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Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Cookware Set Market in Germany | Report – IndexBox

Germany Cookware Set Market 2026 Analysis and Forecast to 2035 Executive Summary Key Findings Germany’s cookware …
#Germany #DE #Europe #EU #Europa #Boiling&Simmering #consumergoodsmarketreport #cookwareset #forecast #Induction-ReadyBaseTechnology #marketanalysis #Multi-ply/cladconstruction #Non-StickCoatingFormulations #Ovenbaking/roasting #Oven-SafeHandle&LidMaterials #Sautéing&Frying #Stovetopcooking
https://www.europesays.com/germany/14157/

Heavy Duty Saucepan Market in Germany | Report – IndexBox

Germany Heavy Duty Saucepan Market 2026 Analysis and Forecast to 2035 Executive Summary Key Findings The German heavy…
#Germany #DE #Europe #EU #Europa #Boilingpasta/vegetables #consumergoodsmarketreport #Encapsulatedbase #Ergonomichandledesign #forecast #heavydutysaucepan #Induction-compatiblebase #Makingsoupsandstews #marketanalysis #Multi-plycladding #Saucereduction #Simmeringandbraising
https://www.europesays.com/germany/13751/

Pots and Pans Kit Market in Germany | Report – IndexBox

This report is an independent strategic category study of the market for pots an…
#Germany #DE #Europe #EU #Europa #ceramic) #consumergoodsmarketreport #forecast #Induction-compatiblebasetechnology #marketanalysis #Mealprepversatility #Multi-ply/cladconstruction #Non-stickcoatingsystems(PTFE #Ovenbaking/roasting #Oven-safehandlematerials #potsandpanskit #Sautéingandfrying #Stovetopboiling/simmering
https://www.europesays.com/germany/12233/

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 10.2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/02/11/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-10-a/
• https://bsky.app/profile/inquiryintoinquiry.bsky.social/post/3lhyet3gfzk2c

In logical terms, the analogy of experience proceeds by inducing a Rule about the validity of a current knowledge base and then by deducing a Fact, the applicability of that knowledge base to a current experience.

Step 1 is Inductive, abstracting a Rule from a Case and a Fact.

• Case : E_past ⇒ E_poss, Chosen events fairly sample Collective events.
• Fact : E_past ⇒ K_pres, Chosen events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.

Step 2 is Deductive, admitting a Case to a Rule and arriving at a Fact.

• Case : E_pres ⇒ E_poss, Current events fairly sample Collective events.
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Fact : E_pres ⇒ K_pres, Current events support the Knowledge regime.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm

Resources —

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02/27/survey-of-abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-4/

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/26/survey-of-semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-5/

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations
#JohnDewey #Interpreter #Interpretant #Pragmatism
#Abduction #Deduction #Induction #Analogy #Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 10.1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/02/11/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-10-a/
• https://bsky.app/profile/inquiryintoinquiry.bsky.social/post/3lhyet3gfzk2c

Transfer —

Returning to the scene of Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example, let's continue examining how the transfer of knowledge through the analogy of experience works in that case.

By way of a recap, we began by considering a fragment K_pres of the reasoner's knowledge base which is logically equivalent to a conjunction of two rules.

• K_pres ⇔ (B ⇒ A) ∧ (B ⇒ D).

K_pres may be thought of as a piece of knowledge or item of information allowing for the possibility of certain conditions, expressed in the form of a logical constraint on the present universe of discourse.

Next we found it convenient to express all logical statements in terms of their models, that is, in terms of the primitive circumstances or elements of experience over which they hold true.

• Let E_past be the chosen set of experiences, or the circumstances in mind under “past experience”.

• Let E_poss be the collective set of experiences, or the prospective total of possible circumstances.

• Let E_pres be the current experience, or the circumstances immediately present to the reasoner.

If we think of the knowledge base K_pres as referring to the “regime of experience” over which it is valid, then the sets of models involved in the analogy may be ordered according to the relationships of set inclusion or logical implication existing among them.

Figure 4 shows the subsumption relations involved in the analogy of experience.

Figure 4. Analogy of Experience
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2025/02/analogy-of-experience.png

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations
#JohnDewey #Interpreter #Interpretant #Pragmatism
#Abduction #Deduction #Induction #Analogy #Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 9.2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/27/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-9-a/

Transfer —

In logical terms, the analogy of experience proceeds by inducing a Rule about the validity of a current knowledge base and then by deducing a Fact, the applicability of that knowledge base to a current experience.

Step 1 is Inductive, abstracting a Rule from a Case and a Fact.

• Case : E_past ⇒ E_poss, Chosen events fairly sample Collective events.
• Fact : E_past ⇒ K_pres, Chosen events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.

Step 2 is Deductive, admitting a Case to a Rule and arriving at a Fact.

• Case : E_pres ⇒ E_poss, Current events fairly sample Collective events.
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Fact : E_pres ⇒ K_pres, Current events support the Knowledge regime.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm

Resources —

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02/27/survey-of-abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-4/

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/26/survey-of-semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-5/

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations
#JohnDewey #Interpreter #Interpretant #Pragmatism
#Abduction #Deduction #Induction #Analogy #Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 9.1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/27/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-9-a/

Transfer —

Let's examine how the transfer of knowledge through the analogy of experience works in the case of Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example.

For concreteness, consider a fragment K_pres of the reasoner's knowledge base which is logically equivalent to a conjunction of two rules.

• K_pres ⇔ (B ⇒ A) ∧ (B ⇒ D).

K_pres may be thought of as a piece of knowledge or item of information allowing for the possibility of certain conditions, expressed in the form of a logical constraint on the present universe of discourse.

It is convenient to have the option of expressing all logical statements in terms of their models, that is, in terms of the primitive circumstances or elements of experience over which they hold true.

• Let E_past be the chosen set of experiences, or the circumstances in mind under “past experience”.

• Let E_poss be the collective set of experiences, or the prospective total of possible circumstances.

• Let E_pres be the current experience, or the circumstances immediately present to the reasoner.

If we think of the knowledge base K_pres as referring to the “regime of experience” over which it is valid, then the sets of models involved in the analogy may be ordered according to the relationships of set inclusion or logical implication existing among them.

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations
#JohnDewey #Interpreter #Interpretant #Pragmatism
#Abduction #Deduction #Induction #Analogy #Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 8
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/24/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-8-a/

Transfer —

What exactly gives the acquisition of a knowledge base its distinctively inductive character? It is evidently the “analogy of experience” involved in applying what we've learned in the past to what confronts us in the present.

Whenever we find ourselves approaching a problem with the thought, “If past experience is any guide …” we can be sure the analogy of experience has come into play. We are seeking to find analogies between past experience as a totality and present experience as a point of application.

From a statistical point of view what we mean is this — “If past experience is a fair sample of possible experience then knowledge gained from past experience may usefully apply to present experience”. It is that mechanism which allows a knowledge base to be carried across gulfs of experience which remain indifferent to the effective contents of its rules.

Next we'll examine how the transfer of knowledge through the analogy of experience works out in the case of Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations
#JohnDewey #Interpreter #Interpretant #Pragmatism
#Abduction #Deduction #Induction #Analogy #Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 7
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/15/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-7-a/

Learning —

Rules in a knowledge base, as far as their effective content goes, can be obtained by any mode of inference. For example, consider a proposition of the following form.

• B ⇒ A, Just Before it rains, the Air is cool.

Such a proposition is usually induced from a consideration of many past events. The inductive inference may be observed to fit the following pattern.

• Case : C ⇒ B, In Certain events, it is just Before it rains.
• Fact : C ⇒ A, In Certain events, the Air is cool.
────────────────────────────────────
• Rule : B ⇒ A, Just Before it rains, the Air is cool.

However, the same proposition could also be abduced as an explanation of a singular occurrence or deduced as a conclusion of a prior theory.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm

Resources —

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02/27/survey-of-abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-4/

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/26/survey-of-semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-5/

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
#Interpretation #Interpreter #Interpretant #Hermeneutics
#JohnDewey #Inquiry #Abduction #Deduction #Induction
#Abstraction #HypostaticAbstraction #Reflection

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 6
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/13/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-6-a/

Inquiry and Induction —

To understand the bearing of inductive reasoning on the closing phases of inquiry there are a couple of observations we should make.

• Smaller inquiries are typically woven into larger inquiries, whether the whole pattern of inquiry is carried on by a single agent or by a complex community.

• There are several ways particular instances of inquiry are related to ongoing inquiries at larger scales. Three modes of interaction between component inquiries and compound inquiries may be described under the headings of Learning, Transfer, and Testing of Rules.

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
#Interpretation #Interpreter #Interpretant #Hermeneutics
#JohnDewey #Inquiry #Abduction #Deduction #Induction
#Abstraction #HypostaticAbstraction #Reflection

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 5
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/11/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-5-a/

Inquiry and Inference —

If we follow Dewey's “Sign of Rain” story far enough to consider the import of thought for action, we realize the subsequent conduct of the interpreter, progressing up through the natural conclusion of the episode — the quickening steps, the seeking of shelter in time to escape the rain — all those acts amount to a series of further interpretants for the initially recognized signs of rain and the first impressions of the actual case. Just as critical reflection develops the positive and negative signs which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores the consequential and contrasting actions which give effective and testable meaning to a person's belief in it.

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
#Interpretation #Interpreter #Interpretant #Hermeneutics
#JohnDewey #Inquiry #Abduction #Deduction #Induction
#Abstraction #HypostaticAbstraction #Reflection

References —

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
• https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
• https://web.archive.org/web/20001210162300/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html
• https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052
• https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry
• https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Resources —

Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02/28/survey-of-inquiry-driven-systems-6/

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01/26/survey-of-semiotics-semiosis-sign-relations-5/

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
#Cybersemiotics #Interpreter #Interpretant #Hermeneutics #Hermenaut
#JohnDewey #HowWeThink #Inquiry #Abduction #Deduction #Induction
#Abstraction #HypostaticAbstraction #Reflection #Interpretation

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01/09/interpreter-and-interpretant-selection-4-a/

Interpretation and Inquiry —

To illustrate the role of sign relations in inquiry we begin with Dewey's elegant and simple example of reflective thinking in everyday life.

❝A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however, something suggested. The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of clouds and a coming shower.❞ (John Dewey, How We Think, 6–7).

#Peirce #Logic #Semiotics #Semiosis #SignRelations #TriadicRelations
#Cybersemiotics #Interpreter #Interpretant #Hermeneutics #Hermenaut
#JohnDewey #HowWeThink #Inquiry #Abduction #Deduction #Induction
#Abstraction #HypostaticAbstraction #Reflection #Interpretation

Why do we say that induction is stronger than deduction?

It depends, because induction is stronger than deduction in several ways.

Formal strength lies in part in what sort of problem the method can work on. Induction can work on stuff that deduction can't even begin to work on.

Strength of output lies in how well the outcomes tolerate contradiction. An inductive conclusion can withstand quite a bit of contradiction. Deductive outcomes cannot withstand any contradiction at all.

These two are related, though.
An inductive outcome can be formed from input that contains contradictions. And when the outcome encounters a contradiction, this is simply added to the Body of Evidence, with all the other contradictions that in the end didn't manage to prevent conclusion.

Of course, given enough such evidence, a better outcome or set of outcomes can be produced.

But with deduction, if you hit even a single contradiction, your entire effort was wasted - the conclusion is now worthless.

This strength of induction was predicted already by Hume, who described what we now call inductive reasoning as:

• infallible in its operations
• discovers itself at the first appearance of life and thought
• independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding

@philosophy #deduction #induction

Zero Emission Vehicles Market in the Netherlands | Report – IndexBox

Netherlands Zero Emission Vehicles Market 2026 Ana…
#Netherlands #Nederland #NL #Europe #Europa #EU #automotivemarketreport #ElectricMotorTopologies(PMSM #forecast #FuelCellStacks(PEM) #IGBT) #Induction) #Last-miledelivery #LFP) #Lithium-ionBatteryChemistries(NMC #Long-haulfreight #marketanalysis #Personalmobility #PowerElectronics(SiC #Ride-hailing&taxifleets #ZeroEmissionVehicles
https://www.europesays.com/netherlands/10085/

Zero Emission Vehicles Market in the United Kingdom | Report – IndexBox

United Kingdom Zero Emission Vehicles Market 2026 A…
#NewsBeep #News #UnitedKingdom #automotivemarketreport #ElectricMotorTopologies(PMSM #forecast #FuelCellStacks(PEM) #GB #GreatBritain #IGBT) #Induction) #Last-miledelivery #LFP) #Lithium-ionBatteryChemistries(NMC #Long-haulfreight #market-analysis #Personalmobility #PowerElectronics(SiC #Ride-hailing&taxifleets #UK #ZeroEmissionVehicles
https://www.newsbeep.com/uk/572364/

@Nathanpboston @gpk I live in NYC and understand its way too expensive to rewire the building and do not expect #ConEd to change its wiring. Totally believe the ONLY solution to the grid is #decentralization and in the case of #NYC to have safe #LIFEPo4 batteries in every apartment. Would allow running all variety of electric appliances like #induction stovetops and electric ovens.

@Nathanpboston @gpk I live in NYC and understand its way too expensive to rewire the building and do not expect #ConEd to change its wiring. Totally believe the ONLY solution to the grid is #decentralization and in the case of #NYC to have safe #LIFEPo4 batteries in every apartment. Would allow running all variety of electric appliances like #induction stovetops and electric ovens.

@Nathanpboston @gpk I live in NYC and understand its way too expensive to rewire the building and do not expect #ConEd to change its wiring. Totally believe the ONLY solution to the grid is #decentralization and in the case of #NYC to have safe #LIFEPo4 batteries in every apartment. Would allow running all variety of electric appliances like #induction stovetops and electric ovens.

@Nathanpboston @gpk I live in NYC and understand its way too expensive to rewire the building and do not expect #ConEd to change its wiring. Totally believe the ONLY solution to the grid is #decentralization and in the case of #NYC to have safe #LIFEPo4 batteries in every apartment. Would allow running all variety of electric appliances like #induction stovetops and electric ovens.

@Nathanpboston @gpk I live in NYC and understand its way too expensive to rewire the building and do not expect #ConEd to change its wiring. Totally believe the ONLY solution to the grid is #decentralization and in the case of #NYC to have safe #LIFEPo4 batteries in every apartment. Would allow running all variety of electric appliances like #induction stovetops and electric ovens.

I have a new moka pot, brought back from holiday. It is full induction of course, quite weighty. The borosilicate glass is a nice touch. I can monitor progress without having the lid up. Also, this is a proper size, making a decent mug of coffee.

#coffee #induction #moka

Electrified Vehicles Market in the Netherlands | Report – IndexBox

Netherlands Electrified Vehicles Market 2026 Analysis and Forec…
#Netherlands #Nederland #NL #Europe #Europa #EU #automotivemarketreport #Corporatefleets #ElectricMotorTopologies(PMSM #ElectrifiedVehicles #forecast #IGBT) #Induction) #LFP) #Lithium-ionBatteryChemistries(NMC #marketanalysis #PowerElectronics(SiC #Privateownership #Ride-hailingfleets #Urbanmobility #Vehicle-to-Grid(V2G)
https://www.europesays.com/netherlands/8832/

Coach Les Murakami inducted into College Baseball Hall Of Fame https://www.rawchili.com/mlb/591834/ #AssistantCoaches #Athletics #AthleticsDepartment #Baseball #BaseballTeam #bows #coach #CollegeBaseball #GeneStephenson #HallOfFame #Hawaii #HawaiiAthletics #HeadCoach #inducted #induction #LesMurakami #manoa #NCAA #NCAABaseball #players #PregameProgram #RainbowWarriors #stadium #StaffRecognition #tatsuno #uh #UhManoa #UhManoaAthletics #uhm #UniversityOfHawaii #video #WichitaState #YouTube