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#zkp — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #zkp, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Cроки факторизации приватных ключей RSA и Bitcoin немного приблизились

    В марте 2026 году криптографы из Google Quantum AI опубликовали доказательство , что сверхпроводящий квантовый компьютер с 500 000 физических кубитов (это 1200 кубитов с коррекцией ошибок) способен взломать приватные ключи Bitcoin максимум за 9 минут (быстрее, чем 10-минутное время генерации новых блоков). Хотя опасность квантовых вычислений для традиционных шифров известна давно, ранее для этого предполагалась более серьёзная конфигурация, чем 500 тыс. кубитов. Новое доказательство поднимает перед финансовой индустрией несколько вопросов. Самый главный — когда будут разработаны и поступят в продажу квантовые компьютеры на 500 тыс. кубитов, если сейчас у самого мощного около 150 кубитов? Исследователи Google Quantum AI в техническом отчёте дают рекомендации по минимизации ущерба.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1028168/

    #квантовый_компьютер #алгоритм_Шора #Ethereum #Bitcoin #ECDLP #ZKP #secp256k1 #приватные_мемпулы #постквантовая_криптография

  2. Cроки факторизации приватных ключей RSA и Bitcoin немного приблизились

    В марте 2026 году криптографы из Google Quantum AI опубликовали доказательство , что сверхпроводящий квантовый компьютер с 500 000 физических кубитов (это 1200 кубитов с коррекцией ошибок) способен взломать приватные ключи Bitcoin максимум за 9 минут (быстрее, чем 10-минутное время генерации новых блоков). Хотя опасность квантовых вычислений для традиционных шифров известна давно, ранее для этого предполагалась более серьёзная конфигурация, чем 500 тыс. кубитов. Новое доказательство поднимает перед финансовой индустрией несколько вопросов. Самый главный — когда будут разработаны и поступят в продажу квантовые компьютеры на 500 тыс. кубитов, если сейчас у самого мощного около 150 кубитов? Исследователи Google Quantum AI в техническом отчёте дают рекомендации по минимизации ущерба.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1028168/

    #квантовый_компьютер #алгоритм_Шора #Ethereum #Bitcoin #ECDLP #ZKP #secp256k1 #приватные_мемпулы #постквантовая_криптография

  3. Cроки факторизации приватных ключей RSA и Bitcoin немного приблизились

    В марте 2026 году криптографы из Google Quantum AI опубликовали доказательство , что сверхпроводящий квантовый компьютер с 500 000 физических кубитов (это 1200 кубитов с коррекцией ошибок) способен взломать приватные ключи Bitcoin максимум за 9 минут (быстрее, чем 10-минутное время генерации новых блоков). Хотя опасность квантовых вычислений для традиционных шифров известна давно, ранее для этого предполагалась более серьёзная конфигурация, чем 500 тыс. кубитов. Новое доказательство поднимает перед финансовой индустрией несколько вопросов. Самый главный — когда будут разработаны и поступят в продажу квантовые компьютеры на 500 тыс. кубитов, если сейчас у самого мощного около 150 кубитов? Исследователи Google Quantum AI в техническом отчёте дают рекомендации по минимизации ущерба.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1028168/

    #квантовый_компьютер #алгоритм_Шора #Ethereum #Bitcoin #ECDLP #ZKP #secp256k1 #приватные_мемпулы #постквантовая_криптография

  4. Cроки факторизации приватных ключей RSA и Bitcoin немного приблизились

    В марте 2026 году криптографы из Google Quantum AI опубликовали доказательство , что сверхпроводящий квантовый компьютер с 500 000 физических кубитов (это 1200 кубитов с коррекцией ошибок) способен взломать приватные ключи Bitcoin максимум за 9 минут (быстрее, чем 10-минутное время генерации новых блоков). Хотя опасность квантовых вычислений для традиционных шифров известна давно, ранее для этого предполагалась более серьёзная конфигурация, чем 500 тыс. кубитов. Новое доказательство поднимает перед финансовой индустрией несколько вопросов. Самый главный — когда будут разработаны и поступят в продажу квантовые компьютеры на 500 тыс. кубитов, если сейчас у самого мощного около 150 кубитов? Исследователи Google Quantum AI в техническом отчёте дают рекомендации по минимизации ущерба.

    habr.com/ru/articles/1028168/

    #квантовый_компьютер #алгоритм_Шора #Ethereum #Bitcoin #ECDLP #ZKP #secp256k1 #приватные_мемпулы #постквантовая_криптография

  5. New breakthrough results for quantum attack resource estimates against 256-bit elliptic curves: most ECC-based applications including ECDSA and Bitcoin could be at risk way sooner than expected:

    research.google/blog/safeguard

    We estimate that these circuits can be executed on a superconducting qubit CRQC with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in a few minutes [...] This is an approximately 20-fold reduction in the number of physical qubits required to solve ECDLP-256"

    Interestingly, Google and friends did not release the blueprint for the attack circuit. In the name of "responsible disclosure", they only provided a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) proving that the circuit works. This is, I think , a first in the realm of cryptanalysis disclosure.

    The statement that our ZK proof demonstrates is the following: we possess a classical reversible circuit of a specified size which on most inputs correctly computes point addition on the elliptic curve secp256k. This is the primary bottleneck in Shor’s quantum algorithm

    I have been saying this since the 2010s: quantum cryptanalysis is one of those non-linear technology progresses that will take everyone by surprise when it arrives. Qubits quality and numbers go up, error-correction and attacks improve, investments scale up accordingly. It's a perfect storm of compound factors. Folks didn't listen, now time is ticking.

    More context at: gagliardoni.net/#20260331_new_

    #quantum #quantumcomputing #cryptography #security #cybersecurity #infosec #google #bitcoin #blockchain #ethereum #zkp #zeroknowledge

  6. New breakthrough results for quantum attack resource estimates against 256-bit elliptic curves: most ECC-based applications including ECDSA and Bitcoin could be at risk way sooner than expected:

    research.google/blog/safeguard

    We estimate that these circuits can be executed on a superconducting qubit CRQC with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in a few minutes [...] This is an approximately 20-fold reduction in the number of physical qubits required to solve ECDLP-256"

    Interestingly, Google and friends did not release the blueprint for the attack circuit. In the name of "responsible disclosure", they only provided a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) proving that the circuit works. This is, I think , a first in the realm of cryptanalysis disclosure.

    The statement that our ZK proof demonstrates is the following: we possess a classical reversible circuit of a specified size which on most inputs correctly computes point addition on the elliptic curve secp256k. This is the primary bottleneck in Shor’s quantum algorithm

    I have been saying this since the 2010s: quantum cryptanalysis is one of those non-linear technology progresses that will take everyone by surprise when it arrives. Qubits quality and numbers go up, error-correction and attacks improve, investments scale up accordingly. It's a perfect storm of compound factors. Folks didn't listen, now time is ticking.

    More context at: gagliardoni.net/#20260331_new_

    #quantum #quantumcomputing #cryptography #security #cybersecurity #infosec #google #bitcoin #blockchain #ethereum #zkp #zeroknowledge

  7. New breakthrough results for quantum attack resource estimates against 256-bit elliptic curves: most ECC-based applications including ECDSA and Bitcoin could be at risk way sooner than expected:

    research.google/blog/safeguard

    We estimate that these circuits can be executed on a superconducting qubit CRQC with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in a few minutes [...] This is an approximately 20-fold reduction in the number of physical qubits required to solve ECDLP-256"

    Interestingly, Google and friends did not release the blueprint for the attack circuit. In the name of "responsible disclosure", they only provided a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) proving that the circuit works. This is, I think , a first in the realm of cryptanalysis disclosure.

    The statement that our ZK proof demonstrates is the following: we possess a classical reversible circuit of a specified size which on most inputs correctly computes point addition on the elliptic curve secp256k. This is the primary bottleneck in Shor’s quantum algorithm

    I have been saying this since the 2010s: quantum cryptanalysis is one of those non-linear technology progresses that will take everyone by surprise when it arrives. Qubits quality and numbers go up, error-correction and attacks improve, investments scale up accordingly. It's a perfect storm of compound factors. Folks didn't listen, now time is ticking.

    More context at: gagliardoni.net/#20260331_new_

    #quantum #quantumcomputing #cryptography #security #cybersecurity #infosec #google #bitcoin #blockchain #ethereum #zkp #zeroknowledge

  8. New breakthrough results for quantum attack resource estimates against 256-bit elliptic curves: most ECC-based applications including ECDSA and Bitcoin could be at risk way sooner than expected:

    research.google/blog/safeguard

    We estimate that these circuits can be executed on a superconducting qubit CRQC with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in a few minutes [...] This is an approximately 20-fold reduction in the number of physical qubits required to solve ECDLP-256"

    Interestingly, Google and friends did not release the blueprint for the attack circuit. In the name of "responsible disclosure", they only provided a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) proving that the circuit works. This is, I think , a first in the realm of cryptanalysis disclosure.

    The statement that our ZK proof demonstrates is the following: we possess a classical reversible circuit of a specified size which on most inputs correctly computes point addition on the elliptic curve secp256k. This is the primary bottleneck in Shor’s quantum algorithm

    I have been saying this since the 2010s: quantum cryptanalysis is one of those non-linear technology progresses that will take everyone by surprise when it arrives. Qubits quality and numbers go up, error-correction and attacks improve, investments scale up accordingly. It's a perfect storm of compound factors. Folks didn't listen, now time is ticking.

    More context at: gagliardoni.net/#20260331_new_

    #quantum #quantumcomputing #cryptography #security #cybersecurity #infosec #google #bitcoin #blockchain #ethereum #zkp #zeroknowledge

  9. New breakthrough results for quantum attack resource estimates against 256-bit elliptic curves: most ECC-based applications including ECDSA and Bitcoin could be at risk way sooner than expected:

    research.google/blog/safeguard

    We estimate that these circuits can be executed on a superconducting qubit CRQC with fewer than 500,000 physical qubits in a few minutes [...] This is an approximately 20-fold reduction in the number of physical qubits required to solve ECDLP-256"

    Interestingly, Google and friends did not release the blueprint for the attack circuit. In the name of "responsible disclosure", they only provided a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) proving that the circuit works. This is, I think , a first in the realm of cryptanalysis disclosure.

    The statement that our ZK proof demonstrates is the following: we possess a classical reversible circuit of a specified size which on most inputs correctly computes point addition on the elliptic curve secp256k. This is the primary bottleneck in Shor’s quantum algorithm

    I have been saying this since the 2010s: quantum cryptanalysis is one of those non-linear technology progresses that will take everyone by surprise when it arrives. Qubits quality and numbers go up, error-correction and attacks improve, investments scale up accordingly. It's a perfect storm of compound factors. Folks didn't listen, now time is ticking.

    More context at: gagliardoni.net/#20260331_new_

    #quantum #quantumcomputing #cryptography #security #cybersecurity #infosec #google #bitcoin #blockchain #ethereum #zkp #zeroknowledge

  10. #ZKP Achievement unlocked! We're using 100% of the crates providing Tom-256 curves (crates.io/search?q=t256, ignoring `uint256`):

    Our

    crates.io/crates/ark-tom256

    based on arkworks, to make noir produce circuits based on the T-256 curve, and

    crates.io/crates/halo2curves

    in the MS Crescent implementation to use Spartan as a prover backend...

    And Clément proved that `1 == 1`, and he cannot prove that `2 == 1`, because the circuit constraints are not met!

  11. #ZKP Achievement unlocked! We're using 100% of the crates providing Tom-256 curves (crates.io/search?q=t256, ignoring `uint256`):

    Our

    crates.io/crates/ark-tom256

    based on arkworks, to make noir produce circuits based on the T-256 curve, and

    crates.io/crates/halo2curves

    in the MS Crescent implementation to use Spartan as a prover backend...

    And Clément proved that `1 == 1`, and he cannot prove that `2 == 1`, because the circuit constraints are not met!

  12. #ZKP Achievement unlocked! We're using 100% of the crates providing Tom-256 curves (crates.io/search?q=t256, ignoring `uint256`):

    Our

    crates.io/crates/ark-tom256

    based on arkworks, to make noir produce circuits based on the T-256 curve, and

    crates.io/crates/halo2curves

    in the MS Crescent implementation to use Spartan as a prover backend...

    And Clément proved that `1 == 1`, and he cannot prove that `2 == 1`, because the circuit constraints are not met!

  13. #ZKP Achievement unlocked! We're using 100% of the crates providing Tom-256 curves (crates.io/search?q=t256, ignoring `uint256`):

    Our

    crates.io/crates/ark-tom256

    based on arkworks, to make noir produce circuits based on the T-256 curve, and

    crates.io/crates/halo2curves

    in the MS Crescent implementation to use Spartan as a prover backend...

    And Clément proved that `1 == 1`, and he cannot prove that `2 == 1`, because the circuit constraints are not met!

  14. #ZKP Achievement unlocked! We're using 100% of the crates providing Tom-256 curves (crates.io/search?q=t256, ignoring `uint256`):

    Our

    crates.io/crates/ark-tom256

    based on arkworks, to make noir produce circuits based on the T-256 curve, and

    crates.io/crates/halo2curves

    in the MS Crescent implementation to use Spartan as a prover backend...

    And Clément proved that `1 == 1`, and he cannot prove that `2 == 1`, because the circuit constraints are not met!

  15. I’ve been analyzing the current state of "secure" messaging, and my recent tests with Signal have highlighted some persistent vulnerabilities inherent to any stack relying on standard TCP/IP. Even with strong encryption, metadata leakage at the ISP/CDN level and the reliance on kernel-level interfaces like TUN/TAP remain significant privacy bottlenecks.

    I’m curious to discuss the feasibility of a user-space only stack built in Rust that completely decouples identity, addressing, and transport to mitigate these leaks. My current architectural hypothesis involves an identity layer using hardware-backed Zero-Knowledge Proofs—via TEE or zkVM—to handle authentication without persistent identifiers or central registries. For addressing and routing, I'm thinking of a minimal RINA overlay where Distributed IPC Facilities (DIF) allow us to route between processes rather than nodes, effectively moving away from traditional IP-based addressing. This would all be wrapped in a "blind" transport, such as Ockam or shadowsocks-rust, to make the traffic indistinguishable from generic noise to any external observer.

    I’m still weighing the practical hurdles, especially how to best bridge RINA's recursive logic with a user-space transport like Ockam without requiring root privileges. I'm open to suggestions on alternative technologies or implementations that might achieve this same level of isolation. If anyone has thoughts on the practical hurdles or existing foundations that could be leveraged here, I’d really value your perspective. Definitely feels like there's a lot to dig into.

    #Rust #Rustlang #Infosec #Cryptography #Networking #Privacy #DistributedSystems #RINA #ZKP

  16. I’ve been analyzing the current state of "secure" messaging, and my recent tests with Signal have highlighted some persistent vulnerabilities inherent to any stack relying on standard TCP/IP. Even with strong encryption, metadata leakage at the ISP/CDN level and the reliance on kernel-level interfaces like TUN/TAP remain significant privacy bottlenecks.

    I’m curious to discuss the feasibility of a user-space only stack built in Rust that completely decouples identity, addressing, and transport to mitigate these leaks. My current architectural hypothesis involves an identity layer using hardware-backed Zero-Knowledge Proofs—via TEE or zkVM—to handle authentication without persistent identifiers or central registries. For addressing and routing, I'm thinking of a minimal RINA overlay where Distributed IPC Facilities (DIF) allow us to route between processes rather than nodes, effectively moving away from traditional IP-based addressing. This would all be wrapped in a "blind" transport, such as Ockam or shadowsocks-rust, to make the traffic indistinguishable from generic noise to any external observer.

    I’m still weighing the practical hurdles, especially how to best bridge RINA's recursive logic with a user-space transport like Ockam without requiring root privileges. I'm open to suggestions on alternative technologies or implementations that might achieve this same level of isolation. If anyone has thoughts on the practical hurdles or existing foundations that could be leveraged here, I’d really value your perspective. Definitely feels like there's a lot to dig into.

    #Rust #Rustlang #Infosec #Cryptography #Networking #Privacy #DistributedSystems #RINA #ZKP

  17. I’ve been analyzing the current state of "secure" messaging, and my recent tests with Signal have highlighted some persistent vulnerabilities inherent to any stack relying on standard TCP/IP. Even with strong encryption, metadata leakage at the ISP/CDN level and the reliance on kernel-level interfaces like TUN/TAP remain significant privacy bottlenecks.

    I’m curious to discuss the feasibility of a user-space only stack built in Rust that completely decouples identity, addressing, and transport to mitigate these leaks. My current architectural hypothesis involves an identity layer using hardware-backed Zero-Knowledge Proofs—via TEE or zkVM—to handle authentication without persistent identifiers or central registries. For addressing and routing, I'm thinking of a minimal RINA overlay where Distributed IPC Facilities (DIF) allow us to route between processes rather than nodes, effectively moving away from traditional IP-based addressing. This would all be wrapped in a "blind" transport, such as Ockam or shadowsocks-rust, to make the traffic indistinguishable from generic noise to any external observer.

    I’m still weighing the practical hurdles, especially how to best bridge RINA's recursive logic with a user-space transport like Ockam without requiring root privileges. I'm open to suggestions on alternative technologies or implementations that might achieve this same level of isolation. If anyone has thoughts on the practical hurdles or existing foundations that could be leveraged here, I’d really value your perspective. Definitely feels like there's a lot to dig into.

    #Rust #Rustlang #Infosec #Cryptography #Networking #Privacy #DistributedSystems #RINA #ZKP

  18. I’ve been analyzing the current state of "secure" messaging, and my recent tests with Signal have highlighted some persistent vulnerabilities inherent to any stack relying on standard TCP/IP. Even with strong encryption, metadata leakage at the ISP/CDN level and the reliance on kernel-level interfaces like TUN/TAP remain significant privacy bottlenecks.

    I’m curious to discuss the feasibility of a user-space only stack built in Rust that completely decouples identity, addressing, and transport to mitigate these leaks. My current architectural hypothesis involves an identity layer using hardware-backed Zero-Knowledge Proofs—via TEE or zkVM—to handle authentication without persistent identifiers or central registries. For addressing and routing, I'm thinking of a minimal RINA overlay where Distributed IPC Facilities (DIF) allow us to route between processes rather than nodes, effectively moving away from traditional IP-based addressing. This would all be wrapped in a "blind" transport, such as Ockam or shadowsocks-rust, to make the traffic indistinguishable from generic noise to any external observer.

    I’m still weighing the practical hurdles, especially how to best bridge RINA's recursive logic with a user-space transport like Ockam without requiring root privileges. I'm open to suggestions on alternative technologies or implementations that might achieve this same level of isolation. If anyone has thoughts on the practical hurdles or existing foundations that could be leveraged here, I’d really value your perspective. Definitely feels like there's a lot to dig into.

    #Rust #Rustlang #Infosec #Cryptography #Networking #Privacy #DistributedSystems #RINA #ZKP

  19. I’ve been analyzing the current state of "secure" messaging, and my recent tests with Signal have highlighted some persistent vulnerabilities inherent to any stack relying on standard TCP/IP. Even with strong encryption, metadata leakage at the ISP/CDN level and the reliance on kernel-level interfaces like TUN/TAP remain significant privacy bottlenecks.

    I’m curious to discuss the feasibility of a user-space only stack built in Rust that completely decouples identity, addressing, and transport to mitigate these leaks. My current architectural hypothesis involves an identity layer using hardware-backed Zero-Knowledge Proofs—via TEE or zkVM—to handle authentication without persistent identifiers or central registries. For addressing and routing, I'm thinking of a minimal RINA overlay where Distributed IPC Facilities (DIF) allow us to route between processes rather than nodes, effectively moving away from traditional IP-based addressing. This would all be wrapped in a "blind" transport, such as Ockam or shadowsocks-rust, to make the traffic indistinguishable from generic noise to any external observer.

    I’m still weighing the practical hurdles, especially how to best bridge RINA's recursive logic with a user-space transport like Ockam without requiring root privileges. I'm open to suggestions on alternative technologies or implementations that might achieve this same level of isolation. If anyone has thoughts on the practical hurdles or existing foundations that could be leveraged here, I’d really value your perspective. Definitely feels like there's a lot to dig into.

    #Rust #Rustlang #Infosec #Cryptography #Networking #Privacy #DistributedSystems #RINA #ZKP

  20. I'm interested in learning about formal methods and zero-knowledge proofs, particularly for their use in verifying software. I know very, very little about this, but it would be very useful if I knew more.

    What are some good basic introductions?

    I'm going to poke around a bit with Lean and Dafny. What else might I look at to get, at least, what you might call a "dinner party level" of understanding -- enough so that I can follow and basically participate in a conversation about those in a not-so-formal situation?

    #cs #formalmethods #zkp

  21. I'm interested in learning about formal methods and zero-knowledge proofs, particularly for their use in verifying software. I know very, very little about this, but it would be very useful if I knew more.

    What are some good basic introductions?

    I'm going to poke around a bit with Lean and Dafny. What else might I look at to get, at least, what you might call a "dinner party level" of understanding -- enough so that I can follow and basically participate in a conversation about those in a not-so-formal situation?

    #cs #formalmethods #zkp

  22. I'm interested in learning about formal methods and zero-knowledge proofs, particularly for their use in verifying software. I know very, very little about this, but it would be very useful if I knew more.

    What are some good basic introductions?

    I'm going to poke around a bit with Lean and Dafny. What else might I look at to get, at least, what you might call a "dinner party level" of understanding -- enough so that I can follow and basically participate in a conversation about those in a not-so-formal situation?

    #cs #formalmethods #zkp

  23. I'm interested in learning about formal methods and zero-knowledge proofs, particularly for their use in verifying software. I know very, very little about this, but it would be very useful if I knew more.

    What are some good basic introductions?

    I'm going to poke around a bit with Lean and Dafny. What else might I look at to get, at least, what you might call a "dinner party level" of understanding -- enough so that I can follow and basically participate in a conversation about those in a not-so-formal situation?

    #cs #formalmethods #zkp

  24. I'm interested in learning about formal methods and zero-knowledge proofs, particularly for their use in verifying software. I know very, very little about this, but it would be very useful if I knew more.

    What are some good basic introductions?

    I'm going to poke around a bit with Lean and Dafny. What else might I look at to get, at least, what you might call a "dinner party level" of understanding -- enough so that I can follow and basically participate in a conversation about those in a not-so-formal situation?

    #cs #formalmethods #zkp

  25. A very clear and simple explanation of the selective disclosure and zero knowledge proof (#ZKP) in the digital-wallet world from @leifj siros.org/blog/zero-knowledge-

    Many people know a lot, but the skill of explaining things to mass is different skill set. I wish to write this clearly.

  26. A very clear and simple explanation of the selective disclosure and zero knowledge proof (#ZKP) in the digital-wallet world from @leifj siros.org/blog/zero-knowledge-

    Many people know a lot, but the skill of explaining things to mass is different skill set. I wish to write this clearly.

  27. A very clear and simple explanation of the selective disclosure and zero knowledge proof (#ZKP) in the digital-wallet world from @leifj siros.org/blog/zero-knowledge-

    Many people know a lot, but the skill of explaining things to mass is different skill set. I wish to write this clearly.

  28. A very clear and simple explanation of the selective disclosure and zero knowledge proof (#ZKP) in the digital-wallet world from @leifj siros.org/blog/zero-knowledge-

    Many people know a lot, but the skill of explaining things to mass is different skill set. I wish to write this clearly.

  29. A very clear and simple explanation of the selective disclosure and zero knowledge proof (#ZKP) in the digital-wallet world from @leifj siros.org/blog/zero-knowledge-

    Many people know a lot, but the skill of explaining things to mass is different skill set. I wish to write this clearly.

  30. #e_id #ZKP

    This just blew my head: we're looking at the latest and greatest ZKP frameworks before digging more into noir, and I saw this:

    doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/platfo

    A freakin' RUST TARGET FOR ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF VIRTUAL MACHINES!

    So: take your rust program (not all of std is supported), compile it to a zkvm, and run it there!

    I found this on OpenVMs page:

    github.com/openvm-org/openvm

  31. #e_id #ZKP

    This just blew my head: we're looking at the latest and greatest ZKP frameworks before digging more into noir, and I saw this:

    doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/platfo

    A freakin' RUST TARGET FOR ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF VIRTUAL MACHINES!

    So: take your rust program (not all of std is supported), compile it to a zkvm, and run it there!

    I found this on OpenVMs page:

    github.com/openvm-org/openvm

  32. #e_id #ZKP

    This just blew my head: we're looking at the latest and greatest ZKP frameworks before digging more into noir, and I saw this:

    doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/platfo

    A freakin' RUST TARGET FOR ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF VIRTUAL MACHINES!

    So: take your rust program (not all of std is supported), compile it to a zkvm, and run it there!

    I found this on OpenVMs page:

    github.com/openvm-org/openvm

  33. #e_id #ZKP

    This just blew my head: we're looking at the latest and greatest ZKP frameworks before digging more into noir, and I saw this:

    doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/platfo

    A freakin' RUST TARGET FOR ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF VIRTUAL MACHINES!

    So: take your rust program (not all of std is supported), compile it to a zkvm, and run it there!

    I found this on OpenVMs page:

    github.com/openvm-org/openvm

  34. #e_id #ZKP

    This just blew my head: we're looking at the latest and greatest ZKP frameworks before digging more into noir, and I saw this:

    doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/platfo

    A freakin' RUST TARGET FOR ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF VIRTUAL MACHINES!

    So: take your rust program (not all of std is supported), compile it to a zkvm, and run it there!

    I found this on OpenVMs page:

    github.com/openvm-org/openvm

  35. Phiên bản 0.7.0 “Soul Layer” của AgentAuth (mở nguồn) giới thiệu 3 tính năng: Persona System cho AI agent có “linh hồn số” ký tên HMAC, xác thực ẩn danh Zero‑Knowledge Proof, và Anti‑Drift Vault giám sát hành vi, tự động thu hồi khi lệch chuẩn. Thêm 16 API mới, SDK TypeScript/Python và dashboard chỉnh sửa persona. Mời góp ý! #AI #OpenSource #AgentAuth #ZKP #Security #CôngNghệ #MãNguồnMở

    reddit.com/r/SideProject/comme

  36. 📉 El mercado cripto se agita: #ZKP Crypto distribuye 190M de monedas en subasta diaria, mientras $AVAX ronda los $12 y #Ethereum lucha contra la presión vendedora. Movimientos clave más allá del precio. #Cripto.

  37. Second layer do Bitcoin sem token — VTVM e saída unilateral

    E se existisse uma second layer do Bitcoin onde você entra e sai só com BTC — sem token? 🤯

    • O conceito:
    - Second layer que permite entrar e sair com Bitcoin diretamente, sem criar ou usar tokens.

    • Diferencial técnico:
    - Saída unilateral: você pode sair da camada sem precisar coordenar com o parceiro de canal — menos dependências e mais segurança.

    • Quem está...

    #Bitcoin #VTVM #Layer2 #Lightning #zkp #crypto #MorningCrypto

  38. Second layer do Bitcoin sem token — VTVM e saída unilateral

    E se existisse uma second layer do Bitcoin onde você entra e sai só com BTC — sem token? 🤯

    • O conceito:
    - Second layer que permite entrar e sair com Bitcoin diretamente, sem criar ou usar tokens.

    • Diferencial técnico:
    - Saída unilateral: você pode sair da camada sem precisar coordenar com o parceiro de canal — menos dependências e mais segurança.

    • Quem está...

    #Bitcoin #VTVM #Layer2 #Lightning #zkp #crypto #MorningCrypto

  39. #ZKP #eID #swiyu

    I'm very happy to say that Ubique, working on heidi-universe.ch/en/index.htm, told me to use `--release` with `cargo-test` :)

    Now our benchmark looks quite different from the last one:

    eid-privacy.github.io/2026/01/

    Before: Noir is as fast or faster than Docknetwork
    Now: Docknetwork is as fast or much faster than Noir

    The next thing I need to find out is how to run benchmarks directly on a mobile phone. Is there some kind of server I can tap into with a github workflow?

  40. #ZKP #eID #swiyu

    I'm very happy to say that Ubique, working on heidi-universe.ch/en/index.htm, told me to use `--release` with `cargo-test` :)

    Now our benchmark looks quite different from the last one:

    eid-privacy.github.io/2026/01/

    Before: Noir is as fast or faster than Docknetwork
    Now: Docknetwork is as fast or much faster than Noir

    The next thing I need to find out is how to run benchmarks directly on a mobile phone. Is there some kind of server I can tap into with a github workflow?

  41. #ZKP #eID #swiyu

    I'm very happy to say that Ubique, working on heidi-universe.ch/en/index.htm, told me to use `--release` with `cargo-test` :)

    Now our benchmark looks quite different from the last one:

    eid-privacy.github.io/2026/01/

    Before: Noir is as fast or faster than Docknetwork
    Now: Docknetwork is as fast or much faster than Noir

    The next thing I need to find out is how to run benchmarks directly on a mobile phone. Is there some kind of server I can tap into with a github workflow?