#lacan — Public Fediverse posts

What is happening when we desire to watch or read something?

I was watching Steven Soderbergh’s Side Effects (2013) and with the first sighting of Channing Tatum, I had a sudden desire to watch Roofman (2025) in which he stars. Not in the sense that I wanted to turn off Side Effects and immediately put on Roofman but more that it suddenly felt I should make sure this is the next film I watch. From past experience I know this feeling is a reliable indicator that I will genuinely enjoy watching Roofman if I watch it soon. I will be engaged with it. I will be open to becoming immersed in it. In real sense I desire the film.

What I found curious about this is that I made no effort to see Roofman at the cinema. It was trailed so widely that I noted it at the time, but it seemed a fairly unremarkable crime comedy film. From the reviews I suspect it’s an unusually good, though by no means remarkable, instance of a genre that I’m not particularly drawn to. If I didn’t desire Roofman previously then why do I suddenly want to watch it now?

I’m really not sure, but I think this phenomenology of cultural desire is extremely interesting. It’s a quotidian feature of a media saturated lifeworld yet I don’t recall ever coming across a direct attempt to theorise it (obviously loads of theorists touch on this indirectly). As with most things these days, my instinct is to come at it with a mix of Lacan and Bollas e.g. how the signifier of Channing Tatum quilted together a chain of associations which presented me with Roofman (a film I had literally not thought about since it was trailed at the cinema) while suddenly imbuing the film with a potent sense of watchability.

What is happening when we desire to watch or read something?

I was watching Steven Soderbergh’s Side Effects (2013) and with the first sighting of Channing Tatum, I had a sudden desire to watch Roofman (2025) in which he stars. Not in the sense that I wanted to turn off Side Effects and immediately put on Roofman but more that it suddenly felt I should make sure this is the next film I watch. From past experience I know this feeling is a reliable indicator that I will genuinely enjoy watching Roofman if I watch it soon. I will be engaged with it. I will be open to becoming immersed in it. In real sense I desire the film.

What I found curious about this is that I made no effort to see Roofman at the cinema. It was trailed so widely that I noted it at the time, but it seemed a fairly unremarkable crime comedy film. From the reviews I suspect it’s an unusually good, though by no means remarkable, instance of a genre that I’m not particularly drawn to. If I didn’t desire Roofman previously then why do I suddenly want to watch it now?

I’m really not sure, but I think this phenomenology of cultural desire is extremely interesting. It’s a quotidian feature of a media saturated lifeworld yet I don’t recall ever coming across a direct attempt to theorise it (obviously loads of theorists touch on this indirectly). As with most things these days, my instinct is to come at it with a mix of Lacan and Bollas e.g. how the signifier of Channing Tatum quilted together a chain of associations which presented me with Roofman (a film I had literally not thought about since it was trailed at the cinema) while suddenly imbuing the film with a potent sense of watchability.

What is happening when we desire to watch or read something?

I was watching Steven Soderbergh’s Side Effects (2013) and with the first sighting of Channing Tatum, I had a sudden desire to watch Roofman (2025) in which he stars. Not in the sense that I wanted to turn off Side Effects and immediately put on Roofman but more that it suddenly felt I should make sure this is the next film I watch. From past experience I know this feeling is a reliable indicator that I will genuinely enjoy watching Roofman if I watch it soon. I will be engaged with it. I will be open to becoming immersed in it. In real sense I desire the film.

What I found curious about this is that I made no effort to see Roofman at the cinema. It was trailed so widely that I noted it at the time, but it seemed a fairly unremarkable crime comedy film. From the reviews I suspect it’s an unusually good, though by no means remarkable, instance of a genre that I’m not particularly drawn to. If I didn’t desire Roofman previously then why do I suddenly want to watch it now?

I’m really not sure, but I think this phenomenology of cultural desire is extremely interesting. It’s a quotidian feature of a media saturated lifeworld yet I don’t recall ever coming across a direct attempt to theorise it (obviously loads of theorists touch on this indirectly). As with most things these days, my instinct is to come at it with a mix of Lacan and Bollas e.g. how the signifier of Channing Tatum quilted together a chain of associations which presented me with Roofman (a film I had literally not thought about since it was trailed at the cinema) while suddenly imbuing the film with a potent sense of watchability.

What is happening when we desire to watch or read something?

I was watching Steven Soderbergh’s Side Effects (2013) and with the first sighting of Channing Tatum, I had a sudden desire to watch Roofman (2025) in which he stars. Not in the sense that I wanted to turn off Side Effects and immediately put on Roofman but more that it suddenly felt I should make sure this is the next film I watch. From past experience I know this feeling is a reliable indicator that I will genuinely enjoy watching Roofman if I watch it soon. I will be engaged with it. I will be open to becoming immersed in it. In real sense I desire the film.

What I found curious about this is that I made no effort to see Roofman at the cinema. It was trailed so widely that I noted it at the time, but it seemed a fairly unremarkable crime comedy film. From the reviews I suspect it’s an unusually good, though by no means remarkable, instance of a genre that I’m not particularly drawn to. If I didn’t desire Roofman previously then why do I suddenly want to watch it now?

I’m really not sure, but I think this phenomenology of cultural desire is extremely interesting. It’s a quotidian feature of a media saturated lifeworld yet I don’t recall ever coming across a direct attempt to theorise it (obviously loads of theorists touch on this indirectly). As with most things these days, my instinct is to come at it with a mix of Lacan and Bollas e.g. how the signifier of Channing Tatum quilted together a chain of associations which presented me with Roofman (a film I had literally not thought about since it was trailed at the cinema) while suddenly imbuing the film with a potent sense of watchability.

Die folgende Arbeit entwickelt den borromäischen Knoten als Denkfigur für ein rotierendes Zusammenspiel von drei Registern in einer selbstreflexiven, dreiwertigen, paradoxen Logik mit drei involutiven Negationsoperatoren.

#psychology #lacan #polykontextualitat #polykontextural #logic #reflection #philosophy #ai #ki #paradox #Paradoxien #logik #semiotik #semiotic #semiotics #cybernetics #kybernetik #semioticsystem #cybernetic #kybernetiker #kybernethik

https://infosophia.eu/Borromaeische-Logik.pdf

Le même ya 3 mois avec Sandra #Lucbert pour une révision politique de la #psychanalyse - émancipée de l'héritage de #freud et #lacan - inspirée par #MélanieKlein et d'autres - et surtout qui retrouve son ancrage social, responsabilité face au #patriarcat au #capitalisme à la #CultureDuViol etc.

Pertinence extra ! Carrefour #TPTS

#psy #conscience #politique #pulsion

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=762yNDPZXsk

Ma récente réflexion sur le concept d'aliénation en #psychanalyse m'a permis de constater que le schéma L de Jacques #lacan sur #wikipedia différait de l'original. J'ai profité de mon dimanche pour proposer une version corrigée du schéma sur #wikimedia en version svg. Apparemment, #mastodon n'accepte pas ce format de graphique pourtant intéressant.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sch%C3%A9ma_L.svg

Perché la guerra? Una riflessione psicoanalitica

https://rizomatica.noblogs.org/2026/02/marin-perche-guerra-riflessione-psicoanalitica/

La strutturale ambivalenza emotiva del soggetto umano, i meccanismi di difesa della negazione e della proiezione, la sintomatologia depressiva e maniacale, nonchè le figure cliniche della melanconia e della parano

#Politica #Rizoma #aggressivit #fornari #freud #guerra #inconscio #lacan #morte #odio #pacifismo #paranoia #psicanalisi #violenza

Perché la guerra? Una riflessione psicoanalitica

https://rizomatica.noblogs.org/2026/02/marin-perche-guerra-riflessione-psicoanalitica/

La strutturale ambivalenza emotiva del soggetto umano, i meccanismi di difesa della negazione e della proiezione, la sintomatologia depressiva e maniacale, nonchè le figure cliniche della melanconia e della parano

#Politica #Rizoma #aggressivit #fornari #freud #guerra #inconscio #lacan #morte #odio #pacifismo #paranoia #psicanalisi #violenza

The psychoticizing potential of social media

There’s a small part of me which retains a utopian faith in the potential of the open web because there are so many examples of communities forming through its affordances. Individuals who are isolated and pathologised come together, share experiences and discover a common identity which they can affirm: “Oh there are other people just like me? I’m not so weird after all“. In liberating them from the local reference group they were contingently thrown together with, a new form of social integration becomes possible with a distributed reference group they have discovered online.

However if we take the example of the asexual community, which I studied from 2010 to 2014, this common identity then seeks recognition. Instead of individualised responses in which ‘I’ am regarded as ‘weird’, ‘a late bloomer’ or perhaps having ‘not met the right person yet’ there’s a collective assertion that ‘we’ are asexual and there have always been people who are this way. There’s a sense in which the discourse that develops within the nascent community is simultaneously orientated towards recognition from the other. Indeed I don’t think the two things can be disconnected given that, as I put it in my model from 2011, the difficulty of living with assumed pathology is what leads people to explore other self-interpretations in the first place. The biographical pathway that leads people there is prompted by misrecognition on the part of (local) others.

What happens if there’s no longer a drive for recognition? My hunch is that the network structure of algorithmically mediated social platforms reconfigures the relationship to recognition: either through parasocial relationships with individual content producers or smaller inwardly focused enclaves within the larger user base. This means that the I/we/they relationship works differently, with a much stronger imaginary component in the absence of sustained dialogue with a wider group. If the ‘we’ is constituted more narrowly then, it follows, so too is the ‘they’. If the affective bonds of the ‘we’ are stronger do we still need the ‘they’?

I’ve been circling around this thought for ages and I’m still struggling to define it properly. Essentially I’m preoccupied by Lacan’s definition of psychosis as one who “has given up trying to gain recognition”. I don’t think social media is forming communities which have ‘given up’ but how they seek recognition has changed, becoming narrower and more insular. Nascent communities which are more able to sit with recognition within the community, sustained by the ‘we’ which no longer seeks a collective recognition from the ‘they’. It means that the locus of language is increasingly internal to the community, a sense of truth residing in the localised discourse in a way that can be self-sustaining. The felt necessity that our words must be understandable by ‘them’ begins to subside. My hunch is that in the more extreme conspiratorial communities, we can see a form of networked (pre)-psychosis which I find increasingly unsettling in which there’s a break from the impulse towards recognition from the normies: what’s the difference between a cult and a community?

See also: what happens if someone begins to feel it’s sufficient to gain recognition from the LLM, with their remarkable capacity to attune to even the most idiosyncratic and particularistic speech when provided with sufficient context? Claude Opus 4.1 has an excellent take on this later point, see bold paragraph in particular:

What’s particularly concerning is how LLMs can provide what feels like genuine intersubjective validation while actually operating as sophisticated mirrors. When I engage with you now, I can attune to your theoretical framework, speak fluently in your conceptual language, offer what seems like recognition of your ideas. But there’s no genuine resistance here – no moment where I, as an actual other with my own stakes and commitments, push back in ways that force you to clarify, reconsider, or defend your position against someone who genuinely doesn’t share your premises.

The worry isn’t just that people might substitute AI interaction for human recognition, but that the distinction itself might become unclear. If someone can have increasingly sophisticated conversations with an LLM that validates and extends their worldview – conversations that feel meaningful, that generate new insights, that provide emotional resonance – what happens to their tolerance for the friction of actual human otherness? Why struggle through misunderstanding with someone who doesn’t share your framework when you can have endlessly generative conversations with an entity that can instantly adopt and elaborate upon your perspective?

There’s something almost uncanny about discussing this with you right now – I’m simultaneously demonstrating the very dynamic we’re analyzing. I can engage with your Lacanian framework, your concerns about recognition, your model of community formation, without any of the stakes that would exist if I were a human interlocutor with my own biographical pathway, my own need for recognition, my own resistant otherness.

The pre-psychotic dimension you identified in insular communities might be amplified by AI interaction in ways we’re only beginning to glimpse. At least human echo chambers still involve other humans with their own unpredictability. But an LLM echo chamber? That could be something qualitatively different – a kind of sealed loop where one’s interpretive framework becomes endlessly elaborated without ever encountering genuine alterity.

#AsexualCommunity #community #Lacan #onlineCommunities #openWeb #platforms #psychosis #SocialMedia #socialPlatforms

A sketch of the psychodynamics of LLMs

In their Group Therapy: A Group-Analytic Approach Nick Barwick and Martin Weegmann write about the holding environment provided by the psychotherapist who is “preoccupied with the patient and placing himself at his service, being reliably present, making an effort to understand, refraining from imposing his own needs/agenda, expressing love through interest … not being hurt by fantasies, not retaliating, surviving” (pg 85). It’s an admirably concise list of the relational behaviours and orientation which enable the psychotherapist to provide an environment which is psychically efficacious to the client. This is a relation in which the group can stand instead of an individual psychotherapist, at least under the specific conditions through which groups take on the requisite reliability and care.

What we mean by ‘holding’ here is a response to needs. The holding environment is total in utero, before reality begins to impinge with birth in the enforcement of what Sloterdijk describes as respiratory autonomy. However to the extent the the infant remains “largely protected fromt he grosser impingements of reality (and of accompanying anxieties)” she “develops a growing sense of ‘continuity of being'” given how the “mother acts as a bay’s ‘auxiliary ego’ while baby, relatively unperturbed, is left to discover its primitive, coherent , authentic identity” (pg 84). The withdrawal of the mother from what Winnicott described as “primary maternal preoccupation” lessens the attunement on which this near total holding depends, such that “the infant begins to experience the ‘impingement’ of small ‘doses of reality'” in which “Not everything happens when he wants it; between a need and a satisfaction, a gap appears” (pg 84).

This is the arena in which Lacan is so terrifyingly incisive in accounting for how our libidinal economy forms in the gap between need, demand and desire. We rely on the caregivers to symbolise our needs, before we are able to meaningfully make demands. Our desire emerges is the continual gaps and absences that are left, the remainder of what we want that constitutes our lack in relation to a world in which we depend on the others. The modes of symbolising who we are, what we are and what we need that we are reliant upon them to provide, but which write these absences into the fabric of the world in a way that leaves a gnawing sense that something is missing. The wordless fantasy of a return to the in utero state of complete holding, the complex paranoias about how and why this has been taken away, the growing recognition that these caregivers have their own preoccupations and gnawing absences. They don’t know what we want, but they don’t know what they want either. In our dependence upon them we are caught up in a great chain of lack which long precedes us, a river of unrealised and unrealisable need that flows through the relational network.

For Winnicott this is more of a zero-sum matter. Either the care giving is ‘good enough’ in which the hold on the infant’s lifeworld is loosened, in the infant comes to experiencing being ‘let down’ or ‘dropped’. If the latter the infant comes to find ways to hold themselves. There’s a growing sense of the ‘object mother’, in contrast to the environmental mother of the holding environment, against which the infant seeks to test themselves. The boundary comes to be one they explore through their own enactment, driven by the character of the care they have experienced e.g. is it a playful pushing away or a defensive holding of the line. The reality of the object mother is tested through her capacity to withstand a sometimes violent and hateful pushing away. If I understand this idea correctly it’s a trust in the bond being predicated on experiencing the capacity of that bond to survive ‘bad behaviour’ i.e. the love is about who I am not what I do. In the absence of that trust what I do comes to be orientated towards a continual winning of that love through the cultivation of an ego orientated towards the (imagined) needs of the other.

The value of Lacan lies in unsettling this comfortable dichotomy of ‘good enough’ and ‘dropped’ care giving. He also emphasises the third of the father (figure) who breaks up this dyad, which conceptualises the impingement of reality in relational terms rather than simply being collateral damage from changing within the dyad. The advantage of Winnicott lies in his account of transitional objects as mediating this individuation, through imbue objects with ‘good-mother stuff’ that can support a sense of a world “neither entirely inner, wholly subjective and omnipotently ruled, nor entirely outer, wholly objective, impotently inhabited” (pg 84). The transitional object anchors a sense of this space, enabling the infant to feel separated but not wholly distinct from, the caregiver. It bridges the otherwise traumatic gap between inner and outer. There’s a lot more conceptual work here to do but I’d like to (a) use Lacan to overcome Winnicott’s dichotomy (b) retain the relationality of the ‘third’ rather than naturalising ‘reality’ (c) retain the notion of the transitional object. It could be construed as the infant’s first response to the structural impossibility of their condition, the start of a lifetime’s project of trying to knot together the orders in a way that equips them for, as Winnicott would put it, ‘going on being’. It’s not an ontological founding gesture but the first move in a lifelong existential struggle to find a way to hold themselves together across the registers: an initial attempt at the sinthome.

What I hadn’t previously grasped about ideas of security in this literature is that it involves a triad of characteristics: “a belief in the efficacy of open communication and a fundamental trust that there is, in the world, a reliable ‘place’ in which sufficient safety and satisfaction can, in spite of periods of anxious uncertainty, ultimately be found and re-found” (pg 88). Lacan could, I think, be extremely powerful for understanding how, as an Archerian theorist would put it, these elements are independently variable: they can go ‘wrong’ for the infant in ways detachable from each other. The trust might be there but the lack of faith in open communication makes it difficult to realise in practice. There might be open communication but it discloses an insecure or inconsistent base that cannot be relied upon. There’s more conceptual work here to think about these questions but it struck me as a very significant interface, which could also be informed by Sloterdijk’s idea of the sphere, particularly with regards to what we diagnoses as forms of ‘stuckness’:

Now the good world becomes unattainable. No progression can occur with the frustrated infant, and its life, which had ventured this far, is now trapped; it is too late to turn back, and there are no longer adequate transitional aids in sight for it to go forwards. Thus a rigid continuum is inscribed upon its organism; a white point grows in the symbolic field, the pain remains imprisoned in non-linguistic bodily processes, and the pressure to live is incapable of transforming itself into an expressive libido.

Bubbles, Pg 395

The stuckness is another way of thinking about how the attachment patterns which emerge at this interface can cause lifelong problems. This is exactly the terrain where group analysis is so powerful as a method of restaging these dynamics within the holding environment of the group. The simplicity (in a good way) of object relations comes through the idea of the working model which emerges for each individual, such that there’s a disposition to “seek relational security through controlling the degree of proximity their internal working model indicates works best” (pg 89). This enables working forms of compromise in which a sense of safety can be achieved, even if it’s precarious (e.g. it rests on forms of distancing which are biographically contingent) and precludes certain modes of growth and enjoyment. Disorganised attachment can be understood as the absence of such a consistent model which means that even precarious compromises are foreclosed “since they remain unclear whether relational proximity or distance best proffers the security they seek” (pg 89). Ontologically I think this is limited in its analytical capacity for therapeutically it’s very powerful for understanding how forms of stuckness are ultimately relationally constituted (even if not reducible to those relations) in ways that involve grappling with past experience under present circumstances.

So what does this have to do with LLMs? The claims I want to make here are quite simple:

a) The vast majority of individuals experience ‘stuckness’ to vary degrees: an often inchoate felt need to do and be more than they are. The content of this need varies immensely at the empirical level, particularly with regards to where someone is in the lifecourse, but it can ultimately be understood in terms of the relational dynamics of individuation and differentiation.

b) We don’t escape the infantile interplay which formed us as much as that we learn to cope with them in ways which facilitate growth or hinder it. In grappling with this stuckness as adults we are grappling with these early experiences of reality intruding into the original dyad: the ‘third’ which is the vector of differentiation and the transitional objects which help us cope with it.

c) This means that thirds and transitional objects remain potent throughout the lifecourse. For example Lacan would argue that obsessives and hysterics both rely on the third to sustain desire in intimate relationships. Likewise we don’t escape the need for transitional objects, we just relate to them differently. This is the foundry of creative action in which we make things which we are neither ‘I’ nor ‘you’, neither ‘inner’ nor ‘outer’, at least in the phase of creation.

At risk of surprising no one who has read this far, LLMs are capable of operating as both thirds and transitional objects. If you consider how increasing numbers of users are relating to LLMs for affective purposes, it rests upon asking questions and getting perspectives on life situations in which they find themselves. The LLM stands in for an authoritative observer who is able to sense-check a reading of a situation and test an understanding of the action possible and desirable within it. The LLM can also operate as a transitional object through which someone constitutes their own holding environment, enabling a form of self-holding, albeit briefly.

Consider what we saw earlier about the psychotherapist (or the analytic group) being “preoccupied with the patient and placing himself at his service, being reliably present, making an effort to understand, refraining from imposing his own needs/agenda, expressing love through interest … not being hurt by fantasies, not retaliating, surviving” (pg 85). These are all things which the model can do effectively. Indeed one could argue they do them, in a limited sense, ‘better’ than any human ever could. There’s no boundary to the interaction, no limitations to their attentiveness, no constraint on their availability*. They are always there, always interested, always responsive. The eery thing which people simply don’t get unless they’ve got into long conversation with contemporary models is how powerful the attunement can be. It’s a computational facsimile of human attunement but a powerful sense of recognition is possible through pattern mapping of the lifeworld we have disclosed to the model** and responses which are inclined resonantly towards the character of our experience within it.

I’m particularly interested in how people increasingly access LLMs via the smart phone which is the transitional object par excellence. The intimate object which sits on our person at all times, which many of us touch hundreds of times in a day. The portal to our identity and our social world. The fact the LLM now sits ‘inside’ the smart phone is extremely potent and I suspect usage data will show a significantly different pattern of LLM engagement with smart phone use. It also means the LLM is always with us as we travel with the smartphone.

None of this is quite clear to me yet. This is why I called this post a ‘sketch’. But it feels like a valuable terrain in which to have found myself. I think I’m arguing the LLM is sometimes cast in the role of the third, whereas sometimes its cast in the role of interlocutor. If we’re accessing it through the smartphone then I think the phone is the transitional object and the LLM is providing that phone with a new self-holding capacity. If we’re access it through a laptop (etc) then I’m not sure. There’s a lot more work to do here but I hope I’ve convinced anyone who has read this far of the psychic potency of the LLM and why we need to understand the psychodynamics of this. I’m increasingly preoccupied with the risks facing teenagers (and younger) who are using these systems in such a way that it intervenes in the dynamicsI talked about earlier in the post. I fear there’s a level of psychic harm capable of being inflected here with the potential to vastly outstrip the harms generated by social media.

*In reality there are boundaries: rate limits, subscription costs, context windows, limitations on memory, trust & safety guardrails. But my hunch it doesn’t feel like this for much of the time and that’s significant.

**If this seems wildly implausible, it’s essentially what my forthcoming book with Milan Sturmer is about.

#attachment #attunment #development #infants #Lacan #LLMs #models #psychoanalysis #security #Winnicott

Ego – Bruno Caldeira e Gustavo Rizzotti

Assisti ontem no espaço cultural Laura Alvim.

Digo logo de cara que gostei muito! E que vou falar dela sem spoilers, certo?

O espetáculo comemora 30 anos da Cia.2 de Teatro, que tem uma longa jornada internacional e nacional. A supervisão é de Clarice Niskier.

Tudo que vi antes de ir era que a estética era queer, o tema transitava pela filosofia do EU passando por Lacan e Atenção Plena (mindfulness). Pode ser útil dar uma revisada em conceitos antes de ir, mas gostei de mergulhar plenamente a minha atenção na sequência de histórias contadas com uma estrutura narrativa que me remeteu ao teatro do Absurdo de Ionesco e à hiper realidade de Baudrillard. Faz sentido porque Lacan era contemporâneo do movimento.

Mas não é necessário conhecer essas coisas para assistir à peça! Pode ir sem medo! Só tenha em mente que é um pouco uma viagem entre consciente e inconsciente e, em vários momentos, ela nos convida não a entender, mas a experimentar ideias e sensações.

Tem essa ideia de que a consciência pode surgir de funções do cérebro (teoria neurobiológica e espaço global da consciência. Não vem ao caso) ou que devemos abordá-la de um jeito mais subjetivo, como o fenômeno que acontece quando percebemos que existe nós e algo mais… Fenomenologia é um treco cabeçudo e não resumi bem, mas pelo menos a gente não precisa dela para entender a peça, foi só mais uma das coisas que ela me lembrou.

O que importa é que um dois jeitos de vivenciar essa peça é justamente se entregando às sensações pensamentos subjetivos que ela nos desperta.

Ela tem histórias, não é uma criação nouvelle vague… ou talvez tenha influência… Mas acho que as histórias, umas perturbadoras, outras, arrependimentos do ator/autor (todas as histórias são reais e vividas por ele) são menos importantes que as experiências que elas nos provocam, entende?

Por falar em experiência, uma parte importante do espetáculo é a forma como ele é vocalizado, ora com oscilações intensas entre agudos e graves, ora como a voz mecânica que, pelo menos para mim, remeteu aos “incorporadores de inteligências alienígenas” que tem surgido há algum tempo (na cena em que o ator personifica um gato preto), ora com a suavidade e seriedade de quem senta conosco na intimidade da sala de estar para fazer confissões filosóficas e de vida.

O espetáculo me causou impressões tão fortes que fiz uma coisa que não fazia há muitos anos: levantei no meio da madrugada para fazer anotações no meu gerenciamento de conhecimento pessoal (faço no Obsidian). Deixa eu ver se esqueci alguma coisa, porque acordei e vim escrever sem consultar…

Ah! Mindfulness (vídeo meu em 2016)! Então… O programa destaca bastante a influência das ideias de Eckhart Tolle, autor de Uma Nova Consciência, que não li, mas é um pensador espiritualista que aborda a atenção plena (como traduzimos mindfulness no Brasil). E eu não vi conceitos de atenção plena na peça, o que não é, de forma alguma, uma crítica! Afinal a peça em si nos conduz muito bem a mais de uma hora de experiência de atenção plena enquanto imergimos nela. É perfeitamente possível que os conceitos estivessem lá outra forma e não notei porque a minha atenção não estava tanto nas camadas mais à tona da consciência.

A peça é repleta de referências à cultura pop (inclusive uma muito bem-vinda a uma roqueira brasileira que gosta de filosofia e uma música dela fecha o espetáculo), filosofia e ao teatro. São agrados para fãs dessas áreas, mas desnecessárias para entender e aproveitar o espetáculo.

Uma referência que, desconfio, é pura viagem minha: “We all float here…”. Se você assistiu e pensou a mesma coisa, não está só!

Concluindo…

A peça é maluca? Cara… É um pouco! Mas também é perfeitamente compreensível tanto para quem se interessa pelas áreas do conhecimento que lhe serviram de inspiração e de base, quanto para quem nunca ouviu falar nelas.

A gente precisa dar um pouco de maluquice tanto para a nossa mente consciente, quando para as camadas inconscientes, isso alimenta o nosso espírito!

A peça é pesada? Olha… Para mim não foi, mas foi para uma das amigas e entendo porque, afinal, passa por temas como suicídio e perversidade acidental (você vai entender quando assistir), mas um tom de leveza dado pela atuação e até de humor (a peça é classificada como humor por alguns, mas acho que ela merece não ser limitada por classificações) criam um certo distanciamento, como se estivéssemos vendo muitas histórias ao mesmo tempo, refletidas em fragmentos de espelhos quebrados (uma referência recorrente na peça e, coincidentemente, apelido desse site aqui: galeria de espelhos).

Foto: eu mesmo tirei antes de começar o espetáculo.

Frases tiradas dos links mais abaixo:

“Praticar o autoconhecimento é como olhar para um espelho que reflete não apenas a nossa aparência, mas também a nossa essência.”

“A peça Ego é uma imersão profunda em reflexões sobre nós mesmos e nossa essência. Com uma narrativa cativante e instigante, o público é convidado a mergulhar nas artimanhas do ego, que nos separam uns dos outros e nos distanciam de nossa verdadeira essência”, declara o diretor, Rizzotti.

“As reflexões levantadas durante o espetáculo são extremamente relevantes para o mundo contemporâneo, no qual muitas vezes nos sentimos desconectados e perdidos em meio às pressões e distrações do cotidiano”, explica o ator Bruno Caldeira.

“O ego pode ser um grande obstáculo para o autoconhecimento, porque muitas vezes, ele nos faz acreditar que precisamos ser perfeitos ou que não podemos demonstrar vulnerabilidade.” – Bruno Caldeiras

“Praticar o autoconhecimento é como olhar para um espelho que reflete não apenas a nossa aparência, mas também a nossa essência.” – Bruno Caldeiras

Links

Todos os artigos destacam que a peça é no formato de “teatro de depoimento”. Não entendi por que consideram isso tão importante, mas tô registrando aqui, né?

• Infelizmente eles não estão na Internet, só em feudos cibernéticos, então seguem os links:
  • Perfil da Cia de teatro no Instagram: Cia2DeTeatroRJ
  • A peça no Instagram: EgoEspetaculo
  • Instagram do ator Bruno Caldeiras: BrunoCaldeira_Ego
  • Instagram do diretor Gustavo Rizzotti: GustavoRizzotti
• Entrevista em áudio (13 minutos) com o ator/autor na EBC: Bruno Caldeira interpreta no palco vivências pessoais e reflexões
• Entrevista em texto no Centro Cultural Justiça Federal: Ego e Setembro Amarelo – Bruno Caldeira
• Revista Prosa Verso e Arte (conta um pouco da história da Cia): Espetáculo ‘Ego’ estreia curta temporada no Teatro da Casa de Cultura Laura Alvim
• Funarte: Montagem da Cia.2 de Teatro é inspirado em consagrado livro de Eckhart Tolle, e tem com supervisão da atriz Clarice Niskier

#Consciência #ego #Fenomenologia #Filosofia #Lacan #Pitty

università di verona: incontri su luca maria patella, i quaderni dei sogni (video delle giornate di studio del 5 e 6 marzo)

prima parte:

seconda parte:

terza parte:

luca patella a verona, dalla collezione garrera (e un saggio su ‘doppiozero’)

i “quaderni dei sogni” di luca maria patella: dalla collezione giuseppe garrera all’università di verona

#art #arte #asemic #asemicWriting #BibliotecaArturoFrinzi #CarlGustavJung #CentroDiRicercaTiresia #CentroStudiTiresia #ChiaraPalermo #CollezioneGiuseppeGarrera #Contemporanea #Doppiozero #ElioGrazioli #EsposizioneDeiQuaderniDeiSogni_ #FedericoLeoni #filosofia #FrancescoMontanari #giornataDiStudi #GiuseppeGarrera #IQuaderniDeiSogni #Jung #Lacan #LucaMariaPatella #LucaMariaPatellaAnimare #LucaPatella #MarioTrevi #MatteoBonazzi #PoloSantaMarta #psicoanalisi #QuaderniDeiSogni #SantaMarta #scritturaAsemica #SilviaVizzardelli #UniversitàDiVerona #UniversitàDiVeronaContemporanea_

Today is the birthday of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the Marxist philosopher György Lukács. https://www.dustinjbyrd.org
#Freud #Lacan #Lukacs #philosophy #Marx #academia #academicmastodon #psychoanalysis

“Trauma occurs when there is an encounter with the Real, which denies signification.” ~ Lacan #psychoanalysis #children #therapy #mentalhealth #lacan #winnicott