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#microtargeting — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #microtargeting, aggregated by home.social.

  1. DATE: May 15, 2026 at 08:00PM
    SOURCE: PSYPOST.ORG

    ** Research quality varies widely from fantastic to small exploratory studies. Please check research methods when conclusions are very important to you. **
    -------------------------------------------------

    TITLE: Digital voter suppression ads tied to lower election turnout among specific demographic groups

    URL: psypost.org/digital-voter-supp

    Digital advertisements designed to discourage voting were heavily aimed at specific demographic groups during the 2016 United States presidential election. People who saw these undisclosed political advertisements were less likely to cast a ballot compared to those who did not. The research, published in PNAS, presents real-world data connecting personalized social media messaging to offline voting behavior.

    Political campaigns have a history of trying to demobilize selected segments of the population. This practice is known as voter suppression. It involves targeted strategies intended to discourage or prevent opposing demographic groups from casting ballots.

    Historically, voter suppression manifested through physical intimidation or strict localized regulations. In previous eras, tactics included regulatory devices such as poll taxes, stringent identification laws, and deliberately confusing information about polling locations. Today, these targeted efforts have increasingly shifted to the digital sphere. Modern platforms operate on customized feed algorithms that allow messages to reach specific individuals.

    Advertisers use microtargeting to reach these specific audiences online. They rely on vast amounts of data regarding user interests, geographic locations, and demographic backgrounds. Social media companies package this data into consumer categories, which allows political groups to deliver customized messages to very narrow slices of the public.

    Government reports later showed that Russian operatives purchased platform advertisements using historical search terms associated with the African American Civil Rights Movement to find targeted users in 2016. Many of these digital strategies operate in regulatory blind spots. The messages frequently come from undisclosed campaigns that do not file financial reports with traditional tax agencies or federal election regulators. Because these sponsors remain anonymous, misleading election content can spread unchecked across social networks.

    Measuring exactly who saw specific advertisements and tracking whether those people voted is extremely difficult. Most prior studies relied on computer simulations or asked people to self report their voting histories, which can be inaccurate. Young Mie Kim, a media researcher at the University of Wisconsin Madison, recognized this gap in the research.

    She worked with Ross Dahlke, Hyebin Song, and Richard Heinrich to design an observational study measuring direct exposure to anonymous negative election advertisements. The team wanted to know exactly who received these messages. They also sought to evaluate whether the visual exposure was tied to actual turnout at the ballot box.

    To monitor advertising exposure, the researchers asked thousands of volunteers to install a custom digital tracking application. The tracking program functioned similarly to a conventional ad blocker. Instead of blocking the promotional content, the program cataloged each advertisement and its associated data on a secure research server. During the six weeks leading up to the 2016 election, the application recorded every political advertisement displayed on the participants’ social media feeds.

    A major challenge in studying social media influence is accounting for user choices, often called self selection bias. When individuals browse unpaid posts on social networks, they actively select which accounts to follow and interact with. This mechanism makes it difficult to separate preexisting political beliefs from the influence of new information.

    Digital advertisements operate differently because they are delivered solely based on algorithmic targeting rather than user subscriptions. A person encounters a promotional message simply because the sponsor paid to put it in their feed. By analyzing these forced exposures, the researchers could remove self selection from the equation, adding validity to their measurements of electoral influence.

    The researchers also asked the participants to complete a survey about their political leanings and demographic backgrounds. Following the election, the team partnered with external data firms to link these profile surveys and advertisement logs with official localized voting records. This allowed the researchers to confirm whether a person actually voted without having to rely on the individual’s memory.

    Kim and her colleagues reviewed the collected advertisements to identify specific forms of voter suppression messages. They looked for content encouraging election boycotts or promoting third party candidates primarily to split votes. For the central statistical analysis, the team isolated tens of thousands of messages sponsored by anonymous entities.

    The researchers identified common themes utilized by the anonymous sponsors. Campaigns often spread deceptive information about voting mechanics, such as telling users they could vote from home using a text message or social media post. These tactics were built directly upon historic efforts to depress voter turnout, tailored to modern digital consumption habits.

    The research team documented a highly specific pattern of distribution for these advertisements. Non-White voters residing in counties with high populations of racial minorities within battleground states received a disproportionate volume of negative voting messages. The data showed that these specific demographic and geographic groups were intensely targeted compared to white voters living in less competitive electoral regions.

    To estimate the effect on voting behavior, the researchers used a statistical adjustment technique known as entropy balancing. This method creates groups of exposed and unexposed people with closely matching traits. By pairing individuals who shared the exact same age, income, education, and political ideology, the researchers could compare variations in their final voting habits. Since the exposure happened before the election, the timeline ensures the advertisements preceded the voting behavior.

    Across the entire sample population, exposure to voter suppression advertisements was connected to lower voter turnout. On average, the voting rate of people exposed to the advertisements was about two percent lower than those who never saw the messages. Several battleground states in 2016 were decided by margins of less than one percent, meaning even subtle shifts in voter participation could alter final electoral outcomes.

    The researchers noted an even larger drop in turnout among the specific groups tracked most heavily by the targeted algorithms. Non-White voters living in minority population centers within battleground states experienced the largest declines in voting rates after exposure. The targeted subpopulation saw a voting drop of roughly 14 percent compared to counterparts who did not encounter the negative election messages. This indicates that the advertisements had distinct and varied effects depending on the demographic profile of the matched audience.

    To verify their work, the researchers tested the data against multiple control groups. They compared the targeted subjects with voters who interacted with generic political messaging and voters who saw no political advertisements at all. The patterns of suppressed turnout remained consistent across the different groups. The researchers also noted that people exposed to positive political advertising saw slight increases in total turnout, highlighting the unique depressive effect of the suppression messages.

    The study relies entirely on observational data rather than an actively manipulated, randomized experiment. Although the researchers used matching techniques to account for confounding variables like income and political ideology, unknown factors could still theoretically influence the results. A person’s local community environment, for instance, might impact their decision to visit a polling location on election day. Consequently, the team advises caution when making direct causal assumptions about the digital advertisements and individual voting decisions.

    The results are also specific to the political context of the 2016 presidential contest, as the digital advertising landscape and social media moderation policies shift continuously with each election cycle. Future observational research could focus on other election periods to build a more comprehensive understanding of how customized online messaging affects localized voting habits. The study, “Targeted digital voter suppression efforts likely decrease voter turnout,” was authored by Young Mie Kim, Ross Dahlke, Hyebin Song, and Richard Heinrich.

    URL: psypost.org/digital-voter-supp

    -------------------------------------------------

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    -------------------------------------------------

    #psychology #counseling #socialwork #psychotherapy @psychotherapist @psychotherapists @psychology @socialpsych @socialwork @psychiatry #mentalhealth #psychiatry #healthcare #depression #psychotherapist #DigitalVoterSuppression #VoterTurnout #Microtargeting #PoliticalAds #ElectionIntegrity #BattlegroundStates #MinorityVoterImpact #OnlineDisinformation #PoliticalAdvertising #ElectionResearch

  2. DATE: May 15, 2026 at 08:00PM
    SOURCE: PSYPOST.ORG

    ** Research quality varies widely from fantastic to small exploratory studies. Please check research methods when conclusions are very important to you. **
    -------------------------------------------------

    TITLE: Digital voter suppression ads tied to lower election turnout among specific demographic groups

    URL: psypost.org/digital-voter-supp

    Digital advertisements designed to discourage voting were heavily aimed at specific demographic groups during the 2016 United States presidential election. People who saw these undisclosed political advertisements were less likely to cast a ballot compared to those who did not. The research, published in PNAS, presents real-world data connecting personalized social media messaging to offline voting behavior.

    Political campaigns have a history of trying to demobilize selected segments of the population. This practice is known as voter suppression. It involves targeted strategies intended to discourage or prevent opposing demographic groups from casting ballots.

    Historically, voter suppression manifested through physical intimidation or strict localized regulations. In previous eras, tactics included regulatory devices such as poll taxes, stringent identification laws, and deliberately confusing information about polling locations. Today, these targeted efforts have increasingly shifted to the digital sphere. Modern platforms operate on customized feed algorithms that allow messages to reach specific individuals.

    Advertisers use microtargeting to reach these specific audiences online. They rely on vast amounts of data regarding user interests, geographic locations, and demographic backgrounds. Social media companies package this data into consumer categories, which allows political groups to deliver customized messages to very narrow slices of the public.

    Government reports later showed that Russian operatives purchased platform advertisements using historical search terms associated with the African American Civil Rights Movement to find targeted users in 2016. Many of these digital strategies operate in regulatory blind spots. The messages frequently come from undisclosed campaigns that do not file financial reports with traditional tax agencies or federal election regulators. Because these sponsors remain anonymous, misleading election content can spread unchecked across social networks.

    Measuring exactly who saw specific advertisements and tracking whether those people voted is extremely difficult. Most prior studies relied on computer simulations or asked people to self report their voting histories, which can be inaccurate. Young Mie Kim, a media researcher at the University of Wisconsin Madison, recognized this gap in the research.

    She worked with Ross Dahlke, Hyebin Song, and Richard Heinrich to design an observational study measuring direct exposure to anonymous negative election advertisements. The team wanted to know exactly who received these messages. They also sought to evaluate whether the visual exposure was tied to actual turnout at the ballot box.

    To monitor advertising exposure, the researchers asked thousands of volunteers to install a custom digital tracking application. The tracking program functioned similarly to a conventional ad blocker. Instead of blocking the promotional content, the program cataloged each advertisement and its associated data on a secure research server. During the six weeks leading up to the 2016 election, the application recorded every political advertisement displayed on the participants’ social media feeds.

    A major challenge in studying social media influence is accounting for user choices, often called self selection bias. When individuals browse unpaid posts on social networks, they actively select which accounts to follow and interact with. This mechanism makes it difficult to separate preexisting political beliefs from the influence of new information.

    Digital advertisements operate differently because they are delivered solely based on algorithmic targeting rather than user subscriptions. A person encounters a promotional message simply because the sponsor paid to put it in their feed. By analyzing these forced exposures, the researchers could remove self selection from the equation, adding validity to their measurements of electoral influence.

    The researchers also asked the participants to complete a survey about their political leanings and demographic backgrounds. Following the election, the team partnered with external data firms to link these profile surveys and advertisement logs with official localized voting records. This allowed the researchers to confirm whether a person actually voted without having to rely on the individual’s memory.

    Kim and her colleagues reviewed the collected advertisements to identify specific forms of voter suppression messages. They looked for content encouraging election boycotts or promoting third party candidates primarily to split votes. For the central statistical analysis, the team isolated tens of thousands of messages sponsored by anonymous entities.

    The researchers identified common themes utilized by the anonymous sponsors. Campaigns often spread deceptive information about voting mechanics, such as telling users they could vote from home using a text message or social media post. These tactics were built directly upon historic efforts to depress voter turnout, tailored to modern digital consumption habits.

    The research team documented a highly specific pattern of distribution for these advertisements. Non-White voters residing in counties with high populations of racial minorities within battleground states received a disproportionate volume of negative voting messages. The data showed that these specific demographic and geographic groups were intensely targeted compared to white voters living in less competitive electoral regions.

    To estimate the effect on voting behavior, the researchers used a statistical adjustment technique known as entropy balancing. This method creates groups of exposed and unexposed people with closely matching traits. By pairing individuals who shared the exact same age, income, education, and political ideology, the researchers could compare variations in their final voting habits. Since the exposure happened before the election, the timeline ensures the advertisements preceded the voting behavior.

    Across the entire sample population, exposure to voter suppression advertisements was connected to lower voter turnout. On average, the voting rate of people exposed to the advertisements was about two percent lower than those who never saw the messages. Several battleground states in 2016 were decided by margins of less than one percent, meaning even subtle shifts in voter participation could alter final electoral outcomes.

    The researchers noted an even larger drop in turnout among the specific groups tracked most heavily by the targeted algorithms. Non-White voters living in minority population centers within battleground states experienced the largest declines in voting rates after exposure. The targeted subpopulation saw a voting drop of roughly 14 percent compared to counterparts who did not encounter the negative election messages. This indicates that the advertisements had distinct and varied effects depending on the demographic profile of the matched audience.

    To verify their work, the researchers tested the data against multiple control groups. They compared the targeted subjects with voters who interacted with generic political messaging and voters who saw no political advertisements at all. The patterns of suppressed turnout remained consistent across the different groups. The researchers also noted that people exposed to positive political advertising saw slight increases in total turnout, highlighting the unique depressive effect of the suppression messages.

    The study relies entirely on observational data rather than an actively manipulated, randomized experiment. Although the researchers used matching techniques to account for confounding variables like income and political ideology, unknown factors could still theoretically influence the results. A person’s local community environment, for instance, might impact their decision to visit a polling location on election day. Consequently, the team advises caution when making direct causal assumptions about the digital advertisements and individual voting decisions.

    The results are also specific to the political context of the 2016 presidential contest, as the digital advertising landscape and social media moderation policies shift continuously with each election cycle. Future observational research could focus on other election periods to build a more comprehensive understanding of how customized online messaging affects localized voting habits. The study, “Targeted digital voter suppression efforts likely decrease voter turnout,” was authored by Young Mie Kim, Ross Dahlke, Hyebin Song, and Richard Heinrich.

    URL: psypost.org/digital-voter-supp

    -------------------------------------------------

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    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Unofficial Psychology Today Xitter to toot feed at Psych Today Unofficial Bot @PTUnofficialBot

    NYU Information for Practice puts out 400-500 good quality health-related research posts per week but its too much for many people, so that bot is limited to just subscribers. You can read it or subscribe at @PsychResearchBot

    Since 1991 The National Psychologist has focused on keeping practicing psychologists current with news, information and items of interest. Check them out for more free articles, resources, and subscription information: nationalpsychologist.com

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    -------------------------------------------------

    #psychology #counseling #socialwork #psychotherapy @psychotherapist @psychotherapists @psychology @socialpsych @socialwork @psychiatry #mentalhealth #psychiatry #healthcare #depression #psychotherapist #DigitalVoterSuppression #VoterTurnout #Microtargeting #PoliticalAds #ElectionIntegrity #BattlegroundStates #MinorityVoterImpact #OnlineDisinformation #PoliticalAdvertising #ElectionResearch

  3. DATE: May 15, 2026 at 08:00PM
    SOURCE: PSYPOST.ORG

    ** Research quality varies widely from fantastic to small exploratory studies. Please check research methods when conclusions are very important to you. **
    -------------------------------------------------

    TITLE: Digital voter suppression ads tied to lower election turnout among specific demographic groups

    URL: psypost.org/digital-voter-supp

    Digital advertisements designed to discourage voting were heavily aimed at specific demographic groups during the 2016 United States presidential election. People who saw these undisclosed political advertisements were less likely to cast a ballot compared to those who did not. The research, published in PNAS, presents real-world data connecting personalized social media messaging to offline voting behavior.

    Political campaigns have a history of trying to demobilize selected segments of the population. This practice is known as voter suppression. It involves targeted strategies intended to discourage or prevent opposing demographic groups from casting ballots.

    Historically, voter suppression manifested through physical intimidation or strict localized regulations. In previous eras, tactics included regulatory devices such as poll taxes, stringent identification laws, and deliberately confusing information about polling locations. Today, these targeted efforts have increasingly shifted to the digital sphere. Modern platforms operate on customized feed algorithms that allow messages to reach specific individuals.

    Advertisers use microtargeting to reach these specific audiences online. They rely on vast amounts of data regarding user interests, geographic locations, and demographic backgrounds. Social media companies package this data into consumer categories, which allows political groups to deliver customized messages to very narrow slices of the public.

    Government reports later showed that Russian operatives purchased platform advertisements using historical search terms associated with the African American Civil Rights Movement to find targeted users in 2016. Many of these digital strategies operate in regulatory blind spots. The messages frequently come from undisclosed campaigns that do not file financial reports with traditional tax agencies or federal election regulators. Because these sponsors remain anonymous, misleading election content can spread unchecked across social networks.

    Measuring exactly who saw specific advertisements and tracking whether those people voted is extremely difficult. Most prior studies relied on computer simulations or asked people to self report their voting histories, which can be inaccurate. Young Mie Kim, a media researcher at the University of Wisconsin Madison, recognized this gap in the research.

    She worked with Ross Dahlke, Hyebin Song, and Richard Heinrich to design an observational study measuring direct exposure to anonymous negative election advertisements. The team wanted to know exactly who received these messages. They also sought to evaluate whether the visual exposure was tied to actual turnout at the ballot box.

    To monitor advertising exposure, the researchers asked thousands of volunteers to install a custom digital tracking application. The tracking program functioned similarly to a conventional ad blocker. Instead of blocking the promotional content, the program cataloged each advertisement and its associated data on a secure research server. During the six weeks leading up to the 2016 election, the application recorded every political advertisement displayed on the participants’ social media feeds.

    A major challenge in studying social media influence is accounting for user choices, often called self selection bias. When individuals browse unpaid posts on social networks, they actively select which accounts to follow and interact with. This mechanism makes it difficult to separate preexisting political beliefs from the influence of new information.

    Digital advertisements operate differently because they are delivered solely based on algorithmic targeting rather than user subscriptions. A person encounters a promotional message simply because the sponsor paid to put it in their feed. By analyzing these forced exposures, the researchers could remove self selection from the equation, adding validity to their measurements of electoral influence.

    The researchers also asked the participants to complete a survey about their political leanings and demographic backgrounds. Following the election, the team partnered with external data firms to link these profile surveys and advertisement logs with official localized voting records. This allowed the researchers to confirm whether a person actually voted without having to rely on the individual’s memory.

    Kim and her colleagues reviewed the collected advertisements to identify specific forms of voter suppression messages. They looked for content encouraging election boycotts or promoting third party candidates primarily to split votes. For the central statistical analysis, the team isolated tens of thousands of messages sponsored by anonymous entities.

    The researchers identified common themes utilized by the anonymous sponsors. Campaigns often spread deceptive information about voting mechanics, such as telling users they could vote from home using a text message or social media post. These tactics were built directly upon historic efforts to depress voter turnout, tailored to modern digital consumption habits.

    The research team documented a highly specific pattern of distribution for these advertisements. Non-White voters residing in counties with high populations of racial minorities within battleground states received a disproportionate volume of negative voting messages. The data showed that these specific demographic and geographic groups were intensely targeted compared to white voters living in less competitive electoral regions.

    To estimate the effect on voting behavior, the researchers used a statistical adjustment technique known as entropy balancing. This method creates groups of exposed and unexposed people with closely matching traits. By pairing individuals who shared the exact same age, income, education, and political ideology, the researchers could compare variations in their final voting habits. Since the exposure happened before the election, the timeline ensures the advertisements preceded the voting behavior.

    Across the entire sample population, exposure to voter suppression advertisements was connected to lower voter turnout. On average, the voting rate of people exposed to the advertisements was about two percent lower than those who never saw the messages. Several battleground states in 2016 were decided by margins of less than one percent, meaning even subtle shifts in voter participation could alter final electoral outcomes.

    The researchers noted an even larger drop in turnout among the specific groups tracked most heavily by the targeted algorithms. Non-White voters living in minority population centers within battleground states experienced the largest declines in voting rates after exposure. The targeted subpopulation saw a voting drop of roughly 14 percent compared to counterparts who did not encounter the negative election messages. This indicates that the advertisements had distinct and varied effects depending on the demographic profile of the matched audience.

    To verify their work, the researchers tested the data against multiple control groups. They compared the targeted subjects with voters who interacted with generic political messaging and voters who saw no political advertisements at all. The patterns of suppressed turnout remained consistent across the different groups. The researchers also noted that people exposed to positive political advertising saw slight increases in total turnout, highlighting the unique depressive effect of the suppression messages.

    The study relies entirely on observational data rather than an actively manipulated, randomized experiment. Although the researchers used matching techniques to account for confounding variables like income and political ideology, unknown factors could still theoretically influence the results. A person’s local community environment, for instance, might impact their decision to visit a polling location on election day. Consequently, the team advises caution when making direct causal assumptions about the digital advertisements and individual voting decisions.

    The results are also specific to the political context of the 2016 presidential contest, as the digital advertising landscape and social media moderation policies shift continuously with each election cycle. Future observational research could focus on other election periods to build a more comprehensive understanding of how customized online messaging affects localized voting habits. The study, “Targeted digital voter suppression efforts likely decrease voter turnout,” was authored by Young Mie Kim, Ross Dahlke, Hyebin Song, and Richard Heinrich.

    URL: psypost.org/digital-voter-supp

    -------------------------------------------------

    DAILY EMAIL DIGEST: Email [email protected] -- no subject or message needed.

    Private, vetted email list for mental health professionals: clinicians-exchange.org

    Unofficial Psychology Today Xitter to toot feed at Psych Today Unofficial Bot @PTUnofficialBot

    NYU Information for Practice puts out 400-500 good quality health-related research posts per week but its too much for many people, so that bot is limited to just subscribers. You can read it or subscribe at @PsychResearchBot

    Since 1991 The National Psychologist has focused on keeping practicing psychologists current with news, information and items of interest. Check them out for more free articles, resources, and subscription information: nationalpsychologist.com

    EMAIL DAILY DIGEST OF RSS FEEDS -- SUBSCRIBE: subscribe-article-digests.clin

    READ ONLINE: read-the-rss-mega-archive.clin

    It's primitive... but it works... mostly...

    -------------------------------------------------

    #psychology #counseling #socialwork #psychotherapy @psychotherapist @psychotherapists @psychology @socialpsych @socialwork @psychiatry #mentalhealth #psychiatry #healthcare #depression #psychotherapist #DigitalVoterSuppression #VoterTurnout #Microtargeting #PoliticalAds #ElectionIntegrity #BattlegroundStates #MinorityVoterImpact #OnlineDisinformation #PoliticalAdvertising #ElectionResearch

  4. University of Wisconsin-Madison: Research shows social media advertising suppresses voting in targeted communities. “Messages intended to suppress votes can be precisely delivered to particularly vulnerable and consequential groups of people via social media and keep millions of them from casting ballots, according to a new study that is the first to quantify the effect of this kind of […]

    https://rbfirehose.com/2026/02/24/university-of-wisconsin-madison-research-shows-social-media-advertising-suppresses-voting-in-targeted-communities/
  5. @RAlpenstern

    „Unverständnis“ & vor allem „Abscheu“ trifft es gut, da die #Zerblasung gezielt konstruktiven #Dialog durch emotionalen Freund - Feind - #Dualismus ersetzt.

    Angesichts des schon „alten“ #Microtargeting & der gezielten, medialen Befeuerung von Konflikten durch #Putin - Trolle gehe ich jedoch fast davon aus, dass die mehrdimensionale #Spaltung der Gesellschaften hin zu einer fossilen #Zerblasung im #Fossilismus gewollt ist. Vgl.: youtu.be/F1nITBjZUAM

  6. De promotie van geweld tegen vrouwen en sexueel misbruik door #Meta.

    Laatst had ik nog een discussie over het gevaar van het delen van privegegevens op #socialemedia en met #chatbots. Dat #microtargeting een enorme invloed zal hebben op hoe de wereld door de slachtoffers wordt gezien. Bijna zonder uitzondering wordt mij te kennen gegeven dat ik overdrijf, dat er wat met mij aan de hand is, dat ik mij zoveel zorgen maak.
    theguardian.com/technology/202

  7. 🔬| Wie könnte in #Zukunft unsere Wahlentscheidung beeinflusst werden?

    Sicher auch für die Älteren interessant:

    In einem Beitrag für die #YoungSkeptix-Beitrag beschreibt Rowena wie Parteien in Zukunft für jede Person zugeschnittene #Wahlwerbung schnell und einfach durch #KI erstellen lassen können und wie man sich selbst vor dieser #Manipulation schützen kann.

    skeptix.org/2025/09/11/wie-koe

    #AI #Wahlen #NRW #microtargeting #nrwwahl

  8. "Prominent voices worry that generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) will negatively impact elections worldwide and trigger a misinformation apocalypse. A recurrent fear is that GenAI will make it easier to influence voters and facilitate the creation and dissemination of potent mis- and disinformation. We argue that despite the incredible capabilities of GenAI systems, their influence on election outcomes has been overestimated. Looking back at 2024, the predicted outsized effects of GenAI did not happen and were overshadowed by traditional sources of influence. We review current evidence on the impact of GenAI in the 2024 elections and identify several reasons why the impact of GenAI on elections has been overblown. These include the inherent challenges of mass persuasion, the complexity of media effects and people’s interaction with technology, the difficulty of reaching target audiences, and the limited effectiveness of AI-driven microtargeting in political campaigns. Additionally, we argue that the socioeconomic, cultural, and personal factors that shape voting behavior outweigh the influence of AI-generated content. We further analyze the bifurcated discourse on GenAI’s role in elections, framing it as part of the ongoing “cycle of technology panics.” While acknowledging AI’s risks, such as amplifying social inequalities, we argue that focusing on AI distracts from more structural threats to elections and democracy, including voter disenfranchisement and attacks on election integrity. The paper calls for a recalibration of the narratives around AI and elections, proposing a nuanced approach that considers AI within broader sociopolitical contexts."

    knightcolumbia.org/content/don

    #AI #GenerativeAI #Disinformation #Elections #Politics #Misinformation #MassPersuasion #Microtargeting #MediaEffects

  9. Ja Ja, der Datenschutz
    Datenschutz ist der dünne Lack zwischen Profiling Microtargeting und Nudging es ist der minimale Schutz vor Stalking Doxing Identitätsdiebstahl.
    Datenschutz stört, wenn ein Dienst/ App nur einen Collateralnutzen für die User ins Schaufenster stellt, aber im Kern die Interessen von Politik, Staat und Wirtschaft bedienen soll. Das Märchen von der Fortschrittsbremse.

    #fortschrittsbremse #datenschutz #bsi #microtargeting #nudging

  10. New paper:

    ‘Issue ownership in the online campaign for Dutch general elections: A topic modeling approach.’

    By Joren Vrancken, Tom Dobber, and me.

    Journal of Digital Social Research, open access.

    publicera.kb.se/jdsr/article/v

    #politics #law #elections #netherlands #microtargeting #dsa #tech #advertising #meta #Facebook

  11. There is little research on #microtargeting ads so far. Mona Krewel & Jeanelle Frontin researched their impact in U.S. presidential #elections with the Meta Ad Data Set. They show that surprisingly not gender, age or location are used for targeting, but a persons interests instead. #WIConf2025

  12. 2/

    A manipulation technique also known as "microtargeting": "a type of personalised communication that involves collecting information about people, and using that information to show them targeted political advertisements" [3].

    [3] on #microtargeting:
    - "it exploits personal data [...]
    - conceals its true nature [...]
    - allows [...] to make incompatible promises to different segments of the electorate". Potentially targeting #CognitiveBiases by opaque/foreign #misinformation & #disinformation

  13. @OmasgR Weil ihr einen Mastodon-Account bei #Digitalcourage habt, interessiert es euch vielleicht, dass Digitalcourage die Leute, bei denen ihr eure "Petition" untergebracht habt, vor 9 Jahren einen mit einem #BigBrotherAward geächtet hat: bigbrotherawards.de/2016/chang

    Damals waren die #innnit-Leute noch der deutsche Arm von #changeOrg. Inzwischen wird change.org in Deutschland von einem anderen Team gemacht.

    Ich fand die Laudatio für diesen Negativpreis nicht besonders gelungen. Die Preisvergabe war umstritten. Ich halte sie aber immer noch für gerechtfertigt, weil ich damals bei meinen Recherchen darauf stieß, dass change.org damit warb, Daten der Mitzeichnenden schön als Profil aufbereitet an Interessierte zu verkaufen, z.B. für #Microtargeting im britischen Wahlkampf. Nach der Preisvergabe gelobte change.org, damit aufzuhören. Warum sich Innnit später selbständig gemacht hat, ist mir nicht bekannt.

    Belege: archive.fo/diZhm

  14. @OmasgR Weil ihr einen Mastodon-Account bei #Digitalcourage habt, interessiert es euch vielleicht, dass Digitalcourage die Leute, bei denen ihr eure "Petition" untergebracht habt, vor 9 Jahren einen mit einem #BigBrotherAward geächtet hat: bigbrotherawards.de/2016/chang

    Damals waren die #innnit-Leute noch der deutsche Arm von #changeOrg. Inzwischen wird change.org in Deutschland von einem anderen Team gemacht.

    Ich fand die Laudatio für diesen Negativpreis nicht besonders gelungen. Die Preisvergabe war umstritten. Ich halte sie aber immer noch für gerechtfertigt, weil ich damals bei meinen Recherchen darauf stieß, dass change.org damit warb, Daten der Mitzeichnenden schön als Profil aufbereitet an Interessierte zu verkaufen, z.B. für #Microtargeting im britischen Wahlkampf. Nach der Preisvergabe gelobte change.org, damit aufzuhören. Warum sich Innnit später selbständig gemacht hat, ist mir nicht bekannt.

    Belege: archive.fo/diZhm

  15. @zdfmagazin
    Die Linke will Microtargeting verbieten:

    "Um Machtmissbrauch durch digitale Monopole zu verhindern, werden wir rechtliche Spielräume zur Zerschlagung der Monopole ausschöpfen, das Kartellrecht und seine Umsetzung stärken und personalisierte Onlinewerbung verbieten. Die Vorstellung von Daten als verkäuflichem Eigentum lehnen wir ab. Öffentliche und genossenschaftliche Plattformen für gemeinnützige Dienstleistungen und wirklich soziale Netzwerke fördern wir als Alternative zu den profitorientierten Plattformen der Konzerngiganten."

    die-linke.de/bundestagswahl-20

    #microtargeting #werbung #dielinke

  16. Nehmt euch die Zeit und schaut heute Abend @zdfmagazin unter dem Hashtag #Grauburgunderbereich.

    Schaut euch erst die Folge an, dann das Interview mit Dr. Simon Kruschinski zum Thema Microtargeting.
    ... und macht dann vielleicht besser nochmal den Wahl-O-Mat, bevor ihr Sonntag zur Wahl geht.

    #ZMR: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Interview: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Wahl-O-Mat: wahl-o-mat.de/bundestagswahl20

    #zdfmagazinroyal #BTW25 #microtargeting

  17. Nehmt euch die Zeit und schaut heute Abend @zdfmagazin unter dem Hashtag #Grauburgunderbereich.

    Schaut euch erst die Folge an, dann das Interview mit Dr. Simon Kruschinski zum Thema Microtargeting.
    ... und macht dann vielleicht besser nochmal den Wahl-O-Mat, bevor ihr Sonntag zur Wahl geht.

    #ZMR: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Interview: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Wahl-O-Mat: wahl-o-mat.de/bundestagswahl20

    #zdfmagazinroyal #BTW25 #microtargeting

  18. Nehmt euch die Zeit und schaut heute Abend @zdfmagazin unter dem Hashtag #Grauburgunderbereich.

    Schaut euch erst die Folge an, dann das Interview mit Dr. Simon Kruschinski zum Thema Microtargeting.
    ... und macht dann vielleicht besser nochmal den Wahl-O-Mat, bevor ihr Sonntag zur Wahl geht.

    #ZMR: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Interview: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Wahl-O-Mat: wahl-o-mat.de/bundestagswahl20

    #zdfmagazinroyal #BTW25 #microtargeting

  19. Nehmt euch die Zeit und schaut heute Abend @zdfmagazin unter dem Hashtag #Grauburgunderbereich.

    Schaut euch erst die Folge an, dann das Interview mit Dr. Simon Kruschinski zum Thema Microtargeting.
    ... und macht dann vielleicht besser nochmal den Wahl-O-Mat, bevor ihr Sonntag zur Wahl geht.

    #ZMR: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Interview: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Wahl-O-Mat: wahl-o-mat.de/bundestagswahl20

    #zdfmagazinroyal #BTW25 #microtargeting

  20. Nehmt euch die Zeit und schaut heute Abend @zdfmagazin unter dem Hashtag #Grauburgunderbereich.

    Schaut euch erst die Folge an, dann das Interview mit Dr. Simon Kruschinski zum Thema Microtargeting.
    ... und macht dann vielleicht besser nochmal den Wahl-O-Mat, bevor ihr Sonntag zur Wahl geht.

    #ZMR: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Interview: zdf.de/comedy/zdf-magazin-roya

    Wahl-O-Mat: wahl-o-mat.de/bundestagswahl20

    #zdfmagazinroyal #BTW25 #microtargeting

  21. @taschenorakel @dielinke

    Wie soll ich n das praktisch machen?

    Ich kann nicht rumgehen & +80 Millionen Leute (oder weiß ich 40 Mio. Wähler*innen) fragen.

    Alles was ich tun kann ist mein Umfeld zu beobachten.

    Und da sehe ich, dass v.a. konservative #Medien & politisches #MicroTargeting in Messengern 1 Hauptrolle dabei spielen, wie sich die "nicht-bürgerliche" Bevölkerung ihre politische Meinung bildet.

    Und faktisch wissen die noch nicht mal, dass sie "nicht-bürgerlich" sind.

    Is nich leicht.

  22. Komm immer noch nicht really damit klar, dass der #Kanzler der @Bundesregierung , #OlafScholz, #Totalüberwachung, #Microtargeting, die Förderung von #Hass & #Hetze durch #Algorithmen, das Ausblenden von #Kritik, das Aussperren bzw. Unsichtbarmachen von #Kritiker_innen, die Nutzung von #Medienmacht für eigene Zwecke sowie die #Finanzierung von #Extremisten mal so mir nichts, dir nichts als .. legitime "#Meinung" bezeichnet hat.

    Der verarscht uns volle Lotte. Macht ihm anscheinend auch noch Spaß.

  23. Toezichthouder: De Europese Commissie gebruikte illegale #microtargeting rond voorstel chatcontrole en overtrad daarmee de eigen #privacywetgeving

    De Commissie krijgt nu van de Europese toezichthouder een tik op de vingers, waar verder geen sancties aan zijn verbonden.

    Bizar, vindt Danny #Mekic. "Ze hebben iets gedaan wat niet moet kunnen, op basis van de wet waarop de Commissie zelf toezicht moet houden."

    nu.nl/tech/6339014/europese-co

    #Chatcontrole #Johansson

  24. JETZT HÖREN: die spannende neue #DaSou-Folge zum Thema #Microtargeting im politischen #Wahlkampf!

    Unser Interview Gast und #Datenschutzexperte: Meike Kamp, Berliner Datenschutz Beauftragte!

    Zu finden bei Deiner Lieblings-Podcastapp oder ➡️ae2onc.podcaster.de/download/S

  25. AB SOFORT ZUM ANHÖREN BEREIT: die neue Folge #DaSou mit der Berliner Datenschutzbeauftragten Meike Kamp @BlnBDI!

    Wie beeinflusst #Microtargeting den politischen Wahlkampf, unsere freie Meinungsbildung & unsere Demokratie?

    In Deiner Podcast-App oder direkt hier:
    ➡️ae2onc.podcaster.de/download/S

  26. #Wahlwarnung zur #Europawahl - So hat die #AfD im EU-Parlament seit 2019 abgestimmt:
    🤷Verlängerung der freiwilligen #Chatkontrolle
    🤷#AIAct: Ermöglichung flächendeckender biometrischer Massenüberwachung in der Öffentlichkeit per Echtzeit-Gesichtserkennung
    🤷Das EU-Ausland soll künftig direkt auf deine Bestandsdaten, Standortdaten, Verbindungsdaten und Inhaltsdaten zugreifen dürfen (#eEvidence Verordnung)
    ❌Ob EU-Abgeordnete die #Kostenpauschale von 4.700€ monatlich für dienstliche Zwecke verwenden, soll kontrolliert werden
    ❌Durchleuchtung der Internetnutzung für politische Werbebotschaften verbieten (#Microtargeting)
    ✅3,5%-#Sperrklausel für Europawahlen einführen
    ✅Zensur: Internetplattformen sollen #Uploadfilter einsetzen dürfen

    Vertraue keinen Versprechungen, informiere dich über das tatsächliche Abstimmungsverhalten!
    piratomat.de
    digitalomat24.de

    #Transparenz #TatenstattWorte #PiratenWählen

  27. #Wahlwarnung zur #Europawahl - So hat die #AfD im EU-Parlament seit 2019 abgestimmt:
    🤷Verlängerung der freiwilligen #Chatkontrolle
    🤷#AIAct: Ermöglichung flächendeckender biometrischer Massenüberwachung in der Öffentlichkeit per Echtzeit-Gesichtserkennung
    🤷Das EU-Ausland soll künftig direkt auf deine Bestandsdaten, Standortdaten, Verbindungsdaten und Inhaltsdaten zugreifen dürfen (#eEvidence Verordnung)
    ❌Ob EU-Abgeordnete die #Kostenpauschale von 4.700€ monatlich für dienstliche Zwecke verwenden, soll kontrolliert werden
    ❌Durchleuchtung der Internetnutzung für politische Werbebotschaften verbieten (#Microtargeting)
    ✅3,5%-#Sperrklausel für Europawahlen einführen
    ✅Zensur: Internetplattformen sollen #Uploadfilter einsetzen dürfen

    Vertraue keinen Versprechungen, informiere dich über das tatsächliche Abstimmungsverhalten!
    piratomat.de
    digitalomat24.de

    #Transparenz #TatenstattWorte #PiratenWählen

  28. #Wahlwarnung zur #Europawahl - So hat die #AfD im EU-Parlament seit 2019 abgestimmt:
    🤷Verlängerung der freiwilligen #Chatkontrolle
    🤷#AIAct: Ermöglichung flächendeckender biometrischer Massenüberwachung in der Öffentlichkeit per Echtzeit-Gesichtserkennung
    🤷Das EU-Ausland soll künftig direkt auf deine Bestandsdaten, Standortdaten, Verbindungsdaten und Inhaltsdaten zugreifen dürfen (#eEvidence Verordnung)
    ❌Ob EU-Abgeordnete die #Kostenpauschale von 4.700€ monatlich für dienstliche Zwecke verwenden, soll kontrolliert werden
    ❌Durchleuchtung der Internetnutzung für politische Werbebotschaften verbieten (#Microtargeting)
    ✅3,5%-#Sperrklausel für Europawahlen einführen
    ✅Zensur: Internetplattformen sollen #Uploadfilter einsetzen dürfen

    Vertraue keinen Versprechungen, informiere dich über das tatsächliche Abstimmungsverhalten!
    piratomat.de
    digitalomat24.de

    #Transparenz #TatenstattWorte #PiratenWählen

  29. #Wahlwarnung zur #Europawahl - So hat die #AfD im EU-Parlament seit 2019 abgestimmt:
    🤷Verlängerung der freiwilligen #Chatkontrolle
    🤷#AIAct: Ermöglichung flächendeckender biometrischer Massenüberwachung in der Öffentlichkeit per Echtzeit-Gesichtserkennung
    🤷Das EU-Ausland soll künftig direkt auf deine Bestandsdaten, Standortdaten, Verbindungsdaten und Inhaltsdaten zugreifen dürfen (#eEvidence Verordnung)
    ❌Ob EU-Abgeordnete die #Kostenpauschale von 4.700€ monatlich für dienstliche Zwecke verwenden, soll kontrolliert werden
    ❌Durchleuchtung der Internetnutzung für politische Werbebotschaften verbieten (#Microtargeting)
    ✅3,5%-#Sperrklausel für Europawahlen einführen
    ✅Zensur: Internetplattformen sollen #Uploadfilter einsetzen dürfen

    Vertraue keinen Versprechungen, informiere dich über das tatsächliche Abstimmungsverhalten!
    piratomat.de
    digitalomat24.de

    #Transparenz #TatenstattWorte #PiratenWählen

  30. #Wahlwarnung zur #Europawahl - So hat die #AfD im EU-Parlament seit 2019 abgestimmt:
    🤷Verlängerung der freiwilligen #Chatkontrolle
    🤷#AIAct: Ermöglichung flächendeckender biometrischer Massenüberwachung in der Öffentlichkeit per Echtzeit-Gesichtserkennung
    🤷Das EU-Ausland soll künftig direkt auf deine Bestandsdaten, Standortdaten, Verbindungsdaten und Inhaltsdaten zugreifen dürfen (#eEvidence Verordnung)
    ❌Ob EU-Abgeordnete die #Kostenpauschale von 4.700€ monatlich für dienstliche Zwecke verwenden, soll kontrolliert werden
    ❌Durchleuchtung der Internetnutzung für politische Werbebotschaften verbieten (#Microtargeting)
    ✅3,5%-#Sperrklausel für Europawahlen einführen
    ✅Zensur: Internetplattformen sollen #Uploadfilter einsetzen dürfen

    Vertraue keinen Versprechungen, informiere dich über das tatsächliche Abstimmungsverhalten!
    piratomat.de
    digitalomat24.de

    #Transparenz #TatenstattWorte #PiratenWählen

  31. Der digitale Fingerabdruck, den wir im Netz hinterlassen, sagt viel über uns aus. Er ist so wertvoll für die Werbeindustrie, dass sich Datenhandelsunternehmen gebildet haben, deren einzige Funktion es ist, einen möglichst akkuraten Fingerabdruck zu erzeugen. Auch der US-Evangelikalismus hat mittlerweile die üppigen Vorzüge des Microtargetings erkannt und nutzt die App "Bless Every Home", um gezielt Angehörige ethnischer Minderheiten anzusprechen, die als empfänglich für religiöse Botschaften klassifiziert werden.
    Missionierung goes digital: Wie evangelikale Netzwerke Microtargeting nutzen
  32. Der digitale Fingerabdruck, den wir im Netz hinterlassen, sagt viel über uns aus. Er ist so wertvoll für die Werbeindustrie, dass sich Datenhandelsunternehmen gebildet haben, deren einzige Funktion es ist, einen möglichst akkuraten Fingerabdruck zu erzeugen. Auch der US-Evangelikalismus hat mittlerweile die üppigen Vorzüge des Microtargetings erkannt und nutzt die App "Bless Every Home", um gezielt Angehörige ethnischer Minderheiten anzusprechen, die als empfänglich für religiöse Botschaften klassifiziert werden.
    Missionierung goes digital: Wie evangelikale Netzwerke Microtargeting nutzen
  33. Some of the #37c3 talks are just so brilliant, so important, that I'm watching them for the second time. One of them was "The #Xandr File". Scary.

    Wouldn't #Xandr be a really hot candidate for the #BigBrotherAward 2024? See for yourself:

    y.lab.nrw/37c3-xandr

    Hint: There is a cool translation from @c3lingo & #sebalis.

    \___
    #Adtech #TargetedAdvertisement #Microtargeting #data protection #DSGVO #adblocker #surveillancecapitalism

    +++

    @netzpolitik_feed @Digitalcourage @sebmeineck @roofjoke

  34. Some of the #37c3 talks are just so brilliant, so important, that I'm watching them for the second time. One of them was "The #Xandr File". Scary.

    Wouldn't #Xandr be a really hot candidate for the #BigBrotherAward 2024? See for yourself:

    y.lab.nrw/37c3-xandr

    Hint: There is a cool translation from @c3lingo & #sebalis.

    \___
    #Adtech #TargetedAdvertisement #Microtargeting #data protection #DSGVO #adblocker #surveillancecapitalism

    +++

    @netzpolitik_feed @Digitalcourage @sebmeineck @roofjoke

  35. Some of the #37c3 talks are just so brilliant, so important, that I'm watching them for the second time. One of them was "The #Xandr File". Scary.

    Wouldn't #Xandr be a really hot candidate for the #BigBrotherAward 2024? See for yourself:

    y.lab.nrw/37c3-xandr

    Hint: There is a cool translation from @c3lingo & #sebalis.

    \___
    #Adtech #TargetedAdvertisement #Microtargeting #data protection #DSGVO #adblocker #surveillancecapitalism

    +++

    @netzpolitik_feed @Digitalcourage @sebmeineck @roofjoke

  36. Some of the #37c3 talks are just so brilliant, so important, that I'm watching them for the second time. One of them was "The #Xandr File". Scary.

    Wouldn't #Xandr be a really hot candidate for the #BigBrotherAward 2024? See for yourself:

    y.lab.nrw/37c3-xandr

    Hint: There is a cool translation from @c3lingo & #sebalis.

    \___
    #Adtech #TargetedAdvertisement #Microtargeting #data protection #DSGVO #adblocker #surveillancecapitalism

    +++

    @netzpolitik_feed @Digitalcourage @sebmeineck @roofjoke

  37. Some of the #37c3 talks are just so brilliant, so important, that I'm watching them for the second time. One of them was "The #Xandr File". Scary.

    Wouldn't #Xandr be a really hot candidate for the #BigBrotherAward 2024? See for yourself:

    y.lab.nrw/37c3-xandr

    Hint: There is a cool translation from @c3lingo & #sebalis.

    \___
    #Adtech #TargetedAdvertisement #Microtargeting #data protection #DSGVO #adblocker #surveillancecapitalism

    +++

    @netzpolitik_feed @Digitalcourage @sebmeineck @roofjoke

  38. Manche Vorträge des #37c3 sind einfach so genial, so wichtig, daß ich mir sie schon zum zweitenmal anschaue. Einer davon war "Die Akte #Xandr" Gruselig.

    Wäre #Xandr nicht ein echt heißer Kandidat für den #BigBrotherAward 2024? Seht selbst:

    y.lab.nrw/37c3-xandr

    \___
    #Adtech #TargetedAdvertisement #Microtargeting #datenschutz #DSGVO #adblocker #uberwachungskapitalismus

    +++

    @netzpolitik_feed @digitalcourage @sebmeineck @roofjoke