home.social

#triton — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #triton, aggregated by home.social.

fetched live
  1. Triton Video

    NASA Voyager 2 spacecraft flew by Triton, a moon of Neptune, on August 25, 1989. This frame from a video using Voyager data recreates that exciting encounter.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA186
    Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech/Lunar & Planetary Institute

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  2. Triton Surface Topography

    NASA Voyager 2 was 530,000 kilometers 330,000 miles from Neptune largest satellite, Triton, when this photo was taken, Aug. 24, 1989. This is the first photo of Triton to reveal surface topography.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA022
    Credit: NASA/JPL

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  3. @HardBeingGreen
    Long toot… apologies

    An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

    IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

    There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

    If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

    #Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

    /all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

  4. @HardBeingGreen
    Long toot… apologies

    An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

    IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

    There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

    If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

    #Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

    /all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

  5. @HardBeingGreen
    Long toot… apologies

    An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

    IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

    There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

    If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

    #Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

    /all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

  6. @HardBeingGreen
    Long toot… apologies

    An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

    IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

    There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

    If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

    #Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

    /all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

  7. @HardBeingGreen
    Long toot… apologies

    An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

    IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

    There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

    If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

    #Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

    /all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

  8. Triton likely formed in the outer solar system before Neptune captured it, largely destroying the planet’s original moon system. JWST observations published in July 2026 suggest today’s inner moons reassembled from the wreckage — although Nereid may be one original survivor.
    atlas.whatip.xyz/post.php?slug
    <p>Webb spectra suggest Neptune’s inner moons were rebuilt from destroyed icy interiors
    #original #neptune #system #triton

  9. Voyager Parting Shot of Triton

    NASA Voyager 2 obtained this parting shot of Triton, Neptune largest satellite, shortly after closest approach to the moon and passage through its shadow on the morning of Aug. 25, 1989.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA022
    Credit: NASA/JPL

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  10. Today is my last day with @smartosorg and @triton_dc .

    I will still be in greater - #illumos .

    Also both #smartos and #triton developers and users are quite a good community!

  11. Today is my last day with @smartosorg and @triton_dc .

    I will still be in greater - #illumos .

    Also both #smartos and #triton developers and users are quite a good community!

  12. Today is my last day with @smartosorg and @triton_dc .

    I will still be in greater - #illumos .

    Also both #smartos and #triton developers and users are quite a good community!

  13. Today is my last day with @smartosorg and @triton_dc .

    I will still be in greater - #illumos .

    Also both #smartos and #triton developers and users are quite a good community!

  14. Today is my last day with @smartosorg and @triton_dc .

    I will still be in greater - #illumos .

    Also both #smartos and #triton developers and users are quite a good community!

  15. FYI: Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #NasdaqStockholm #Triton #TakePrivateDeal #FinancialNews

  16. FYI: Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #NasdaqStockholm #Triton #TakePrivateDeal #FinancialNews

  17. FYI: Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #NasdaqStockholm #Triton #TakePrivateDeal #FinancialNews

  18. ICYMI: Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #NasdaqStockholm #TakePrivate #InvestmentDeals

  19. ICYMI: Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #NasdaqStockholm #TakePrivate #InvestmentDeals

  20. ICYMI: Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #NasdaqStockholm #TakePrivate #InvestmentDeals

  21. Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #Nasdaq #Stockholm #Finance

  22. Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #Nasdaq #Stockholm #Finance

  23. Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #Nasdaq #Stockholm #Finance

  24. Cint exits Nasdaq Stockholm as Triton closes SEK 2bn take-private deal: Shares stopped trading on 7 August after the bidder reached 93% acceptance at SEK 5.60. Buyers lose another measurement vendor's quarterly numbers. What now? ppc.land/cint-exits-nasdaq-sto #Cint #Triton #Nasdaq #Stockholm #Finance

  25. Global Color Mosaic of Triton

    Global color mosaic of Triton, taken in 1989 by Voyager 2 during its flyby of the Neptune system. Color was synthesized by combining high-resolution images taken through orange, violet, and ultraviolet filters; these images were displayed as red, green, and blue images and combined to create this color version. With a radius of 1,350 (...

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA003
    Credit: NASA/JPL/USGS

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  26. Montage of Neptune and Triton

    This computer generated montage created from images obtained by NASA Voyager 2 shows Neptune as it would appear from a spacecraft approaching Triton, Neptune largest moon at 2706 km 1683 mi in diameter. photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/cata

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA003
    Credit: NASA/JPL/USGS

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  27. Kazry — новая кусочно‑заданная активация

    Привет, Хабр, в этой статье я хочу представить новую функцию активации для нейронных сетей под названием Kazry, которая по результатам тестов обошла SiLU .

    habr.com/ru/articles/1067080/

    #Kazry #ai #triton #казри #pytorch #машинное+обучение #machinelearning

  28. Kazry — новая кусочно‑заданная активация

    Привет, Хабр, в этой статье я хочу представить новую функцию активации для нейронных сетей под названием Kazry, которая по результатам тестов обошла SiLU .

    habr.com/ru/articles/1067080/

    #Kazry #ai #triton #казри #pytorch #машинное+обучение #machinelearning

  29. Kazry — новая кусочно‑заданная активация

    Привет, Хабр, в этой статье я хочу представить новую функцию активации для нейронных сетей под названием Kazry, которая по результатам тестов обошла SiLU .

    habr.com/ru/articles/1067080/

    #Kazry #ai #triton #казри #pytorch #машинное+обучение #machinelearning

  30. #Neptune’s moon #Triton was likely once a #KuiperBeltObject, destroying all the planet’s original satellites (save Nereid) as it fell into Neptune’s gravity well.

    Webb telescope finds signs of ancient disaster for Neptune's moons | Reuters reuters.com/science/webb-teles #science #astronomy

  31. #Neptune’s moon #Triton was likely once a #KuiperBeltObject, destroying all the planet’s original satellites (save Nereid) as it fell into Neptune’s gravity well.

    Webb telescope finds signs of ancient disaster for Neptune's moons | Reuters reuters.com/science/webb-teles #science #astronomy

  32. #Neptune’s moon #Triton was likely once a #KuiperBeltObject, destroying all the planet’s original satellites (save Nereid) as it fell into Neptune’s gravity well.

    Webb telescope finds signs of ancient disaster for Neptune's moons | Reuters reuters.com/science/webb-teles #science #astronomy

  33. #Neptune’s moon #Triton was likely once a #KuiperBeltObject, destroying all the planet’s original satellites (save Nereid) as it fell into Neptune’s gravity well.

    Webb telescope finds signs of ancient disaster for Neptune's moons | Reuters reuters.com/science/webb-teles #science #astronomy

  34. #Neptune’s moon #Triton was likely once a #KuiperBeltObject, destroying all the planet’s original satellites (save Nereid) as it fell into Neptune’s gravity well.

    Webb telescope finds signs of ancient disaster for Neptune's moons | Reuters reuters.com/science/webb-teles #science #astronomy

  35. Neptune’s moon system is bizarre. James Webb Space Telescope data helps explain why

    Neptune has a very strange moon system. The farthest planet from the Sun in our Solar System has…
    #NewsBeep #News #US #USA #UnitedStates #UnitedStatesOfAmerica #Science #howdidNeptune&#x27;smoonsform? #HowmanymoonsdoesNeptunehave? #JamesWebbSpaceTelescope #Moons #Neptune #Neptune&#x27;smoons #solarsystem #Triton #Tritonmoon
    newsbeep.com/us/796886/

  36. Neptune’s moon system is bizarre. James Webb Space Telescope data helps explain why

    Neptune has a very strange moon system. The farthest planet from the Sun in our Solar System has…
    #NewsBeep #News #Space #howdidNeptune&#x27;smoonsform? #HowmanymoonsdoesNeptunehave? #jameswebbspacetelescope #Moons #Neptune #Neptune&#x27;smoons #Science #solarsystem #Triton #Tritonmoon #UK #UnitedKingdom
    newsbeep.com/uk/719035/

  37. Neptune’s moon system is bizarre. James Webb Space Telescope data helps explain why

    Neptune has a very strange moon system. The farthest planet from the Sun in our Solar System has…
    #NewsBeep #News #Space #AU #Australia #howdidNeptune&#x27;smoonsform? #HowmanymoonsdoesNeptunehave? #Jameswebbspacetelescope #Moons #Neptune #Neptune&#x27;smoons #Science #SolarSystem #Triton #Tritonmoon
    newsbeep.com/au/833025/

  38. Neptune’s moon system is bizarre. James Webb Space Telescope data helps explain why

    Neptune has a very strange moon system. The farthest planet from the Sun in our Solar System has…
    #NewsBeep #News #Space #AU #Australia #howdidNeptune&#x27;smoonsform? #HowmanymoonsdoesNeptunehave? #Jameswebbspacetelescope #Moons #Neptune #Neptune&#x27;smoons #Science #SolarSystem #Triton #Tritonmoon
    newsbeep.com/au/833025/

  39. Triton

    This photo of Triton is one of a continuing series of observatory phase images obtained by NASA Voyager spacecraft. Lines inscribed on the image at right form a reference grid used by the Imaging Science Team.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA022
    Credit: NASA/JPL

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  40. Triton

    This photo of Triton is one of a continuing series of observatory phase images obtained by NASA Voyager spacecraft. Lines inscribed on the image at right form a reference grid used by the Imaging Science Team.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA022
    Credit: NASA/JPL

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  41. Triton

    This photo of Triton is one of a continuing series of observatory phase images obtained by NASA Voyager spacecraft. Lines inscribed on the image at right form a reference grid used by the Imaging Science Team.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA022
    Credit: NASA/JPL

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  42. Triton

    This photo of Triton is one of a continuing series of observatory phase images obtained by NASA Voyager spacecraft. Lines inscribed on the image at right form a reference grid used by the Imaging Science Team.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA022
    Credit: NASA/JPL

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  43. Triton Cantaloupe Terrain

    This view of the volcanic plains of Neptune moon Triton was produced using topographic maps derived from images acquired by NASA Voyager spacecraft during its August 1989 flyby, 20 years ago this week.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA121
    Credit: NASA/JPL/Universities Space Research Association/Lunar & Planetary Institute

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  44. Triton Cantaloupe Terrain

    This view of the volcanic plains of Neptune moon Triton was produced using topographic maps derived from images acquired by NASA Voyager spacecraft during its August 1989 flyby, 20 years ago this week.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA121
    Credit: NASA/JPL/Universities Space Research Association/Lunar & Planetary Institute

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  45. Triton Cantaloupe Terrain

    This view of the volcanic plains of Neptune moon Triton was produced using topographic maps derived from images acquired by NASA Voyager spacecraft during its August 1989 flyby, 20 years ago this week.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA121
    Credit: NASA/JPL/Universities Space Research Association/Lunar & Planetary Institute

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  46. Triton Cantaloupe Terrain

    This view of the volcanic plains of Neptune moon Triton was produced using topographic maps derived from images acquired by NASA Voyager spacecraft during its August 1989 flyby, 20 years ago this week.

    More: images.nasa.gov/details/PIA121
    Credit: NASA/JPL/Universities Space Research Association/Lunar & Planetary Institute

    #triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

  47. Nouveau disque "Bach TO Haendel" à paraître chez #Triton !
    Florilège de cantates sacrées et profanes par la soprano Géraldine Casey et l'organiste Vincent Grappy 💿 🎧

    Encore 7 jours pour aider à financer le projet !!
    👇👇 C'est ICI 👇 👇
    fr.ulule.com/bach-to-haendel/