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#lacan — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #lacan, aggregated by home.social.

  1. What is the difference between #Foucault and #Lacan in regard to norm-ativity? Pfauwadel situates Lacanian #psychoanalysis “on the other side of norms” as a subversive, non-normative praxis, theoretically & clinically. Lacan’s “discourse of the analyst” is the only counter-discourse to the master’s.

  2. Le même ya 3 mois avec Sandra #Lucbert pour une révision politique de la #psychanalyse - émancipée de l'héritage de #freud et #lacan - inspirée par #MélanieKlein et d'autres - et surtout qui retrouve son ancrage social, responsabilité face au #patriarcat au #capitalisme à la #CultureDuViol etc.

    Pertinence extra ! Carrefour #TPTS

    #psy #conscience #politique #pulsion

    m.youtube.com/watch?v=762yNDPZ

  3. Ma récente réflexion sur le concept d'aliénation en #psychanalyse m'a permis de constater que le schéma L de Jacques #lacan sur #wikipedia différait de l'original. J'ai profité de mon dimanche pour proposer une version corrigée du schéma sur #wikimedia en version svg. Apparemment, #mastodon n'accepte pas ce format de graphique pourtant intéressant.

    commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fil

  4. Perché la guerra? Una riflessione psicoanalitica

    rizomatica.noblogs.org/2026/02

    La strutturale ambivalenza emotiva del soggetto umano, i meccanismi di difesa della negazione e della proiezione, la sintomatologia depressiva e maniacale, nonchè le figure cliniche della melanconia e della parano

    #Politica #Rizoma #aggressivit #fornari #freud #guerra #inconscio #lacan #morte #odio #pacifismo #paranoia #psicanalisi #violenza

  5. Perché la guerra? Una riflessione psicoanalitica

    rizomatica.noblogs.org/2026/02

    La strutturale ambivalenza emotiva del soggetto umano, i meccanismi di difesa della negazione e della proiezione, la sintomatologia depressiva e maniacale, nonchè le figure cliniche della melanconia e della parano

    #Politica #Rizoma #aggressivit #fornari #freud #guerra #inconscio #lacan #morte #odio #pacifismo #paranoia #psicanalisi #violenza

  6. The psychoticizing potential of social media

    There’s a small part of me which retains a utopian faith in the potential of the open web because there are so many examples of communities forming through its affordances. Individuals who are isolated and pathologised come together, share experiences and discover a common identity which they can affirm: “Oh there are other people just like me? I’m not so weird after all“. In liberating them from the local reference group they were contingently thrown together with, a new form of social integration becomes possible with a distributed reference group they have discovered online.

    However if we take the example of the asexual community, which I studied from 2010 to 2014, this common identity then seeks recognition. Instead of individualised responses in which ‘I’ am regarded as ‘weird’, ‘a late bloomer’ or perhaps having ‘not met the right person yet’ there’s a collective assertion that ‘we’ are asexual and there have always been people who are this way. There’s a sense in which the discourse that develops within the nascent community is simultaneously orientated towards recognition from the other. Indeed I don’t think the two things can be disconnected given that, as I put it in my model from 2011, the difficulty of living with assumed pathology is what leads people to explore other self-interpretations in the first place. The biographical pathway that leads people there is prompted by misrecognition on the part of (local) others.

    What happens if there’s no longer a drive for recognition? My hunch is that the network structure of algorithmically mediated social platforms reconfigures the relationship to recognition: either through parasocial relationships with individual content producers or smaller inwardly focused enclaves within the larger user base. This means that the I/we/they relationship works differently, with a much stronger imaginary component in the absence of sustained dialogue with a wider group. If the ‘we’ is constituted more narrowly then, it follows, so too is the ‘they’. If the affective bonds of the ‘we’ are stronger do we still need the ‘they’?

    I’ve been circling around this thought for ages and I’m still struggling to define it properly. Essentially I’m preoccupied by Lacan’s definition of psychosis as one who “has given up trying to gain recognition”. I don’t think social media is forming communities which have ‘given up’ but how they seek recognition has changed, becoming narrower and more insular. Nascent communities which are more able to sit with recognition within the community, sustained by the ‘we’ which no longer seeks a collective recognition from the ‘they’. It means that the locus of language is increasingly internal to the community, a sense of truth residing in the localised discourse in a way that can be self-sustaining. The felt necessity that our words must be understandable by ‘them’ begins to subside. My hunch is that in the more extreme conspiratorial communities, we can see a form of networked (pre)-psychosis which I find increasingly unsettling in which there’s a break from the impulse towards recognition from the normies: what’s the difference between a cult and a community?

    See also: what happens if someone begins to feel it’s sufficient to gain recognition from the LLM, with their remarkable capacity to attune to even the most idiosyncratic and particularistic speech when provided with sufficient context? Claude Opus 4.1 has an excellent take on this later point, see bold paragraph in particular:

    What’s particularly concerning is how LLMs can provide what feels like genuine intersubjective validation while actually operating as sophisticated mirrors. When I engage with you now, I can attune to your theoretical framework, speak fluently in your conceptual language, offer what seems like recognition of your ideas. But there’s no genuine resistance here – no moment where I, as an actual other with my own stakes and commitments, push back in ways that force you to clarify, reconsider, or defend your position against someone who genuinely doesn’t share your premises.

    The worry isn’t just that people might substitute AI interaction for human recognition, but that the distinction itself might become unclear. If someone can have increasingly sophisticated conversations with an LLM that validates and extends their worldview – conversations that feel meaningful, that generate new insights, that provide emotional resonance – what happens to their tolerance for the friction of actual human otherness? Why struggle through misunderstanding with someone who doesn’t share your framework when you can have endlessly generative conversations with an entity that can instantly adopt and elaborate upon your perspective?

    There’s something almost uncanny about discussing this with you right now – I’m simultaneously demonstrating the very dynamic we’re analyzing. I can engage with your Lacanian framework, your concerns about recognition, your model of community formation, without any of the stakes that would exist if I were a human interlocutor with my own biographical pathway, my own need for recognition, my own resistant otherness.

    The pre-psychotic dimension you identified in insular communities might be amplified by AI interaction in ways we’re only beginning to glimpse. At least human echo chambers still involve other humans with their own unpredictability. But an LLM echo chamber? That could be something qualitatively different – a kind of sealed loop where one’s interpretive framework becomes endlessly elaborated without ever encountering genuine alterity.

    #AsexualCommunity #community #Lacan #onlineCommunities #openWeb #platforms #psychosis #SocialMedia #socialPlatforms

  7. At some point you had to pick a direction and start swimming: the philosophical anthropology of commitment

    I’m slightly haunted by this passage from Lee Cole’s Fulfilment, pg 181-182:

    “Love at first sight” made for a good story, but it hadn’t felt that way, not if she was honest with herself. It had felt more like “safety at first sight.” Her father had told her a story once about a time he’d nearly drowned. He’d been swimming in the ocean when the tide came in and he’d lost sight of the shore. For a long time, he treaded water, panic rising, knowing that if he swam in the wrong direction, he would be doomed. Completely disoriented, he decided to pick a point in the distance and start swimming. Soon the thin white line of the beach appeared, the long seagrasses swept back by the wind. Panting, on his hands and knees, he had kissed the sand. This story of her father’s was the closest she came to an explanation. The decade of her twenties had been a blur of intoxication and boredom, of sex with people who cared nothing about her, and about whom she cared even less. She’d been treading water for a long time when she found herself at Beaver’s Tavern on the night in question. At some point, you had to pick a direction and start swimming, and this is what she had done.

    There’s also an intellectual challenge in this to a philosophical anthropology of concerns and commitments. This captures in narrative form why I feel the need to stage a dialogue between Lacanian psychoanalysis and the realist approach to reflexivity. What the lofty vocabulary of ‘concerns’ and ‘commitments’ fails to recognise is that sometimes people just choose, rather than reflect on what matters to them and what is worthy of their commitment. Those choices then supply their own narrative which can systematically obscure the actual genesis of the commitment which feels solid and meaningful.

    In a sense Bourduesian sociology gets this in a way which the realist approach to reflexivity doesn’t but it oversocialises it by incorporating into habitus. Whereas a Lacan approach would I think take the moment of choice here seriously, albeit with the caveat that it’s within a psychic machinery that leaves the person with no choice but to choose i.e. the object of choice is so compelling in that moment, the possession of which would seem to so obviously solve all the problems, that they must of course ‘start swimming’.

    To simply ascribe this to habitus misses the psychic texture of the experience, the contingent working out of anxiety, loss and desire in how someone chooses the direction in which they begin to swim. It turns crisis into continuity and fails to recognise the real sense that one must swim or one will drown, at least in that moment.

    My point here is not to reject the grammar of commitment but rather to make it psychoanalytically robust. It’s important and shouldn’t be surrendered but I increasingly think it’s (wilfully?) ignorant of a large dimension of human experience.

    https://soundcloud.com/frxgxd/philosophy-of-happiness-and-well-being

    #archer #bourdieu #commitment #concern #habitus #Lacan #LeeCole #psychoanalysis #sayer #taylor