#semiotics — Public Fediverse posts

Happy July 4th — Celebrate USA!

Happy July 4th — Celebrate USA!

Happy July 4th — Celebrate USA!

Happy July 4th — Celebrate USA!

Happy July 4th — Celebrate USA!

I was up for hours this morning chatting with Claude about the meaning of Meaning, and I lived to tell the tale.

https://brywillis634737.substack.com/p/capital-letters-trade-marks-and-other?r=pvxh5

#philosophy #ontology #truth #meaning #semantics #semiotics #orthography #language #metaphysics #orthography #deconstruction #typography #blog #substack #podcast #video

I was up for hours this morning chatting with Claude about the meaning of Meaning, and I lived to tell the tale.

https://brywillis634737.substack.com/p/capital-letters-trade-marks-and-other?r=pvxh5

#philosophy #ontology #truth #meaning #semantics #semiotics #orthography #language #metaphysics #orthography #deconstruction #typography #blog #substack #podcast #video

In this essay, I investigate the ideas of Stuart Hall in light of my own. Hall and I have many commonalities in the operation of language, but my enterprise is broader and deeper, as his was ostensibly limited to media.

https://open.substack.com/pub/brywillis634737/p/the-floor-beneath-hall?r=pvxh5&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

#philosophy #language #substack #blog #podcast #grammar #ontology #agency #Gramsci #semiotics #encoding #ideology #architecture #encounter #languageinsufficiency #response #agentic #media

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

(5) now imagine a monochrome supermarket.
entire aisles of identical packages.
rows of grayscale promises.
all stripped of urgency.

#mastodon #art #soundart #visualculture #perception #mediaart #waysOfSeeing #johnberger #barthes #semiotics #visualstudies #design #packaging #consumerculture #aesthetics #contemporaryart #criticaltheory #mediaecology #visualtheory #sensoryexperience #fooddesign #graphicdesign #soundstudies #culturaltheory #everydayaesthetics

(5) now imagine a monochrome supermarket.
entire aisles of identical packages.
rows of grayscale promises.
all stripped of urgency.

#mastodon #art #soundart #visualculture #perception #mediaart #waysOfSeeing #johnberger #barthes #semiotics #visualstudies #design #packaging #consumerculture #aesthetics #contemporaryart #criticaltheory #mediaecology #visualtheory #sensoryexperience #fooddesign #graphicdesign #soundstudies #culturaltheory #everydayaesthetics

(5) now imagine a monochrome supermarket.
entire aisles of identical packages.
rows of grayscale promises.
all stripped of urgency.

#mastodon #art #soundart #visualculture #perception #mediaart #waysOfSeeing #johnberger #barthes #semiotics #visualstudies #design #packaging #consumerculture #aesthetics #contemporaryart #criticaltheory #mediaecology #visualtheory #sensoryexperience #fooddesign #graphicdesign #soundstudies #culturaltheory #everydayaesthetics

(5) now imagine a monochrome supermarket.
entire aisles of identical packages.
rows of grayscale promises.
all stripped of urgency.

#mastodon #art #soundart #visualculture #perception #mediaart #waysOfSeeing #johnberger #barthes #semiotics #visualstudies #design #packaging #consumerculture #aesthetics #contemporaryart #criticaltheory #mediaecology #visualtheory #sensoryexperience #fooddesign #graphicdesign #soundstudies #culturaltheory #everydayaesthetics

(5) now imagine a monochrome supermarket.
entire aisles of identical packages.
rows of grayscale promises.
all stripped of urgency.

#mastodon #art #soundart #visualculture #perception #mediaart #waysOfSeeing #johnberger #barthes #semiotics #visualstudies #design #packaging #consumerculture #aesthetics #contemporaryart #criticaltheory #mediaecology #visualtheory #sensoryexperience #fooddesign #graphicdesign #soundstudies #culturaltheory #everydayaesthetics

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Die folgende Arbeit entwickelt den borromäischen Knoten als Denkfigur für ein rotierendes Zusammenspiel von drei Registern in einer selbstreflexiven, dreiwertigen, paradoxen Logik mit drei involutiven Negationsoperatoren.

#psychology #lacan #polykontextualitat #polykontextural #logic #reflection #philosophy #ai #ki #paradox #Paradoxien #logik #semiotik #semiotic #semiotics #cybernetics #kybernetik #semioticsystem #cybernetic #kybernetiker #kybernethik

https://infosophia.eu/Borromaeische-Logik.pdf

Die folgende Arbeit entwickelt den borromäischen Knoten als Denkfigur für ein rotierendes Zusammenspiel von drei Registern in einer selbstreflexiven, dreiwertigen, paradoxen Logik mit drei involutiven Negationsoperatoren.

#psychology #lacan #polykontextualitat #polykontextural #logic #reflection #philosophy #ai #ki #paradox #Paradoxien #logik #semiotik #semiotic #semiotics #cybernetics #kybernetik #semioticsystem #cybernetic #kybernetiker #kybernethik

https://infosophia.eu/Borromaeische-Logik.pdf

Die folgende Arbeit entwickelt den borromäischen Knoten als Denkfigur für ein rotierendes Zusammenspiel von drei Registern in einer selbstreflexiven, dreiwertigen, paradoxen Logik mit drei involutiven Negationsoperatoren.

#psychology #lacan #polykontextualitat #polykontextural #logic #reflection #philosophy #ai #ki #paradox #Paradoxien #logik #semiotik #semiotic #semiotics #cybernetics #kybernetik #semioticsystem #cybernetic #kybernetiker #kybernethik

https://infosophia.eu/Borromaeische-Logik.pdf

Die folgende Arbeit entwickelt den borromäischen Knoten als Denkfigur für ein rotierendes Zusammenspiel von drei Registern in einer selbstreflexiven, dreiwertigen, paradoxen Logik mit drei involutiven Negationsoperatoren.

#psychology #lacan #polykontextualitat #polykontextural #logic #reflection #philosophy #ai #ki #paradox #Paradoxien #logik #semiotik #semiotic #semiotics #cybernetics #kybernetik #semioticsystem #cybernetic #kybernetiker #kybernethik

https://infosophia.eu/Borromaeische-Logik.pdf

Die folgende Arbeit entwickelt den borromäischen Knoten als Denkfigur für ein rotierendes Zusammenspiel von drei Registern in einer selbstreflexiven, dreiwertigen, paradoxen Logik mit drei involutiven Negationsoperatoren.

#psychology #lacan #polykontextualitat #polykontextural #logic #reflection #philosophy #ai #ki #paradox #Paradoxien #logik #semiotik #semiotic #semiotics #cybernetics #kybernetik #semioticsystem #cybernetic #kybernetiker #kybernethik

https://infosophia.eu/Borromaeische-Logik.pdf

Animated Logical Graphs • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/14/animated-logical-graphs-2/

It's almost 50 years now since I first encountered the volumes of Peirce's “Collected Papers” in the math library at Michigan State, and shortly afterwards a friend called my attention to the entry for Spencer Brown's “Laws of Form” in the Whole Earth Catalog and I sent off for it right away. I would spend the next decade just beginning to figure out what either one of them was talking about in the matter of logical graphs and I would spend another decade after that developing a program, first in Lisp and then in Pascal, that turned graph‑theoretic data structures formed on their ideas to good purpose as the basis of its reasoning engine.

I thought it might contribute to a number of long‑running and ongoing discussions if I could articulate what I think I learned from that experience.

So I'll try to keep focused on that.

Resources —

Logical Graphs • First Impressions
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/08/26/logical-graphs-first-impressions-a/

Logical Graphs • Formal Development
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/09/12/logical-graphs-formal-development-b/

Survey of Animated Logical Graphs
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/05/02/survey-of-animated-logical-graphs-8/

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics #Semiotics #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory
#SpencerBrown #LawsOfForm #PropositionalCalculus #ProofAnimations

Animated Logical Graphs • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/14/animated-logical-graphs-2/

It's almost 50 years now since I first encountered the volumes of Peirce's “Collected Papers” in the math library at Michigan State, and shortly afterwards a friend called my attention to the entry for Spencer Brown's “Laws of Form” in the Whole Earth Catalog and I sent off for it right away. I would spend the next decade just beginning to figure out what either one of them was talking about in the matter of logical graphs and I would spend another decade after that developing a program, first in Lisp and then in Pascal, that turned graph‑theoretic data structures formed on their ideas to good purpose as the basis of its reasoning engine.

I thought it might contribute to a number of long‑running and ongoing discussions if I could articulate what I think I learned from that experience.

So I'll try to keep focused on that.

Resources —

Logical Graphs • First Impressions
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/08/26/logical-graphs-first-impressions-a/

Logical Graphs • Formal Development
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/09/12/logical-graphs-formal-development-b/

Survey of Animated Logical Graphs
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/05/02/survey-of-animated-logical-graphs-8/

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics #Semiotics #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory
#SpencerBrown #LawsOfForm #PropositionalCalculus #ProofAnimations

Animated Logical Graphs • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/08/animated-logical-graphs-1/

For Your Musement …

Here are some animations I made up to illustrate several different styles of proof in an extended topological variant of Peirce's Alpha Graphs for propositional logic.

Proof Animations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/ANIMATION#Proof_Animations

Double Negation
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-double-negation-2.0.gif

Peirce's Law
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-peirces-law-2.0.gif

Praeclarum Theorema
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-praeclarum-theorema-2.0.gif

Two‑Thirds Majority Function
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-two-thirds-majority-function-2.0.gif

A full discussion of logical graphs can be found in the following article.

Logical Graphs
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_Graphs

Resources —

Logical Graphs • First Impressions
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/08/26/logical-graphs-first-impressions-a/

Logical Graphs • Formal Development
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/09/12/logical-graphs-formal-development-b/

Survey of Animated Logical Graphs
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/05/02/survey-of-animated-logical-graphs-8/

cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/ldzadj
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/116494097283214718
cc: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Animated_Logical_Graphs
cc: https://stream.syscoi.com/2026/04/30/animated-logical-graphs-1/
cc: https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/animated_logical_graphs/119049814

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics #Semiotics #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory
#SpencerBrown #LawsOfForm #PropositionalCalculus #ProofAnimations

Animated Logical Graphs • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/08/animated-logical-graphs-1/

For Your Musement …

Here are some animations I made up to illustrate several different styles of proof in an extended topological variant of Peirce's Alpha Graphs for propositional logic.

Proof Animations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/ANIMATION#Proof_Animations

Double Negation
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-double-negation-2.0.gif

Peirce's Law
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-peirces-law-2.0.gif

Praeclarum Theorema
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-praeclarum-theorema-2.0.gif

Two‑Thirds Majority Function
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/proof-animation-e280a2-two-thirds-majority-function-2.0.gif

A full discussion of logical graphs can be found in the following article.

Logical Graphs
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_Graphs

Resources —

Logical Graphs • First Impressions
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/08/26/logical-graphs-first-impressions-a/

Logical Graphs • Formal Development
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/09/12/logical-graphs-formal-development-b/

Survey of Animated Logical Graphs
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/05/02/survey-of-animated-logical-graphs-8/

cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/ldzadj
cc: https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/116494097283214718
cc: https://www.researchgate.net/post/Animated_Logical_Graphs
cc: https://stream.syscoi.com/2026/04/30/animated-logical-graphs-1/
cc: https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/animated_logical_graphs/119049814

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics #Semiotics #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory
#SpencerBrown #LawsOfForm #PropositionalCalculus #ProofAnimations

Animated Logical Graphs • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/08/animated-logical-graphs-1/

For Your Musement …

Here are some animations I made up to illustrate several different styles of proof in an extended topological variant of Peirce’s Alpha Graphs for propositional logic.

Proof Animations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/ANIMATION#Proof_Animations

See the following article for a full discussion of this type of logical graph.

Logical Graphs
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_Graphs

Additional Resources —

Logical Graphs • First Impressions
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/08/26/logical-graphs-first-impressions-a/

Logical Graphs • Formal Development
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/09/12/logical-graphs-formal-development-b/

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics #Semiotics #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory
#SpencerBrown #LawsOfForm #PropositionalCalculus #ProofAnimations

Animated Logical Graphs • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/08/animated-logical-graphs-1/

For Your Musement …

Here are some animations I made up to illustrate several different styles of proof in an extended topological variant of Peirce’s Alpha Graphs for propositional logic.

Proof Animations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/ANIMATION#Proof_Animations

See the following article for a full discussion of this type of logical graph.

Logical Graphs
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_Graphs

Additional Resources —

Logical Graphs • First Impressions
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/08/26/logical-graphs-first-impressions-a/

Logical Graphs • Formal Development
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/09/12/logical-graphs-formal-development-b/

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics #Semiotics #LogicalGraphs #GraphTheory
#SpencerBrown #LawsOfForm #PropositionalCalculus #ProofAnimations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations