#plcs — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #plcs, aggregated by home.social.
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"However, AI systems allow attackers to cash in on tech debt, and they don't need access to frontier models to do it. Free, open-weight models also excel at finding bugs in software and configurations, chaining these together, and abusing them to break software and systems."
https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/08/14/autonomous-ai-attacks-pose-clear-and-present-danger-to-critical-infrastructure/5287594
#cybersecurity #criticalinfrastructure #PLCs #technicaldebt -
"However, AI systems allow attackers to cash in on tech debt, and they don't need access to frontier models to do it. Free, open-weight models also excel at finding bugs in software and configurations, chaining these together, and abusing them to break software and systems."
https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/08/14/autonomous-ai-attacks-pose-clear-and-present-danger-to-critical-infrastructure/5287594
#cybersecurity #criticalinfrastructure #PLCs #technicaldebt -
CISA and EPA Warn: Internet-Exposed HMIs Pose Serious Cybersecurity Risks to Water Systems https://thecyberexpress.com/exposed-human-machine-interfaces-in-wws/ #CybersecurityRiskstoWater #HumanMachineInterfaces #TheCyberExpressNews #TheCyberExpress #FirewallDaily #CyberNews #SCADA #CISA #PLCs #EPA #WWS
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CISA and EPA Warn: Internet-Exposed HMIs Pose Serious Cybersecurity Risks to Water Systems https://thecyberexpress.com/exposed-human-machine-interfaces-in-wws/ #CybersecurityRiskstoWater #HumanMachineInterfaces #TheCyberExpressNews #TheCyberExpress #FirewallDaily #CyberNews #SCADA #CISA #PLCs #EPA #WWS
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You know shits about to get super real when #DavidMuir is reporting about it on #ABCWorldNewsTonight
A #PumpStation in #Aliquippa #Pennsylvania was hacked by #IranianHackers simply because they used electronics made in #Israel. Obviously, they were just probing to gain #intel for a future attack against a larger critical infrastructure target. Thankfully, no one was hurt, and the town's water supply isn't tainted. The #hackers even threatened that "Israel-made gear is fair game" pointing to continued aggressions.
Woke up to an advisory from #CISA on #UnitronicPLCs using in Water and Wastewater Systems: Cyber threat actors are targeting #PLCs associated with #WWS facilities, including an identified Unitronics PLC, at a U.S. water facility.
#cyberwar #criticalinfrastructure #IsraelHamaswar #PatchYourSystems
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You know shits about to get super real when #DavidMuir is reporting about it on #ABCWorldNewsTonight
A #PumpStation in #Aliquippa #Pennsylvania was hacked by #IranianHackers simply because they used electronics made in #Israel. Obviously, they were just probing to gain #intel for a future attack against a larger critical infrastructure target. Thankfully, no one was hurt, and the town's water supply isn't tainted. The #hackers even threatened that "Israel-made gear is fair game" pointing to continued aggressions.
Woke up to an advisory from #CISA on #UnitronicPLCs using in Water and Wastewater Systems: Cyber threat actors are targeting #PLCs associated with #WWS facilities, including an identified Unitronics PLC, at a U.S. water facility.
#cyberwar #criticalinfrastructure #IsraelHamaswar #PatchYourSystems
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CW: research review
R. Ma et al., "Towards Comprehensively Understanding the Run-time Security of Programmable Logic Controllers: A 3-year Empirical Study"¹
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the core control devices in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), which control and monitor the underlying physical plants such as power grids. PLCs were initially designed to work in a trusted industrial network, which however can be brittle once deployed in an Internet-facing (or penetrated) network. Yet, there is a lack of systematic empirical analysis of the run-time security of modern real-world PLCs. To close this gap, we present the first large-scale measurement on 23 off-the-shelf PLCs across 13 leading vendors. We find many common security issues and unexplored implications that should be more carefully addressed in the design and implementation. To sum up, the unsupervised logic applications can cause system resource/privilege abuse, which gives adversaries new means to hijack the control flow of a runtime system remotely (without exploiting memory vulnerabilities); 2) the improper access control mechanisms bring many unauthorized access implications; 3) the proprietary or semi-proprietary protocols are fragile regarding confidentiality and integrity protection of run-time data. We empirically evaluated the corresponding attack vectors on multiple PLCs, which demonstrates that the security implications are severe and broad. Our findings were reported to the related parties responsibly, and 20 bugs have been confirmed with 7 assigned CVEs.
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CW: research review
R. Ma et al., "Towards Comprehensively Understanding the Run-time Security of Programmable Logic Controllers: A 3-year Empirical Study"¹
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the core control devices in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), which control and monitor the underlying physical plants such as power grids. PLCs were initially designed to work in a trusted industrial network, which however can be brittle once deployed in an Internet-facing (or penetrated) network. Yet, there is a lack of systematic empirical analysis of the run-time security of modern real-world PLCs. To close this gap, we present the first large-scale measurement on 23 off-the-shelf PLCs across 13 leading vendors. We find many common security issues and unexplored implications that should be more carefully addressed in the design and implementation. To sum up, the unsupervised logic applications can cause system resource/privilege abuse, which gives adversaries new means to hijack the control flow of a runtime system remotely (without exploiting memory vulnerabilities); 2) the improper access control mechanisms bring many unauthorized access implications; 3) the proprietary or semi-proprietary protocols are fragile regarding confidentiality and integrity protection of run-time data. We empirically evaluated the corresponding attack vectors on multiple PLCs, which demonstrates that the security implications are severe and broad. Our findings were reported to the related parties responsibly, and 20 bugs have been confirmed with 7 assigned CVEs.