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#x509 — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #x509, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Blain Smith @[email protected] ·

    Oh, nice! I pulled all the latest changes for Hare's stdlib and I saw `crypto::x509` come down!

    #HareLang #TLS #x509

    #harelang #tls #x509
  2. Blain Smith @blainsmith ·

    Oh, nice! I pulled all the latest changes for Hare's stdlib and I saw `crypto::x509` come down!

    #harelang #tls #x509
  3. Blain Smith @[email protected] ·

    Oh, nice! I pulled all the latest changes for Hare's stdlib and I saw `crypto::x509` come down!

    #HareLang #TLS #x509

    #harelang #tls #x509
  4. Blain Smith @[email protected] ·

    Oh, nice! I pulled all the latest changes for Hare's stdlib and I saw `crypto::x509` come down!

    #HareLang #TLS #x509

    #harelang #tls #x509
  5. Blain Smith @[email protected] ·

    Oh, nice! I pulled all the latest changes for Hare's stdlib and I saw `crypto::x509` come down!

    #HareLang #TLS #x509

    #x509 #tls #harelang
  6. Habr @[email protected] ·

    От Root CA до User Authorization в nginx+apache. Часть 2. Отзыв сертификатов, CRL и OCSP

    Сертификат скомпрометирован, а срок действия ещё не вышел — как сказать клиентам «больше ему не верьте»? Разбираем оба механизма отзыва, CRL и OCSP: отзыв, генерация и публикация списков, responder, stapling в nginx/apache. С полным справочником всех параметров.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1051674/

    #OpenSSL #PKI #OCSP #CRL #отзыв_сертификатов #X509 #certificate_authority #OCSP_stapling #nginx #информационная_безопасность

    #информационная_безопасность #nginx #ocsp_stapling #certificate_authority #x509 #отзыв_сертификатов
  7. Habr @[email protected] ·

    От Root CA до User Authorization в nginx+apache. Часть 2. Отзыв сертификатов, CRL и OCSP

    Сертификат скомпрометирован, а срок действия ещё не вышел — как сказать клиентам «больше ему не верьте»? Разбираем оба механизма отзыва, CRL и OCSP: отзыв, генерация и публикация списков, responder, stapling в nginx/apache. С полным справочником всех параметров.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1051674/

    #OpenSSL #PKI #OCSP #CRL #отзыв_сертификатов #X509 #certificate_authority #OCSP_stapling #nginx #информационная_безопасность

    #информационная_безопасность #nginx #ocsp_stapling #certificate_authority #x509 #отзыв_сертификатов
  8. Habr @[email protected] ·

    От Root CA до User Authorization в nginx+apache. Часть 2. Отзыв сертификатов, CRL и OCSP

    Сертификат скомпрометирован, а срок действия ещё не вышел — как сказать клиентам «больше ему не верьте»? Разбираем оба механизма отзыва, CRL и OCSP: отзыв, генерация и публикация списков, responder, stapling в nginx/apache. С полным справочником всех параметров.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1051674/

    #OpenSSL #PKI #OCSP #CRL #отзыв_сертификатов #X509 #certificate_authority #OCSP_stapling #nginx #информационная_безопасность

    #openssl #pki #ocsp #crl #отзыв_сертификатов #x509
  9. jendrik @[email protected] ·

    Researching #x509 #EIDAS stuff regarding organizationIdentifier, clicking through some links, following a link to the Browser CA Bugzilla (bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.)

    Be greeted by a bug from @q

    Small world

    #x509 #eidas
  10. jendrik @[email protected] ·

    Researching #x509 #EIDAS stuff regarding organizationIdentifier, clicking through some links, following a link to the Browser CA Bugzilla (bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.)

    Be greeted by a bug from @q

    Small world

    #x509 #eidas
  11. jendrik @[email protected] ·

    Researching #x509 #EIDAS stuff regarding organizationIdentifier, clicking through some links, following a link to the Browser CA Bugzilla (bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.)

    Be greeted by a bug from @q

    Small world

    #x509 #eidas
  12. jendrik @[email protected] ·

    Researching #x509 #EIDAS stuff regarding organizationIdentifier, clicking through some links, following a link to the Browser CA Bugzilla (bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.)

    Be greeted by a bug from @q

    Small world

    #x509 #eidas
  13. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  14. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  15. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  16. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #strongswan #ipsec #vpn #ike #ikev1 #ikev2
  17. Neustradamus :xmpp: :linux: @[email protected] ·

    #strongSwan 6.0.6 has been released ( #IPsec / #VPN / #IKE / #IKEv1 / #IKEv2 / #PostQuantumIKEv2 / #PostQuantumEncryption / #PostQuantum / #X509 / #FreeSWAN ) strongswan.org/

    #freeswan #x509 #postquantum #postquantumencryption #postquantumikev2 #ikev2
  18. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  19. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  20. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  21. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #digicert #infosec #x509
  22. kravietz 🦇 @[email protected] ·

    #DigiCert customer support compromised with .scr ZIP attachment 🤷

    During our investigation between 2026-04-14 and 2026-04-17, as DigiCert identified certificates potentially affected by the threat actor’s actions, we revoked them. DigiCert revoked 60 certificates issued from the following CAs:

    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA256 2021 CA1
    • DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1
    • GoGetSSL G4 CS RSA4096 SHA256 2022 CA-1
    • Verokey High Assurance Secure Code EV

    https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2033170

    #x509 #infosec

    #x509 #infosec #digicert
  23. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  24. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  25. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  26. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #bgp #ddos #x509 #cellular #signal #infosec
  27. John Kristoff @[email protected] ·

    Weekend Reads

    * DDoS scrubbing in BGP
    labs.ripe.net/author/shyam-kri
    * Revocation of X.509 certs
    blog.apnic.net/2026/04/24/revo
    * Mobile telecom surveillance actors
    citizenlab.ca/research/uncover
    * Signalgate socio-technical analysis
    arxiv.org/abs/2604.19711
    * Inside a fake shops bulletproof host
    netcraft.com/blog/fibergrid-in

    #BGP #DDoS #X509 #Cellular #Signal #Infosec

    #infosec #signal #cellular #x509 #ddos #bgp
  28. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  29. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  30. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  31. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #dns #quad9 #usdod #bgp #x509 #digicert
  32. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * DigiCert CA bundle expiry
    help.duo.com/s/article/9451
    * Various US DoD route updates
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-rep
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * Quad9 enables DoH3 and DoQ
    quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-enab

    #DigiCert #X509 #BGP #USDoD #Quad9 #DNS

    #digicert #x509 #bgp #usdod #quad9 #dns
  33. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #x509 #dnssec #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125
  34. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125 #x509 #dnssec
  35. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125 #x509 #dnssec
  36. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #bogons #botnets #cuba #ietf125 #x509 #dnssec
  37. Dataplane.org @[email protected] ·

    The Internet Last Week

    * IETF 125
    ietf.org/meeting/125/
    * Cuba power outage effects
    noc.social/@cloudflareradar/11
    mastodon.social/@IODA/11624604
    infosec.exchange/@dougmadory/1
    mastodon.social/@netblocks/116
    * IoT DDoS botnets disrupted
    justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/authori
    * Unallocated IP4 /13 announced
    infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116
    bgp.he.net/net/102.224.0.0/13
    stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-h
    * CAs must perform DNSSEC validation
    cabforum.org/2025/06/18/ballot
    infosec.exchange/@mnordhoff/11

    #IETF125 #Cuba #Botnets #Bogons #DNSSEC #X509

    #dnssec #x509 #ietf125 #cuba #botnets #bogons
  38. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: infosec.exchange/@paulehoffman

    Side note: this is why things like "multi-perapective corroboration" for domain validation do not work.

    When every single packet to .ir nameservers and servers inside Iran pass through two (yes, 2!) gateways, then those controlling the gateways can acquire a valid domain validation certificate for any .ir domain or any server located in Iran.

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate
  39. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: infosec.exchange/@paulehoffman

    Side note: this is why things like "multi-perapective corroboration" for domain validation do not work.

    When every single packet to .ir nameservers and servers inside Iran pass through two (yes, 2!) gateways, then those controlling the gateways can acquire a valid domain validation certificate for any .ir domain or any server located in Iran.

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate
  40. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: infosec.exchange/@paulehoffman

    Side note: this is why things like "multi-perapective corroboration" for domain validation do not work.

    When every single packet to .ir nameservers and servers inside Iran pass through two (yes, 2!) gateways, then those controlling the gateways can acquire a valid domain validation certificate for any .ir domain or any server located in Iran.

    #x509 #dns #dnssec #certificate

    #certificate #dnssec #dns #x509
  41. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/11

    An archive of all CT-logged certificates with all the tools needed for an analysis! No more scraping.

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate
  42. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/11

    An archive of all CT-logged certificates with all the tools needed for an analysis! No more scraping.

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate
  43. Pontiff Fractal Tiam @[email protected] ·

    RE: abyssdomain.expert/@filippo/11

    An archive of all CT-logged certificates with all the tools needed for an analysis! No more scraping.

    #ctlog #x509 #certificate

    #certificate #x509 #ctlog
  44. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  45. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  46. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  47. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #x509 #letsencrypt #ip
  48. Ben Hardill @[email protected] ·

    So @letsencrypt have put out a new blog post about shorter lives for certs moving forward (45days by 2028), but I've still not seen any movement on deploying the "shortlived" profile (and as a result IP address certs) from their post back in July. It's all been up on the test Staging servers since then.

    Does anybody have any idea when this will finally go live?

    It's in the docs, but no mention that it is restricted to invited users only still

    letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/

    #x509 #LetsEncrypt #ip

    #ip #letsencrypt #x509
  49. Volker Stolz🏳️‍🌈 @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #zoom #x509
  50. Volker Stolz🏳️‍🌈 @[email protected] ·

    % openssl x509 -in /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/Resources/BBMMRoot.crt -text
    …
    Validity
    Not Before: Feb 8 00:00:00 2010 GMT
    Not After : Feb 7 23:59:59 2020 GMT
    Subject: C=US, O=Thawte, Inc., CN=Thawte SSL CA
    …

    🧐

    #Zoom #x509

    #zoom #x509