#scada — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #scada, aggregated by home.social.
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It is appalling that PLC devices are connected to the Internet. I get why it happens, a former company I worked for had a vendor install an SCADA + HVAC system, networking provided a standard drop without configuring the specific restricted VLAN. That system was open to the internet with the default password as "password." No one checked the network other than active connectivity and the system was put on the internet.
For water and power companies it is unbelievably negligent to connect SCADA to the Internet. There should be no reason why we need task force, after task force to solve this entirely self owned problem. This was a problem back in the early 2000s and systems are still placed on the Internet.
What is a solution? How about a private network between utility companies with encrypted traffic, not connected to the open Internet. If Internet monitoring is required, configure a very secure VPN to a DMZ.
Water system controllers don't belong on the internet, says ex-NSA chief after suspected Iran attacks
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It is appalling that PLC devices are connected to the Internet. I get why it happens, a former company I worked for had a vendor install an SCADA + HVAC system, networking provided a standard drop without configuring the specific restricted VLAN. That system was open to the internet with the default password as "password." No one checked the network other than active connectivity and the system was put on the internet.
For water and power companies it is unbelievably negligent to connect SCADA to the Internet. There should be no reason why we need task force, after task force to solve this entirely self owned problem. This was a problem back in the early 2000s and systems are still placed on the Internet.
What is a solution? How about a private network between utility companies with encrypted traffic, not connected to the open Internet. If Internet monitoring is required, configure a very secure VPN to a DMZ.
Water system controllers don't belong on the internet, says ex-NSA chief after suspected Iran attacks
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It is appalling that PLC devices are connected to the Internet. I get why it happens, a former company I worked for had a vendor install an SCADA + HVAC system, networking provided a standard drop without configuring the specific restricted VLAN. That system was open to the internet with the default password as "password." No one checked the network other than active connectivity and the system was put on the internet.
For water and power companies it is unbelievably negligent to connect SCADA to the Internet. There should be no reason why we need task force, after task force to solve this entirely self owned problem. This was a problem back in the early 2000s and systems are still placed on the Internet.
What is a solution? How about a private network between utility companies with encrypted traffic, not connected to the open Internet. If Internet monitoring is required, configure a very secure VPN to a DMZ.
Water system controllers don't belong on the internet, says ex-NSA chief after suspected Iran attacks
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It is appalling that PLC devices are connected to the Internet. I get why it happens, a former company I worked for had a vendor install an SCADA + HVAC system, networking provided a standard drop without configuring the specific restricted VLAN. That system was open to the internet with the default password as "password." No one checked the network other than active connectivity and the system was put on the internet.
For water and power companies it is unbelievably negligent to connect SCADA to the Internet. There should be no reason why we need task force, after task force to solve this entirely self owned problem. This was a problem back in the early 2000s and systems are still placed on the Internet.
What is a solution? How about a private network between utility companies with encrypted traffic, not connected to the open Internet. If Internet monitoring is required, configure a very secure VPN to a DMZ.
Water system controllers don't belong on the internet, says ex-NSA chief after suspected Iran attacks
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It is appalling that PLC devices are connected to the Internet. I get why it happens, a former company I worked for had a vendor install an SCADA + HVAC system, networking provided a standard drop without configuring the specific restricted VLAN. That system was open to the internet with the default password as "password." No one checked the network other than active connectivity and the system was put on the internet.
For water and power companies it is unbelievably negligent to connect SCADA to the Internet. There should be no reason why we need task force, after task force to solve this entirely self owned problem. This was a problem back in the early 2000s and systems are still placed on the Internet.
What is a solution? How about a private network between utility companies with encrypted traffic, not connected to the open Internet. If Internet monitoring is required, configure a very secure VPN to a DMZ.
Water system controllers don't belong on the internet, says ex-NSA chief after suspected Iran attacks
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UPDATE 3: Attribution unclear, though the Minnesota breach followed federal warnings about Iran-backed actors targeting U.S. critical infrastructure amid escalating conflict with Tehran. RESOLUTION NOTES: Put your PLCs behind a firewall, you absolute legends. They were just sitting there, naked on the internet, like a Tamagotchi left on a park bench.
Reward: You've received a Boil Water Notice and a stern look from the FBI.
#CriticalInfrastructure #CyberSecurity #SCADA #WaterSystems #FBI (2/2)
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Childersburg Water Works in Alabama reports cyberattack; water service unaffected #Alabama #SCADA #PLC #Cyberattack #WaterUtility #FBI https://dysruptionhub.com/childersburg-al-water-cyberattack/
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Childersburg Water Works in Alabama reports cyberattack; water service unaffected #Alabama #SCADA #PLC #Cyberattack #WaterUtility #FBI https://dysruptionhub.com/childersburg-al-water-cyberattack/
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Minnesota reports no supply contamination; other jurisdictions not specified.
Federal agencies note attribution is ongoing. Your prize tier is currently labeled "unknown threat actor," which is our most popular box.
Put your PLCs behind firewalls and access control lists — that is the only SKU not available in this program.
Reward: You've received a Bronze Unmonitored Pipe Token. Non-transferable. Non-potable.
#CriticalInfrastructure #CyberSecurity #SCADA #WaterSystems (2/2)
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Minnesota reports no supply contamination; other jurisdictions not specified.
Federal agencies note attribution is ongoing. Your prize tier is currently labeled "unknown threat actor," which is our most popular box.
Put your PLCs behind firewalls and access control lists — that is the only SKU not available in this program.
Reward: You've received a Bronze Unmonitored Pipe Token. Non-transferable. Non-potable.
#CriticalInfrastructure #CyberSecurity #SCADA #WaterSystems (2/2)
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Iran's involvement is suspected but unconfirmed, because attribution, as Minnesota so delicately put it, "requires careful analysis."
You left critical infrastructure directly internet-exposed, and the villains noticed. Put your PLCs behind firewalls and secure gateways, enforce access control lists, and use strong passwords — or I'll be back.
Reward: You've received the Boil Water Advisory Canteen — empty, lukewarm, and deeply symbolic.
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Iran's involvement is suspected but unconfirmed, because attribution, as Minnesota so delicately put it, "requires careful analysis."
You left critical infrastructure directly internet-exposed, and the villains noticed. Put your PLCs behind firewalls and secure gateways, enforce access control lists, and use strong passwords — or I'll be back.
Reward: You've received the Boil Water Advisory Canteen — empty, lukewarm, and deeply symbolic.
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CVE-2026-16462 is a critical SQL injection in Weidmueller PROCON-WEB SCADA, rated CVSS 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker can run SQL commands. Patch now.
#PROCONWEB #Weidmueller #CVE202616462 #SQLInjection #SCADA #CyberSecurity
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CVE-2026-16462 is a critical SQL injection in Weidmueller PROCON-WEB SCADA, rated CVSS 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker can run SQL commands. Patch now.
#PROCONWEB #Weidmueller #CVE202616462 #SQLInjection #SCADA #CyberSecurity
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A coordinated cyberattack disrupted Minnesota water systems across 30 municipalities, targeting critical infrastructure and cellular equipment.
#Cybersecurity #CriticalInfrastructure #WaterSecurity #Minnesota #SCADA
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A coordinated cyberattack disrupted Minnesota water systems across 30 municipalities, targeting critical infrastructure and cellular equipment.
#Cybersecurity #CriticalInfrastructure #WaterSecurity #Minnesota #SCADA
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CVE-2026-0667 (CRITICAL, CVSS 9.3): Schneider Electric SCADAPack 47x is vulnerable to improper Modbus TCP checks — risk of code execution, DoS, data loss. Review exposure & monitor for patches. https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-0667-cwe-754-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions-in-schneider-electric-09bef19ebc8e9eb8 #OffSeq #ICS #Vulnerability #SCADA
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CVE-2026-0667 (CRITICAL, CVSS 9.3): Schneider Electric SCADAPack 47x is vulnerable to improper Modbus TCP checks — risk of code execution, DoS, data loss. Review exposure & monitor for patches. https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-0667-cwe-754-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions-in-schneider-electric-09bef19ebc8e9eb8 #OffSeq #ICS #Vulnerability #SCADA
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CVE-2026-0667 (CRITICAL, CVSS 9.3): Schneider Electric SCADAPack 47x is vulnerable to improper Modbus TCP checks — risk of code execution, DoS, data loss. Review exposure & monitor for patches. https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-0667-cwe-754-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions-in-schneider-electric-09bef19ebc8e9eb8 #OffSeq #ICS #Vulnerability #SCADA
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CVE-2026-0667 (CRITICAL, CVSS 9.3): Schneider Electric SCADAPack 47x is vulnerable to improper Modbus TCP checks — risk of code execution, DoS, data loss. Review exposure & monitor for patches. https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-0667-cwe-754-improper-check-for-unusual-or-exceptional-conditions-in-schneider-electric-09bef19ebc8e9eb8 #OffSeq #ICS #Vulnerability #SCADA
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Hack like Mr Robot // WiFi, Bluetooth and Scada hacking
OccupytheWeb explains how hacks shown in the Mr Robot TV Series actually work. He compares real world WiFi, Bluetooth and Scada hacking vs what is shown in the TV series.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3yiT_WMlosg
#youtube #wifi #bluetooth #scada #ics #infosec #cybersecurity #hacking
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Hack like Mr Robot // WiFi, Bluetooth and Scada hacking
OccupytheWeb explains how hacks shown in the Mr Robot TV Series actually work. He compares real world WiFi, Bluetooth and Scada hacking vs what is shown in the TV series.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3yiT_WMlosg
#youtube #wifi #bluetooth #scada #ics #infosec #cybersecurity #hacking
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Hack like Mr Robot // WiFi, Bluetooth and Scada hacking
OccupytheWeb explains how hacks shown in the Mr Robot TV Series actually work. He compares real world WiFi, Bluetooth and Scada hacking vs what is shown in the TV series.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3yiT_WMlosg
#youtube #wifi #bluetooth #scada #ics #infosec #cybersecurity #hacking
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Showing operators whatever the attackers felt like showing them. U.S. federal agencies have confirmed the disruption to industrial operations. The crowd is absolutely losing it.
Corner team advice before the next round: get those PLCs off the public internet and validate your control logic and HMI display configurations immediately.
Reward: You've received a Crumpled Blueprint and 0 Operational Visibility points.
#CriticalInfrastructure #SCADA #Ransomware #ICS #CyberSecurity (2/2)
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Showing operators whatever the attackers felt like showing them. U.S. federal agencies have confirmed the disruption to industrial operations. The crowd is absolutely losing it.
Corner team advice before the next round: get those PLCs off the public internet and validate your control logic and HMI display configurations immediately.
Reward: You've received a Crumpled Blueprint and 0 Operational Visibility points.
#CriticalInfrastructure #SCADA #Ransomware #ICS #CyberSecurity (2/2)
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Came across a disclosure in Altus BluePlant 9.1.40 — a SCADA HMI / ICS platform. CVSS 9.8, unauthenticated RCE, default configuration, as the service account (administrator).
The standout: the vendor's auth validator hardcodes three credential-bypass paths in code. Use any one to bypass Connect, get a connectionHandle, then drive a generic RMI gateway to FileServer.RunProcess → Process.Start. No creds, no TLS, port 3100 reachable by default after install.
Full root-cause + self-contained PoC on the advisory page.
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/altus-blueplant-hardcoded-creds-rce
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-RubbishThe project attributes discovery to an automated multi-LLM process (Claude/OpenAI/DeepSeek/GLM), defensive framing, full-disclosure posture. Not affiliated; noting for awareness.
#infosec #ICS #SCADA #OTsecurity #vulnerability #0day #RCE #exploit
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Came across a disclosure in Altus BluePlant 9.1.40 — a SCADA HMI / ICS platform. CVSS 9.8, unauthenticated RCE, default configuration, as the service account (administrator).
The standout: the vendor's auth validator hardcodes three credential-bypass paths in code. Use any one to bypass Connect, get a connectionHandle, then drive a generic RMI gateway to FileServer.RunProcess → Process.Start. No creds, no TLS, port 3100 reachable by default after install.
Full root-cause + self-contained PoC on the advisory page.
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/altus-blueplant-hardcoded-creds-rce
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-RubbishThe project attributes discovery to an automated multi-LLM process (Claude/OpenAI/DeepSeek/GLM), defensive framing, full-disclosure posture. Not affiliated; noting for awareness.
#infosec #ICS #SCADA #OTsecurity #vulnerability #0day #RCE #exploit
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15 лет спустя: как я модернизировал умный дом на базе PLC и написал свой OPC-сервер для перехода от SCADA к ioBroker
Мой умный дом уже длительное время работает на промышленном контроллере - стабильно, без сбоев и без привязки к облакам. Но с годами технологии изменились: появились новые беспроводные протоколы, веб-интерфейсы, голосовые ассистенты и гибкие сценарии автоматизации. Проблема заключалась не в том, что существующая система устарела, а в том, что она уже не позволяла реализовать многие современные сценарии без серьезной переделки. Передо мной стояла задача не заменить работающую систему, а расширить ее возможности, сохранив все то, что доказало свою надежность. Для этого я создал поверх контроллера современный интеграционный слой. А чтобы полностью отказаться от проприетарного ПО, написал собственный OPC-сервер. В этой статье не только история модернизации моего умного дома, но и попытка показать, какие архитектурные решения, принятые еще в 2011 году, позволили спустя многие годы добавить новые технологии без полной перестройки системы. Надеюсь, этот опыт окажется полезен тем, кто только начинает строить свой умный дом и хочет, чтобы его можно было развивать, а не переделывать через несколько лет.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/lanit/articles/1054842/
#DirectLOGIC #Koyo #OPCсервер #SCADA #ioBroker #Raspberry #ZigBee #сезон_DIY_и_IT #ЛАНИТ
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15 лет спустя: как я модернизировал умный дом на базе PLC и написал свой OPC-сервер для перехода от SCADA к ioBroker
Мой умный дом уже длительное время работает на промышленном контроллере - стабильно, без сбоев и без привязки к облакам. Но с годами технологии изменились: появились новые беспроводные протоколы, веб-интерфейсы, голосовые ассистенты и гибкие сценарии автоматизации. Проблема заключалась не в том, что существующая система устарела, а в том, что она уже не позволяла реализовать многие современные сценарии без серьезной переделки. Передо мной стояла задача не заменить работающую систему, а расширить ее возможности, сохранив все то, что доказало свою надежность. Для этого я создал поверх контроллера современный интеграционный слой. А чтобы полностью отказаться от проприетарного ПО, написал собственный OPC-сервер. В этой статье не только история модернизации моего умного дома, но и попытка показать, какие архитектурные решения, принятые еще в 2011 году, позволили спустя многие годы добавить новые технологии без полной перестройки системы. Надеюсь, этот опыт окажется полезен тем, кто только начинает строить свой умный дом и хочет, чтобы его можно было развивать, а не переделывать через несколько лет.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/lanit/articles/1054842/
#DirectLOGIC #Koyo #OPCсервер #SCADA #ioBroker #Raspberry #ZigBee #сезон_DIY_и_IT #ЛАНИТ
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15 лет спустя: как я модернизировал умный дом на базе PLC и написал свой OPC-сервер для перехода от SCADA к ioBroker
Мой умный дом уже длительное время работает на промышленном контроллере - стабильно, без сбоев и без привязки к облакам. Но с годами технологии изменились: появились новые беспроводные протоколы, веб-интерфейсы, голосовые ассистенты и гибкие сценарии автоматизации. Проблема заключалась не в том, что существующая система устарела, а в том, что она уже не позволяла реализовать многие современные сценарии без серьезной переделки. Передо мной стояла задача не заменить работающую систему, а расширить ее возможности, сохранив все то, что доказало свою надежность. Для этого я создал поверх контроллера современный интеграционный слой. А чтобы полностью отказаться от проприетарного ПО, написал собственный OPC-сервер. В этой статье не только история модернизации моего умного дома, но и попытка показать, какие архитектурные решения, принятые еще в 2011 году, позволили спустя многие годы добавить новые технологии без полной перестройки системы. Надеюсь, этот опыт окажется полезен тем, кто только начинает строить свой умный дом и хочет, чтобы его можно было развивать, а не переделывать через несколько лет.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/lanit/articles/1054842/
#DirectLOGIC #Koyo #OPCсервер #SCADA #ioBroker #Raspberry #ZigBee #сезон_DIY_и_IT #ЛАНИТ
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https://www.europesays.com/ch/103887/ ABB wins Pelican Point control system upgrade contract #ABB #Adelaide #AssetManagement #Australian #CriticalInfrastructure #Cybersecurity #Decarbonisation #DistributedControlSystems(DCS) #ENGIE #ICS #IndustrialAutomation #IndustrialControlSystems #IndustrialCybersecurity #OTSecurity #SCADA #SouthAustralia
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SCADA Hacking: Inside Russian Facilities
This unique series of articles allows you to see how a SCADA/ICS specialist works!
https://hackers-arise.com/scada-hacking-inside-russian-scada-ics-facilities/
#cybersecurity #scada #ics #hacking -
SCADA Hacking: Inside Russian Facilities
This unique series of articles allows you to see how a SCADA/ICS specialist works!
https://hackers-arise.com/scada-hacking-inside-russian-scada-ics-facilities/
#cybersecurity #scada #ics #hacking -
SCADA Hacking: Inside Russian Facilities
This unique series of articles allows you to see how a SCADA/ICS specialist works!
https://hackers-arise.com/scada-hacking-inside-russian-scada-ics-facilities/
#cybersecurity #scada #ics #hacking -
SCADA Hacking: Inside Russian Facilities
This unique series of articles allows you to see how a SCADA/ICS specialist works!
https://hackers-arise.com/scada-hacking-inside-russian-scada-ics-facilities/
#cybersecurity #scada #ics #hacking -
Most factories already monitor electricity in real time—but monitoring alone doesn't reduce energy costs. By combining a **Power Monitoring System** with **AI Predictor**, historical SCADA data can be transformed into forecasts that help predict energy demand, detect anomalies early, and optimize production planning. Learn more: https://scada-thai.com/products/ai-predictor
https://scada-thai.com/products/power-monitoring-systems
#SCADA #AI #EnergyManagement #Industry40 -
Most factories already monitor electricity in real time—but monitoring alone doesn't reduce energy costs. By combining a **Power Monitoring System** with **AI Predictor**, historical SCADA data can be transformed into forecasts that help predict energy demand, detect anomalies early, and optimize production planning. Learn more: https://scada-thai.com/products/ai-predictor
https://scada-thai.com/products/power-monitoring-systems
#SCADA #AI #EnergyManagement #Industry40 -
Most factories already monitor electricity in real time—but monitoring alone doesn't reduce energy costs. By combining a **Power Monitoring System** with **AI Predictor**, historical SCADA data can be transformed into forecasts that help predict energy demand, detect anomalies early, and optimize production planning. Learn more: https://scada-thai.com/products/ai-predictor
https://scada-thai.com/products/power-monitoring-systems
#SCADA #AI #EnergyManagement #Industry40 -
Traffic cameras shouldn't just record video—they should generate actionable data. 🚦 AI Vehicle Detection counts and classifies vehicles in real time, while Traffic Predictor forecasts traffic flow and optimizes signal timing through SCADA & PLC integration for smarter intersections.
https://scada-thai.com/products/ai-vehicle-detection-counting-software-onvif-camera-integration
https://scada-thai.com/products/traffic-predictor
#AI #SmartCity #TrafficAI #ComputerVision #SCADA #ITS #DeepLearning
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Traffic cameras shouldn't just record video—they should generate actionable data. 🚦 AI Vehicle Detection counts and classifies vehicles in real time, while Traffic Predictor forecasts traffic flow and optimizes signal timing through SCADA & PLC integration for smarter intersections.
https://scada-thai.com/products/ai-vehicle-detection-counting-software-onvif-camera-integration
https://scada-thai.com/products/traffic-predictor
#AI #SmartCity #TrafficAI #ComputerVision #SCADA #ITS #DeepLearning
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Traffic cameras shouldn't just record video—they should generate actionable data. 🚦 AI Vehicle Detection counts and classifies vehicles in real time, while Traffic Predictor forecasts traffic flow and optimizes signal timing through SCADA & PLC integration for smarter intersections.
https://scada-thai.com/products/ai-vehicle-detection-counting-software-onvif-camera-integration
https://scada-thai.com/products/traffic-predictor
#AI #SmartCity #TrafficAI #ComputerVision #SCADA #ITS #DeepLearning
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CVE-2026-9695: CRITICAL improper authentication vuln in DELMIA Apriso (2020 – 2026). Allows unauthenticated privileged access — no patch yet. Restrict server access & monitor for anomalies. Details: https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-9695-cwe-287-improper-authentication-in-d-f67e224c65e69eb9 #OffSeq #CVE20269695 #SCADA #Infosec
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CVE-2026-9695: CRITICAL improper authentication vuln in DELMIA Apriso (2020 – 2026). Allows unauthenticated privileged access — no patch yet. Restrict server access & monitor for anomalies. Details: https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-9695-cwe-287-improper-authentication-in-d-f67e224c65e69eb9 #OffSeq #CVE20269695 #SCADA #Infosec
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CVE-2026-9695: CRITICAL improper authentication vuln in DELMIA Apriso (2020 – 2026). Allows unauthenticated privileged access — no patch yet. Restrict server access & monitor for anomalies. Details: https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-9695-cwe-287-improper-authentication-in-d-f67e224c65e69eb9 #OffSeq #CVE20269695 #SCADA #Infosec
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CVE-2026-9695: CRITICAL improper authentication vuln in DELMIA Apriso (2020 – 2026). Allows unauthenticated privileged access — no patch yet. Restrict server access & monitor for anomalies. Details: https://radar.offseq.com/threat/cve-2026-9695-cwe-287-improper-authentication-in-d-f67e224c65e69eb9 #OffSeq #CVE20269695 #SCADA #Infosec
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Preventive maintenance is more than monitoring.
**AT-PMS** helps identify equipment that needs inspection.
**Centralized Clock System** helps keep maintenance activities on schedule.
Together, they support a more consistent solar farm maintenance workflow.
AT-PMS: https://scada-thai.com/products/solar-farm-at-pms?variant=54843884372259
Centralized Clock: https://scada-thai.com/products/centralized-clock-system?variant=55269461754147
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Preventive maintenance is more than monitoring.
**AT-PMS** helps identify equipment that needs inspection.
**Centralized Clock System** helps keep maintenance activities on schedule.
Together, they support a more consistent solar farm maintenance workflow.
AT-PMS: https://scada-thai.com/products/solar-farm-at-pms?variant=54843884372259
Centralized Clock: https://scada-thai.com/products/centralized-clock-system?variant=55269461754147
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Preventive maintenance is more than monitoring.
**AT-PMS** helps identify equipment that needs inspection.
**Centralized Clock System** helps keep maintenance activities on schedule.
Together, they support a more consistent solar farm maintenance workflow.
AT-PMS: https://scada-thai.com/products/solar-farm-at-pms?variant=54843884372259
Centralized Clock: https://scada-thai.com/products/centralized-clock-system?variant=55269461754147
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Preventive maintenance is more than monitoring.
**AT-PMS** helps identify equipment that needs inspection.
**Centralized Clock System** helps keep maintenance activities on schedule.
Together, they support a more consistent solar farm maintenance workflow.
AT-PMS: https://scada-thai.com/products/solar-farm-at-pms?variant=54843884372259
Centralized Clock: https://scada-thai.com/products/centralized-clock-system?variant=55269461754147
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Till the end of the month we are offering a 50% off our advanced courses. Many of SDR for #Hackers, Car Hacking, Advanced #Forensics, #Ransomware Training, Advanced #SCADA and more is available of you with coupon code: advanced50
See our products here: https://hackersarise.thinkific.com/collections/products
#cybersecurity #digitalArt -
Till the end of the month we are offering a 50% off our advanced courses. Many of SDR for #Hackers, Car Hacking, Advanced #Forensics, #Ransomware Training, Advanced #SCADA and more is available of you with coupon code: advanced50
See our products here: https://hackersarise.thinkific.com/collections/products
#cybersecurity #digitalArt -
Till the end of the month we are offering a 50% off our advanced courses. Many of SDR for #Hackers, Car Hacking, Advanced #Forensics, #Ransomware Training, Advanced #SCADA and more is available of you with coupon code: advanced50
See our products here: https://hackersarise.thinkific.com/collections/products
#cybersecurity #digitalArt -
EAM-система: как на самом деле работает управление активами предприятия
EAM — это цифровая нервная система производства: она связывает гайку в цеху с бухгалтерским балансом. Ещё несколько лет назад этот рынок в России держали SAP, IBM Maximo и Infor EAM — на них строились процессы крупнейших заводов и энергохолдингов. Когда вендоры ушли, выяснилось, что «просто заменить» такую систему невозможно.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/simpleone/articles/1050982/
#EAM #управление_активами_предприятия #ТОиР #CMMS #ITAM #управление_основными_фондами #импортозамещение #обслуживание_оборудования #MDM #scada
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EAM-система: как на самом деле работает управление активами предприятия
EAM — это цифровая нервная система производства: она связывает гайку в цеху с бухгалтерским балансом. Ещё несколько лет назад этот рынок в России держали SAP, IBM Maximo и Infor EAM — на них строились процессы крупнейших заводов и энергохолдингов. Когда вендоры ушли, выяснилось, что «просто заменить» такую систему невозможно.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/simpleone/articles/1050982/
#EAM #управление_активами_предприятия #ТОиР #CMMS #ITAM #управление_основными_фондами #импортозамещение #обслуживание_оборудования #MDM #scada
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EAM-система: как на самом деле работает управление активами предприятия
EAM — это цифровая нервная система производства: она связывает гайку в цеху с бухгалтерским балансом. Ещё несколько лет назад этот рынок в России держали SAP, IBM Maximo и Infor EAM — на них строились процессы крупнейших заводов и энергохолдингов. Когда вендоры ушли, выяснилось, что «просто заменить» такую систему невозможно.
https://habr.com/ru/companies/simpleone/articles/1050982/
#EAM #управление_активами_предприятия #ТОиР #CMMS #ITAM #управление_основными_фондами #импортозамещение #обслуживание_оборудования #MDM #scada
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🚨 CVE-2026-47717: Dive into my deep technical analysis of the FUXA SCADA API logic flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to leak critical project configurations and operational data.
Read the full analysis here: 👇 https://denizhalil.com/2026/06/19/cve-2026-47717-fuxa-scada-data-disclosure/
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🚨 CVE-2026-47717: Dive into my deep technical analysis of the FUXA SCADA API logic flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to leak critical project configurations and operational data.
Read the full analysis here: 👇 https://denizhalil.com/2026/06/19/cve-2026-47717-fuxa-scada-data-disclosure/
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🚨 CVE-2026-47717: Dive into my deep technical analysis of the FUXA SCADA API logic flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to leak critical project configurations and operational data.
Read the full analysis here: 👇 https://denizhalil.com/2026/06/19/cve-2026-47717-fuxa-scada-data-disclosure/
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🚨 CVE-2026-47717: Dive into my deep technical analysis of the FUXA SCADA API logic flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to leak critical project configurations and operational data.
Read the full analysis here: 👇 https://denizhalil.com/2026/06/19/cve-2026-47717-fuxa-scada-data-disclosure/
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🚨 CVE-2026-47717: Dive into my deep technical analysis of the FUXA SCADA API logic flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to leak critical project configurations and operational data.
Read the full analysis here: 👇 https://denizhalil.com/2026/06/19/cve-2026-47717-fuxa-scada-data-disclosure/