home.social

#revenues — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #revenues, aggregated by home.social.

  1. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    #PUTIN SELLING RUSSIA’S LAST RESERVES Vlog 1385: War in #Ukraine

    The Bank of #Russia has sold approximately 22 tons of #gold since the start of 2026 to help fund its #budget #deficit. By the end of March, this deficit reached 4.6 trillion rubles ($61.3 billion) due to low #oil and #gas #revenues at the beginning of the year.

    #russoUkrainianWar

    youtu.be/16isKKKALGg

  2. Manila Bulletin – Lacson pushes for estate tax amnesty bill to unlock idle assets, boost revenues

    Published Feb 25, 2026 10:43 am  |  Updated Feb 25, 2026 02:09 pm Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo “Ping” Lacson…
    #NewsBeep #News #Personalfinance #amnesty #assets #bill #boost #Business #CA #Canada #estate #Finance #for #idle #Lacson #PersonalFinance #pushes #revenues #tax #to #unlock
    newsbeep.com/ca/502770/

  3. Manila Bulletin – Lacson pushes for estate tax amnesty bill to unlock idle assets, boost revenues

    Published Feb 25, 2026 10:43 am  |  Updated Feb 25, 2026 02:09 pm Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo “Ping” Lacson…
    #NewsBeep #News #US #USA #UnitedStates #UnitedStatesOfAmerica #Personalfinance #amnesty #assets #bill #boost #Business #estate #for #idle #Lacson #PersonalFinance #pushes #Revenues #Tax #to #unlock
    newsbeep.com/us/492902/

  4. Manila Bulletin – Lacson pushes for estate tax amnesty bill to unlock idle assets, boost revenues

    Published Feb 25, 2026 10:43 am  |  Updated Feb 25, 2026 02:09 pm Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo “Ping” Lacson…
    #NewsBeep #News #US #USA #UnitedStates #UnitedStatesOfAmerica #Personalfinance #amnesty #assets #bill #boost #Business #estate #for #idle #Lacson #PersonalFinance #pushes #Revenues #Tax #to #unlock
    newsbeep.com/us/492902/

  5. Manila Bulletin – Lacson pushes for estate tax amnesty bill to unlock idle assets, boost revenues

    Published Feb 25, 2026 10:43 am  |  Updated Feb 25, 2026 02:09 pm Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo “Ping” Lacson…
    #NewsBeep #News #Personalfinance #amnesty #assets #AU #Australia #Bill #boost #Business #Estate #Finance #for #idle #Lacson #PersonalFinance #pushes #revenues #tax #To #unlock
    newsbeep.com/au/506703/

  6. Manila Bulletin – Lacson pushes for estate tax amnesty bill to unlock idle assets, boost revenues

    Published Feb 25, 2026 10:43 am  |  Updated Feb 25, 2026 02:09 pm Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo “Ping” Lacson…
    #NewsBeep #News #Personalfinance #amnesty #assets #AU #Australia #Bill #boost #Business #Estate #Finance #for #idle #Lacson #PersonalFinance #pushes #revenues #tax #To #unlock
    newsbeep.com/au/506703/

  7. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    🧵 👇

    PUTIN’S BUDGET COLLAPSE: OIL $27, #TAXES, LUKOIL ASKS FOR HELP Vlog 1310: War in #Ukraine

    #Russia’s #oil and #gas #revenues have crashed by 50 percent to the lowest level of the #Putin era. The key #mineral #extraction #tax has fallen nearly 60% compared to January 2025, export duties have decreased by 44%. The price of Russian #Urals oil dropped to $39 per barrel in December, significantly lower than in the #budget plan. Russia’s ...

    1/2

  8. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    🧵 👇

    RUSSIA FACES PRICE SHOCK, GOLD RESERVES ARE GONE Vlog 1302: War in #Ukraine

    According to data from #Russia’s Ministry of #Finance, the volume of #gold on the #NWF’s balance sheet dropped by 71% between May 2022 and January 2025. According to the Ministry of Finance, the average price of Russian #Urals crude fell to $39 per barrel—well below the $59 assumed in the federal #budget. To cover the #shortfall in #oil and #gas #revenues, ...

    1/3

  9. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    🧵 👇

    RUSSIA FACES PRICE SHOCK, GOLD RESERVES ARE GONE Vlog 1302: War in #Ukraine

    According to data from #Russia’s Ministry of #Finance, the volume of #gold on the #NWF’s balance sheet dropped by 71% between May 2022 and January 2025. According to the Ministry of Finance, the average price of Russian #Urals crude fell to $39 per barrel—well below the $59 assumed in the federal #budget. To cover the #shortfall in #oil and #gas #revenues, ...

    1/3

  10. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    🧵 👇

    RUSSIA FACES PRICE SHOCK, GOLD RESERVES ARE GONE Vlog 1302: War in #Ukraine

    According to data from #Russia’s Ministry of #Finance, the volume of #gold on the #NWF’s balance sheet dropped by 71% between May 2022 and January 2025. According to the Ministry of Finance, the average price of Russian #Urals crude fell to $39 per barrel—well below the $59 assumed in the federal #budget. To cover the #shortfall in #oil and #gas #revenues, ...

    1/3

  11. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    🧵 👇

    RUSSIA FACES PRICE SHOCK, GOLD RESERVES ARE GONE Vlog 1302: War in #Ukraine

    According to data from #Russia’s Ministry of #Finance, the volume of #gold on the #NWF’s balance sheet dropped by 71% between May 2022 and January 2025. According to the Ministry of Finance, the average price of Russian #Urals crude fell to $39 per barrel—well below the $59 assumed in the federal #budget. To cover the #shortfall in #oil and #gas #revenues, ...

    1/3

  12. From ⁨⁨⁨⁨⁨#AnnafromUkraine⁩⁩⁩⁩⁩ @[email protected]

    🧵 👇

    RUSSIA FACES PRICE SHOCK, GOLD RESERVES ARE GONE Vlog 1302: War in #Ukraine

    According to data from #Russia’s Ministry of #Finance, the volume of #gold on the #NWF’s balance sheet dropped by 71% between May 2022 and January 2025. According to the Ministry of Finance, the average price of Russian #Urals crude fell to $39 per barrel—well below the $59 assumed in the federal #budget. To cover the #shortfall in #oil and #gas #revenues, ...

    1/3

  13. Tuesday, January 20, 2026

    Russia's oil, gas revenues to drop by 46% in January year-on-year -- Ukraine hits drone warehouse in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast -- Ukraine's SBU 'destroyed or disabled' $4 billion worth of Russian air defense systems over past year -- Ukraine needs billions in US arms as Greenland dispute pushes alliance to breaking point ... and more

    activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026

  14. Tuesday, January 20, 2026

    Russia's oil, gas revenues to drop by 46% in January year-on-year -- Ukraine hits drone warehouse in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast -- Ukraine's SBU 'destroyed or disabled' $4 billion worth of Russian air defense systems over past year -- Ukraine needs billions in US arms as Greenland dispute pushes alliance to breaking point ... and more

    activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026

  15. Tuesday, January 20, 2026

    Russia's oil, gas revenues to drop by 46% in January year-on-year -- Ukraine hits drone warehouse in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast -- Ukraine's SBU 'destroyed or disabled' $4 billion worth of Russian air defense systems over past year -- Ukraine needs billions in US arms as Greenland dispute pushes alliance to breaking point ... and more

    activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026

  16. Tuesday, January 20, 2026

    Russia's oil, gas revenues to drop by 46% in January year-on-year -- Ukraine hits drone warehouse in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast -- Ukraine's SBU 'destroyed or disabled' $4 billion worth of Russian air defense systems over past year -- Ukraine needs billions in US arms as Greenland dispute pushes alliance to breaking point ... and more

    activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026

  17. Tuesday, January 20, 2026

    Russia's oil, gas revenues to drop by 46% in January year-on-year -- Ukraine hits drone warehouse in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast -- Ukraine's SBU 'destroyed or disabled' $4 billion worth of Russian air defense systems over past year -- Ukraine needs billions in US arms as Greenland dispute pushes alliance to breaking point ... and more

    activitypub.writeworks.uk/2026

  18. Sunday, December 14, 2025

    [Video] One night with a Kyiv family amid Russia’s mass attack -- Russia’s December oil and gas revenue set to drop to lowest level since 2020, Reuters reports -- Under fire, Ukraine becomes Europe's energy defense instructor -- India’s short-sighted embrace of Russia will endanger its own national security ... and more

    activitypub.writeworks.uk/2025

  19. Hokkaido to introduce lodging tax of up to 500 yen per night from 2026

    The imposition of a lodging tax is expected to generate around 4.5 billion yen for the Hokkaido government. Photo for illustrative purposes only – Canva SAPPORO – The government of Hokkaido, Japan’s northern island re…
    #Japan #JP #Hokkaido #HokkaidoTopics #lodgingtax #revenues #sinar #SinarDaily #sinarharian #tourism #北海道
    alojapan.com/1386526/hokkaido-

  20. Hokkaido to introduce lodging tax of up to 500 yen per night from 2026

    The imposition of a lodging tax is expected to generate around 4.5 billion yen for the Hokkaido government. Photo for illustrative purposes only – Canva SAPPORO – The government of Hokkaido, Japan’s northern island re…
    #Japan #JP #Hokkaido #HokkaidoTopics #lodgingtax #revenues #sinar #SinarDaily #sinarharian #tourism #北海道
    alojapan.com/1386526/hokkaido-

  21. alojapan.com/1386526/hokkaido- Hokkaido to introduce lodging tax of up to 500 yen per night from 2026 #Hokkaido #HokkaidoTopics #Japan #LodgingTax #revenues #sinar #SinarDaily #SinarHarian #tourism #北海道 The imposition of a lodging tax is expected to generate around 4.5 billion yen for the Hokkaido government. Photo for illustrative purposes only – Canva SAPPORO – The government of Hokkaido, Japan’s northern island renowned for its popularity among tourists, will introduce

  22. alojapan.com/1386526/hokkaido- Hokkaido to introduce lodging tax of up to 500 yen per night from 2026 #Hokkaido #HokkaidoTopics #Japan #LodgingTax #revenues #sinar #SinarDaily #SinarHarian #tourism #北海道 The imposition of a lodging tax is expected to generate around 4.5 billion yen for the Hokkaido government. Photo for illustrative purposes only – Canva SAPPORO – The government of Hokkaido, Japan’s northern island renowned for its popularity among tourists, will introduce

  23. A #carbontax on emission-intensive agricultural goods – #meat, #dairy – can reduce agricultural emissions in Germany by over 20% & generate #revenues over 8 billion EUR/year. Used for a compensation scheme, a carbon #tax can have a progressive #incomedistribution effect & increase social acceptance. Carbon #taxes on agricultural goods can help achieve the sectoral #emissions reductions targeted by the government: doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2024 #climatechange #meattax #taxation #Germany

  24. Sweden: A #tax on red & processed #meat becomes more acceptable if #consumers' total food #costs do not increase and #revenues are used for public #health & the #climate; it is most acceptable when it allows a #VAT reduction on fruit & greens: doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2024 #meattax #vegetables #Sweden

  25. "#Workers in the #US have an estimated $50bn-plus #stolen from them every year, according to the #Economic #Policy #Institute, surpassing all #robberies, #burglaries and motor vehicle #thefts #combined. The majority of these stolen #wages are never recovered by workers.

    Between 2017 to 2020, $3.24bn in stolen wages were recovered by the US Department of Labor, state labor departments and attorney generals, and through class- and collective-action litigation.

    #Wage theft disproportionately affects lower-wage workers, women, people of color, and immigrant workers, and negatively affects local #economies and #tax #revenues.

    There are numerous forms of wage theft, from #employers not #compensating workers for time #worked, #violating minimum #wage and #overtime #laws, misclassifying #employees as independent #contractors, not providing #legally required meal breaks, confiscating worker tips, or illegally taking #deductions from worker wages."

    theguardian.com/us-news/2023/j

  26. "#Workers in the #US have an estimated $50bn-plus #stolen from them every year, according to the #Economic #Policy #Institute, surpassing all #robberies, #burglaries and motor vehicle #thefts #combined. The majority of these stolen #wages are never recovered by workers.

    Between 2017 to 2020, $3.24bn in stolen wages were recovered by the US Department of Labor, state labor departments and attorney generals, and through class- and collective-action litigation.

    #Wage theft disproportionately affects lower-wage workers, women, people of color, and immigrant workers, and negatively affects local #economies and #tax #revenues.

    There are numerous forms of wage theft, from #employers not #compensating workers for time #worked, #violating minimum #wage and #overtime #laws, misclassifying #employees as independent #contractors, not providing #legally required meal breaks, confiscating worker tips, or illegally taking #deductions from worker wages."

    theguardian.com/us-news/2023/j

  27. "#Workers in the #US have an estimated $50bn-plus #stolen from them every year, according to the #Economic #Policy #Institute, surpassing all #robberies, #burglaries and motor vehicle #thefts #combined. The majority of these stolen #wages are never recovered by workers.

    Between 2017 to 2020, $3.24bn in stolen wages were recovered by the US Department of Labor, state labor departments and attorney generals, and through class- and collective-action litigation.

    #Wage theft disproportionately affects lower-wage workers, women, people of color, and immigrant workers, and negatively affects local #economies and #tax #revenues.

    There are numerous forms of wage theft, from #employers not #compensating workers for time #worked, #violating minimum #wage and #overtime #laws, misclassifying #employees as independent #contractors, not providing #legally required meal breaks, confiscating worker tips, or illegally taking #deductions from worker wages."

    theguardian.com/us-news/2023/j

  28. "#Workers in the #US have an estimated $50bn-plus #stolen from them every year, according to the #Economic #Policy #Institute, surpassing all #robberies, #burglaries and motor vehicle #thefts #combined. The majority of these stolen #wages are never recovered by workers.

    Between 2017 to 2020, $3.24bn in stolen wages were recovered by the US Department of Labor, state labor departments and attorney generals, and through class- and collective-action litigation.

    #Wage theft disproportionately affects lower-wage workers, women, people of color, and immigrant workers, and negatively affects local #economies and #tax #revenues.

    There are numerous forms of wage theft, from #employers not #compensating workers for time #worked, #violating minimum #wage and #overtime #laws, misclassifying #employees as independent #contractors, not providing #legally required meal breaks, confiscating worker tips, or illegally taking #deductions from worker wages."

    theguardian.com/us-news/2023/j

  29. "#Workers in the #US have an estimated $50bn-plus #stolen from them every year, according to the #Economic #Policy #Institute, surpassing all #robberies, #burglaries and motor vehicle #thefts #combined. The majority of these stolen #wages are never recovered by workers.

    Between 2017 to 2020, $3.24bn in stolen wages were recovered by the US Department of Labor, state labor departments and attorney generals, and through class- and collective-action litigation.

    #Wage theft disproportionately affects lower-wage workers, women, people of color, and immigrant workers, and negatively affects local #economies and #tax #revenues.

    There are numerous forms of wage theft, from #employers not #compensating workers for time #worked, #violating minimum #wage and #overtime #laws, misclassifying #employees as independent #contractors, not providing #legally required meal breaks, confiscating worker tips, or illegally taking #deductions from worker wages."

    theguardian.com/us-news/2023/j

  30. Rep Golden said it was a “mistake” for Democrats to allow the GOP to define the debt limit debate as simply a question of #spending #cuts (#without #revenues entering into the conversation) and claim the mantle of “fiscal responsibility” — a position he feels they should not be entitled to, given that they added trillions to the federal debt under President Trump.

    Instead, he sees a way for Dems to seize the high ground. How? By using the debt limit negotiations to start a conversation about #raising #taxes on the #richest Americans and #wealthiest #corporations.

    “We should engage in this debate rather than trying to avoid it by demanding a clean debt ceiling raise,” Golden said. “Let’s call [#Republicans] out on their fiscal #irresponsibility and let’s welcome them to the table for a real solution, which I think means reducing #spending — because that is the environment we’re in, with a divided government anyways — and raising #revenues to put towards that reduction.”

  31. @jpreisendoerfer @airun @happy @marqle

    To see why I make the point, let me first sketch the two generic cooperative modells which are subsumed under the roof of the #InternationalCooperativeAlliance (#ICA).

    The two generic modells covered by ICA's #GuidanceNotes on the #CooperativePrinciples are the membership-fee modell and the membership-shares modell.

    In the membership-fees modell, members of the respective cooperative usually contribute a recurring #membership #fee.

    The membership fee basically fills the gap between operational #costs and operational #revenues of the cooperative.

    In the membership-share modell, members of the respective cooperative own a share in the cooperative, similar to #shares in a joint-stock company.

    A single share need not necessarily have a large nominal value. Some cooperatives emit shares with a nominal value of just € 10.

    The cooperative shares can not be traded freely. In this respect, they are similar to vinculated registered shares of a joint-stock company which is not listed on a stock exchange.

    In this modell, members usually don't pay membership fees, but rather receive some yearly #dividend on their share(s).

    However, different from joint-stock companies, cooperatives in the membership-share modell follow the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule. That is, members do not receive an increased weight-of-vote when they buy additional shares of the #coop.

    Both cooperative modells can be mixed. This results in some type of monetary #reallocation between members, depending on the relationship the respective cooperative has set up between operational #turnover, membership fees, non-member #business, and so forth.

    As an example, almost all cooperatives in #FRG follow the membership-share modell. Cooperatives which collect a membership-fee do exist in FRG, but they are rare.

    On the other hand, most cooperatives in #Switzerland collect a membership-fee.

    Recently, the first cooperative #railway society was established in #France. This coop uses the membership-share modell.

    Also, not every coop under the roof of ICA uses the legal form of a cooperative.

    Again as an example from FRG:

    It is entirely possible to establish a business which is conceptually a coop by ICA's standards, but legally is a joint-stock company.

    This requires to emit vinculated registered shares and writing the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule into the #statues of the joint-stock company.

    In particular in FRG, it's also reasonable to follow this path, because the cooperative law of this jurisdiction still contains regulation from #Nazi era, when no #parliamentary #legislator existed.

    With regard to the question if a cooperative should be #nonProfit or #forProfit:

    In the membership-fee modell, the fees collected from members serve the same purpose as #donations to a cooperative. As I layed out above, membership fees and donations fill the gap between operational costs and operational revenues of the cooperative.

    Obviously, members must be able to afford the membership fee.

    Maybe the cooperative has some reduced membership fees for people who can not easily afford the fee. In that case, said people have to come out to the cooperative as being poor.

    For many poor people, being poor is a big #stigma, and they shy away from identifying themselves with that stigma. So the membership fee in fact poses a high social #barrier.

    On the other hand, in the membership-share modell, a poor person which buys a cooperative share does not have to pay a recurring membership fee and therefore doesn't have to identify with the stigma of being poor with respect to the cooperative.

    A cooperative in the membership-share modell will have to create larger revenues, but not necessarily a #surplus. (The term ›surplus‹ is used in coop lingo instead of #profit.)

    When it does indeed create a surplus, then it can grow its undivisable reserve and can pay some dividend on the cooperative shares.

    For the reasons I layed out above, I consider the membership-fee modell of cooperatives as presenting a considerable amount of #Classism, and I decided not to contribute resources to such cooperatives (at least not after a start-up phase, where membership-fees only contribute to the costs of getting the cooperative going):

    In essence, membership-fee or non-profit cooperatives #socialise the costs of their operation, rather than the revenues of their operation (or, to be more precise, the surplus of their operation).

    An issue that I have with a publication like ›Relationship-to-Profit: A Theory of Business, Markets, and Profit for Social Ecological Economics‹ by Jennifer Hinton is that it considers ›the pursuit of unlimited financial gain‹ as if this is what happens in a cooperative which creates a surplus (or profit).

    I think that this is an unjustifiably, severely #classist misconception of the operation of a membership-share cooperative.

    In the central-european cooperative tradition, as marked by Raiffeisen and Schultze-Delitzsch, fostering the financial situation of members of cooperatives is not just a side-effect, but a core aim.

    🌺

    🏷️ #donation #donor
  32. @jpreisendoerfer @airun @happy @marqle

    To see why I make the point, let me first sketch the two generic cooperative modells which are subsumed under the roof of the #InternationalCooperativeAlliance (#ICA).

    The two generic modells covered by ICA's #GuidanceNotes on the #CooperativePrinciples are the membership-fee modell and the membership-shares modell.

    In the membership-fees modell, members of the respective cooperative usually contribute a recurring #membership #fee.

    The membership fee basically fills the gap between operational #costs and operational #revenues of the cooperative.

    In the membership-share modell, members of the respective cooperative own a share in the cooperative, similar to #shares in a joint-stock company.

    A single share need not necessarily have a large nominal value. Some cooperatives emit shares with a nominal value of just € 10.

    The cooperative shares can not be traded freely. In this respect, they are similar to vinculated registered shares of a joint-stock company which is not listed on a stock exchange.

    In this modell, members usually don't pay membership fees, but rather receive some yearly #dividend on their share(s).

    However, different from joint-stock companies, cooperatives in the membership-share modell follow the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule. That is, members do not receive an increased weight-of-vote when they buy additional shares of the #coop.

    Both cooperative modells can be mixed. This results in some type of monetary #reallocation between members, depending on the relationship the respective cooperative has set up between operational #turnover, membership fees, non-member #business, and so forth.

    As an example, almost all cooperatives in #FRG follow the membership-share modell. Cooperatives which collect a membership-fee do exist in FRG, but they are rare.

    On the other hand, most cooperatives in #Switzerland collect a membership-fee.

    Recently, the first cooperative #railway society was established in #France. This coop uses the membership-share modell.

    Also, not every coop under the roof of ICA uses the legal form of a cooperative.

    Again as an example from FRG:

    It is entirely possible to establish a business which is conceptually a coop by ICA's standards, but legally is a joint-stock company.

    This requires to emit vinculated registered shares and writing the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule into the #statues of the joint-stock company.

    In particular in FRG, it's also reasonable to follow this path, because the cooperative law of this jurisdiction still contains regulation from #Nazi era, when no #parliamentary #legislator existed.

    With regard to the question if a cooperative should be #nonProfit or #forProfit:

    In the membership-fee modell, the fees collected from members serve the same purpose as #donations to a cooperative. As I layed out above, membership fees and donations fill the gap between operational costs and operational revenues of the cooperative.

    Obviously, members must be able to afford the membership fee.

    Maybe the cooperative has some reduced membership fees for people who can not easily afford the fee. In that case, said people have to come out to the cooperative as being poor.

    For many poor people, being poor is a big #stigma, and they shy away from identifying themselves with that stigma. So the membership fee in fact poses a high social #barrier.

    On the other hand, in the membership-share modell, a poor person which buys a cooperative share does not have to pay a recurring membership fee and therefore doesn't have to identify with the stigma of being poor with respect to the cooperative.

    A cooperative in the membership-share modell will have to create larger revenues, but not necessarily a #surplus. (The term ›surplus‹ is used in coop lingo instead of #profit.)

    When it does indeed create a surplus, then it can grow its undivisable reserve and can pay some dividend on the cooperative shares.

    For the reasons I layed out above, I consider the membership-fee modell of cooperatives as presenting a considerable amount of #Classism, and I decided not to contribute resources to such cooperatives (at least not after a start-up phase, where membership-fees only contribute to the costs of getting the cooperative going):

    In essence, membership-fee or non-profit cooperatives #socialise the costs of their operation, rather than the revenues of their operation (or, to be more precise, the surplus of their operation).

    An issue that I have with a publication like ›Relationship-to-Profit: A Theory of Business, Markets, and Profit for Social Ecological Economics‹ by Jennifer Hinton is that it considers ›the pursuit of unlimited financial gain‹ as if this is what happens in a cooperative which creates a surplus (or profit).

    I think that this is an unjustifiably, severely #classist misconception of the operation of a membership-share cooperative.

    In the central-european cooperative tradition, as marked by Raiffeisen and Schultze-Delitzsch, fostering the financial situation of members of cooperatives is not just a side-effect, but a core aim.

    🌺

    🏷️ #donation #donor
  33. @jpreisendoerfer @airun @happy @marqle

    To see why I make the point, let me first sketch the two generic cooperative modells which are subsumed under the roof of the #InternationalCooperativeAlliance (#ICA).

    The two generic modells covered by ICA's #GuidanceNotes on the #CooperativePrinciples are the membership-fee modell and the membership-shares modell.

    In the membership-fees modell, members of the respective cooperative usually contribute a recurring #membership #fee.

    The membership fee basically fills the gap between operational #costs and operational #revenues of the cooperative.

    In the membership-share modell, members of the respective cooperative own a share in the cooperative, similar to #shares in a joint-stock company.

    A single share need not necessarily have a large nominal value. Some cooperatives emit shares with a nominal value of just € 10.

    The cooperative shares can not be traded freely. In this respect, they are similar to vinculated registered shares of a joint-stock company which is not listed on a stock exchange.

    In this modell, members usually don't pay membership fees, but rather receive some yearly #dividend on their share(s).

    However, different from joint-stock companies, cooperatives in the membership-share modell follow the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule. That is, members do not receive an increased weight-of-vote when they buy additional shares of the #coop.

    Both cooperative modells can be mixed. This results in some type of monetary #reallocation between members, depending on the relationship the respective cooperative has set up between operational #turnover, membership fees, non-member #business, and so forth.

    As an example, almost all cooperatives in #FRG follow the membership-share modell. Cooperatives which collect a membership-fee do exist in FRG, but they are rare.

    On the other hand, most cooperatives in #Switzerland collect a membership-fee.

    Recently, the first cooperative #railway society was established in #France. This coop uses the membership-share modell.

    Also, not every coop under the roof of ICA uses the legal form of a cooperative.

    Again as an example from FRG:

    It is entirely possible to establish a business which is conceptually a coop by ICA's standards, but legally is a joint-stock company.

    This requires to emit vinculated registered shares and writing the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule into the #statues of the joint-stock company.

    In particular in FRG, it's also reasonable to follow this path, because the cooperative law of this jurisdiction still contains regulation from #Nazi era, when no #parliamentary #legislator existed.

    With regard to the question if a cooperative should be #nonProfit or #forProfit:

    In the membership-fee modell, the fees collected from members serve the same purpose as #donations to a cooperative. As I layed out above, membership fees and donations fill the gap between operational costs and operational revenues of the cooperative.

    Obviously, members must be able to afford the membership fee.

    Maybe the cooperative has some reduced membership fees for people who can not easily afford the fee. In that case, said people have to come out to the cooperative as being poor.

    For many poor people, being poor is a big #stigma, and they shy away from identifying themselves with that stigma. So the membership fee in fact poses a high social #barrier.

    On the other hand, in the membership-share modell, a poor person which buys a cooperative share does not have to pay a recurring membership fee and therefore doesn't have to identify with the stigma of being poor with respect to the cooperative.

    A cooperative in the membership-share modell will have to create larger revenues, but not necessarily a #surplus. (The term ›surplus‹ is used in coop lingo instead of #profit.)

    When it does indeed create a surplus, then it can grow its undivisable reserve and can pay some dividend on the cooperative shares.

    For the reasons I layed out above, I consider the membership-fee modell of cooperatives as presenting a considerable amount of #Classism, and I decided not to contribute resources to such cooperatives (at least not after a start-up phase, where membership-fees only contribute to the costs of getting the cooperative going):

    In essence, membership-fee or non-profit cooperatives #socialise the costs of their operation, rather than the revenues of their operation (or, to be more precise, the surplus of their operation).

    An issue that I have with a publication like ›Relationship-to-Profit: A Theory of Business, Markets, and Profit for Social Ecological Economics‹ by Jennifer Hinton is that it considers ›the pursuit of unlimited financial gain‹ as if this is what happens in a cooperative which creates a surplus (or profit).

    I think that this is an unjustifiably, severely #classist misconception of the operation of a membership-share cooperative.

    In the central-european cooperative tradition, as marked by Raiffeisen and Schultze-Delitzsch, fostering the financial situation of members of cooperatives is not just a side-effect, but a core aim.

    🌺

    🏷️ #donation #donor
  34. @datatitian @jpreisendoerfer I am not familiar with the jurisdiction of Washington state, and only vaguely with the #jurisdiction on federal level in the US, but in general, #cooperative societies can in fact have owners, due to the various cooperative modells which are subsumed under the roof of the #InternationalCooperativeAlliance (#ICA).

    The two generic modells covered by ICA's #GuidanceNotes on the #CooperativePrinciples are the membership-fee modell and the membership-shares modell.

    In the membership-fees modell, members of the respective cooperative usually contribute a recurring #membership #fee.

    The membership fee basically fills the gap between operational #costs and operational #revenues of the cooperative.

    In the membership-share modell, members of the respective cooperative own a share in the cooperative, similar to #shares in a joint-stock company.

    In this modell, members usually don't pay membership fees, but rather receive some yearly #dividend on their share(s).

    However, different from joint-stock companies, cooperatives in the membership-share modell follow the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule. That is, members do not receive an increased weight-of-vote when they buy additional shares of the #coop.

    Both cooperative modells can be mixed. This results in some type of monetary #reallocation between members, depending on the relationship the respective cooperative has set up between operational #turnover, membership fees, non-member #business, and so forth.

    As an example, almost all cooperatives in #FRG follow the membership-share modell. Cooperatives which collect a membership-fee do exist in FRG, but they are rare.

    On the other hand, most cooperatives in #Switzerland collect a membership-fee.

    Recently, the first cooperative #railway society was established in #France. This coop uses the membership-share modell.

    In essence, the guy you are refering to in your posting need not necessarily be wrong in stating that he is (some, an) owner of the cooperative, as long as #Washington state allows the membership-share modell of cooperatives.

    Also, not every coop under the roof of ICA uses the legal form of a cooperative.

    Again as an example from FRG:

    It is entirely possible to establish a business which is conceptually a coop by ICA's standards, but legally is a joint-stock company.

    This requires to emit vinculated registered shares and writing the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule into the #statues of the joint-stock company.

    In particular in FRG, it's also reasonable to follow this path, because the cooperative law of this jurisdiction still contains regulation from #Nazi era, when no #parliamentary #legislator existed.

    HTH!

    🌺
  35. @datatitian @jpreisendoerfer I am not familiar with the jurisdiction of Washington state, and only vaguely with the #jurisdiction on federal level in the US, but in general, #cooperative societies can in fact have owners, due to the various cooperative modells which are subsumed under the roof of the #InternationalCooperativeAlliance (#ICA).

    The two generic modells covered by ICA's #GuidanceNotes on the #CooperativePrinciples are the membership-fee modell and the membership-shares modell.

    In the membership-fees modell, members of the respective cooperative usually contribute a recurring #membership #fee.

    The membership fee basically fills the gap between operational #costs and operational #revenues of the cooperative.

    In the membership-share modell, members of the respective cooperative own a share in the cooperative, similar to #shares in a joint-stock company.

    In this modell, members usually don't pay membership fees, but rather receive some yearly #dividend on their share(s).

    However, different from joint-stock companies, cooperatives in the membership-share modell follow the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule. That is, members do not receive an increased weight-of-vote when they buy additional shares of the #coop.

    Both cooperative modells can be mixed. This results in some type of monetary #reallocation between members, depending on the relationship the respective cooperative has set up between operational #turnover, membership fees, non-member #business, and so forth.

    As an example, almost all cooperatives in #FRG follow the membership-share modell. Cooperatives which collect a membership-fee do exist in FRG, but they are rare.

    On the other hand, most cooperatives in #Switzerland collect a membership-fee.

    Recently, the first cooperative #railway society was established in #France. This coop uses the membership-share modell.

    In essence, the guy you are refering to in your posting need not necessarily be wrong in stating that he is (some, an) owner of the cooperative, as long as #Washington state allows the membership-share modell of cooperatives.

    Also, not every coop under the roof of ICA uses the legal form of a cooperative.

    Again as an example from FRG:

    It is entirely possible to establish a business which is conceptually a coop by ICA's standards, but legally is a joint-stock company.

    This requires to emit vinculated registered shares and writing the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule into the #statues of the joint-stock company.

    In particular in FRG, it's also reasonable to follow this path, because the cooperative law of this jurisdiction still contains regulation from #Nazi era, when no #parliamentary #legislator existed.

    HTH!

    🌺
  36. @datatitian @jpreisendoerfer I am not familiar with the jurisdiction of Washington state, and only vaguely with the #jurisdiction on federal level in the US, but in general, #cooperative societies can in fact have owners, due to the various cooperative modells which are subsumed under the roof of the #InternationalCooperativeAlliance (#ICA).

    The two generic modells covered by ICA's #GuidanceNotes on the #CooperativePrinciples are the membership-fee modell and the membership-shares modell.

    In the membership-fees modell, members of the respective cooperative usually contribute a recurring #membership #fee.

    The membership fee basically fills the gap between operational #costs and operational #revenues of the cooperative.

    In the membership-share modell, members of the respective cooperative own a share in the cooperative, similar to #shares in a joint-stock company.

    In this modell, members usually don't pay membership fees, but rather receive some yearly #dividend on their share(s).

    However, different from joint-stock companies, cooperatives in the membership-share modell follow the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule. That is, members do not receive an increased weight-of-vote when they buy additional shares of the #coop.

    Both cooperative modells can be mixed. This results in some type of monetary #reallocation between members, depending on the relationship the respective cooperative has set up between operational #turnover, membership fees, non-member #business, and so forth.

    As an example, almost all cooperatives in #FRG follow the membership-share modell. Cooperatives which collect a membership-fee do exist in FRG, but they are rare.

    On the other hand, most cooperatives in #Switzerland collect a membership-fee.

    Recently, the first cooperative #railway society was established in #France. This coop uses the membership-share modell.

    In essence, the guy you are refering to in your posting need not necessarily be wrong in stating that he is (some, an) owner of the cooperative, as long as #Washington state allows the membership-share modell of cooperatives.

    Also, not every coop under the roof of ICA uses the legal form of a cooperative.

    Again as an example from FRG:

    It is entirely possible to establish a business which is conceptually a coop by ICA's standards, but legally is a joint-stock company.

    This requires to emit vinculated registered shares and writing the ›one-person, one-vote‹ rule into the #statues of the joint-stock company.

    In particular in FRG, it's also reasonable to follow this path, because the cooperative law of this jurisdiction still contains regulation from #Nazi era, when no #parliamentary #legislator existed.

    HTH!

    🌺