#cryptography — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #cryptography, aggregated by home.social.
-
CW: llm producing genuinely impressive cryptographic result
I was looking at the NIST-competition for further signatures at work today and noticed that HAWK has been withdrawn...
(Context: NIST wasn't exactly enthusiastic about any signature scheme in the previous pqc competition and started a new one that is now in round three with only a few schemes left. HAWK was the only remaining lattice based scheme with the claim to fame being that it is basically FALCON (in standardization by NIST as FN-DSA) without the need for floating point arithmetic.)
Now it turns out that Anthropic has an LLM that managed to find a severe enough attack to require enough of an adjustment to the parameters, that HAWK would become noncompetitive.
This was genuinely new, clearly found by AI, on a very high profile target that lots of humans actively tried to break unsuccessfully, and clearly important that it was found...
They also managed to improve the cryptanalysis on a round reduced version of AES, another VERY impressive feat!
There is a genuine argument now that AI is competitive with the best human cryptanalysts and I am not yet sure what to make of that... 😐
#crypto #cryptography #pqc -
CW: llm producing genuinely impressive cryptographic result
I was looking at the NIST-competition for further signatures at work today and noticed that HAWK has been withdrawn...
(Context: NIST wasn't exactly enthusiastic about any signature scheme in the previous pqc competition and started a new one that is now in round three with only a few schemes left. HAWK was the only remaining lattice based scheme with the claim to fame being that it is basically FALCON (in standardization by NIST as FN-DSA) without the need for floating point arithmetic.)
Now it turns out that Anthropic has an LLM that managed to find a severe enough attack to require enough of an adjustment to the parameters, that HAWK would become noncompetitive.
This was genuinely new, clearly found by AI, on a very high profile target that lots of humans actively tried to break unsuccessfully, and clearly important that it was found...
They also managed to improve the cryptanalysis on a round reduced version of AES, another VERY impressive feat!
There is a genuine argument now that AI is competitive with the best human cryptanalysts and I am not yet sure what to make of that... 😐
#crypto #cryptography #pqc -
Google Cloud published a dated PQC migration roadmap on 11 Aug. Nineteen dated entries against named services, which is more resolution than AWS or Microsoft has published.
Domain 1 covers store-now-decrypt-later mitigation - end of 2027. Domain 2 covers integrity and non-repudiation, Domain 3 foundations and key management, and both for 2028. Everything converges on 2029.
Google's March post said it had adjusted its threat model to prioritize authentication and digital signatures. The roadmap now puts signatures a year behind confidentiality anyway.
So I try to explain the change.
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/google-cloud-pqc-roadmap/
#PQC #postquantum #cryptography #infosec #TLS #PKI #cloudsecurity
-
Google Cloud published a dated PQC migration roadmap on 11 Aug. Nineteen dated entries against named services, which is more resolution than AWS or Microsoft has published.
Domain 1 covers store-now-decrypt-later mitigation - end of 2027. Domain 2 covers integrity and non-repudiation, Domain 3 foundations and key management, and both for 2028. Everything converges on 2029.
Google's March post said it had adjusted its threat model to prioritize authentication and digital signatures. The roadmap now puts signatures a year behind confidentiality anyway.
So I try to explain the change.
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/google-cloud-pqc-roadmap/
#PQC #postquantum #cryptography #infosec #TLS #PKI #cloudsecurity
-
Yomiuri and Asahi gain cryptographic IDs as fake clones of their sites spread: Dentsu is signing its own Japanese ad buys with the same credential, and OP-CIP wants 50 organizations running it by early 2027. Will browser makers follow? https://ppc.land/yomiuri-and-asahi-gain-cryptographic-ids-as-fake-clones-of-their-sites-spread/ #Cryptography #DigitalSecurity #AdTech #BrowserSafety #WebAuthenticity
-
Introducing Automatic Key Verification https://lobste.rs/s/b3y5qs #cryptography #privacy
https://signal.org/blog/automatic-key-verification/ -
Introducing Automatic Key Verification https://lobste.rs/s/b3y5qs #cryptography #privacy
https://signal.org/blog/automatic-key-verification/ -
I can't believe they chose "Mallory" as the attacker's name in the man-in-the-middle attack when "Malcolm" was right there
-
I can't believe they chose "Mallory" as the attacker's name in the man-in-the-middle attack when "Malcolm" was right there
-
Unpatched #HP #ThinPro flaw allows bypass of disk #encryption protections
https://cyberinsider.com/unpatched-hp-thinpro-flaw-allows-bypass-of-disk-encryption-protections/
-
Unpatched #HP #ThinPro flaw allows bypass of disk #encryption protections
https://cyberinsider.com/unpatched-hp-thinpro-flaw-allows-bypass-of-disk-encryption-protections/
-
https://specifications.freedesktop.org/secret-service/latest/
Is this the state-of-the-art design? 🤔
-
https://specifications.freedesktop.org/secret-service/latest/
Is this the state-of-the-art design? 🤔
-
This is the part of 2FA/TOTP that many people don’t realize:
Your phone isn’t receiving the 6-digit code from the server.
Instead, your authenticator app acts like a specialized cryptographic calculator. 🧮🔐
It takes a shared secret key, combines it with the current time, and applies the TOTP algorithm to generate a temporary 6-digit code.
At the same time, the server independently performs the same calculation using its copy of the secret key and the same time counter.
Same secret + same time counter + same algorithm = same result.
That’s why your authenticator app can generate the correct code without receiving it from the server.
It’s a simple idea, but a brilliant application of cryptography.
You can even test this yourself: add the same TOTP secret to both Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator. Even if you set them up at different times, both apps can independently generate the same 6-digit code at the same time.
And here’s another important point:
The algorithm doesn’t need to be secret.
TOTP is based on publicly known, standardized cryptographic algorithms such as HMAC. What needs to remain secret is the shared secret key.
So:
🧮 Algorithm/math: Can be publicly known.
🔑 Secret key: Must remain private. Never share it.
⏱️ Time: Isn’t secret.
🔐 Security: Comes from protecting the secret key, not from hiding the algorithm.That’s a core principle of modern cryptography: A cryptographic system should remain secure even when the algorithm is publicly known. The secret is the key.
#2FA #TwoFactor #Security #Cybersecurity #SecretKey #Authentication #Cryptography #Math #TOTP #OTP #AuthenticatorApp #Internet #SecurityResearch
-
This is the part of 2FA/TOTP that many people don’t realize:
Your phone isn’t receiving the 6-digit code from the server.
Instead, your authenticator app acts like a specialized cryptographic calculator. 🧮🔐
It takes a shared secret key, combines it with the current time, and applies the TOTP algorithm to generate a temporary 6-digit code.
At the same time, the server independently performs the same calculation using its copy of the secret key and the same time counter.
Same secret + same time counter + same algorithm = same result.
That’s why your authenticator app can generate the correct code without receiving it from the server.
It’s a simple idea, but a brilliant application of cryptography.
You can even test this yourself: add the same TOTP secret to both Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator. Even if you set them up at different times, both apps can independently generate the same 6-digit code at the same time.
And here’s another important point:
The algorithm doesn’t need to be secret.
TOTP is based on publicly known, standardized cryptographic algorithms such as HMAC. What needs to remain secret is the shared secret key.
So:
🧮 Algorithm/math: Can be publicly known.
🔑 Secret key: Must remain private. Never share it.
⏱️ Time: Isn’t secret.
🔐 Security: Comes from protecting the secret key, not from hiding the algorithm.That’s a core principle of modern cryptography: A cryptographic system should remain secure even when the algorithm is publicly known. The secret is the key.
#2FA #TwoFactor #Security #Cybersecurity #SecretKey #Authentication #Cryptography #Math #TOTP #OTP #AuthenticatorApp #Internet #SecurityResearch
-
-
Rolling your own #crypto
-
Shipping post-quantum cryptography to Python https://lobste.rs/s/szvtko #cryptography #python #security
https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/06/30/shipping-post-quantum-cryptography-to-python/ -
Shipping post-quantum cryptography to Python https://lobste.rs/s/szvtko #cryptography #python #security
https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/06/30/shipping-post-quantum-cryptography-to-python/ -
After checking out my university's library: Does anybody have some recommendations on books/resources about elliptic curve cryptography and other lattice-based cryptography fields. I would like to better understand the maths behind it but am happy to have real life examples/guides/best practices included?
Language can be english, german, or italian.
I do study comp sci so my mathematical training is OKish at best, but I want to learn. :BoostOK: -
After checking out my university's library: Does anybody have some recommendations on books/resources about elliptic curve cryptography and other lattice-based cryptography fields. I would like to better understand the maths behind it but am happy to have real life examples/guides/best practices included?
Language can be english, german, or italian.
I do study comp sci so my mathematical training is OKish at best, but I want to learn. :BoostOK: -
Oh, the thrill of resuscitating a tech relic from the good ol' days of 2021! 🦖 Apparently, all you need is a masterclass in #cryptography and network jargon to fix a glorified notepad. Next time, try offering it as a contemporary art piece instead. 🖼️
https://oskrim.github.io/hardware/2026/08/09/remarkable-over-ssh.html #techrelics #nostalgia #digitalart #techhumor #HackerNews #ngated -
Oh, the thrill of resuscitating a tech relic from the good ol' days of 2021! 🦖 Apparently, all you need is a masterclass in #cryptography and network jargon to fix a glorified notepad. Next time, try offering it as a contemporary art piece instead. 🖼️
https://oskrim.github.io/hardware/2026/08/09/remarkable-over-ssh.html #techrelics #nostalgia #digitalart #techhumor #HackerNews #ngated -
On unrelated post, if you are into cryptography and vtubing, go check out kurenaif on YouTube.
In this video, they covered about Isogeny cryptography. It has english subtitle :D
(Yeah, I haven't finished the video, but still, sharing is caring right?)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlhSM0sKZXI
#cybersecurity #infosec #cryptography #isogenycrypto #vtuber
-
On unrelated post, if you are into cryptography and vtubing, go check out kurenaif on YouTube.
In this video, they covered about Isogeny cryptography. It has english subtitle :D
(Yeah, I haven't finished the video, but still, sharing is caring right?)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlhSM0sKZXI
#cybersecurity #infosec #cryptography #isogenycrypto #vtuber
-
A new paper by Daniel Simon might indicate lattice based crypto (#MLKEM etc) breaks with quantum computers
-
A new paper by Daniel Simon might indicate lattice based crypto (#MLKEM etc) breaks with quantum computers
-
Bringing Post-Quantum Cryptography to Java LTS Releases via @fs111 https://lobste.rs/s/oihm9i #cryptography #java
https://blogs.oracle.com/java/post-quantum-cryptography-in-long-term-support-jdk-releases -
Bringing Post-Quantum Cryptography to Java LTS Releases via @fs111 https://lobste.rs/s/oihm9i #cryptography #java
https://blogs.oracle.com/java/post-quantum-cryptography-in-long-term-support-jdk-releases -
Can you reverse engineer an ASIC?
https://blog.janestreet.com/can-you-reverse-engineer-an-asic/
Comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49200933
#HackerNews #reverseengineering #ASIC #hardwaretechnology #cryptography #hackernews
-
Can you reverse engineer an ASIC?
https://blog.janestreet.com/can-you-reverse-engineer-an-asic/
Comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49200933
#HackerNews #reverseengineering #ASIC #hardwaretechnology #cryptography #hackernews
-
<<< torbrowser (anon-dist / Kicksecure) >>>
* nice onion signature dl
(/etc/torbrowser.d/30_user.conf) made possible by a systemd unit.
* live run is not yet possible
* tb is disabled by default in persistent mode (sysmaint)
#tor #FundInternetFreedom @whonix #LinuxDevelopment<<< torbrowser-launcher ('Official') >>>
* tor+https signature from only a few functional mirrors that remain on the --settings list
* does run grub live in Kicksecure<<< #Arti + tb >>>
* live functionality in Qubes dvms but not in Kicksecure
@tails
#ComputerSafetyEducation #GetFediHired #cryptography #linux -
A Polynomial-Time Quantum Algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem https://lobste.rs/s/mfylx2 #pdf #cryptography
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591.pdf -
A Polynomial-Time Quantum Algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem https://lobste.rs/s/mfylx2 #pdf #cryptography
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591.pdf -
Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.
Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.
Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.
But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.
Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.
Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.
And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.
Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.
If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.
The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.
SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.
Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/
#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility
-
Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.
Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.
Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.
But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.
Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.
Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.
And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.
Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.
If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.
The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.
SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.
Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/
#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility
-
Uh-oh... https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591
Potentially worrying. Has anyone looked into it already?
#cryptography #pqc #crypto #quantum #quantsec #postquantum #lattice