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#pqcrypto — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #pqcrypto, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. Aceptaron mi charla en la #UbuConLa 2026!!

    A investigar y preparar las diapos y ... estaré hablando sobre Criptografía Post-Cuántica en Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, y jugando con algunas herramientas 😜

    Si van a andar por Chile a fines de setiembre, no olviden pasarse por la Facultad de Ingeniería U. Central.

    Mi charla será virtual, así que supongo que habrá stream, les aviso!

    ubuconla.org/2026/

    #gnu #linux #ubuntu #ubucon #ubuconla #pqc #pqcrypto #postquantum #cryptography #criptografía #cripto

  2. Aceptaron mi charla en la #UbuConLa 2026!!

    A investigar y preparar las diapos y ... estaré hablando sobre Criptografía Post-Cuántica en Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, y jugando con algunas herramientas 😜

    Si van a andar por Chile a fines de setiembre, no olviden pasarse por la Facultad de Ingeniería U. Central.

    Mi charla será virtual, así que supongo que habrá stream, les aviso!

    ubuconla.org/2026/

    #gnu #linux #ubuntu #ubucon #ubuconla #pqc #pqcrypto #postquantum #cryptography #criptografía #cripto

  3. When there are a lot of discussions around the voting of an Internet-Draft publication, double check. Especially when it's draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08

    #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #voting

    nsa.2026.action.cr.yp.to/

  4. When there are a lot of discussions around the voting of an Internet-Draft publication, double check. Especially when it's draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08

    #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #voting

    nsa.2026.action.cr.yp.to/

  5. New blog post "EuroQCI feedback: A simple idea for improving Europe's investments in data security." blog.cr.yp.to/20260619-euroqci This covers my reply to a European Commission survey that still seems to be open; maybe you have thoughts on it too. #qkd #quantumcrypto #euroqci #pqcrypto

  6. New blog post "EuroQCI feedback: A simple idea for improving Europe's investments in data security." blog.cr.yp.to/20260619-euroqci This covers my reply to a European Commission survey that still seems to be open; maybe you have thoughts on it too. #qkd #quantumcrypto #euroqci #pqcrypto

  7. Interesante resumen de #liboqs y algoritmos de criptografía post-cuántica, con perspectivas futuras y estado de migración del #nist

    👇

    asecuritysite.com/liboqs/

    #pqc #pqcrypto #postquantum #cryptography #encryption

  8. Interesante resumen de #liboqs y algoritmos de criptografía post-cuántica, con perspectivas futuras y estado de migración del #nist

    👇

    asecuritysite.com/liboqs/

    #pqc #pqcrypto #postquantum #cryptography #encryption

  9. «Decentralized P2P Chat & File Transfer - Secure Messaging Without Central Servers:
    Creating decentralized P2P technology. Aiming to provide industry-grade cryptographic capabilities encapsulated into a webapp.»

    Do any of you regularly use @xoron with several people at the same time or even professionally and what is your impression about it?

    🐟 positive-intentions.com

    #chat #p2p #e2ee #filetransfer #security #decentralization #webtools #webapp #pqc #pqcrypto #cryptography #noserver

  10. «Decentralized P2P Chat & File Transfer - Secure Messaging Without Central Servers:
    Creating decentralized P2P technology. Aiming to provide industry-grade cryptographic capabilities encapsulated into a webapp.»

    Do any of you regularly use @xoron with several people at the same time or even professionally and what is your impression about it?

    🐟 positive-intentions.com

    #chat #p2p #e2ee #filetransfer #security #decentralization #webtools #webapp #pqc #pqcrypto #cryptography #noserver

  11. ML-KEM Mythbusting

    "There have been some recent concerns about ML-KEM, NIST’s standard for encryption with Post-Quantum Cryptography, related standards of the IETF, and lots of conspiracy theories about malicious actors subverting the standardization process. "

    #pqc #pqcrypto #cybersecurity #ietf

    🔗 keymaterial.net/2025/11/27/ml-

  12. ML-KEM Mythbusting

    "There have been some recent concerns about ML-KEM, NIST’s standard for encryption with Post-Quantum Cryptography, related standards of the IETF, and lots of conspiracy theories about malicious actors subverting the standardization process. "

    #pqc #pqcrypto #cybersecurity #ietf

    🔗 keymaterial.net/2025/11/27/ml-

  13. Is Post Quantum Crypto dead on arrival. At least there is a strange smell!

    @djb

    "Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography? #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

    It's normal for post-quantum cryptography to be rolled out as an extra layer of security on top of traditional pre-quantum cryptography, rather than as a replacement.

    ... looking at how easy it is for NSA to simply spend money to corrupt the standardization process."

    blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakene

  14. Is Post Quantum Crypto dead on arrival. At least there is a strange smell!

    @djb

    "Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography? #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

    It's normal for post-quantum cryptography to be rolled out as an extra layer of security on top of traditional pre-quantum cryptography, rather than as a replacement.

    ... looking at how easy it is for NSA to simply spend money to corrupt the standardization process."

    blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakene

  15. New blog post "NSA and IETF: Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography?" blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakene #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

  16. New blog post "NSA and IETF: Can an attacker simply purchase standardization of weakened cryptography?" blog.cr.yp.to/20251004-weakene #pqcrypto #hybrids #nsa #ietf #antitrust

  17. »NIST standardisiert ein leichtgewichtiges Kryptografieverfahren für IoT-Geräte:
    Ascon ist ein leichtgewichtiges Kryptografieverfahren, das insbesondere für IoT-Geräte wie RFID-Tags gedacht ist. NIST hat das Verfahren nun standardisiert.«

    Ich habe absolut keine Ahnung von IoT aber spannend. Es sind leider sehr viele IoT-Tools, die im allgemeinen erhältlich sind, sehr unsicher im Web.

    ✔️ heise.de/news/NIST-standardisi

    #iota #nist #pqc #pqcrypto #rfid #tools #web #internet #postquantum #kryptografie

  18. »NIST standardisiert ein leichtgewichtiges Kryptografieverfahren für IoT-Geräte:
    Ascon ist ein leichtgewichtiges Kryptografieverfahren, das insbesondere für IoT-Geräte wie RFID-Tags gedacht ist. NIST hat das Verfahren nun standardisiert.«

    Ich habe absolut keine Ahnung von IoT aber spannend. Es sind leider sehr viele IoT-Tools, die im allgemeinen erhältlich sind, sehr unsicher im Web.

    ✔️ heise.de/news/NIST-standardisi

    #iota #nist #pqc #pqcrypto #rfid #tools #web #internet #postquantum #kryptografie

  19. 🎥 Just released! Watch the COSIC Seminar "FRIttata: Distributed Proof Generation of FRI-based SNARKs" by Hua Xu (KU Leuven): youtube.com/watch?v=sMHfxYrNl5I
    📄 Read the full paper on #eprint: eprint.iacr.org/2025/1285
    #FRIttata #SNARKs #PostQuantum #PQCrypto

  20. Talk "Migrating Telecom to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography on a Global Scale" by John Preuß Mattsson

    #IETF123 #PQcrypto

  21. Talk "Migrating Telecom to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography on a Global Scale" by John Preuß Mattsson

    #IETF123 #PQcrypto

  22. #Qualys needs to update their TLS client test to support the new signature algorithms and named groups. There are a fair number of "unknown" entries with #OpenSSL 3.5. clienttest.ssllabs.com:8443/ss

    #pqc #pqcrypto

  23. #Qualys needs to update their TLS client test to support the new signature algorithms and named groups. There are a fair number of "unknown" entries with #OpenSSL 3.5. clienttest.ssllabs.com:8443/ss

    #pqc #pqcrypto

  24. #NIST chose #HQC as their backup KEM and elected not to standardize #ClassicMcElice for now among other reasons pointing to the standardization with #ISO.

    The argument to choose HQC over Bike is a higher confidence in IND-CCA-security of HQC. I cannot comment on whether that is a reasonable assessment, though I have no reason to doubt it, but I can say that in terms of reasons to make a choice this is of course a pretty good one.

    I’m not sure how I think about the decision regarding McElice, but I can to an extend see where they are coming from.

    This means there are now
    9 post quantum algorithms approved, standardized or chosen for standardization by generally respected organizations:

    Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (“KEMs”):

    * ML-KEM (“Kyber”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST

    * HQC, based on Codes, chosen for standardization by NIST

    * Classic McElice, based on codes, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)

    * Frodo, based on lattices, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)

    Signatures:

    * ML-DSA (“Dilithium”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST

    * SLH-DSA (“SPHINCS+”), based on hashes, standardized by NIST

    * FN-DSA (“Falcon”), based on lattices, chosen for standardization by NIST

    Stateful Signatures:

    * XMSS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE

    * LMS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE

    Overall, this looks like a decent portfolio. Future standardization might add schemes based on multivariate-equations and isogonies, but for now this should do and give us a basis from which we can design more efficient schemes without being to concerned about the entire ground suddenly giving in because one random guy/gal finds a new attack-vector.

    #postquantumcryptography #PQC #PQCrypto

  25. #NIST chose #HQC as their backup KEM and elected not to standardize #ClassicMcElice for now among other reasons pointing to the standardization with #ISO.

    The argument to choose HQC over Bike is a higher confidence in IND-CCA-security of HQC. I cannot comment on whether that is a reasonable assessment, though I have no reason to doubt it, but I can say that in terms of reasons to make a choice this is of course a pretty good one.

    I’m not sure how I think about the decision regarding McElice, but I can to an extend see where they are coming from.

    This means there are now
    9 post quantum algorithms approved, standardized or chosen for standardization by generally respected organizations:

    Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (“KEMs”):

    * ML-KEM (“Kyber”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST

    * HQC, based on Codes, chosen for standardization by NIST

    * Classic McElice, based on codes, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)

    * Frodo, based on lattices, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)

    Signatures:

    * ML-DSA (“Dilithium”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST

    * SLH-DSA (“SPHINCS+”), based on hashes, standardized by NIST

    * FN-DSA (“Falcon”), based on lattices, chosen for standardization by NIST

    Stateful Signatures:

    * XMSS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE

    * LMS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE

    Overall, this looks like a decent portfolio. Future standardization might add schemes based on multivariate-equations and isogonies, but for now this should do and give us a basis from which we can design more efficient schemes without being to concerned about the entire ground suddenly giving in because one random guy/gal finds a new attack-vector.

    #postquantumcryptography #PQC #PQCrypto

  26. So looking through some old projects I’ve had lying around, I ran into something I started (and never even really wrote anything) about steganography. This led me down a bit of rabbit-hole and I now have a slightly better understanding of some components of ML-KEM (aka. #Kyber).

    Both the public key and the ciphertext are for the most part long sequences of integers modulo 3329 that are effectively indistinguishable from random integers out of that range.

    Of course they are obvious to distinguish from random bitstrings, but the easiest way to fix that would be to just view them as numbers in base 3329, re-encode them to base 2 and work from there… So that might be one thing I could look into now.

    The alternative is to see whether there is a sufficiently hard to detect way to change some of the representatives of the field-elements… It might be easier to implement if, if not easier from a mathematical perspective, but would also let the possibility of slightly compressing the public-key and ciphertext by about 2.5% in length lie on the table.

    In any case, this is something that might be worthwhile for practical use-cases…
    🤔

    #cryptography #pqc #pqcrypto #steganography #crypto #MLKEM

  27. Pushing my “let’s stop pretending post-quantum crypto is something fundamentally different from regular crypto and acknowledge that it really is just the replacement of broken algorithms with secure ones”-agenda in the intro of the paper I’m co-writing. 😈

    #itsecurity #cryptography #crypto #postquantumcryptography #quantumcomputing #pqc #pqcrypto

  28. Gear up for the quantum era! 🔐⚛️ Check out Kicksecure's guide on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto) with info on quantum-resistant tools like Codecrypt, Cyph, and more. 💻🔑 #PQCrypto

    kicksecure.com/wiki/PQCrypto

    #privacy #security

  29. Gear up for the quantum era! 🔐⚛️ Check out Kicksecure's guide on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto) with info on quantum-resistant tools like Codecrypt, Cyph, and more. 💻🔑 #PQCrypto

    kicksecure.com/wiki/PQCrypto

    #privacy #security

  30. Guter Start in den #mrmcd23 Tag: Ein Update Talk zu @rosenpass

    Danke an
    @kora @ajuvo
    @engler

    Ihr macht tolle Arbeit, weiter so...👍

    #pqcrypto #rosenpass #ccc

  31. Guter Start in den #mrmcd23 Tag: Ein Update Talk zu @rosenpass

    Danke an
    @kora @ajuvo
    @engler

    Ihr macht tolle Arbeit, weiter so...👍

    #pqcrypto #rosenpass #ccc

  32. heise-Angebot: c’t-Workshop: Post-Quanten-Kryptographie

    Quantencomputer bedrohen übliche Verschlüsselungsmethoden und rücken immer näher. Im Workshop lernen Softwareentwickler, wie man die Gefahr rechtzeitig abwehrt.
    c’t-Workshop: Post-Quanten-Kryptographie
  33. heise-Angebot: c’t-Workshop: Post-Quanten-Kryptographie

    Quantencomputer bedrohen übliche Verschlüsselungsmethoden und rücken immer näher. Im Workshop lernen Softwareentwickler, wie man die Gefahr rechtzeitig abwehrt.
    c’t-Workshop: Post-Quanten-Kryptographie
  34. heise-Angebot: c’t-Workshop: Post-Quanten-Kryptographie

    Neue Verschlüsselungsverfahren widerstehen auch Quantencomputern. Im Workshop lernen Softwareentwickler die nötige Theorie und bekommen Tipps für die Praxis.
    c’t-Workshop: Post-Quanten-Kryptographie