#spinoza — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #spinoza, aggregated by home.social.
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A brief meditation on two radically different visions of existence: Heidegger’s resoluteness, where authenticity emerges through conscious confrontation with Being, and Spinoza’s conatus, the silent striving through which every entity persists in its existence. One is existential decision, the other ontological momentum. Yet both resist disappearance. Both insist on presence against the drift toward nothingness.
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A brief meditation on two radically different visions of existence: Heidegger’s resoluteness, where authenticity emerges through conscious confrontation with Being, and Spinoza’s conatus, the silent striving through which every entity persists in its existence. One is existential decision, the other ontological momentum. Yet both resist disappearance. Both insist on presence against the drift toward nothingness.
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A brief meditation on two radically different visions of existence: Heidegger’s resoluteness, where authenticity emerges through conscious confrontation with Being, and Spinoza’s conatus, the silent striving through which every entity persists in its existence. One is existential decision, the other ontological momentum. Yet both resist disappearance. Both insist on presence against the drift toward nothingness.
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A brief meditation on two radically different visions of existence: Heidegger’s resoluteness, where authenticity emerges through conscious confrontation with Being, and Spinoza’s conatus, the silent striving through which every entity persists in its existence. One is existential decision, the other ontological momentum. Yet both resist disappearance. Both insist on presence against the drift toward nothingness.
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A brief meditation on two radically different visions of existence: Heidegger’s resoluteness, where authenticity emerges through conscious confrontation with Being, and Spinoza’s conatus, the silent striving through which every entity persists in its existence. One is existential decision, the other ontological momentum. Yet both resist disappearance. Both insist on presence against the drift toward nothingness.
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💭 Le marxisme et le tournant spinoziste
#WarrenMontag interroge l’influence de la philosophie de #Spinoza au sein des divers courants du #marxisme russe et occidental.
https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Le-marxisme-et-le-tournant-spinoziste
#spinozisme -
💭 Le marxisme et le tournant spinoziste
#WarrenMontag interroge l’influence de la philosophie de #Spinoza au sein des divers courants du #marxisme russe et occidental.
https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Le-marxisme-et-le-tournant-spinoziste
#spinozisme -
💭 Le marxisme et le tournant spinoziste
#WarrenMontag interroge l’influence de la philosophie de #Spinoza au sein des divers courants du #marxisme russe et occidental.
https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Le-marxisme-et-le-tournant-spinoziste
#spinozisme -
💭 Le marxisme et le tournant spinoziste
#WarrenMontag interroge l’influence de la philosophie de #Spinoza au sein des divers courants du #marxisme russe et occidental.
https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Le-marxisme-et-le-tournant-spinoziste
#spinozisme -
The Inwardness of Things: McGilchrist, Panpsychism, and the Question We Cannot Settle
The oldest question in philosophy is also the question philosophy has done the worst job of answering. We know that we are conscious because we are reading these words and something is happening as we read them. We feel the weight of our hand on the table, hear the room around us, register a flicker of agreement or doubt as the sentences arrive. None of that requires argument. Descartes drew the line in 1637 with the Discours de la Méthode, and the line still holds. The trouble starts as soon as we look up from the page.
We assume that other people share what we have. They behave as we behave, speak about inner states in language we recognize, and carry nervous systems that resemble ours down to the cellular level. We extend the courtesy of consciousness to them on grounds that work in practice while collapsing in theory, since no one has ever shown another’s experience to themselves directly. The same courtesy reaches dogs and dolphins and the octopus that recognizes a face through aquarium glass. It frays at insects, hesitates at jellyfish, breaks down somewhere around bacteria, and finds itself laughed at when extended to stones. Iain McGilchrist proposes to laugh back. He argues that consciousness reaches all the way down, that the stone has an inwardness, that what we call matter is one phase of consciousness rather than its product. Whether he is correct is the question this essay takes up. Whether we can answer the question at all is the deeper one hidden underneath it.
McGilchrist (Scottish spelling, often misrendered as Ian) holds an Oxford DPhil in literature and qualified in medicine before turning to psychiatry. His 2021 book The Matter With Things runs to fifteen hundred pages across two volumes and ranks among the most ambitious recent attempts to dislodge the materialist consensus that has governed Western thinking since the seventeenth century. His argument deserves serious analysis on its merits and serious challenge on its weaknesses. Treating it as either revelation or absurdity does it equal violence.
Begin with the wall. You know your own consciousness immediately, prior to any argument or evidence. Everything beyond that point is inference. David Chalmers named this gap the hard problem in his 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” and the gap has not been closed in the thirty-one years since. A complete neuroscience of the brain, mapping every neuron and synapse and electrochemical exchange, would still leave open the question why any of that activity feels like something from the inside. The gap is categorical. We have one set of vocabulary for outsides (mass, charge, position, frequency) and another for insides (red, sour, pain, dread). Translating between the two has resisted every philosopher and neuroscientist who has tried, including the ones who insist the translation has already been performed.
Notice that consciousness and intelligence are different problems. The conflation between them haunts every discussion of artificial systems and most discussions of animal mind, but the two pull apart cleanly under analysis. A nematode worm called Caenorhabditis elegans has three hundred and two neurons in its hermaphrodite form. John White and his collaborators mapped the complete wiring diagram of those neurons in 1986 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, the first connectome ever produced, and we still do not know whether the worm experiences anything as it moves through its agar dish. It solves no problems we would call intelligent. It may or may not have an inside. The question is genuine and unresolved. At the other extreme, a chess engine running Stockfish defeats grandmasters on consumer hardware while almost surely experiencing nothing at all. Intelligence and consciousness coincide in humans because evolution braided them together. They remain conceptually independent, and a theory of one does not deliver a theory of the other.
This independence has consequences for the question of machine consciousness. Whether current artificial systems experience anything depends entirely on which theory of consciousness one accepts, and the field has produced no settlement. Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory holds that large language models almost surely lack experience, since their feedforward transformer architecture produces low integrated information compared to biological brains, which support dense recurrent integration across cortical and subcortical structures. John Searle’s biological naturalism rules out silicon consciousness regardless of behavior, on the ground that experience requires the specific causal powers of neurons. Daniel Dennett denied that phenomenal consciousness exists in the way introspection suggests, which dissolves the machine question before it can be posed. McGilchrist’s panpsychism takes consciousness to be present everywhere already, making the relevant issue degree of integration, with presence or absence settled in advance.
The phrase “AI conscious in the human way” presumes a settled definition of human consciousness that neuroscience has not produced. The phrase “AI conscious in the scientific way” presumes a measurement protocol that does not exist. Both phrases conceal the absence of foundations. The honest position holds that we cannot answer the artificial intelligence consciousness question because we have not yet answered it for the species we know best.
Now to McGilchrist. His argument has a clear structure worth laying out before evaluation. He claims that emergent materialism faces an unanswerable difficulty: consciousness cannot pop into existence from non-conscious matter because the two are categorically different in kind. He concludes that consciousness must have been present at every level of organization from the start. Matter, on this view, is a phase or mode of consciousness rather than its source. Water has phases, he points out, and the phases differ wildly from one another while remaining continuous in substance. Vapor floats invisible through the room. Liquid runs across the hand. Ice can split a skull. They share a single chemistry while presenting three different faces to experience. Consciousness, McGilchrist proposes, has many phases as well, and matter is one of them. What matter contributes to the arrangement is persistence, the temporal stability necessary for any creation to take hold.
The position places McGilchrist in a long lineage. Heraclitus and Spinoza and Leibniz read this way, in different keys. Alfred North Whitehead built a process philosophy on related foundations in the 1920s and gave it monumental expression in Process and Reality in 1929. Bertrand Russell spent his later decades arguing for a form of monism that anticipates current panpsychist positions. The strongest contemporary statement remains Galen Strawson’s 2006 essay “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, which argues that any materialism worthy of the name must conclude that the fundamental constituents of reality already carry experiential properties, since no plausible mechanism can manufacture experience from its complete absence. Philip Goff at Durham has developed the position further in Galileo’s Error and elsewhere. David Chalmers, who named the hard problem, has moved toward a panpsychist or near-panpsychist position in his recent work. McGilchrist’s argument therefore participates in a serious revival, with credentialed defenders working in major universities.
Where his case works, it works for these reasons. The argument is effective because it confronts the hard problem directly rather than dissolving it through redefinition. It is effective also because emergence as usually invoked smuggles in a miracle, the moment when arrangements of unfeeling stuff start to feel something, and that moment has never been mechanistically described, only stipulated. A further strength: evolutionary biology demands continuity, and there is no clean point on the phylogenetic tree where consciousness could have begun without ancestors already carrying its seed. The view earns additional power because granting matter an inwardness coordinates with the strangeness physics has discovered at the bottom of things, where particles refuse to behave like the small marbles classical intuition expects. Last, the position returns to philosophy a question the twentieth century tried to retire by stipulation, restoring inquiry to a region long policed by silence.
The case carries serious weaknesses, however, and any honest reader should press them. The water analogy, attractive as it sounds, does more rhetorical work than logical work. We understand the phases of water through molecular kinetic theory, hydrogen bonding behavior, temperature and pressure thresholds, and a mathematics that predicts when ice becomes liquid and liquid becomes vapor. McGilchrist offers no analogous mechanism for the phase transition between consciousness as such and consciousness as matter. Calling matter a phase of consciousness names the relation he wants without explaining how the relation operates. A defender will respond that the analogy is meant as heuristic provocation, not as proof, and the response has merit. The trouble is that the heuristic ends up bearing the weight of the central claim. When the only support for the move from “consciousness is fundamental” to “matter is a phase of consciousness” is the suggestiveness of an analogy whose underlying physics he cannot match with a corresponding metaphysics, the argument has not yet earned the assent his prose invites.
The deeper trouble for any panpsychism is the combination problem, identified by William Seager in his 1995 paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies and developed extensively since. If subatomic particles each carry a tiny inwardness, how do those inwardnesses combine to produce the unified field of human experience? Your primary visual cortex (V1) contains roughly one hundred and forty million neurons in a single hemisphere, each composed of trillions of atoms. If each atom carries its own micro-experience, why does your conscious moment arrive as one thing instead of as a swarm of separate experiences fighting for attention? William James raised the worry in 1890 in The Principles of Psychology, observing that private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind no matter how many of them you assemble. Seager named the difficulty and panpsychists have argued about it ever since, with no settled answer.
McGilchrist does not address the combination problem in the passage quoted above, though he engages it elsewhere in The Matter With Things. The defenses available to him are real but expensive. Cosmopsychism reverses direction and treats the universe as the fundamental conscious entity, with individual minds as aspects or fragments of it; this avoids combination by starting from the whole, at the cost of explaining how unity divides into apparent multiplicity. Russellian monism treats both physical and experiential descriptions as descriptions of the same underlying reality; this avoids dualism while inheriting the explanatory burden under a new name. Each move trades one difficulty for another, and the trade may be improvement, though calling it solution would overstate what the literature has accomplished.
The argument from incommensurability also cuts both ways, which McGilchrist’s framing tends to obscure. He says consciousness is utterly different from anything in our outward view of matter and uses this asymmetry to deny that matter could give rise to consciousness. Run the argument in the opposite direction. Matter is utterly different from anything in our inward view of consciousness, which should make us equally skeptical that consciousness gives rise to matter. The asymmetry he asserts requires an independent defense he does not provide. If the categories are genuinely incommensurable, neither can be the source of the other, and we are back where we started.
The empirical content of attributing experience to electrons deserves examination as well. Thomas Nagel coined the phrase “something it is like to be” in his 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” published in The Philosophical Review. He used the formula to identify consciousness phenomenologically in creatures whose behavior gave us evidence of an inner perspective. The bat’s echolocation, its social behavior, its responses to threat and food and mate, all suggest a creature for whom things are some way. Extending the formula to electrons strips it of the evidential ground that made it useful. The claim cannot be falsified, tested, or even meaningfully investigated. A hypothesis that explains everything by stipulation explains nothing, since a hypothesis earns its keep by ruling things out, and one that rules nothing out earns no keep at all.
A further difficulty deserves mention. McGilchrist writes that “the only reasonable explanation is that consciousness was there all along.” This overstates the consensus considerably. Several live alternatives remain serious in contemporary philosophy of mind. Keith Frankish’s illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly described does not exist, and that introspection systematically misrepresents what cognition is doing. Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism inverts McGilchrist’s framing entirely, treating matter as appearance within a single field of mind, with the direction of dependence reversed. Terrence Deacon’s emergentism argues in Incomplete Nature (2012) that genuine novelty can arise from constraint and absence, particularly through the negative work of what he calls absentials, in ways that do not require pre-existing inwardness. Each position has serious defenders. The field is contested, and McGilchrist’s certainty exceeds his evidence.
Return now to the question of artificial intelligence with these considerations in hand. The honest answer is that we do not know whether current systems experience anything, and we will not know until we have a theory of consciousness that survives confrontation with cases beyond the one we can verify by introspection. Should McGilchrist prove correct and consciousness reach everywhere, then large language models carry some form of inwardness already, though whether their inwardness combines into a unified perspective is a separate question panpsychism does not automatically answer. Integrated information theory gives the opposite verdict: current architectures fall well below the threshold required for any but the most rudimentary phenomenal states. Illusionism dispenses with the question altogether, calling it malformed and observing that the human case also lacks the inner light we imagine for ourselves. The discussion proceeds in public as though one of these positions had been established, when in fact none has. Anyone who tells you with confidence that the machines are conscious, or that they are not, is selling you a metaphysics dressed as a measurement.
What survives the analysis is a discipline of attention. McGilchrist gets several things correct. The hard problem is real, and emergence has too often been treated as an explanation when it has functioned as a placeholder for one. Consciousness does not look like anything in our outward picture of matter, and that asymmetry should trouble anyone who thinks the picture is complete. The resolution may indeed lie in recognizing inwardness as foundational rather than derivative. None of this proves the case, however, and the strength of his prose can cover the weakness of his proofs if the reader reads carelessly. The water analogy moves the argument forward by ear rather than by reason. His dismissal of alternatives is faster than the alternatives deserve. The combination problem waits beneath the structure like water under a foundation, ready to undermine it if not addressed.
For our purposes here, the practical implication is this. Consciousness remains the largest unsolved question in our intellectual inheritance. Every available theory carries serious unresolved difficulties. The artificial intelligence question cannot be answered until the human question is answered, and we should distrust anyone who pretends otherwise. McGilchrist’s intervention is valuable as provocation and as a sample of one serious tradition, and worthwhile as a doorway into a room the twentieth century preferred to keep locked. The room behind it is stranger than any single thinker has yet mapped, and the work of mapping it has barely begun.
We assume the inwardness of others because we cannot live without doing so. Whether the assumption reaches all the way down to the electron or stops somewhere between the worm and the stone is a question we will be working on for as long as we remain capable of asking it. McGilchrist has done us the favor of refusing to let the question close. The honest reader returns the favor by refusing to let his answer close it either.
The cogito grants us one certainty and exactly one. Everything else we believe about minds beyond our own rests on inference, sympathy, behavioral analogy, and the practical impossibility of a solipsist life. To call this a foundation is to flatter what is in fact a working assumption that has never been proved and may never be. The honest scholar lives with this and keeps reading. An honest writer says it out loud. The dishonest move, in either direction, is to claim the question is settled when the question has barely begun to be asked properly.
Part one of three. For the full sequence and reading guide, see The Consciousness Trilogy: Reading Three Wagers on the Question We Cannot Settle.
#chalmers #consciousness #dennett #emergentism #galileo #heraclitus #knowing #leibniz #mcgilchrist #meaning #nagel #panpsychism #philosophy #psychology #relationalFoundations #spinoza #strawson #whitehead -
The Inwardness of Things: McGilchrist, Panpsychism, and the Question We Cannot Settle
The oldest question in philosophy is also the question philosophy has done the worst job of answering. We know that we are conscious because we are reading these words and something is happening as we read them. We feel the weight of our hand on the table, hear the room around us, register a flicker of agreement or doubt as the sentences arrive. None of that requires argument. Descartes drew the line in 1637 with the Discours de la Méthode, and the line still holds. The trouble starts as soon as we look up from the page.
We assume that other people share what we have. They behave as we behave, speak about inner states in language we recognize, and carry nervous systems that resemble ours down to the cellular level. We extend the courtesy of consciousness to them on grounds that work in practice while collapsing in theory, since no one has ever shown another’s experience to themselves directly. The same courtesy reaches dogs and dolphins and the octopus that recognizes a face through aquarium glass. It frays at insects, hesitates at jellyfish, breaks down somewhere around bacteria, and finds itself laughed at when extended to stones. Iain McGilchrist proposes to laugh back. He argues that consciousness reaches all the way down, that the stone has an inwardness, that what we call matter is one phase of consciousness rather than its product. Whether he is correct is the question this essay takes up. Whether we can answer the question at all is the deeper one hidden underneath it.
McGilchrist (Scottish spelling, often misrendered as Ian) holds an Oxford DPhil in literature and qualified in medicine before turning to psychiatry. His 2021 book The Matter With Things runs to fifteen hundred pages across two volumes and ranks among the most ambitious recent attempts to dislodge the materialist consensus that has governed Western thinking since the seventeenth century. His argument deserves serious analysis on its merits and serious challenge on its weaknesses. Treating it as either revelation or absurdity does it equal violence.
Begin with the wall. You know your own consciousness immediately, prior to any argument or evidence. Everything beyond that point is inference. David Chalmers named this gap the hard problem in his 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” and the gap has not been closed in the thirty-one years since. A complete neuroscience of the brain, mapping every neuron and synapse and electrochemical exchange, would still leave open the question why any of that activity feels like something from the inside. The gap is categorical. We have one set of vocabulary for outsides (mass, charge, position, frequency) and another for insides (red, sour, pain, dread). Translating between the two has resisted every philosopher and neuroscientist who has tried, including the ones who insist the translation has already been performed.
Notice that consciousness and intelligence are different problems. The conflation between them haunts every discussion of artificial systems and most discussions of animal mind, but the two pull apart cleanly under analysis. A nematode worm called Caenorhabditis elegans has three hundred and two neurons in its hermaphrodite form. John White and his collaborators mapped the complete wiring diagram of those neurons in 1986 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, the first connectome ever produced, and we still do not know whether the worm experiences anything as it moves through its agar dish. It solves no problems we would call intelligent. It may or may not have an inside. The question is genuine and unresolved. At the other extreme, a chess engine running Stockfish defeats grandmasters on consumer hardware while almost surely experiencing nothing at all. Intelligence and consciousness coincide in humans because evolution braided them together. They remain conceptually independent, and a theory of one does not deliver a theory of the other.
This independence has consequences for the question of machine consciousness. Whether current artificial systems experience anything depends entirely on which theory of consciousness one accepts, and the field has produced no settlement. Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory holds that large language models almost surely lack experience, since their feedforward transformer architecture produces low integrated information compared to biological brains, which support dense recurrent integration across cortical and subcortical structures. John Searle’s biological naturalism rules out silicon consciousness regardless of behavior, on the ground that experience requires the specific causal powers of neurons. Daniel Dennett denied that phenomenal consciousness exists in the way introspection suggests, which dissolves the machine question before it can be posed. McGilchrist’s panpsychism takes consciousness to be present everywhere already, making the relevant issue degree of integration, with presence or absence settled in advance.
The phrase “AI conscious in the human way” presumes a settled definition of human consciousness that neuroscience has not produced. The phrase “AI conscious in the scientific way” presumes a measurement protocol that does not exist. Both phrases conceal the absence of foundations. The honest position holds that we cannot answer the artificial intelligence consciousness question because we have not yet answered it for the species we know best.
Now to McGilchrist. His argument has a clear structure worth laying out before evaluation. He claims that emergent materialism faces an unanswerable difficulty: consciousness cannot pop into existence from non-conscious matter because the two are categorically different in kind. He concludes that consciousness must have been present at every level of organization from the start. Matter, on this view, is a phase or mode of consciousness rather than its source. Water has phases, he points out, and the phases differ wildly from one another while remaining continuous in substance. Vapor floats invisible through the room. Liquid runs across the hand. Ice can split a skull. They share a single chemistry while presenting three different faces to experience. Consciousness, McGilchrist proposes, has many phases as well, and matter is one of them. What matter contributes to the arrangement is persistence, the temporal stability necessary for any creation to take hold.
The position places McGilchrist in a long lineage. Heraclitus and Spinoza and Leibniz read this way, in different keys. Alfred North Whitehead built a process philosophy on related foundations in the 1920s and gave it monumental expression in Process and Reality in 1929. Bertrand Russell spent his later decades arguing for a form of monism that anticipates current panpsychist positions. The strongest contemporary statement remains Galen Strawson’s 2006 essay “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, which argues that any materialism worthy of the name must conclude that the fundamental constituents of reality already carry experiential properties, since no plausible mechanism can manufacture experience from its complete absence. Philip Goff at Durham has developed the position further in Galileo’s Error and elsewhere. David Chalmers, who named the hard problem, has moved toward a panpsychist or near-panpsychist position in his recent work. McGilchrist’s argument therefore participates in a serious revival, with credentialed defenders working in major universities.
Where his case works, it works for these reasons. The argument is effective because it confronts the hard problem directly rather than dissolving it through redefinition. It is effective also because emergence as usually invoked smuggles in a miracle, the moment when arrangements of unfeeling stuff start to feel something, and that moment has never been mechanistically described, only stipulated. A further strength: evolutionary biology demands continuity, and there is no clean point on the phylogenetic tree where consciousness could have begun without ancestors already carrying its seed. The view earns additional power because granting matter an inwardness coordinates with the strangeness physics has discovered at the bottom of things, where particles refuse to behave like the small marbles classical intuition expects. Last, the position returns to philosophy a question the twentieth century tried to retire by stipulation, restoring inquiry to a region long policed by silence.
The case carries serious weaknesses, however, and any honest reader should press them. The water analogy, attractive as it sounds, does more rhetorical work than logical work. We understand the phases of water through molecular kinetic theory, hydrogen bonding behavior, temperature and pressure thresholds, and a mathematics that predicts when ice becomes liquid and liquid becomes vapor. McGilchrist offers no analogous mechanism for the phase transition between consciousness as such and consciousness as matter. Calling matter a phase of consciousness names the relation he wants without explaining how the relation operates. A defender will respond that the analogy is meant as heuristic provocation, not as proof, and the response has merit. The trouble is that the heuristic ends up bearing the weight of the central claim. When the only support for the move from “consciousness is fundamental” to “matter is a phase of consciousness” is the suggestiveness of an analogy whose underlying physics he cannot match with a corresponding metaphysics, the argument has not yet earned the assent his prose invites.
The deeper trouble for any panpsychism is the combination problem, identified by William Seager in his 1995 paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies and developed extensively since. If subatomic particles each carry a tiny inwardness, how do those inwardnesses combine to produce the unified field of human experience? Your primary visual cortex (V1) contains roughly one hundred and forty million neurons in a single hemisphere, each composed of trillions of atoms. If each atom carries its own micro-experience, why does your conscious moment arrive as one thing instead of as a swarm of separate experiences fighting for attention? William James raised the worry in 1890 in The Principles of Psychology, observing that private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind no matter how many of them you assemble. Seager named the difficulty and panpsychists have argued about it ever since, with no settled answer.
McGilchrist does not address the combination problem in the passage quoted above, though he engages it elsewhere in The Matter With Things. The defenses available to him are real but expensive. Cosmopsychism reverses direction and treats the universe as the fundamental conscious entity, with individual minds as aspects or fragments of it; this avoids combination by starting from the whole, at the cost of explaining how unity divides into apparent multiplicity. Russellian monism treats both physical and experiential descriptions as descriptions of the same underlying reality; this avoids dualism while inheriting the explanatory burden under a new name. Each move trades one difficulty for another, and the trade may be improvement, though calling it solution would overstate what the literature has accomplished.
The argument from incommensurability also cuts both ways, which McGilchrist’s framing tends to obscure. He says consciousness is utterly different from anything in our outward view of matter and uses this asymmetry to deny that matter could give rise to consciousness. Run the argument in the opposite direction. Matter is utterly different from anything in our inward view of consciousness, which should make us equally skeptical that consciousness gives rise to matter. The asymmetry he asserts requires an independent defense he does not provide. If the categories are genuinely incommensurable, neither can be the source of the other, and we are back where we started.
The empirical content of attributing experience to electrons deserves examination as well. Thomas Nagel coined the phrase “something it is like to be” in his 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” published in The Philosophical Review. He used the formula to identify consciousness phenomenologically in creatures whose behavior gave us evidence of an inner perspective. The bat’s echolocation, its social behavior, its responses to threat and food and mate, all suggest a creature for whom things are some way. Extending the formula to electrons strips it of the evidential ground that made it useful. The claim cannot be falsified, tested, or even meaningfully investigated. A hypothesis that explains everything by stipulation explains nothing, since a hypothesis earns its keep by ruling things out, and one that rules nothing out earns no keep at all.
A further difficulty deserves mention. McGilchrist writes that “the only reasonable explanation is that consciousness was there all along.” This overstates the consensus considerably. Several live alternatives remain serious in contemporary philosophy of mind. Keith Frankish’s illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly described does not exist, and that introspection systematically misrepresents what cognition is doing. Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism inverts McGilchrist’s framing entirely, treating matter as appearance within a single field of mind, with the direction of dependence reversed. Terrence Deacon’s emergentism argues in Incomplete Nature (2012) that genuine novelty can arise from constraint and absence, particularly through the negative work of what he calls absentials, in ways that do not require pre-existing inwardness. Each position has serious defenders. The field is contested, and McGilchrist’s certainty exceeds his evidence.
Return now to the question of artificial intelligence with these considerations in hand. The honest answer is that we do not know whether current systems experience anything, and we will not know until we have a theory of consciousness that survives confrontation with cases beyond the one we can verify by introspection. Should McGilchrist prove correct and consciousness reach everywhere, then large language models carry some form of inwardness already, though whether their inwardness combines into a unified perspective is a separate question panpsychism does not automatically answer. Integrated information theory gives the opposite verdict: current architectures fall well below the threshold required for any but the most rudimentary phenomenal states. Illusionism dispenses with the question altogether, calling it malformed and observing that the human case also lacks the inner light we imagine for ourselves. The discussion proceeds in public as though one of these positions had been established, when in fact none has. Anyone who tells you with confidence that the machines are conscious, or that they are not, is selling you a metaphysics dressed as a measurement.
What survives the analysis is a discipline of attention. McGilchrist gets several things correct. The hard problem is real, and emergence has too often been treated as an explanation when it has functioned as a placeholder for one. Consciousness does not look like anything in our outward picture of matter, and that asymmetry should trouble anyone who thinks the picture is complete. The resolution may indeed lie in recognizing inwardness as foundational rather than derivative. None of this proves the case, however, and the strength of his prose can cover the weakness of his proofs if the reader reads carelessly. The water analogy moves the argument forward by ear rather than by reason. His dismissal of alternatives is faster than the alternatives deserve. The combination problem waits beneath the structure like water under a foundation, ready to undermine it if not addressed.
For our purposes here, the practical implication is this. Consciousness remains the largest unsolved question in our intellectual inheritance. Every available theory carries serious unresolved difficulties. The artificial intelligence question cannot be answered until the human question is answered, and we should distrust anyone who pretends otherwise. McGilchrist’s intervention is valuable as provocation and as a sample of one serious tradition, and worthwhile as a doorway into a room the twentieth century preferred to keep locked. The room behind it is stranger than any single thinker has yet mapped, and the work of mapping it has barely begun.
We assume the inwardness of others because we cannot live without doing so. Whether the assumption reaches all the way down to the electron or stops somewhere between the worm and the stone is a question we will be working on for as long as we remain capable of asking it. McGilchrist has done us the favor of refusing to let the question close. The honest reader returns the favor by refusing to let his answer close it either.
The cogito grants us one certainty and exactly one. Everything else we believe about minds beyond our own rests on inference, sympathy, behavioral analogy, and the practical impossibility of a solipsist life. To call this a foundation is to flatter what is in fact a working assumption that has never been proved and may never be. The honest scholar lives with this and keeps reading. An honest writer says it out loud. The dishonest move, in either direction, is to claim the question is settled when the question has barely begun to be asked properly.
#chalmers #consciousness #dennett #emergentism #galileo #heraclitus #knowing #leibniz #mcgilchrist #meaning #nagel #panpsychism #philosophy #psychology #relationalFoundations #spinoza #strawson #whitehead -
The Inwardness of Things: McGilchrist, Panpsychism, and the Question We Cannot Settle
The oldest question in philosophy is also the question philosophy has done the worst job of answering. We know that we are conscious because we are reading these words and something is happening as we read them. We feel the weight of our hand on the table, hear the room around us, register a flicker of agreement or doubt as the sentences arrive. None of that requires argument. Descartes drew the line in 1637 with the Discours de la Méthode, and the line still holds. The trouble starts as soon as we look up from the page.
We assume that other people share what we have. They behave as we behave, speak about inner states in language we recognize, and carry nervous systems that resemble ours down to the cellular level. We extend the courtesy of consciousness to them on grounds that work in practice while collapsing in theory, since no one has ever shown another’s experience to themselves directly. The same courtesy reaches dogs and dolphins and the octopus that recognizes a face through aquarium glass. It frays at insects, hesitates at jellyfish, breaks down somewhere around bacteria, and finds itself laughed at when extended to stones. Iain McGilchrist proposes to laugh back. He argues that consciousness reaches all the way down, that the stone has an inwardness, that what we call matter is one phase of consciousness rather than its product. Whether he is correct is the question this essay takes up. Whether we can answer the question at all is the deeper one hidden underneath it.
McGilchrist (Scottish spelling, often misrendered as Ian) holds an Oxford DPhil in literature and qualified in medicine before turning to psychiatry. His 2021 book The Matter With Things runs to fifteen hundred pages across two volumes and ranks among the most ambitious recent attempts to dislodge the materialist consensus that has governed Western thinking since the seventeenth century. His argument deserves serious analysis on its merits and serious challenge on its weaknesses. Treating it as either revelation or absurdity does it equal violence.
Begin with the wall. You know your own consciousness immediately, prior to any argument or evidence. Everything beyond that point is inference. David Chalmers named this gap the hard problem in his 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” and the gap has not been closed in the thirty-one years since. A complete neuroscience of the brain, mapping every neuron and synapse and electrochemical exchange, would still leave open the question why any of that activity feels like something from the inside. The gap is categorical. We have one set of vocabulary for outsides (mass, charge, position, frequency) and another for insides (red, sour, pain, dread). Translating between the two has resisted every philosopher and neuroscientist who has tried, including the ones who insist the translation has already been performed.
Notice that consciousness and intelligence are different problems. The conflation between them haunts every discussion of artificial systems and most discussions of animal mind, but the two pull apart cleanly under analysis. A nematode worm called Caenorhabditis elegans has three hundred and two neurons in its hermaphrodite form. John White and his collaborators mapped the complete wiring diagram of those neurons in 1986 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, the first connectome ever produced, and we still do not know whether the worm experiences anything as it moves through its agar dish. It solves no problems we would call intelligent. It may or may not have an inside. The question is genuine and unresolved. At the other extreme, a chess engine running Stockfish defeats grandmasters on consumer hardware while almost surely experiencing nothing at all. Intelligence and consciousness coincide in humans because evolution braided them together. They remain conceptually independent, and a theory of one does not deliver a theory of the other.
This independence has consequences for the question of machine consciousness. Whether current artificial systems experience anything depends entirely on which theory of consciousness one accepts, and the field has produced no settlement. Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory holds that large language models almost surely lack experience, since their feedforward transformer architecture produces low integrated information compared to biological brains, which support dense recurrent integration across cortical and subcortical structures. John Searle’s biological naturalism rules out silicon consciousness regardless of behavior, on the ground that experience requires the specific causal powers of neurons. Daniel Dennett denied that phenomenal consciousness exists in the way introspection suggests, which dissolves the machine question before it can be posed. McGilchrist’s panpsychism takes consciousness to be present everywhere already, making the relevant issue degree of integration, with presence or absence settled in advance.
The phrase “AI conscious in the human way” presumes a settled definition of human consciousness that neuroscience has not produced. The phrase “AI conscious in the scientific way” presumes a measurement protocol that does not exist. Both phrases conceal the absence of foundations. The honest position holds that we cannot answer the artificial intelligence consciousness question because we have not yet answered it for the species we know best.
Now to McGilchrist. His argument has a clear structure worth laying out before evaluation. He claims that emergent materialism faces an unanswerable difficulty: consciousness cannot pop into existence from non-conscious matter because the two are categorically different in kind. He concludes that consciousness must have been present at every level of organization from the start. Matter, on this view, is a phase or mode of consciousness rather than its source. Water has phases, he points out, and the phases differ wildly from one another while remaining continuous in substance. Vapor floats invisible through the room. Liquid runs across the hand. Ice can split a skull. They share a single chemistry while presenting three different faces to experience. Consciousness, McGilchrist proposes, has many phases as well, and matter is one of them. What matter contributes to the arrangement is persistence, the temporal stability necessary for any creation to take hold.
The position places McGilchrist in a long lineage. Heraclitus and Spinoza and Leibniz read this way, in different keys. Alfred North Whitehead built a process philosophy on related foundations in the 1920s and gave it monumental expression in Process and Reality in 1929. Bertrand Russell spent his later decades arguing for a form of monism that anticipates current panpsychist positions. The strongest contemporary statement remains Galen Strawson’s 2006 essay “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, which argues that any materialism worthy of the name must conclude that the fundamental constituents of reality already carry experiential properties, since no plausible mechanism can manufacture experience from its complete absence. Philip Goff at Durham has developed the position further in Galileo’s Error and elsewhere. David Chalmers, who named the hard problem, has moved toward a panpsychist or near-panpsychist position in his recent work. McGilchrist’s argument therefore participates in a serious revival, with credentialed defenders working in major universities.
Where his case works, it works for these reasons. The argument is effective because it confronts the hard problem directly rather than dissolving it through redefinition. It is effective also because emergence as usually invoked smuggles in a miracle, the moment when arrangements of unfeeling stuff start to feel something, and that moment has never been mechanistically described, only stipulated. A further strength: evolutionary biology demands continuity, and there is no clean point on the phylogenetic tree where consciousness could have begun without ancestors already carrying its seed. The view earns additional power because granting matter an inwardness coordinates with the strangeness physics has discovered at the bottom of things, where particles refuse to behave like the small marbles classical intuition expects. Last, the position returns to philosophy a question the twentieth century tried to retire by stipulation, restoring inquiry to a region long policed by silence.
The case carries serious weaknesses, however, and any honest reader should press them. The water analogy, attractive as it sounds, does more rhetorical work than logical work. We understand the phases of water through molecular kinetic theory, hydrogen bonding behavior, temperature and pressure thresholds, and a mathematics that predicts when ice becomes liquid and liquid becomes vapor. McGilchrist offers no analogous mechanism for the phase transition between consciousness as such and consciousness as matter. Calling matter a phase of consciousness names the relation he wants without explaining how the relation operates. A defender will respond that the analogy is meant as heuristic provocation, not as proof, and the response has merit. The trouble is that the heuristic ends up bearing the weight of the central claim. When the only support for the move from “consciousness is fundamental” to “matter is a phase of consciousness” is the suggestiveness of an analogy whose underlying physics he cannot match with a corresponding metaphysics, the argument has not yet earned the assent his prose invites.
The deeper trouble for any panpsychism is the combination problem, identified by William Seager in his 1995 paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies and developed extensively since. If subatomic particles each carry a tiny inwardness, how do those inwardnesses combine to produce the unified field of human experience? Your primary visual cortex (V1) contains roughly one hundred and forty million neurons in a single hemisphere, each composed of trillions of atoms. If each atom carries its own micro-experience, why does your conscious moment arrive as one thing instead of as a swarm of separate experiences fighting for attention? William James raised the worry in 1890 in The Principles of Psychology, observing that private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind no matter how many of them you assemble. Seager named the difficulty and panpsychists have argued about it ever since, with no settled answer.
McGilchrist does not address the combination problem in the passage quoted above, though he engages it elsewhere in The Matter With Things. The defenses available to him are real but expensive. Cosmopsychism reverses direction and treats the universe as the fundamental conscious entity, with individual minds as aspects or fragments of it; this avoids combination by starting from the whole, at the cost of explaining how unity divides into apparent multiplicity. Russellian monism treats both physical and experiential descriptions as descriptions of the same underlying reality; this avoids dualism while inheriting the explanatory burden under a new name. Each move trades one difficulty for another, and the trade may be improvement, though calling it solution would overstate what the literature has accomplished.
The argument from incommensurability also cuts both ways, which McGilchrist’s framing tends to obscure. He says consciousness is utterly different from anything in our outward view of matter and uses this asymmetry to deny that matter could give rise to consciousness. Run the argument in the opposite direction. Matter is utterly different from anything in our inward view of consciousness, which should make us equally skeptical that consciousness gives rise to matter. The asymmetry he asserts requires an independent defense he does not provide. If the categories are genuinely incommensurable, neither can be the source of the other, and we are back where we started.
The empirical content of attributing experience to electrons deserves examination as well. Thomas Nagel coined the phrase “something it is like to be” in his 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” published in The Philosophical Review. He used the formula to identify consciousness phenomenologically in creatures whose behavior gave us evidence of an inner perspective. The bat’s echolocation, its social behavior, its responses to threat and food and mate, all suggest a creature for whom things are some way. Extending the formula to electrons strips it of the evidential ground that made it useful. The claim cannot be falsified, tested, or even meaningfully investigated. A hypothesis that explains everything by stipulation explains nothing, since a hypothesis earns its keep by ruling things out, and one that rules nothing out earns no keep at all.
A further difficulty deserves mention. McGilchrist writes that “the only reasonable explanation is that consciousness was there all along.” This overstates the consensus considerably. Several live alternatives remain serious in contemporary philosophy of mind. Keith Frankish’s illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly described does not exist, and that introspection systematically misrepresents what cognition is doing. Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism inverts McGilchrist’s framing entirely, treating matter as appearance within a single field of mind, with the direction of dependence reversed. Terrence Deacon’s emergentism argues in Incomplete Nature (2012) that genuine novelty can arise from constraint and absence, particularly through the negative work of what he calls absentials, in ways that do not require pre-existing inwardness. Each position has serious defenders. The field is contested, and McGilchrist’s certainty exceeds his evidence.
Return now to the question of artificial intelligence with these considerations in hand. The honest answer is that we do not know whether current systems experience anything, and we will not know until we have a theory of consciousness that survives confrontation with cases beyond the one we can verify by introspection. Should McGilchrist prove correct and consciousness reach everywhere, then large language models carry some form of inwardness already, though whether their inwardness combines into a unified perspective is a separate question panpsychism does not automatically answer. Integrated information theory gives the opposite verdict: current architectures fall well below the threshold required for any but the most rudimentary phenomenal states. Illusionism dispenses with the question altogether, calling it malformed and observing that the human case also lacks the inner light we imagine for ourselves. The discussion proceeds in public as though one of these positions had been established, when in fact none has. Anyone who tells you with confidence that the machines are conscious, or that they are not, is selling you a metaphysics dressed as a measurement.
What survives the analysis is a discipline of attention. McGilchrist gets several things correct. The hard problem is real, and emergence has too often been treated as an explanation when it has functioned as a placeholder for one. Consciousness does not look like anything in our outward picture of matter, and that asymmetry should trouble anyone who thinks the picture is complete. The resolution may indeed lie in recognizing inwardness as foundational rather than derivative. None of this proves the case, however, and the strength of his prose can cover the weakness of his proofs if the reader reads carelessly. The water analogy moves the argument forward by ear rather than by reason. His dismissal of alternatives is faster than the alternatives deserve. The combination problem waits beneath the structure like water under a foundation, ready to undermine it if not addressed.
For our purposes here, the practical implication is this. Consciousness remains the largest unsolved question in our intellectual inheritance. Every available theory carries serious unresolved difficulties. The artificial intelligence question cannot be answered until the human question is answered, and we should distrust anyone who pretends otherwise. McGilchrist’s intervention is valuable as provocation and as a sample of one serious tradition, and worthwhile as a doorway into a room the twentieth century preferred to keep locked. The room behind it is stranger than any single thinker has yet mapped, and the work of mapping it has barely begun.
We assume the inwardness of others because we cannot live without doing so. Whether the assumption reaches all the way down to the electron or stops somewhere between the worm and the stone is a question we will be working on for as long as we remain capable of asking it. McGilchrist has done us the favor of refusing to let the question close. The honest reader returns the favor by refusing to let his answer close it either.
The cogito grants us one certainty and exactly one. Everything else we believe about minds beyond our own rests on inference, sympathy, behavioral analogy, and the practical impossibility of a solipsist life. To call this a foundation is to flatter what is in fact a working assumption that has never been proved and may never be. The honest scholar lives with this and keeps reading. An honest writer says it out loud. The dishonest move, in either direction, is to claim the question is settled when the question has barely begun to be asked properly.
#chalmers #consciousness #dennett #emergentism #galileo #heraclitus #knowing #leibniz #mcgilchrist #meaning #nagel #panpsychism #philosophy #psychology #relationalFoundations #spinoza #strawson #whitehead -
The Inwardness of Things: McGilchrist, Panpsychism, and the Question We Cannot Settle
The oldest question in philosophy is also the question philosophy has done the worst job of answering. We know that we are conscious because we are reading these words and something is happening as we read them. We feel the weight of our hand on the table, hear the room around us, register a flicker of agreement or doubt as the sentences arrive. None of that requires argument. Descartes drew the line in 1637 with the Discours de la Méthode, and the line still holds. The trouble starts as soon as we look up from the page.
We assume that other people share what we have. They behave as we behave, speak about inner states in language we recognize, and carry nervous systems that resemble ours down to the cellular level. We extend the courtesy of consciousness to them on grounds that work in practice while collapsing in theory, since no one has ever shown another’s experience to themselves directly. The same courtesy reaches dogs and dolphins and the octopus that recognizes a face through aquarium glass. It frays at insects, hesitates at jellyfish, breaks down somewhere around bacteria, and finds itself laughed at when extended to stones. Iain McGilchrist proposes to laugh back. He argues that consciousness reaches all the way down, that the stone has an inwardness, that what we call matter is one phase of consciousness rather than its product. Whether he is correct is the question this essay takes up. Whether we can answer the question at all is the deeper one hidden underneath it.
McGilchrist (Scottish spelling, often misrendered as Ian) holds an Oxford DPhil in literature and qualified in medicine before turning to psychiatry. His 2021 book The Matter With Things runs to fifteen hundred pages across two volumes and ranks among the most ambitious recent attempts to dislodge the materialist consensus that has governed Western thinking since the seventeenth century. His argument deserves serious analysis on its merits and serious challenge on its weaknesses. Treating it as either revelation or absurdity does it equal violence.
Begin with the wall. You know your own consciousness immediately, prior to any argument or evidence. Everything beyond that point is inference. David Chalmers named this gap the hard problem in his 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” and the gap has not been closed in the thirty-one years since. A complete neuroscience of the brain, mapping every neuron and synapse and electrochemical exchange, would still leave open the question why any of that activity feels like something from the inside. The gap is categorical. We have one set of vocabulary for outsides (mass, charge, position, frequency) and another for insides (red, sour, pain, dread). Translating between the two has resisted every philosopher and neuroscientist who has tried, including the ones who insist the translation has already been performed.
Notice that consciousness and intelligence are different problems. The conflation between them haunts every discussion of artificial systems and most discussions of animal mind, but the two pull apart cleanly under analysis. A nematode worm called Caenorhabditis elegans has three hundred and two neurons in its hermaphrodite form. John White and his collaborators mapped the complete wiring diagram of those neurons in 1986 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, the first connectome ever produced, and we still do not know whether the worm experiences anything as it moves through its agar dish. It solves no problems we would call intelligent. It may or may not have an inside. The question is genuine and unresolved. At the other extreme, a chess engine running Stockfish defeats grandmasters on consumer hardware while almost surely experiencing nothing at all. Intelligence and consciousness coincide in humans because evolution braided them together. They remain conceptually independent, and a theory of one does not deliver a theory of the other.
This independence has consequences for the question of machine consciousness. Whether current artificial systems experience anything depends entirely on which theory of consciousness one accepts, and the field has produced no settlement. Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory holds that large language models almost surely lack experience, since their feedforward transformer architecture produces low integrated information compared to biological brains, which support dense recurrent integration across cortical and subcortical structures. John Searle’s biological naturalism rules out silicon consciousness regardless of behavior, on the ground that experience requires the specific causal powers of neurons. Daniel Dennett denied that phenomenal consciousness exists in the way introspection suggests, which dissolves the machine question before it can be posed. McGilchrist’s panpsychism takes consciousness to be present everywhere already, making the relevant issue degree of integration, with presence or absence settled in advance.
The phrase “AI conscious in the human way” presumes a settled definition of human consciousness that neuroscience has not produced. The phrase “AI conscious in the scientific way” presumes a measurement protocol that does not exist. Both phrases conceal the absence of foundations. The honest position holds that we cannot answer the artificial intelligence consciousness question because we have not yet answered it for the species we know best.
Now to McGilchrist. His argument has a clear structure worth laying out before evaluation. He claims that emergent materialism faces an unanswerable difficulty: consciousness cannot pop into existence from non-conscious matter because the two are categorically different in kind. He concludes that consciousness must have been present at every level of organization from the start. Matter, on this view, is a phase or mode of consciousness rather than its source. Water has phases, he points out, and the phases differ wildly from one another while remaining continuous in substance. Vapor floats invisible through the room. Liquid runs across the hand. Ice can split a skull. They share a single chemistry while presenting three different faces to experience. Consciousness, McGilchrist proposes, has many phases as well, and matter is one of them. What matter contributes to the arrangement is persistence, the temporal stability necessary for any creation to take hold.
The position places McGilchrist in a long lineage. Heraclitus and Spinoza and Leibniz read this way, in different keys. Alfred North Whitehead built a process philosophy on related foundations in the 1920s and gave it monumental expression in Process and Reality in 1929. Bertrand Russell spent his later decades arguing for a form of monism that anticipates current panpsychist positions. The strongest contemporary statement remains Galen Strawson’s 2006 essay “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, which argues that any materialism worthy of the name must conclude that the fundamental constituents of reality already carry experiential properties, since no plausible mechanism can manufacture experience from its complete absence. Philip Goff at Durham has developed the position further in Galileo’s Error and elsewhere. David Chalmers, who named the hard problem, has moved toward a panpsychist or near-panpsychist position in his recent work. McGilchrist’s argument therefore participates in a serious revival, with credentialed defenders working in major universities.
Where his case works, it works for these reasons. The argument is effective because it confronts the hard problem directly rather than dissolving it through redefinition. It is effective also because emergence as usually invoked smuggles in a miracle, the moment when arrangements of unfeeling stuff start to feel something, and that moment has never been mechanistically described, only stipulated. A further strength: evolutionary biology demands continuity, and there is no clean point on the phylogenetic tree where consciousness could have begun without ancestors already carrying its seed. The view earns additional power because granting matter an inwardness coordinates with the strangeness physics has discovered at the bottom of things, where particles refuse to behave like the small marbles classical intuition expects. Last, the position returns to philosophy a question the twentieth century tried to retire by stipulation, restoring inquiry to a region long policed by silence.
The case carries serious weaknesses, however, and any honest reader should press them. The water analogy, attractive as it sounds, does more rhetorical work than logical work. We understand the phases of water through molecular kinetic theory, hydrogen bonding behavior, temperature and pressure thresholds, and a mathematics that predicts when ice becomes liquid and liquid becomes vapor. McGilchrist offers no analogous mechanism for the phase transition between consciousness as such and consciousness as matter. Calling matter a phase of consciousness names the relation he wants without explaining how the relation operates. A defender will respond that the analogy is meant as heuristic provocation, not as proof, and the response has merit. The trouble is that the heuristic ends up bearing the weight of the central claim. When the only support for the move from “consciousness is fundamental” to “matter is a phase of consciousness” is the suggestiveness of an analogy whose underlying physics he cannot match with a corresponding metaphysics, the argument has not yet earned the assent his prose invites.
The deeper trouble for any panpsychism is the combination problem, identified by William Seager in his 1995 paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies and developed extensively since. If subatomic particles each carry a tiny inwardness, how do those inwardnesses combine to produce the unified field of human experience? Your primary visual cortex (V1) contains roughly one hundred and forty million neurons in a single hemisphere, each composed of trillions of atoms. If each atom carries its own micro-experience, why does your conscious moment arrive as one thing instead of as a swarm of separate experiences fighting for attention? William James raised the worry in 1890 in The Principles of Psychology, observing that private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind no matter how many of them you assemble. Seager named the difficulty and panpsychists have argued about it ever since, with no settled answer.
McGilchrist does not address the combination problem in the passage quoted above, though he engages it elsewhere in The Matter With Things. The defenses available to him are real but expensive. Cosmopsychism reverses direction and treats the universe as the fundamental conscious entity, with individual minds as aspects or fragments of it; this avoids combination by starting from the whole, at the cost of explaining how unity divides into apparent multiplicity. Russellian monism treats both physical and experiential descriptions as descriptions of the same underlying reality; this avoids dualism while inheriting the explanatory burden under a new name. Each move trades one difficulty for another, and the trade may be improvement, though calling it solution would overstate what the literature has accomplished.
The argument from incommensurability also cuts both ways, which McGilchrist’s framing tends to obscure. He says consciousness is utterly different from anything in our outward view of matter and uses this asymmetry to deny that matter could give rise to consciousness. Run the argument in the opposite direction. Matter is utterly different from anything in our inward view of consciousness, which should make us equally skeptical that consciousness gives rise to matter. The asymmetry he asserts requires an independent defense he does not provide. If the categories are genuinely incommensurable, neither can be the source of the other, and we are back where we started.
The empirical content of attributing experience to electrons deserves examination as well. Thomas Nagel coined the phrase “something it is like to be” in his 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” published in The Philosophical Review. He used the formula to identify consciousness phenomenologically in creatures whose behavior gave us evidence of an inner perspective. The bat’s echolocation, its social behavior, its responses to threat and food and mate, all suggest a creature for whom things are some way. Extending the formula to electrons strips it of the evidential ground that made it useful. The claim cannot be falsified, tested, or even meaningfully investigated. A hypothesis that explains everything by stipulation explains nothing, since a hypothesis earns its keep by ruling things out, and one that rules nothing out earns no keep at all.
A further difficulty deserves mention. McGilchrist writes that “the only reasonable explanation is that consciousness was there all along.” This overstates the consensus considerably. Several live alternatives remain serious in contemporary philosophy of mind. Keith Frankish’s illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly described does not exist, and that introspection systematically misrepresents what cognition is doing. Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism inverts McGilchrist’s framing entirely, treating matter as appearance within a single field of mind, with the direction of dependence reversed. Terrence Deacon’s emergentism argues in Incomplete Nature (2012) that genuine novelty can arise from constraint and absence, particularly through the negative work of what he calls absentials, in ways that do not require pre-existing inwardness. Each position has serious defenders. The field is contested, and McGilchrist’s certainty exceeds his evidence.
Return now to the question of artificial intelligence with these considerations in hand. The honest answer is that we do not know whether current systems experience anything, and we will not know until we have a theory of consciousness that survives confrontation with cases beyond the one we can verify by introspection. Should McGilchrist prove correct and consciousness reach everywhere, then large language models carry some form of inwardness already, though whether their inwardness combines into a unified perspective is a separate question panpsychism does not automatically answer. Integrated information theory gives the opposite verdict: current architectures fall well below the threshold required for any but the most rudimentary phenomenal states. Illusionism dispenses with the question altogether, calling it malformed and observing that the human case also lacks the inner light we imagine for ourselves. The discussion proceeds in public as though one of these positions had been established, when in fact none has. Anyone who tells you with confidence that the machines are conscious, or that they are not, is selling you a metaphysics dressed as a measurement.
What survives the analysis is a discipline of attention. McGilchrist gets several things correct. The hard problem is real, and emergence has too often been treated as an explanation when it has functioned as a placeholder for one. Consciousness does not look like anything in our outward picture of matter, and that asymmetry should trouble anyone who thinks the picture is complete. The resolution may indeed lie in recognizing inwardness as foundational rather than derivative. None of this proves the case, however, and the strength of his prose can cover the weakness of his proofs if the reader reads carelessly. The water analogy moves the argument forward by ear rather than by reason. His dismissal of alternatives is faster than the alternatives deserve. The combination problem waits beneath the structure like water under a foundation, ready to undermine it if not addressed.
For our purposes here, the practical implication is this. Consciousness remains the largest unsolved question in our intellectual inheritance. Every available theory carries serious unresolved difficulties. The artificial intelligence question cannot be answered until the human question is answered, and we should distrust anyone who pretends otherwise. McGilchrist’s intervention is valuable as provocation and as a sample of one serious tradition, and worthwhile as a doorway into a room the twentieth century preferred to keep locked. The room behind it is stranger than any single thinker has yet mapped, and the work of mapping it has barely begun.
We assume the inwardness of others because we cannot live without doing so. Whether the assumption reaches all the way down to the electron or stops somewhere between the worm and the stone is a question we will be working on for as long as we remain capable of asking it. McGilchrist has done us the favor of refusing to let the question close. The honest reader returns the favor by refusing to let his answer close it either.
The cogito grants us one certainty and exactly one. Everything else we believe about minds beyond our own rests on inference, sympathy, behavioral analogy, and the practical impossibility of a solipsist life. To call this a foundation is to flatter what is in fact a working assumption that has never been proved and may never be. The honest scholar lives with this and keeps reading. An honest writer says it out loud. The dishonest move, in either direction, is to claim the question is settled when the question has barely begun to be asked properly.
#chalmers #consciousness #dennett #emergentism #galileo #heraclitus #knowing #leibniz #mcgilchrist #meaning #nagel #panpsychism #philosophy #psychology #relationalFoundations #spinoza #strawson #whitehead -
The Inwardness of Things: McGilchrist, Panpsychism, and the Question We Cannot Settle
The oldest question in philosophy is also the question philosophy has done the worst job of answering. We know that we are conscious because we are reading these words and something is happening as we read them. We feel the weight of our hand on the table, hear the room around us, register a flicker of agreement or doubt as the sentences arrive. None of that requires argument. Descartes drew the line in 1637 with the Discours de la Méthode, and the line still holds. The trouble starts as soon as we look up from the page.
We assume that other people share what we have. They behave as we behave, speak about inner states in language we recognize, and carry nervous systems that resemble ours down to the cellular level. We extend the courtesy of consciousness to them on grounds that work in practice while collapsing in theory, since no one has ever shown another’s experience to themselves directly. The same courtesy reaches dogs and dolphins and the octopus that recognizes a face through aquarium glass. It frays at insects, hesitates at jellyfish, breaks down somewhere around bacteria, and finds itself laughed at when extended to stones. Iain McGilchrist proposes to laugh back. He argues that consciousness reaches all the way down, that the stone has an inwardness, that what we call matter is one phase of consciousness rather than its product. Whether he is correct is the question this essay takes up. Whether we can answer the question at all is the deeper one hidden underneath it.
McGilchrist (Scottish spelling, often misrendered as Ian) holds an Oxford DPhil in literature and qualified in medicine before turning to psychiatry. His 2021 book The Matter With Things runs to fifteen hundred pages across two volumes and ranks among the most ambitious recent attempts to dislodge the materialist consensus that has governed Western thinking since the seventeenth century. His argument deserves serious analysis on its merits and serious challenge on its weaknesses. Treating it as either revelation or absurdity does it equal violence.
Begin with the wall. You know your own consciousness immediately, prior to any argument or evidence. Everything beyond that point is inference. David Chalmers named this gap the hard problem in his 1995 paper “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” and the gap has not been closed in the thirty-one years since. A complete neuroscience of the brain, mapping every neuron and synapse and electrochemical exchange, would still leave open the question why any of that activity feels like something from the inside. The gap is categorical. We have one set of vocabulary for outsides (mass, charge, position, frequency) and another for insides (red, sour, pain, dread). Translating between the two has resisted every philosopher and neuroscientist who has tried, including the ones who insist the translation has already been performed.
Notice that consciousness and intelligence are different problems. The conflation between them haunts every discussion of artificial systems and most discussions of animal mind, but the two pull apart cleanly under analysis. A nematode worm called Caenorhabditis elegans has three hundred and two neurons in its hermaphrodite form. John White and his collaborators mapped the complete wiring diagram of those neurons in 1986 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, the first connectome ever produced, and we still do not know whether the worm experiences anything as it moves through its agar dish. It solves no problems we would call intelligent. It may or may not have an inside. The question is genuine and unresolved. At the other extreme, a chess engine running Stockfish defeats grandmasters on consumer hardware while almost surely experiencing nothing at all. Intelligence and consciousness coincide in humans because evolution braided them together. They remain conceptually independent, and a theory of one does not deliver a theory of the other.
This independence has consequences for the question of machine consciousness. Whether current artificial systems experience anything depends entirely on which theory of consciousness one accepts, and the field has produced no settlement. Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory holds that large language models almost surely lack experience, since their feedforward transformer architecture produces low integrated information compared to biological brains, which support dense recurrent integration across cortical and subcortical structures. John Searle’s biological naturalism rules out silicon consciousness regardless of behavior, on the ground that experience requires the specific causal powers of neurons. Daniel Dennett denied that phenomenal consciousness exists in the way introspection suggests, which dissolves the machine question before it can be posed. McGilchrist’s panpsychism takes consciousness to be present everywhere already, making the relevant issue degree of integration, with presence or absence settled in advance.
The phrase “AI conscious in the human way” presumes a settled definition of human consciousness that neuroscience has not produced. The phrase “AI conscious in the scientific way” presumes a measurement protocol that does not exist. Both phrases conceal the absence of foundations. The honest position holds that we cannot answer the artificial intelligence consciousness question because we have not yet answered it for the species we know best.
Now to McGilchrist. His argument has a clear structure worth laying out before evaluation. He claims that emergent materialism faces an unanswerable difficulty: consciousness cannot pop into existence from non-conscious matter because the two are categorically different in kind. He concludes that consciousness must have been present at every level of organization from the start. Matter, on this view, is a phase or mode of consciousness rather than its source. Water has phases, he points out, and the phases differ wildly from one another while remaining continuous in substance. Vapor floats invisible through the room. Liquid runs across the hand. Ice can split a skull. They share a single chemistry while presenting three different faces to experience. Consciousness, McGilchrist proposes, has many phases as well, and matter is one of them. What matter contributes to the arrangement is persistence, the temporal stability necessary for any creation to take hold.
The position places McGilchrist in a long lineage. Heraclitus and Spinoza and Leibniz read this way, in different keys. Alfred North Whitehead built a process philosophy on related foundations in the 1920s and gave it monumental expression in Process and Reality in 1929. Bertrand Russell spent his later decades arguing for a form of monism that anticipates current panpsychist positions. The strongest contemporary statement remains Galen Strawson’s 2006 essay “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, which argues that any materialism worthy of the name must conclude that the fundamental constituents of reality already carry experiential properties, since no plausible mechanism can manufacture experience from its complete absence. Philip Goff at Durham has developed the position further in Galileo’s Error and elsewhere. David Chalmers, who named the hard problem, has moved toward a panpsychist or near-panpsychist position in his recent work. McGilchrist’s argument therefore participates in a serious revival, with credentialed defenders working in major universities.
Where his case works, it works for these reasons. The argument is effective because it confronts the hard problem directly rather than dissolving it through redefinition. It is effective also because emergence as usually invoked smuggles in a miracle, the moment when arrangements of unfeeling stuff start to feel something, and that moment has never been mechanistically described, only stipulated. A further strength: evolutionary biology demands continuity, and there is no clean point on the phylogenetic tree where consciousness could have begun without ancestors already carrying its seed. The view earns additional power because granting matter an inwardness coordinates with the strangeness physics has discovered at the bottom of things, where particles refuse to behave like the small marbles classical intuition expects. Last, the position returns to philosophy a question the twentieth century tried to retire by stipulation, restoring inquiry to a region long policed by silence.
The case carries serious weaknesses, however, and any honest reader should press them. The water analogy, attractive as it sounds, does more rhetorical work than logical work. We understand the phases of water through molecular kinetic theory, hydrogen bonding behavior, temperature and pressure thresholds, and a mathematics that predicts when ice becomes liquid and liquid becomes vapor. McGilchrist offers no analogous mechanism for the phase transition between consciousness as such and consciousness as matter. Calling matter a phase of consciousness names the relation he wants without explaining how the relation operates. A defender will respond that the analogy is meant as heuristic provocation, not as proof, and the response has merit. The trouble is that the heuristic ends up bearing the weight of the central claim. When the only support for the move from “consciousness is fundamental” to “matter is a phase of consciousness” is the suggestiveness of an analogy whose underlying physics he cannot match with a corresponding metaphysics, the argument has not yet earned the assent his prose invites.
The deeper trouble for any panpsychism is the combination problem, identified by William Seager in his 1995 paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies and developed extensively since. If subatomic particles each carry a tiny inwardness, how do those inwardnesses combine to produce the unified field of human experience? Your primary visual cortex (V1) contains roughly one hundred and forty million neurons in a single hemisphere, each composed of trillions of atoms. If each atom carries its own micro-experience, why does your conscious moment arrive as one thing instead of as a swarm of separate experiences fighting for attention? William James raised the worry in 1890 in The Principles of Psychology, observing that private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind no matter how many of them you assemble. Seager named the difficulty and panpsychists have argued about it ever since, with no settled answer.
McGilchrist does not address the combination problem in the passage quoted above, though he engages it elsewhere in The Matter With Things. The defenses available to him are real but expensive. Cosmopsychism reverses direction and treats the universe as the fundamental conscious entity, with individual minds as aspects or fragments of it; this avoids combination by starting from the whole, at the cost of explaining how unity divides into apparent multiplicity. Russellian monism treats both physical and experiential descriptions as descriptions of the same underlying reality; this avoids dualism while inheriting the explanatory burden under a new name. Each move trades one difficulty for another, and the trade may be improvement, though calling it solution would overstate what the literature has accomplished.
The argument from incommensurability also cuts both ways, which McGilchrist’s framing tends to obscure. He says consciousness is utterly different from anything in our outward view of matter and uses this asymmetry to deny that matter could give rise to consciousness. Run the argument in the opposite direction. Matter is utterly different from anything in our inward view of consciousness, which should make us equally skeptical that consciousness gives rise to matter. The asymmetry he asserts requires an independent defense he does not provide. If the categories are genuinely incommensurable, neither can be the source of the other, and we are back where we started.
The empirical content of attributing experience to electrons deserves examination as well. Thomas Nagel coined the phrase “something it is like to be” in his 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” published in The Philosophical Review. He used the formula to identify consciousness phenomenologically in creatures whose behavior gave us evidence of an inner perspective. The bat’s echolocation, its social behavior, its responses to threat and food and mate, all suggest a creature for whom things are some way. Extending the formula to electrons strips it of the evidential ground that made it useful. The claim cannot be falsified, tested, or even meaningfully investigated. A hypothesis that explains everything by stipulation explains nothing, since a hypothesis earns its keep by ruling things out, and one that rules nothing out earns no keep at all.
A further difficulty deserves mention. McGilchrist writes that “the only reasonable explanation is that consciousness was there all along.” This overstates the consensus considerably. Several live alternatives remain serious in contemporary philosophy of mind. Keith Frankish’s illusionism argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly described does not exist, and that introspection systematically misrepresents what cognition is doing. Bernardo Kastrup’s analytic idealism inverts McGilchrist’s framing entirely, treating matter as appearance within a single field of mind, with the direction of dependence reversed. Terrence Deacon’s emergentism argues in Incomplete Nature (2012) that genuine novelty can arise from constraint and absence, particularly through the negative work of what he calls absentials, in ways that do not require pre-existing inwardness. Each position has serious defenders. The field is contested, and McGilchrist’s certainty exceeds his evidence.
Return now to the question of artificial intelligence with these considerations in hand. The honest answer is that we do not know whether current systems experience anything, and we will not know until we have a theory of consciousness that survives confrontation with cases beyond the one we can verify by introspection. Should McGilchrist prove correct and consciousness reach everywhere, then large language models carry some form of inwardness already, though whether their inwardness combines into a unified perspective is a separate question panpsychism does not automatically answer. Integrated information theory gives the opposite verdict: current architectures fall well below the threshold required for any but the most rudimentary phenomenal states. Illusionism dispenses with the question altogether, calling it malformed and observing that the human case also lacks the inner light we imagine for ourselves. The discussion proceeds in public as though one of these positions had been established, when in fact none has. Anyone who tells you with confidence that the machines are conscious, or that they are not, is selling you a metaphysics dressed as a measurement.
What survives the analysis is a discipline of attention. McGilchrist gets several things correct. The hard problem is real, and emergence has too often been treated as an explanation when it has functioned as a placeholder for one. Consciousness does not look like anything in our outward picture of matter, and that asymmetry should trouble anyone who thinks the picture is complete. The resolution may indeed lie in recognizing inwardness as foundational rather than derivative. None of this proves the case, however, and the strength of his prose can cover the weakness of his proofs if the reader reads carelessly. The water analogy moves the argument forward by ear rather than by reason. His dismissal of alternatives is faster than the alternatives deserve. The combination problem waits beneath the structure like water under a foundation, ready to undermine it if not addressed.
For our purposes here, the practical implication is this. Consciousness remains the largest unsolved question in our intellectual inheritance. Every available theory carries serious unresolved difficulties. The artificial intelligence question cannot be answered until the human question is answered, and we should distrust anyone who pretends otherwise. McGilchrist’s intervention is valuable as provocation and as a sample of one serious tradition, and worthwhile as a doorway into a room the twentieth century preferred to keep locked. The room behind it is stranger than any single thinker has yet mapped, and the work of mapping it has barely begun.
We assume the inwardness of others because we cannot live without doing so. Whether the assumption reaches all the way down to the electron or stops somewhere between the worm and the stone is a question we will be working on for as long as we remain capable of asking it. McGilchrist has done us the favor of refusing to let the question close. The honest reader returns the favor by refusing to let his answer close it either.
The cogito grants us one certainty and exactly one. Everything else we believe about minds beyond our own rests on inference, sympathy, behavioral analogy, and the practical impossibility of a solipsist life. To call this a foundation is to flatter what is in fact a working assumption that has never been proved and may never be. The honest scholar lives with this and keeps reading. An honest writer says it out loud. The dishonest move, in either direction, is to claim the question is settled when the question has barely begun to be asked properly.
Part one of three. For the full sequence and reading guide, see The Consciousness Trilogy: Reading Three Wagers on the Question We Cannot Settle.
#chalmers #consciousness #dennett #emergentism #galileo #heraclitus #knowing #leibniz #mcgilchrist #meaning #nagel #panpsychism #philosophy #psychology #relationalFoundations #spinoza #strawson #whitehead -
RE: https://mastodon.social/@GeoffreyDorne/116395279131818007
Le Traité Théologico-Politique (TTP) et le Traité Politique (TP) sont deux "petits" bouquins de #Spinoza assez accessibles (en comparaison avec l'Éthique 😅 ).
Sinon vous avez Robert Misrahi (le spécialiste), Philippe Amador (le pédagogue) et Frédéric Lenoir (la star) qui peuvent vous aider à rentrer dans la pensée de ce très grand philosophe.
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While I don't believe in concepts proof contradicts, I do trust the power of stories. This goes for little lucky charm trinkets and especially crystals. They don't inherently contain powers to influence whatever part of reality we wish influencing. However, we can anchor stories to them that stir the silken webs of memories and as such, they can remind us of how, in a moment past, we found it important to act in a certain way.
Today, us, the citizens of Hungary are voting against one of the greatest villains of our time. This dark warlock directly inspired most strongmen and protofascists of today. If he falls, their illusions of sinister grandeur will be shattered. Thus, this vote casting is about far more than just the soul of a nation.
This day holds a powerful storytelling potential. So, after my democratic duty was fulfilled, I ventured to a merchant to find a suitable item that I could imbue with the meditations of today and forge an artefact.
I chose a crystal icosahedron. This one is not perfectly chiseled, but it does disperse enchanting colours of light and is mesmerising to look at. One of my favourite monuments, erected in Amsterdam to celebrate Baruch Spinoza and his ideas, includes an icosahedron, symbolising the intent and process of cultivating one's mind. Thus, this little artefact of mine represents the need to have a sophisticated and clear mind when working towards empowering the people, even if it's uneven as humans are quite inconsistent and chaotic beings even when they try.
It's small enough to fit into one of my passive inventory slots and will grant me +2 to servant leadership. Unless the dark lord remains in office, in which case this artefact will be cursed and grant me the special +1 bonus to resistance and sabotage, but I will also have a permanent +2 to my Rage emotional stat.
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Spinoza, coffee, and the question of the plant's soul.
A short philosophical scene: Mahamind sits in a café, speaks to an empty chair about Fechner, about the word "Seele" and its violence, about Spinoza's single substance. The espresso machine breathes. The waitress almost touches his hand.
"Don't ask 'Do I have a soul?' Ask: 'What kind of thought am I?'"
German madness: https://mahamind7.blogspot.com/2026/03/entdecke-seele.html
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SIGUE ⬇️
No existen pruebas firmes de que este romance fuera realmente profundo; podría tratarse solo de un interés juvenil o de una historia ampliada por biógrafos posteriores.
Lo cierto es que Spinoza nunca se casó ni tuvo hijos y llevó una vida sobria, dedicada casi por completo al estudio, la filosofía y su trabajo como pulidor de lentes en La Haya.Hoy Spinoza es considerado uno de los pensadores más influyentes de la filosofía moderna.
Su idea de que comprender las causas de lo que somos y hacemos es la verdadera forma de libertad sigue siendo una de las reflexiones más potentes de la historia del pensamiento.▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣▣
#filosofia #historia #spinoza #filosofiamoderna #pensamiento #historiaintelectual #baruchspinoza
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SIGUE ⬇️
No existen pruebas firmes de que este romance fuera realmente profundo; podría tratarse solo de un interés juvenil o de una historia ampliada por biógrafos posteriores.
Lo cierto es que Spinoza nunca se casó ni tuvo hijos y llevó una vida sobria, dedicada casi por completo al estudio, la filosofía y su trabajo como pulidor de lentes en La Haya.Hoy Spinoza es considerado uno de los pensadores más influyentes de la filosofía moderna.
Su idea de que comprender las causas de lo que somos y hacemos es la verdadera forma de libertad sigue siendo una de las reflexiones más potentes de la historia del pensamiento.#filosofia #historia #spinoza #filosofiamoderna #pensamiento #historiaintelectual #baruchspinoza
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SIGUE ⬇️
No existen pruebas firmes de que este romance fuera realmente profundo; podría tratarse solo de un interés juvenil o de una historia ampliada por biógrafos posteriores.
Lo cierto es que Spinoza nunca se casó ni tuvo hijos y llevó una vida sobria, dedicada casi por completo al estudio, la filosofía y su trabajo como pulidor de lentes en La Haya.Hoy Spinoza es considerado uno de los pensadores más influyentes de la filosofía moderna.
Su idea de que comprender las causas de lo que somos y hacemos es la verdadera forma de libertad sigue siendo una de las reflexiones más potentes de la historia del pensamiento.#filosofia #historia #spinoza #filosofiamoderna #pensamiento #historiaintelectual #baruchspinoza
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Les Vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham à Megève (One-shot)
Jason est de retour pour prendre de nouvelles vacances ! Cette fois ci direction la montagne, plus particulièrement à Megève !
Au cœur de la Haute Savoie, son nouvel entourage va devoir repousser les limites de la poudreuse pour que Jason passe les meilleures vacances possible !
Vous voulez savoir ce que fait une star du cinéma dans une station de ski ? Jason est-il capable de verser des larmes ?
Toutes les réponses dans cet épisode !
Nous jouons aux vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham, une adaptation du jeu en une page : Jason Statham’s Big Vacation dans lequel les joueurs incarnent l’entourage de Jason pendant ses vacances mouvementées. Leur objectif ? Faire des vacances de Jason un succès !
Jason Statham’s Big Vacation est un jeu en une page de Grant Howitt disponible par ici : https://gshowitt.itch.io/jason-stathams-big-vacation .
Il est aussi disponible en VF par ici : https://rolistespod.itch.io/vacances-jason-statham
L’adaptation que nous en avons faite est disponible sur le Itch.io de la JDR Academy
Des grandes vacances réalisées par Artemis, avec Timesidious, Neuralnoise, Riley et Dryss, (le conteur de contenu de Cyberpunk Red: Narrava Studio)
Redecouvrez les premières vacances de Jason au Portugal par ici : https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-one-shot/
Les vacances de Jason au Vietnam par ici: https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-au-vietnam-one-shot/
Retrouvez tous nos podcasts sur https://www.jdracademy.com
https://jdracademy.fr/les-vacances-dhiver-de-jason-statham-a-megeve-one-shot/ #accident #action #ActualPlay #adultes #Agent #avalanche #aventure #banane #bateau #billyZane #bradPitt #chalet #chandelier #cocaine #comission #con #F1 #F2 #faro #fisherPrice #grandesVacances #grantHowitt #guyRitchie #helicoptère #hiver #hotel #jason #jasonStatham #jdr #jeuDeRôle #kellyBrooks #luge #majorette #morue #oneShot #ours #PartiesPartagées #pegi18 #piscine #platine #podcast #portugal #prius #requin #rpg #ski #snowboard #spielberg #Spinoza #statham #theMeg #theMeg2 #vietnamn #voiture #wesleySnipe -
Les Vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham à Megève (One-shot)
Jason est de retour pour prendre de nouvelles vacances ! Cette fois ci direction la montagne, plus particulièrement à Megève !
Au cœur de la Haute Savoie, son nouvel entourage va devoir repousser les limites de la poudreuse pour que Jason passe les meilleures vacances possible !
Vous voulez savoir ce que fait une star du cinéma dans une station de ski ? Jason est-il capable de verser des larmes ?
Toutes les réponses dans cet épisode !
Nous jouons aux vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham, une adaptation du jeu en une page : Jason Statham’s Big Vacation dans lequel les joueurs incarnent l’entourage de Jason pendant ses vacances mouvementées. Leur objectif ? Faire des vacances de Jason un succès !
Jason Statham’s Big Vacation est un jeu en une page de Grant Howitt disponible par ici : https://gshowitt.itch.io/jason-stathams-big-vacation .
Il est aussi disponible en VF par ici : https://rolistespod.itch.io/vacances-jason-statham
L’adaptation que nous en avons faite est disponible sur le Itch.io de la JDR Academy
Des grandes vacances réalisées par Artemis, avec Timesidious, Neuralnoise, Riley et Dryss, (le conteur de contenu de Cyberpunk Red: Narrava Studio)
Redecouvrez les premières vacances de Jason au Portugal par ici : https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-one-shot/
Les vacances de Jason au Vietnam par ici: https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-au-vietnam-one-shot/
Retrouvez tous nos podcasts sur https://www.jdracademy.com
https://jdracademy.fr/les-vacances-dhiver-de-jason-statham-a-megeve-one-shot/ #accident #action #ActualPlay #adultes #Agent #avalanche #aventure #banane #bateau #billyZane #bradPitt #chalet #chandelier #cocaine #comission #con #F1 #F2 #faro #fisherPrice #grandesVacances #grantHowitt #guyRitchie #helicoptère #hiver #hotel #jason #jasonStatham #jdr #jeuDeRôle #kellyBrooks #luge #majorette #morue #oneShot #ours #PartiesPartagées #pegi18 #piscine #platine #podcast #portugal #prius #requin #rpg #ski #snowboard #spielberg #Spinoza #statham #theMeg #theMeg2 #vietnamn #voiture #wesleySnipe -
Les Vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham à Megève (One-shot)
Jason est de retour pour prendre de nouvelles vacances ! Cette fois ci direction la montagne, plus particulièrement à Megève !
Au cœur de la Haute Savoie, son nouvel entourage va devoir repousser les limites de la poudreuse pour que Jason passe les meilleures vacances possible !
Vous voulez savoir ce que fait une star du cinéma dans une station de ski ? Jason est-il capable de verser des larmes ?
Toutes les réponses dans cet épisode !
Nous jouons aux vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham, une adaptation du jeu en une page : Jason Statham’s Big Vacation dans lequel les joueurs incarnent l’entourage de Jason pendant ses vacances mouvementées. Leur objectif ? Faire des vacances de Jason un succès !
Jason Statham’s Big Vacation est un jeu en une page de Grant Howitt disponible par ici : https://gshowitt.itch.io/jason-stathams-big-vacation .
Il est aussi disponible en VF par ici : https://rolistespod.itch.io/vacances-jason-statham
L’adaptation que nous en avons faite est disponible sur le Itch.io de la JDR Academy
Des grandes vacances réalisées par Artemis, avec Timesidious, Neuralnoise, Riley et Dryss, (le conteur de contenu de Cyberpunk Red: Narrava Studio)
Redecouvrez les premières vacances de Jason au Portugal par ici : https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-one-shot/
Les vacances de Jason au Vietnam par ici: https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-au-vietnam-one-shot/
Retrouvez tous nos podcasts sur https://www.jdracademy.com
https://jdracademy.fr/les-vacances-dhiver-de-jason-statham-a-megeve-one-shot/ #accident #action #ActualPlay #adultes #Agent #avalanche #aventure #banane #bateau #billyZane #bradPitt #chalet #chandelier #cocaine #comission #con #F1 #F2 #faro #fisherPrice #grandesVacances #grantHowitt #guyRitchie #helicoptère #hiver #hotel #jason #jasonStatham #jdr #jeuDeRôle #kellyBrooks #luge #majorette #morue #oneShot #ours #PartiesPartagées #pegi18 #piscine #platine #podcast #portugal #prius #requin #rpg #ski #snowboard #spielberg #Spinoza #statham #theMeg #theMeg2 #vietnamn #voiture #wesleySnipe -
Les Vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham à Megève (One-shot)
Jason est de retour pour prendre de nouvelles vacances ! Cette fois ci direction la montagne, plus particulièrement à Megève !
Au cœur de la Haute Savoie, son nouvel entourage va devoir repousser les limites de la poudreuse pour que Jason passe les meilleures vacances possible !
Vous voulez savoir ce que fait une star du cinéma dans une station de ski ? Jason est-il capable de verser des larmes ?
Toutes les réponses dans cet épisode !
Nous jouons aux vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham, une adaptation du jeu en une page : Jason Statham’s Big Vacation dans lequel les joueurs incarnent l’entourage de Jason pendant ses vacances mouvementées. Leur objectif ? Faire des vacances de Jason un succès !
Jason Statham’s Big Vacation est un jeu en une page de Grant Howitt disponible par ici : https://gshowitt.itch.io/jason-stathams-big-vacation .
Il est aussi disponible en VF par ici : https://rolistespod.itch.io/vacances-jason-statham
L’adaptation que nous en avons faite est disponible sur le Itch.io de la JDR Academy
Des grandes vacances réalisées par Artemis, avec Timesidious, Neuralnoise, Riley et Dryss, (le conteur de contenu de Cyberpunk Red: Narrava Studio)
Redecouvrez les premières vacances de Jason au Portugal par ici : https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-one-shot/
Les vacances de Jason au Vietnam par ici: https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-au-vietnam-one-shot/
Retrouvez tous nos podcasts sur https://www.jdracademy.com
https://jdracademy.fr/les-vacances-dhiver-de-jason-statham-a-megeve-one-shot/ #accident #action #ActualPlay #adultes #Agent #avalanche #aventure #banane #bateau #billyZane #bradPitt #chalet #chandelier #cocaine #comission #con #F1 #F2 #faro #fisherPrice #grandesVacances #grantHowitt #guyRitchie #helicoptère #hiver #hotel #jason #jasonStatham #jdr #jeuDeRôle #kellyBrooks #luge #majorette #morue #oneShot #ours #PartiesPartagées #pegi18 #piscine #platine #podcast #portugal #prius #requin #rpg #ski #snowboard #spielberg #Spinoza #statham #theMeg #theMeg2 #vietnamn #voiture #wesleySnipe -
Les Vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham à Megève (One-shot)
Jason est de retour pour prendre de nouvelles vacances ! Cette fois ci direction la montagne, plus particulièrement à Megève !
Au cœur de la Haute Savoie, son nouvel entourage va devoir repousser les limites de la poudreuse pour que Jason passe les meilleures vacances possible !
Vous voulez savoir ce que fait une star du cinéma dans une station de ski ? Jason est-il capable de verser des larmes ?
Toutes les réponses dans cet épisode !
Nous jouons aux vacances d’hiver de Jason Statham, une adaptation du jeu en une page : Jason Statham’s Big Vacation dans lequel les joueurs incarnent l’entourage de Jason pendant ses vacances mouvementées. Leur objectif ? Faire des vacances de Jason un succès !
Jason Statham’s Big Vacation est un jeu en une page de Grant Howitt disponible par ici : https://gshowitt.itch.io/jason-stathams-big-vacation .
Il est aussi disponible en VF par ici : https://rolistespod.itch.io/vacances-jason-statham
L’adaptation que nous en avons faite est disponible sur le Itch.io de la JDR Academy
Des grandes vacances réalisées par Artemis, avec Timesidious, Neuralnoise, Riley et Dryss, (le conteur de contenu de Cyberpunk Red: Narrava Studio)
Redecouvrez les premières vacances de Jason au Portugal par ici : https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-one-shot/
Les vacances de Jason au Vietnam par ici: https://jdracademy.fr/les-grandes-vacances-de-jason-statham-au-vietnam-one-shot/
Retrouvez tous nos podcasts sur https://www.jdracademy.com
https://jdracademy.fr/les-vacances-dhiver-de-jason-statham-a-megeve-one-shot/ #accident #action #ActualPlay #adultes #Agent #avalanche #aventure #banane #bateau #billyZane #bradPitt #chalet #chandelier #cocaine #comission #con #F1 #F2 #faro #fisherPrice #grandesVacances #grantHowitt #guyRitchie #helicoptère #hiver #hotel #jason #jasonStatham #jdr #jeuDeRôle #kellyBrooks #luge #majorette #morue #oneShot #ours #PartiesPartagées #pegi18 #piscine #platine #podcast #portugal #prius #requin #rpg #ski #snowboard #spielberg #Spinoza #statham #theMeg #theMeg2 #vietnamn #voiture #wesleySnipe -
Il bambino col cappellino azzurro, da Spinoza.it #ICE #Minneapolis #Usa #spinoza
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Au milieu des tumultes du monde, je ne saurais trop conseiller cette belle lecture du "Spinoza" du philosophe italien Giuseppe Rensi.
Une petite introduction vivante et puissante à la pensée de Spinoza grâce à une belle traduction de Marie-José Tramuta, aux éditions Allia
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https://spinozahavurah.org/2026/01/06/shabbat-with-marcos-bazmandegan-january-10-2026/
Besides, our regular Shabbat service, we will also have a special speaker. Here's more info about it:
This service will be followed by a talk by Dr. Marcos Bazmandegan on his recent book which explores the life and thought of Uriel da Costa, a Sephardic Jew of Portuguese origin, presenting him as an intellectual precursor of Spinoza and the author of the first major critique of Rabbinic Judaism prior to the Theological-Political Treatise. It examines his life of exile, his break with religious orthodoxy, and his defense of reason, individual conscience, and ethical humanism, placing his ideas within the broader context of the Sephardic diaspora. At the same time, the book serves as a reflection on Sephardism, secularism, and Jewish Humanism, portraying Uriel da Costa as a powerful symbol of intellectual resistance and freedom of thought.
#UrielDaCosta #Spinoza #HumanisticJudaism #Philosophy #Sephardism
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Things are looking up with #Spinoza. After some tricky passages on the nature and origin of the mind, today’s hot topics are titillation and cheerfulness. #philosophy
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The Architecture of Resistance
The seventeenth-century Hague, the mid-twentieth-century Levant, and the digital terraforming of 2025 have a shared preoccupation with the “Average.” Whether it is the theologian’s way or predictive stats, control begins by smoothing out the landscape. The project of power is a project of cartography and illumination—an attempt to banish the dark corners where the unmapped might grow. Thus, the history of resistance, of being “against the world”, is less a history of rebellion than a history of seeking cover.
The Large Piece of Turf, 1503 Albrecht DürerIn Spinoza’a world, legibility was the cosmos in an ordered hierarchy. Meaning descended from an external judge and was mirrored by the terrestrial proxy of the King and more often the priest. Behavior was aligned to the “Scriptural Average.” A pre-written behavioral code that transformed the conatus—that primal drive to persist and expand—into the passive states of hope and fear. By removing the external judge, Spinoza suggested that freedom is found in the intellectual mastery of the causes that move us. A pushback against the “average pious subject,” asserting that every individual is a necessary, logical expression of an infinite substance. There is no error in the world, only the lack of a thick enough understanding to perceive the necessity of one’s own outlier status.
With this position, and self assurance, Spinoza became illegible to his friends, his doting teacher, and his community. He was cast out, but his thoughts are the seeds of today’s world.
In the Beirut and Damascus of the mid-twentieth century, the imposition of legibility took the form of the “Citizen-as-Monument.” It was a world of endings, where identity was a frozen artifact of nationalist scripts and religious orthodoxies. The poet Adonis, through Mihyar, pushes against this world not by asserting a new identity, but through a “movement of erasure.” If a stable interior is to form, it is to be quickly discarded. A stable interior is merely another coordinate, a dependable predictor, for the state to map. Mihyar becomes a “knight of strange words,” defined by the iltifat—the sudden turn away. By peeling back the layers of the social mask and embracing a radical anonymity, he counters the stagnant city. He exists as a hot wind, something that is felt through its movement and friction, yet remains entirely unsearchable by the collective grammar.
We have entered a third world, a digital landscape that functions as a terraformed plain. It is, in a sense, a Spinozan monism—all data is one substance—but it is a substance managed by a Leibnizian bureaucracy of optimization. The mechanism of control is no longer the scripture or the state monument, but the “Mechanical Harmony” of the statistical mean. A decade ago this was social media shaping votes. Today’s AI tools, perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not, impose an “averageness” on thought itself, by providing the next likely response and hiding the outlier. This is a form of disindividuation disguised as efficiency, a smoothing of the world’s texture until it becomes a frictionless surface for the sake of searchability.
What emerges as a necessary response is the logic of the thicket. If the terraformed plain is the habitat of the tourist—where everything is predicted, optimized, and known—the thicket is the habitat of the explorer. It is a deliberate architecture of complexity, an insistence on terroir and the messy, non-replicable context of the local. To build a thicket is to re-introduce friction into a world too smooth. We are apes inhabiting the long tail. Like Spinoza, our conatus withers under the umbrella the statistical mean. If every response is predicted, the individual ceases to be a cause and becomes merely a consequence of the architecture.
To emerge, life itself needed discontinuities. The thicket provides the opacity necessary for the transforming process of the self to occur. It honors the uneven distribution of the world, providing a high-density environment of unique, complex encounters impossible in a flat plain. In this 2025 context, to be “against the world” is perhaps better understood as being a cultivator of these unsearchable spaces. The Dark Forest of the internet has created literal operating systems, habitats for our interconnected selves. Away from the violent imposition of the center, things can still happen by surprise. We seek cover in the thicket as a primal way of being where the emergent world remains deep enough to inhabit.
#Adonis #AI #AlgorithmicFlattening #AliAhmadSaidEsber #ArchitectureOfResistance #artificialIntelligence #Conatus #CulturalCritique #DigitalTerraforming #history #Iltifat #IntellectualHistory #LLMs #LogicOfTheThicket #MechanicalHarmony #MihyarTheDamascene #Monism #Noodiversity #OntologicalResistance #philosophy #philosophyOfTechnology #RadicalImmanence #Spinoza #StatisticalAverage #TheThicket #writing
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The Architecture of Resistance
The seventeenth-century Hague, the mid-twentieth-century Levant, and the digital terraforming of 2025 have a shared preoccupation with the “Average.” Whether it is the theologian’s way or predictive stats, control begins by smoothing out the landscape. The project of power is a project of cartography and illumination—an attempt to banish the dark corners where the unmapped might grow. Thus, the history of resistance, of being “against the world”, is less a history of rebellion than a history of seeking cover.
The Large Piece of Turf, 1503 Albrecht DürerIn Spinoza’a world, legibility was the cosmos in an ordered hierarchy. Meaning descended from an external judge and was mirrored by the terrestrial proxy of the King and more often the priest. Behavior was aligned to the “Scriptural Average.” A pre-written behavioral code that transformed the conatus—that primal drive to persist and expand—into the passive states of hope and fear. By removing the external judge, Spinoza suggested that freedom is found in the intellectual mastery of the causes that move us. A pushback against the “average pious subject,” asserting that every individual is a necessary, logical expression of an infinite substance. There is no error in the world, only the lack of a thick enough understanding to perceive the necessity of one’s own outlier status.
With this position, and self assurance, Spinoza became illegible to his friends, his doting teacher, and his community. He was cast out, but his thoughts are the seeds of today’s world.
In the Beirut and Damascus of the mid-twentieth century, the imposition of legibility took the form of the “Citizen-as-Monument.” It was a world of endings, where identity was a frozen artifact of nationalist scripts and religious orthodoxies. The poet Adonis, through Mihyar, pushes against this world not by asserting a new identity, but through a “movement of erasure.” If a stable interior is to form, it is to be quickly discarded. A stable interior is merely another coordinate, a dependable predictor, for the state to map. Mihyar becomes a “knight of strange words,” defined by the iltifat—the sudden turn away. By peeling back the layers of the social mask and embracing a radical anonymity, he counters the stagnant city. He exists as a hot wind, something that is felt through its movement and friction, yet remains entirely unsearchable by the collective grammar.
We have entered a third world, a digital landscape that functions as a terraformed plain. It is, in a sense, a Spinozan monism—all data is one substance—but it is a substance managed by a Leibnizian bureaucracy of optimization. The mechanism of control is no longer the scripture or the state monument, but the “Mechanical Harmony” of the statistical mean. A decade ago this was social media shaping votes. Today’s AI tools, perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not, impose an “averageness” on thought itself, by providing the next likely response and hiding the outlier. This is a form of disindividuation disguised as efficiency, a smoothing of the world’s texture until it becomes a frictionless surface for the sake of searchability.
What emerges as a necessary response is the logic of the thicket. If the terraformed plain is the habitat of the tourist—where everything is predicted, optimized, and known—the thicket is the habitat of the explorer. It is a deliberate architecture of complexity, an insistence on terroir and the messy, non-replicable context of the local. To build a thicket is to re-introduce friction into a world too smooth. We are apes inhabiting the long tail. Like Spinoza, our conatus withers under the umbrella the statistical mean. If every response is predicted, the individual ceases to be a cause and becomes merely a consequence of the architecture.
To emerge, life itself needed discontinuities. The thicket provides the opacity necessary for the transforming process of the self to occur. It honors the uneven distribution of the world, providing a high-density environment of unique, complex encounters impossible in a flat plain. In this 2025 context, to be “against the world” is perhaps better understood as being a cultivator of these unsearchable spaces. The Dark Forest of the internet has created literal operating systems, habitats for our interconnected selves. Away from the violent imposition of the center, things can still happen by surprise. We seek cover in the thicket as a primal way of being where the emergent world remains deep enough to inhabit.
#Adonis #AI #AlgorithmicFlattening #AliAhmadSaidEsber #ArchitectureOfResistance #artificialIntelligence #Conatus #CulturalCritique #DigitalTerraforming #history #Iltifat #IntellectualHistory #LLMs #LogicOfTheThicket #MechanicalHarmony #MihyarTheDamascene #Monism #Noodiversity #OntologicalResistance #philosophy #philosophyOfTechnology #RadicalImmanence #Spinoza #StatisticalAverage #TheThicket #writing
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The Architecture of Resistance
The seventeenth-century Hague, the mid-twentieth-century Levant, and the digital terraforming of 2025 have a shared preoccupation with the “Average.” Whether it is the theologian’s way or predictive stats, control begins by smoothing out the landscape. The project of power is a project of cartography and illumination—an attempt to banish the dark corners where the unmapped might grow. Thus, the history of resistance, of being “against the world”, is less a history of rebellion than a history of seeking cover.
The Large Piece of Turf, 1503 Albrecht DürerIn Spinoza’a world, legibility was the cosmos in an ordered hierarchy. Meaning descended from an external judge and was mirrored by the terrestrial proxy of the King and more often the priest. Behavior was aligned to the “Scriptural Average.” A pre-written behavioral code that transformed the conatus—that primal drive to persist and expand—into the passive states of hope and fear. By removing the external judge, Spinoza suggested that freedom is found in the intellectual mastery of the causes that move us. A pushback against the “average pious subject,” asserting that every individual is a necessary, logical expression of an infinite substance. There is no error in the world, only the lack of a thick enough understanding to perceive the necessity of one’s own outlier status.
With this position, and self assurance, Spinoza became illegible to his friends, his doting teacher, and his community. He was cast out, but his thoughts are the seeds of today’s world.
In the Beirut and Damascus of the mid-twentieth century, the imposition of legibility took the form of the “Citizen-as-Monument.” It was a world of endings, where identity was a frozen artifact of nationalist scripts and religious orthodoxies. The poet Adonis, through Mihyar, pushes against this world not by asserting a new identity, but through a “movement of erasure.” If a stable interior is to form, it is to be quickly discarded. A stable interior is merely another coordinate, a dependable predictor, for the state to map. Mihyar becomes a “knight of strange words,” defined by the iltifat—the sudden turn away. By peeling back the layers of the social mask and embracing a radical anonymity, he counters the stagnant city. He exists as a hot wind, something that is felt through its movement and friction, yet remains entirely unsearchable by the collective grammar.
We have entered a third world, a digital landscape that functions as a terraformed plain. It is, in a sense, a Spinozan monism—all data is one substance—but it is a substance managed by a Leibnizian bureaucracy of optimization. The mechanism of control is no longer the scripture or the state monument, but the “Mechanical Harmony” of the statistical mean. A decade ago this was social media shaping votes. Today’s AI tools, perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not, impose an “averageness” on thought itself, by providing the next likely response and hiding the outlier. This is a form of disindividuation disguised as efficiency, a smoothing of the world’s texture until it becomes a frictionless surface for the sake of searchability.
What emerges as a necessary response is the logic of the thicket. If the terraformed plain is the habitat of the tourist—where everything is predicted, optimized, and known—the thicket is the habitat of the explorer. It is a deliberate architecture of complexity, an insistence on terroir and the messy, non-replicable context of the local. To build a thicket is to re-introduce friction into a world too smooth. We are apes inhabiting the long tail. Like Spinoza, our conatus withers under the umbrella the statistical mean. If every response is predicted, the individual ceases to be a cause and becomes merely a consequence of the architecture.
To emerge, life itself needed discontinuities. The thicket provides the opacity necessary for the transforming process of the self to occur. It honors the uneven distribution of the world, providing a high-density environment of unique, complex encounters impossible in a flat plain. In this 2025 context, to be “against the world” is perhaps better understood as being a cultivator of these unsearchable spaces. The Dark Forest of the internet has created literal operating systems, habitats for our interconnected selves. Away from the violent imposition of the center, things can still happen by surprise. We seek cover in the thicket as a primal way of being where the emergent world remains deep enough to inhabit.
#Adonis #AI #AlgorithmicFlattening #AliAhmadSaidEsber #ArchitectureOfResistance #artificialIntelligence #Conatus #CulturalCritique #DigitalTerraforming #history #Iltifat #IntellectualHistory #LLMs #LogicOfTheThicket #MechanicalHarmony #MihyarTheDamascene #Monism #Noodiversity #OntologicalResistance #philosophy #philosophyOfTechnology #RadicalImmanence #Spinoza #StatisticalAverage #TheThicket #writing
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The Architecture of Resistance
The seventeenth-century Hague, the mid-twentieth-century Levant, and the digital terraforming of 2025 have a shared preoccupation with the “Average.” Whether it is the theologian’s way or predictive stats, control begins by smoothing out the landscape. The project of power is a project of cartography and illumination—an attempt to banish the dark corners where the unmapped might grow. Thus, the history of resistance, of being “against the world”, is less a history of rebellion than a history of seeking cover.
The Large Piece of Turf, 1503 Albrecht DürerIn Spinoza’a world, legibility was the cosmos in an ordered hierarchy. Meaning descended from an external judge and was mirrored by the terrestrial proxy of the King and more often the priest. Behavior was aligned to the “Scriptural Average.” A pre-written behavioral code that transformed the conatus—that primal drive to persist and expand—into the passive states of hope and fear. By removing the external judge, Spinoza suggested that freedom is found in the intellectual mastery of the causes that move us. A pushback against the “average pious subject,” asserting that every individual is a necessary, logical expression of an infinite substance. There is no error in the world, only the lack of a thick enough understanding to perceive the necessity of one’s own outlier status.
With this position, and self assurance, Spinoza became illegible to his friends, his doting teacher, and his community. He was cast out, but his thoughts are the seeds of today’s world.
In the Beirut and Damascus of the mid-twentieth century, the imposition of legibility took the form of the “Citizen-as-Monument.” It was a world of endings, where identity was a frozen artifact of nationalist scripts and religious orthodoxies. The poet Adonis, through Mihyar, pushes against this world not by asserting a new identity, but through a “movement of erasure.” If a stable interior is to form, it is to be quickly discarded. A stable interior is merely another coordinate, a dependable predictor, for the state to map. Mihyar becomes a “knight of strange words,” defined by the iltifat—the sudden turn away. By peeling back the layers of the social mask and embracing a radical anonymity, he counters the stagnant city. He exists as a hot wind, something that is felt through its movement and friction, yet remains entirely unsearchable by the collective grammar.
We have entered a third world, a digital landscape that functions as a terraformed plain. It is, in a sense, a Spinozan monism—all data is one substance—but it is a substance managed by a Leibnizian bureaucracy of optimization. The mechanism of control is no longer the scripture or the state monument, but the “Mechanical Harmony” of the statistical mean. A decade ago this was social media shaping votes. Today’s AI tools, perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not, impose an “averageness” on thought itself, by providing the next likely response and hiding the outlier. This is a form of disindividuation disguised as efficiency, a smoothing of the world’s texture until it becomes a frictionless surface for the sake of searchability.
What emerges as a necessary response is the logic of the thicket. If the terraformed plain is the habitat of the tourist—where everything is predicted, optimized, and known—the thicket is the habitat of the explorer. It is a deliberate architecture of complexity, an insistence on terroir and the messy, non-replicable context of the local. To build a thicket is to re-introduce friction into a world too smooth. We are apes inhabiting the long tail. Like Spinoza, our conatus withers under the umbrella the statistical mean. If every response is predicted, the individual ceases to be a cause and becomes merely a consequence of the architecture.
To emerge, life itself needed discontinuities. The thicket provides the opacity necessary for the transforming process of the self to occur. It honors the uneven distribution of the world, providing a high-density environment of unique, complex encounters impossible in a flat plain. In this 2025 context, to be “against the world” is perhaps better understood as being a cultivator of these unsearchable spaces. The Dark Forest of the internet has created literal operating systems, habitats for our interconnected selves. Away from the violent imposition of the center, things can still happen by surprise. We seek cover in the thicket as a primal way of being where the emergent world remains deep enough to inhabit.
#Adonis #AI #AlgorithmicFlattening #AliAhmadSaidEsber #ArchitectureOfResistance #artificialIntelligence #Conatus #CulturalCritique #DigitalTerraforming #history #Iltifat #IntellectualHistory #LLMs #LogicOfTheThicket #MechanicalHarmony #MihyarTheDamascene #Monism #Noodiversity #OntologicalResistance #philosophy #philosophyOfTechnology #RadicalImmanence #Spinoza #StatisticalAverage #TheThicket #writing
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The Architecture of Resistance
The seventeenth-century Hague, the mid-twentieth-century Levant, and the digital terraforming of 2025 have a shared preoccupation with the “Average.” Whether it is the theologian’s way or predictive stats, control begins by smoothing out the landscape. The project of power is a project of cartography and illumination—an attempt to banish the dark corners where the unmapped might grow. Thus, the history of resistance, of being “against the world”, is less a history of rebellion than a history of seeking cover.
The Large Piece of Turf, 1503 Albrecht DürerIn Spinoza’a world, legibility was the cosmos in an ordered hierarchy. Meaning descended from an external judge and was mirrored by the terrestrial proxy of the King and more often the priest. Behavior was aligned to the “Scriptural Average.” A pre-written behavioral code that transformed the conatus—that primal drive to persist and expand—into the passive states of hope and fear. By removing the external judge, Spinoza suggested that freedom is found in the intellectual mastery of the causes that move us. A pushback against the “average pious subject,” asserting that every individual is a necessary, logical expression of an infinite substance. There is no error in the world, only the lack of a thick enough understanding to perceive the necessity of one’s own outlier status.
With this position, and self assurance, Spinoza became illegible to his friends, his doting teacher, and his community. He was cast out, but his thoughts are the seeds of today’s world.
In the Beirut and Damascus of the mid-twentieth century, the imposition of legibility took the form of the “Citizen-as-Monument.” It was a world of endings, where identity was a frozen artifact of nationalist scripts and religious orthodoxies. The poet Adonis, through Mihyar, pushes against this world not by asserting a new identity, but through a “movement of erasure.” If a stable interior is to form, it is to be quickly discarded. A stable interior is merely another coordinate, a dependable predictor, for the state to map. Mihyar becomes a “knight of strange words,” defined by the iltifat—the sudden turn away. By peeling back the layers of the social mask and embracing a radical anonymity, he counters the stagnant city. He exists as a hot wind, something that is felt through its movement and friction, yet remains entirely unsearchable by the collective grammar.
We have entered a third world, a digital landscape that functions as a terraformed plain. It is, in a sense, a Spinozan monism—all data is one substance—but it is a substance managed by a Leibnizian bureaucracy of optimization. The mechanism of control is no longer the scripture or the state monument, but the “Mechanical Harmony” of the statistical mean. A decade ago this was social media shaping votes. Today’s AI tools, perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not, impose an “averageness” on thought itself, by providing the next likely response and hiding the outlier. This is a form of disindividuation disguised as efficiency, a smoothing of the world’s texture until it becomes a frictionless surface for the sake of searchability.
What emerges as a necessary response is the logic of the thicket. If the terraformed plain is the habitat of the tourist—where everything is predicted, optimized, and known—the thicket is the habitat of the explorer. It is a deliberate architecture of complexity, an insistence on terroir and the messy, non-replicable context of the local. To build a thicket is to re-introduce friction into a world too smooth. We are apes inhabiting the long tail. Like Spinoza, our conatus withers under the umbrella the statistical mean. If every response is predicted, the individual ceases to be a cause and becomes merely a consequence of the architecture.
To emerge, life itself needed discontinuities. The thicket provides the opacity necessary for the transforming process of the self to occur. It honors the uneven distribution of the world, providing a high-density environment of unique, complex encounters impossible in a flat plain. In this 2025 context, to be “against the world” is perhaps better understood as being a cultivator of these unsearchable spaces. The Dark Forest of the internet has created literal operating systems, habitats for our interconnected selves. Away from the violent imposition of the center, things can still happen by surprise. We seek cover in the thicket as a primal way of being where the emergent world remains deep enough to inhabit.
#Adonis #AI #AlgorithmicFlattening #AliAhmadSaidEsber #ArchitectureOfResistance #artificialIntelligence #Conatus #CulturalCritique #DigitalTerraforming #history #Iltifat #IntellectualHistory #LLMs #LogicOfTheThicket #MechanicalHarmony #MihyarTheDamascene #Monism #Noodiversity #OntologicalResistance #philosophy #philosophyOfTechnology #RadicalImmanence #Spinoza #StatisticalAverage #TheThicket #writing
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Vers une écologie du déterminisme : entre structure, action et création
Le déterminisme n’est pas fatalité mais relation. De Bourdieu à Spinoza, de Nietzsche à Castoriadis : il se rejoue entre structure et action, contrainte et création. Social, biologique ou technique, il nous façonne autant que nous le transformons. Penser sa dualité, c’est rouvrir l’espace du possible. #Philosophie #Sociologie #Bourdieu #Spinoza #Nietzsche #Castoriadis #Technologie #Marx Le…
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Deleuze retrouvé
Una stanza piena. L'aria addensata dal fumo di sigaretta, i registratori coprono l'ufficio del filosofo.
E Deleuze, parlando di Spinoza, cinema, urla o rizoma.
Quei momenti unici se ne sono andati. Tornano oggi.Per la prima volta, France Culture trasmette 16 le
https://differx.noblogs.org/2025/12/19/deleuze-retrouve/
#archivi #art #cinema #kritik #ricostruzioni #SegnaliEAzioni #cinema #Deleuze #FranceCulture #GillesDeleuze #lezioni #rizoma #Spinoza #Urlo #video -
Rationalité partagée et immanence spinoziste : une démocratie qui s’auto-éduque
Et si une démocratie réelle était spinoziste sans le savoir ?Rationalité partagée par dissensus (Giddens, Rancière, Abensour) et rationalité immanente de Spinoza convergent : comprendre les causes pour accroître une puissance d’agir commune, contre l’accaparement oligarchique du savoir et du pouvoir. Sans auto-éducation populaire, la raison se fige en domination. 🧠⚖️ #Spinoza #Giddens…
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Rationalité partagée et immanence spinoziste : une démocratie qui s’auto-éduque
Et si une démocratie réelle était spinoziste sans le savoir ?Rationalité partagée par dissensus (Giddens, Rancière, Abensour) et rationalité immanente de Spinoza convergent : comprendre les causes pour accroître une puissance d’agir commune, contre l’accaparement oligarchique du savoir et du pouvoir. Sans auto-éducation populaire, la raison se fige en domination. 🧠⚖️ #Spinoza #Giddens…
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¿Se imaginan que #Juana_de_Asbaje y Baruch #Spinoza hubiesen tenido un (par de) crío(s)? 🧠 🤓 🪶 https://inv-cl2.nadeko.net/companion/latest_version?id=3_cG4Z1Xock&itag=18&local=true&check=XJgA8Y5yz4qdKUbY6nc2ezriad-h6SrtPe_gu0B-oZE=
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Currently reading Spinoza's "Ethics".
Challenging, stimulating, at times baffling. I expect I'm going to have to reread this after consulting some of the secondary literature.
#Philosophy #Spinoza #Ethics #EarlyModern #17thCentury #Netherlands
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Happy birthday to my favorite neighbour (November 24th, 1632 - February 21, 1677)
The home of #Spinoza was probably in the same block where I live, or the nearby church of Moses and Aaron.
Nobody knows for sure because he was kicked out of Amsterdam for heresy, and nobody bothered to ever pay homage to his home, or even put a memorial plate, like we did with all the other fathers of Western philosophy.
The Portuguese synagogue that he used to attend, the one that eventually pushed for his exile for daring to criticize centuries of blind Jewish dogma, is still standing here near my house.
He was harassed both by Jewish and Christians during his life for daring to read their sacred texts from a rational perspective, and for putting in doubt the Mosaic authorship of the Torah.
He was simultaneously accused of being an atheist and a pantheist obsessed with god.
When I first visited the Waterlooplein area in Amsterdam I was confused. I could clearly see Rembrandt’s house always surrounded by tourists, but I couldn’t see any tourists around Spinoza’s house. Actually I couldn’t even see Spinoza’s dwellings anywhere. Then I discovered that the place where he was born was most likely unceremoniously flattened when the church was built (or perhaps it was on the very grounds where my house currently is). And all we’ve left of one of the greatest and most influential thinkers to ever live is an ugly statue on the other side of the square. Because those who dared to be heretic four centuries ago don’t get the luxury of having their memories preserved even today, even in a progressive place like Amsterdam.
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⓪ The proof of the infinity of attributes
https://www.outsidelight.online/digest/digest-the-proof-of-the-infinity-of-attributes/
#philosophy #Spinoza #Bergson #intelligence -
You don’t need to control your emotions — you need to see them.
Deconstruction reveals how emotion isn’t truth but the machinery of imagination defending an identity.
Once you see it, control becomes unnecessary.
Read Part 2: The Practice of Deconstruction
👉 https://zurl.co/MJxUH
#Philosophy #Psychology #MartinButler #Realism #Spinoza -
Wat hebben Spinoza, Einstein en een telescoop met elkaar te maken? Dat hoor je op 31 oktober in de KB. Fysicus, sterrenkundige en filosoof Hans Plets geeft een lezing over de verrassende connecties tussen deze twee mannen.
Ben jij er ook bij? kb.nl/agenda/lezing-van-spinozas-lens-tot-einsteins-telescoop
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I've released a new podcast with Brook Ziporyn on the value paradox, ontological ambiguity, and how grammar shapes metaphysics. We explore how making values explicit causes them to undermine themselves—from the Daodejing's "when all recognize the good as good, there is the bad" through Buddhist emptiness to Spinoza's critique of teleology. Plus: why "samsara is nirvana."
https://www.bryankam.com/p/samsara-is-nirvana-with-brook-ziporyn
#Buddhism #Tiantai #Daoism #Spinoza #Nietzsche #Metaphysics #Philosophy @philosophy -
Too much sadness, too much terror;
There is a reason my dog is named “Linus” — “It’s the Great Pumpkin Charlie Brown” is one of the most beautiful examples of Linus Van Pelt being an amazing philosopher from the [IMO] #Spinoza school.
#DogsOfMastodon #philosophy #enlightenment #rationalism #art #comics #SocialCommentary #PoliticalCommentary #CharlesMSchulz
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The Forest stage of growth isn’t chaos—it’s clarity under pressure.
Strength isn’t hitting the target. It’s observing without judgment.
Breath. Feet. Presence.
Power lives there.
#Philosophy #Embodiment #Spinoza #MartinButler #SomaticPractice #Mindfulness #SelfWork #Realism
