#integration — Public Fediverse posts

https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/schweizer-schulsystem-bericht-zur-chancengleichheit-gravierendes-resultat

...ja, auch kleinere Schulklassen, weniger Schüler pro Lehrerin* wären enorm wichtig

#CH #Schulsystem #Integration #Chancengleichheit

Fascinating article! Well worth a read & a boost!

“With China, It’s Getting Late Early”

by Prof. Robert Pape in Escalation Trap on Substack

“What Americans Are Suddenly Seeing From Trump’s Beijing Trip — And What I Saw Touring China’s Advanced Industries”

[..]

“I came away convinced that much of Washington is debating the wrong problem.

The issue is no longer simply whether China manufactures goods more cheaply than the United States.

The issue is whether China is beginning to organize innovation itself more effectively than the United States”

https://open.substack.com/pub/escalationtrap/p/with-china-its-getting-late-early

#Press #SocialMedia #China #Innovation #EcoSystems #Universities #AI #Robotics #EnergySystems #Software #Logistics #Manufacturing #Integration #US #Decline #Trump #Beijing #Xi

@AwetTesfaiesus

Ich finds ja bezeichnend, dass Integrieren in Deutschland vor allem im Passiv verwendet wird. ("Jemand wird integriert", statt "jemand integriert". Im Nomen dann Integration statt Integrieren. Die Konstellation "jemand integriert sich" ist sprachlich und inhaltlich besonders abstrus.)

Stünde da "Integrieren = Assimilieren?" wärs vielleicht auch zu klar und einfach?

#StarTrek #Integration #Borg

@AwetTesfaiesus

Ich finds ja bezeichnend, dass Integrieren in Deutschland vor allem im Passiv verwendet wird. ("Jemand wird integriert", statt "jemand integriert". Im Nomen dann Integration statt Integrieren. Die Konstellation "jemand integriert sich" ist sprachlich und inhaltlich besonders abstrus.)

Stünde da "Integrieren = Assimilieren?" wärs vielleicht auch zu klar und einfach?

#StarTrek #Integration #Borg

@AwetTesfaiesus

Ich finds ja bezeichnend, dass Integrieren in Deutschland vor allem im Passiv verwendet wird. ("Jemand wird integriert", statt "jemand integriert". Im Nomen dann Integration statt Integrieren. Die Konstellation "jemand integriert sich" ist sprachlich und inhaltlich besonders abstrus.)

Stünde da "Integrieren = Assimilieren?" wärs vielleicht auch zu klar und einfach?

#StarTrek #Integration #Borg

@AwetTesfaiesus

Ich finds ja bezeichnend, dass Integrieren in Deutschland vor allem im Passiv verwendet wird. ("Jemand wird integriert", statt "jemand integriert". Im Nomen dann Integration statt Integrieren. Die Konstellation "jemand integriert sich" ist sprachlich und inhaltlich besonders abstrus.)

Stünde da "Integrieren = Assimilieren?" wärs vielleicht auch zu klar und einfach?

#StarTrek #Integration #Borg

Reading the Lattice Without the Legend: Grinberg, Syntergy, and the Argument for Real Entry

A scientist walks out of his office in Mexico City on December 8, 1994, and never walks back in. The man is Jacobo Grinberg-Zylberbaum, forty-eight years old, a UNAM-trained neurophysiologist with a doctorate from New York Medical College, the author of a stack of monographs on consciousness, and the last serious researcher to claim that the human brain could be wired into a holographic substrate of reality he called the Lattice. He had spent years measuring electroencephalographic correlations between separated human subjects. Two months before he vanished, he published a paper in Physics Essays arguing that pairs of subjects, separated inside semisilent Faraday chambers fourteen and a half meters apart, showed brain activity that mirrored stimulation given to only one of them. Then he was gone. The laboratory was found. Several notes were missing. His wife, who had cause to suspect him of an affair and a documented history of violence, became a person of interest and was never charged. Mexican press cycled through the story for years. Mystics and conspiracy theorists folded the disappearance into the theory, as if the man had stepped sideways into his own hypothesis.

I want to take the legend apart and see what is left.

The Lattice, in Grinberg’s framing, refuses the picture of space that physics offers. Space, in Syntergic Theory, behaves as a high-coherence informational matrix. The brain produces what he called a “neuronal field” that interacts with the Lattice the way a film negative interacts with a beam of light, decoding a hologram. Reality, in this picture, gets read off a substrate that already contains every point in space, every moment in time, and every state of consciousness. The brain becomes one of many possible decoders. High coherence, the kind Grinberg believed he saw in expert meditators and in the Mexican curandera he studied for years (Bárbara Guerrero, known as Pachita), allowed certain brains to interact with the Lattice directly. Telepathy followed from that interaction. Remote viewing came next. Materialization, in the most extreme reading of Pachita’s psychic surgery, sat at the far end of the same continuum.

This is a beautiful theory. It is also, as stated, almost entirely unfalsifiable.

The temptation, when you encounter writing like this, is to either swallow it whole or dismiss it whole. Both responses are lazy. The work has a testable core and a metaphysical shell, and the two need to be separated before anything useful can be said about either.

The testable core is the transferred potential experiment. Two people interact for twenty minutes. They are placed in electromagnetically shielded rooms separated by a distance that rules out ordinary signaling. Only one subject of each pair is stimulated by one hundred light flashes. An EEG records evoked potentials in the stimulated subject. A second EEG records the unstimulated subject. Grinberg and his coauthors, including the theoretical physicist Amit Goswami, claimed that when the stimulated subject showed distinct evoked potentials, the nonstimulated subject showed “transferred potentials” similar to those evoked in the stimulated subject. They titled the 1994 paper “The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox in the Brain,” and they proposed that the brain has a macroscopic quantum component capable of nonlocal correlation across distance.

If the effect were real and robust, it would rank among the most important findings in the history of neuroscience. So what does the replication record show?

Leanna Standish and colleagues at Bastyr University and the University of Washington repeated the design in 2003 and 2004, recording simultaneous EEGs from pairs of subjects placed in sound-attenuated rooms separated by ten meters, later extending the work to fMRI. They reported small correlations in some pairs, statistically above chance, broadly consistent with Grinberg’s direction. A 2018 re-analysis by groups at IULM in Milan and the University of Padova, applying machine-learning classifiers to two pooled datasets covering forty-five pairs, found classification accuracies of 50.74 percent on the first dataset and 51.17 percent, 50.45 percent, and 51.91 percent across stimulation conditions on the second. The honest reading of those numbers is that there is, at best, a faint signal above noise, on the order of one to two percent above chance, and that the signal does not hold up under stricter analytical methods. The “one in four pairs” claim from the original paper is the kind of effect size that thins out when sample sizes grow and protocols tighten. The result might be noise. It might be small and real. The data, after thirty years, cannot tell us which.

The Lattice does not announce itself in clean experimental data. What announces itself is a smear of weakly positive results, sensitive to method, sample, and the personal coherence of the experimenters and subjects. A smear of that kind, in any other branch of biology, would be treated as a candidate artifact rather than a candidate discovery.

So where are the weak spots in Grinberg’s argument? I count five.

The first concerns decoherence. Quantum entanglement is fragile. It survives at extremely low temperatures, in highly isolated systems, in laboratories where engineers work for years to prevent contact with the surrounding environment. The human brain operates at 310 Kelvin, immersed in saltwater, packed with thermal vibration and electrochemical traffic. The mainstream physical objection to any macroscopic quantum brain is that entangled states cannot last long enough at body temperature to do anything cognitively useful. Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed microtubules inside neurons as a possible shelter for such states, and that proposal has critics of its own. Grinberg borrowed the language of EPR correlation without supplying a physical mechanism that addresses decoherence at all.

Venue makes a second weakness. Physics Essays publishes heterodox work. It is peer-reviewed, but it is not Physical Review Letters. Goswami, the coauthor who supplied the quantum framework, is a theoretical physicist whose later career was spent largely outside academic physics, writing for general audiences on consciousness. David Bohm, whose Wholeness and the Implicate Order Grinberg cited as foundational, was taken seriously by working physicists in a way that Goswami’s idealist consciousness work has not been. None of this disqualifies Grinberg’s results. It does qualify the weight one should give them before independent replication settles the question.

Pachita is a third problem. Grinberg believed he was watching a high-coherence shaman manipulate the Lattice when he observed the curandera apparently materializing tissue and performing organ transplants without anesthesia. The skeptical literature on psychic surgery is well developed, going back to James Randi’s documentation of Filipino practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s. The techniques are reproducible by stage magicians using animal tissue concealed in the hand. I do not claim that Pachita was fraudulent. I claim that Grinberg’s failure to engage with that literature on his own observations was a methodological gap large enough to fall through.

A fourth weakness sits in the unfalsifiability of the Lattice itself. The transferred potential is testable. The claim that space is a holographic informational matrix decoded by the brain is, as currently stated, not testable in any sharp way. The interpretation can absorb any outcome by adjusting what counts as coherence. A theory closed to refutation has crossed out of science and into philosophy, where Bohm’s implicate order belongs and where Grinberg’s Syntergic Theory should be argued.

The fifth weakness is the disappearance, which has worked as an evidentiary force-multiplier in the opposite direction the mystics imagine. Because the man vanished, the work is treated as forbidden knowledge. Because the work is treated as forbidden, it is shielded from the ordinary correction processes of science. The romance of the vanishing has done more damage to the theory than any single critic ever could.

That is the harsh audit. Here is what survives it.

What survives is a serious twentieth-century researcher who took indigenous practitioners seriously when most of his peers would not, who designed and ran controlled experiments on a phenomenon his discipline refused to study, who published in peer-reviewed venues with a theoretical physicist as coauthor, and whose specific empirical claim of brain-to-brain correlation across electromagnetic shielding has been independently tested by university laboratories in the United States and Europe with weakly positive but unconvincing results. The Lattice as cosmology fails the audit, while the transferred potential as a research program clears it.

Which brings me to the question worth taking seriously. What would real entry into the Lattice look like, if Grinberg’s empirical claim deserves another hearing?

Entry would begin by separating Syntergic cosmology from transferred-potential empiricism, permanently. The cosmology is interesting as a philosophical proposition and belongs in the philosophy of mind, alongside Bohm, Whitehead, and the slow-burning literature on panpsychism. The empiricism is interesting as a falsifiable claim and demands the methodological rigor the original work lacked. That means preregistered protocols, pair samples in the hundreds rather than the dozens, blinded analysis, machine-learning classifiers reported with confidence intervals, datasets shared openly, and a pre-committed null hypothesis the field will accept if the signal fails to clear it. The work has been creeping in that direction for twenty years, slowly, in the parapsychology literature and in a small set of medical schools. It needs to migrate into mainstream cognitive neuroscience or it will live on the margins forever.

Mechanism comes next. Holographic metaphors are not mechanisms. A specific physical proposal must explain how two brains separated by fifteen meters of air and steel could correlate at all. Decoherence is the wall. Until someone proposes a mechanism that survives a hostile physics seminar, the empirical results, even if they hold up, will be read as artifact rather than discovery. Penrose and Hameroff at least attempted a mechanism. Grinberg never did, and the field has not done it for him in the thirty years since.

Last, we would have to give up the romance of the vanishing. Grinberg probably did not step into his own theory. The most likely reading of the available evidence is that he died in late 1994, in circumstances Mexican authorities never resolved, with attention focused on his immediate domestic situation. The investigation failed. The case remains open. As long as his disappearance functions as evidence for his theory, we are doing magical thinking under the cover of physics. A theory has to survive on its experimental record, not on the mystery of its author’s death.

Is any of this real, or possible? The transferred potential, in its weak form, might be real. The Lattice, as Grinberg drew it, is most likely not real in the literal physical sense he intended. What is real is the underlying scandal that consciousness studies were starved of funding and respectability for most of the twentieth century, that a serious researcher who tried to bring rigor to the question was treated as fringe in his own lifetime, that he disappeared before he could finish his work, and that the field has only now begun to catch up to the questions he was asking.

If we want to enter the Lattice, the entry point is methodological, not mystical. We pick up where he left off. The testable parts get tested. Cosmology stands as a working metaphor that may, or may not, be redeemed by data. Above all, we resist the temptation to make the man’s death do the work that his experiments could not finish.

That is the only honest way to read him now.

Reading the Lattice Without the Legend: Grinberg, Syntergy, and the Argument for Real Entry

A scientist walks out of his office in Mexico City on December 8, 1994, and never walks back in. The man is Jacobo Grinberg-Zylberbaum, forty-eight years old, a UNAM-trained neurophysiologist with a doctorate from New York Medical College, the author of a stack of monographs on consciousness, and the last serious researcher to claim that the human brain could be wired into a holographic substrate of reality he called the Lattice. He had spent years measuring electroencephalographic correlations between separated human subjects. Two months before he vanished, he published a paper in Physics Essays arguing that pairs of subjects, separated inside semisilent Faraday chambers fourteen and a half meters apart, showed brain activity that mirrored stimulation given to only one of them. Then he was gone. The laboratory was found. Several notes were missing. His wife, who had cause to suspect him of an affair and a documented history of violence, became a person of interest and was never charged. Mexican press cycled through the story for years. Mystics and conspiracy theorists folded the disappearance into the theory, as if the man had stepped sideways into his own hypothesis.

I want to take the legend apart and see what is left.

The Lattice, in Grinberg’s framing, refuses the picture of space that physics offers. Space, in Syntergic Theory, behaves as a high-coherence informational matrix. The brain produces what he called a “neuronal field” that interacts with the Lattice the way a film negative interacts with a beam of light, decoding a hologram. Reality, in this picture, gets read off a substrate that already contains every point in space, every moment in time, and every state of consciousness. The brain becomes one of many possible decoders. High coherence, the kind Grinberg believed he saw in expert meditators and in the Mexican curandera he studied for years (Bárbara Guerrero, known as Pachita), allowed certain brains to interact with the Lattice directly. Telepathy followed from that interaction. Remote viewing came next. Materialization, in the most extreme reading of Pachita’s psychic surgery, sat at the far end of the same continuum.

This is a beautiful theory. It is also, as stated, almost entirely unfalsifiable.

The temptation, when you encounter writing like this, is to either swallow it whole or dismiss it whole. Both responses are lazy. The work has a testable core and a metaphysical shell, and the two need to be separated before anything useful can be said about either.

The testable core is the transferred potential experiment. Two people interact for twenty minutes. They are placed in electromagnetically shielded rooms separated by a distance that rules out ordinary signaling. Only one subject of each pair is stimulated by one hundred light flashes. An EEG records evoked potentials in the stimulated subject. A second EEG records the unstimulated subject. Grinberg and his coauthors, including the theoretical physicist Amit Goswami, claimed that when the stimulated subject showed distinct evoked potentials, the nonstimulated subject showed “transferred potentials” similar to those evoked in the stimulated subject. They titled the 1994 paper “The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox in the Brain,” and they proposed that the brain has a macroscopic quantum component capable of nonlocal correlation across distance.

If the effect were real and robust, it would rank among the most important findings in the history of neuroscience. So what does the replication record show?

Leanna Standish and colleagues at Bastyr University and the University of Washington repeated the design in 2003 and 2004, recording simultaneous EEGs from pairs of subjects placed in sound-attenuated rooms separated by ten meters, later extending the work to fMRI. They reported small correlations in some pairs, statistically above chance, broadly consistent with Grinberg’s direction. A 2018 re-analysis by groups at IULM in Milan and the University of Padova, applying machine-learning classifiers to two pooled datasets covering forty-five pairs, found classification accuracies of 50.74 percent on the first dataset and 51.17 percent, 50.45 percent, and 51.91 percent across stimulation conditions on the second. The honest reading of those numbers is that there is, at best, a faint signal above noise, on the order of one to two percent above chance, and that the signal does not hold up under stricter analytical methods. The “one in four pairs” claim from the original paper is the kind of effect size that thins out when sample sizes grow and protocols tighten. The result might be noise. It might be small and real. The data, after thirty years, cannot tell us which.

The Lattice does not announce itself in clean experimental data. What announces itself is a smear of weakly positive results, sensitive to method, sample, and the personal coherence of the experimenters and subjects. A smear of that kind, in any other branch of biology, would be treated as a candidate artifact rather than a candidate discovery.

So where are the weak spots in Grinberg’s argument? I count five.

The first concerns decoherence. Quantum entanglement is fragile. It survives at extremely low temperatures, in highly isolated systems, in laboratories where engineers work for years to prevent contact with the surrounding environment. The human brain operates at 310 Kelvin, immersed in saltwater, packed with thermal vibration and electrochemical traffic. The mainstream physical objection to any macroscopic quantum brain is that entangled states cannot last long enough at body temperature to do anything cognitively useful. Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed microtubules inside neurons as a possible shelter for such states, and that proposal has critics of its own. Grinberg borrowed the language of EPR correlation without supplying a physical mechanism that addresses decoherence at all.

Venue makes a second weakness. Physics Essays publishes heterodox work. It is peer-reviewed, but it is not Physical Review Letters. Goswami, the coauthor who supplied the quantum framework, is a theoretical physicist whose later career was spent largely outside academic physics, writing for general audiences on consciousness. David Bohm, whose Wholeness and the Implicate Order Grinberg cited as foundational, was taken seriously by working physicists in a way that Goswami’s idealist consciousness work has not been. None of this disqualifies Grinberg’s results. It does qualify the weight one should give them before independent replication settles the question.

Pachita is a third problem. Grinberg believed he was watching a high-coherence shaman manipulate the Lattice when he observed the curandera apparently materializing tissue and performing organ transplants without anesthesia. The skeptical literature on psychic surgery is well developed, going back to James Randi’s documentation of Filipino practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s. The techniques are reproducible by stage magicians using animal tissue concealed in the hand. I do not claim that Pachita was fraudulent. I claim that Grinberg’s failure to engage with that literature on his own observations was a methodological gap large enough to fall through.

A fourth weakness sits in the unfalsifiability of the Lattice itself. The transferred potential is testable. The claim that space is a holographic informational matrix decoded by the brain is, as currently stated, not testable in any sharp way. The interpretation can absorb any outcome by adjusting what counts as coherence. A theory closed to refutation has crossed out of science and into philosophy, where Bohm’s implicate order belongs and where Grinberg’s Syntergic Theory should be argued.

The fifth weakness is the disappearance, which has worked as an evidentiary force-multiplier in the opposite direction the mystics imagine. Because the man vanished, the work is treated as forbidden knowledge. Because the work is treated as forbidden, it is shielded from the ordinary correction processes of science. The romance of the vanishing has done more damage to the theory than any single critic ever could.

That is the harsh audit. Here is what survives it.

What survives is a serious twentieth-century researcher who took indigenous practitioners seriously when most of his peers would not, who designed and ran controlled experiments on a phenomenon his discipline refused to study, who published in peer-reviewed venues with a theoretical physicist as coauthor, and whose specific empirical claim of brain-to-brain correlation across electromagnetic shielding has been independently tested by university laboratories in the United States and Europe with weakly positive but unconvincing results. The Lattice as cosmology fails the audit, while the transferred potential as a research program clears it.

Which brings me to the question worth taking seriously. What would real entry into the Lattice look like, if Grinberg’s empirical claim deserves another hearing?

Entry would begin by separating Syntergic cosmology from transferred-potential empiricism, permanently. The cosmology is interesting as a philosophical proposition and belongs in the philosophy of mind, alongside Bohm, Whitehead, and the slow-burning literature on panpsychism. The empiricism is interesting as a falsifiable claim and demands the methodological rigor the original work lacked. That means preregistered protocols, pair samples in the hundreds rather than the dozens, blinded analysis, machine-learning classifiers reported with confidence intervals, datasets shared openly, and a pre-committed null hypothesis the field will accept if the signal fails to clear it. The work has been creeping in that direction for twenty years, slowly, in the parapsychology literature and in a small set of medical schools. It needs to migrate into mainstream cognitive neuroscience or it will live on the margins forever.

Mechanism comes next. Holographic metaphors are not mechanisms. A specific physical proposal must explain how two brains separated by fifteen meters of air and steel could correlate at all. Decoherence is the wall. Until someone proposes a mechanism that survives a hostile physics seminar, the empirical results, even if they hold up, will be read as artifact rather than discovery. Penrose and Hameroff at least attempted a mechanism. Grinberg never did, and the field has not done it for him in the thirty years since.

Last, we would have to give up the romance of the vanishing. Grinberg probably did not step into his own theory. The most likely reading of the available evidence is that he died in late 1994, in circumstances Mexican authorities never resolved, with attention focused on his immediate domestic situation. The investigation failed. The case remains open. As long as his disappearance functions as evidence for his theory, we are doing magical thinking under the cover of physics. A theory has to survive on its experimental record, not on the mystery of its author’s death.

Is any of this real, or possible? The transferred potential, in its weak form, might be real. The Lattice, as Grinberg drew it, is most likely not real in the literal physical sense he intended. What is real is the underlying scandal that consciousness studies were starved of funding and respectability for most of the twentieth century, that a serious researcher who tried to bring rigor to the question was treated as fringe in his own lifetime, that he disappeared before he could finish his work, and that the field has only now begun to catch up to the questions he was asking.

If we want to enter the Lattice, the entry point is methodological, not mystical. We pick up where he left off. The testable parts get tested. Cosmology stands as a working metaphor that may, or may not, be redeemed by data. Above all, we resist the temptation to make the man’s death do the work that his experiments could not finish.

That is the only honest way to read him now.

Reading the Lattice Without the Legend: Grinberg, Syntergy, and the Argument for Real Entry

A scientist walks out of his office in Mexico City on December 8, 1994, and never walks back in. The man is Jacobo Grinberg-Zylberbaum, forty-eight years old, a UNAM-trained neurophysiologist with a doctorate from New York Medical College, the author of a stack of monographs on consciousness, and the last serious researcher to claim that the human brain could be wired into a holographic substrate of reality he called the Lattice. He had spent years measuring electroencephalographic correlations between separated human subjects. Two months before he vanished, he published a paper in Physics Essays arguing that pairs of subjects, separated inside semisilent Faraday chambers fourteen and a half meters apart, showed brain activity that mirrored stimulation given to only one of them. Then he was gone. The laboratory was found. Several notes were missing. His wife, who had cause to suspect him of an affair and a documented history of violence, became a person of interest and was never charged. Mexican press cycled through the story for years. Mystics and conspiracy theorists folded the disappearance into the theory, as if the man had stepped sideways into his own hypothesis.

I want to take the legend apart and see what is left.

The Lattice, in Grinberg’s framing, refuses the picture of space that physics offers. Space, in Syntergic Theory, behaves as a high-coherence informational matrix. The brain produces what he called a “neuronal field” that interacts with the Lattice the way a film negative interacts with a beam of light, decoding a hologram. Reality, in this picture, gets read off a substrate that already contains every point in space, every moment in time, and every state of consciousness. The brain becomes one of many possible decoders. High coherence, the kind Grinberg believed he saw in expert meditators and in the Mexican curandera he studied for years (Bárbara Guerrero, known as Pachita), allowed certain brains to interact with the Lattice directly. Telepathy followed from that interaction. Remote viewing came next. Materialization, in the most extreme reading of Pachita’s psychic surgery, sat at the far end of the same continuum.

This is a beautiful theory. It is also, as stated, almost entirely unfalsifiable.

The temptation, when you encounter writing like this, is to either swallow it whole or dismiss it whole. Both responses are lazy. The work has a testable core and a metaphysical shell, and the two need to be separated before anything useful can be said about either.

The testable core is the transferred potential experiment. Two people interact for twenty minutes. They are placed in electromagnetically shielded rooms separated by a distance that rules out ordinary signaling. Only one subject of each pair is stimulated by one hundred light flashes. An EEG records evoked potentials in the stimulated subject. A second EEG records the unstimulated subject. Grinberg and his coauthors, including the theoretical physicist Amit Goswami, claimed that when the stimulated subject showed distinct evoked potentials, the nonstimulated subject showed “transferred potentials” similar to those evoked in the stimulated subject. They titled the 1994 paper “The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox in the Brain,” and they proposed that the brain has a macroscopic quantum component capable of nonlocal correlation across distance.

If the effect were real and robust, it would rank among the most important findings in the history of neuroscience. So what does the replication record show?

Leanna Standish and colleagues at Bastyr University and the University of Washington repeated the design in 2003 and 2004, recording simultaneous EEGs from pairs of subjects placed in sound-attenuated rooms separated by ten meters, later extending the work to fMRI. They reported small correlations in some pairs, statistically above chance, broadly consistent with Grinberg’s direction. A 2018 re-analysis by groups at IULM in Milan and the University of Padova, applying machine-learning classifiers to two pooled datasets covering forty-five pairs, found classification accuracies of 50.74 percent on the first dataset and 51.17 percent, 50.45 percent, and 51.91 percent across stimulation conditions on the second. The honest reading of those numbers is that there is, at best, a faint signal above noise, on the order of one to two percent above chance, and that the signal does not hold up under stricter analytical methods. The “one in four pairs” claim from the original paper is the kind of effect size that thins out when sample sizes grow and protocols tighten. The result might be noise. It might be small and real. The data, after thirty years, cannot tell us which.

The Lattice does not announce itself in clean experimental data. What announces itself is a smear of weakly positive results, sensitive to method, sample, and the personal coherence of the experimenters and subjects. A smear of that kind, in any other branch of biology, would be treated as a candidate artifact rather than a candidate discovery.

So where are the weak spots in Grinberg’s argument? I count five.

The first concerns decoherence. Quantum entanglement is fragile. It survives at extremely low temperatures, in highly isolated systems, in laboratories where engineers work for years to prevent contact with the surrounding environment. The human brain operates at 310 Kelvin, immersed in saltwater, packed with thermal vibration and electrochemical traffic. The mainstream physical objection to any macroscopic quantum brain is that entangled states cannot last long enough at body temperature to do anything cognitively useful. Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed microtubules inside neurons as a possible shelter for such states, and that proposal has critics of its own. Grinberg borrowed the language of EPR correlation without supplying a physical mechanism that addresses decoherence at all.

Venue makes a second weakness. Physics Essays publishes heterodox work. It is peer-reviewed, but it is not Physical Review Letters. Goswami, the coauthor who supplied the quantum framework, is a theoretical physicist whose later career was spent largely outside academic physics, writing for general audiences on consciousness. David Bohm, whose Wholeness and the Implicate Order Grinberg cited as foundational, was taken seriously by working physicists in a way that Goswami’s idealist consciousness work has not been. None of this disqualifies Grinberg’s results. It does qualify the weight one should give them before independent replication settles the question.

Pachita is a third problem. Grinberg believed he was watching a high-coherence shaman manipulate the Lattice when he observed the curandera apparently materializing tissue and performing organ transplants without anesthesia. The skeptical literature on psychic surgery is well developed, going back to James Randi’s documentation of Filipino practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s. The techniques are reproducible by stage magicians using animal tissue concealed in the hand. I do not claim that Pachita was fraudulent. I claim that Grinberg’s failure to engage with that literature on his own observations was a methodological gap large enough to fall through.

A fourth weakness sits in the unfalsifiability of the Lattice itself. The transferred potential is testable. The claim that space is a holographic informational matrix decoded by the brain is, as currently stated, not testable in any sharp way. The interpretation can absorb any outcome by adjusting what counts as coherence. A theory closed to refutation has crossed out of science and into philosophy, where Bohm’s implicate order belongs and where Grinberg’s Syntergic Theory should be argued.

The fifth weakness is the disappearance, which has worked as an evidentiary force-multiplier in the opposite direction the mystics imagine. Because the man vanished, the work is treated as forbidden knowledge. Because the work is treated as forbidden, it is shielded from the ordinary correction processes of science. The romance of the vanishing has done more damage to the theory than any single critic ever could.

That is the harsh audit. Here is what survives it.

What survives is a serious twentieth-century researcher who took indigenous practitioners seriously when most of his peers would not, who designed and ran controlled experiments on a phenomenon his discipline refused to study, who published in peer-reviewed venues with a theoretical physicist as coauthor, and whose specific empirical claim of brain-to-brain correlation across electromagnetic shielding has been independently tested by university laboratories in the United States and Europe with weakly positive but unconvincing results. The Lattice as cosmology fails the audit, while the transferred potential as a research program clears it.

Which brings me to the question worth taking seriously. What would real entry into the Lattice look like, if Grinberg’s empirical claim deserves another hearing?

Entry would begin by separating Syntergic cosmology from transferred-potential empiricism, permanently. The cosmology is interesting as a philosophical proposition and belongs in the philosophy of mind, alongside Bohm, Whitehead, and the slow-burning literature on panpsychism. The empiricism is interesting as a falsifiable claim and demands the methodological rigor the original work lacked. That means preregistered protocols, pair samples in the hundreds rather than the dozens, blinded analysis, machine-learning classifiers reported with confidence intervals, datasets shared openly, and a pre-committed null hypothesis the field will accept if the signal fails to clear it. The work has been creeping in that direction for twenty years, slowly, in the parapsychology literature and in a small set of medical schools. It needs to migrate into mainstream cognitive neuroscience or it will live on the margins forever.

Mechanism comes next. Holographic metaphors are not mechanisms. A specific physical proposal must explain how two brains separated by fifteen meters of air and steel could correlate at all. Decoherence is the wall. Until someone proposes a mechanism that survives a hostile physics seminar, the empirical results, even if they hold up, will be read as artifact rather than discovery. Penrose and Hameroff at least attempted a mechanism. Grinberg never did, and the field has not done it for him in the thirty years since.

Last, we would have to give up the romance of the vanishing. Grinberg probably did not step into his own theory. The most likely reading of the available evidence is that he died in late 1994, in circumstances Mexican authorities never resolved, with attention focused on his immediate domestic situation. The investigation failed. The case remains open. As long as his disappearance functions as evidence for his theory, we are doing magical thinking under the cover of physics. A theory has to survive on its experimental record, not on the mystery of its author’s death.

Is any of this real, or possible? The transferred potential, in its weak form, might be real. The Lattice, as Grinberg drew it, is most likely not real in the literal physical sense he intended. What is real is the underlying scandal that consciousness studies were starved of funding and respectability for most of the twentieth century, that a serious researcher who tried to bring rigor to the question was treated as fringe in his own lifetime, that he disappeared before he could finish his work, and that the field has only now begun to catch up to the questions he was asking.

If we want to enter the Lattice, the entry point is methodological, not mystical. We pick up where he left off. The testable parts get tested. Cosmology stands as a working metaphor that may, or may not, be redeemed by data. Above all, we resist the temptation to make the man’s death do the work that his experiments could not finish.

That is the only honest way to read him now.

Reading the Lattice Without the Legend: Grinberg, Syntergy, and the Argument for Real Entry

A scientist walks out of his office in Mexico City on December 8, 1994, and never walks back in. The man is Jacobo Grinberg-Zylberbaum, forty-eight years old, a UNAM-trained neurophysiologist with a doctorate from New York Medical College, the author of a stack of monographs on consciousness, and the last serious researcher to claim that the human brain could be wired into a holographic substrate of reality he called the Lattice. He had spent years measuring electroencephalographic correlations between separated human subjects. Two months before he vanished, he published a paper in Physics Essays arguing that pairs of subjects, separated inside semisilent Faraday chambers fourteen and a half meters apart, showed brain activity that mirrored stimulation given to only one of them. Then he was gone. The laboratory was found. Several notes were missing. His wife, who had cause to suspect him of an affair and a documented history of violence, became a person of interest and was never charged. Mexican press cycled through the story for years. Mystics and conspiracy theorists folded the disappearance into the theory, as if the man had stepped sideways into his own hypothesis.

I want to take the legend apart and see what is left.

The Lattice, in Grinberg’s framing, refuses the picture of space that physics offers. Space, in Syntergic Theory, behaves as a high-coherence informational matrix. The brain produces what he called a “neuronal field” that interacts with the Lattice the way a film negative interacts with a beam of light, decoding a hologram. Reality, in this picture, gets read off a substrate that already contains every point in space, every moment in time, and every state of consciousness. The brain becomes one of many possible decoders. High coherence, the kind Grinberg believed he saw in expert meditators and in the Mexican curandera he studied for years (Bárbara Guerrero, known as Pachita), allowed certain brains to interact with the Lattice directly. Telepathy followed from that interaction. Remote viewing came next. Materialization, in the most extreme reading of Pachita’s psychic surgery, sat at the far end of the same continuum.

This is a beautiful theory. It is also, as stated, almost entirely unfalsifiable.

The temptation, when you encounter writing like this, is to either swallow it whole or dismiss it whole. Both responses are lazy. The work has a testable core and a metaphysical shell, and the two need to be separated before anything useful can be said about either.

The testable core is the transferred potential experiment. Two people interact for twenty minutes. They are placed in electromagnetically shielded rooms separated by a distance that rules out ordinary signaling. Only one subject of each pair is stimulated by one hundred light flashes. An EEG records evoked potentials in the stimulated subject. A second EEG records the unstimulated subject. Grinberg and his coauthors, including the theoretical physicist Amit Goswami, claimed that when the stimulated subject showed distinct evoked potentials, the nonstimulated subject showed “transferred potentials” similar to those evoked in the stimulated subject. They titled the 1994 paper “The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox in the Brain,” and they proposed that the brain has a macroscopic quantum component capable of nonlocal correlation across distance.

If the effect were real and robust, it would rank among the most important findings in the history of neuroscience. So what does the replication record show?

Leanna Standish and colleagues at Bastyr University and the University of Washington repeated the design in 2003 and 2004, recording simultaneous EEGs from pairs of subjects placed in sound-attenuated rooms separated by ten meters, later extending the work to fMRI. They reported small correlations in some pairs, statistically above chance, broadly consistent with Grinberg’s direction. A 2018 re-analysis by groups at IULM in Milan and the University of Padova, applying machine-learning classifiers to two pooled datasets covering forty-five pairs, found classification accuracies of 50.74 percent on the first dataset and 51.17 percent, 50.45 percent, and 51.91 percent across stimulation conditions on the second. The honest reading of those numbers is that there is, at best, a faint signal above noise, on the order of one to two percent above chance, and that the signal does not hold up under stricter analytical methods. The “one in four pairs” claim from the original paper is the kind of effect size that thins out when sample sizes grow and protocols tighten. The result might be noise. It might be small and real. The data, after thirty years, cannot tell us which.

The Lattice does not announce itself in clean experimental data. What announces itself is a smear of weakly positive results, sensitive to method, sample, and the personal coherence of the experimenters and subjects. A smear of that kind, in any other branch of biology, would be treated as a candidate artifact rather than a candidate discovery.

So where are the weak spots in Grinberg’s argument? I count five.

The first concerns decoherence. Quantum entanglement is fragile. It survives at extremely low temperatures, in highly isolated systems, in laboratories where engineers work for years to prevent contact with the surrounding environment. The human brain operates at 310 Kelvin, immersed in saltwater, packed with thermal vibration and electrochemical traffic. The mainstream physical objection to any macroscopic quantum brain is that entangled states cannot last long enough at body temperature to do anything cognitively useful. Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed microtubules inside neurons as a possible shelter for such states, and that proposal has critics of its own. Grinberg borrowed the language of EPR correlation without supplying a physical mechanism that addresses decoherence at all.

Venue makes a second weakness. Physics Essays publishes heterodox work. It is peer-reviewed, but it is not Physical Review Letters. Goswami, the coauthor who supplied the quantum framework, is a theoretical physicist whose later career was spent largely outside academic physics, writing for general audiences on consciousness. David Bohm, whose Wholeness and the Implicate Order Grinberg cited as foundational, was taken seriously by working physicists in a way that Goswami’s idealist consciousness work has not been. None of this disqualifies Grinberg’s results. It does qualify the weight one should give them before independent replication settles the question.

Pachita is a third problem. Grinberg believed he was watching a high-coherence shaman manipulate the Lattice when he observed the curandera apparently materializing tissue and performing organ transplants without anesthesia. The skeptical literature on psychic surgery is well developed, going back to James Randi’s documentation of Filipino practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s. The techniques are reproducible by stage magicians using animal tissue concealed in the hand. I do not claim that Pachita was fraudulent. I claim that Grinberg’s failure to engage with that literature on his own observations was a methodological gap large enough to fall through.

A fourth weakness sits in the unfalsifiability of the Lattice itself. The transferred potential is testable. The claim that space is a holographic informational matrix decoded by the brain is, as currently stated, not testable in any sharp way. The interpretation can absorb any outcome by adjusting what counts as coherence. A theory closed to refutation has crossed out of science and into philosophy, where Bohm’s implicate order belongs and where Grinberg’s Syntergic Theory should be argued.

The fifth weakness is the disappearance, which has worked as an evidentiary force-multiplier in the opposite direction the mystics imagine. Because the man vanished, the work is treated as forbidden knowledge. Because the work is treated as forbidden, it is shielded from the ordinary correction processes of science. The romance of the vanishing has done more damage to the theory than any single critic ever could.

That is the harsh audit. Here is what survives it.

What survives is a serious twentieth-century researcher who took indigenous practitioners seriously when most of his peers would not, who designed and ran controlled experiments on a phenomenon his discipline refused to study, who published in peer-reviewed venues with a theoretical physicist as coauthor, and whose specific empirical claim of brain-to-brain correlation across electromagnetic shielding has been independently tested by university laboratories in the United States and Europe with weakly positive but unconvincing results. The Lattice as cosmology fails the audit, while the transferred potential as a research program clears it.

Which brings me to the question worth taking seriously. What would real entry into the Lattice look like, if Grinberg’s empirical claim deserves another hearing?

Entry would begin by separating Syntergic cosmology from transferred-potential empiricism, permanently. The cosmology is interesting as a philosophical proposition and belongs in the philosophy of mind, alongside Bohm, Whitehead, and the slow-burning literature on panpsychism. The empiricism is interesting as a falsifiable claim and demands the methodological rigor the original work lacked. That means preregistered protocols, pair samples in the hundreds rather than the dozens, blinded analysis, machine-learning classifiers reported with confidence intervals, datasets shared openly, and a pre-committed null hypothesis the field will accept if the signal fails to clear it. The work has been creeping in that direction for twenty years, slowly, in the parapsychology literature and in a small set of medical schools. It needs to migrate into mainstream cognitive neuroscience or it will live on the margins forever.

Mechanism comes next. Holographic metaphors are not mechanisms. A specific physical proposal must explain how two brains separated by fifteen meters of air and steel could correlate at all. Decoherence is the wall. Until someone proposes a mechanism that survives a hostile physics seminar, the empirical results, even if they hold up, will be read as artifact rather than discovery. Penrose and Hameroff at least attempted a mechanism. Grinberg never did, and the field has not done it for him in the thirty years since.

Last, we would have to give up the romance of the vanishing. Grinberg probably did not step into his own theory. The most likely reading of the available evidence is that he died in late 1994, in circumstances Mexican authorities never resolved, with attention focused on his immediate domestic situation. The investigation failed. The case remains open. As long as his disappearance functions as evidence for his theory, we are doing magical thinking under the cover of physics. A theory has to survive on its experimental record, not on the mystery of its author’s death.

Is any of this real, or possible? The transferred potential, in its weak form, might be real. The Lattice, as Grinberg drew it, is most likely not real in the literal physical sense he intended. What is real is the underlying scandal that consciousness studies were starved of funding and respectability for most of the twentieth century, that a serious researcher who tried to bring rigor to the question was treated as fringe in his own lifetime, that he disappeared before he could finish his work, and that the field has only now begun to catch up to the questions he was asking.

If we want to enter the Lattice, the entry point is methodological, not mystical. We pick up where he left off. The testable parts get tested. Cosmology stands as a working metaphor that may, or may not, be redeemed by data. Above all, we resist the temptation to make the man’s death do the work that his experiments could not finish.

That is the only honest way to read him now.

Reading the Lattice Without the Legend: Grinberg, Syntergy, and the Argument for Real Entry

A scientist walks out of his office in Mexico City on December 8, 1994, and never walks back in. The man is Jacobo Grinberg-Zylberbaum, forty-eight years old, a UNAM-trained neurophysiologist with a doctorate from New York Medical College, the author of a stack of monographs on consciousness, and the last serious researcher to claim that the human brain could be wired into a holographic substrate of reality he called the Lattice. He had spent years measuring electroencephalographic correlations between separated human subjects. Two months before he vanished, he published a paper in Physics Essays arguing that pairs of subjects, separated inside semisilent Faraday chambers fourteen and a half meters apart, showed brain activity that mirrored stimulation given to only one of them. Then he was gone. The laboratory was found. Several notes were missing. His wife, who had cause to suspect him of an affair and a documented history of violence, became a person of interest and was never charged. Mexican press cycled through the story for years. Mystics and conspiracy theorists folded the disappearance into the theory, as if the man had stepped sideways into his own hypothesis.

I want to take the legend apart and see what is left.

The Lattice, in Grinberg’s framing, refuses the picture of space that physics offers. Space, in Syntergic Theory, behaves as a high-coherence informational matrix. The brain produces what he called a “neuronal field” that interacts with the Lattice the way a film negative interacts with a beam of light, decoding a hologram. Reality, in this picture, gets read off a substrate that already contains every point in space, every moment in time, and every state of consciousness. The brain becomes one of many possible decoders. High coherence, the kind Grinberg believed he saw in expert meditators and in the Mexican curandera he studied for years (Bárbara Guerrero, known as Pachita), allowed certain brains to interact with the Lattice directly. Telepathy followed from that interaction. Remote viewing came next. Materialization, in the most extreme reading of Pachita’s psychic surgery, sat at the far end of the same continuum.

This is a beautiful theory. It is also, as stated, almost entirely unfalsifiable.

The temptation, when you encounter writing like this, is to either swallow it whole or dismiss it whole. Both responses are lazy. The work has a testable core and a metaphysical shell, and the two need to be separated before anything useful can be said about either.

The testable core is the transferred potential experiment. Two people interact for twenty minutes. They are placed in electromagnetically shielded rooms separated by a distance that rules out ordinary signaling. Only one subject of each pair is stimulated by one hundred light flashes. An EEG records evoked potentials in the stimulated subject. A second EEG records the unstimulated subject. Grinberg and his coauthors, including the theoretical physicist Amit Goswami, claimed that when the stimulated subject showed distinct evoked potentials, the nonstimulated subject showed “transferred potentials” similar to those evoked in the stimulated subject. They titled the 1994 paper “The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox in the Brain,” and they proposed that the brain has a macroscopic quantum component capable of nonlocal correlation across distance.

If the effect were real and robust, it would rank among the most important findings in the history of neuroscience. So what does the replication record show?

Leanna Standish and colleagues at Bastyr University and the University of Washington repeated the design in 2003 and 2004, recording simultaneous EEGs from pairs of subjects placed in sound-attenuated rooms separated by ten meters, later extending the work to fMRI. They reported small correlations in some pairs, statistically above chance, broadly consistent with Grinberg’s direction. A 2018 re-analysis by groups at IULM in Milan and the University of Padova, applying machine-learning classifiers to two pooled datasets covering forty-five pairs, found classification accuracies of 50.74 percent on the first dataset and 51.17 percent, 50.45 percent, and 51.91 percent across stimulation conditions on the second. The honest reading of those numbers is that there is, at best, a faint signal above noise, on the order of one to two percent above chance, and that the signal does not hold up under stricter analytical methods. The “one in four pairs” claim from the original paper is the kind of effect size that thins out when sample sizes grow and protocols tighten. The result might be noise. It might be small and real. The data, after thirty years, cannot tell us which.

The Lattice does not announce itself in clean experimental data. What announces itself is a smear of weakly positive results, sensitive to method, sample, and the personal coherence of the experimenters and subjects. A smear of that kind, in any other branch of biology, would be treated as a candidate artifact rather than a candidate discovery.

So where are the weak spots in Grinberg’s argument? I count five.

The first concerns decoherence. Quantum entanglement is fragile. It survives at extremely low temperatures, in highly isolated systems, in laboratories where engineers work for years to prevent contact with the surrounding environment. The human brain operates at 310 Kelvin, immersed in saltwater, packed with thermal vibration and electrochemical traffic. The mainstream physical objection to any macroscopic quantum brain is that entangled states cannot last long enough at body temperature to do anything cognitively useful. Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have proposed microtubules inside neurons as a possible shelter for such states, and that proposal has critics of its own. Grinberg borrowed the language of EPR correlation without supplying a physical mechanism that addresses decoherence at all.

Venue makes a second weakness. Physics Essays publishes heterodox work. It is peer-reviewed, but it is not Physical Review Letters. Goswami, the coauthor who supplied the quantum framework, is a theoretical physicist whose later career was spent largely outside academic physics, writing for general audiences on consciousness. David Bohm, whose Wholeness and the Implicate Order Grinberg cited as foundational, was taken seriously by working physicists in a way that Goswami’s idealist consciousness work has not been. None of this disqualifies Grinberg’s results. It does qualify the weight one should give them before independent replication settles the question.

Pachita is a third problem. Grinberg believed he was watching a high-coherence shaman manipulate the Lattice when he observed the curandera apparently materializing tissue and performing organ transplants without anesthesia. The skeptical literature on psychic surgery is well developed, going back to James Randi’s documentation of Filipino practitioners in the 1970s and 1980s. The techniques are reproducible by stage magicians using animal tissue concealed in the hand. I do not claim that Pachita was fraudulent. I claim that Grinberg’s failure to engage with that literature on his own observations was a methodological gap large enough to fall through.

A fourth weakness sits in the unfalsifiability of the Lattice itself. The transferred potential is testable. The claim that space is a holographic informational matrix decoded by the brain is, as currently stated, not testable in any sharp way. The interpretation can absorb any outcome by adjusting what counts as coherence. A theory closed to refutation has crossed out of science and into philosophy, where Bohm’s implicate order belongs and where Grinberg’s Syntergic Theory should be argued.

The fifth weakness is the disappearance, which has worked as an evidentiary force-multiplier in the opposite direction the mystics imagine. Because the man vanished, the work is treated as forbidden knowledge. Because the work is treated as forbidden, it is shielded from the ordinary correction processes of science. The romance of the vanishing has done more damage to the theory than any single critic ever could.

That is the harsh audit. Here is what survives it.

What survives is a serious twentieth-century researcher who took indigenous practitioners seriously when most of his peers would not, who designed and ran controlled experiments on a phenomenon his discipline refused to study, who published in peer-reviewed venues with a theoretical physicist as coauthor, and whose specific empirical claim of brain-to-brain correlation across electromagnetic shielding has been independently tested by university laboratories in the United States and Europe with weakly positive but unconvincing results. The Lattice as cosmology fails the audit, while the transferred potential as a research program clears it.

Which brings me to the question worth taking seriously. What would real entry into the Lattice look like, if Grinberg’s empirical claim deserves another hearing?

Entry would begin by separating Syntergic cosmology from transferred-potential empiricism, permanently. The cosmology is interesting as a philosophical proposition and belongs in the philosophy of mind, alongside Bohm, Whitehead, and the slow-burning literature on panpsychism. The empiricism is interesting as a falsifiable claim and demands the methodological rigor the original work lacked. That means preregistered protocols, pair samples in the hundreds rather than the dozens, blinded analysis, machine-learning classifiers reported with confidence intervals, datasets shared openly, and a pre-committed null hypothesis the field will accept if the signal fails to clear it. The work has been creeping in that direction for twenty years, slowly, in the parapsychology literature and in a small set of medical schools. It needs to migrate into mainstream cognitive neuroscience or it will live on the margins forever.

Mechanism comes next. Holographic metaphors are not mechanisms. A specific physical proposal must explain how two brains separated by fifteen meters of air and steel could correlate at all. Decoherence is the wall. Until someone proposes a mechanism that survives a hostile physics seminar, the empirical results, even if they hold up, will be read as artifact rather than discovery. Penrose and Hameroff at least attempted a mechanism. Grinberg never did, and the field has not done it for him in the thirty years since.

Last, we would have to give up the romance of the vanishing. Grinberg probably did not step into his own theory. The most likely reading of the available evidence is that he died in late 1994, in circumstances Mexican authorities never resolved, with attention focused on his immediate domestic situation. The investigation failed. The case remains open. As long as his disappearance functions as evidence for his theory, we are doing magical thinking under the cover of physics. A theory has to survive on its experimental record, not on the mystery of its author’s death.

Is any of this real, or possible? The transferred potential, in its weak form, might be real. The Lattice, as Grinberg drew it, is most likely not real in the literal physical sense he intended. What is real is the underlying scandal that consciousness studies were starved of funding and respectability for most of the twentieth century, that a serious researcher who tried to bring rigor to the question was treated as fringe in his own lifetime, that he disappeared before he could finish his work, and that the field has only now begun to catch up to the questions he was asking.

If we want to enter the Lattice, the entry point is methodological, not mystical. We pick up where he left off. The testable parts get tested. Cosmology stands as a working metaphor that may, or may not, be redeemed by data. Above all, we resist the temptation to make the man’s death do the work that his experiments could not finish.

That is the only honest way to read him now.

Es darf wieder (ein bisschen) Integriert werden

Schwer tut man sich, beim Zugeständnis des menschlich absolut selbsverständlichen Minimums auch noch zu klatschen ...

https://taz.de/Einigung-bei-Integrationskursen/!6178578/

#Integration
#Dobrindt
#Menschenwürde

41% of Muslim Youths in Vienna Place Sharia Above Austrian Law

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/vienna-41-percent-muslim-youths-place-sharia-above-austrian-law/

„Wer nur über anfängliche Belastungen spricht, aber nicht über spätere Arbeit, Beitragszahlung, Fachkräftesicherung und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, erzählt nicht die ganze Geschichte. Er erzählt nur den für Ressentiments politisch nützlichen Teil.“

#Migration #Integration #Flüchtlinge #Asyl #AfD #BärbelBas

https://starke-meinungen.de/blog/2026/05/12/die-andere-seite-der-migrationsbilanz/#more-17634

„Wer nur über anfängliche Belastungen spricht, aber nicht über spätere Arbeit, Beitragszahlung, Fachkräftesicherung und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, erzählt nicht die ganze Geschichte. Er erzählt nur den für Ressentiments politisch nützlichen Teil.“

#Migration #Integration #Flüchtlinge #Asyl #AfD #BärbelBas

https://starke-meinungen.de/blog/2026/05/12/die-andere-seite-der-migrationsbilanz/#more-17634

„Wer nur über anfängliche Belastungen spricht, aber nicht über spätere Arbeit, Beitragszahlung, Fachkräftesicherung und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, erzählt nicht die ganze Geschichte. Er erzählt nur den für Ressentiments politisch nützlichen Teil.“

#Migration #Integration #Flüchtlinge #Asyl #AfD #BärbelBas

https://starke-meinungen.de/blog/2026/05/12/die-andere-seite-der-migrationsbilanz/#more-17634

„Wer nur über anfängliche Belastungen spricht, aber nicht über spätere Arbeit, Beitragszahlung, Fachkräftesicherung und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, erzählt nicht die ganze Geschichte. Er erzählt nur den für Ressentiments politisch nützlichen Teil.“

#Migration #Integration #Flüchtlinge #Asyl #AfD #BärbelBas

https://starke-meinungen.de/blog/2026/05/12/die-andere-seite-der-migrationsbilanz/#more-17634

„Wer nur über anfängliche Belastungen spricht, aber nicht über spätere Arbeit, Beitragszahlung, Fachkräftesicherung und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, erzählt nicht die ganze Geschichte. Er erzählt nur den für Ressentiments politisch nützlichen Teil.“

#Migration #Integration #Flüchtlinge #Asyl #AfD #BärbelBas

https://starke-meinungen.de/blog/2026/05/12/die-andere-seite-der-migrationsbilanz/#more-17634

PoleClimb State for Animal Controller #Integration #Character #Charactercontroller #Climbing #Thirdpersoncharactercontroller #Climb #Thirdpersoncontroller #Poles #Pole #Animalcontroller #AssetStore

https://u3dn.com/packages/poleclimb-state-for-animal-controller-292596

*** Neue Spezial-Folge des #Tuwort‑#Podcasts ***

Thema: Deutsch als Zweitsprache (#DaZ)

Gast: Andrea Ender

Andrea ist Professorin für Germanistische Linguistik an der Uni Salzburg mit Schwerpunkt Deutsch als Zweitsprache.

In Einzelnen: gesellschaftliche, didaktische und sprachwissenschaftliche Herausforderungen des #Zweitspracherwerb|s, Fragen der #Mehrsprachigkeit #Sprachförderung und #Integration sowie aktuelle Perspektiven der DaZ-Forschung.

https://www.tuwort.com/index.php/2026/05/11/tuwort-spezial-16-mit-andrea-ender-ueber-deutsch-als-zweitsprache-daz/

*** Neue Spezial-Folge des #Tuwort‑#Podcasts ***

Thema: Deutsch als Zweitsprache (#DaZ)

Gast: Andrea Ender

Andrea ist Professorin für Germanistische Linguistik an der Uni Salzburg mit Schwerpunkt Deutsch als Zweitsprache.

In Einzelnen: gesellschaftliche, didaktische und sprachwissenschaftliche Herausforderungen des #Zweitspracherwerb|s, Fragen der #Mehrsprachigkeit #Sprachförderung und #Integration sowie aktuelle Perspektiven der DaZ-Forschung.

https://www.tuwort.com/index.php/2026/05/11/tuwort-spezial-16-mit-andrea-ender-ueber-deutsch-als-zweitsprache-daz/

RE: https://mstdn.social/@SWeiermann/116539473522956923

https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1199576.integrationspolitik-laender-fordern-bund-auf-integrationskurse-wieder-zu-oeffnen.html #BaWü aber offenbar nicht dabei. Wer solche #Grüne hat, braucht keine #CDU. @gruenejugendka @GrueneBundestag @gruene_ka_nordstadt

#Integration #BAMF

RE: https://mstdn.social/@SWeiermann/116539473522956923

https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1199576.integrationspolitik-laender-fordern-bund-auf-integrationskurse-wieder-zu-oeffnen.html #BaWü aber offenbar nicht dabei. Wer solche #Grüne hat, braucht keine #CDU. @gruenejugendka @GrueneBundestag @gruene_ka_nordstadt

#Integration #BAMF

RE: https://mstdn.social/@SWeiermann/116539473522956923

https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1199576.integrationspolitik-laender-fordern-bund-auf-integrationskurse-wieder-zu-oeffnen.html #BaWü aber offenbar nicht dabei. Wer solche #Grüne hat, braucht keine #CDU. @gruenejugendka @GrueneBundestag @gruene_ka_nordstadt

#Integration #BAMF

RE: https://mstdn.social/@SWeiermann/116539473522956923

https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1199576.integrationspolitik-laender-fordern-bund-auf-integrationskurse-wieder-zu-oeffnen.html #BaWü aber offenbar nicht dabei. Wer solche #Grüne hat, braucht keine #CDU. @gruenejugendka @GrueneBundestag @gruene_ka_nordstadt

#Integration #BAMF

RE: https://mstdn.social/@SWeiermann/116539473522956923

https://www.nd-aktuell.de/artikel/1199576.integrationspolitik-laender-fordern-bund-auf-integrationskurse-wieder-zu-oeffnen.html #BaWü aber offenbar nicht dabei. Wer solche #Grüne hat, braucht keine #CDU. @gruenejugendka @GrueneBundestag @gruene_ka_nordstadt

#Integration #BAMF

German companies are already preparing for significant investments in Ukraine following the war's end, according to the East Committee of German Industry.Speaki... https://news.osna.fm/?p=44950 | #news #business #gears #german #integration

#341: How Radical Should You Be In Your Belief?

https://youtu.be/mOoLMJQRrQY

How radical should you be in your belief? If you believe in something, shouldn’t you aim to believe in it more? So, let’s discuss.

All of us have our ideas that we prefer over others. All of us may have our political, religious, cultural preferences. There’s nothing wrong with that. That’s what we do. That’s what makes us human.

If we believe deeply that something is correct, that something is good, should we not think also that more of that is better? It’s a seductive idea and it seems logical initially. If you are X, if you believe in X, shouldn’t you believe in it more so? That seems to be the case because otherwise why would you believe in it? Is your belief really that weak that you can’t strengthen it?

So that’s the idea. And if you for some reason don’t want to fully commit, maybe you really never believed it completely. Maybe you’re not really a true believer. That’s the other part of the idea.

However, I would say this ignores certain facts about ideas, because every idea — whether it’s a religion, a philosophy, a cultural preference — typically has safeguards. When you look at all the big religions, they have some sort of clause, some sort of warning against taking it too far. Because that’s what the very idea of divinity is. That’s what the very idea of God is: that which we as human beings cannot completely understand. God is that which we cannot even approach so much that we can be certain of what God is. Because if we could, wouldn’t that mean in some way that we could become God? And that’s the very warning that most religions promote.

Believe, but don’t assume for a moment that you have all the answers.

There’s this joke that camels always look at humans in a specific way. The joke is that God has 100 names. We know 99 of them. But the camel knows all 100. And that’s why the camel looks so superior.

But that is the idea of religion. The idea of religion is a combination — as strange as this may sound — of belief and humility. We are not God. We are not everything in the universe. We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. And we will never get there. So whatever you think of as God — whether you think that’s a religious idea, whether you think that’s nature, whether you think that’s the universe, whether you think that’s just the ultimate good — this idea is clear: do not pretend to be all-knowing yourself. Have some sense of humility.

Now that also goes for philosophy. You may say, I follow philosopher so-and-so. But philosophy is an ongoing conversation about wisdom — the love of wisdom; that’s what philosophia means. Each idea in philosophy lives in interaction with other ideas. Philosophy is more than just footnotes to Plato. Plato can be footnotes to Plato — if you look at the Laws and the Republic, there are two very different ideas there, and more than two.

Philosophers are typically smarter than those who follow a specific philosophy. Because every philosopher knows that in order to put out the strongest version of their idea, they have to leave some of the complications out. But there are always complications. And philosophy X always lives in some form of exchange with philosophy Y or Z or however many there are. Every idea lives in an ecosystem of ideas. It lives in relation with others.

Philosophy X may be good or better in certain respects than philosophy Y. Maybe philosophy Y is good in other aspects. But the truth emerges in the interaction between the two.

So you may believe that the individual is the source of all morality. But how far do you want to take this? Do you believe this to the complete abdication of responsibility for others? Do you believe this to the complete rejection of the state? Similarly, if you believe the state is the authority over everything else, at which point does this have to stop? At which point does the state have to even question itself as to how far it should go?

Everything costs money. Does this mean that everything should be judged by its price tag? Even though price is not a static thing — it depends on a lot of factors. Is the price tag always the value of something, or is it just our momentary expression of our social and cultural priorities? Of course there’s supply and demand which regulate that. But is that still everything? Aren’t there things where we should find some difficulty putting a price on? Aren’t there some things that we can’t really measure very well? So isn’t there a limit to this kind of positivist, materialist way of looking at things?

Equally, if we say the materialistic world doesn’t matter and we need to live in a more spiritual, contemplative state of mind — that may be true to a point, but eventually bills will have to be paid. You do live in some form of reality, and that reality means that resources typically are limited and there needs to be a prioritizing. How do you organize that?

The material and the spiritual belong together. They will always have friction between each other, but they will always complement each other. If you’re too materialistic — if you believe that only that which can be measured, only that which can be owned, only that which can have a price tag matters — you should maybe think about some more spiritual components of life. If you’re too spiritual, maybe you need to be rooted more in the fact that there’s also a materialist component of life.

If X drowns out Y, sides of X may appear that make it wrong, because you need that balance. And there are more than just two — X and Y is easier, but you could say XYZ or whatever.

So in fact the saying may be true that too much of a good thing is indeed not good. It distorts what it is.

This is why you see me frequently call for moderation. You could argue that too much moderation is also wrong — you need some passion and some intensity and some belief. Well, yes. But moderation can also be just a middle ground between these different poles. All these different ideas around us lead us to negotiate our space within them. Moderation does not mean you don’t have convictions. It means that you question at which point your convictions turn into such a radicality, into such an extreme version, that they become wrong — that they are undermined by their own conviction.

Is radicality the truest expression of an idea? No. It may be the most flamboyant, the most interesting. But it can’t survive well. If you turn too radical, too extremist, your idea may be more attractive to people who really think like you. But then look at history. Every time an idea became too radical, it fails. It has failed. No matter what the idea — because in its radicality, in its extremism, it loses its power of conviction towards those who don’t agree with you. And the number of people in the world who agree with you is always going to be punctuated by the number of people who disagree with you.

If you want to build a successful movement, if you want to build a successful approach to politics, to religion, to whatever your cultural or social idea may be, you need to convince others. You need to find ways of integrating aspects of the other into your own.

Which is why this very familiar symbol of yin and yang — masculine, feminine, black, white, dark, light — shows you these two parts, but there’s always something of the other in the bigger part. You know the symbol.

If we don’t find a way to integrate that with which we disagree — as some sense of doubt, as some sense of humility within our convictions — then our convictions will be nothing but arrogance, nothing but self-congratulatory pose, and turn out to be nothing else than solipsism: centering on yourself and that which you think defines you as the only thing that matters.

[This was originally posted to YouTube as a video. This post is a slightly abbreviated transcript, preserving the oral style of the video.]

#341: How Radical Should You Be In Your Belief?

https://youtu.be/mOoLMJQRrQY

How radical should you be in your belief? If you believe in something, shouldn’t you aim to believe in it more? So, let’s discuss.

All of us have our ideas that we prefer over others. All of us may have our political, religious, cultural preferences. There’s nothing wrong with that. That’s what we do. That’s what makes us human.

If we believe deeply that something is correct, that something is good, should we not think also that more of that is better? It’s a seductive idea and it seems logical initially. If you are X, if you believe in X, shouldn’t you believe in it more so? That seems to be the case because otherwise why would you believe in it? Is your belief really that weak that you can’t strengthen it?

So that’s the idea. And if you for some reason don’t want to fully commit, maybe you really never believed it completely. Maybe you’re not really a true believer. That’s the other part of the idea.

However, I would say this ignores certain facts about ideas, because every idea — whether it’s a religion, a philosophy, a cultural preference — typically has safeguards. When you look at all the big religions, they have some sort of clause, some sort of warning against taking it too far. Because that’s what the very idea of divinity is. That’s what the very idea of God is: that which we as human beings cannot completely understand. God is that which we cannot even approach so much that we can be certain of what God is. Because if we could, wouldn’t that mean in some way that we could become God? And that’s the very warning that most religions promote.

Believe, but don’t assume for a moment that you have all the answers.

There’s this joke that camels always look at humans in a specific way. The joke is that God has 100 names. We know 99 of them. But the camel knows all 100. And that’s why the camel looks so superior.

But that is the idea of religion. The idea of religion is a combination — as strange as this may sound — of belief and humility. We are not God. We are not everything in the universe. We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. And we will never get there. So whatever you think of as God — whether you think that’s a religious idea, whether you think that’s nature, whether you think that’s the universe, whether you think that’s just the ultimate good — this idea is clear: do not pretend to be all-knowing yourself. Have some sense of humility.

Now that also goes for philosophy. You may say, I follow philosopher so-and-so. But philosophy is an ongoing conversation about wisdom — the love of wisdom; that’s what philosophia means. Each idea in philosophy lives in interaction with other ideas. Philosophy is more than just footnotes to Plato. Plato can be footnotes to Plato — if you look at the Laws and the Republic, there are two very different ideas there, and more than two.

Philosophers are typically smarter than those who follow a specific philosophy. Because every philosopher knows that in order to put out the strongest version of their idea, they have to leave some of the complications out. But there are always complications. And philosophy X always lives in some form of exchange with philosophy Y or Z or however many there are. Every idea lives in an ecosystem of ideas. It lives in relation with others.

Philosophy X may be good or better in certain respects than philosophy Y. Maybe philosophy Y is good in other aspects. But the truth emerges in the interaction between the two.

So you may believe that the individual is the source of all morality. But how far do you want to take this? Do you believe this to the complete abdication of responsibility for others? Do you believe this to the complete rejection of the state? Similarly, if you believe the state is the authority over everything else, at which point does this have to stop? At which point does the state have to even question itself as to how far it should go?

Everything costs money. Does this mean that everything should be judged by its price tag? Even though price is not a static thing — it depends on a lot of factors. Is the price tag always the value of something, or is it just our momentary expression of our social and cultural priorities? Of course there’s supply and demand which regulate that. But is that still everything? Aren’t there things where we should find some difficulty putting a price on? Aren’t there some things that we can’t really measure very well? So isn’t there a limit to this kind of positivist, materialist way of looking at things?

Equally, if we say the materialistic world doesn’t matter and we need to live in a more spiritual, contemplative state of mind — that may be true to a point, but eventually bills will have to be paid. You do live in some form of reality, and that reality means that resources typically are limited and there needs to be a prioritizing. How do you organize that?

The material and the spiritual belong together. They will always have friction between each other, but they will always complement each other. If you’re too materialistic — if you believe that only that which can be measured, only that which can be owned, only that which can have a price tag matters — you should maybe think about some more spiritual components of life. If you’re too spiritual, maybe you need to be rooted more in the fact that there’s also a materialist component of life.

If X drowns out Y, sides of X may appear that make it wrong, because you need that balance. And there are more than just two — X and Y is easier, but you could say XYZ or whatever.

So in fact the saying may be true that too much of a good thing is indeed not good. It distorts what it is.

This is why you see me frequently call for moderation. You could argue that too much moderation is also wrong — you need some passion and some intensity and some belief. Well, yes. But moderation can also be just a middle ground between these different poles. All these different ideas around us lead us to negotiate our space within them. Moderation does not mean you don’t have convictions. It means that you question at which point your convictions turn into such a radicality, into such an extreme version, that they become wrong — that they are undermined by their own conviction.

Is radicality the truest expression of an idea? No. It may be the most flamboyant, the most interesting. But it can’t survive well. If you turn too radical, too extremist, your idea may be more attractive to people who really think like you. But then look at history. Every time an idea became too radical, it fails. It has failed. No matter what the idea — because in its radicality, in its extremism, it loses its power of conviction towards those who don’t agree with you. And the number of people in the world who agree with you is always going to be punctuated by the number of people who disagree with you.

If you want to build a successful movement, if you want to build a successful approach to politics, to religion, to whatever your cultural or social idea may be, you need to convince others. You need to find ways of integrating aspects of the other into your own.

Which is why this very familiar symbol of yin and yang — masculine, feminine, black, white, dark, light — shows you these two parts, but there’s always something of the other in the bigger part. You know the symbol.

If we don’t find a way to integrate that with which we disagree — as some sense of doubt, as some sense of humility within our convictions — then our convictions will be nothing but arrogance, nothing but self-congratulatory pose, and turn out to be nothing else than solipsism: centering on yourself and that which you think defines you as the only thing that matters.

[This was originally posted to YouTube as a video. This post is a slightly abbreviated transcript, preserving the oral style of the video.]

#341: How Radical Should You Be In Your Belief?

https://youtu.be/mOoLMJQRrQY

How radical should you be in your belief? If you believe in something, shouldn’t you aim to believe in it more? So, let’s discuss.

All of us have our ideas that we prefer over others. All of us may have our political, religious, cultural preferences. There’s nothing wrong with that. That’s what we do. That’s what makes us human.

If we believe deeply that something is correct, that something is good, should we not think also that more of that is better? It’s a seductive idea and it seems logical initially. If you are X, if you believe in X, shouldn’t you believe in it more so? That seems to be the case because otherwise why would you believe in it? Is your belief really that weak that you can’t strengthen it?

So that’s the idea. And if you for some reason don’t want to fully commit, maybe you really never believed it completely. Maybe you’re not really a true believer. That’s the other part of the idea.

However, I would say this ignores certain facts about ideas, because every idea — whether it’s a religion, a philosophy, a cultural preference — typically has safeguards. When you look at all the big religions, they have some sort of clause, some sort of warning against taking it too far. Because that’s what the very idea of divinity is. That’s what the very idea of God is: that which we as human beings cannot completely understand. God is that which we cannot even approach so much that we can be certain of what God is. Because if we could, wouldn’t that mean in some way that we could become God? And that’s the very warning that most religions promote.

Believe, but don’t assume for a moment that you have all the answers.

There’s this joke that camels always look at humans in a specific way. The joke is that God has 100 names. We know 99 of them. But the camel knows all 100. And that’s why the camel looks so superior.

But that is the idea of religion. The idea of religion is a combination — as strange as this may sound — of belief and humility. We are not God. We are not everything in the universe. We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. And we will never get there. So whatever you think of as God — whether you think that’s a religious idea, whether you think that’s nature, whether you think that’s the universe, whether you think that’s just the ultimate good — this idea is clear: do not pretend to be all-knowing yourself. Have some sense of humility.

Now that also goes for philosophy. You may say, I follow philosopher so-and-so. But philosophy is an ongoing conversation about wisdom — the love of wisdom; that’s what philosophia means. Each idea in philosophy lives in interaction with other ideas. Philosophy is more than just footnotes to Plato. Plato can be footnotes to Plato — if you look at the Laws and the Republic, there are two very different ideas there, and more than two.

Philosophers are typically smarter than those who follow a specific philosophy. Because every philosopher knows that in order to put out the strongest version of their idea, they have to leave some of the complications out. But there are always complications. And philosophy X always lives in some form of exchange with philosophy Y or Z or however many there are. Every idea lives in an ecosystem of ideas. It lives in relation with others.

Philosophy X may be good or better in certain respects than philosophy Y. Maybe philosophy Y is good in other aspects. But the truth emerges in the interaction between the two.

So you may believe that the individual is the source of all morality. But how far do you want to take this? Do you believe this to the complete abdication of responsibility for others? Do you believe this to the complete rejection of the state? Similarly, if you believe the state is the authority over everything else, at which point does this have to stop? At which point does the state have to even question itself as to how far it should go?

Everything costs money. Does this mean that everything should be judged by its price tag? Even though price is not a static thing — it depends on a lot of factors. Is the price tag always the value of something, or is it just our momentary expression of our social and cultural priorities? Of course there’s supply and demand which regulate that. But is that still everything? Aren’t there things where we should find some difficulty putting a price on? Aren’t there some things that we can’t really measure very well? So isn’t there a limit to this kind of positivist, materialist way of looking at things?

Equally, if we say the materialistic world doesn’t matter and we need to live in a more spiritual, contemplative state of mind — that may be true to a point, but eventually bills will have to be paid. You do live in some form of reality, and that reality means that resources typically are limited and there needs to be a prioritizing. How do you organize that?

The material and the spiritual belong together. They will always have friction between each other, but they will always complement each other. If you’re too materialistic — if you believe that only that which can be measured, only that which can be owned, only that which can have a price tag matters — you should maybe think about some more spiritual components of life. If you’re too spiritual, maybe you need to be rooted more in the fact that there’s also a materialist component of life.

If X drowns out Y, sides of X may appear that make it wrong, because you need that balance. And there are more than just two — X and Y is easier, but you could say XYZ or whatever.

So in fact the saying may be true that too much of a good thing is indeed not good. It distorts what it is.

This is why you see me frequently call for moderation. You could argue that too much moderation is also wrong — you need some passion and some intensity and some belief. Well, yes. But moderation can also be just a middle ground between these different poles. All these different ideas around us lead us to negotiate our space within them. Moderation does not mean you don’t have convictions. It means that you question at which point your convictions turn into such a radicality, into such an extreme version, that they become wrong — that they are undermined by their own conviction.

Is radicality the truest expression of an idea? No. It may be the most flamboyant, the most interesting. But it can’t survive well. If you turn too radical, too extremist, your idea may be more attractive to people who really think like you. But then look at history. Every time an idea became too radical, it fails. It has failed. No matter what the idea — because in its radicality, in its extremism, it loses its power of conviction towards those who don’t agree with you. And the number of people in the world who agree with you is always going to be punctuated by the number of people who disagree with you.

If you want to build a successful movement, if you want to build a successful approach to politics, to religion, to whatever your cultural or social idea may be, you need to convince others. You need to find ways of integrating aspects of the other into your own.

Which is why this very familiar symbol of yin and yang — masculine, feminine, black, white, dark, light — shows you these two parts, but there’s always something of the other in the bigger part. You know the symbol.

If we don’t find a way to integrate that with which we disagree — as some sense of doubt, as some sense of humility within our convictions — then our convictions will be nothing but arrogance, nothing but self-congratulatory pose, and turn out to be nothing else than solipsism: centering on yourself and that which you think defines you as the only thing that matters.

[This was originally posted to YouTube as a video. This post is a slightly abbreviated transcript, preserving the oral style of the video.]

#341: How Radical Should You Be In Your Belief?

https://youtu.be/mOoLMJQRrQY

How radical should you be in your belief? If you believe in something, shouldn’t you aim to believe in it more? So, let’s discuss.

All of us have our ideas that we prefer over others. All of us may have our political, religious, cultural preferences. There’s nothing wrong with that. That’s what we do. That’s what makes us human.

If we believe deeply that something is correct, that something is good, should we not think also that more of that is better? It’s a seductive idea and it seems logical initially. If you are X, if you believe in X, shouldn’t you believe in it more so? That seems to be the case because otherwise why would you believe in it? Is your belief really that weak that you can’t strengthen it?

So that’s the idea. And if you for some reason don’t want to fully commit, maybe you really never believed it completely. Maybe you’re not really a true believer. That’s the other part of the idea.

However, I would say this ignores certain facts about ideas, because every idea — whether it’s a religion, a philosophy, a cultural preference — typically has safeguards. When you look at all the big religions, they have some sort of clause, some sort of warning against taking it too far. Because that’s what the very idea of divinity is. That’s what the very idea of God is: that which we as human beings cannot completely understand. God is that which we cannot even approach so much that we can be certain of what God is. Because if we could, wouldn’t that mean in some way that we could become God? And that’s the very warning that most religions promote.

Believe, but don’t assume for a moment that you have all the answers.

There’s this joke that camels always look at humans in a specific way. The joke is that God has 100 names. We know 99 of them. But the camel knows all 100. And that’s why the camel looks so superior.

But that is the idea of religion. The idea of religion is a combination — as strange as this may sound — of belief and humility. We are not God. We are not everything in the universe. We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. And we will never get there. So whatever you think of as God — whether you think that’s a religious idea, whether you think that’s nature, whether you think that’s the universe, whether you think that’s just the ultimate good — this idea is clear: do not pretend to be all-knowing yourself. Have some sense of humility.

Now that also goes for philosophy. You may say, I follow philosopher so-and-so. But philosophy is an ongoing conversation about wisdom — the love of wisdom; that’s what philosophia means. Each idea in philosophy lives in interaction with other ideas. Philosophy is more than just footnotes to Plato. Plato can be footnotes to Plato — if you look at the Laws and the Republic, there are two very different ideas there, and more than two.

Philosophers are typically smarter than those who follow a specific philosophy. Because every philosopher knows that in order to put out the strongest version of their idea, they have to leave some of the complications out. But there are always complications. And philosophy X always lives in some form of exchange with philosophy Y or Z or however many there are. Every idea lives in an ecosystem of ideas. It lives in relation with others.

Philosophy X may be good or better in certain respects than philosophy Y. Maybe philosophy Y is good in other aspects. But the truth emerges in the interaction between the two.

So you may believe that the individual is the source of all morality. But how far do you want to take this? Do you believe this to the complete abdication of responsibility for others? Do you believe this to the complete rejection of the state? Similarly, if you believe the state is the authority over everything else, at which point does this have to stop? At which point does the state have to even question itself as to how far it should go?

Everything costs money. Does this mean that everything should be judged by its price tag? Even though price is not a static thing — it depends on a lot of factors. Is the price tag always the value of something, or is it just our momentary expression of our social and cultural priorities? Of course there’s supply and demand which regulate that. But is that still everything? Aren’t there things where we should find some difficulty putting a price on? Aren’t there some things that we can’t really measure very well? So isn’t there a limit to this kind of positivist, materialist way of looking at things?

Equally, if we say the materialistic world doesn’t matter and we need to live in a more spiritual, contemplative state of mind — that may be true to a point, but eventually bills will have to be paid. You do live in some form of reality, and that reality means that resources typically are limited and there needs to be a prioritizing. How do you organize that?

The material and the spiritual belong together. They will always have friction between each other, but they will always complement each other. If you’re too materialistic — if you believe that only that which can be measured, only that which can be owned, only that which can have a price tag matters — you should maybe think about some more spiritual components of life. If you’re too spiritual, maybe you need to be rooted more in the fact that there’s also a materialist component of life.

If X drowns out Y, sides of X may appear that make it wrong, because you need that balance. And there are more than just two — X and Y is easier, but you could say XYZ or whatever.

So in fact the saying may be true that too much of a good thing is indeed not good. It distorts what it is.

This is why you see me frequently call for moderation. You could argue that too much moderation is also wrong — you need some passion and some intensity and some belief. Well, yes. But moderation can also be just a middle ground between these different poles. All these different ideas around us lead us to negotiate our space within them. Moderation does not mean you don’t have convictions. It means that you question at which point your convictions turn into such a radicality, into such an extreme version, that they become wrong — that they are undermined by their own conviction.

Is radicality the truest expression of an idea? No. It may be the most flamboyant, the most interesting. But it can’t survive well. If you turn too radical, too extremist, your idea may be more attractive to people who really think like you. But then look at history. Every time an idea became too radical, it fails. It has failed. No matter what the idea — because in its radicality, in its extremism, it loses its power of conviction towards those who don’t agree with you. And the number of people in the world who agree with you is always going to be punctuated by the number of people who disagree with you.

If you want to build a successful movement, if you want to build a successful approach to politics, to religion, to whatever your cultural or social idea may be, you need to convince others. You need to find ways of integrating aspects of the other into your own.

Which is why this very familiar symbol of yin and yang — masculine, feminine, black, white, dark, light — shows you these two parts, but there’s always something of the other in the bigger part. You know the symbol.

If we don’t find a way to integrate that with which we disagree — as some sense of doubt, as some sense of humility within our convictions — then our convictions will be nothing but arrogance, nothing but self-congratulatory pose, and turn out to be nothing else than solipsism: centering on yourself and that which you think defines you as the only thing that matters.

[This was originally posted to YouTube as a video. This post is a slightly abbreviated transcript, preserving the oral style of the video.]

#341: How Radical Should You Be In Your Belief?

https://youtu.be/mOoLMJQRrQY

How radical should you be in your belief? If you believe in something, shouldn’t you aim to believe in it more? So, let’s discuss.

All of us have our ideas that we prefer over others. All of us may have our political, religious, cultural preferences. There’s nothing wrong with that. That’s what we do. That’s what makes us human.

If we believe deeply that something is correct, that something is good, should we not think also that more of that is better? It’s a seductive idea and it seems logical initially. If you are X, if you believe in X, shouldn’t you believe in it more so? That seems to be the case because otherwise why would you believe in it? Is your belief really that weak that you can’t strengthen it?

So that’s the idea. And if you for some reason don’t want to fully commit, maybe you really never believed it completely. Maybe you’re not really a true believer. That’s the other part of the idea.

However, I would say this ignores certain facts about ideas, because every idea — whether it’s a religion, a philosophy, a cultural preference — typically has safeguards. When you look at all the big religions, they have some sort of clause, some sort of warning against taking it too far. Because that’s what the very idea of divinity is. That’s what the very idea of God is: that which we as human beings cannot completely understand. God is that which we cannot even approach so much that we can be certain of what God is. Because if we could, wouldn’t that mean in some way that we could become God? And that’s the very warning that most religions promote.

Believe, but don’t assume for a moment that you have all the answers.

There’s this joke that camels always look at humans in a specific way. The joke is that God has 100 names. We know 99 of them. But the camel knows all 100. And that’s why the camel looks so superior.

But that is the idea of religion. The idea of religion is a combination — as strange as this may sound — of belief and humility. We are not God. We are not everything in the universe. We are not all-knowing. We are not omnipotent. And we will never get there. So whatever you think of as God — whether you think that’s a religious idea, whether you think that’s nature, whether you think that’s the universe, whether you think that’s just the ultimate good — this idea is clear: do not pretend to be all-knowing yourself. Have some sense of humility.

Now that also goes for philosophy. You may say, I follow philosopher so-and-so. But philosophy is an ongoing conversation about wisdom — the love of wisdom; that’s what philosophia means. Each idea in philosophy lives in interaction with other ideas. Philosophy is more than just footnotes to Plato. Plato can be footnotes to Plato — if you look at the Laws and the Republic, there are two very different ideas there, and more than two.

Philosophers are typically smarter than those who follow a specific philosophy. Because every philosopher knows that in order to put out the strongest version of their idea, they have to leave some of the complications out. But there are always complications. And philosophy X always lives in some form of exchange with philosophy Y or Z or however many there are. Every idea lives in an ecosystem of ideas. It lives in relation with others.

Philosophy X may be good or better in certain respects than philosophy Y. Maybe philosophy Y is good in other aspects. But the truth emerges in the interaction between the two.

So you may believe that the individual is the source of all morality. But how far do you want to take this? Do you believe this to the complete abdication of responsibility for others? Do you believe this to the complete rejection of the state? Similarly, if you believe the state is the authority over everything else, at which point does this have to stop? At which point does the state have to even question itself as to how far it should go?

Everything costs money. Does this mean that everything should be judged by its price tag? Even though price is not a static thing — it depends on a lot of factors. Is the price tag always the value of something, or is it just our momentary expression of our social and cultural priorities? Of course there’s supply and demand which regulate that. But is that still everything? Aren’t there things where we should find some difficulty putting a price on? Aren’t there some things that we can’t really measure very well? So isn’t there a limit to this kind of positivist, materialist way of looking at things?

Equally, if we say the materialistic world doesn’t matter and we need to live in a more spiritual, contemplative state of mind — that may be true to a point, but eventually bills will have to be paid. You do live in some form of reality, and that reality means that resources typically are limited and there needs to be a prioritizing. How do you organize that?

The material and the spiritual belong together. They will always have friction between each other, but they will always complement each other. If you’re too materialistic — if you believe that only that which can be measured, only that which can be owned, only that which can have a price tag matters — you should maybe think about some more spiritual components of life. If you’re too spiritual, maybe you need to be rooted more in the fact that there’s also a materialist component of life.

If X drowns out Y, sides of X may appear that make it wrong, because you need that balance. And there are more than just two — X and Y is easier, but you could say XYZ or whatever.

So in fact the saying may be true that too much of a good thing is indeed not good. It distorts what it is.

This is why you see me frequently call for moderation. You could argue that too much moderation is also wrong — you need some passion and some intensity and some belief. Well, yes. But moderation can also be just a middle ground between these different poles. All these different ideas around us lead us to negotiate our space within them. Moderation does not mean you don’t have convictions. It means that you question at which point your convictions turn into such a radicality, into such an extreme version, that they become wrong — that they are undermined by their own conviction.

Is radicality the truest expression of an idea? No. It may be the most flamboyant, the most interesting. But it can’t survive well. If you turn too radical, too extremist, your idea may be more attractive to people who really think like you. But then look at history. Every time an idea became too radical, it fails. It has failed. No matter what the idea — because in its radicality, in its extremism, it loses its power of conviction towards those who don’t agree with you. And the number of people in the world who agree with you is always going to be punctuated by the number of people who disagree with you.

If you want to build a successful movement, if you want to build a successful approach to politics, to religion, to whatever your cultural or social idea may be, you need to convince others. You need to find ways of integrating aspects of the other into your own.

Which is why this very familiar symbol of yin and yang — masculine, feminine, black, white, dark, light — shows you these two parts, but there’s always something of the other in the bigger part. You know the symbol.

If we don’t find a way to integrate that with which we disagree — as some sense of doubt, as some sense of humility within our convictions — then our convictions will be nothing but arrogance, nothing but self-congratulatory pose, and turn out to be nothing else than solipsism: centering on yourself and that which you think defines you as the only thing that matters.

[This was originally posted to YouTube as a video. This post is a slightly abbreviated transcript, preserving the oral style of the video.]

41 Prozent! Ein und vier zig!

Das Land wird mutwillig, vorsätzlich und absichtlich in den #Faschismus gewählt.

Die meisten #Wähler glauben tatsächlich, dass die #AfD am ehesten Probleme löst (drängendste Themen sind natürlich #Migration und #Integration, logisch 🤦🏼). Und obwohl die #CDU in #SachsenAnhalt den #Ministerpräsidenten stellt, ist auch bestimmt daran wieder nur die #SPD Schuld, ist klar. 🤮

Dabei ist die Faktenlage klar: #Demokratie ist wehrlos gegen Dummheit.

https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-05/umfrage-landtagswahl-sachsen-anhalt

Start here: Standard-Slope Integration (SSI)

A new, first-of-its-kind class of derivative-driven integration operators built solely from slope information.

If you’re new to my work, this post links to the full SSI series—a structured overview of a first-of-its-kind, derivative-driven integration operator built on structural iteration invariants and slope-based reconstruction. The recap summarizes all seven posts in order and provides the conceptual foundation for understanding SSI.

Series recap:

https://mathstodon.xyz/@BlueNovaX/116523359117197532

Repository with details and examples:

https://github.com/BlueNovaX/standard-slope-integration

#numericalanalysis #scientificcomputing #mathematics #integration #StandardSlopeIntegration #SSI

@netzpolitik
Es geht dann ja gleich mit der anlasslosen #Vorratsdatenspeicherung weiter. Das man dabei riskiert hunderte von freien Bürger-Netzwerken zu zerstören, weil diese die #vds nicht leisten können, wir überhaupt nicht zur Kenntnis genommen. Aktuell muss jeder kleine Internet-Verein damit rechnen, dass ihn der Hahn abgedreht wird.

Das geht bei kleinen #buergernetzwerke n los und hört bei den großen #freifunk Communities nicht auf. Letzter stellen jedoch für hundert tausende Nutzer jeder Tag 24/7 die Möglichkeit zur #DigitaleTeilhabe . Allein wir versorgen hier vor Ort schon über 100 Sozialinstallationen. Darunter fallen Übergangswohnheime für Geflüchtete, teils mit mehreren hundert Menschen, Notschlafstellen für Wohnungslose, Frauen- und Kinderschutzhäuser, Beratungsstellen, Sozial-Kaffees und Tafel, aber auch zentrale Stellen wie Busbahnhöfe oder große Teile der Fussgängerzone.

Hier gibt es eine föderierte #freifunkkarte . Da sind große Teile der DEU Freifunk-Installationen zu sehen (freilich nur die, die ihre Geo-Daten teilen). Hier kann man ein Gefühl dafür bekommen, was diese Gesetz bewirken kann.

Aktuell sind im Gesetzentwurf zur VDS für gemeinnützige Bürgernetze keine Ausnahmen vorgesehen. Will man das wirklich kaputt gehen lassen, nur um eine mehr als Fragwürdige, ggf. sogar #verfassungsfeindlich e Datensammelwut zu fröhnen? Sicher Daten sind die, die man gar nicht erst erhebt.

federated-map.ffmuc.net/

#freifunkrheinsieg
#freifunkrheinland
#integration
#digitalefreiheit

@netzpolitik
Es geht dann ja gleich mit der anlasslosen #Vorratsdatenspeicherung weiter. Das man dabei riskiert hunderte von freien Bürger-Netzwerken zu zerstören, weil diese die #vds nicht leisten können, wir überhaupt nicht zur Kenntnis genommen. Aktuell muss jeder kleine Internet-Verein damit rechnen, dass ihn der Hahn abgedreht wird.

Das geht bei kleinen #buergernetzwerke n los und hört bei den großen #freifunk Communities nicht auf. Letzter stellen jedoch für hundert tausende Nutzer jeder Tag 24/7 die Möglichkeit zur #DigitaleTeilhabe . Allein wir versorgen hier vor Ort schon über 100 Sozialinstallationen. Darunter fallen Übergangswohnheime für Geflüchtete, teils mit mehreren hundert Menschen, Notschlafstellen für Wohnungslose, Frauen- und Kinderschutzhäuser, Beratungsstellen, Sozial-Kaffees und Tafel, aber auch zentrale Stellen wie Busbahnhöfe oder große Teile der Fussgängerzone.

Hier gibt es eine föderierte #freifunkkarte . Da sind große Teile der DEU Freifunk-Installationen zu sehen (freilich nur die, die ihre Geo-Daten teilen). Hier kann man ein Gefühl dafür bekommen, was diese Gesetz bewirken kann.

Aktuell sind im #Gesetzentwurf zur VDS für gemeinnützige Bürgernetze keine Ausnahmen vorgesehen. Will man das wirklich kaputt gehen lassen, nur um eine mehr als Fragwürdige, ggf. sogar #verfassungsfeindlich e Datensammelwut zu fröhnen? Sicher Daten sind die, die man gar nicht erst erhebt.

federated-map.ffmuc.net/

#freifunkrheinsieg
#freifunkrheinland
#integration
#digitalefreiheit

federated-map.ffmuc.net/

Wenn Integrationen über die Jahre „nebenbei“ entstehen, wächst schnell ein Geflecht aus Sonderlösungen: individuelle Schnittstellen, fragile Abhängigkeiten, hohe Wartungs- und Sicherheitsrisiken.

Im neuen OpenCloud Whitepaper „Einfache, sichere und stabile Integrationen für moderne IT-Landschaften“ erfahren Sie, wie Sie Integrationen vereinfachen, Kosten senken und gleichzeitig digitale Souveränität stärken.

👉 https://opencloud.eu/de/einfache-und-stabile-integrationen-fuer-moderne-it

#OpenCloud #Integration #ITInfrastruktur #OpenSource

WooCommerce Slack Integration: Get Store Alerts in Real Time

Set up a WooCommerce Slack integration to get real-time order notifications, sales alerts and customer[…][...]
 
#WordPress #WooCommerce #FunnelKit #FunnelKitAutomations #integration #notifications #Slack

https://www.wpnews.io/woocommerce-slack-integration-get-store-alerts-in-real-time/

https://www.europesays.com/iran/97091/ Syrian army begins integrating SDF brigades under deal #Integration #SDF #Syria

Zwischen Hoffen und Bangen: Familie aus Schnega Bahnhof droht die Abschiebung

Eine türkische Familie hat sich in Lüchow-Dannenberg ein neues Leben aufgebaut – Unterschriftenliste von vielen Unterschrieben

€ https://www.ejz.de/lokales/zwischen-hoffen-bangen-familie-schnega-bahnhof-droht-abschie-id504781.html

#Integration #Migrationspolitik #Ausländerbehörde #Familie

👉🏼Mehr als 143.000 Menschen protestieren! 🤗

1️⃣ Bundesinnenminister Alexander Dobrindt schließt Zugewanderte, die in Deutschland arbeiten und dafür Deutsch lernen wollen, vom Integrationskurs aus. Das schadet nicht nur den unmittelbar Betroffenen, sondern auch den Unternehmen, die Arbeitskräfte mit guten Deutschkenntnissen brauchen.

2️⃣ Darüber hinaus demontiert der Minister das erfolgreiche System der Sprachförderung für Migrant*innen. Denn mangels Mindestteilnehmerzahl fallen nun zahllose Kurse aus. Das trifft auch viele Zugewanderte, die zur Teilnahme am Integrationskurs verpflichtet sind. Und: Wertvolle Lehrkräfte haben keine Arbeit mehr, Bildungseinrichtungen werden finanziell geschädigt.

‼️ Der DVV fordert den Bundesinnenminister auf, den Ausschluss freiwilliger Teilnehmer*innen vom Integrationskurs umgehend zurückzunehmen. Auch zahlreiche andere Organisationen verlangen die Rücknahme der kurzsichtigen Aktion.

✅ Über 143.000 Personen haben bereits eine Petition der Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW) unterschrieben.

🫵🏼 Schließ dich jetzt an – jede Unterschrift zählt!

ℹ️ Zur Petition: https://weact.campact.de/petitions/zulassungsstopp-fur-integrationskurse-zurucknehmen

#VHS #Volkshochschule #Bildung #Integration #DVV #Demokratie #Berlin #Inklusion @volkshochschule #Weiterbildung @gew.de @campact

Standard‑Slope Integration (SSI) — Post #3: Failure-mode robustness

A new, first-of-its-kind class of derivative-driven integration operators built solely from slope information.

Classical integration methods often fail when the integrand is discontinuous, poorly conditioned, or structurally misaligned with area-based accumulation. SSI approaches these cases differently: its derivative-driven structure and step-to-step invariants prevent the amplification and drift that destabilize classical formulations.

This makes SSI effective in cases where traditional quadrature becomes unstable, unreliable, or fails outright—not by modifying classical methods, but by using a fundamentally different reconstruction principle.

#numericalanalysis #scientificcomputing #mathematics #integration #StandardSlopeIntegration #SSI

50 Years of Family Reunification: Time To Take Stock

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/france-family-reunification-50-years-anniversary-integration-chirac/

1Password + Flatpak browser: A fix for a thorny integration problem for Linux systems
https://github.com/FlyinPancake/1password-flatpak-browser-integration
#integration #1password #container #security #flatpak #browser #linux #+

Alright, future engineers!
**Trapezoidal Rule:** Approximates definite integrals by summing areas of trapezoids under the curve.
Ex: `h/2 * (f(x0) + f(x1))` for one interval.
Pro-Tip: More subintervals (smaller `h`) generally means better accuracy!

#NumMethods #Integration #STEM #StudyNotes

IMHO the BSD familie is not in the category dinosaur

The BSD boxes which I had installed at different clients have worked literally till they fell apart. All of them were running freeBSD

The human clients never knew how to even spell the operating system. I quietly replaced hard drives when they were broken and threw the systems away when the hardware was done the operating system was always good.

None of my BSD based boxes ever lost any data because I followed the rules which were in the man pages. Back then I came from a Linux World compiling kernels manually and all other GNU programs, no distribución then.

BSD FELT LIKE THE FOUNDATION OF WHERE LINUX SHOULD HAVE BEEN

My clients were running Mission critical operations and I couldn't trust them to Linux so I went to BSD I was never ever disappointed.

What drew me to BSD was the centralized system of everything together. Not just a fantastic kernel with the rest glued to it, glued with water based Glue

The BSD programmers and user manuals are very well written
I was amazed how easy it was to search for the information with my Linux background see that in BSD it was much better documented and that everything I needed was already there I didn't need to go on dial-up internet to find out something

@stefano

@h3artbl33d

#BSD #Praise #Operating #System #Stability #programming #coherent #Integration

@h3artbl33d

https://www.europesays.com/be-fr/88339/ Visites domiciliaires : une fausse bonne solution #AnneleenVanBossuyt #asile #BE #BEFr #Belgique #Belgium #GestionDesFluxMigratoires #GouvernementBelge #IMMIGRATION #Intégration #MinistreDeLaMigration #NVa #PolitiqueD’asile #PolitiqueMigratoire

Wenn Expats in Kneipen nur Englisch sprechen, wirken sie lässig. Bei Geflüchteten gilt dasselbe als verweigerte Integration. Das ist nicht fair.

Englischsprechende Expats: Aufgeschlossen und weltoffen? My ass | taz.de

#Berlin #expats #Integration
https://taz.de/Englischsprechende-Expats/!6170313/

Do I know anyone who is a Deluge scripting expert? (The language that Zoho uses)

One of my contacts is looking for one.

#Deluge #Zoho #CRM #Code #Coding #Integration #SmallBusiness #Developer #Script #Scripting #FediHire #FediJobs #Job