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#bri — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #bri, aggregated by home.social.

  1. « Je suis favorable » : vers la création d’une antenne de la Brigade de recherche et

    Contenu réservé aux abonnés Lundi 04 mai 2026 16:10 … 1 La Bretagne va-t-elle disposer de ses propres…
    #Nantes #FR #France #Actu #News #Europe #EU #actu #Actualités #antenne #bretagne #BRI #brigade #création #europe #favorable #intervention #paysdelaloire #recherche #Républiquefrançaise
    europesays.com/fr/911069/

  2. @Julianoe
    Ça me fait penser dans une bien moindre mesure à l'épisode cloudflare (dans le principe).

    Et ça va surtout être un redoublement des efforts pour bypasser cette zone : #IMEC, #BRI, route du développement..
    piaille.fr/@gomli/113330512835

  3. @Julianoe
    Ça me fait penser dans une bien moindre mesure à l'épisode cloudflare (dans le principe).

    Et ça va surtout être un redoublement des efforts pour bypasser cette zone : #IMEC, #BRI, route du développement..
    piaille.fr/@gomli/113330512835

  4. @Julianoe
    Ça me fait penser dans une bien moindre mesure à l'épisode cloudflare (dans le principe).

    Et ça va surtout être un redoublement des efforts pour bypasser cette zone : #IMEC, #BRI, route du développement..
    piaille.fr/@gomli/113330512835

  5. @Julianoe
    Ça me fait penser dans une bien moindre mesure à l'épisode cloudflare (dans le principe).

    Et ça va surtout être un redoublement des efforts pour bypasser cette zone : #IMEC, #BRI, route du développement..
    piaille.fr/@gomli/113330512835

  6. @Julianoe
    Ça me fait penser dans une bien moindre mesure à l'épisode cloudflare (dans le principe).

    Et ça va surtout être un redoublement des efforts pour bypasser cette zone : #IMEC, #BRI, route du développement..
    piaille.fr/@gomli/113330512835

  7. The #environmental burdens of #SpecialEconomicZones on the coastal and marine #environment: A remote sensing assessment in #Myanmar

    Thiri Shwesin Aung, Indra Overland, Roman Vakulchuk, Yanhua Xie
    November 2022

    "Special economic zones (#SEZs) are unusual parts of the world economy in terms of law, institutions, and economic functions (Chaisse and Dimitropoulos 2021). SEZs are geographically delimited areas created to facilitate industrial activities through fiscal and regulatory incentives and infrastructure support (UNCTAD 2019). Such zones carve out jurisdiction as a subset of the overall state jurisdiction for the purposes of enacting different laws and regulations that are more trade and investment friendly (Zeng 2021). Since the year 2000, SEZs have mushroomed in developing countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), accelerate industrialization and create jobs (Aiyer 2017). There are 5400 SEZs in 147 economies around the world. Asia is home to three quarters of them (UNIDO 2015). They have been a core element of the economic development strategy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and currently all ASEAN member states have SEZs (Aggarwal 2022).

    "As part of an export-oriented development strategy, the zones commonly include industrial mega-areas that accommodate large-scale infrastructure, deep-sea ports, logistical infrastructure for oil and gas, hotels and tourism, and industrial complexes (Aggarwal 2022). They are primarily defined by a specific regulatory regime and a dedicated governance mechanism designed to relieve customs and tariffs and reduce the burden on businesses from permits, licenses, employment laws, and land access. In return, host governments expect investors to create positive spillover effects, such as facilitating innovation, boosting employment, raising exports, and diversifying the economy. The global experience of SEZs have been mixed, with some countries achieving successful economic outcomes, while others struggle to overcome market failures, institutional constraints, and social and environmental costs (Aggarwal 2022; Zeng 2021).

    "The lax regulatory regimes of SEZs often raise concerns about environmental, social, and #HumanRights standards, as well as possible conflicts over #LandRights (Brussevich 2020). Several SEZs have failed to yield the expected economic benefits while having severe adverse impacts on the environment and local communities (Adunbi 2019; Aritenang and Chandramidi 2020; Chaisse and Ji 2020). On the other hand, while SEZs can be hotspots for environmental #mismanagement, they can also provide opportunities for implementing environmental policies specifically designed to regulate industries within the zones. Also, certain environmental advantages may ensue from the introduction of foreign financial resources and environmental technologies that are otherwise not readily available (Richardson 2004).

    "However, according to the 'race to the bottom' literature, most SEZs have a net negative impact on the environment and local communities (Richardson 2004; UNIDO 2015; ZENG and DOUGLAS, 2012).

    "Despite this contradiction, existing studies focusing on the direct and indirect impacts of SEZs have been rare (#WorldBank, 2017). Particularly, the magnitude and intensity of SEZ impacts on the environment remain understudied.
    SEZs tend to be located in remote regions. As such, SEZ-related information and data are generally scarce, making it difficult to assess the environmental consequences of such zones. Many SEZs are also located in countries where there is limited scope for independent environmental assessment due to #authoritarian rule, #corruption, and/or #secrecy surrounding deals with foreign investors. Recent improvements in access to satellite data and computing platforms for machine learning have greatly improved the ability to comprehensively assess SEZs in any location in the world in near real time (Ali et al., 2020; Jensen et al., 2019). This article demonstrates how these technologies can be applied to provide evidence related to the environmental impacts of SEZs. The method is tried out on the Kyaukpyu SEZ in Myanmar. Myanmar is an authoritarian country and the #KyaukpyuSEZ is a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (#BRI) located in an inaccessible part of #Myanmar. This is precisely the type of case where independent access can be limited and a remote sensing approach can be useful.

    "From 2010 onwards, Myanmar was navigating its economic transformation and a partial loosening of military rule. SEZ development was prioritized as a critical element of the country's industrialization (Oxfam 2017). The three most notable ongoing SEZ projects are the Kyaukpyu SEZ in the rural but strategically important Rakhine State, which is also the largest SEZ in Myanmar, the Thilawa SEZ on the outskirts of Myanmar's former capital Yangon, and the Dawei SEZ in the Tanintharyi Region. Tanintharyi is a long narrow southern territory of Myanmar bordering the Andaman Sea to the west and Thailand to the east.

    "Although they are expected to encourage economic growth and reduce poverty, all three SEZ projects continue to face local opposition, particularly the Kyaukpyu and Dawei SEZs. The International Commission of Jurists (2017) has reported that SEZs in Myanmar are linked to human rights violations and environmental abuses (Donateo 2017). Although Myanmar's SEZ law adopted in 2014 reaffirms the applicability of environmental regulations to SEZ development, it does not clearly delineate responsibilities between developers and the state (DICA 2014). The law also does not conform with international human rights standards (MCRB 2018)."

    Read more:
    sciencedirect.com/science/arti

    #RaceToTheBottom #HumanRightsViolations #Pollution #EnvironmentalDegradation #EconomicSacrificZones #ForcedRelocation #ForcedDisplacement #HumanRightsViolations #EnvironmentalDegradation #IndigenousPeoples #ForestPeoples #SaveTheForests #Exploitation #CorporateColonialism

  8. Das beim Erdbeben in Bangkok eingestürzte Hochhaus wurde vom selben chinesischen Bauunternehmen errichtet, das auch den eingestürzten Bahnhof von Novi Sad in Serbien renoviert hatte.

    Die China Railway Group Limited (CREC) ist teilweise im Staatsbesitz.

    vreme.com/en/vesti/kinezi-koji

    #NoviSad #Bangkok #Thailand #Erdbeben #CREC #BRI #beltandroadinitiative #NeueSeidenstraße

  9. #China begins work on #Kenya geothermal power plant amid African renewable energy push

    "State-owned energy and construction company PowerChina will build the 35-megawatt Orpower 22 #geothermal plant at the Menengai Crater, with the facility owned by Chinese firm Kaishan Group, which is spending US$93 million on the construction."

    scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/

    #BeltAndRoadInitiative #BRI

  10. For all the revisionists hyping up the "Marxish-Leninish" Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the new JVP-led gov't of Sri Lanka, here's the Sri Lanka BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) director Yasiru Ranaraja saying that JVP's economic policies don't seem any different to him from the outgoing neoliberal ones. #facts (He is still very positive about him though, of course. 🤔)

    The problem here is that, when revisionists present their (in this case, Tamil-genocidal) liberalism as Marxism and fail to stop the economic crisis because they haven't built socialism -- the JVP doesn't even want to nationalize large industry like mining -- it further confuses the masses about how to end capitalism. This is roughly the same approach that fascist governments began taking a century ago to prolong capital's reign.

    source: twitter.com/YRanaraja/status/1
    source: dailymirror.lk/opinion/JVP-led
    source: themorning.lk/articles/218843

    #news #politics #srilanka #dissanayake #jvp #bri #beltandroadinitiative #china #marxism #marxist #marxismleninism #socialism #marxistleninist #socialist #communism #communist #neoliberalism #india #tamil #fascism

  11. Here we go... There's always a dark side when there's money involved... And when loans come due!

    Dangers and Opportunities as #China’s #Loans to #Africa Come Due

    Timothy Ditter | Monday, March 18, 2024

    "Many African economies are facing a period of serious #economic distress with a very different character from the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. This time, the People’s Republic of China (#PRC) is a major player, and a dramatic decline in PRC lending has compounded economic shocks in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—just as the continent tries to recover from the pandemic. From 2001 to 2022, PRC financial institutions provided more than $170 billion in credit, loans, and grants to #AfricanNations, primarily to fund infrastructure projects tied to the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative. But new PRC loans to African governments plummeted from $28.4 billion in 2016 to less than $2 billion in 2020 and have continued to decline.

    "African governments are awakening to the fact that opaque PRC lending practices and problematic #LoanTerms have rendered already fragile economies at an increased risk of default. However, this moment of peril also provides an opportunity for African economies to build resilience by diversifying their economic partnerships and seeking out lenders with better terms and different motivations.

    "I and other CNA analysts from our China Studies and Strategy and Policy Analysis programs have just completed a series of studies on trends in the involvement of the PRC across major sectors in Africa in the context of global shocks. These include the military, mining, infrastructure, and financial sectors. We recently released the report PRC Lending in Africa: Impacts in a Time of Global Shocks. This component of the series focuses on PRC lending to nine African countries. In some cases, PRC loans helped African nations build or upgrade much-needed infrastructure. However, we also found a wide range of PRC lending practices that have contributed to the financial distress and increased the risk of default for African countries ravaged by the global shocks of the last few years. These practices include high interest rates, unfavorable terms, and uncompetitive contracting, most of which is hidden from the public in opaque contracts.

    "And when African countries struggle to repay those loans, PRC lenders have taken inflexible positions that have delayed and hardened terms in renegotiations.

    "China’s Unforgiving Lenders

    "Today’s debt troubles have some of their roots in the loan agreements signed when the PRC was eager to plow its excess savings into foreign loans. Often these agreements made the loans due in just 10 years, compared to up to 35 years for loans from the World Bank. Interest rates are often higher, too. For example, the Export–Import Bank of China charged Djibouti a fully commercial rate for the loan to build the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, higher than multinational lenders like the World Bank charge for loans. The PRC is #Djibouti’s largest creditor, holding approximately $1.4 billion in debt, equal to about 45 percent of the country’s GDP. In January 2023, Djibouti suspended debt payments to the PRC, making it the second African nation—after #Zambia—to do so.

    "Often these agreements require loan recipients to give business to PRC contractors—without competitive bidding. The Export–Import Bank of China contract with #Kenya to finance the Standard Gauge Railway connecting the port city of Mombasa to the Great Rift Valley stipulated that most construction materials would be purchased from the PRC. The project ended up much more costly than anticipated, increasing from 220 billion to 327 billion Kenyan shillings over a period of three years. The Kenya Court of Appeal found that 'the project’s design was manipulated to inflate costs while construction and supervision charges were also overpriced.' Such agreements have helped make China’s construction firms dominant on the continent. A University of London study found that of the 32 major international contractor companies working major construction projects in Ethiopia in 2017, 80 percent were PRC contractors.

    "Because PRC loan agreements tend to be opaque, the public is usually not even aware of these loan terms. In the case of the Standard Gauge Railway, the loan with the Export–Import Bank of China was signed in 2014, but details about the terms only became publicly known in 2022, preventing oversight from Kenyan politicians or the public. In some cases, those opaque agreements and #unethical business practices may contribute to corruption. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China funded a dam project in Angola while ignoring various potential red flags, including the involvement of the daughter of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. Isabel dos Santos was awarded the $4.5 billion contract to construct the dam by her father’s government in 2015. As of 2023, Angola holds more PRC debt than any other country in Africa. And the #WorldBank listed Angola as one of seven African countries that it considered to be at high risk of debt distress in 2020.

    "Our research found that when struggling African nations need to renegotiate their loans, PRC lenders have resisted standard #LoanForgiveness practices and have slowed debt negotiations. The PRC does not follow typical debt negotiation protocols used by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. Instead, the PRC prefers bilateral negotiations, often behind closed doors, and strongly resists cutting the total principal owed on loans. Rather, PRC lenders favor extending repayment periods or holding infrastructure as collateral on loans. This has an impact on negotiations with other creditors as well, since lenders want concessions to be shared fairly. Recent negotiations to restructure #Chad’s debt with a committee of five bilateral creditors took nearly two years. World Bank and IMF officials claimed that lenders from China unnecessarily delayed the debt deal, an accusation that has come up in debt negotiations with other African countries.

    "In the long run, however, this difficult period could have an upside for African nations. The reduction in PRC loans provides an opportunity for African countries to diversify, considering new economic partnerships on more favorable terms, with greater transparency and good governance. African nations can use multilateral negotiations to seek out lenders operating with different motivations, lenders that can help them build domestic economic strength and resilience for the future."

    Source:
    cna.org/our-media/indepth/2024

    #BeltAndRoadInitiative #BRI #LoanSharks #CancelAllDebt

  12. Here we go... There's always a dark side when there's money involved... And when loans come due!

    Dangers and Opportunities as #China’s #Loans to #Africa Come Due

    Timothy Ditter | Monday, March 18, 2024

    "Many African economies are facing a period of serious #economic distress with a very different character from the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. This time, the People’s Republic of China (#PRC) is a major player, and a dramatic decline in PRC lending has compounded economic shocks in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—just as the continent tries to recover from the pandemic. From 2001 to 2022, PRC financial institutions provided more than $170 billion in credit, loans, and grants to #AfricanNations, primarily to fund infrastructure projects tied to the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative. But new PRC loans to African governments plummeted from $28.4 billion in 2016 to less than $2 billion in 2020 and have continued to decline.

    "African governments are awakening to the fact that opaque PRC lending practices and problematic #LoanTerms have rendered already fragile economies at an increased risk of default. However, this moment of peril also provides an opportunity for African economies to build resilience by diversifying their economic partnerships and seeking out lenders with better terms and different motivations.

    "I and other CNA analysts from our China Studies and Strategy and Policy Analysis programs have just completed a series of studies on trends in the involvement of the PRC across major sectors in Africa in the context of global shocks. These include the military, mining, infrastructure, and financial sectors. We recently released the report PRC Lending in Africa: Impacts in a Time of Global Shocks. This component of the series focuses on PRC lending to nine African countries. In some cases, PRC loans helped African nations build or upgrade much-needed infrastructure. However, we also found a wide range of PRC lending practices that have contributed to the financial distress and increased the risk of default for African countries ravaged by the global shocks of the last few years. These practices include high interest rates, unfavorable terms, and uncompetitive contracting, most of which is hidden from the public in opaque contracts.

    "And when African countries struggle to repay those loans, PRC lenders have taken inflexible positions that have delayed and hardened terms in renegotiations.

    "China’s Unforgiving Lenders

    "Today’s debt troubles have some of their roots in the loan agreements signed when the PRC was eager to plow its excess savings into foreign loans. Often these agreements made the loans due in just 10 years, compared to up to 35 years for loans from the World Bank. Interest rates are often higher, too. For example, the Export–Import Bank of China charged Djibouti a fully commercial rate for the loan to build the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, higher than multinational lenders like the World Bank charge for loans. The PRC is #Djibouti’s largest creditor, holding approximately $1.4 billion in debt, equal to about 45 percent of the country’s GDP. In January 2023, Djibouti suspended debt payments to the PRC, making it the second African nation—after #Zambia—to do so.

    "Often these agreements require loan recipients to give business to PRC contractors—without competitive bidding. The Export–Import Bank of China contract with #Kenya to finance the Standard Gauge Railway connecting the port city of Mombasa to the Great Rift Valley stipulated that most construction materials would be purchased from the PRC. The project ended up much more costly than anticipated, increasing from 220 billion to 327 billion Kenyan shillings over a period of three years. The Kenya Court of Appeal found that 'the project’s design was manipulated to inflate costs while construction and supervision charges were also overpriced.' Such agreements have helped make China’s construction firms dominant on the continent. A University of London study found that of the 32 major international contractor companies working major construction projects in Ethiopia in 2017, 80 percent were PRC contractors.

    "Because PRC loan agreements tend to be opaque, the public is usually not even aware of these loan terms. In the case of the Standard Gauge Railway, the loan with the Export–Import Bank of China was signed in 2014, but details about the terms only became publicly known in 2022, preventing oversight from Kenyan politicians or the public. In some cases, those opaque agreements and #unethical business practices may contribute to corruption. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China funded a dam project in Angola while ignoring various potential red flags, including the involvement of the daughter of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. Isabel dos Santos was awarded the $4.5 billion contract to construct the dam by her father’s government in 2015. As of 2023, Angola holds more PRC debt than any other country in Africa. And the #WorldBank listed Angola as one of seven African countries that it considered to be at high risk of debt distress in 2020.

    "Our research found that when struggling African nations need to renegotiate their loans, PRC lenders have resisted standard #LoanForgiveness practices and have slowed debt negotiations. The PRC does not follow typical debt negotiation protocols used by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. Instead, the PRC prefers bilateral negotiations, often behind closed doors, and strongly resists cutting the total principal owed on loans. Rather, PRC lenders favor extending repayment periods or holding infrastructure as collateral on loans. This has an impact on negotiations with other creditors as well, since lenders want concessions to be shared fairly. Recent negotiations to restructure #Chad’s debt with a committee of five bilateral creditors took nearly two years. World Bank and IMF officials claimed that lenders from China unnecessarily delayed the debt deal, an accusation that has come up in debt negotiations with other African countries.

    "In the long run, however, this difficult period could have an upside for African nations. The reduction in PRC loans provides an opportunity for African countries to diversify, considering new economic partnerships on more favorable terms, with greater transparency and good governance. African nations can use multilateral negotiations to seek out lenders operating with different motivations, lenders that can help them build domestic economic strength and resilience for the future."

    Source:
    cna.org/our-media/indepth/2024

    #BeltAndRoadInitiative #BRI #LoanSharks #CancelAllDebt

  13. Here we go... There's always a dark side when there's money involved... And when loans come due!

    Dangers and Opportunities as #China’s #Loans to #Africa Come Due

    Timothy Ditter | Monday, March 18, 2024

    "Many African economies are facing a period of serious #economic distress with a very different character from the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. This time, the People’s Republic of China (#PRC) is a major player, and a dramatic decline in PRC lending has compounded economic shocks in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—just as the continent tries to recover from the pandemic. From 2001 to 2022, PRC financial institutions provided more than $170 billion in credit, loans, and grants to #AfricanNations, primarily to fund infrastructure projects tied to the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative. But new PRC loans to African governments plummeted from $28.4 billion in 2016 to less than $2 billion in 2020 and have continued to decline.

    "African governments are awakening to the fact that opaque PRC lending practices and problematic #LoanTerms have rendered already fragile economies at an increased risk of default. However, this moment of peril also provides an opportunity for African economies to build resilience by diversifying their economic partnerships and seeking out lenders with better terms and different motivations.

    "I and other CNA analysts from our China Studies and Strategy and Policy Analysis programs have just completed a series of studies on trends in the involvement of the PRC across major sectors in Africa in the context of global shocks. These include the military, mining, infrastructure, and financial sectors. We recently released the report PRC Lending in Africa: Impacts in a Time of Global Shocks. This component of the series focuses on PRC lending to nine African countries. In some cases, PRC loans helped African nations build or upgrade much-needed infrastructure. However, we also found a wide range of PRC lending practices that have contributed to the financial distress and increased the risk of default for African countries ravaged by the global shocks of the last few years. These practices include high interest rates, unfavorable terms, and uncompetitive contracting, most of which is hidden from the public in opaque contracts.

    "And when African countries struggle to repay those loans, PRC lenders have taken inflexible positions that have delayed and hardened terms in renegotiations.

    "China’s Unforgiving Lenders

    "Today’s debt troubles have some of their roots in the loan agreements signed when the PRC was eager to plow its excess savings into foreign loans. Often these agreements made the loans due in just 10 years, compared to up to 35 years for loans from the World Bank. Interest rates are often higher, too. For example, the Export–Import Bank of China charged Djibouti a fully commercial rate for the loan to build the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, higher than multinational lenders like the World Bank charge for loans. The PRC is #Djibouti’s largest creditor, holding approximately $1.4 billion in debt, equal to about 45 percent of the country’s GDP. In January 2023, Djibouti suspended debt payments to the PRC, making it the second African nation—after #Zambia—to do so.

    "Often these agreements require loan recipients to give business to PRC contractors—without competitive bidding. The Export–Import Bank of China contract with #Kenya to finance the Standard Gauge Railway connecting the port city of Mombasa to the Great Rift Valley stipulated that most construction materials would be purchased from the PRC. The project ended up much more costly than anticipated, increasing from 220 billion to 327 billion Kenyan shillings over a period of three years. The Kenya Court of Appeal found that 'the project’s design was manipulated to inflate costs while construction and supervision charges were also overpriced.' Such agreements have helped make China’s construction firms dominant on the continent. A University of London study found that of the 32 major international contractor companies working major construction projects in Ethiopia in 2017, 80 percent were PRC contractors.

    "Because PRC loan agreements tend to be opaque, the public is usually not even aware of these loan terms. In the case of the Standard Gauge Railway, the loan with the Export–Import Bank of China was signed in 2014, but details about the terms only became publicly known in 2022, preventing oversight from Kenyan politicians or the public. In some cases, those opaque agreements and #unethical business practices may contribute to corruption. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China funded a dam project in Angola while ignoring various potential red flags, including the involvement of the daughter of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. Isabel dos Santos was awarded the $4.5 billion contract to construct the dam by her father’s government in 2015. As of 2023, Angola holds more PRC debt than any other country in Africa. And the #WorldBank listed Angola as one of seven African countries that it considered to be at high risk of debt distress in 2020.

    "Our research found that when struggling African nations need to renegotiate their loans, PRC lenders have resisted standard #LoanForgiveness practices and have slowed debt negotiations. The PRC does not follow typical debt negotiation protocols used by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. Instead, the PRC prefers bilateral negotiations, often behind closed doors, and strongly resists cutting the total principal owed on loans. Rather, PRC lenders favor extending repayment periods or holding infrastructure as collateral on loans. This has an impact on negotiations with other creditors as well, since lenders want concessions to be shared fairly. Recent negotiations to restructure #Chad’s debt with a committee of five bilateral creditors took nearly two years. World Bank and IMF officials claimed that lenders from China unnecessarily delayed the debt deal, an accusation that has come up in debt negotiations with other African countries.

    "In the long run, however, this difficult period could have an upside for African nations. The reduction in PRC loans provides an opportunity for African countries to diversify, considering new economic partnerships on more favorable terms, with greater transparency and good governance. African nations can use multilateral negotiations to seek out lenders operating with different motivations, lenders that can help them build domestic economic strength and resilience for the future."

    Source:
    cna.org/our-media/indepth/2024

    #BeltAndRoadInitiative #BRI #LoanSharks #CancelAllDebt

  14. As part of my work on international intellectual property, I have just published an article on The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: intellectual property and trade in the Asia-Pacific in the Asia Pacific Law Review lnkd.in/e2ME9G9p The work draws on my experience of engaging with the policy process over #RCEP in the #JSCOT committee in the Australian Parliament. #RCEP #trade #IP #Asia #Pacific #regionalism Cf #TPP #TPPA #CPTPP #BRI #openaccess #auslaw #auspol