#triton — Public Fediverse posts

@HardBeingGreen
Long toot… apologies

An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

#Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

/all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

@HardBeingGreen
Long toot… apologies

An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

#Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

/all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

@HardBeingGreen
Long toot… apologies

An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

#Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

/all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

@HardBeingGreen
Long toot… apologies

An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

#Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

/all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

@HardBeingGreen
Long toot… apologies

An interesting article, if somewhat dated (some of the refefence links no longer return a page - 404 cannot be found). I had to laugh at the #Beazly reference, he really didn’t understand that issue very well, he had the basic idea but a confused understanding of it — based on the quoted words in the reference and my limited knowledge.

IMO the ‘kill switch’ (back door, trojan or whatever) is ultimately controlled via *comms* of some sort. If an asset goes dark (as boats do all the time), there’s no way to ‘kill it remotely’ unless it is baked-in and ‘clocked’ — think Y2K — which in armement is too silly a thing to contemplate; just shy of declaring war. Back doors are a given though, and techs in the ITC world actively seek out and work to counter them.

There are known, if expensive and time-consuming, solutions though. The RAN has developed its own combat management systems that connects (or disconnects) to allied network-centric C4ISR systems such as the Aegis system, etc. While the US can deny access to its own enclave, the weapon plaform is still operable even with reduced situational awareness (which can be resolved with Australia designed and operated systems connected to other allied network-centric systems - Japan, UK, NATO, etc.). Systems experts in armements are not idiots and if history does something well it is to teach lessons. So, the F18 saga has taught us that our F35As are most probably subject to similar constraints (think #Link16, #IFF, #SAR, etc., anything digitally enhanced) and solutions either have been found or are in progres, I have no doubts about that (think of other Australian assets that would plug in to fill the ‘holes’ (think #E8 Posidon, #Triton UAV, #E7 Wedgetail, #JORN, MilSat, MilComms, rocket motors, missile assembly, etc.)

If we can speculate kill switch (that’s all this is), why is it impossible to think that whatever ‘kill switch’ might be embedded in the second-hand #Virginia boats are known? In any case the real goal of #AUKUS is to build them here. If a ‘black box’ appears for integration (from #US or #UK) we’d isolate and pull it apart before integration with the platform wouldn’t we? We’d at least make sure we know its functional parameters, its limitiations and T&C.

#Journos must really think all #Defence personel (civil & uniform) are stupid sometimes (good for #security and #secrecy, but bad politics in my view)

/all of the above are opinions based on what I know atm/

Triton likely formed in the outer solar system before Neptune captured it, largely destroying the planet’s original moon system. JWST observations published in July 2026 suggest today’s inner moons reassembled from the wreckage — although Nereid may be one original survivor.
https://atlas.whatip.xyz/post.php?slug=triton-likely-formed-in-the-outer-solar-system-before-neptune-captured-it-largely-destroying-the-planets-original-moon-system-jwst-observations-published-in-july-2026-suggest-todays-inner-moons-reassembled-from-the-wreckage-although-nereid-may-be-one-original-survivor
<p>Webb spectra suggest Neptune’s inner moons were rebuilt from destroyed icy interiors
#original #neptune #system #triton

Today is my last day with @smartosorg and @triton_dc .

I will still be in greater - #illumos .

Also both #smartos and #triton developers and users are quite a good community!

Triton: DirectX 11 Driver for QEMU

https://blog.getutm.app/2026/introducing-triton-directx-11-driver-for-qemu/

Comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49221711

#HackerNews #Triton #QEMU #DirectX11 #Driver #Virtualization #Gaming #Tech

Kazry — новая кусочно‑заданная активация

Привет, Хабр, в этой статье я хочу представить новую функцию активации для нейронных сетей под названием Kazry, которая по результатам тестов обошла SiLU .

https://habr.com/ru/articles/1067080/

#Kazry #ai #triton #казри #pytorch #машинное+обучение #machinelearning

#Neptune’s moon #Triton was likely once a #KuiperBeltObject, destroying all the planet’s original satellites (save Nereid) as it fell into Neptune’s gravity well.

Webb telescope finds signs of ancient disaster for Neptune's moons | Reuters https://www.reuters.com/science/webb-telescope-finds-signs-ancient-disaster-neptunes-moons-2026-08-03/ #science #astronomy

Triton may have a magnetic field, and a subsurface ocean to go with it

https://1ban.news/triton-magnetic-field-subsurface-ocean/
#1ban #triton #magnetic #field #subsurface #science

Triton

This photo of Triton is one of a continuing series of observatory phase images obtained by NASA Voyager spacecraft. Lines inscribed on the image at right form a reference grid used by the Imaging Science Team.

More: https://images.nasa.gov/details/PIA02221
Credit: NASA/JPL

#triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

Triton Cantaloupe Terrain

This view of the volcanic plains of Neptune moon Triton was produced using topographic maps derived from images acquired by NASA Voyager spacecraft during its August 1989 flyby, 20 years ago this week.

More: https://images.nasa.gov/details/PIA12186
Credit: NASA/JPL/Universities Space Research Association/Lunar & Planetary Institute

#triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

Je l'ai trouvé en jetant un œil dans les récupérateurs d'eau, flottant à la surface. J'ai cru qu'il était mort. En fait il était très vif, bon nageur. J’ai cru bien faire en le "sauvant" et en le mettant pas loin dans un endroit humide avec des abris
Maintenant je me demande si j'ai bien fait. Il a su y aller, il devait savoir en sortir, non ? Il avait besoin de cette eau pour se reproduire ? Je n'ai vu qu’1 individu...
L’an dernier j’ai vu des alpestres dans le jardin.
Il n'était pas orange sur le ventre. Un jeune ?
S'il y a des naturalistes dans le coin pour me dire ce qu'il faut faire dans ce cas là. J'ai peur d'avoir fait une bêtise
#potager
#triton

Flying Past #Neptune's #Moon #Triton
#Astronomy #Picture of the Day

https://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap260623.html
https://apod.nasa.gov/image/2606/TritonPass_voyager2.mp4

#APOD #Voyager2

#war #iran Da Al-Dhafra a #Sigonella: la rotta dei #Triton #eau
di Antonio Mazzeo
Il ruolo della stazione aeronavale siciliana di Sigonella si è rivelato cruciale sin dalle fasi calde che hanno preceduto l’attacco statunitense e israeliano. Da quel momento, i droni MQ-4C Triton della Marina USA hanno solcato quotidianamente i cieli dell’isola per dirigersi verso lo scacchiere mediorientale.https://osservatorionomilscuola.com/2026/06/12/da-al-dhafra-a-sigonella-la-rotta-dei-triton/

Triton High Resolution View of Northern Hemisphere

This is one of the most detailed views of the surface of Triton taken by NASA Voyager 2 on its flyby of the large satellite of Neptune early in the morning of Aug. 25, 1989. The picture was stored on the tape recorder and relayed to Earth later. http://photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/catalog/PIA00061

More: https://images.nasa.gov/details/PIA00061
Credit: NASA/JPL

#triton #voyager #astrodon #astronomy #astrophotography #astrophysics

🌔🪐 #Space near #Earth is far more varied than just craters and dust. Planetary scientists describe #moons that defy expectations, like #Iapetus with its walnut-like ridge and #Triton’s backward orbit.

👉 https://www.skyatnightmagazine.com/solar-system/weirdest-moons-solar-system

#astronomy #solarsystem #geology #neptune #uranus #saturn #jupiter #hyperion #io #science #exploration

Actions Target Russian Govt. Botnet, Hydra Dark Market https://krebsonsecurity.com/2022/04/actions-target-russian-govt-botnet-hydra-dark-market/ #GermanFederalCriminalPoliceOffice #MainIntelligenceDirectorate #U.S.DepartmentofTreasury #U.S.DepartmentofJustice #FederalSecurityService #Ne'er-Do-WellNews #CyclopsBlink #Dragonfly2.0 #WebFraud2.0 #ArsTechnica #HydraMarket #Ransomware #BeserkBear #RussianFSB #VoodooBear #WatchGuard #DanGoodin #VPNFilter #Garantex #NotPetya #Sandworm #Trisis #Triton