#signrelations — Public Fediverse posts

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

• E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
• The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
• The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
2. Strictly an enthymeme.
3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/19/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-2-a/

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211153209/http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11234
• https://web.archive.org/web/20131211034001/http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/11235

I'm still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle's account relates to Peirce's usage, though I'm pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle's usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

❝We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/05/17/icon-likeness-likely-story-likelihood-probability-1-a/

Here's a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

❝A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον). The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:

❝For example, that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.

❝A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.❞ (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference —

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource —

Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A
• https://www.academia.edu/5211369/Theme_One_Program_User_Guide

#Aristotle #Peirce #IconIndexSymbol #Semiotics #SignRelations
#Logic #Mathematics #Probability #ProbableReasoning #Induction
#Inquiry #Analogy #Likelihood #LikelyStory #Likeness #Morphism

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

• Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

• Theme One Program • User Guide • Appendix A

Related Discussion

• Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/21/reflection-on-recursion-discussion-1/

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/06/reflection-on-recursion-1/
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers
• https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/4943

JM:
❝This is a very important and interesting topic. I think you should consider the relationship to self‑reference, indeed are they really the same thing?

❝Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.❞

Thanks, John. Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few. But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed in the x‑ray vision of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”. The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.

And when we ask, “What is this, that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we cannot tell when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Et sic deinceps …

#Peirce #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #Semiotics
#SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers

Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.

Thanks, John.  Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few.  But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed under x‑rays of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”.  The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.  And when we think to ask, “What is this that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we do not know when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Everything I’ll be working at here will be done within a framework like that.

Regards,
Jon

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers

Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.

Thanks, John.  Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few.  But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed under x‑rays of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”.  The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.  And when we think to ask, “What is this that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we do not know when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Everything I’ll be working at here will be done within a framework like that.

Regards,
Jon

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers

Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.

Thanks, John.  Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few.  But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed under x‑rays of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”.  The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.  And when we think to ask, “What is this that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we do not know when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Everything I’ll be working at here will be done within a framework like that.

Regards,
Jon

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers

Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.

Thanks, John.  Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few.  But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed under x‑rays of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”.  The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.  And when we think to ask, “What is this that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we do not know when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Everything I’ll be working at here will be done within a framework like that.

Regards,
Jon

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • Discussion 1

Re: Reflection On Recursion • 1
Re: Laws of Form • John Mingers

Also the work of Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the neurophysiology of cognition which also has recursion at its heart.

Thanks, John.  Yes, we certainly find the whole array of self concepts coming into play here — selfhood, autopoiesis or self creation, self reference and self transformation, just to name a few.  But one thing I need to emphasize from the start is how radically different such concepts appear when viewed under x‑rays of Peirce’s pragmatic semiotics.

I forget where I first heard it, but it’s fairly common observation that the persistence of a recurring problem is a symptom of how unlikely it is to be solved in the paradigm where it keeps occurring.

After a while, it simply becomes time to change the paradigm …

Just by way of a first example, take the very idea of “self‑reference”.  The moment we place it in the medium of triadic sign relations we realize signs do not refer to anything at all except insofar as an interpreter refers them.  And when we think to ask, “What is this that we call an interpreter?”, the pragmatic theory of signs tells us we do not know when we turn out the light but under the x‑ray of the pragmatic maxim the sum of its effects is effectively modeled by an extended triadic sign relation.

Everything I’ll be working at here will be done within a framework like that.

Regards,
Jon

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/18/reflection-on-recursion-4/

A feature worth noting in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other. It preserves an image of the object n all the while its precedent p(n) is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/18/reflection-on-recursion-4/

A feature worth noting in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other. It preserves an image of the object n all the while its precedent p(n) is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/18/reflection-on-recursion-4/

A feature worth noting in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other. It preserves an image of the object n all the while its precedent p(n) is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/18/reflection-on-recursion-4/

A feature worth noting in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other. It preserves an image of the object n all the while its precedent p(n) is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 4
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/18/reflection-on-recursion-4/

A feature worth noting in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other. It preserves an image of the object n all the while its precedent p(n) is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 4

A feature of special note in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other.  It preserves an image of the object all the while its precedent is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 4

A feature of special note in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other.  It preserves an image of the object all the while its precedent is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 4

A feature of special note in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other.  It preserves an image of the object all the while its precedent is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 4

A feature of special note in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other.  It preserves an image of the object all the while its precedent is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 4

A feature of special note in the recursion diagram is the function traversing the square from one triadic node to the other.  It preserves an image of the object all the while its precedent is being retrieved and processed — thus it injects a measure of parallel process and a modicum of extra memory over and above that afforded by the serial composition of functions.

Resources

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• The Phenomenology of Reflection
• Higher Order Sign Relations

cc: Academia.edu • Cybernetics • Laws of Form • Mathstodon
cc: Research Gate • Structural Modeling • Systems Science • Syscoi

Reflection On Recursion • 3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/13/reflection-on-recursion-3/

One other feature of syntactic recursion deserves to be brought into higher relief. Evidence of it can be found in the recursion diagram by examining the places where three paths meet. On the descending side there is the point where three paths diverge. On the ascending side there is the point where the middlemost of the three divergent paths joins the upshot arrow in medias res.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

The arrows of the diagram represent functions, a species of dyadic relations, but nodes of degree three signify aspects of triadic relations somewhere in the mix.

• The three arrows from the initial node represent a function F : N → N×N×N such that F(n) = (p(n), n, f(n)).

• The three arrows at the penultimate node represent a function m : N×N → N such that m(j, k) = jk.

For the sake of a first approach, many questions about triadic relations which might arise at this point can be safely left to later discussions, since the current level of generality is comprehensible enough in functional terms.

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/13/reflection-on-recursion-3/

One other feature of syntactic recursion deserves to be brought into higher relief. Evidence of it can be found in the recursion diagram by examining the places where three paths meet. On the descending side there is the point where three paths diverge. On the ascending side there is the point where the middlemost of the three divergent paths joins the upshot arrow in medias res.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

The arrows of the diagram represent functions, a species of dyadic relations, but nodes of degree three signify aspects of triadic relations somewhere in the mix.

• The three arrows from the initial node represent a function F : N → N×N×N such that F(n) = (p(n), n, f(n)).

• The three arrows at the penultimate node represent a function m : N×N → N such that m(j, k) = jk.

For the sake of a first approach, many questions about triadic relations which might arise at this point can be safely left to later discussions, since the current level of generality is comprehensible enough in functional terms.

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/13/reflection-on-recursion-3/

One other feature of syntactic recursion deserves to be brought into higher relief. Evidence of it can be found in the recursion diagram by examining the places where three paths meet. On the descending side there is the point where three paths diverge. On the ascending side there is the point where the middlemost of the three divergent paths joins the upshot arrow in medias res.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

The arrows of the diagram represent functions, a species of dyadic relations, but nodes of degree three signify aspects of triadic relations somewhere in the mix.

• The three arrows from the initial node represent a function F : N → N×N×N such that F(n) = (p(n), n, f(n)).

• The three arrows at the penultimate node represent a function m : N×N → N such that m(j, k) = jk.

For the sake of a first approach, many questions about triadic relations which might arise at this point can be safely left to later discussions, since the current level of generality is comprehensible enough in functional terms.

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/13/reflection-on-recursion-3/

One other feature of syntactic recursion deserves to be brought into higher relief. Evidence of it can be found in the recursion diagram by examining the places where three paths meet. On the descending side there is the point where three paths diverge. On the ascending side there is the point where the middlemost of the three divergent paths joins the upshot arrow in medias res.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

The arrows of the diagram represent functions, a species of dyadic relations, but nodes of degree three signify aspects of triadic relations somewhere in the mix.

• The three arrows from the initial node represent a function F : N → N×N×N such that F(n) = (p(n), n, f(n)).

• The three arrows at the penultimate node represent a function m : N×N → N such that m(j, k) = jk.

For the sake of a first approach, many questions about triadic relations which might arise at this point can be safely left to later discussions, since the current level of generality is comprehensible enough in functional terms.

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations

Reflection On Recursion • 3
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2026/04/13/reflection-on-recursion-3/

One other feature of syntactic recursion deserves to be brought into higher relief. Evidence of it can be found in the recursion diagram by examining the places where three paths meet. On the descending side there is the point where three paths diverge. On the ascending side there is the point where the middlemost of the three divergent paths joins the upshot arrow in medias res.

Simple Recursion
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/simple-recursion-fn-mn-fpn.png

The arrows of the diagram represent functions, a species of dyadic relations, but nodes of degree three signify aspects of triadic relations somewhere in the mix.

• The three arrows from the initial node represent a function F : N → N×N×N such that F(n) = (p(n), n, f(n)).

• The three arrows at the penultimate node represent a function m : N×N → N such that m(j, k) = jk.

For the sake of a first approach, many questions about triadic relations which might arise at this point can be safely left to later discussions, since the current level of generality is comprehensible enough in functional terms.

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems • Inquiry Into Inquiry
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_10#RIF_1

The Phenomenology of Reflection
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#The_Phenomenology_of_Reflection

Higher Order Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_12#Higher_Order_Sign_Relations

#Peirce #HigherOrderSignRelations #Inquiry #InquiryIntoInquiry #Logic #Mathematics
#Recursion #Reflection #RelationTheory #Semiotics #SignRelations #TriadicRelations