#imsi — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #imsi, aggregated by home.social.
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Damaskus setzt digitale Überwachung in Rojava ein
Während die Interimsregierung Damaskus versucht, das Abkommen vom 29. Januar nach seinen eigenen Prioritäten in Rojava umzusetzen, führt sie den massiven Einsatz von IMSI (digitale Überwachungsgeräte), besser bekannt als „StingRay“ oder gefälschte Basisstationen, in kurdischen Gebieten durch, mit direkter Unterstützung der türkischen Geheimdienste (MIT).
Artikel auf französisch: https://kurdistan-au-feminin.fr/2026/05/14/damas-deploie-sa-surveillance-numerique-au-rojava/
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Damaskus setzt digitale Überwachung in Rojava ein
Während die Interimsregierung Damaskus versucht, das Abkommen vom 29. Januar nach seinen eigenen Prioritäten in Rojava umzusetzen, führt sie den massiven Einsatz von IMSI (digitale Überwachungsgeräte), besser bekannt als „StingRay“ oder gefälschte Basisstationen, in kurdischen Gebieten durch, mit direkter Unterstützung der türkischen Geheimdienste (MIT).
Artikel auf französisch: https://kurdistan-au-feminin.fr/2026/05/14/damas-deploie-sa-surveillance-numerique-au-rojava/
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Damaskus setzt digitale Überwachung in Rojava ein
Während die Interimsregierung Damaskus versucht, das Abkommen vom 29. Januar nach seinen eigenen Prioritäten in Rojava umzusetzen, führt sie den massiven Einsatz von IMSI (digitale Überwachungsgeräte), besser bekannt als „StingRay“ oder gefälschte Basisstationen, in kurdischen Gebieten durch, mit direkter Unterstützung der türkischen Geheimdienste (MIT).
Artikel auf französisch: https://kurdistan-au-feminin.fr/2026/05/14/damas-deploie-sa-surveillance-numerique-au-rojava/
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Damaskus setzt digitale Überwachung in Rojava ein
Während die Interimsregierung Damaskus versucht, das Abkommen vom 29. Januar nach seinen eigenen Prioritäten in Rojava umzusetzen, führt sie den massiven Einsatz von IMSI (digitale Überwachungsgeräte), besser bekannt als „StingRay“ oder gefälschte Basisstationen, in kurdischen Gebieten durch, mit direkter Unterstützung der türkischen Geheimdienste (MIT).
Artikel auf französisch: https://kurdistan-au-feminin.fr/2026/05/14/damas-deploie-sa-surveillance-numerique-au-rojava/
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What's up with the huge amount of IMSI catchers around Tokyo?
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What's up with the huge amount of IMSI catchers around Tokyo?
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What's up with the huge amount of IMSI catchers around Tokyo?
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What's up with the huge amount of IMSI catchers around Tokyo?
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What's up with the huge amount of IMSI catchers around Tokyo?
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TIL about #IMSI and #IMSIcatcher
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TIL about #IMSI and #IMSIcatcher
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TIL about #IMSI and #IMSIcatcher
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TIL about #IMSI and #IMSIcatcher
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TIL about #IMSI and #IMSIcatcher
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Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...
TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.
So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.
IMSI vs IMEI
The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).
But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.
The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:
"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4
Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:
"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4
IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6
So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".
Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.
PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.
1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone
2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.
4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/
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Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...
TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.
So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.
IMSI vs IMEI
The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).
But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.
The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:
"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4
Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:
"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4
IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6
So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".
Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.
PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.
1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone
2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.
4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/
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Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...
TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.
So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.
IMSI vs IMEI
The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).
But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.
The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:
"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4
Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:
"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4
IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6
So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".
Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.
PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.
1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone
2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.
4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/
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Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...
TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.
So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.
IMSI vs IMEI
The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).
But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.
The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:
"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4
Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:
"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4
IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6
So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".
Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.
PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.
1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone
2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.
4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/
-
Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...
TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.
So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.
IMSI vs IMEI
The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).
But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.
The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:
"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4
Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:
"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4
IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6
So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".
Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.
PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.
1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone
2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.
4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/
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KT Corp. confirmed a data breach affecting 5,561 customers after recent micro-payment fraud, prompting CEO Kim Young-seob to issue a public apology and pledge enhanced security and compensation measures.
#YonhapInfomax #KTCorp #DataBreach #MicroPaymentFraud #IMSI #CustomerProtection #Economics #FinancialMarkets #Banking #Securities #Bonds #StockMarket
https://en.infomaxai.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=81332 -
KT Corp. confirmed a data breach affecting 5,561 customers after recent micro-payment fraud, prompting CEO Kim Young-seob to issue a public apology and pledge enhanced security and compensation measures.
#YonhapInfomax #KTCorp #DataBreach #MicroPaymentFraud #IMSI #CustomerProtection #Economics #FinancialMarkets #Banking #Securities #Bonds #StockMarket
https://en.infomaxai.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=81332 -
KT Corp. confirmed a data breach affecting 5,561 customers after recent micro-payment fraud, prompting CEO Kim Young-seob to issue a public apology and pledge enhanced security and compensation measures.
#YonhapInfomax #KTCorp #DataBreach #MicroPaymentFraud #IMSI #CustomerProtection #Economics #FinancialMarkets #Banking #Securities #Bonds #StockMarket
https://en.infomaxai.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=81332 -
KT Corp. confirmed a data breach affecting 5,561 customers after recent micro-payment fraud, prompting CEO Kim Young-seob to issue a public apology and pledge enhanced security and compensation measures.
#YonhapInfomax #KTCorp #DataBreach #MicroPaymentFraud #IMSI #CustomerProtection #Economics #FinancialMarkets #Banking #Securities #Bonds #StockMarket
https://en.infomaxai.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=81332 -
#Rayhunter : What We Have Found So Far
A little over a year ago we released Rayhunter, our #OpenSource tool designed to detect cell-site simulators. We’ve been blown away by the level of community engagement on this project. It has been installed on thousands of devices (or so we estimate, we don’t actually know since Rayhunter doesn’t have any telemetry!). We have received dozens of packet captures, hundreds of improvements, both minor & major…
#privacy #imsi #stingrayhttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/rayhunter-what-we-have-found-so-far
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#Rayhunter : What We Have Found So Far
A little over a year ago we released Rayhunter, our #OpenSource tool designed to detect cell-site simulators. We’ve been blown away by the level of community engagement on this project. It has been installed on thousands of devices (or so we estimate, we don’t actually know since Rayhunter doesn’t have any telemetry!). We have received dozens of packet captures, hundreds of improvements, both minor & major…
#privacy #imsi #stingrayhttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/rayhunter-what-we-have-found-so-far
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#Rayhunter : What We Have Found So Far
A little over a year ago we released Rayhunter, our #OpenSource tool designed to detect cell-site simulators. We’ve been blown away by the level of community engagement on this project. It has been installed on thousands of devices (or so we estimate, we don’t actually know since Rayhunter doesn’t have any telemetry!). We have received dozens of packet captures, hundreds of improvements, both minor & major…
#privacy #imsi #stingrayhttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/rayhunter-what-we-have-found-so-far
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#Rayhunter : What We Have Found So Far
A little over a year ago we released Rayhunter, our #OpenSource tool designed to detect cell-site simulators. We’ve been blown away by the level of community engagement on this project. It has been installed on thousands of devices (or so we estimate, we don’t actually know since Rayhunter doesn’t have any telemetry!). We have received dozens of packet captures, hundreds of improvements, both minor & major…
#privacy #imsi #stingrayhttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/rayhunter-what-we-have-found-so-far
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#Rayhunter : What We Have Found So Far
A little over a year ago we released Rayhunter, our #OpenSource tool designed to detect cell-site simulators. We’ve been blown away by the level of community engagement on this project. It has been installed on thousands of devices (or so we estimate, we don’t actually know since Rayhunter doesn’t have any telemetry!). We have received dozens of packet captures, hundreds of improvements, both minor & major…
#privacy #imsi #stingrayhttps://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/rayhunter-what-we-have-found-so-far
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#eff Suspicious requests In Westchester NY headed to NJ around the Mario Cuomo Bridge. Sending PCAPS. #imsi #privacy #opensource
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#eff Suspicious requests In Westchester NY headed to NJ around the Mario Cuomo Bridge. Sending PCAPS. #imsi #privacy #opensource
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#Android phones could soon warn you of “Stingrays” #snooping on your communications
#privacy #stingrays #imsicatcher #imsi #surveillance -
#Android phones could soon warn you of “Stingrays” #snooping on your communications
#privacy #stingrays #imsicatcher #imsi #surveillance -
#Android phones could soon warn you of “Stingrays” #snooping on your communications
#privacy #stingrays #imsicatcher #imsi #surveillance -
#Android phones could soon warn you of “Stingrays” #snooping on your communications
#privacy #stingrays #imsicatcher #imsi #surveillance -
#Android phones could soon warn you of “Stingrays” #snooping on your communications
#privacy #stingrays #imsicatcher #imsi #surveillance -
Year 5 of the IMSI Data Science Summer Workshop Series in the books! From one workshop to my favorite tradition - 2 weeks mentoring incredible PhD students as they develop industry-ready skills.
Stats/Math PhDs: 2026 apps open Fall 2025!
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Year 5 of the IMSI Data Science Summer Workshop Series in the books! From one workshop to my favorite tradition - 2 weeks mentoring incredible PhD students as they develop industry-ready skills.
Stats/Math PhDs: 2026 apps open Fall 2025!
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Year 5 of the IMSI Data Science Summer Workshop Series in the books! From one workshop to my favorite tradition - 2 weeks mentoring incredible PhD students as they develop industry-ready skills.
Stats/Math PhDs: 2026 apps open Fall 2025!
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Year 5 of the IMSI Data Science Summer Workshop Series in the books! From one workshop to my favorite tradition - 2 weeks mentoring incredible PhD students as they develop industry-ready skills.
Stats/Math PhDs: 2026 apps open Fall 2025!
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Year 5 of the IMSI Data Science Summer Workshop Series in the books! From one workshop to my favorite tradition - 2 weeks mentoring incredible PhD students as they develop industry-ready skills.
Stats/Math PhDs: 2026 apps open Fall 2025!
