home.social

#ietf125 — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #ietf125, aggregated by home.social.

  1. After testing chinese payment apps at #IETF125, I discover in Arora's talk at #UndoneCS that there is an indian payment app, Aadhaar Pay play.google.com/store/apps/det

  2. After testing chinese payment apps at #IETF125, I discover in Arora's talk at #UndoneCS that there is an indian payment app, Aadhaar Pay play.google.com/store/apps/det

  3. After testing chinese payment apps at #IETF125, I discover in Arora's talk at #UndoneCS that there is an indian payment app, Aadhaar Pay play.google.com/store/apps/det

  4. After testing chinese payment apps at #IETF125, I discover in Arora's talk at #UndoneCS that there is an indian payment app, Aadhaar Pay play.google.com/store/apps/det

  5. After testing chinese payment apps at #IETF125, I discover in Arora's talk at #UndoneCS that there is an indian payment app, Aadhaar Pay play.google.com/store/apps/det

  6. Now, a bit of SciFi: securing communications in space (related to working groups like tiptop or dtn).

    Prevent the aliens from modifying packets?

    Not obvious to do with asynchronous communications (common in space).

    #IETF125

  7. Now, a bit of SciFi: securing communications in space (related to working groups like tiptop or dtn).

    Prevent the aliens from modifying packets?

    Not obvious to do with asynchronous communications (common in space).

    #IETF125

  8. Now, a bit of SciFi: securing communications in space (related to working groups like tiptop or dtn).

    Prevent the aliens from modifying packets?

    Not obvious to do with asynchronous communications (common in space).

    #IETF125

  9. Now, a bit of SciFi: securing communications in space (related to working groups like tiptop or dtn).

    Prevent the aliens from modifying packets?

    Not obvious to do with asynchronous communications (common in space).

    #IETF125

  10. Now, a bit of SciFi: securing communications in space (related to working groups like tiptop or dtn).

    Prevent the aliens from modifying packets?

    Not obvious to do with asynchronous communications (common in space).

    #IETF125

  11. An interesting point is that the chinese challenge is open internationaly. Foreigners are encouraged to apply. (Unlike what Russia did for GOST.)

    Apparently (but the speaker refused to answer) the proposal has to be new. Do not submit ML-KEM.

    #IETF125

  12. An interesting point is that the chinese challenge is open internationaly. Foreigners are encouraged to apply. (Unlike what Russia did for GOST.)

    Apparently (but the speaker refused to answer) the proposal has to be new. Do not submit ML-KEM.

    #IETF125

  13. An interesting point is that the chinese challenge is open internationaly. Foreigners are encouraged to apply. (Unlike what Russia did for GOST.)

    Apparently (but the speaker refused to answer) the proposal has to be new. Do not submit ML-KEM.

    #IETF125

  14. An interesting point is that the chinese challenge is open internationaly. Foreigners are encouraged to apply. (Unlike what Russia did for GOST.)

    Apparently (but the speaker refused to answer) the proposal has to be new. Do not submit ML-KEM.

    #IETF125

  15. An interesting point is that the chinese challenge is open internationaly. Foreigners are encouraged to apply. (Unlike what Russia did for GOST.)

    Apparently (but the speaker refused to answer) the proposal has to be new. Do not submit ML-KEM.

    #IETF125

  16. A talk about the new chinese commercial cryptographic algorithms program at #IETF125 (ping @shaft)
    "commercial" as in "no State secrets"

    Current algorithms are ZUC, SM2, SM3, SM4, SM9... (All of them ISO standards.) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZUC_stre en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM9_(cry

    Some are in IANA registries (for instance for TLS) See RFC 8998

    Now asking for post-quantum alternatives. (Formal announcement one year ago.) niccs.org.cn/niccs/index.html You can still submit a poposal!

  17. A talk about the new chinese commercial cryptographic algorithms program at #IETF125 (ping @shaft)
    "commercial" as in "no State secrets"

    Current algorithms are ZUC, SM2, SM3, SM4, SM9... (All of them ISO standards.) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZUC_stre en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM9_(cry

    Some are in IANA registries (for instance for TLS) See RFC 8998

    Now asking for post-quantum alternatives. (Formal announcement one year ago.) niccs.org.cn/niccs/index.html You can still submit a poposal!

  18. A talk about the new chinese commercial cryptographic algorithms program at #IETF125 (ping @shaft)
    "commercial" as in "no State secrets"

    Current algorithms are ZUC, SM2, SM3, SM4, SM9... (All of them ISO standards.) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZUC_stre en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM9_(cry

    Some are in IANA registries (for instance for TLS) See RFC 8998

    Now asking for post-quantum alternatives. (Formal announcement one year ago.) niccs.org.cn/niccs/index.html You can still submit a poposal!

  19. A talk about the new chinese commercial cryptographic algorithms program at #IETF125 (ping @shaft)
    "commercial" as in "no State secrets"

    Current algorithms are ZUC, SM2, SM3, SM4, SM9... (All of them ISO standards.) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZUC_stre en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM9_(cry

    Some are in IANA registries (for instance for TLS) See RFC 8998

    Now asking for post-quantum alternatives. (Formal announcement one year ago.) niccs.org.cn/niccs/index.html You can still submit a poposal!

  20. A talk about the new chinese commercial cryptographic algorithms program at #IETF125 (ping @shaft)
    "commercial" as in "no State secrets"

    Current algorithms are ZUC, SM2, SM3, SM4, SM9... (All of them ISO standards.) en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZUC_stre en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM9_(cry

    Some are in IANA registries (for instance for TLS) See RFC 8998

    Now asking for post-quantum alternatives. (Formal announcement one year ago.) niccs.org.cn/niccs/index.html You can still submit a poposal!

  21. A proposal to run #BGP over #TLS. Obvious issue: we don't want to use the classical PKI (because it would create a chicken-and-egg problem for IP).

    A BGP-specific PKI, with short-lived certificates including the AS number of the BGP speaker and new introducers. (Not using the RPKI.)

    #IETF125

  22. A proposal to run #BGP over #TLS. Obvious issue: we don't want to use the classical PKI (because it would create a chicken-and-egg problem for IP).

    A BGP-specific PKI, with short-lived certificates including the AS number of the BGP speaker and new introducers. (Not using the RPKI.)

    #IETF125

  23. A proposal to run #BGP over #TLS. Obvious issue: we don't want to use the classical PKI (because it would create a chicken-and-egg problem for IP).

    A BGP-specific PKI, with short-lived certificates including the AS number of the BGP speaker and new introducers. (Not using the RPKI.)

    #IETF125

  24. A proposal to run #BGP over #TLS. Obvious issue: we don't want to use the classical PKI (because it would create a chicken-and-egg problem for IP).

    A BGP-specific PKI, with short-lived certificates including the AS number of the BGP speaker and new introducers. (Not using the RPKI.)

    #IETF125

  25. A proposal to run #BGP over #TLS. Obvious issue: we don't want to use the classical PKI (because it would create a chicken-and-egg problem for IP).

    A BGP-specific PKI, with short-lived certificates including the AS number of the BGP speaker and new introducers. (Not using the RPKI.)

    #IETF125

  26. It has been a (mosty) wonderful 4 years as Security Area Director, working with and managing awesome people and making the internet work better and more securely :) #ietf #ietf125

  27. It has been a (mosty) wonderful 4 years as Security Area Director, working with and managing awesome people and making the internet work better and more securely :) #ietf #ietf125

  28. It has been a (mosty) wonderful 4 years as Security Area Director, working with and managing awesome people and making the internet work better and more securely :) #ietf #ietf125

  29. It has been a (mosty) wonderful 4 years as Security Area Director, working with and managing awesome people and making the internet work better and more securely :) #ietf #ietf125

  30. It has been a (mosty) wonderful 4 years as Security Area Director, working with and managing awesome people and making the internet work better and more securely :) #ietf #ietf125

  31. Among the funny questions: at what point will ML-DSA and ML-KEM no longer regarded "Post-Quantum Cryptography" but just plain "Cryptography"? Before or after IPv6 world domination?

    #IETF125

  32. Among the funny questions: at what point will ML-DSA and ML-KEM no longer regarded "Post-Quantum Cryptography" but just plain "Cryptography"? Before or after IPv6 world domination?

    #IETF125

  33. Among the funny questions: at what point will ML-DSA and ML-KEM no longer regarded "Post-Quantum Cryptography" but just plain "Cryptography"? Before or after IPv6 world domination?

    #IETF125

  34. Among the funny questions: at what point will ML-DSA and ML-KEM no longer regarded "Post-Quantum Cryptography" but just plain "Cryptography"? Before or after IPv6 world domination?

    #IETF125

  35. Among the funny questions: at what point will ML-DSA and ML-KEM no longer regarded "Post-Quantum Cryptography" but just plain "Cryptography"? Before or after IPv6 world domination?

    #IETF125

  36. Now, SAAG meeting (Security Area Open Meeting, basically examining possible future security work).

    There are many IETF working groups in the Security Area...

    #IETF125

  37. Now, SAAG meeting (Security Area Open Meeting, basically examining possible future security work).

    There are many IETF working groups in the Security Area...

    #IETF125

  38. Now, SAAG meeting (Security Area Open Meeting, basically examining possible future security work).

    There are many IETF working groups in the Security Area...

    #IETF125