28,000kph (22 times the speed of sound). A five-gram #bolt 🔩 hitting at #OrbitalSpeed packs as much #energy 💥 as a 200kg weight dropped from the top of an 18-storey building. The typical #radiation ☢️ dose from one day in #space is equivalent to what you’d receive over an entire year back on #Earth sciencefocus.com/space/space-t

    #SpaceTravel #HumanSpaceflightHealth #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  43. Reaching #orbit means accelerating up to around 28,000kph (22 times the speed of sound). A five-gram #bolt 🔩 hitting at #OrbitalSpeed packs as much #energy 💥 as a 200kg weight dropped from the top of an 18-storey building. The typical #radiation ☢️ dose from one day in #space is equivalent to what you’d receive over an entire year back on #Earth sciencefocus.com/space/space-t

    #SpaceTravel #HumanSpaceflightHealth #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  44. Reaching #orbit means accelerating up to around 28,000kph (22 times the speed of sound). A five-gram #bolt 🔩 hitting at #OrbitalSpeed packs as much #energy 💥 as a 200kg weight dropped from the top of an 18-storey building. The typical #radiation ☢️ dose from one day in #space is equivalent to what you’d receive over an entire year back on #Earth sciencefocus.com/space/space-t

    #SpaceTravel #HumanSpaceflightHealth #HumanSpaceflightSecurity

  45. Reaching means accelerating up to around 28,000kph (22 times the speed of sound). A five-gram 🔩 hitting at packs as much 💥 as a 200kg weight dropped from the top of an 18-storey building. The typical ☢️ dose from one day in is equivalent to what you’d receive over an entire year back on sciencefocus.com/space/space-t