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#x509 — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #x509, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  2. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  3. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #freeswan #x509 #postquantum #postquantumencryption #postquantumikev2 #ikev2
  4. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  5. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  6. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  7. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  8. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  9. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #x509 #infosec #digicert
  10. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  11. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  12. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  13. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  14. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #infosec #signal #cellular #x509 #ddos #bgp
  15. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  16. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  17. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  18. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  19. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #digicert #x509 #bgp #usdod #quad9 #dns
  20. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  21. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #x509 #dnssec #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125
  22. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125 #x509 #dnssec
  23. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125 #x509 #dnssec
  24. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #dnssec #x509 #ietf125 #cuba #botnets #bogons
  25. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125 #x509 #dnssec
  26. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: infosec.exchange/@paulehoffman

    Side note: this is why things like "multi-perapective corroboration" for domain validation do not work.

    When every single packet to .ir nameservers and servers inside Iran pass through two (yes, 2!) gateways, then those controlling the gateways can acquire a valid domain validation certificate for any .ir domain or any server located in Iran.

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate
  27. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: infosec.exchange/@paulehoffman

    Side note: this is why things like "multi-perapective corroboration" for domain validation do not work.

    When every single packet to .ir nameservers and servers inside Iran pass through two (yes, 2!) gateways, then those controlling the gateways can acquire a valid domain validation certificate for any .ir domain or any server located in Iran.

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate
  28. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: infosec.exchange/@paulehoffman

    Side note: this is why things like "multi-perapective corroboration" for domain validation do not work.

    When every single packet to .ir nameservers and servers inside Iran pass through two (yes, 2!) gateways, then those controlling the gateways can acquire a valid domain validation certificate for any .ir domain or any server located in Iran.

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate

    #certificate #dnssec #dns #x509
  29. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/11

    An archive of all CT-logged certificates with all the tools needed for an analysis! No more scraping.

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate
  30. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/11

    An archive of all CT-logged certificates with all the tools needed for an analysis! No more scraping.

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate
  31. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/11

    An archive of all CT-logged certificates with all the tools needed for an analysis! No more scraping.

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate

    #certificate #x509 #ctlog
  32. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  33. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  34. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  35. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #ip #letsencrypt #x509
  36. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  37. Volker Stolz @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #zoom #x509
  38. Volker Stolz @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #zoom #x509
  39. Volker Stolz @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #zoom #x509
  40. Volker Stolz @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #x509 #zoom
  41. Volker Stolz @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #zoom #x509
  42. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    It's been over half a year and the Internet still seems to be working.

    Here's your regular reminder that #cname in #x509 is almost always irrelevant for the validation. If someone is using it, they are doing it wrong.

    #cname #x509
  43. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    It's been over half a year and the Internet still seems to be working.

    Here's your regular reminder that #cname in #x509 is almost always irrelevant for the validation. If someone is using it, they are doing it wrong.

    #cname #x509
  44. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    It's been over half a year and the Internet still seems to be working.

    Here's your regular reminder that #cname in #x509 is almost always irrelevant for the validation. If someone is using it, they are doing it wrong.

    #x509 #cname
  45. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    It's been over half a year and the Internet still seems to be working.

    Here's your regular reminder that #cname in #x509 is almost always irrelevant for the validation. If someone is using it, they are doing it wrong.

    #cname #x509
  46. Ype Kingma @[email protected] ·

    @petarov

    Fortunately the #python #cryptography library has good code examples on how to actually get a #pki to work.

    Roughly, #x509 provides one way trust and I need mutual trust in a distributed group.

    So I find myself working on x509 certificates for #wireguard. Wireguard works with a key pair at each tunnel end. Adding certs to that sounds conceptually easy, but for me it's a struggle.

    #python #cryptography #pki #x509 #wireguard
  47. Ype Kingma @[email protected] ·

    @petarov

    Fortunately the #python #cryptography library has good code examples on how to actually get a #pki to work.

    Roughly, #x509 provides one way trust and I need mutual trust in a distributed group.

    So I find myself working on x509 certificates for #wireguard. Wireguard works with a key pair at each tunnel end. Adding certs to that sounds conceptually easy, but for me it's a struggle.

    #python #cryptography #pki #x509 #wireguard
  48. Ype Kingma @[email protected] ·

    @petarov

    Fortunately the #python #cryptography library has good code examples on how to actually get a #pki to work.

    Roughly, #x509 provides one way trust and I need mutual trust in a distributed group.

    So I find myself working on x509 certificates for #wireguard. Wireguard works with a key pair at each tunnel end. Adding certs to that sounds conceptually easy, but for me it's a struggle.

    #python #cryptography #pki #x509 #wireguard
  49. Ype Kingma @[email protected] ·

    @petarov

    Fortunately the #python #cryptography library has good code examples on how to actually get a #pki to work.

    Roughly, #x509 provides one way trust and I need mutual trust in a distributed group.

    So I find myself working on x509 certificates for #wireguard. Wireguard works with a key pair at each tunnel end. Adding certs to that sounds conceptually easy, but for me it's a struggle.

    #wireguard #x509 #pki #cryptography #python
  50. Ype Kingma @[email protected] ·

    @petarov

    Fortunately the #python #cryptography library has good code examples on how to actually get a #pki to work.

    Roughly, #x509 provides one way trust and I need mutual trust in a distributed group.

    So I find myself working on x509 certificates for #wireguard. Wireguard works with a key pair at each tunnel end. Adding certs to that sounds conceptually easy, but for me it's a struggle.

    #python #cryptography #pki #x509 #wireguard