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#metaethics — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #metaethics, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Call: “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory”

    Organized by Andrew Sepielli, the “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory” will take place at the University of Toronto from November 7 to 8, 2026.

    Submissions for contributions can be submitted until July 1, 2026. The call reads:

    The workshop aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars working on questions about the relationship between empirical research on moral cognition and the foundations of moral theory. The goal is to foster interdisciplinary discussion about how empirical work in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory bears on moral judgment and the evaluation of moral beliefs.

    Invited speakers include:

    • Paul Bloom (Psychology, University of Toronto / Yale University)
    • Joshua Knobe (Philosophy and Psychology, Yale University)
    • Liane Young (Psychology, Boston College)
    • Roseanna Sommers (Law and Psychology, University of Michigan)
    • Brendan de Kenessey (Philosophy, University of Toronto)

    We invite submissions addressing topics at the intersection of empirical research and moral theory. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to:

    • experimental philosophy
    • the psychology of moral cognition
    • causal cognition and moral judgment
    • the neuroscience of moral judgment
    • evolutionary approaches to morality
    • empirical work bearing on normative ethics or metaethics
    • methodological questions about the role of empirical research in moral theory
    • debunking arguments and related challenges to moral belief

    Five contributed papers will be selected. Contributed talks will consist of a 45-minute presentation followed by 45 minutes of discussion. The workshop is designed to be discussion-focused, with substantial time devoted to questions and conversation about each paper.

    We welcome submissions from scholars in philosophy, psychology, law, and related disciplines. Submissions from early-career scholars are especially encouraged.

    Submission Guidelines:

    Please submit an abstract of 750–1000 words, along with a brief CV, to: [email protected] 

    Submissions should not be anonymized.

    Important Dates:

    Submission deadline: July 1, 2026

    Notification of decisions: August 1, 2026

    Limited support for travel and accommodation may be available.

    Questions about the workshop may be directed to the conference organizer, Andrew Sepielli (Philosophy, University of Toronto), at: [email protected]

    #Beliefs #CognitiveScience #Law #Metaethics #MoralPsychology #Neuroscience #Norms
  2. Call: “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory”

    Organized by Andrew Sepielli, the “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory” will take place at the University of Toronto from November 7 to 8, 2026.

    Submissions for contributions can be submitted until July 1, 2026. The call reads:

    The workshop aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars working on questions about the relationship between empirical research on moral cognition and the foundations of moral theory. The goal is to foster interdisciplinary discussion about how empirical work in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory bears on moral judgment and the evaluation of moral beliefs.

    Invited speakers include:

    • Paul Bloom (Psychology, University of Toronto / Yale University)
    • Joshua Knobe (Philosophy and Psychology, Yale University)
    • Liane Young (Psychology, Boston College)
    • Roseanna Sommers (Law and Psychology, University of Michigan)
    • Brendan de Kenessey (Philosophy, University of Toronto)

    We invite submissions addressing topics at the intersection of empirical research and moral theory. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to:

    • experimental philosophy
    • the psychology of moral cognition
    • causal cognition and moral judgment
    • the neuroscience of moral judgment
    • evolutionary approaches to morality
    • empirical work bearing on normative ethics or metaethics
    • methodological questions about the role of empirical research in moral theory
    • debunking arguments and related challenges to moral belief

    Five contributed papers will be selected. Contributed talks will consist of a 45-minute presentation followed by 45 minutes of discussion. The workshop is designed to be discussion-focused, with substantial time devoted to questions and conversation about each paper.

    We welcome submissions from scholars in philosophy, psychology, law, and related disciplines. Submissions from early-career scholars are especially encouraged.

    Submission Guidelines:

    Please submit an abstract of 750–1000 words, along with a brief CV, to: [email protected] 

    Submissions should not be anonymized.

    Important Dates:

    Submission deadline: July 1, 2026

    Notification of decisions: August 1, 2026

    Limited support for travel and accommodation may be available.

    Questions about the workshop may be directed to the conference organizer, Andrew Sepielli (Philosophy, University of Toronto), at: [email protected]

    #Beliefs #CognitiveScience #Law #Metaethics #MoralPsychology #Neuroscience #Norms
  3. @burnoutqueen @kaye

    Those inversions can be demonstrated to be incoherent. If good and evil are immature, that implies that there is no reason to act one way over another. If that is true and someone really believes, the question is why aren’t they behaving randomly.

    Believing incoherent notions of good and evil is bad as is the case with evangelicals.

    #philosophy #moral #morals #ethics #MoralRealism #metaethics

  4. @burnoutqueen @kaye

    Those inversions can be demonstrated to be incoherent. If good and evil are immature, that implies that there is no reason to act one way over another. If that is true and someone really believes, the question is why aren’t they behaving randomly.

    Believing incoherent notions of good and evil is bad as is the case with evangelicals.

    #philosophy #moral #morals #ethics #MoralRealism #metaethics

  5. @burnoutqueen @kaye

    Those inversions can be demonstrated to be incoherent. If good and evil are immature, that implies that there is no reason to act one way over another. If that is true and someone really believes, the question is why aren’t they behaving randomly.

    Believing incoherent notions of good and evil is bad as is the case with evangelicals.

    #philosophy #moral #morals #ethics #MoralRealism #metaethics

  6. A moral philosophy paper recently written by me, presenting a new liar paradox-like argument about contradictions within consequentialism:

    philpapers.org/rec/IONCJP

    #philosophy #ethic #consequentialism #deontology #metaethics #morality #paradox #research

  7. A moral philosophy paper recently written by me, presenting a new liar paradox-like argument about contradictions within consequentialism:

    philpapers.org/rec/IONCJP

    #philosophy #ethic #consequentialism #deontology #metaethics #morality #paradox #research

  8. A moral philosophy paper recently written by me, presenting a new liar paradox-like argument about contradictions within consequentialism:

    philpapers.org/rec/IONCJP

    #philosophy #ethic #consequentialism #deontology #metaethics #morality #paradox #research

  9. RE: mastodon.online/@citify/115900

    Aesthetic value has an objective component for the same reason that moral value has an objective component. Minds are physical systems. A consequence of that is that they can, in principle, be computationally modeled. We can talk about an infinite-time Turing machine running all these mind models and have it search for regularities in behavior in the limit (morals) or aesthetic appreciation.

    What do you think is #ethics or aesthetics objective?

    #philosophy #metaethics #morality

  10. RE: mastodon.online/@citify/115900

    Aesthetic value has an objective component for the same reason that moral value has an objective component. Minds are physical systems. A consequence of that is that they can, in principle, be computationally modeled. We can talk about an infinite-time Turing machine running all these mind models and have it search for regularities in behavior in the limit (morals) or aesthetic appreciation.

    What do you think is #ethics or aesthetics objective?

    #philosophy #metaethics #morality

  11. RE: mastodon.online/@citify/115900

    Aesthetic value has an objective component for the same reason that moral value has an objective component. Minds are physical systems. A consequence of that is that they can, in principle, be computationally modeled. We can talk about an infinite-time Turing machine running all these mind models and have it search for regularities in behavior in the limit (morals) or aesthetic appreciation.

    What do you think is #ethics or aesthetics objective?

    #philosophy #metaethics #morality

  12. CAN PHILOSOPHY SAVE HUMANITY IF AI->AGI? While not one mention of "AI" in this paper, there are certain implications that may be worth an ☕ of contemplation. #philosophy #ai #ethics #agi #law #order #judgement #systems #consequentialism #metaethics #errtling www.researchgate.net/publication/...

    (PDF) Consequentialist Judgmen...

  13. CAN PHILOSOPHY SAVE HUMANITY IF AI->AGI? While not one mention of "AI" in this paper, there are certain implications that may be worth an ☕ of contemplation. #philosophy #ai #ethics #agi #law #order #judgement #systems #consequentialism #metaethics #errtling www.researchgate.net/publication/...

    (PDF) Consequentialist Judgmen...

  14. CAN PHILOSOPHY SAVE HUMANITY IF AI->AGI? While not one mention of "AI" in this paper, there are certain implications that may be worth an ☕ of contemplation. #philosophy #ai #ethics #agi #law #order #judgement #systems #consequentialism #metaethics #errtling www.researchgate.net/publication/...

    (PDF) Consequentialist Judgmen...

  15. @AlexanderKingsbury

    Rationality has no motivation, this isn't a fringe position its formulated more thoroughly by philosophers like David Hume I wont keep replying but don't presume to be in the right just because you dont understand a philosophical position

    philosophy.stackexchange.com/q

    #DavidHume #Philosophy #Metaethics

  16. @AlexanderKingsbury

    Rationality has no motivation, this isn't a fringe position its formulated more thoroughly by philosophers like David Hume I wont keep replying but don't presume to be in the right just because you dont understand a philosophical position

    philosophy.stackexchange.com/q

    #DavidHume #Philosophy #Metaethics

  17. @AlexanderKingsbury

    Rationality has no motivation, this isn't a fringe position its formulated more thoroughly by philosophers like David Hume I wont keep replying but don't presume to be in the right just because you dont understand a philosophical position

    philosophy.stackexchange.com/q

    #DavidHume #Philosophy #Metaethics

  18. @AlexanderKingsbury Basically thats what everyones axioms are. You can't get away from being a utility maximising machine. Everything you do and justify is because you want to do it, and you don't choose what you want.

    #Metaethics #FreeWill

  19. @AlexanderKingsbury Basically thats what everyones axioms are. You can't get away from being a utility maximising machine. Everything you do and justify is because you want to do it, and you don't choose what you want.

    #Metaethics #FreeWill

  20. @AlexanderKingsbury Basically thats what everyones axioms are. You can't get away from being a utility maximising machine. Everything you do and justify is because you want to do it, and you don't choose what you want.

    #Metaethics #FreeWill

  21. @jlou Property rights are not objective any more than the right to life or any other so called rights, they are intersubjective constructed based on shared experience, it can appear close to objective but its ultimately the same thing as preferences they are just widely held preferences.

    "
    YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND
    GRIND IT DOWN TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE AND
    THEN *SHOW* ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF MERCY. AND YET-- Death
    waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD, AS
    IF THERE IS SOME... SOME *RIGHTNESS* IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH IT MAY BE
    JUDGED
    "
    Terry Pratchett

    #Metaethics #Rights #Property #Leftism #Socialism #Anarchism

  22. @jlou Property rights are not objective any more than the right to life or any other so called rights, they are intersubjective constructed based on shared experience, it can appear close to objective but its ultimately the same thing as preferences they are just widely held preferences.

    "
    YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND
    GRIND IT DOWN TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE AND
    THEN *SHOW* ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF MERCY. AND YET-- Death
    waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD, AS
    IF THERE IS SOME... SOME *RIGHTNESS* IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH IT MAY BE
    JUDGED
    "
    Terry Pratchett

    #Metaethics #Rights #Property #Leftism #Socialism #Anarchism

  23. @jlou Property rights are not objective any more than the right to life or any other so called rights, they are intersubjective constructed based on shared experience, it can appear close to objective but its ultimately the same thing as preferences they are just widely held preferences.

    "
    YOU THINK SO? THEN TAKE THE UNIVERSE AND
    GRIND IT DOWN TO THE FINEST POWDER AND SIEVE IT THROUGH THE FINEST SIEVE AND
    THEN *SHOW* ME ONE ATOM OF JUSTICE, ONE MOLECULE OF MERCY. AND YET-- Death
    waved a hand. AND YET YOU ACT AS IF THERE IS SOME IDEAL ORDER IN THE WORLD, AS
    IF THERE IS SOME... SOME *RIGHTNESS* IN THE UNIVERSE BY WHICH IT MAY BE
    JUDGED
    "
    Terry Pratchett

    #Metaethics #Rights #Property #Leftism #Socialism #Anarchism

  24. Many disagreements don’t persist because people are irrational or uninformed. They persist because the parties involved are not standing on the same conceptual ground.

    New essay on ontological incommensurability, moral disagreement, and why convergence is sometimes the wrong expectation.

    Disagreement Without Referees
    🔗 philosophics.blog/2025/12/16/e

    #Metaethics #Philosophy #Morality #AntiFoundationalism #metaethics #referee #ontology #redcard #disagreement
    #blog #podcast #writing #essay

  25. Many disagreements don’t persist because people are irrational or uninformed. They persist because the parties involved are not standing on the same conceptual ground.

    New essay on ontological incommensurability, moral disagreement, and why convergence is sometimes the wrong expectation.

    Disagreement Without Referees
    🔗 philosophics.blog/2025/12/16/e

    #Metaethics #Philosophy #Morality #AntiFoundationalism #metaethics #referee #ontology #redcard #disagreement
    #blog #podcast #writing #essay

  26. Many disagreements don’t persist because people are irrational or uninformed. They persist because the parties involved are not standing on the same conceptual ground.

    New essay on ontological incommensurability, moral disagreement, and why convergence is sometimes the wrong expectation.

    Disagreement Without Referees
    🔗 philosophics.blog/2025/12/16/e

    #Metaethics #Philosophy #Morality #AntiFoundationalism #metaethics #referee #ontology #redcard #disagreement
    #blog #podcast #writing #essay

  27. Many disagreements don’t persist because people are irrational or uninformed. They persist because the parties involved are not standing on the same conceptual ground.

    New essay on ontological incommensurability, moral disagreement, and why convergence is sometimes the wrong expectation.

    Disagreement Without Referees
    🔗 philosophics.blog/2025/12/16/e

    #Metaethics #Philosophy #Morality #AntiFoundationalism #metaethics #referee #ontology #redcard #disagreement
    #blog #podcast #writing #essay

  28. Many disagreements don’t persist because people are irrational or uninformed. They persist because the parties involved are not standing on the same conceptual ground.

    New essay on ontological incommensurability, moral disagreement, and why convergence is sometimes the wrong expectation.

    Disagreement Without Referees
    🔗 philosophics.blog/2025/12/16/e

    #Metaethics #Philosophy #Morality #AntiFoundationalism #metaethics #referee #ontology #redcard #disagreement
    #blog #podcast #writing #essay

  29. Truth → Rhetoric: Why Access Determines Authority.
    👉 philosophics.blog/2025/12/15/t
    It's total philosophical geekery, but it poses an important question to Realists™.

    𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘦 80 % 𝘰𝘧 𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘷𝘦𝘺𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘰𝘱𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵 𝘴𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘰𝘯-𝘴𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘮, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐 𝘥𝘰𝘯'𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘦 𝘢 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘦𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘮.

    I'd love to get responses from people in this cohort.

    #Philosophy #MetaEthics #Ethics #MoralRealism #Rhetoric #Ontology #CriticalTheory #Leadership #OrganisationalLife #Normativity #Writing #Truth #Rhetoric

  30. Truth → Rhetoric: Why Access Determines Authority.
    👉 philosophics.blog/2025/12/15/t
    It's total philosophical geekery, but it poses an important question to Realists™.

    𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘦 80 % 𝘰𝘧 𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘷𝘦𝘺𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘰𝘱𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵 𝘴𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘰𝘯-𝘴𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘴𝘮, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘐 𝘥𝘰𝘯'𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘦 𝘢 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘮𝘦𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘮.

    I'd love to get responses from people in this cohort.

    #Philosophy #MetaEthics #Ethics #MoralRealism #Rhetoric #Ontology #CriticalTheory #Leadership #OrganisationalLife #Normativity #Writing #Truth #Rhetoric