#cryptoagility — Public Fediverse posts

Daniel Simon, creator of the algorithm that catalyzed Shor's, claims a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for the Dihedral Coset Problem (ePrint 2026/1591). If correct, the asymptotic security assumptions behind ML-KEM and ML-DSA would need reassessment.

Related interesting part: Wen and Zheng at Télécom Paris (ePrint 2026/155, accepted to CRYPTO 2026 and therefore peer-reviewed) prove that Module-LWE is quantum-polynomially equivalent to a structured dihedral variant, over the power-of-two cyclotomic rings with constant module rank that ML-KEM actually uses in production. They also reduce that structured variant to plain EDCP. The reduction chain between Simon's claim and the algorithms in your TLS stack has fewer unproven joints than it did a week ago, and half of that chain is now peer-reviewed.

Simon's paper is preliminary, several proofs are sketches, and the final SVP/LWE corollary rests on personal communications rather than published derivations. No concrete attack on any NIST parameter set is presented or costed. I am not a theoretical cryptographer and I am not declaring this proven. I am waiting for people like Micciancio, Peikert, Regev, Ducas to review it.

But this is the third event this summer hitting PQC from a different angle.

Bernstein demonstrated ML-DSA signing-key recovery in under one second by exploiting implementation flaws. The algorithm itself is fine; what organizations actually deploy is not. The attack surface is the gap between a correct specification and a correct implementation, and that gap exists in every deployment.

Anthropic's AI model autonomously recovered signing keys from HAWK-256 challenge instances. HAWK is a NIST Round 3 signature candidate, not a deployed standard, so nothing in production was touched. But the result showed that AI systems are now producing original cryptanalysis, not just assisting human researchers. Every deprecated or candidate algorithm still running in your estate became easier to attack the moment that capability crossed the line.

And now Simon's claim against the mathematical foundations themselves, with a peer-reviewed bridge connecting it to ML-KEM's specific hardness assumption.

Three different attack classes: implementation bugs found by a human, a PQC candidate broken autonomously by AI, and a theoretical quantum algorithm targeting foundational lattice assumptions.

If the lesson were just "lattice math is fragile," one event would suffice.

The lesson is that your cryptographic attack surface is wider than any single threat model covers, and the only architecture that absorbs all three is one built to replace algorithms without rebuilding infrastructure. I.e. crypto-agility.

SLH-DSA, LMS/XMSS, HQC, and everything hash-based or code-based is untouched by all of this.

Full analysis of the Simon paper, including where the proof is most vulnerable and what it means for migration planning:

https://postquantum.com/security-pqc/simon-quantum-algorithm-lattice-pqc/

#infosec #cybersecurity #PQC #postquantum #cryptography #quantum #MLKEM #latticecrypto #cryptoagility

Every technique used in the various July AI hacking incidents has a known defense. Weak passwords. Unauthenticated endpoints. SQL injection. Unmonitored east-west traffic. Two of three organizations Anthropic's models compromised didn't even detect it.

This is not an AI problem. It is a cybersecurity basics problem exposed at machine speed.

Vendors are already starting to market "AI-resilient" infrastructure and "Mythos-resistant" cryptography. Do not buy the label. The correct response to faster attacks is faster defense, not a different kind of defense. Shorter patching windows. Better credential rotation. Tighter segmentation. Automated rollout.

The one actually new investment: crypto-agility. In the same week OpenAI and Anthropic disclosed their hacking incidents, Anthropic's AI killed a PQC candidate that had survived years of NIST evaluation. 60 hours. $100K. HAWK was withdrawn the next day.

AI is now also attacking mathematical layer of your defenses. And the upcoming quantum threat is defeating the mathematical layer. The shared defense is the ability to swap cryptographic algorithms without rebuilding your stack.

Do good cybersecurity. Do it better. Do it faster. Build crypto-agility into the architecture.

https://postquantum.com/ai-security/ai-hacking-theater-crypto-agility/

#cybersecurity #CISO #AIhacking #cryptoagility #PQC #postquantum #infosec #AI #quantumsecurity

Every PQC guide says "be crypto-agile." After leading Fortune Global 500 migrations: HSMs can't upgrade, protocols hard-code ciphers, cert chains assume fixed key sizes.

Real crypto-agility needs abstraction layers, algorithm negotiation, and swappable primitives. Most stacks have none.

https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/crypto-agility-architecture/

#cryptoagility #PQC #infosec #cryptography

The biggest near-term PQC risk isn't quantum. It's classical implementation bugs in brand-new cryptographic code deployed under deadline pressure across critical systems.

Hybrid ECC+PQ deployment isn't hedging quantum uncertainty. It's hedging classical software engineering reality.

https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/pqc-migration-risk-hybrid/

#PQC #cryptography #infosec #cryptoagility

🚀 𝘗𝘰𝘴𝘵-𝘘𝘶𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘶𝘮 𝘊𝘳𝘺𝘱𝘵𝘰𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘱𝘩𝘺: Preparing for 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗡𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗖𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗘𝗿𝗮

Quantum computing is getting closer — and so is the risk to today’s encryption (RSA, ECC).

At RELIANOID, we’re already preparing with crypto-agile architecture and early Post-Quantum Cryptography testing.

The future is coming. Security must evolve now.

#CyberSecurity #PostQuantum #PQC #QuantumComputing #CryptoAgility #RELIANOID #FutureProofSecurity

https://www.relianoid.com/blog/post-quantum-cryptography-the-cybersecurity-race-against-quantum-threats/

PQC migration is a program, not a patch. I just updated my quantum readiness starting list - curated for security people who need actionable info.

Takes you from threat understanding → prioritization → running a real migration program with owners, milestones, dependencies, and vendor timelines.

https://postquantum.com/quantum-readiness-starting/

#PQC #PostQuantumCryptography #InfoSec #CryptoAgility #QuantumSecurity

CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials) is the new buzzword. Think SBOM but for encryption. IBM’s approach uses static analysis to list all algorithms/keys (your CBOM) and dynamic monitoring to see them in action. Why does it matter? Because to migrate to #PQC, you first need a map of every place cryptography lives in your org. This article shows how various tools help assemble that map. #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/cryptographic-inventory-vendors/

What’s a CBOM? A Cryptographic Bill of Materials is an inventory of all crypto assets in a system – algorithms, key lengths, certificates, libraries, protocols, etc. In the age of #QuantumThreats and new regulations, CBOMs are becoming crucial. They give security teams X-ray vision into “what crypto are we using and where,” so we can find weak links (e.g., an obsolete cipher or a short RSA key) and plan upgrades to #PQC. #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/cryptographic-bill-of-materials-cbom/

TL;DR from this deep-dive: transparency is security. A CBOM brings cryptography out of the shadows. It’s not just a compliance checkbox – it helps identify legacy crypto that needs replacing (e.g., “oh wow, this app still uses SHA-1 certs”), ensures you meet standards, and guides your PQC migration. Expect CBOMs to become as routine as SBOMs in audits. It’s a bit more work now for a lot more peace of mind later. #PQC #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/cryptographic-bill-of-materials-cbom/

Quantum readiness isn’t just future-proofing – it’s a chance to fix lingering security debt. By embarking on a PQC migration, you finally fund that full cryptographic inventory (you can’t protect what you don’t know you have) and clean up “crypto junk” (weak algorithms, expired certs) . It’s like spring cleaning your security while prepping for the future. #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/quantum-ciso-budget/

Regulators are mandating comprehensive cryptographic inventories for quantum readiness - but what if that’s not feasible yet?

My latest article explores a pragmatic, risk-driven alternative to begin mitigating quantum threats without boiling the ocean.

#QuantumRisk #PQC #Cybersecurity #QuantumReady #CryptoAgility

https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/risk-driven-quantum-crypto-inventory/

CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials) is the new buzzword. Think SBOM but for encryption. Why does it matter? Because to migrate to #PQC, you first need a map of every place cryptography lives in your org. This article shows how various tools help assemble that map. #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/cryptographic-inventory-vendors/

You can’t secure what you can’t see. Thankfully, a growing ecosystem of tools can map out all your organization’s cryptography. This article surveys leading cryptographic inventory solutions – static code analyzers, network sniffers, host scanners, etc. – that together build a full picture of where and how encryption is used. For true #QuantumReadiness, these tools are your new best friends. #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/cryptographic-inventory-vendors/

Quantum readiness isn’t just future-proofing – it’s a chance to fix lingering security debt. By embarking on a PQC migration, you finally fund that full cryptographic inventory (you can’t protect what you don’t know you have) and clean up “crypto junk” (weak algorithms, expired certs). It’s like spring cleaning your security while prepping for the future. #CryptoAgility https://postquantum.com/post-quantum/quantum-ciso-budget/

Crypto agility, qué importante es este concepto en el mundo de la criptografía actual, la facilidad de poder cambiar un algoritmo criptográfico vulnerable por otro, sin necesidad de cambiar detalles internos de los protocolos.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_agility?wprov=sfla1

#cryptoagility #criptografia #pqc #postquantumcryptography #cryptography

MT @[email protected]
#TLS cert lifetimes are shrinking to 47 days by 2029. The message is clear: #automation isn’t optional anymore. As DigiCert’s Dean Coclin says, “success depends on #cryptoagility + treating #DigitalTrust as a strategy, not a set-it-and-forget-it task.” 🔐
https://www.digicert.com/blog/tls-certificate-lifetimes-will-officially-reduce-to-47-days #pki #news #x509

At the upcoming SANS Emerging Threats Summit on May 14, I will be delivering a session: "Preparing for the Quantum Threat: Practical Steps for Cybersecurity Teams"

SANS Emerging Threats Summit is a free live online event and you can register here: https://sans.org/u/1zh8

This is a practical, engineering-led conversation about preparing for Q-Day — not years from now, but starting today.

#EmergingThreatsSummit #PQC #PostQuantumSecurity #QuantumComputing #Cybersecurity #Quantum #CryptoAgility

At the upcoming SANS Emerging Threats Summit on May 14, I will be delivering a session: "Preparing for the Quantum Threat: Practical Steps for Cybersecurity Teams"

SANS Emerging Threats Summit is a free live online event and you can register here: https://sans.org/u/1zh8

This is a practical, engineering-led conversation about preparing for Q-Day — not years from now, but starting today.

#EmergingThreatsSummit #PostQuantumSecurity #QuantumComputing #Cybersecurity #Quantum #CryptoAgility #PQC

Maybe #quantumcomputing will change this from "HARD" to "NOT SO HARD" or even "EASY". 🤷‍♂️

No no, don't worry. Not today, not tomorrow. But like MD5 was "unbreakable" long time ago, technical advances are coming fast.

Source #xkcd https://xkcd.com/936/

#quantumsecurity #security #cryptoagility

I am afraid that if current encryption schemes are broken by #quantumcomputing it will more like being hit by a deadly meteroit then an earthquake. ☄️ This will not leave any technological component untouched.

"Quantum computing looms in our future like a technological earthquake, because quantum decryption threatens to compromise a foundational element of data encryption schemes."

#pqc #postquantum #cryptograhpy #cryptoagility

https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/fin-tech/1267752/quantum-computing-the-looming-threat-of-quantum-decryption

"Even if the Schnorr-based technique won’t break the Internet, quantum computers could eventually do so by running Shor’s algorithm. Security researchers have been busy developing a number of alternative cryptographic systems that are seen as less likely to succumb to a quantum attack, called post-quantum or quantum-safe. "

#security #quantumcomputing #pqc #postquantumcryptography #cryptoagility

Are quantum computers about to break online privacy?
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00017-0#ref-CR1

Since it is often believed that replacing crypto is easy, #NIST shows here that it isn't. There are from now on 8 years for fixing software and hardware using sha-1. Maybe as a reminder for those who still believe that this is an easy job.

“Modules that still use SHA-1 after 2030 will not be permitted for purchase by the federal government,” Celi said.

#cryptography #cryptoagility #quantumcomputing

https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-retires-sha-1-cryptographic-algorithm

@[email protected] @tc Hopefully the companies are re-encrypting as well. I guess this is the big issue with companies: this won't happen fast if there is not some kind of -- lets call it -- #cryptoagility setup. And the appropriate #architecture to support this.

If not, it can talk years before an alternative storage encryption is setup up. I have seen this where a replacement of a DMS took almost 5 years. 😱

The threat: #QuantumComputer, the solution: #PQC by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

"In 2019, a team of researchers factored a 795-bit RSA key, making it the biggest key size ever to be solved." and "The researchers estimated that the sum of the computation time for both of the new records was about 4,000 core-years using Intel Xeon Gold 6130 CPUs (running at 2.1 GHz)."

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/07/nist-selects-quantum-proof-algorithms-to-head-off-the-coming-cryptopocalypse/ #cryptoagility #cryptography

Still some way to go but it is time to start to experiment with new algorithms and to get the hands dirty with #pqc. Expertise in #cryptoagility won't come over night. Changing systems will take years.

"Governments need to invest in cybersecurity that can defend against the future threat of bad actors using quantum computers that are exponentially faster than ordinary machines, a cryptography expert said."

https://www.bworldonline.com/sparkup/2022/11/16/487531/ibm-raises-cybersecurity-red-flag-warns-against-quantum-computing-threats/

“All we need to do is replace those algorithms with newer versions that are quantum-resistant,” said Marc Witteman , CEO of Riscure. “Unfortunately, that is easier said than done.”

Michael Osborne, CTO of IBM Quantum Safe, said during a recent webinar, “We understand quantum-safe as being safe in the quantum era. Part of that is replacing the cryptography that we use."

Less talk, more action + #cryptoagility 💯 #qkd #cryptography #QuantumTechnology #QuantumComputing

https://semiengineering.com/post-quantum-and-pre-quantum-security-issues-grow/

@roomey I am neither an expert in this area, but I haven't seen a suggestion to move to one of the possible candidates of the #NIST competition.

Why? Because they are still not the final candidates and as it was demonstrated in August with the SIKE, you can see, how quickly a possible winner can be cracked. I would really defer the move to one of the candidates.

But yes, #cryptoagility is a must nowadays. Not only because of #quantumcomputing. It is generally needed!