#mlkem — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #mlkem, aggregated by home.social.
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Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.
Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.
Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.
But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.
Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.
Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.
And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.
Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.
If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.
The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.
SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.
Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/
#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility
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Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.
Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.
Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.
But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.
Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.
Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.
And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.
Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.
If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.
The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.
SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.
Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/
#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility
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Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.
Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.
Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.
But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.
Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.
Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.
And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.
Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.
If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.
The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.
SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.
Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/
#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility
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Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.
Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.
Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.
But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.
Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.
Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.
And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.
Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.
If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.
The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.
SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.
Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:
https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/
#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility
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X25519MLKEM768 zerlegt: was in einem Post-Quantum-Handshake wirklich steckt
Die Zeichenkette X25519MLKEM768 steht in jedem modernen TLS-Handshake und sieht aus wie zwei zusammengeklebte Dinge. Ich zerlege sie Stück für Stück: klassischer plus quantensicherer Schlüsselaustausch, was ein KEM ist, warum hybrid und was bewusst klassisch bleibt.https://www.kernel-error.de/2026/07/26/x25519mlkem768-zerlegt-post-quantum-handshake-tls/
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Свой VPN на Rust: как я спорил с сетью, TLS и самим собой
Если совсем коротко: я написал свой VPN на Rust — побайтово-корректный TLS 1.3 с заёмом чужого сертификата, гибридное постквантовое рукопожатие, пять режимов маскировки и под 700 Мбит/с на скачивание. Ниже — как это устроено изнутри и десяток шишек, на которых я учился. Но начать хочется издалека.
https://habr.com/ru/articles/1052536/
#Rust #vpn #tls_13 #криптография #MLKEM #сетевая_безопасность #разработка_по #open_source #channel_binding
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Свой VPN на Rust: как я спорил с сетью, TLS и самим собой
Если совсем коротко: я написал свой VPN на Rust — побайтово-корректный TLS 1.3 с заёмом чужого сертификата, гибридное постквантовое рукопожатие, пять режимов маскировки и под 700 Мбит/с на скачивание. Ниже — как это устроено изнутри и десяток шишек, на которых я учился. Но начать хочется издалека.
https://habr.com/ru/articles/1052536/
#Rust #vpn #tls_13 #криптография #MLKEM #сетевая_безопасность #разработка_по #open_source #channel_binding
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Свой VPN на Rust: как я спорил с сетью, TLS и самим собой
Если совсем коротко: я написал свой VPN на Rust — побайтово-корректный TLS 1.3 с заёмом чужого сертификата, гибридное постквантовое рукопожатие, пять режимов маскировки и под 700 Мбит/с на скачивание. Ниже — как это устроено изнутри и десяток шишек, на которых я учился. Но начать хочется издалека.
https://habr.com/ru/articles/1052536/
#Rust #vpn #tls_13 #криптография #MLKEM #сетевая_безопасность #разработка_по #open_source #channel_binding
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Post-Quantum Cryptography and Crypto-Agility | by Michael Howard
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Post-Quantum Cryptography and Crypto-Agility | by Michael Howard
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Post-Quantum Cryptography and Crypto-Agility | by Michael Howard
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Post-Quantum Cryptography and Crypto-Agility | by Michael Howard
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Post-Quantum Cryptography and Crypto-Agility | by Michael Howard
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Apple Bolsters Encryption with Quantum-Resistant Code Release
Apple is taking a major leap in securing our digital lives by releasing quantum-resistant code, adding an extra layer of protection against potential future threats. By integrating this advanced encryption into its corecrypto library, the company is safeguarding the data of over 2.5 billion active devices worldwide.
#QuantumresistantEncryption #Apple #Corecrypto #Mlkem #Mldsa
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Apple Bolsters Encryption with Quantum-Resistant Code Release
Apple is taking a major leap in securing our digital lives by releasing quantum-resistant code, adding an extra layer of protection against potential future threats. By integrating this advanced encryption into its corecrypto library, the company is safeguarding the data of over 2.5 billion active devices worldwide.
#QuantumresistantEncryption #Apple #Corecrypto #Mlkem #Mldsa
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Apple Bolsters Encryption with Quantum-Resistant Code Release
Apple is taking a major leap in securing our digital lives by releasing quantum-resistant code, adding an extra layer of protection against potential future threats. By integrating this advanced encryption into its corecrypto library, the company is safeguarding the data of over 2.5 billion active devices worldwide.
#QuantumresistantEncryption #Apple #Corecrypto #Mlkem #Mldsa
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Apple Bolsters Encryption with Quantum-Resistant Code Release
Apple is taking a major leap in securing our digital lives by releasing quantum-resistant code, adding an extra layer of protection against potential future threats. By integrating this advanced encryption into its corecrypto library, the company is safeguarding the data of over 2.5 billion active devices worldwide.
#QuantumresistantEncryption #Apple #Corecrypto #Mlkem #Mldsa
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Apple udostępnia kod kryptografii postkwantowej dla iPhone’a i Maka na GitHubie
Apple opublikowało na GitHubie kod źródłowy biblioteki corecrypto wraz ze szczegółowym opisem technicznym swojej pracy nad kryptografią postkwantową. To kolejny krok po wprowadzeniu protokołu PQ3 w iMessage w 2024 roku.
Jak podaje 9to5Mac, Apple opublikowało na GitHubie kod źródłowy biblioteki corecrypto — niskopoziomowej biblioteki kryptograficznej używanej przez Security framework, CryptoKit i CommonCrypto we wszystkich urządzeniach Apple. Biblioteka odpowiada za szyfrowanie, haszowanie, generowanie liczb losowych i podpisy cyfrowe.
Repozytorium zawiera implementacje algorytmów ML-KEM i ML-DSA — dwóch standardów postkwantowych zatwierdzonych przez NIST, zaprojektowanych z myślą o ochronie przed zagrożeniami ze strony przyszłych komputerów kwantowych. Publikacja to kontynuacja prac rozpoczętych w 2024 roku, gdy Apple wprowadziło protokół PQ3 w iMessage, zapewniający ochronę postkwantową zarówno przy nawiązywaniu szyfrowanej rozmowy, jak i przy odświeżaniu kluczy szyfrowania.
Apple podkreśla, że opracowało własne narzędzia do formalnej weryfikacji kodu — istniejące rozwiązania nie spełniały wymagań firmy, bo corecrypto musi działać na całym portfolio sprzętowym Apple, w tym na urządzeniach z różnymi układami Apple Silicon. Dzięki tej weryfikacji udało się wykryć m.in. brakujący krok w wczesnej implementacji ML-DSA, który w skrajnych przypadkach mógłby prowadzić do cichego błędu kryptograficznego — niewidocznego dla standardowych zestawów testów.
<h2 class="text-text-100 mt-3 -mb-1 text-1 font-bold” style=”text-align: center;”>Co to oznacza dla zwykłego użytkownika? <p class="font-claude-response-body break-words whitespace-normal leading-2„>Dzisiejsze szyfrowanie — to, które chroni Twoje wiadomości, dane bankowe i hasła — opiera się na zadaniach matematycznych, których obecne komputery nie są w stanie rozwiązać w rozsądnym czasie. Problem w tym, że komputery kwantowe, nad którymi pracują dziś rządy i największe korporacje technologiczne, mogłyby te zadania rozwiązać w ciągu minut. To nie jest odległa science fiction — specjaliści szacują, że wystarczająco wydajne komputery kwantowe mogą pojawić się w ciągu najbliższej dekady.
<p class="font-claude-response-body break-words whitespace-normal leading-2„>Co więcej, istnieje realne zagrożenie zwane atakiem „zbierz teraz, odszyfruj później” — służby wywiadowcze i cyberprzestępcy mogą już dziś przechwytywać zaszyfrowane dane i przechowywać je do czasu, gdy będą dysponować wystarczającą mocą obliczeniową, żeby je odczytać. Twoje dzisiejsze wiadomości czy dokumenty mogłyby zostać odszyfrowane za kilka lat. <p #AppleBezpieczeństwo #AppleKryptografiaPostkwantowa #AppleSecurityResearch #AppleSzyfrowanie #corecryptoGitHub #iMessagePQ3 #kryptografiaKwantowa #MLDSA #MLKEM #NISTKryptografiaApple zablokowało oszustwa w App Store warte ponad 2,2 mld dolarów w 2025 roku
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Apple udostępnia kod kryptografii postkwantowej dla iPhone’a i Maka na GitHubie
Apple opublikowało na GitHubie kod źródłowy biblioteki corecrypto wraz ze szczegółowym opisem technicznym swojej pracy nad kryptografią postkwantową. To kolejny krok po wprowadzeniu protokołu PQ3 w iMessage w 2024 roku.
Jak podaje 9to5Mac, Apple opublikowało na GitHubie kod źródłowy biblioteki corecrypto — niskopoziomowej biblioteki kryptograficznej używanej przez Security framework, CryptoKit i CommonCrypto we wszystkich urządzeniach Apple. Biblioteka odpowiada za szyfrowanie, haszowanie, generowanie liczb losowych i podpisy cyfrowe.
Repozytorium zawiera implementacje algorytmów ML-KEM i ML-DSA — dwóch standardów postkwantowych zatwierdzonych przez NIST, zaprojektowanych z myślą o ochronie przed zagrożeniami ze strony przyszłych komputerów kwantowych. Publikacja to kontynuacja prac rozpoczętych w 2024 roku, gdy Apple wprowadziło protokół PQ3 w iMessage, zapewniający ochronę postkwantową zarówno przy nawiązywaniu szyfrowanej rozmowy, jak i przy odświeżaniu kluczy szyfrowania.
Apple podkreśla, że opracowało własne narzędzia do formalnej weryfikacji kodu — istniejące rozwiązania nie spełniały wymagań firmy, bo corecrypto musi działać na całym portfolio sprzętowym Apple, w tym na urządzeniach z różnymi układami Apple Silicon. Dzięki tej weryfikacji udało się wykryć m.in. brakujący krok w wczesnej implementacji ML-DSA, który w skrajnych przypadkach mógłby prowadzić do cichego błędu kryptograficznego — niewidocznego dla standardowych zestawów testów.
<h2 class="text-text-100 mt-3 -mb-1 text-1 font-bold” style=”text-align: center;”>Co to oznacza dla zwykłego użytkownika? <p class="font-claude-response-body break-words whitespace-normal leading-2„>Dzisiejsze szyfrowanie — to, które chroni Twoje wiadomości, dane bankowe i hasła — opiera się na zadaniach matematycznych, których obecne komputery nie są w stanie rozwiązać w rozsądnym czasie. Problem w tym, że komputery kwantowe, nad którymi pracują dziś rządy i największe korporacje technologiczne, mogłyby te zadania rozwiązać w ciągu minut. To nie jest odległa science fiction — specjaliści szacują, że wystarczająco wydajne komputery kwantowe mogą pojawić się w ciągu najbliższej dekady.
<p class="font-claude-response-body break-words whitespace-normal leading-2„>Co więcej, istnieje realne zagrożenie zwane atakiem „zbierz teraz, odszyfruj później” — służby wywiadowcze i cyberprzestępcy mogą już dziś przechwytywać zaszyfrowane dane i przechowywać je do czasu, gdy będą dysponować wystarczającą mocą obliczeniową, żeby je odczytać. Twoje dzisiejsze wiadomości czy dokumenty mogłyby zostać odszyfrowane za kilka lat. <p #AppleBezpieczeństwo #AppleKryptografiaPostkwantowa #AppleSecurityResearch #AppleSzyfrowanie #corecryptoGitHub #iMessagePQ3 #kryptografiaKwantowa #MLDSA #MLKEM #NISTKryptografiaApple zablokowało oszustwa w App Store warte ponad 2,2 mld dolarów w 2025 roku
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Java и постквантовый TLS
В JDK 27 появится JEP 527: гибридный post-quantum key exchange для TLS 1.3. Разбираем, что меняется в JSSE, зачем нужен X25519MLKEM768 и какие проблемы могут всплыть при миграции. А ты готов к квантовым атакам ?
https://habr.com/ru/articles/1038654/
#Java #JDK_27 #JEP_527 #TLS_13 #JSSE #PostQuantum_Cryptography #MLKEM #Hybrid_Key_Exchange #X25519MLKEM768 #javaxnetssl
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Java и постквантовый TLS
В JDK 27 появится JEP 527: гибридный post-quantum key exchange для TLS 1.3. Разбираем, что меняется в JSSE, зачем нужен X25519MLKEM768 и какие проблемы могут всплыть при миграции. А ты готов к квантовым атакам ?
https://habr.com/ru/articles/1038654/
#Java #JDK_27 #JEP_527 #TLS_13 #JSSE #PostQuantum_Cryptography #MLKEM #Hybrid_Key_Exchange #X25519MLKEM768 #javaxnetssl
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Java и постквантовый TLS
В JDK 27 появится JEP 527: гибридный post-quantum key exchange для TLS 1.3. Разбираем, что меняется в JSSE, зачем нужен X25519MLKEM768 и какие проблемы могут всплыть при миграции. А ты готов к квантовым атакам ?
https://habr.com/ru/articles/1038654/
#Java #JDK_27 #JEP_527 #TLS_13 #JSSE #PostQuantum_Cryptography #MLKEM #Hybrid_Key_Exchange #X25519MLKEM768 #javaxnetssl
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Using seeds as ML-KEM keys is one of those ideas that sounds elegant at first glance — and then the cryptographic rabbit hole opens up. Determinism, reproducibility, key derivation... each choice ripples through the whole system. The beauty of cryptography: every shortcut has a story to tell. 🔑 #cryptography #infosec #MLKEM
https://words.filippo.io/ml-kem-seeds/ -
Feedback gezocht op:
→ Protocolontwerp & dreigingsmodel
→ Bekende beperking: nog geen Double Ratchet
→ Side-channel analyseWhitepaper + demo: paramant.vercel.app
#PostKwantum #Cryptografie #MLKEM #PeerReview #InfoSec #WebCrypto
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Feedback gezocht op:
→ Protocolontwerp & dreigingsmodel
→ Bekende beperking: nog geen Double Ratchet
→ Side-channel analyseWhitepaper + demo: paramant.vercel.app
#PostKwantum #Cryptografie #MLKEM #PeerReview #InfoSec #WebCrypto
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Feedback gezocht op:
→ Protocolontwerp & dreigingsmodel
→ Bekende beperking: nog geen Double Ratchet
→ Side-channel analyseWhitepaper + demo: paramant.vercel.app
#PostKwantum #Cryptografie #MLKEM #PeerReview #InfoSec #WebCrypto
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Feedback gezocht op:
→ Protocolontwerp & dreigingsmodel
→ Bekende beperking: nog geen Double Ratchet
→ Side-channel analyseWhitepaper + demo: paramant.vercel.app
#PostKwantum #Cryptografie #MLKEM #PeerReview #InfoSec #WebCrypto
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Feedback gezocht op:
→ Protocolontwerp & dreigingsmodel
→ Bekende beperking: nog geen Double Ratchet
→ Side-channel analyseWhitepaper + demo: paramant.vercel.app
#PostKwantum #Cryptografie #MLKEM #PeerReview #InfoSec #WebCrypto
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TLDR: I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Encryption into my #P2P messaging #webapp using #MLKEM (#Kyber) to protect against future #QuantumComputing threats. Read my latest #Blog post to see how I’m securing #DataPrivacy today.
My journey into #PostQuantum #Security
I’ve been working hard on my latest project update, focusing on how we can protect our #Privacy from the looming threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. I just finished writing a technical deep dive into how I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Cryptography into my #P2P messaging platform.The core of my approach involves using #MLKEM (formerly #Kyber) to ensure long-term #DataSecurity. I’m particularly proud of the #CascadingEncryption layer I’ve built; by combining #NIST standards with the #SignalProtocol, I'm ensuring that your #Communications remain #Secure even if a single algorithm is compromised in the future.
If you are into #OpenSource, #InfoSec, or #Decentralized #Tech, I’d love for you to read about my implementation and the challenges of bringing #QuantumResistance to the #Browser using #JavaScript.
Read my write-up here:
https://positive-intentions.com/blog/quantum-resistant-encryptionCrash course in ML-KEM: https://positive-intentions.com/blog/ml-kem-beginner-tutorial
I'm excited to hear what the #Developer and #CyberSecurity community thinks about this #PrivacyFirst milestone!
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TLDR: I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Encryption into my #P2P messaging #webapp using #MLKEM (#Kyber) to protect against future #QuantumComputing threats. Read my latest #Blog post to see how I’m securing #DataPrivacy today.
My journey into #PostQuantum #Security
I’ve been working hard on my latest project update, focusing on how we can protect our #Privacy from the looming threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. I just finished writing a technical deep dive into how I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Cryptography into my #P2P messaging platform.The core of my approach involves using #MLKEM (formerly #Kyber) to ensure long-term #DataSecurity. I’m particularly proud of the #CascadingEncryption layer I’ve built; by combining #NIST standards with the #SignalProtocol, I'm ensuring that your #Communications remain #Secure even if a single algorithm is compromised in the future.
If you are into #OpenSource, #InfoSec, or #Decentralized #Tech, I’d love for you to read about my implementation and the challenges of bringing #QuantumResistance to the #Browser using #JavaScript.
Read my write-up here:
https://positive-intentions.com/blog/quantum-resistant-encryptionCrash course in ML-KEM: https://positive-intentions.com/blog/ml-kem-beginner-tutorial
I'm excited to hear what the #Developer and #CyberSecurity community thinks about this #PrivacyFirst milestone!
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TLDR: I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Encryption into my #P2P messaging #webapp using #MLKEM (#Kyber) to protect against future #QuantumComputing threats. Read my latest #Blog post to see how I’m securing #DataPrivacy today.
My journey into #PostQuantum #Security
I’ve been working hard on my latest project update, focusing on how we can protect our #Privacy from the looming threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. I just finished writing a technical deep dive into how I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Cryptography into my #P2P messaging platform.The core of my approach involves using #MLKEM (formerly #Kyber) to ensure long-term #DataSecurity. I’m particularly proud of the #CascadingEncryption layer I’ve built; by combining #NIST standards with the #SignalProtocol, I'm ensuring that your #Communications remain #Secure even if a single algorithm is compromised in the future.
If you are into #OpenSource, #InfoSec, or #Decentralized #Tech, I’d love for you to read about my implementation and the challenges of bringing #QuantumResistance to the #Browser using #JavaScript.
Read my write-up here:
https://positive-intentions.com/blog/quantum-resistant-encryptionCrash course in ML-KEM: https://positive-intentions.com/blog/ml-kem-beginner-tutorial
I'm excited to hear what the #Developer and #CyberSecurity community thinks about this #PrivacyFirst milestone!
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TLDR: I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Encryption into my #P2P messaging #webapp using #MLKEM (#Kyber) to protect against future #QuantumComputing threats. Read my latest #Blog post to see how I’m securing #DataPrivacy today.
My journey into #PostQuantum #Security
I’ve been working hard on my latest project update, focusing on how we can protect our #Privacy from the looming threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. I just finished writing a technical deep dive into how I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Cryptography into my #P2P messaging platform.The core of my approach involves using #MLKEM (formerly #Kyber) to ensure long-term #DataSecurity. I’m particularly proud of the #CascadingEncryption layer I’ve built; by combining #NIST standards with the #SignalProtocol, I'm ensuring that your #Communications remain #Secure even if a single algorithm is compromised in the future.
If you are into #OpenSource, #InfoSec, or #Decentralized #Tech, I’d love for you to read about my implementation and the challenges of bringing #QuantumResistance to the #Browser using #JavaScript.
Read my write-up here:
https://positive-intentions.com/blog/quantum-resistant-encryptionCrash course in ML-KEM: https://positive-intentions.com/blog/ml-kem-beginner-tutorial
I'm excited to hear what the #Developer and #CyberSecurity community thinks about this #PrivacyFirst milestone!
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TLDR: I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Encryption into my #P2P messaging #webapp using #MLKEM (#Kyber) to protect against future #QuantumComputing threats. Read my latest #Blog post to see how I’m securing #DataPrivacy today.
My journey into #PostQuantum #Security
I’ve been working hard on my latest project update, focusing on how we can protect our #Privacy from the looming threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. I just finished writing a technical deep dive into how I’ve implemented #QuantumResistant #Cryptography into my #P2P messaging platform.The core of my approach involves using #MLKEM (formerly #Kyber) to ensure long-term #DataSecurity. I’m particularly proud of the #CascadingEncryption layer I’ve built; by combining #NIST standards with the #SignalProtocol, I'm ensuring that your #Communications remain #Secure even if a single algorithm is compromised in the future.
If you are into #OpenSource, #InfoSec, or #Decentralized #Tech, I’d love for you to read about my implementation and the challenges of bringing #QuantumResistance to the #Browser using #JavaScript.
Read my write-up here:
https://positive-intentions.com/blog/quantum-resistant-encryptionCrash course in ML-KEM: https://positive-intentions.com/blog/ml-kem-beginner-tutorial
I'm excited to hear what the #Developer and #CyberSecurity community thinks about this #PrivacyFirst milestone!
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Hanno Becker is teaching #mlkem/#mldsa-native at the #PQCSA workshop Open-Source #PQC Libraries and Implementations today in Brussels.
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/events/pqcsa-workshop-pqc-migration/program/
#quantum #postquantum #cosic #kuleuven -
Hanno Becker is teaching #mlkem/#mldsa-native at the #PQCSA workshop Open-Source #PQC Libraries and Implementations today in Brussels.
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/events/pqcsa-workshop-pqc-migration/program/
#quantum #postquantum #cosic #kuleuven -
Hanno Becker is teaching #mlkem/#mldsa-native at the #PQCSA workshop Open-Source #PQC Libraries and Implementations today in Brussels.
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/events/pqcsa-workshop-pqc-migration/program/
#quantum #postquantum #cosic #kuleuven -
Hanno Becker is teaching #mlkem/#mldsa-native at the #PQCSA workshop Open-Source #PQC Libraries and Implementations today in Brussels.
https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/events/pqcsa-workshop-pqc-migration/program/
#quantum #postquantum #cosic #kuleuven -
La bonne nouvelle : les solutions existent déjà. En 2024, le #NIST ( #National #Institute of #Standards and #Technology) a finalisé ses trois premières normes #post- #quantiques ( #PQC) : #ML-KEM pour encapsulation de clés, #ML-DSA et #SLH-DSA pour les #signatures.
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La bonne nouvelle : les solutions existent déjà. En 2024, le #NIST ( #National #Institute of #Standards and #Technology) a finalisé ses trois premières normes #post- #quantiques ( #PQC) : #ML-KEM pour encapsulation de clés, #ML-DSA et #SLH-DSA pour les #signatures.
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via @dotnet : Post-Quantum Cryptography in .NET
https://ift.tt/osS9nPf
#PostQuantumCryptography #DotNet10 #Cryptography #PQC #MLDSA #MLKEM #SLHDSA #CompositeMLDSA #AsymmetricAlgorithms #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #Encryption #SecureCoding #TechInnovation #Ope… -
via @dotnet : Post-Quantum Cryptography in .NET
https://ift.tt/osS9nPf
#PostQuantumCryptography #DotNet10 #Cryptography #PQC #MLDSA #MLKEM #SLHDSA #CompositeMLDSA #AsymmetricAlgorithms #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #Encryption #SecureCoding #TechInnovation #Ope… -
via @dotnet : Post-Quantum Cryptography in .NET
https://ift.tt/osS9nPf
#PostQuantumCryptography #DotNet10 #Cryptography #PQC #MLDSA #MLKEM #SLHDSA #CompositeMLDSA #AsymmetricAlgorithms #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #Encryption #SecureCoding #TechInnovation #Ope… -
via @dotnet : Post-Quantum Cryptography in .NET
https://ift.tt/osS9nPf
#PostQuantumCryptography #DotNet10 #Cryptography #PQC #MLDSA #MLKEM #SLHDSA #CompositeMLDSA #AsymmetricAlgorithms #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #Encryption #SecureCoding #TechInnovation #Ope… -
via @dotnet : Post-Quantum Cryptography in .NET
https://ift.tt/osS9nPf
#PostQuantumCryptography #DotNet10 #Cryptography #PQC #MLDSA #MLKEM #SLHDSA #CompositeMLDSA #AsymmetricAlgorithms #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #Encryption #SecureCoding #TechInnovation #Ope… -
[Перевод] Неожиданная находка в Kubernetes: постквантовая криптография в кластерах
Развитие квантовых компьютеров ставит под угрозу классическую криптографию: потенциально они смогут взломать существующие алгоритмы шифрования вроде RSA и ECC. На выручку приходит постквантовая криптография (PQC). Автор статьи объясняет, как обстоят дела с PQC в TLS, что это значит для Kubernetes — и почему уже сегодня кластеры получили постквантовую защиту почти случайно.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/flant/articles/955310/
#постквантовая_криптография #алгоритм_шора #rsa #ecc #kubernetes #tls #mlkem #fips_203 #цифровые_подписи #X25519MLKEM768
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[Перевод] Неожиданная находка в Kubernetes: постквантовая криптография в кластерах
Развитие квантовых компьютеров ставит под угрозу классическую криптографию: потенциально они смогут взломать существующие алгоритмы шифрования вроде RSA и ECC. На выручку приходит постквантовая криптография (PQC). Автор статьи объясняет, как обстоят дела с PQC в TLS, что это значит для Kubernetes — и почему уже сегодня кластеры получили постквантовую защиту почти случайно.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/flant/articles/955310/
#постквантовая_криптография #алгоритм_шора #rsa #ecc #kubernetes #tls #mlkem #fips_203 #цифровые_подписи #X25519MLKEM768
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[Перевод] Неожиданная находка в Kubernetes: постквантовая криптография в кластерах
Развитие квантовых компьютеров ставит под угрозу классическую криптографию: потенциально они смогут взломать существующие алгоритмы шифрования вроде RSA и ECC. На выручку приходит постквантовая криптография (PQC). Автор статьи объясняет, как обстоят дела с PQC в TLS, что это значит для Kubernetes — и почему уже сегодня кластеры получили постквантовую защиту почти случайно.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/flant/articles/955310/
#постквантовая_криптография #алгоритм_шора #rsa #ecc #kubernetes #tls #mlkem #fips_203 #цифровые_подписи #X25519MLKEM768
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Постквантовая криптография для современной почты
Электронная почта — это сервис и хранилище самой конфиденциальной информации пользователей. Следовательно, он нуждается в надёжном сквозном шифровании, также как мессенджеры. Компьютерная индустрия продолжает готовиться к распространению квантовых вычислений . Поскольку некоторые операции на квантовых компьютерах выполняются экспоненциально быстрее, чем в бинарной логике, современные шифры будут скомпрометированы. Как только это произойдёт, то расшифруются все современные данные, собранные и сохранённые в рамках политики “Harvest now, decrypt later” в 2010−2020 гг. Включая переписку по электронной почте и в мессенджерах.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/globalsign/articles/912692/
#постквантовая_криптография #сквозное_шифрование #электронная_почта #сертификаты_шифрования #Google #Gmail #шифрование #приватность #E2EE #RSA2048 #CRYSTALSKyber #ECDH #x25519 #асимметричное_шифрование #постквантовые_алгоритмы #AES_256 #MLKEM #MLDSA #цифровые_подписи #FIPS_203 #FIPS_204 #TutaCrypt #PQDrive #PQMail
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Постквантовая криптография для современной почты
Электронная почта — это сервис и хранилище самой конфиденциальной информации пользователей. Следовательно, он нуждается в надёжном сквозном шифровании, также как мессенджеры. Компьютерная индустрия продолжает готовиться к распространению квантовых вычислений . Поскольку некоторые операции на квантовых компьютерах выполняются экспоненциально быстрее, чем в бинарной логике, современные шифры будут скомпрометированы. Как только это произойдёт, то расшифруются все современные данные, собранные и сохранённые в рамках политики “Harvest now, decrypt later” в 2010−2020 гг. Включая переписку по электронной почте и в мессенджерах.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/globalsign/articles/912692/
#постквантовая_криптография #сквозное_шифрование #электронная_почта #сертификаты_шифрования #Google #Gmail #шифрование #приватность #E2EE #RSA2048 #CRYSTALSKyber #ECDH #x25519 #асимметричное_шифрование #постквантовые_алгоритмы #AES_256 #MLKEM #MLDSA #цифровые_подписи #FIPS_203 #FIPS_204 #TutaCrypt #PQDrive #PQMail
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Постквантовая криптография для современной почты
Электронная почта — это сервис и хранилище самой конфиденциальной информации пользователей. Следовательно, он нуждается в надёжном сквозном шифровании, также как мессенджеры. Компьютерная индустрия продолжает готовиться к распространению квантовых вычислений . Поскольку некоторые операции на квантовых компьютерах выполняются экспоненциально быстрее, чем в бинарной логике, современные шифры будут скомпрометированы. Как только это произойдёт, то расшифруются все современные данные, собранные и сохранённые в рамках политики “Harvest now, decrypt later” в 2010−2020 гг. Включая переписку по электронной почте и в мессенджерах.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/globalsign/articles/912692/
#постквантовая_криптография #сквозное_шифрование #электронная_почта #сертификаты_шифрования #Google #Gmail #шифрование #приватность #E2EE #RSA2048 #CRYSTALSKyber #ECDH #x25519 #асимметричное_шифрование #постквантовые_алгоритмы #AES_256 #MLKEM #MLDSA #цифровые_подписи #FIPS_203 #FIPS_204 #TutaCrypt #PQDrive #PQMail
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Here is a scan from testssl.net (which is at cloudflare and proxies testssl.sh) -- watch out for the #MLKEM(s)
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Here is a scan from testssl.net (which is at cloudflare and proxies testssl.sh) -- watch out for the #MLKEM(s)
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Here is a scan from testssl.net (which is at cloudflare and proxies testssl.sh) -- watch out for the #MLKEM(s)
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Here is a scan from testssl.net (which is at cloudflare and proxies testssl.sh) -- watch out for the #MLKEM(s)
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Here is a scan from testssl.net (which is at cloudflare and proxies testssl.sh) -- watch out for the #MLKEM(s)
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The Impact of Quantum Computing on Cryptography (2025).
https://aliyesha.com/sub/articles/technology/display/al_impact_quantum_computing_cryptography
#technology #computing #security #java #QuantumComputing #QuantumCryptography #Cryptography #SPHINCS #CRYSTALSDilithium #CRYSTALSKyber #SLHDSA #MLDSA #MLKEM
Enjoy tracker free reading with us. #privacy #privacymatters
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The Impact of Quantum Computing on Cryptography (2025).
https://aliyesha.com/sub/articles/technology/display/al_impact_quantum_computing_cryptography
#technology #computing #security #java #QuantumComputing #QuantumCryptography #Cryptography #SPHINCS #CRYSTALSDilithium #CRYSTALSKyber #SLHDSA #MLDSA #MLKEM
Enjoy tracker free reading with us. #privacy #privacymatters
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The Impact of Quantum Computing on Cryptography (2025).
https://aliyesha.com/sub/articles/technology/display/al_impact_quantum_computing_cryptography
#technology #computing #security #java #QuantumComputing #QuantumCryptography #Cryptography #SPHINCS #CRYSTALSDilithium #CRYSTALSKyber #SLHDSA #MLDSA #MLKEM
Enjoy tracker free reading with us. #privacy #privacymatters
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The Impact of Quantum Computing on Cryptography (2025).
https://aliyesha.com/sub/articles/technology/display/al_impact_quantum_computing_cryptography
#technology #computing #security #java #QuantumComputing #QuantumCryptography #Cryptography #SPHINCS #CRYSTALSDilithium #CRYSTALSKyber #SLHDSA #MLDSA #MLKEM
Enjoy tracker free reading with us. #privacy #privacymatters
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#NIST Selects #HQC as Fifth Algorithm for Post #Quantum #Encryption
HQC is the latest algorithm chosen by NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography project, which has overseen efforts since 2016 to head off potential threats from #quantumcomputers. HQC will take its place alongside the four algorithms NIST selected previously. Three of those algorithms have been incorporated into finished standards, including #MLKEM, which forms the core of the standard called #FIPS203.
https://www.hpcwire.com/2025/03/12/nist-selects-hqc-as-fifth-algorithm-for-post-quantum-encryption/