#postquantum — Public Fediverse posts

Google Cloud published a dated PQC migration roadmap on 11 Aug. Nineteen dated entries against named services, which is more resolution than AWS or Microsoft has published.

Domain 1 covers store-now-decrypt-later mitigation - end of 2027. Domain 2 covers integrity and non-repudiation, Domain 3 foundations and key management, and both for 2028. Everything converges on 2029.

Google's March post said it had adjusted its threat model to prioritize authentication and digital signatures. The roadmap now puts signatures a year behind confidentiality anyway.

So I try to explain the change.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/google-cloud-pqc-roadmap/

#PQC #postquantum #cryptography #infosec #TLS #PKI #cloudsecurity

Google Cloud published a dated PQC migration roadmap on 11 Aug. Nineteen dated entries against named services, which is more resolution than AWS or Microsoft has published.

Domain 1 covers store-now-decrypt-later mitigation - end of 2027. Domain 2 covers integrity and non-repudiation, Domain 3 foundations and key management, and both for 2028. Everything converges on 2029.

Google's March post said it had adjusted its threat model to prioritize authentication and digital signatures. The roadmap now puts signatures a year behind confidentiality anyway.

So I try to explain the change.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/google-cloud-pqc-roadmap/

#PQC #postquantum #cryptography #infosec #TLS #PKI #cloudsecurity

Sí señor!

Desde #JuncoTIC somos patrocinadores de la #UbuConLA2026 que se realizará en Chile el próximo 29 y 30 de setiembre!

Estaremos sorteando accesos gratuitos a nuestros cursos, así que los que vayan a ir estén atentos a los sorteos!

Por mi parte, daré una charla sobre Criptografía Post-cuántica en #Ubuntu

Acá seguimos, apoyando eventos de #softwarelibre y #opensource, y las comunidades abiertas, que compartiendo se aprende más :-)

#UbuConLA #pqc #postquantum #cybersecurity #infosec

Sí señor!

Desde #JuncoTIC somos patrocinadores de la #UbuConLA2026 que se realizará en Chile el próximo 29 y 30 de setiembre!

Estaremos sorteando accesos gratuitos a nuestros cursos, así que los que vayan a ir estén atentos a los sorteos!

Por mi parte, daré una charla sobre Criptografía Post-cuántica en #Ubuntu

Acá seguimos, apoyando eventos de #softwarelibre y #opensource, y las comunidades abiertas, que compartiendo se aprende más :-)

#UbuConLA #pqc #postquantum #cybersecurity #infosec

Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.

Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.

Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.

But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.

Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.

Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.

And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.

Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.

If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.

The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.

SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.

Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility

Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.

Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.

Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.

But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.

Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.

Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.

And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.

Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.

If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.

The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.

SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.

Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility

Uh-oh... https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591

Potentially worrying. Has anyone looked into it already?

#cryptography #pqc #crypto #quantum #quantsec #postquantum #lattice

Uh-oh... https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1591

Potentially worrying. Has anyone looked into it already?

#cryptography #pqc #crypto #quantum #quantsec #postquantum #lattice

Singapore's MAS will issue supervisory expectations for FIs' quantum-safe migration. Target: quantum resilience before end of decade. Three-phase approach: cryptographic asset inventory, prioritized migration of vulnerable systems, then technical capabilities + governance.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/mas-quantum-resilience-supervisory-expectations/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #quantum #cryptography #MAS #Singapore

Singapore's MAS will issue supervisory expectations for FIs' quantum-safe migration. Target: quantum resilience before end of decade. Three-phase approach: cryptographic asset inventory, prioritized migration of vulnerable systems, then technical capabilities + governance.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/mas-quantum-resilience-supervisory-expectations/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #quantum #cryptography #MAS #Singapore

Our August online training schedule:
1. Remaining Anonymous — free for Subscribers and Subscribers PRO
2. Post-Quantum — free for Subscribers PRO
#cybersecurity #infosec #postquantum #quantum #anonymous

For the PKI/TLS people here: Chrome's MTC test-operator program is now receiving external applications.

TrustAsia filed Chromium Issue 538260165 ("Test MTC CA Operator: [TrustAsia]") on July 24. Geomys followed on July 31. PKI standards expert Corey Bonnell surfaced the TrustAsia filing publicly and identified it as the first such application he could find in the tracker.

The technical details: TrustAsia's filing uses unsigned CA trust-anchor certificates per RFC 9925 (the general-purpose profile for X.509 certificates without cryptographic signatures, finalized Feb 2026) and the critical id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority extension from draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-05. The extension carries four fields — log hash algorithm, cosigner signature algorithm, and separate min/max serial number bounds. The critical marking prevents conventional path validators from misinterpreting the certificate as an ordinary intermediate.

TrustAsia qualifies for Chrome's Phase 2 (Q1 2027) through its CT log history — Chrome-qualified since 2021, with current log2026a/b shards carrying usable status, clearing the "usable log before Feb 1, 2026" threshold.

Chrome's quantum-resistant root store (CQRS) is targeted for Q3 2027. The current Chrome-Cloudflare experiment covers ~1,000 domains with classical signatures and X.509 failsafe. Production post-quantum authentication via MTC is still a 2027 target, not current reality.

My full analysis covers the web PKI fork implications for PQC migration, the RFC 9925 mechanics, Chrome's three-phase plan, and what DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, and now TrustAsia/Geomys activity means for the MTC deployment timeline:

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/trustasia-mtc-chrome-test-root/

#infosec #cybersecurity #cryptography #PQC #postquantum #TLS #PKI #quantum

For the PKI/TLS people here: Chrome's MTC test-operator program is now receiving external applications.

TrustAsia filed Chromium Issue 538260165 ("Test MTC CA Operator: [TrustAsia]") on July 24. Geomys followed on July 31. PKI standards expert Corey Bonnell surfaced the TrustAsia filing publicly and identified it as the first such application he could find in the tracker.

The technical details: TrustAsia's filing uses unsigned CA trust-anchor certificates per RFC 9925 (the general-purpose profile for X.509 certificates without cryptographic signatures, finalized Feb 2026) and the critical id-pe-mtcCertificationAuthority extension from draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs-05. The extension carries four fields — log hash algorithm, cosigner signature algorithm, and separate min/max serial number bounds. The critical marking prevents conventional path validators from misinterpreting the certificate as an ordinary intermediate.

TrustAsia qualifies for Chrome's Phase 2 (Q1 2027) through its CT log history — Chrome-qualified since 2021, with current log2026a/b shards carrying usable status, clearing the "usable log before Feb 1, 2026" threshold.

Chrome's quantum-resistant root store (CQRS) is targeted for Q3 2027. The current Chrome-Cloudflare experiment covers ~1,000 domains with classical signatures and X.509 failsafe. Production post-quantum authentication via MTC is still a 2027 target, not current reality.

My full analysis covers the web PKI fork implications for PQC migration, the RFC 9925 mechanics, Chrome's three-phase plan, and what DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, and now TrustAsia/Geomys activity means for the MTC deployment timeline:

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/trustasia-mtc-chrome-test-root/

#infosec #cybersecurity #cryptography #PQC #postquantum #TLS #PKI #quantum

Fact-checked the quantum sections of WEF's Top 10 Emerging Technologies 2026.

Three errors: NIST PQC took 8 years, not 2. IBM/Moderna was mRNA structure prediction, not protein folding. "Hybrid classical-quantum cryptography" is wrong terminology.

Also missing: TNFL, key-establishment/signature distinction, all NIST algorithm names.

https://postquantum.com/industry-news/wef-top-10-emerging-technologies-2026-pqc-quantum/

#infosec #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #NIST #cybersecurity

Fact-checked the quantum sections of WEF's Top 10 Emerging Technologies 2026.

Three errors: NIST PQC took 8 years, not 2. IBM/Moderna was mRNA structure prediction, not protein folding. "Hybrid classical-quantum cryptography" is wrong terminology.

Also missing: TNFL, key-establishment/signature distinction, all NIST algorithm names.

https://postquantum.com/industry-news/wef-top-10-emerging-technologies-2026-pqc-quantum/

#infosec #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #NIST #cybersecurity

IBM declared a "quantum advantage era." Three preprints make different claims, but don't confirm the declaration.

UChicago: explicit advantage claim, device-dependent fidelity certificate. Qedma: no formal advantage proof; late-time results use a heuristic. Algorithmiq: no exhaustive classical separation; accuracy bound missing.

IBM packaged three evidence levels as one.

https://postquantum.com/industry-news/ibm-three-quantum-advantage-papers/

#infosec #cybersecurity #quantum #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #IBM

IBM declared a "quantum advantage era." Three preprints make different claims, but don't confirm the declaration.

UChicago: explicit advantage claim, device-dependent fidelity certificate. Qedma: no formal advantage proof; late-time results use a heuristic. Algorithmiq: no exhaustive classical separation; accuracy bound missing.

IBM packaged three evidence levels as one.

https://postquantum.com/industry-news/ibm-three-quantum-advantage-papers/

#infosec #cybersecurity #quantum #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #IBM

A Harvard-Quantinuum-Stony Brook-UChicago collaboration published what the paper describes as the first experimental demonstration of a universal topological gate set built from braiding and fusing non-Abelian anyons, in Nature (vol. 655, pp. 591-597, July 15).

The experiment: 54 physical qubits encoding 18 six-level qudits (each qudit is a qutrit-qubit pair, three physical qubits per site) on the H2-1 trapped-ion processor. The team prepared the ground state of the quantum double of S3 (the smallest non-Abelian group), encoded logical qutrits in the fusion space of spatially separated anyons, and demonstrated three primitives: a pull-through entangling gate via coherent braiding, and logical X- and Z-basis measurements via fusion and topological-charge readout. Braiding alone is provably not universal for these simple anyons; treating fusion as a computational primitive completes the gate set, an idea from Mochon's 2004 paper. The current demonstrations use linear-depth circuits, but the paper notes all three primitives can be scalably implemented with constant-depth adaptive circuits.

Universality was illustrated by topologically preparing a magic state, the non-Clifford resource that most fault-tolerant architectures plan to build through distillation factories. The cyclic-fusion evidence from trapping a single non-Abelian anyon on the torus provides a separate diagnostic of the S3 encoding's computational power.

The caveats are in the paper's own language: stabilizing the topological phase requires active error correction, "which is beyond the scope of the present work," though a finite decoding threshold for quantum doubles with solvable groups has recently been proven. No distance-scaling result shows that a larger lattice improves logical performance. Ground-state preparation discards about 24% of shots under heralding; the most selective calibration protocol (bureau of standards) accepted 11.5% against an ideal 12.5%, with about 6% after all heralding; the magic-state protocol's acceptance was 26.52%. The pull-through gate compiled to 845 native two-qubit gates at depth 307, about 5.9s per shot.

For the CRQC picture: the magic-state result maps onto the magic-state capability in my framework at proof-of-principle level. It shows the anyonic primitives can create a non-Clifford resource but nothing yet about fault-tolerant production, injection, or logical fidelity at scale. The result widens the credible architecture set without shortening the calendar, and it raises the bar for Microsoft's materials-first Majorana approach, which pursues native topological protection in semiconductor-superconductor devices via parity measurements and measurement-based braiding.

The deeper trade this paper forces: fusion-space computing may swap the magic-state-factory overhead for a more complex preparation, measurement, and decoding stack, and this paper makes that comparison an engineering question rather than a theoretical one. Twenty-two years from Mochon's recipe to hardware. Protection is next.

Full analysis: https://postquantum.com/industry-news/universal-topological-gates-anyons/

#quantumcomputing #physics #faulttolerance #infosec #PQC #postquantum #topological

A Harvard-Quantinuum-Stony Brook-UChicago collaboration published what the paper describes as the first experimental demonstration of a universal topological gate set built from braiding and fusing non-Abelian anyons, in Nature (vol. 655, pp. 591-597, July 15).

The experiment: 54 physical qubits encoding 18 six-level qudits (each qudit is a qutrit-qubit pair, three physical qubits per site) on the H2-1 trapped-ion processor. The team prepared the ground state of the quantum double of S3 (the smallest non-Abelian group), encoded logical qutrits in the fusion space of spatially separated anyons, and demonstrated three primitives: a pull-through entangling gate via coherent braiding, and logical X- and Z-basis measurements via fusion and topological-charge readout. Braiding alone is provably not universal for these simple anyons; treating fusion as a computational primitive completes the gate set, an idea from Mochon's 2004 paper. The current demonstrations use linear-depth circuits, but the paper notes all three primitives can be scalably implemented with constant-depth adaptive circuits.

Universality was illustrated by topologically preparing a magic state, the non-Clifford resource that most fault-tolerant architectures plan to build through distillation factories. The cyclic-fusion evidence from trapping a single non-Abelian anyon on the torus provides a separate diagnostic of the S3 encoding's computational power.

The caveats are in the paper's own language: stabilizing the topological phase requires active error correction, "which is beyond the scope of the present work," though a finite decoding threshold for quantum doubles with solvable groups has recently been proven. No distance-scaling result shows that a larger lattice improves logical performance. Ground-state preparation discards about 24% of shots under heralding; the most selective calibration protocol (bureau of standards) accepted 11.5% against an ideal 12.5%, with about 6% after all heralding; the magic-state protocol's acceptance was 26.52%. The pull-through gate compiled to 845 native two-qubit gates at depth 307, about 5.9s per shot.

For the CRQC picture: the magic-state result maps onto the magic-state capability in my framework at proof-of-principle level. It shows the anyonic primitives can create a non-Clifford resource but nothing yet about fault-tolerant production, injection, or logical fidelity at scale. The result widens the credible architecture set without shortening the calendar, and it raises the bar for Microsoft's materials-first Majorana approach, which pursues native topological protection in semiconductor-superconductor devices via parity measurements and measurement-based braiding.

The deeper trade this paper forces: fusion-space computing may swap the magic-state-factory overhead for a more complex preparation, measurement, and decoding stack, and this paper makes that comparison an engineering question rather than a theoretical one. Twenty-two years from Mochon's recipe to hardware. Protection is next.

Full analysis: https://postquantum.com/industry-news/universal-topological-gates-anyons/

#quantumcomputing #physics #faulttolerance #infosec #PQC #postquantum #topological

DigiCert Quantum Readiness Outlook 2026: 87% pursuing PQC, 7% deployed quantum-safe certs at scale. <2 points of progress in a year.

Barriers: legacy complexity 26%, performance 19%, budget 19%, exec buy-in 8%, where to start 3%.

Report ignores TNFL entirely. No key-establishment vs. signature distinction. EO 14412 splits these for a reason.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/digicert-quantum-readiness-outlook-2026/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #quantum #cryptography

DigiCert Quantum Readiness Outlook 2026: 87% pursuing PQC, 7% deployed quantum-safe certs at scale. <2 points of progress in a year.

Barriers: legacy complexity 26%, performance 19%, budget 19%, exec buy-in 8%, where to start 3%.

Report ignores TNFL entirely. No key-establishment vs. signature distinction. EO 14412 splits these for a reason.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/digicert-quantum-readiness-outlook-2026/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #quantum #cryptography

HKMA just published the most granular regulator-led PQC readiness assessment I've seen from any financial authority: a 56-page whitepaper with sector-wide survey data, a four-dimensional readiness index (12 sub-indices), barrier rankings, and five completed pilot descriptions.

The headline number: Hong Kong's banking sector scores 2.3/10 on post-quantum cryptography readiness. Pilots score 1.8/10 — the weakest dimension. 71% of respondents have never conducted or planned any PoC or live testing of PQC algorithms.

The barrier data is more interesting than the score. 87% ranked third-party dependencies as a top-three obstacle. 85% said their vendors lack clear PQC roadmaps. 79% cited technical complexity of cryptographic asset discovery across legacy IT environments. Banks can't migrate what they don't control, and the vendor ecosystem hasn't given them enough to plan against.

FINMA published similar findings from Switzerland two weeks earlier: 72% of 60 surveyed institutions hadn't planned or implemented quantum-safe measures, only 8% had a roadmap. Two jurisdictions, same picture.

What the HKMA report misses: no treatment of signature forgery (Trust Now, Forge Later) as a distinct threat track alongside HNDL. For banking, this matters — a CRQC that can break ECC forges transaction authorizations on the day the capability arrives. The report also never names ML-KEM, ML-DSA, or SLH-DSA in its body (they appear only in the abbreviations appendix), and barely addresses China's divergent PQC standards program despite Hong Kong straddling both cryptographic ecosystems.

Carmen Chu (HKMA Banking Supervision) noted that banks with existing transition plans estimate 5.6 years on average to complete migration. The HKMA targets full readiness by 2030. The contradiction speaks for itself.

Full analysis: https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/hkma-banks-quantum-readiness-2-3/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #quantum #cryptography #banking #HKMA

HKMA just published the most granular regulator-led PQC readiness assessment I've seen from any financial authority: a 56-page whitepaper with sector-wide survey data, a four-dimensional readiness index (12 sub-indices), barrier rankings, and five completed pilot descriptions.

The headline number: Hong Kong's banking sector scores 2.3/10 on post-quantum cryptography readiness. Pilots score 1.8/10 — the weakest dimension. 71% of respondents have never conducted or planned any PoC or live testing of PQC algorithms.

The barrier data is more interesting than the score. 87% ranked third-party dependencies as a top-three obstacle. 85% said their vendors lack clear PQC roadmaps. 79% cited technical complexity of cryptographic asset discovery across legacy IT environments. Banks can't migrate what they don't control, and the vendor ecosystem hasn't given them enough to plan against.

FINMA published similar findings from Switzerland two weeks earlier: 72% of 60 surveyed institutions hadn't planned or implemented quantum-safe measures, only 8% had a roadmap. Two jurisdictions, same picture.

What the HKMA report misses: no treatment of signature forgery (Trust Now, Forge Later) as a distinct threat track alongside HNDL. For banking, this matters — a CRQC that can break ECC forges transaction authorizations on the day the capability arrives. The report also never names ML-KEM, ML-DSA, or SLH-DSA in its body (they appear only in the abbreviations appendix), and barely addresses China's divergent PQC standards program despite Hong Kong straddling both cryptographic ecosystems.

Carmen Chu (HKMA Banking Supervision) noted that banks with existing transition plans estimate 5.6 years on average to complete migration. The HKMA targets full readiness by 2030. The contradiction speaks for itself.

Full analysis: https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/hkma-banks-quantum-readiness-2-3/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #quantum #cryptography #banking #HKMA

Best quantum computing meta-analysis of the year: Jurczak's PFYT framework explains why quantum engineering horizons keep resetting. Backed by Riverlane QEC data and OpenAlex bibliometrics.

Where it breaks: conflating unsettled architecture with undefined targets. For CRQC and simulation workloads, the acceptance test is concrete.

https://postquantum.com/quantum-computing/perpetual-five-year-quantum-computers-pfyt/

#quantum #PQC #infosec #cryptography #postquantum

Best quantum computing meta-analysis of the year: Jurczak's PFYT framework explains why quantum engineering horizons keep resetting. Backed by Riverlane QEC data and OpenAlex bibliometrics.

Where it breaks: conflating unsettled architecture with undefined targets. For CRQC and simulation workloads, the acceptance test is concrete.

https://postquantum.com/quantum-computing/perpetual-five-year-quantum-computers-pfyt/

#quantum #PQC #infosec #cryptography #postquantum

I updated https://arewequantumyet.taffer.ca to include a link to IBM's new Quantum Advantage Tracker page.

Helpful 🤞 if you want to know whether to panic about classical private-key encryption being broken!

#quantum #QuantumComputing #PQ #PostQuantum

I updated https://arewequantumyet.taffer.ca to include a link to IBM's new Quantum Advantage Tracker page.

Helpful 🤞 if you want to know whether to panic about classical private-key encryption being broken!

#quantum #QuantumComputing #PQ #PostQuantum

Every technique used in the various July AI hacking incidents has a known defense. Weak passwords. Unauthenticated endpoints. SQL injection. Unmonitored east-west traffic. Two of three organizations Anthropic's models compromised didn't even detect it.

This is not an AI problem. It is a cybersecurity basics problem exposed at machine speed.

Vendors are already starting to market "AI-resilient" infrastructure and "Mythos-resistant" cryptography. Do not buy the label. The correct response to faster attacks is faster defense, not a different kind of defense. Shorter patching windows. Better credential rotation. Tighter segmentation. Automated rollout.

The one actually new investment: crypto-agility. In the same week OpenAI and Anthropic disclosed their hacking incidents, Anthropic's AI killed a PQC candidate that had survived years of NIST evaluation. 60 hours. $100K. HAWK was withdrawn the next day.

AI is now also attacking mathematical layer of your defenses. And the upcoming quantum threat is defeating the mathematical layer. The shared defense is the ability to swap cryptographic algorithms without rebuilding your stack.

Do good cybersecurity. Do it better. Do it faster. Build crypto-agility into the architecture.

https://postquantum.com/ai-security/ai-hacking-theater-crypto-agility/

#cybersecurity #CISO #AIhacking #cryptoagility #PQC #postquantum #infosec #AI #quantumsecurity

Every technique used in the various July AI hacking incidents has a known defense. Weak passwords. Unauthenticated endpoints. SQL injection. Unmonitored east-west traffic. Two of three organizations Anthropic's models compromised didn't even detect it.

This is not an AI problem. It is a cybersecurity basics problem exposed at machine speed.

Vendors are already starting to market "AI-resilient" infrastructure and "Mythos-resistant" cryptography. Do not buy the label. The correct response to faster attacks is faster defense, not a different kind of defense. Shorter patching windows. Better credential rotation. Tighter segmentation. Automated rollout.

The one actually new investment: crypto-agility. In the same week OpenAI and Anthropic disclosed their hacking incidents, Anthropic's AI killed a PQC candidate that had survived years of NIST evaluation. 60 hours. $100K. HAWK was withdrawn the next day.

AI is now also attacking mathematical layer of your defenses. And the upcoming quantum threat is defeating the mathematical layer. The shared defense is the ability to swap cryptographic algorithms without rebuilding your stack.

Do good cybersecurity. Do it better. Do it faster. Build crypto-agility into the architecture.

https://postquantum.com/ai-security/ai-hacking-theater-crypto-agility/

#cybersecurity #CISO #AIhacking #cryptoagility #PQC #postquantum #infosec #AI #quantumsecurity

The quantum industry has a credibility problem, and announcements like this one from EY make it worse. EY says it installed a quantum computer in Toronto for "optimization, fraud detection, data protection and large-scale risk management." No vendor named. No qubit count. No specifications. I reached out to EY's media contact and CTO - no response.

One journalist got them to confirm it's photonic.

Here's the problem: no photonic quantum computer on Earth can do optimization, fraud detection, or risk management. Not Xanadu's. Not ORCA's. Not anyone's. The photonic modality has the largest gap to useful computation of any quantum platform I track in my CRQC Scorecard.

Buying a quantum computer before they're useful? Actually smart. I wrote many posts defending exactly that logic. Procurement cycles are long. Talent is scarce. Institutional learning takes time.

But describing a research-grade photonic prototype as a machine for "processing highly sensitive workloads" in fraud detection and risk management? That's the kind of claim that makes tech execs roll their eyes at the entire quantum industry.

Joe Depa told Accounting Today the real focus is readiness and PQC. That's honest and a praiseworthy initiative. If that's what EY said, I'd congratulate them. The press release says something else. The gap between the two is the problem.

My full analysis, including two plausible vendors, what they can actually build, and what to watch for on August 5: https://postquantum.com/industry-news/ey-quantum-computer-toronto/

#QuantumComputing #PostQuantum #PQC #PhotonicQuantum #QuantumSecurity #CyberSecurity #BigFour #EY #CISO

The quantum industry has a credibility problem, and announcements like this one from EY make it worse. EY says it installed a quantum computer in Toronto for "optimization, fraud detection, data protection and large-scale risk management." No vendor named. No qubit count. No specifications. I reached out to EY's media contact and CTO - no response.

One journalist got them to confirm it's photonic.

Here's the problem: no photonic quantum computer on Earth can do optimization, fraud detection, or risk management. Not Xanadu's. Not ORCA's. Not anyone's. The photonic modality has the largest gap to useful computation of any quantum platform I track in my CRQC Scorecard.

Buying a quantum computer before they're useful? Actually smart. I wrote many posts defending exactly that logic. Procurement cycles are long. Talent is scarce. Institutional learning takes time.

But describing a research-grade photonic prototype as a machine for "processing highly sensitive workloads" in fraud detection and risk management? That's the kind of claim that makes tech execs roll their eyes at the entire quantum industry.

Joe Depa told Accounting Today the real focus is readiness and PQC. That's honest and a praiseworthy initiative. If that's what EY said, I'd congratulate them. The press release says something else. The gap between the two is the problem.

My full analysis, including two plausible vendors, what they can actually build, and what to watch for on August 5: https://postquantum.com/industry-news/ey-quantum-computer-toronto/

#QuantumComputing #PostQuantum #PQC #PhotonicQuantum #QuantumSecurity #CyberSecurity #BigFour #EY #CISO

Zig's standard library ships one of NIST's two finalised post-quantum signature standards. This is the other one.

slh-dsa-zig v0.1.1 — pure Zig SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), the hash-based scheme whose security rests on SHA-2 and SHAKE rather than lattice assumptions. All 12 parameter sets, KAT-validated against NIST ACVP, constant-time verified under Valgrind in CI.

Experimental and unaudited. Harsh review welcome.

https://nandan.me/writing/the-post-quantum-gap-in-zig/

#Zig #Cryptography #PostQuantum

Privacy is evolving.

Zerion is an open-source, Tor-native messenger focused on modern cryptography and privacy-first communication.

🌐 https://zerion.chat
💻 https://github.com/zerionproject/Zerion

#OpenSource #Privacy #PostQuantum #Tor #Encryption #FOSS #Android

Privacy is evolving.

Zerion is an open-source, Tor-native messenger focused on modern cryptography and privacy-first communication.

🌐 https://zerion.chat
💻 https://github.com/zerionproject/Zerion

#OpenSource #Privacy #PostQuantum #Tor #Encryption #FOSS #Android

Cloudflare: Erhöhte Sicherheit gegen künftige Quanten-Angriffe https://www.computerbase.de/news/internet/cloudflare-erhoehte-sicherheit-gegen-kuenftige-quanten-angriffe.98633/ #Cloudflare #PostQuantum #QuantumSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography

Cloudflare: Erhöhte Sicherheit gegen künftige Quanten-Angriffe https://www.computerbase.de/news/internet/cloudflare-erhoehte-sicherheit-gegen-kuenftige-quanten-angriffe.98633/ #Cloudflare #PostQuantum #QuantumSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography

Decentralized browser-based P2P E2EE messaging.

The key detail that sets this apart from other messaging apps is the browser-based client-side cryptography philosophy.

No need to install anything. Your ID is crypto-random and so the app doesnt need to rely on any central registration system like phone numbers. Your ID is unguessable and to connect to someone, you have to explicitly share it.

WebRTC has other nuances like being to route through a shared network for secure/faster transfer.

I hope this project has reached a level i can share the following details. I've made a genuine effort towards documentation and transparancy. I dont think it'll ever be enough and so im still concerned it isnt ready to share. While im using AI throughout. This is not a vibecoded project. There is attention throughout for unit tests and formal-verification. With your feedback, id like to make improvements for clarity throughout.

This version of the app demonstrates a fairly unique approach using a browser-based, local-only and webrtc approach. I know it's impossible for any system to be the "world's most secure", but that isnt a reason to not try. By rigorously implementing an exhaustive list of security features and practices, the aim is to get as close as possible.

* [Enkrypted.Chat](https://enkrypted.chat/)

This is intended to demonstrate client-side managed secure cryptography.

* [Introducing Enkrypted Chat](https://positive-intentions.com/blog/introducing-enkrypted-chat)
* [Whitepaper (work-in-progress)](https://positive-intentions.com/docs/technical/whitepaper/complete-whitepaper)
* [Protocol Spec (work-in-progress)](https://positive-intentions.com/docs/technical/whitepaper/complete-protocol-spec)
* [Roadmap](https://positive-intentions.com/docs/technical/p2p-messaging-technical-breakdown/)

I know ive tried to compress a lot of my journey into one post. The project above is going to be tricky to understand. Feel free to reach out for clarity on any of the details.

IMPORTANT: While this is aiming to provide a secure experience, It is [not audited or reviewed](https://www.reddit.com/r/CyberSecurityAdvice/comments/1su8lir/security_audit_feedback_from_radically_open/). **Shared for testing, feedback and demo purposes only.** Please use responsibly.

#Privacy #OnlinePrivacy #DataPrivacy #Infosec #CyberSecurity #OpSec #DigitalRights #AntiSurveillance #DataOwnership #E2EE #P2P #PeerToPeer #WebRTC #LocalFirst #LocalOnly #NoCloud #NoRegistration #PWA #SignalProtocol #PostQuantum #Cryptography #SecureMessaging #PrivateChat #EncryptedChat #Decentralized #OpenSource #SelfHosted #BetaTesting #FeedbackWelcome #TechDemo #ProofOfConcept #BuildInPublic #IndieDev #DevCommunity

Decentralized browser-based P2P E2EE messaging.

The key detail that sets this apart from other messaging apps is the browser-based client-side cryptography philosophy.

No need to install anything. Your ID is crypto-random and so the app doesnt need to rely on any central registration system like phone numbers. Your ID is unguessable and to connect to someone, you have to explicitly share it.

WebRTC has other nuances like being to route through a shared network for secure/faster transfer.

I hope this project has reached a level i can share the following details. I've made a genuine effort towards documentation and transparancy. I dont think it'll ever be enough and so im still concerned it isnt ready to share. While im using AI throughout. This is not a vibecoded project. There is attention throughout for unit tests and formal-verification. With your feedback, id like to make improvements for clarity throughout.

This version of the app demonstrates a fairly unique approach using a browser-based, local-only and webrtc approach. I know it's impossible for any system to be the "world's most secure", but that isnt a reason to not try. By rigorously implementing an exhaustive list of security features and practices, the aim is to get as close as possible.

* [Enkrypted.Chat](https://enkrypted.chat/)

This is intended to demonstrate client-side managed secure cryptography.

* [Introducing Enkrypted Chat](https://positive-intentions.com/blog/introducing-enkrypted-chat)
* [Whitepaper (work-in-progress)](https://positive-intentions.com/docs/technical/whitepaper/complete-whitepaper)
* [Protocol Spec (work-in-progress)](https://positive-intentions.com/docs/technical/whitepaper/complete-protocol-spec)
* [Roadmap](https://positive-intentions.com/docs/technical/p2p-messaging-technical-breakdown/)

I know ive tried to compress a lot of my journey into one post. The project above is going to be tricky to understand. Feel free to reach out for clarity on any of the details.

IMPORTANT: While this is aiming to provide a secure experience, It is [not audited or reviewed](https://www.reddit.com/r/CyberSecurityAdvice/comments/1su8lir/security_audit_feedback_from_radically_open/). **Shared for testing, feedback and demo purposes only.** Please use responsibly.

#Privacy #OnlinePrivacy #DataPrivacy #Infosec #CyberSecurity #OpSec #DigitalRights #AntiSurveillance #DataOwnership #E2EE #P2P #PeerToPeer #WebRTC #LocalFirst #LocalOnly #NoCloud #NoRegistration #PWA #SignalProtocol #PostQuantum #Cryptography #SecureMessaging #PrivateChat #EncryptedChat #Decentralized #OpenSource #SelfHosted #BetaTesting #FeedbackWelcome #TechDemo #ProofOfConcept #BuildInPublic #IndieDev #DevCommunity

I just published my analysis of the Anthropic HAWK/AES cryptanalysis papers. Read both against primary sources, and the coverage is getting it wrong in both directions.

"AI broke post-quantum encryption." No. HAWK is a NIST candidate, not a standard. HAWK-256 is a challenge parameter set, not a proposed security level.

"Just implementation bugs." Also no. The HAWK attack exploits a Galois symmetry (τ: ζ↦−ζ) in the power-of-two cyclotomic ring. The AES Mobius Bridge exploits the S-box's GF(2^8) inversion structure as defined in FIPS 197. These are properties of the algorithm specifications. Any correct implementation inherits them.

On the numbers: Anthropic's blog says HAWK-256 cost moved from 2^64 to 2^38. That pairing does not appear in the paper. Table 1 gives per-SVP-call costs of 2^62 and 2^38 (Core-SVP) or 2^74 and 2^52 (gate model). Every outlet running "2^64 to 2^38" is copying the blog, not the paper.

For AES, the "200-800x faster" framing describes the time term only. The attack still needs 2^105 chosen plaintexts, so the balanced complexity max(D,T,M) is unchanged at fixed data. The rebalanced variant reaches 2^96.3 vs DFJ13's 2^99. Call it a 2.7-bit improvement on 7 of 10 rounds. Real work, but production AES is untouched.

The paper that got the least attention matters most: CryptanalysisBench reports a full 128-bit key recovery on unmodified SpoC AEAD using two oracle queries, independently found by two Claude models. Also a KINDI KEM CCA-proof error leading to a working key-recovery attack. Neither scheme was deployed, but these are full-strength design breaks, not reduced-round exercises.

I try to introduce a three-tier framework for classifying cryptographic failures (implementation bug / algorithm design weakness / full-parameter break) and places each result. It also covers the independent GPT-5.6 HAWK attack, Saarinen's HOVER McEliece results, and what I got wrong in my 2025 "Why AI Cannot Break Modern Encryption" article.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/ai-cryptanalysis-hawk-aes/

#infosec #cryptography #PQC #postquantum #HAWK #AES #cryptanalysis #cybersecurity

I just published my analysis of the Anthropic HAWK/AES cryptanalysis papers. Read both against primary sources, and the coverage is getting it wrong in both directions.

"AI broke post-quantum encryption." No. HAWK is a NIST candidate, not a standard. HAWK-256 is a challenge parameter set, not a proposed security level.

"Just implementation bugs." Also no. The HAWK attack exploits a Galois symmetry (τ: ζ↦−ζ) in the power-of-two cyclotomic ring. The AES Mobius Bridge exploits the S-box's GF(2^8) inversion structure as defined in FIPS 197. These are properties of the algorithm specifications. Any correct implementation inherits them.

On the numbers: Anthropic's blog says HAWK-256 cost moved from 2^64 to 2^38. That pairing does not appear in the paper. Table 1 gives per-SVP-call costs of 2^62 and 2^38 (Core-SVP) or 2^74 and 2^52 (gate model). Every outlet running "2^64 to 2^38" is copying the blog, not the paper.

For AES, the "200-800x faster" framing describes the time term only. The attack still needs 2^105 chosen plaintexts, so the balanced complexity max(D,T,M) is unchanged at fixed data. The rebalanced variant reaches 2^96.3 vs DFJ13's 2^99. Call it a 2.7-bit improvement on 7 of 10 rounds. Real work, but production AES is untouched.

The paper that got the least attention matters most: CryptanalysisBench reports a full 128-bit key recovery on unmodified SpoC AEAD using two oracle queries, independently found by two Claude models. Also a KINDI KEM CCA-proof error leading to a working key-recovery attack. Neither scheme was deployed, but these are full-strength design breaks, not reduced-round exercises.

I try to introduce a three-tier framework for classifying cryptographic failures (implementation bug / algorithm design weakness / full-parameter break) and places each result. It also covers the independent GPT-5.6 HAWK attack, Saarinen's HOVER McEliece results, and what I got wrong in my 2025 "Why AI Cannot Break Modern Encryption" article.

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/ai-cryptanalysis-hawk-aes/

#infosec #cryptography #PQC #postquantum #HAWK #AES #cryptanalysis #cybersecurity

New blog post, with some practical details on setting up post-quantum TLS key exchange with Envoy https://noa.re/posts/post-quantum/

#postquantum

What is the UK AI Growth Lab and who should use it?

The UK AI Growth Lab, announced 8 June 2026, brings regulators including the ICO, the SRA and the Legal Services Board together to guide organisations deploying AI, starting with lawtech and conveyancing. It offers practical steer, not a safe harbour; deployments still need to be evidenced.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/what-is-the-uk-ai-growth-lab-and-who-should-use-it

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

What is the UK AI Growth Lab and who should use it?

The UK AI Growth Lab, announced 8 June 2026, brings regulators including the ICO, the SRA and the Legal Services Board together to guide organisations deploying AI, starting with lawtech and conveyancing. It offers practical steer, not a safe harbour; deployments still need to be evidenced.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/what-is-the-uk-ai-growth-lab-and-who-should-use-it

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

What is the EU Cloud and AI Development Act?

A European Commission legislative proposal adopted on 3 June 2026 that aims to triple EU data centre capacity, reduce reliance on non-EU cloud providers, and grade cloud sovereignty on a four-tier procurement ladder. It is still in the legislative process, not law in force.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/what-is-the-eu-cloud-and-ai-development-act

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

What is the EU Cloud and AI Development Act?

A European Commission legislative proposal adopted on 3 June 2026 that aims to triple EU data centre capacity, reduce reliance on non-EU cloud providers, and grade cloud sovereignty on a four-tier procurement ladder. It is still in the legislative process, not law in force.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/what-is-the-eu-cloud-and-ai-development-act

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

What happens when your AI vendor is acquired?

The contract governs, and most AI contracts were not drafted for acquisition. Change of control, data ownership, model continuity, jurisdiction and IP terms can all shift the day a deal closes. Five clauses decide how exposed you are.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/what-happens-when-your-ai-vendor-is-acquired

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

How do you update an air-gapped AI system safely?

Everything arrives as signed artefacts verified against pinned keys, crosses one controlled import path, is exercised in staging before promotion, and the update event itself is sealed to the audit ledger with rollback preserved. On an air-gapped system, provenance is the patch.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/how-do-you-update-an-air-gapped-ai-system-safely

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

How do you find the AI agents already running in your organisation?

You find them the same way you find shadow IT, but with lenses built for agents: egress and DNS logs, OAuth grant reviews, procurement data, browser extension audits and staff attestation. Then an agent register built on five questions per agent keeps them found.

https://mickai.co.uk/articles/how-do-you-find-the-ai-agents-already-running-in-your-organisation

#SovereignAI #AI #DataSovereignty #PostQuantum #AIgovernance

Matthew McPherrin from Let's Encrypt doing a talk next Wednesday at TASK on post quantum readiness, TLS, and many things. Streaming link on site. https://www.task.to/schedule/july2026-business-resilience-post-quantum-tls #TASK #Toronto #Crypto #PostQuantum #PQ #InfoSec
Edit: There are five Wednesdays this month