home.social

#sco — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #sco, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Scotland confirmed to have it's first trans MSP (Scottish MP) I hear.

    Congratulations Iris Duane! Scottish Green Party 💚 :flag_transgender:

    Update: now confirmed that there are two trans MSPs, as Q Manivannan is non-binary

    thenational.scot/news/26091897

    Archive: archive.ph/282yf

    #Scotland #SCO #Scotpol #Trans

  2. Rajnath Singh to Convene at SCO Defence Meet Amidst Regional Tensions

    Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will attend the SCO Defence Ministers' meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on April 27-28 to discuss regional security and terrorism.

    #SCO #RajnathSingh #Kyrgyzstan #DefenceMeet #RegionalSecurity

    newsletter.tf/rajnath-singh-sc

  3. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will attend the SCO Defence Ministers' meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on April 27-28. The meeting will focus on regional security challenges and counter-terrorism efforts.

    #SCO #RajnathSingh #Kyrgyzstan #DefenceMeet #RegionalSecurity
    newsletter.tf/rajnath-singh-sc

  4. PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.

    SCO Angers 3.1%
    Draw 10.3%
    FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6%

    #Football #Soccer #Ligue1 #SCO #PSG #SCOPSG

  5. PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.

    SCO Angers 3.1%
    Draw 10.3%
    FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6%

    #Football #Soccer #Ligue1 #SCO #PSG #SCOPSG

  6. PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.

    SCO Angers 3.1%
    Draw 10.3%
    FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6%

    #Football #Soccer #Ligue1 #SCO #PSG #SCOPSG

  7. PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.

    SCO Angers 3.1%
    Draw 10.3%
    FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6%

    #Football #Soccer #Ligue1 #SCO #PSG #SCOPSG

  8. PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.

    SCO Angers 3.1%
    Draw 10.3%
    FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6%

    #Football #Soccer #Ligue1 #SCO #PSG #SCOPSG

  9. Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw (or possibly ) demo a version of on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?

    And does anyone know when this feature will be added to ? It's just that my testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.

  10. Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?

    And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.

    #retrocomputing

  11. Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?

    And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.

    #retrocomputing

  12. Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?

    And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.

    #retrocomputing

  13. Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?

    And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.

    #retrocomputing

  14. Catturato in Spagna, grazie alla rete europea di ricerca ENFAST

    È stato catturato in Spagna e estradato in Italia un uomo di 45 anni, latitante dal dicembre 2024. L'uomo deve espiare una pena complessiva superiore a 13 anni di reclusione per reati legati allo spaccio di sostanze stupefacenti e alla ricettazione ed è considerato una persona di elevata pericolosità, operante come broker nel narcotraffico internazionale.

    A seguito dell'emissione di un mandato di arresto europeo da parte della Procura di Taranto, su richiesta degli investigatori della Squadra mobile jonica, il latitante è stato rintracciato e arrestato dalla Guardia Civil in una località balneare nei pressi di Alicante.

    La localizzazione e la successiva cattura del latitante sono il risultato di una complessa attività investigativa condotta dalla Squadra mobile di Taranto, coordinata dalla Direzione distrettuale antimafia di Lecce, con il supporto del Servizio centrale operativo, del Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e della Direzione centrale per i servizi antidroga.

    Fondamentale è stata la cooperazione internazionale attraverso la rete Enfast (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams), in particolare tramite l'Unidad de droga y Crimen organizado (Udyco) e il Fast Spagna, attivati attraverso il Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e il Fast Italia, che hanno consentito di individuare il ricercato nel sud della Spagna, dove si era rifugiato con il supporto di alcuni complici.

    La rete ENFAST (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams) è un circuito europeo che collega le unità specializzate nella ricerca e cattura di latitanti pericolosi, garantendo un'efficace cooperazione di polizia tra Italia, Romania, Spagna, Svizzera, Belgio, Lussemburgo e altri Stati Schengen.

    Grazie allo scambio informativo in tempo reale e all'uso di mandati di arresto europei, la rete permette di localizzare e arrestare rapidamente soggetti ricercati in tutta l'Unione Europea. L'operazione è coordinata dai team nazionali FAST (Fugitive Active Search Teams), come il FAST Italia del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (SCIP), che collaborano con omologhi esteri (es. UDYCO in Spagna, FAST Belgio, team rumeni e svizzeri) per garantire l'estradizione dei latitanti.

    Al termine delle procedure di cooperazione giudiziaria internazionale, il latitante è stato consegnato alle autorità italiane e trasferito in Italia.




    #Sco #scip #direzionecentraleserviziantidroga
  15. Catturato in Spagna, grazie alla rete europea di ricerca ENFAST

    È stato catturato in Spagna e estradato in Italia un uomo di 45 anni, latitante dal dicembre 2024. L'uomo deve espiare una pena complessiva superiore a 13 anni di reclusione per reati legati allo spaccio di sostanze stupefacenti e alla ricettazione ed è considerato una persona di elevata pericolosità, operante come broker nel narcotraffico internazionale.

    A seguito dell'emissione di un mandato di arresto europeo da parte della Procura di Taranto, su richiesta degli investigatori della Squadra mobile jonica, il latitante è stato rintracciato e arrestato dalla Guardia Civil in una località balneare nei pressi di Alicante.

    La localizzazione e la successiva cattura del latitante sono il risultato di una complessa attività investigativa condotta dalla Squadra mobile di Taranto, coordinata dalla Direzione distrettuale antimafia di Lecce, con il supporto del Servizio centrale operativo, del Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e della Direzione centrale per i servizi antidroga.

    Fondamentale è stata la cooperazione internazionale attraverso la rete Enfast (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams), in particolare tramite l'Unidad de droga y Crimen organizado (Udyco) e il Fast Spagna, attivati attraverso il Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e il Fast Italia, che hanno consentito di individuare il ricercato nel sud della Spagna, dove si era rifugiato con il supporto di alcuni complici.

    La rete ENFAST (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams) è un circuito europeo che collega le unità specializzate nella ricerca e cattura di latitanti pericolosi, garantendo un'efficace cooperazione di polizia tra Italia, Romania, Spagna, Svizzera, Belgio, Lussemburgo e altri Stati Schengen.

    Grazie allo scambio informativo in tempo reale e all'uso di mandati di arresto europei, la rete permette di localizzare e arrestare rapidamente soggetti ricercati in tutta l'Unione Europea. L'operazione è coordinata dai team nazionali FAST (Fugitive Active Search Teams), come il FAST Italia del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (SCIP), che collaborano con omologhi esteri (es. UDYCO in Spagna, FAST Belgio, team rumeni e svizzeri) per garantire l'estradizione dei latitanti.

    Al termine delle procedure di cooperazione giudiziaria internazionale, il latitante è stato consegnato alle autorità italiane e trasferito in Italia.




    #Sco #scip #direzionecentraleserviziantidroga
  16. Oops. We lost #SCO 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 0 - #JPN 1 🇯🇵 ⚽

    Get the losses out of your system now before the World Cup lads.

    #Football #Scotland

  17. Oops. We lost #SCO 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 0 - #JPN 1 🇯🇵 ⚽

    Get the losses out of your system now before the World Cup lads.

    #Football #Scotland

  18. Oops. We lost #SCO 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 0 - #JPN 1 🇯🇵 ⚽

    Get the losses out of your system now before the World Cup lads.

    #Football #Scotland

  19. Oops. We lost #SCO 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 0 - #JPN 1 🇯🇵 ⚽

    Get the losses out of your system now before the World Cup lads.

    #Football #Scotland

  20. Oops. We lost #SCO 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 0 - #JPN 1 🇯🇵 ⚽

    Get the losses out of your system now before the World Cup lads.

    #Football #Scotland

  21. Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

    Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

    By Uriel Araujo

    The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.

    South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.

    As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.

    The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.

    There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.

    There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activityBaloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.

    No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.

    What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.

    This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.

    At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.

    Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.

    Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.

    Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.

    The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.

    Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.

    To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.

    Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

     

    #AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP

  22. Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

    Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

    By Uriel Araujo

    The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.

    South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.

    As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.

    The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.

    There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.

    There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activityBaloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.

    No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.

    What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.

    This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.

    At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.

    Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.

    Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.

    Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.

    The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.

    Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.

    To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.

    Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

     

    #AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP

  23. Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

    Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line

    By Uriel Araujo

    The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.

    South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.

    As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.

    The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.

    There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.

    There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activityBaloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.

    No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.

    What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.

    This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.

    At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.

    Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.

    Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.

    Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.

    The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.

    Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.

    To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.

     

    #AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP

  24. Only Mbappe, Kane, Gordon, Osimhen and Haaland have scored more than Harvey Barnes in the Champions League this season. Barnes’ strike against PSV took his UCL tally to 5 for the season. In great form: 5th goal in 5 games all comps, following doubles against Leeds United in the Premier League and Bournemouth in the FA Cup. 12 goals since Oct 1.

    BBC Radio Scotland this morning discussed his vibrant form and whether Barnes might receive – or answer – a call from Scotland. He's played once for England, 15 minutes against Wales at Wembley in 2020, but he's not cap-tied as that was a friendly and Fifa eligibility rules were loosened further in 2020. Born in Burnley, the 28-year-old qualifies for Scotland via his maternal grandparents under Fifa ancestry rules.

    Back in November, Barnes didn’t rule out the idea when asked by Sky Sports. “No, of course it’s not,” when asked if the door to Scotland was closed. Steve Clarke subsequently suggested there might be talks in the New Year. No indication either way so far. But could Barnes’ possible arrival affect team harmony amongst those who did so brilliantly in qualifying? Probably not because Scotland are crying out for an attacker of Barnes’ calibre and because he’s such a personable individual.

    He’d need to make a strong statement about his desire to represent the land of his maternal grandparents, not simply appear to be looking around because the door to the England dressing-room seems closed. Would Barnes get in England’s squad? Probably not, even with this form. He’s best position is left wing, cutting on to his right foot, and can also can play at centre-forward. England have strength in depth, especially wide.

    Tuchel has Gordon and Rashford as his main left-flank options and could even seek to accommodate Rogers and Bellingham with Rogers off the left. Tuchel has Saka, Madueke and Bowen on the right. Foden, Palmer and Eze can play wide as well as 10. At centre-forward, he has the peerless Kane, also Watkins, possibly Delap, Calvert-Lewin and Solanke. If Barnes' form continues, and injuries intervene elsewhere, there will doubtless be more talk about Barnes and England.

    He wouldn't start in the World Cup for England but he would for Scotland. He's shared a pitch with the Scots before. He played against Scotland at the 2017 Toulon Tournament (Under-20), scoring twice to knock them out in the semis. Barnes also played alongside Foden in an Under-21 Euros qualifying win over Billy Gilmour and co at Tynecastle in 2018.

    Harvey Barnes is a big talent, in form, enjoying a run free from injuries, and the focus on him and who he represents is understandable. #ENG #SCO #NUFC

  25. Family, academy and the McTominay journey. He's an inspiration to so many with his ability and humility. McTominay's story is also a reminder of the importance of those who nurture young talents. Column #MUFC #SCODEN #SCO open.substack.com/pub/henrywin

  26. Unix SCO, c’est ce vieux serveur au fond du local technique : personne n’ose le toucher, personne ne sait vraiment pourquoi il tourne encore, mais tout le SI s’écroule si tu le débranches. Musée de l’informatique, mais en prod. 🧟‍♂️

    #Unix #SCO #Legacy
    #retrocomputing #silicium #heritage #toulouse

  27. Backport Wisdom

    "The reason is that they don’t buy the IBM answer as the only answer. The saying in the US is “nobody ever got fired for picking IBM.” That’s not a saying in Europe."
    ~Doug Michels, January 1987

    #tallship #Microtimes #SCO #Logica #IBM #XENIX

    .

  28. Backport Wisdom

    "The reason is that they don’t buy the IBM answer as the only answer. The saying in the US is “nobody ever got fired for picking IBM.” That’s not a saying in Europe."
    ~Doug Michels, January 1987

    #tallship #Microtimes #SCO #Logica #IBM #XENIX

    .

  29. Backport Wisdom

    "The reason is that they don’t buy the IBM answer as the only answer. The saying in the US is “nobody ever got fired for picking IBM.” That’s not a saying in Europe."
    ~Doug Michels, January 1987

    #tallship #Microtimes #SCO #Logica #IBM #XENIX

    .

  30. Ad Abu Dhabi l'arresto di latitante albanese indagato per un omicidio, da lui ordinato ad un connazionale in Italia

    Ad Abu Dhabi, con il supporto del Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), la polizia degli Emirati Arabi Uniti ha arrestato il cittadino albanese SINOMATI Altin.
    L'arresto è stato eseguito a seguito di un mandato di arresto internazionale, noto come Red Notice, emesso dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, poiché SINOMATI è ritenuto la "mente" dietro l'omicidio di SHEHAJ Selavdi, detto Passerotto, avvenuto domenica 20 settembre 2020, in una spiaggia affollata di Torvajanica, Pomezia.
    Le indagini, condotte congiuntamente dal Nucleo Investigativo dei #Carabinieri di Roma, dalla Squadra Mobile della #Questura di Roma e dallo #SCO della Polizia di Stato, hanno fornito solide prove contro SINOMATI Altin per aver ordinato a CALDERON Raul Esteban di commettere l'omicidio, versandogli in contanti di 150.000 per l'esecuzione.
    Per questo delitto, CALDERON Raul Esteban, considerato l'effettivo autore, e MOLISSO Giuseppe, in concorso, sono già stati condannati dalla Corte d'Assise di Frosinone all'ergastolo.

    In un altro procedimento penale, SINOMATI è accusato di essere stato uno dei principali canali di approvvigionamento di cocaina per l'organizzazione operante a Roma, guidata da MOLISSO Giuseppe insieme a BENNATO Leandro, smantellata dal Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri di Roma attraverso un'operazione di polizia giudiziaria condotta nel marzo scorso.
    Durante l'esecuzione di tale operazione, avvenuta dopo l'arresto di CALDERON per l'omicidio di SHEHAJ, SINOMATI sfuggì alla cattura, verosimilmente perché temeva di essere al centro dell'azione investigativa coordinata dalla Procura di Roma, e aveva spostato la sua base negli Emirati Arabi Uniti.

    #rednotice #mostwanted #cooperazioneinternazionaledipolizia

    @cooperazione_internazionale_di_polizia
    @news

  31. Ad Abu Dhabi l'arresto di latitante albanese indagato per un omicidio, da lui ordinato ad un connazionale in Italia

    Ad Abu Dhabi, con il supporto del Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), la polizia degli Emirati Arabi Uniti ha arrestato il cittadino albanese SINOMATI Altin.
    L'arresto è stato eseguito a seguito di un mandato di arresto internazionale, noto come Red Notice, emesso dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, poiché SINOMATI è ritenuto la "mente" dietro l'omicidio di SHEHAJ Selavdi, detto Passerotto, avvenuto domenica 20 settembre 2020, in una spiaggia affollata di Torvajanica, Pomezia.
    Le indagini, condotte congiuntamente dal Nucleo Investigativo dei #Carabinieri di Roma, dalla Squadra Mobile della #Questura di Roma e dallo #SCO della Polizia di Stato, hanno fornito solide prove contro SINOMATI Altin per aver ordinato a CALDERON Raul Esteban di commettere l'omicidio, versandogli in contanti di 150.000 per l'esecuzione.
    Per questo delitto, CALDERON Raul Esteban, considerato l'effettivo autore, e MOLISSO Giuseppe, in concorso, sono già stati condannati dalla Corte d'Assise di Frosinone all'ergastolo.

    In un altro procedimento penale, SINOMATI è accusato di essere stato uno dei principali canali di approvvigionamento di cocaina per l'organizzazione operante a Roma, guidata da MOLISSO Giuseppe insieme a BENNATO Leandro, smantellata dal Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri di Roma attraverso un'operazione di polizia giudiziaria condotta nel marzo scorso.
    Durante l'esecuzione di tale operazione, avvenuta dopo l'arresto di CALDERON per l'omicidio di SHEHAJ, SINOMATI sfuggì alla cattura, verosimilmente perché temeva di essere al centro dell'azione investigativa coordinata dalla Procura di Roma, e aveva spostato la sua base negli Emirati Arabi Uniti.

    #rednotice #mostwanted #cooperazioneinternazionaledipolizia

    @cooperazione_internazionale_di_polizia
    @news

  32. It’s Xenix

    While compiling Perl on the Cray I stumbled over the following lines...

    Compiling Perl on UNICOS system

    It's not Xenix...

    Hmm... Looks kind of like an extended USG system, but we'll see...
    Congratulations. You aren't running Eunice.
    It's not Xenix...
    Nor is it Venix...
    Use which C compiler? [cc]

    Well Xe

    behindtheconsole.com/2025/03/2

    #VintageComputing #BSD #CRAY #Linux #microsoft #SCO #VintageComputerLab #VintageComputing #Xenix #BTC

  33. Ad Abu Dhabi l'arresto di latitante albanese indagato per un omicidio, da lui ordinato ad un connazionale in Italia

    Ad Abu Dhabi, con il supporto del Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), la polizia degli Emirati Arabi Uniti ha arrestato il cittadino albanese SINOMATI Altin.
    L'arresto è stato eseguito a seguito di un mandato di arresto internazionale, noto come Red Notice, emesso dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, poiché SINOMATI è ritenuto la "mente" dietro l'omicidio di SHEHAJ Selavdi, detto Passerotto, avvenuto domenica 20 settembre 2020, in una spiaggia affollata di Torvajanica, Pomezia.
    Le indagini, condotte congiuntamente dal Nucleo Investigativo dei #Carabinieri di Roma, dalla Squadra Mobile della #Questura di Roma e dallo #SCO della Polizia di Stato, hanno fornito solide prove contro SINOMATI Altin per aver ordinato a CALDERON Raul Esteban di commettere l'omicidio, versandogli in contanti di 150.000 per l'esecuzione.
    Per questo delitto, CALDERON Raul Esteban, considerato l'effettivo autore, e MOLISSO Giuseppe, in concorso, sono già stati condannati dalla Corte d'Assise di Frosinone all'ergastolo.

    In un altro procedimento penale, SINOMATI è accusato di essere stato uno dei principali canali di approvvigionamento di cocaina per l'organizzazione operante a Roma, guidata da MOLISSO Giuseppe insieme a BENNATO Leandro, smantellata dal Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri di Roma attraverso un'operazione di polizia giudiziaria condotta nel marzo scorso.
    Durante l'esecuzione di tale operazione, avvenuta dopo l'arresto di CALDERON per l'omicidio di SHEHAJ, SINOMATI sfuggì alla cattura, verosimilmente perché temeva di essere al centro dell'azione investigativa coordinata dalla Procura di Roma, e aveva spostato la sua base negli Emirati Arabi Uniti.

    #rednotice #mostwanted #cooperazioneinternazionaledipolizia

    @cooperazione_internazionale_di_polizia
    @news

  34. Operazione El Rais. Traffico di migranti gestito da egiziani, smantellato dalla nostra Polizia di Stato in un contesto di cooperazione nell'ambito di una Operational Task Force di Europol

    È stato estradato in Italia dall’Albania un egiziano arrestato nell’ambito dell’Operazione “El Rais”, condotta dalla Polizia di Stato di Siracusa e dal Servizio Centrale Operativo, coordinata dalla locale Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia (DDA). L’uomo è giunto a bordo di un volo partito da Tirana e atterrato nelle prime ore del pomeriggio presso l’Aeroporto di Fiumicino, scortato dagli agenti del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia e successivamente recluso presso la Casa Circondariale di Roma Rebibbia, a disposizione dell’Autorità Giudiziaria.

    Si tratta di un ulteriore e significativo risultato ottenuto grazie alla sinergia e collaborazione tra le autorità italiane e quelle albanesi (Dipartimento Polizia Criminale – Forza Operazionale) con il contributo dell’Ufficio dell’Esperto per la Sicurezza operativo in Albania, che consentirà di processare in Italia uno dei componenti della complessa rete criminale dedita al traffico di migranti, operante tra l’Egitto, la Turchia e la Grecia.

    L’attività, in particolare, rappresenta un seguito della vasta operazione (denominata “El Rais”) conclusa lo scorso 8 aprile, con l’esecuzione dell’ordinanza di custodia cautelare a carico di 15 egiziani ritenuti appartenenti ad uno dei più articolati e ben organizzati sodalizi dediti al traffico di migranti sulla Rotta del Mediterraneo Orientale, che si stima abbia favorito l’ingresso clandestino in Italia di almeno 3 mila persone, a partire dal 2021 a oggi, con introiti per l’organizzazione criminale di almeno 30 milioni di dollari.

    L’indagine ha visto il coinvolgimento di diverse autorità e Forza di Polizia estere (albanesi, tedesche, turche e omanite), coordinate dal Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia della Direzione Centrale della Polizia Criminale.

    L'ordinanza era stata emessa dal Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari presso il Tribunale di Catania a seguito dell’imponente attività investigativa coordinata da questa Procura della Repubblica – Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, condotta dal Servizio Centrale Operativo (SCO) e dalla Squadra Mobile di Siracusa in stretta sinergia con la Divisione Interpol del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia e l’Agenzia Europea EUROPOL nell’ambito dell’Operational Task Force (OTF) del “Mediterraneo orientale“.

    Una operational task force di Europol è un gruppo di lavoro temporaneo e flessibile composto da esperti di polizia e investigatori provenienti da diversi paesi europei. Queste task force vengono create per affrontare specifiche minacce criminali transnazionali, come il traffico di droga, il terrorismo, il cybercrimine e altre forme di criminalità organizzata. Le principali caratteristiche di una operational task force di Europol sono:

    • Composizione flessibile: I membri provengono da diverse agenzie di contrasto al crimine dei paesi UE, a seconda delle esigenze dell'operazione.
    • Obiettivi mirati: Sono create per indagare su specifici casi o fenomeni criminali di rilevanza internazionale.
    • Coordinamento centralizzato: Vengono coordinate da Europol per massimizzare l'efficacia delle operazioni congiunte.
    • Durata limitata: Hanno una durata limitata, attiva solo per il tempo necessario a raggiungere gli obiettivi dell'indagine.

    #otf #Europol #serviziocentraleoperativo #sco #servizioperlacooperazioneinternazionaledipolizia #cooperazioneinternazionaledipolizia #direzionecentraledellapoliziacriminale #elrais #UfficiodellEspertoperlaSicurezza #trafficodiesseriumani