#imsi — Public Fediverse posts

There's an insane number of IMSI catchers in Taipei. I get GrapheneOS pings almost daily.

Anyone know what this is about? News mentions SIM card fraud.

#Stingray #IMSI #privacy #cybersec #infosec

What's up with the huge amount of IMSI catchers around Tokyo?

#Japan #Tokyo #Cybersecurity #IMSI #Privacy

TIL about #IMSI and #IMSIcatcher

thx @shermozle @kcarruthers

https://www.rtl-sdr.com/the-thought-emporium-explores-imsi-cell-phone-tracking-and-other-advanced-cell-phone-attacks-with-software-defined-radios/

#imsi #cell #rtlsdr

@downey

Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...

TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.

So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.

IMSI vs IMEI

The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).

But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.

The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:

"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4

Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:

"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4

IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6

So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".

Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.

PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.

1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone

2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity

3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.

4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/

5 https://x-surveillance.com/imsi-stingray-device/

6 https://www.stratign.com/imsi-catcher-system/

@downey

Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...

TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.

So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.

IMSI vs IMEI

The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).

But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.

The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:

"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4

Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:

"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4

IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6

So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".

Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.

PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.

1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone

2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity

3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.

4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/

5 https://x-surveillance.com/imsi-stingray-device/

6 https://www.stratign.com/imsi-catcher-system/

@downey

Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...

TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.

So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.

IMSI vs IMEI

The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).

But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.

The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:

"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4

Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:

"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4

IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6

So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".

Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.

PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.

1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone

2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity

3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.

4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/

5 https://x-surveillance.com/imsi-stingray-device/

6 https://www.stratign.com/imsi-catcher-system/

@downey

Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...

TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.

So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.

IMSI vs IMEI

The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).

But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.

The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:

"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4

Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:

"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4

IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6

So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".

Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.

PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.

1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone

2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity

3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.

4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/

5 https://x-surveillance.com/imsi-stingray-device/

6 https://www.stratign.com/imsi-catcher-system/

@downey

Warning! A lot of acronyms ahead! Welcome to Telco land...

TLDR: Anyone with the "fake cellphone tower" device mentioned can track BOTH your SIMcard, AND your mobile device.

So you better leave them at home, or bring a burner1 phone with a burner1 SIM.

IMSI vs IMEI

The "#IMSI" in #IMSIcatcher is an identifying number tied to your SIM(card).

But what #IMSIcatchers can also capture is your device's #IMEI 2.

The supposed purpose of an IMEI is stated clearly in the official documentation:

"The main objective is to be able to take measures against the use of stolen equipment or against equipment of which the use in the PLMN3 can not or no longer be tolerated for technical reasons."4

Mobile device manufacturers are obligated to produce device unique IMEI's:

"The IMEI shall be unique and shall not be changed after the ME’s [Mobile Equipment] final production process. It shall resist tampering, i.e. manipulation and change, by any means (e.g. physical, electrical and software)."4

IMSIcatcher vendors state their equipment can also capture IMEIs.5 6

So, every phone in the neighborhood of IMSIcatchers in use by law enforcement, are certainly in a batch of "to be tracked".

Did I mention law enforcement (through a legal warrant, they'll need help from mobile operators) can track phones based on IMEI alone (so even if you remove the SIM)? Yes, I believe I did.

PS: a phone connecting to or connected to an IMSIcatcher, is not on the network. Not being able to reach emergency services could lead to physical harm, including death. Just saying.

1 https://ssd.eff.org/glossary/burner-phone

2 International Mobile Station Equipment Identity

3 Public Land Mobile Network: wireless communication services offered by a specific operator in a specific country.

4 https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/22_series/22.016/

5 https://x-surveillance.com/imsi-stingray-device/

6 https://www.stratign.com/imsi-catcher-system/

#Rayhunter : What We Have Found So Far

A little over a year ago we released Rayhunter, our #OpenSource tool designed to detect cell-site simulators. We’ve been blown away by the level of community engagement on this project. It has been installed on thousands of devices (or so we estimate, we don’t actually know since Rayhunter doesn’t have any telemetry!). We have received dozens of packet captures, hundreds of improvements, both minor & major…
#privacy #imsi #stingray

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/09/rayhunter-what-we-have-found-so-far

#eff Suspicious requests In Westchester NY headed to NJ around the Mario Cuomo Bridge. Sending PCAPS. #imsi #privacy #opensource

#Android phones could soon warn you of “Stingrays” #snooping on your communications
#privacy #stingrays #imsicatcher #imsi #surveillance

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2025/06/future-android-phones-could-warn-you-about-data-stealing-fake-cell-towers/

Year 5 of the IMSI Data Science Summer Workshop Series in the books! From one workshop to my favorite tradition - 2 weeks mentoring incredible PhD students as they develop industry-ready skills.

Stats/Math PhDs: 2026 apps open Fall 2025!

https://www.imsi.institute/internships/

#imsi #phdstudents #datascience

Überwachung hier und dort
Perfekter Überwachungszoo
Mehr bei https://tkp.at/2025/06/03/pakistans-digitale-id-als-unterdrueckungswerkzeug/
a-fsa.de/d/3Hs
Link zu dieser Seite: https://www.aktion-freiheitstattangst.org/de/articles/9175-20250604-ueberwachung-hier-und-dort.html
Link im Tor-Netzwerk: http://a6pdp5vmmw4zm5tifrc3qo2pyz7mvnk4zzimpesnckvzinubzmioddad.onion/de/articles/9175-20250604-ueberwachung-hier-und-dort.html
Tags: #Polizei #Geheimdienste #Hacking #Geodaten #Geofencing #Videoüberwachung #Lauschangriff #Überwachung #Vorratsdatenspeicherung #eBorder #Freizügigkeit #Unschuldsvermutung #Verhaltensänderung #Smartphone #IMSI-Catcher #Verbraucherdatenschutz #Meinungsmonopol #Meinungsfreiheit #Pressefreiheit #Zensur

Rayhunter Sniffs Out Stingrays for $30 - These days, if you’re walking around with a cellphone, you’ve basically fitted an ... - https://hackaday.com/2025/05/05/rayhunter-sniffs-out-stingrays-for-30/ #cellphonehacks #securityhacks #softwarehacks #imsicatcher #rayhunter #cellular #stingray #phone #imsi

Starting all the way back on October 3rd, 2022, I used [email protected] as my log-in e-mail for free public WiFi access.

I don't insert a SIM card in my throw away phone & I connect to free WiFi for non-sensitive communications with a VPN. I understand that IMSI catchers exist too.

I chronicled this is previous (now deleted) posts. I've amalgamated all the times I've logged in in these posts, and some posts to follow.

Exhibit Q, R, S, and T:

#WiFi #VPN #IMSI #Privacy #InfoSec #BloodFart

Not #SantaBarbara's
Ray Hunter

https://www.waterhousegallery.com/Ray%20Hunter.html

#CSS #Stingrays #IMSI #catchers

Meet Rayhunter:
A New Open Source Tool from EFF to Detect Cellular Spying

At EFF we spend a lot of time thinking about Street Level Surveillance technologies
—the technologies used by police and other authorities to spy on you while you are going about your everyday life
—such as automated license plate readers,
facial recognition,
surveillance camera networks,
and cell-site simulators (. #CSS ).

Rayhunter is a new open source tool we’ve created that runs off an affordable mobile hotspot that we hope empowers everyone,
regardless of technical skill,
to help search out CSS around the world.

CSS
(also known as #Stingrays or #IMSI #catchers)
are devices that masquerade as legitimate cell-phone towers,
tricking phones within a certain radius into connecting to the device rather than a tower.

CSS operate by conducting a general search of all cell phones within the device’s radius.

Law enforcement use CSS to pinpoint the location of phones
often with greater accuracy than other techniques such as cell site location information (CSLI)
and without needing to involve the phone company at all.

CSS can also log International Mobile Subscriber Identifiers (IMSI numbers) unique to each SIM card,
or hardware serial numbers (IMEIs) of all of the mobile devices within a given area.

Some CSS may have advanced features allowing law enforcement to intercept communications in some circumstances.

What makes CSS especially interesting, as compared to other street level surveillance, is that
so little is known about how commercial CSS work.

We don’t fully know what capabilities they have
or what exploits in the phone network they take advantage of to ensnare and spy on our phones, though we have some ideas.

We also know very little about how cell-site simulators are deployed in the US and around the world.

There is no strong evidence either way about whether CSS are commonly being used in the US to spy on First Amendment protected activities
such as protests, communication between journalists and sources, or religious gatherings.

There is some evidence
—much of it circumstantial
—that CSS have been used in the US to spy on protests.

There is also evidence that CSS are used somewhat extensively by US law enforcement,
spyware operators, and scammers.

We know even less about how CSS are being used in other countries,
though it's a safe bet that in other countries CSS are also used by law enforcement.

Much of these gaps in our knowledge are due to a lack of solid, empirical evidence about the function and usage of these devices.

Police departments are resistant to releasing logs of their use,
even when they are kept.

The companies that manufacture CSS are unwilling to divulge details of how they work.

Until now, to detect the presence of CSS, researchers and users have had to either rely on Android apps on rooted phones,
or sophisticated and expensive software-defined radio rigs.

Previous solutions have also focused on attacks on the legacy 2G cellular network, which is almost entirely shut down in the U.S.

Seeking to learn from and improve on previous techniques for CSS detection we have developed a better, cheaper alternative that works natively on the modern 4G network.

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying

#EFF A New Tool to Detect Cellular Spying #IMSI #IMSIcatcher https://supporters.eff.org/civicrm/mailing/view?reset=1&id=12895

Meet #Rayhunter: A New #OpenSource Tool from @eff to Detect Cellular #Spying

#CSS (also known as #Stingrays or #IMSIcatchers) are devices that masquerade as legitimate cell-phone towers, tricking #phones within a certain radius into connecting to the device rather than a tower.
#privacy #security #surveillance #imsi #cellphones #celltower

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/03/meet-rayhunter-new-open-source-tool-eff-detect-cellular-spying

Building secure and privacy protecting mobile phones

https://fifthdimensionnews.substack.com/p/upwardly-mobile

#EFF #Rayhunter #IMSI #CitizenLab #Deibert
#mobile #mobian #Debian #KaliNetHunter #PostMarketOS #Jolla #SailfishOS #Finland #EU #Pine64 #OnionMobileDev #TOR #GuardianProject #press #Journalism #FDE #RFERL #GrapheneOS #Whonix #phone #encryption #CivilLiberties #FirstAmendment #FourthAmendment #USA #Development #FreedomOfThoughtandExpression

Anyone know of similar projects that have not been abandoned?

https://github.com/CellularPrivacy/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector

#StingRay #IMSI #IMSICatcher

Starting all the way back on October 3rd, 2022, I used [email protected] as my log-in e-mail for free public WiFi access.

I don't insert a SIM card in my throw away phone & I connect to free WiFi for non-sensitive communications with a VPN. I understand that IMSI catchers exist too.

I chronicled this is previous (now deleted) posts. I've amalgamated all the times I've logged in in these posts, and some posts to follow.

Exhibit M, N, O, and P:

#WiFi #VPN #IMSI #Privacy #InfoSec #BloodFart

@se38 Ooompf.

#abhören #cybersecurity #sms #imsi #kritis

Backyard #Privacy in the Age of #Drones

In addition to high-resolution photographic and video cameras, police drones may be equipped with myriad #spying payloads, such as live-video transmitters, thermal imaging, heat sensors, mapping technology, automated license plate readers, cell site simulators, cell phone signal interceptors and other technologies.
#alpr #imsi #stingray

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/08/backyard-privacy-age-drones

Niemand bleibt mit Handy unbeobachtet
"Deine MAID reicht uns völlig"
Mehr dazu bei https://netzpolitik.org/2024/databroker-files-firma-verschleudert-36-milliarden-standorte-von-menschen-in-deutschland/
a-fsa.de/d/3BQ
Link zu dieser Seite: https://www.aktion-freiheitstattangst.org/de/articles/8849-20240724-niemand-bleibt-mit-handy-unbeobachtet.html
Link im Tor-Netzwerk: http://a6pdp5vmmw4zm5tifrc3qo2pyz7mvnk4zzimpesnckvzinubzmioddad.onion/de/articles/8849-20240724-niemand-bleibt-mit-handy-unbeobachtet.html
Tags: #Datenhandel #MAID #mobileadvertisingID #GAFAM #Google #Apple #Smartphone #Handy #IMSI-Catcher #Standortdaten #Verbraucherdatenschutz #Datenschutz #Datensicherheit #Datenskandale #Bewegungsprofile #Persönlichkeitsprofil #Werbeindustrie #intimeOrte

#eBay Removes Listing for #StingRay #Cellphone #Spying Tech
StingRay listed at $100,000 before being removed for violating the platform’s policy on not #surveillance equipment. Listed as “Harris Stingray Cellular Phone Surveillance w/ Power Cord & Rolling Case - USED.
This StingRay may not be able to spy on modern phones. StingRays, and more broadly #IMSI-catchers, of which StingRay is a specific model, have been used by #lawenforcement in #US to track cell phones.
https://www.404media.co/ebay-removes-listing-for-stingray-cellphone-spying-tech/

The Next Generation of #Cell-Site Simulators (CSS) is Here. Here’s What We Know.
CSS, also known as #IMSI catchers, are among #lawenforcement’s most closely-guarded secret #surveillance tools. They act like real #cellphone towers, “tricking” mobile devices into connecting to them, designed to intercept the information that #phones send and receive, like the location of the user and metadata for #phone calls, text messages, and other app traffic.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/next-generation-cell-site-simulators-here-heres-what-we-know #privacy #EFF

Da hat wohl jemand versucht, ein #Stingray #IMSI Catcher zu verkaufen, wenn auch älteres Modell… Ob mir @FlohEinstein mal seinen zum Testen ausleiht? https://web.archive.org/web/20240624072838/https://www.ebay.com/itm/404933396019#ABOUT_THIS_ITEM #cybersecurity

BSNL Data Breached Yet Again? Millions of Users Face Risk of SIM Card Cloning, Financial Fraud https://thecyberexpress.com/bsnl-data-breach-sim-card-cloning-fraud/ #TheCyberExpressNews #CybersecurityNews #TheCyberExpress #DataBreachNews #BSNLdatabreach #financialfraud #FirewallDaily #criticaldata #Cyberattack #HackerNews #SIMcloning #servers #BSNL #IMSI

Cell Site Simulators ( #CSS ), also known as #IMSI catchers,
are among law enforcement’s most closely-guarded secret surveillance tools.

They act like real cell phone towers,
🔸“tricking” mobile devices into connecting to them,
🔸designed to intercept the information that phones send and receive,
🔸like the location of the user and metadata for phone calls, text messages, and other app traffic.

CSS are highly invasive and are used covertly.

In the past, law enforcement used a technique called
“parallel construction”
—collecting evidence in a different way to reach an existing conclusion
💥in order to avoid disclosing how law enforcement originally collected it💥
—. 👉to circumvent public disclosure of location findings made through CSS. 👈

This technology is like a dragging fishing net, rather than a focused single hook in the water.

Every phone in the vicinity connects with the device;
🔥even people completely unrelated to an investigation get wrapped up in the surveillance. 🔥

CSS, like other surveillance technologies, subjects civilians to widespread data collection,
even those who have not been involved with a crime,
and has been used against protestors and other protected groups, undermining their civil liberties.

⭐️Their adoption should require public disclosure,
⭐️but this rarely occurs.

In Massachusetts, agencies are expected to get a #warrant before conducting any cell-based location tracking.
The City of Boston is known to own a CSS. 

Dozens of policing agencies are currently using cell-site simulators (CSS) by #Jacobs #Technology and its Engineering Integration Group (EIG), according to newly-available documents on how that company provides CSS capabilities to local law enforcement.

A proposal document from Jacobs Technology,
provided to the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) and first spotted by the Boston Institute for Nonprofit Journalism (BINJ),
outlines elements of the company’s CSS services, which include discreet integration of the CSS system into a Chevrolet Silverado and lifetime technical support .

The proposal document from Jacobs provides some of the most comprehensive information about modern CSS that the public has had access to in years.

It confirms that law enforcement has access to CSS
♦️capable of operating on 5G
♦️as well as older cellular standards.

It also gives us our first look at modern CSS hardware.

The Jacobs system runs on at least nine software-defined radios that simulate cellular network protocols on multiple frequencies
and can also gather #wifi intelligence.

As these documents describe, these CSS are meant to be concealed within a common vehicle.

Antennas are hidden under a false roof so nothing can be seen outside the vehicles,
which is a shift from the more visible antennas and cargo van-sized deployments we’ve seen before.

The system also comes with a TRACHEA2+ and JUGULAR2+ for 🔹direction finding and 🔹mobile direction finding.

Important to the MSP contract is the modification of a Chevrolet Silverado with the CSS system.

This includes both the surreptitious installment of the CSS hardware into the truck and the integration of its software user interface into the navigational system of the vehicle.

According to Jacobs, this is the kind of installation with which they have a lot of experience.

Jacobs has built its CSS project on military and intelligence community relationships,
which are now informing development of a tool used in domestic communities,
not foreign warzones.

#Harris #Corporation, later #L3Harris #Technologies, Inc.,
was the largest provider of CSS technology to domestic law enforcement
but stopped selling to non-federal agencies in 2020.

Once Harris stopped selling to local law enforcement the market was open to several competitors,
one of the largest of which was #KeyW #Corporation.

Following👉 Jacobs’s 2019 acquisition of The KeyW Corporation 👈and its Engineering Integration Group (EIG),
Jacobs is now a leading provider of CSS to police,
and it claims to have
🌟more than 300 current CSS deployments globally. 🌟

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/next-generation-cell-site-simulators-here-heres-what-we-know

The Next Generation of Cell-Site Simulators is Here. Here’s What We Know.

CSS, also known as #IMSI catchers, are among law enforcement’s most closely-guarded secret #surveillance tools. They act like real cell phone towers, “tricking” mobile devices into connecting to them
#privacy #celltower #cellphone #cellsitesimulator

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/next-generation-cell-site-simulators-here-heres-what-we-know

I had a fantastic time over the past two weeks leading my fourth summer workshop series on data science with the IMSI Summer Internship Program!

Are you a Statistics or Mathematics PhD student seeking a summer internship for 2025? Keep an eye out for an announcement in Fall 2024 regarding applications at:

https://www.imsi.institute/internships/

#imsi #phdstudents #datascience

I'll be leading my 4th (!!) summer workshop series on data science with Institute for Mathematical and Statistical Innovation (IMSI) Summer Internship Program!

It's a great program for Statistics and Mathematics PhD students to pick up some internship experience. More details at:

https://www.imsi.institute/internships/

#imsi #phdstudents #datascience

Как собрать LTE-модем на базе SDR

Приветствую всех! Пожалуй, самой закрытой технологией в пользовательском сегменте является сотовая связь. Очень немногие знают о том, как на самом деле работают телефоны и модемы, отчего им часто приписывают всякие мифические свойства. Как насчёт попробовать запустить полностью открытую реализацию модема стандарта 4G? Именно этим я и предлагаю заняться. Итак, в сегодняшней статье поговорим о том, как взаимодействовать с мобильной сетью при помощи SDR. Попутно узнаем, какой софт для этого существует, и соберём самый дорогой 4G-модем в истории. Традиционно будет много интересного.

https://habr.com/ru/companies/timeweb/articles/805977/

#timeweb_статьи #4g #модем #lte #опсос #сотовые_сети #смарткарты #pcsc #sim #gsm #imei #imsi #ki #opc #dragonos #srsran #srsue

#iOS 17 and #macOS 14 #LockdownMode improvements

#Wireless connectivity - Your device won't automatically join non-secure #WiFi networks (#WPA etc) and will disconnect from a non-secure Wi-Fi network when you turn on Lockdown Mode. 2G #cellular support is turned off.

2G being disabled by default is an evolution of #LDM -- attempting to better protect from other classes of physical attacks, like #IMSI catchers or fraudulent cell towers performing #MitM attacks

#Apple and #Google Are Introducing New Ways to Defeat Cell Site Simulators, But Is it Enough?
#imsi #privacy #surveillance #cellsitesimulators #stingray

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/apple-and-google-are-introducing-new-ways-defeat-cell-site-simulators-it-enough

Docs Show #FBI Pressures Cops to Keep Phone #Surveillance Secrets.

Newly released documents highlight the bureau's continued secrecy around cell-site simulators—spying tech that everyone already assumes exists.
#privacy #imsi #imsicatcher #stingrays #cellsitesimulators #spying

https://www.wired.com/story/fbi-cell-site-simulator-stingray-secrecy/

Digitaler Autoklau mit sauberen Händen
Dieses Auto lässt sich nicht so leicht stehlen
Mehr dazu bei https://www.stern.de/auto/e-mobilitaet/autodiebstahl--wie-taeter-ueber-den-scheinwerfer-in-minutenschnelle-vorgehen-33367092.html
a-fsa.de/d/3tG
Link zu dieser Seite: https://www.aktion-freiheitstattangst.org/de/articles/8377-20230423-digitaler-autoklau-mit-sauberen-haenden.htm
Link im Tor-Netzwerk: http://a6pdp5vmmw4zm5tifrc3qo2pyz7mvnk4zzimpesnckvzinubzmioddad.onion/de/articles/8377-20230423-digitaler-autoklau-mit-sauberen-haenden.html
Tags: #Verbraucherdatenschutz #Datenschutz #Datensicherheit #Ergonomie #Datenpannen #Datenskandale #Keyless #Kfz #Diebstahl #Toyota #Scheinwerfer #RFIDChips #Bluetooth #Hacking #Trojaner #Verschluesselung #SmartMeter #IMSI-Catch #Digitalisierung #Verhaltensaenderung

Handyverkehr seit 30 Jahren abhörbar
Wir erfahren, was wir wissen dürfen
Link zu dieser Seite: https://www.aktion-freiheitstattangst.org/de/articles/7679-20210620-handyverkehr-seit-30-jahren-abhoerbar.htm
Link im Tor-Netzwerk: nnksciarbrfsg3ud.onion/de/articles/7679-20210620-handyverkehr-seit-30-jahren-abhoerbar.htm
Tags: #Transparenz #Informationsfreiheit #Anonymisierung #NSA #PRISM #Tempora #Lauschangriff #Überwachung #Vorratsdatenspeicherung #Smartphone #Handy #IMSI-Catcher #Cyberwar #Hacking #Trojaner #Polizei #Geheimdienste #Bewegungsprofile