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  1. Bizarre-Privileged Items in the Universe: The Logic of Likeness by Paul North, 2021

    An imaginative new theory of likeness that ranges widely across history and subjects, from physics and evolution to psychology, language, and art.

    #books
    #nonfiction
    #philosophy
    #likeness
    #homeotics

  2. Don't want your Instagram profile used by anyone who wants to generate AI imagery with your likeness? Take action now:

    "…to avoid…AI generations of your Instagram posts without switching…to private…Open…Instagram…tap…profile… then tap…3 lines in…top-right corner…Then, scroll down to…Sharing & reuse tab…section labeled Allow people to use your content on Instagram and with AI features on Meta…toggle for Posts &…Reels."

    wired.com/story/meta-now-lets-

    #likeness #IP #ai #meta #privacy #DigitalEthics

  3. Don't want your Instagram to generate AI imagery w/your likeness? Act now:

    "…tap…profile…tap…3 lines in…top-right corner…Then, scroll…to…Sharing & reuse…labeled Allow people to use your content on Instagram & w/AI features on Meta…toggle for Posts &…Reels."

    #likeness #IP #ai #meta #privacy

    Meta Now Lets Anyone Use Your ...

  4. Don't want your Instagram to generate AI imagery w/your likeness? Act now:

    "…tap…profile…tap…3 lines in…top-right corner…Then, scroll…to…Sharing & reuse…labeled Allow people to use your content on Instagram & w/AI features on Meta…toggle for Posts &…Reels."

    #likeness #IP #ai #meta #privacy

    Meta Now Lets Anyone Use Your ...

  5. Actor and Producer Cate Blanchett and EU Parliament Member

    BRUSSELS, June 23, 2026 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — RSL Media, together with Member of the European Parliament, Eva Maydell,…
    #Europe #EU #EuropeanParliament #AI #cateblanchett #consent #creativerights #EUParliament #EvaMaydell #Hollywood #identity #likeness #name #NIL #Parliament #registry #RSLMedia
    europesays.com/europe/77412/

  6. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 4

    Re: Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3
    Re: Laws of Form • Lyle Anderson

    Lyle,

    We are engaged in the wider context of which Peirce’s systems of graphs for propositional logic and Spencer Brown’s calculus of indications constitute a prominent corner, one might even say a “cantonical field”, but still just one corner of the larger picture, abstractly syntactic and formally deductive in character.

    Over and above that niche the overarching edifice of Peirce’s Logic of Science, supported by the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry, must cover all three forms of inference — abductive, inductive, deductive — plus the bridge from qualitative logic to quantitative statistics.  That is the architecture of inquiry with which we’ll be occupied for quite some time.

    Continuing from where I left off last time —

    What intrigues me about the recently cited passages from Aristotle is the way he uses what we now regard as semiotic terms — icon, index, sign — to describe the elements and structures of logical syllogisms, including the modes of non‑demonstrative inference.

    The roles of signs informing sign relations and the rules of inference guiding inquiries are subjects Peirce explored in depth.  Especially in the early years the subjects of signs and inquiry are so entwined in Peirce’s relevant lectures and papers that he passes from one to the other with little sense of discontinuity between the two.

    Over the years, both in Peirce’s work and the community of researchers following after, there develops such an intense focus on the problem of classifying signs that the theory of signs takes on the character of a separate subject, detached from its natural connection to the theory of inquiry.

    One of our tasks is to heal that rift and regain a sense of the original common root.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
  7. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

    An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

    • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
    • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
    • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

    If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

    In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

    Translator’s Notes

    1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
    2. Strictly an enthymeme.
    3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
    4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
    5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
    6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
  8. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121115
    • web.archive.org/web/2013121103

    I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    ❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

  9. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
    cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
  10. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
    • inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05

    Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    ❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

    ❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

    ❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference —

    Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource —

    Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
    • academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One

    #Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
    #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
    #Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

  11. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    Related Discussion

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
  12. ByteDance’s SeedAnce 2 Sparks a Reckoning: When AI Video Generation Collides With Celebrity Likeness and Deepfake Ethics ByteDance's SeedAnce 2 AI video model drew fierce criticism after gene...

    #GenAIPro #AI #deepfake #video #ByteDance #SeedAnce #2 #celebrity #likeness #rights #generative

    Origin | Interest | Match
  13. Matthew McConaughey is getting in the fight over unauthorized AI likenesses. The actor is filing trademark applications to prevent AI companies from stealing his likeness. Eight have been approved so far. Read more from @Engadget:

    flip.it/leUZOr

    #Tech #AI #MatthewMcConaghey #Likeness #Technology #ArtificialIntelligence

  14. He Sold His #Likeness. Now His #Avatar Is Shilling Supplements on #TikTok.

    Welcome to a new era of commercial work fueled by generative artificial intelligence.
    #ai #genai #generativeai #privacy

    nytimes.com/2025/08/17/busines

  15. Dear friends of the #unprotected, 🦞

    As we may know all bad things, in fact all things come to an end.
    #Yin suddenly to #yang and around to a cycle of #Great Yin. Even more #strangely; One #cycle #informs the #extremities of the #Next. In other words:

    - let the heads
    #roll, like the good times
    - be kinder than the
    #Middle Way #Buddha
    - we are the recycling
    ♻️

    How this works out, is up to those over the cutting edge. The
    #silent #well of good people, doing even #better under #flourishing #infrastructure. Yes we are the #co-operative #federation of like, #likeness. We are not the enema but the other end of the canal. Or as they say in the marine core of apples, Johnny #Appleseed and the #music of the #ageless:

    - Thin
    - Go froth and
    #multiply
    - Caesar the
    #dazed

    Talking of great Days. Have One an' All, You here?
    ❤️

  16. SINGER-ACTOR FKA twigs & WARNER MUSIC GROUP CEO ROBERT KYNCL ADVOCATE FOR VOICE & LIKENESS PROTECTIONS AT SENATE JUDICIARY HEARING
    Federal Guardrails Against Deceptive AI-Generated Deepfakes and Voice Clones Gains Momentum in Key Senate Subcommittee

    Singer, songwriter, producer, dancer & actor Tahliah Debrett...
    comiccrusaders.com/singer-acto
    #ai #likeness #music #media

  17. I've started producing some core concept videos on Plutarch's short text On Having Many Friends. Here's the first in the series, looking at what we can glean about genuine friendship and what it involves

    youtu.be/VK7ZH78uECY
    #Video #Plutarch #Friendship #Virtue #Intimacy #Testing #Harmony #Likeness #Character

  18. I just finished #indexing Rafael Rachel Neis's forthcoming book, "When a Human Gives Birth to a Raven: Rabbis and the Reproduction of Species," and there's so much good stuff in it that will be relevant to the interests of a good many of you!

    #Rabbinics #Animals #Science #Bible #Trans #Queer #Difference #Likeness #BeyondBinaries

    ucpress.edu/book/9780520391192

  19. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

    An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

    • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
    • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
    • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

    If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

    In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

    Translator’s Notes

    1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
    2. Strictly an enthymeme.
    3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
    4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
    5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
    6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
  20. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

    Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

    I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

    We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
  21. Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

    Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

    Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

    A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

    Reference

    • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

    Resource

    #Analogy #Aristotle #CSPeirce #IconIndexSymbol #Induction #Inquiry #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Semiotics #SignRelations
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