#sco — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #sco, aggregated by home.social.
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https://www.europesays.com/iran/105154/ Iran’s Defiance, BRICS and the Global South: Dr. Sara Larijani’s Exclusive Interview from Tehran #Brics #DrSaraLarijani #GeetaMohan #GlobalSouth #ImamHussain #IndiaTodayGlobal #Iran #IranBRICSAlliance #IranGeopolitics #IranIndiaRelations #IranInterview #IranIsrael #IranSanctions #IranSCOSummit #IranWar #IranUSRelations #MartyrdomIran #SCO #Shahada #ShiaIslam #StraitOfHormuz #Tehran #TehranExclusive
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https://www.europesays.com/iran/105097/ Iran’s Defiance, BRICS and the Global South: Dr. Sara Larijani’s Exclusive Interview from Tehran #Brics #DrSaraLarijani #GeetaMohan #GlobalSouth #ImamHussain #IndiaTodayGlobal #Iran #IranBRICSAlliance #IranGeopolitics #IranIndiaRelations #IranInterview #IranIsrael #IranSanctions #IranSCOSummit #IranWar #IranUSRelations #MartyrdomIran #SCO #Shahada #ShiaIslam #StraitOfHormuz #Tehran #TehranExclusive
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Scotland confirmed to have it's first trans MSP (Scottish MP) I hear.
Congratulations Iris Duane! Scottish Green Party 💚 :flag_transgender:
Update: now confirmed that there are two trans MSPs, as Q Manivannan is non-binary
https://www.thenational.scot/news/26091897.first-two-transgender-msps-elected-scottish-parliament/
Archive: https://archive.ph/282yf
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Rajnath Singh to Convene at SCO Defence Meet Amidst Regional Tensions
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will attend the SCO Defence Ministers' meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on April 27-28 to discuss regional security and terrorism.
#SCO #RajnathSingh #Kyrgyzstan #DefenceMeet #RegionalSecurity
https://newsletter.tf/rajnath-singh-sco-defence-meet-bishkek-april-27-28/
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Defence Minister Rajnath Singh will attend the SCO Defence Ministers' meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on April 27-28. The meeting will focus on regional security challenges and counter-terrorism efforts.
#SCO #RajnathSingh #Kyrgyzstan #DefenceMeet #RegionalSecurity
https://newsletter.tf/rajnath-singh-sco-defence-meet-bishkek-april-27-28/ -
Russia used an SCO defense meeting in Bishkek to warn against outside military involvement in Central Asia https://ow.ly/iCom50YRNJ2 #Security #SCO #Geopolitics #Defense #CentralAsia #SCO2026 #BishkekSummit
Belousov’s Bishkek Warning: Ru... -
Sports : tous les résultats du week-end
https://www.angers.villactu.fr/sports-tous-les-resultats-du-week-end-50/
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PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.
SCO Angers 3.1%
Draw 10.3%
FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6% -
PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.
SCO Angers 3.1%
Draw 10.3%
FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6% -
PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.
SCO Angers 3.1%
Draw 10.3%
FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6% -
PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.
SCO Angers 3.1%
Draw 10.3%
FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6% -
PSG, heavy Ligue 1 favorites at Angers, look to seal a win; Angers chase a surprise result, with a slim draw possible. Kickoff 19:00 CEST.
SCO Angers 3.1%
Draw 10.3%
FC Paris Saint-Germain 86.6% -
Middle-power ties with the U.S. are about shaping the global architecture, not endorsing the occupant of the Oval Office. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2026/04/16/world/case-american-engagement/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=mastodon #commentary #worldnews #donaldtrump #henrykissinger #richardnixon #china #sovietunion #ukraine #wef #nato #eu #russia #rcep #southchinasea #eastchinasea #taiwanstrait #odni #brics #sco #bri #aiib #canada #crinks #iran #northkorea #maga #wipo
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Middle-power ties with the U.S. are about shaping the global architecture, not endorsing the occupant of the Oval Office. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2026/04/16/world/case-american-engagement/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=mastodon #commentary #worldnews #donaldtrump #henrykissinger #richardnixon #china #sovietunion #ukraine #wef #nato #eu #russia #rcep #southchinasea #eastchinasea #taiwanstrait #odni #brics #sco #bri #aiib #canada #crinks #iran #northkorea #maga #wipo
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Middle-power ties with the U.S. are about shaping the global architecture, not endorsing the occupant of the Oval Office. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2026/04/16/world/case-american-engagement/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=mastodon #commentary #worldnews #donaldtrump #henrykissinger #richardnixon #china #sovietunion #ukraine #wef #nato #eu #russia #rcep #southchinasea #eastchinasea #taiwanstrait #odni #brics #sco #bri #aiib #canada #crinks #iran #northkorea #maga #wipo
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Middle-power ties with the U.S. are about shaping the global architecture, not endorsing the occupant of the Oval Office. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2026/04/16/world/case-american-engagement/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=mastodon #commentary #worldnews #donaldtrump #henrykissinger #richardnixon #china #sovietunion #ukraine #wef #nato #eu #russia #rcep #southchinasea #eastchinasea #taiwanstrait #odni #brics #sco #bri #aiib #canada #crinks #iran #northkorea #maga #wipo
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Russia Sees Signs of Crisis in NATO, EU: Lavrov https://www.byteseu.com/1917267/ #a #alliance #and #Atlantic #brewing #Cooperation #Crisis #during #eu #Europe #European #foreign #General #highlighted #in #Islam #Lavrov #meeting #Minister #NATO #north #Nurlan #of #organization #Russia #russian #SCO #secretary #sees #Sergey #shanghai #signs #the #times #Union #with #within #Yermekbayev
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Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?
And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.
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Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?
And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.
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Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?
And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.
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Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?
And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.
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Back In The Day - early/mid 90s - I saw #SCO (or possibly #Novell) demo a version of #Unixware on some funky PC hardware where you could add and remove physical CPUs and memory on the fly. Does anyone remember what that hardware was?
And does anyone know when this feature will be added to #QEMU? It's just that my #FreeBSD testing VM has just started swapping, and I'd like to allocate more memory without having to stop it.
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Catturato in Spagna, grazie alla rete europea di ricerca ENFAST
È stato catturato in Spagna e estradato in Italia un uomo di 45 anni, latitante dal dicembre 2024. L'uomo deve espiare una pena complessiva superiore a 13 anni di reclusione per reati legati allo spaccio di sostanze stupefacenti e alla ricettazione ed è considerato una persona di elevata pericolosità, operante come broker nel narcotraffico internazionale.
A seguito dell'emissione di un mandato di arresto europeo da parte della Procura di Taranto, su richiesta degli investigatori della Squadra mobile jonica, il latitante è stato rintracciato e arrestato dalla Guardia Civil in una località balneare nei pressi di Alicante.
La localizzazione e la successiva cattura del latitante sono il risultato di una complessa attività investigativa condotta dalla Squadra mobile di Taranto, coordinata dalla Direzione distrettuale antimafia di Lecce, con il supporto del Servizio centrale operativo, del Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e della Direzione centrale per i servizi antidroga.
Fondamentale è stata la cooperazione internazionale attraverso la rete Enfast (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams), in particolare tramite l'Unidad de droga y Crimen organizado (Udyco) e il Fast Spagna, attivati attraverso il Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e il Fast Italia, che hanno consentito di individuare il ricercato nel sud della Spagna, dove si era rifugiato con il supporto di alcuni complici.
La rete ENFAST (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams) è un circuito europeo che collega le unità specializzate nella ricerca e cattura di latitanti pericolosi, garantendo un'efficace cooperazione di polizia tra Italia, Romania, Spagna, Svizzera, Belgio, Lussemburgo e altri Stati Schengen.
Grazie allo scambio informativo in tempo reale e all'uso di mandati di arresto europei, la rete permette di localizzare e arrestare rapidamente soggetti ricercati in tutta l'Unione Europea. L'operazione è coordinata dai team nazionali FAST (Fugitive Active Search Teams), come il FAST Italia del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (SCIP), che collaborano con omologhi esteri (es. UDYCO in Spagna, FAST Belgio, team rumeni e svizzeri) per garantire l'estradizione dei latitanti.
Al termine delle procedure di cooperazione giudiziaria internazionale, il latitante è stato consegnato alle autorità italiane e trasferito in Italia.
#Sco #scip #direzionecentraleserviziantidroga -
Catturato in Spagna, grazie alla rete europea di ricerca ENFAST
È stato catturato in Spagna e estradato in Italia un uomo di 45 anni, latitante dal dicembre 2024. L'uomo deve espiare una pena complessiva superiore a 13 anni di reclusione per reati legati allo spaccio di sostanze stupefacenti e alla ricettazione ed è considerato una persona di elevata pericolosità, operante come broker nel narcotraffico internazionale.
A seguito dell'emissione di un mandato di arresto europeo da parte della Procura di Taranto, su richiesta degli investigatori della Squadra mobile jonica, il latitante è stato rintracciato e arrestato dalla Guardia Civil in una località balneare nei pressi di Alicante.
La localizzazione e la successiva cattura del latitante sono il risultato di una complessa attività investigativa condotta dalla Squadra mobile di Taranto, coordinata dalla Direzione distrettuale antimafia di Lecce, con il supporto del Servizio centrale operativo, del Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e della Direzione centrale per i servizi antidroga.
Fondamentale è stata la cooperazione internazionale attraverso la rete Enfast (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams), in particolare tramite l'Unidad de droga y Crimen organizado (Udyco) e il Fast Spagna, attivati attraverso il Servizio per la cooperazione internazionale di Polizia e il Fast Italia, che hanno consentito di individuare il ricercato nel sud della Spagna, dove si era rifugiato con il supporto di alcuni complici.
La rete ENFAST (European Network of Fugitive Active Search Teams) è un circuito europeo che collega le unità specializzate nella ricerca e cattura di latitanti pericolosi, garantendo un'efficace cooperazione di polizia tra Italia, Romania, Spagna, Svizzera, Belgio, Lussemburgo e altri Stati Schengen.
Grazie allo scambio informativo in tempo reale e all'uso di mandati di arresto europei, la rete permette di localizzare e arrestare rapidamente soggetti ricercati in tutta l'Unione Europea. L'operazione è coordinata dai team nazionali FAST (Fugitive Active Search Teams), come il FAST Italia del Servizio per la Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (SCIP), che collaborano con omologhi esteri (es. UDYCO in Spagna, FAST Belgio, team rumeni e svizzeri) per garantire l'estradizione dei latitanti.
Al termine delle procedure di cooperazione giudiziaria internazionale, il latitante è stato consegnato alle autorità italiane e trasferito in Italia.
#Sco #scip #direzionecentraleserviziantidroga -
Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
By Uriel Araujo
The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.
South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.
As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.
The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.
There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.
There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activity, Baloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.
No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.
What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.
This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.
At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.
Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.
Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.
Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.
Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.
To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP
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Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
By Uriel Araujo
The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.
South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.
As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.
The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.
There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.
There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activity, Baloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.
No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.
What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.
This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.
At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.
Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.
Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.
Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.
Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.
To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP
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Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
Eclipsing Kashmir: Why The Afghanistan-Pakistan Standoff Is Now South Asia’s Most Volatile Fault Line
By Uriel Araujo
The Afghanistan–Pakistan border is emerging as a new epicentre of instability, amid Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and Kabul’s warming ties with India. Escalation could reignite mass terrorism, destabilize the region, and strain Eurasian trade, energy, and security corridors, thus testing multipolar frameworks such as SCO and BRICS.
South Asia’s next potential pressure point may lie not along the Line of Control in Kashmir, but westward, along the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This frontier is quickly emerging as a central driver of regional instability.
As expert Michael Kugelman recently noted, an underreported conflict is gaining momentum between Pakistan authorities in Islamabad and the Taliban government in Kabul. It is centred on Pakistan’s claims that Kabul tolerates, if not outright supports, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants operating against Islamabad. This confrontation now risks even eclipsing the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry as the region’s most explosive security dilemma.
The data is telling. Terrorist violence inside Pakistan did surge in 2025, with hundreds of attacks attributed to the TTP, many launched from Afghan territory. The Pakistani authorities in Islamabad responded with airstrikes and border closures (among other measures). This in turn has triggered Taliban retaliation, population displacement, and escalating rhetoric. Neither side currently has incentives to de-escalate: Pakistan’s military feels betrayed by the Afghan Taliban, a movement it once sponsored, now accused of tolerating or even aiding the TTP’s campaign against Islamabad; the Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, gains domestic legitimacy precisely by defying Pakistan, a country widely resented by the Afghan public.
There are many factors fuelling anti-Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan today, including the unresolved Durand Line dispute and Pakistan’s long involvement in Afghan conflicts. Islamabad is widely seen in Afghanistan as having manipulated Afghan factions over decades, by backing proxies (including, ironically enough, the Afghan Taliban itself) to secure “strategic depth.” These historical grievances fuel suspicion and resentment across Afghan society, beyond Taliban supporters, to this day.
There are wider regional tensions, though. In 2025, I argued that South Asian tensions pertaining to India-Pakistani disputes were spilling into Central Asia and beyond, ranging from hydropolitics to militant spillover and great-power competition. The Afghanistan–Pakistan standoff is now intersecting with precisely those broader Eurasian lines of tension. Taliban-backed instability in Pakistan’s northwest is unfolding alongside Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activity, Baloch separatism, and refugee pressures. This takes place amid a range of fragile regional connectivity and transit projects linking South and Central Asia, all dependent on cross-border stability.
No wonder Beijing is concerned: Chinese nationals and investments in Pakistan, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have already been targeted by militants. At the same time, China faces its own security concerns linked to Afghan-based jihadist networks with ideological and operational ties to Xinjiang. Be as it may, China has leverage with both Kabul and Islamabad, and thus far has called for restraint, not confrontation.
What truly alarms Pakistan, however, is not only the Afghan Taliban’s supposed duplicity over the TTP issue, but Kabul’s warming ties with India, marking a shift. Today, senior Taliban officials regularly visit India, embassies are reopening, and trade mechanisms are being discussed. Islamabad reads this shift as a strategic encirclement. Whether this perception is accurate is almost secondary; in South Asia, as I’ve argued before, perceptions kill. Thus, Pakistan may increasingly come to see Afghanistan not merely as a western security headache, but as part of a broader Indo-centric challenge.
This is where escalation risks multiply. A harsher Pakistani campaign against the TTP, including possible ground incursions into Afghanistan, could provoke Taliban-backed militant retaliation deep inside Pakistan’s cities. In this scenario, the November suicide bombing in Islamabad may have signalled what lies ahead.
At the same time, renewed instability in Afghanistan would be a kind of a gift to ISKP, which could further thrive on sectarian polarization. The group has already demonstrated its transnational reach, from attacks in Iran and Russia to foiled plots in Europe. A destabilized Afghanistan–Pakistan axis would thereby increase global terrorism risks.
Meanwhile, a humanitarian problem is on the rise amid border closures and tightening policies, a situation exacerbated by Washington’s suspension of resettlement programs. Tens of thousands have fled Pakistan’s northwest fearing new military operations. Trade and shipping routes are disrupted, affecting landlocked Central Asian economies and energy projects such as the TAPI gas pipeline.
Against this backdrop, Western prescriptions appear increasingly hollow. The Trump administration favours ad hoc, personalized diplomacy, including premature ceasefires, with little to show for it. Its credibility deficit is visible across Eurasia. Even at Davos, Western elites now speak, quite hypocritically, of the “death” of the so-called rules-based international order, a euphemism for the decline of the Anglo-centered order.
Yet the collapse of one order does not automatically yield a better one. Central and South Asia therefore may function as a test case, so to speak, for whether genuinely multipolar frameworks can manage conflict. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, are regionally embedded, inclusive, and not burdened by colonial baggage.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis is not merely a security dispute; it is a convergence point of terrorism, migration, energy corridors, and great-power competition. SCO mechanisms on counterterrorism, border security, and confidence-building could be adapted to address cross-border militancy involving Afghanistan, even if Kabul remains only partially integrated. BRICS, meanwhile, could use economic incentives and infrastructure coordination to create stakes for stability; Pakistan’s interest in BRICS membership is telling enough.
Success is not guaranteed: the Taliban are wary of binding external constraints (to say the least); Pakistan’s military is increasingly impatient; India remains wary of multilateral frameworks that could internationalize Kashmir. But the alternative is escalation by default. A region with nuclear weapons, militant groups, and fragile trade and energy corridors cannot afford improvisation.
To put it bluntly, if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions spiral into open conflict, the shockwaves will not stop at the Khyber Pass. They will reverberate across Eurasia, from Central Asian rivers to Indian Ocean trade routes and beyond, while an old order is fading.
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #Terrorism #TTP
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Only Mbappe, Kane, Gordon, Osimhen and Haaland have scored more than Harvey Barnes in the Champions League this season. Barnes’ strike against PSV took his UCL tally to 5 for the season. In great form: 5th goal in 5 games all comps, following doubles against Leeds United in the Premier League and Bournemouth in the FA Cup. 12 goals since Oct 1.
BBC Radio Scotland this morning discussed his vibrant form and whether Barnes might receive – or answer – a call from Scotland. He's played once for England, 15 minutes against Wales at Wembley in 2020, but he's not cap-tied as that was a friendly and Fifa eligibility rules were loosened further in 2020. Born in Burnley, the 28-year-old qualifies for Scotland via his maternal grandparents under Fifa ancestry rules.
Back in November, Barnes didn’t rule out the idea when asked by Sky Sports. “No, of course it’s not,” when asked if the door to Scotland was closed. Steve Clarke subsequently suggested there might be talks in the New Year. No indication either way so far. But could Barnes’ possible arrival affect team harmony amongst those who did so brilliantly in qualifying? Probably not because Scotland are crying out for an attacker of Barnes’ calibre and because he’s such a personable individual.
He’d need to make a strong statement about his desire to represent the land of his maternal grandparents, not simply appear to be looking around because the door to the England dressing-room seems closed. Would Barnes get in England’s squad? Probably not, even with this form. He’s best position is left wing, cutting on to his right foot, and can also can play at centre-forward. England have strength in depth, especially wide.
Tuchel has Gordon and Rashford as his main left-flank options and could even seek to accommodate Rogers and Bellingham with Rogers off the left. Tuchel has Saka, Madueke and Bowen on the right. Foden, Palmer and Eze can play wide as well as 10. At centre-forward, he has the peerless Kane, also Watkins, possibly Delap, Calvert-Lewin and Solanke. If Barnes' form continues, and injuries intervene elsewhere, there will doubtless be more talk about Barnes and England.
He wouldn't start in the World Cup for England but he would for Scotland. He's shared a pitch with the Scots before. He played against Scotland at the 2017 Toulon Tournament (Under-20), scoring twice to knock them out in the semis. Barnes also played alongside Foden in an Under-21 Euros qualifying win over Billy Gilmour and co at Tynecastle in 2018.
Harvey Barnes is a big talent, in form, enjoying a run free from injuries, and the focus on him and who he represents is understandable. #ENG #SCO #NUFC
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U.S. retrenchment creates a vacuum of global governance leadership — one that China is eager to fill. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/11/28/japan/beijings-globalist-agenda/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=mastodon #commentary #japan #china #ggi #un #xijinping #shanghaicooperationorganization #sco #globalsouth #us #donaldtrump #un #who #unesco #bank #beltandroad
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Family, academy and the McTominay journey. He's an inspiration to so many with his ability and humility. McTominay's story is also a reminder of the importance of those who nurture young talents. Column #MUFC #SCODEN #SCO https://open.substack.com/pub/henrywinterfootball/p/family-academy-and-the-mctominay?r=3osxpq&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true
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India & Russia 10 Hidden Secrets of an Unbreakable Friendship Cold War to BRICS 2025!
#india #russia #strategicpartnership #geopolitics #defensetrade #brics #sco #coldwar #indianhistory #russiaindiafriendship #narendramodi #indiragandhi #vladimirputin
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Ad Abu Dhabi l'arresto di latitante albanese indagato per un omicidio, da lui ordinato ad un connazionale in Italia
Ad Abu Dhabi, con il supporto del Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), la polizia degli Emirati Arabi Uniti ha arrestato il cittadino albanese SINOMATI Altin.
L'arresto è stato eseguito a seguito di un mandato di arresto internazionale, noto come Red Notice, emesso dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, poiché SINOMATI è ritenuto la "mente" dietro l'omicidio di SHEHAJ Selavdi, detto Passerotto, avvenuto domenica 20 settembre 2020, in una spiaggia affollata di Torvajanica, Pomezia.
Le indagini, condotte congiuntamente dal Nucleo Investigativo dei #Carabinieri di Roma, dalla Squadra Mobile della #Questura di Roma e dallo #SCO della Polizia di Stato, hanno fornito solide prove contro SINOMATI Altin per aver ordinato a CALDERON Raul Esteban di commettere l'omicidio, versandogli in contanti di 150.000 per l'esecuzione.
Per questo delitto, CALDERON Raul Esteban, considerato l'effettivo autore, e MOLISSO Giuseppe, in concorso, sono già stati condannati dalla Corte d'Assise di Frosinone all'ergastolo.In un altro procedimento penale, SINOMATI è accusato di essere stato uno dei principali canali di approvvigionamento di cocaina per l'organizzazione operante a Roma, guidata da MOLISSO Giuseppe insieme a BENNATO Leandro, smantellata dal Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri di Roma attraverso un'operazione di polizia giudiziaria condotta nel marzo scorso.
Durante l'esecuzione di tale operazione, avvenuta dopo l'arresto di CALDERON per l'omicidio di SHEHAJ, SINOMATI sfuggì alla cattura, verosimilmente perché temeva di essere al centro dell'azione investigativa coordinata dalla Procura di Roma, e aveva spostato la sua base negli Emirati Arabi Uniti. -
Ad Abu Dhabi l'arresto di latitante albanese indagato per un omicidio, da lui ordinato ad un connazionale in Italia
Ad Abu Dhabi, con il supporto del Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), la polizia degli Emirati Arabi Uniti ha arrestato il cittadino albanese SINOMATI Altin.
L'arresto è stato eseguito a seguito di un mandato di arresto internazionale, noto come Red Notice, emesso dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, poiché SINOMATI è ritenuto la "mente" dietro l'omicidio di SHEHAJ Selavdi, detto Passerotto, avvenuto domenica 20 settembre 2020, in una spiaggia affollata di Torvajanica, Pomezia.
Le indagini, condotte congiuntamente dal Nucleo Investigativo dei #Carabinieri di Roma, dalla Squadra Mobile della #Questura di Roma e dallo #SCO della Polizia di Stato, hanno fornito solide prove contro SINOMATI Altin per aver ordinato a CALDERON Raul Esteban di commettere l'omicidio, versandogli in contanti di 150.000 per l'esecuzione.
Per questo delitto, CALDERON Raul Esteban, considerato l'effettivo autore, e MOLISSO Giuseppe, in concorso, sono già stati condannati dalla Corte d'Assise di Frosinone all'ergastolo.In un altro procedimento penale, SINOMATI è accusato di essere stato uno dei principali canali di approvvigionamento di cocaina per l'organizzazione operante a Roma, guidata da MOLISSO Giuseppe insieme a BENNATO Leandro, smantellata dal Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri di Roma attraverso un'operazione di polizia giudiziaria condotta nel marzo scorso.
Durante l'esecuzione di tale operazione, avvenuta dopo l'arresto di CALDERON per l'omicidio di SHEHAJ, SINOMATI sfuggì alla cattura, verosimilmente perché temeva di essere al centro dell'azione investigativa coordinata dalla Procura di Roma, e aveva spostato la sua base negli Emirati Arabi Uniti. -
Ad Abu Dhabi l'arresto di latitante albanese indagato per un omicidio, da lui ordinato ad un connazionale in Italia
Ad Abu Dhabi, con il supporto del Servizio di Cooperazione Internazionale di Polizia (#SCIP), la polizia degli Emirati Arabi Uniti ha arrestato il cittadino albanese SINOMATI Altin.
L'arresto è stato eseguito a seguito di un mandato di arresto internazionale, noto come Red Notice, emesso dalla Procura Distrettuale Antimafia di Roma, poiché SINOMATI è ritenuto la "mente" dietro l'omicidio di SHEHAJ Selavdi, detto Passerotto, avvenuto domenica 20 settembre 2020, in una spiaggia affollata di Torvajanica, Pomezia.
Le indagini, condotte congiuntamente dal Nucleo Investigativo dei #Carabinieri di Roma, dalla Squadra Mobile della #Questura di Roma e dallo #SCO della Polizia di Stato, hanno fornito solide prove contro SINOMATI Altin per aver ordinato a CALDERON Raul Esteban di commettere l'omicidio, versandogli in contanti di 150.000 per l'esecuzione.
Per questo delitto, CALDERON Raul Esteban, considerato l'effettivo autore, e MOLISSO Giuseppe, in concorso, sono già stati condannati dalla Corte d'Assise di Frosinone all'ergastolo.In un altro procedimento penale, SINOMATI è accusato di essere stato uno dei principali canali di approvvigionamento di cocaina per l'organizzazione operante a Roma, guidata da MOLISSO Giuseppe insieme a BENNATO Leandro, smantellata dal Comando Provinciale dei Carabinieri di Roma attraverso un'operazione di polizia giudiziaria condotta nel marzo scorso.
Durante l'esecuzione di tale operazione, avvenuta dopo l'arresto di CALDERON per l'omicidio di SHEHAJ, SINOMATI sfuggì alla cattura, verosimilmente perché temeva di essere al centro dell'azione investigativa coordinata dalla Procura di Roma, e aveva spostato la sua base negli Emirati Arabi Uniti. -
I am curious about the 64 users of SCO. Were these users comprising the entire SCO's customers at the time?
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Durand Line On Fire: Pakistan And Afghanistan Edge Toward War
Durand Line On Fire: Pakistan And Afghanistan Edge Toward War
By Uriel Araujo
Pakistan’s alleged strikes on Kabul have reignited old disputes over the Durand Line and Pashtun unity. This crisis could reshape the regional order — dragging Iran, India, and major Eurasian blocs into its orbit.
Earlier this month, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan formally accused Pakistan of carrying out airstrikes in Kabul and in eastern provinces: the Pakistani authorities in Islamabad have neither confirmed nor denied such claims. Amid the confusion, a blast near Kabul’s Abdul Haq Square, initially described as an accident, was later attributed by the Afghan Defence Ministry to Pakistani jets violating Afghan airspace.
What followed has been a sharp enough escalation. The Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military posts straddling the border in multiple provinces. Fierce clashes erupted, reportedly killing dozens of soldiers and civilians on both sides. Border crossings have been closed, and heavy shelling continues. Is a new war between Islamabad and Kabul breaking out?
To understand what’s happening, one may recall that Afghanistan has long refused to recognize the Durand Line — the 1,600-mile boundary demarcated by the British in 1893. That boundary cuts through the Pashtun heartland, dividing tribes, communities and families. This matters, among other things, because Pashtun ethnic group forms the Taliban’s core, supplying most leaders, fighters, and support in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They dominate key regions like Kandahar and remain essential to the group’s post-2021 power.
In any case, no Afghan government — including the current Taliban regime — has ever formally accepted the Durand Line as legitimate. The decision by Pakistan, especially since the 2000s, to fence and militarize large stretches of the border in the name of curbing militant movement has only exacerbated local tension, as the barrier physically severs customary cross-border life.
Since the Taliban took over in 2021, Pakistan has experienced a dramatic increase in attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which claims to seek an Islamic regime in Pakistan. Islamabad regularly accuses the Afghan Taliban of harbouring, supporting or giving sanctuary to TTP cadres. The Taliban government denies this. Still, a 2024 UN report indicated that the TTP “received substantial logistical and operational support” from Afghan territory. The ideological affinities between TTP and the Afghan Taliban complicate the picture: they share much of the same extremist worldview, even if their immediate aims diverge.
In recent months, Islamabad has sought to “take the fight” into Afghanistan to combat cross-border terrorism (as researcher Umair Jamal puts it, writing for The Diplomat), thereby redefining red lines. From Pakistan’s reframed perspective, then, any attack that is believed to originate from Afghan soil — even by non-state actors — may now invite punitive response on Afghan territory.
In any case, this Afghanistan-Pakistan flare is not happening in a vacuum. Pakistan is already a target, overtly or covertly, of tensions with both Iran and India, making it vulnerable on multiple fronts.
For example, back in January 2024, I commented on rising Iranian-Pakistan friction, noting that Iran’s growing regional influence, border disputes (especially in Balochistan), and anxieties about Pakistan’s posture in West Asia had the potential to strain the fabric of Eurasian cooperation.
This matters because Iran and Pakistan share membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and both are tied to the Ashgabat Agreement, intended to knit Persian Gulf to Central Asia corridors. Any interstate friction among them threatens connectivity goals in Eurasia.
Meanwhile, the India-Pakistan rivalry is hardly dormant. In May 2025 I already covered the possibility of an emergent Afghanistan-India alignment (against Pakistan): historically the Taliban was a Pakistani ally, but recent reports suggest increasing Indian outreach to Kabul, unsettling Islamabad. This adds some perspective to what is happening now. India sees Taliban engagement as a counterweight to Pakistan, and Islamabad fears being encircled diplomatically.
To complicate matters further, Pakistan already wrestles with internal insurgencies. In June I wrote that Pakistan’s multi-front crisis in conflict with Baloch separatists, exacerbated by ISKP tensions, risks morphing into a broader Eurasian conflagration.
Elsewhere, I’ve emphasized how such Indo-Pak rivalry has global ramifications, far beyond Kashmir — intersecting with Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. And only recently, I argued that water disputes between India and Pakistan — especially around hydropolitics and floods — are being securitized and may spiral unpredictably.
Thus, taken together, Pakistan is squeezed. It must juggle pressures from Afghanistan, India’s manoeuvres, and Iran’s ongoing border tensions. No wonder Islamabad might adopt a more aggressive posture: as a matter of fact, it may see no safe option other than to project power outward to preempt further threats. The problem is that it backfires and escalates.
Right now, one can immediately think of two scenarios: either a controlled standoff with occasional flare-ups or escalation into limited war. A third scenario would be a proxy conflagration with external actors and unpredictable outcomes.
In any case, a new conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan would not stay confined. It could ripple outward, challenging regional Eurasian stability, fracturing multilateral institutions, and dragging in actors well beyond the frontier. Albeit still underreported, the crisis could prove a pivot in Eurasian geopolitics. It is thus time for mechanisms such as SCO and even BRICS to creatively mediate. Moscow can also play a key role, by mediating and encouraging dialogue, using the “Moscow Format” and also acting as a “neutral convener”.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #China #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Iran #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #TTP #USA
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Durand Line On Fire: Pakistan And Afghanistan Edge Toward War
Durand Line On Fire: Pakistan And Afghanistan Edge Toward War
By Uriel Araujo
Pakistan’s alleged strikes on Kabul have reignited old disputes over the Durand Line and Pashtun unity. This crisis could reshape the regional order — dragging Iran, India, and major Eurasian blocs into its orbit.
Earlier this month, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan formally accused Pakistan of carrying out airstrikes in Kabul and in eastern provinces: the Pakistani authorities in Islamabad have neither confirmed nor denied such claims. Amid the confusion, a blast near Kabul’s Abdul Haq Square, initially described as an accident, was later attributed by the Afghan Defence Ministry to Pakistani jets violating Afghan airspace.
What followed has been a sharp enough escalation. The Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military posts straddling the border in multiple provinces. Fierce clashes erupted, reportedly killing dozens of soldiers and civilians on both sides. Border crossings have been closed, and heavy shelling continues. Is a new war between Islamabad and Kabul breaking out?
To understand what’s happening, one may recall that Afghanistan has long refused to recognize the Durand Line — the 1,600-mile boundary demarcated by the British in 1893. That boundary cuts through the Pashtun heartland, dividing tribes, communities and families. This matters, among other things, because Pashtun ethnic group forms the Taliban’s core, supplying most leaders, fighters, and support in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They dominate key regions like Kandahar and remain essential to the group’s post-2021 power.
In any case, no Afghan government — including the current Taliban regime — has ever formally accepted the Durand Line as legitimate. The decision by Pakistan, especially since the 2000s, to fence and militarize large stretches of the border in the name of curbing militant movement has only exacerbated local tension, as the barrier physically severs customary cross-border life.
Since the Taliban took over in 2021, Pakistan has experienced a dramatic increase in attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which claims to seek an Islamic regime in Pakistan. Islamabad regularly accuses the Afghan Taliban of harbouring, supporting or giving sanctuary to TTP cadres. The Taliban government denies this. Still, a 2024 UN report indicated that the TTP “received substantial logistical and operational support” from Afghan territory. The ideological affinities between TTP and the Afghan Taliban complicate the picture: they share much of the same extremist worldview, even if their immediate aims diverge.
In recent months, Islamabad has sought to “take the fight” into Afghanistan to combat cross-border terrorism (as researcher Umair Jamal puts it, writing for The Diplomat), thereby redefining red lines. From Pakistan’s reframed perspective, then, any attack that is believed to originate from Afghan soil — even by non-state actors — may now invite punitive response on Afghan territory.
In any case, this Afghanistan-Pakistan flare is not happening in a vacuum. Pakistan is already a target, overtly or covertly, of tensions with both Iran and India, making it vulnerable on multiple fronts.
For example, back in January 2024, I commented on rising Iranian-Pakistan friction, noting that Iran’s growing regional influence, border disputes (especially in Balochistan), and anxieties about Pakistan’s posture in West Asia had the potential to strain the fabric of Eurasian cooperation.
This matters because Iran and Pakistan share membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and both are tied to the Ashgabat Agreement, intended to knit Persian Gulf to Central Asia corridors. Any interstate friction among them threatens connectivity goals in Eurasia.
Meanwhile, the India-Pakistan rivalry is hardly dormant. In May 2025 I already covered the possibility of an emergent Afghanistan-India alignment (against Pakistan): historically the Taliban was a Pakistani ally, but recent reports suggest increasing Indian outreach to Kabul, unsettling Islamabad. This adds some perspective to what is happening now. India sees Taliban engagement as a counterweight to Pakistan, and Islamabad fears being encircled diplomatically.
To complicate matters further, Pakistan already wrestles with internal insurgencies. In June I wrote that Pakistan’s multi-front crisis in conflict with Baloch separatists, exacerbated by ISKP tensions, risks morphing into a broader Eurasian conflagration.
Elsewhere, I’ve emphasized how such Indo-Pak rivalry has global ramifications, far beyond Kashmir — intersecting with Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. And only recently, I argued that water disputes between India and Pakistan — especially around hydropolitics and floods — are being securitized and may spiral unpredictably.
Thus, taken together, Pakistan is squeezed. It must juggle pressures from Afghanistan, India’s manoeuvres, and Iran’s ongoing border tensions. No wonder Islamabad might adopt a more aggressive posture: as a matter of fact, it may see no safe option other than to project power outward to preempt further threats. The problem is that it backfires and escalates.
Right now, one can immediately think of two scenarios: either a controlled standoff with occasional flare-ups or escalation into limited war. A third scenario would be a proxy conflagration with external actors and unpredictable outcomes.
In any case, a new conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan would not stay confined. It could ripple outward, challenging regional Eurasian stability, fracturing multilateral institutions, and dragging in actors well beyond the frontier. Albeit still underreported, the crisis could prove a pivot in Eurasian geopolitics. It is thus time for mechanisms such as SCO and even BRICS to creatively mediate. Moscow can also play a key role, by mediating and encouraging dialogue, using the “Moscow Format” and also acting as a “neutral convener”.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #China #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Iran #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #TTP #USA
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Durand Line On Fire: Pakistan And Afghanistan Edge Toward War
Durand Line On Fire: Pakistan And Afghanistan Edge Toward War
By Uriel Araujo
Pakistan’s alleged strikes on Kabul have reignited old disputes over the Durand Line and Pashtun unity. This crisis could reshape the regional order — dragging Iran, India, and major Eurasian blocs into its orbit.
Earlier this month, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan formally accused Pakistan of carrying out airstrikes in Kabul and in eastern provinces: the Pakistani authorities in Islamabad have neither confirmed nor denied such claims. Amid the confusion, a blast near Kabul’s Abdul Haq Square, initially described as an accident, was later attributed by the Afghan Defence Ministry to Pakistani jets violating Afghan airspace.
What followed has been a sharp enough escalation. The Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military posts straddling the border in multiple provinces. Fierce clashes erupted, reportedly killing dozens of soldiers and civilians on both sides. Border crossings have been closed, and heavy shelling continues. Is a new war between Islamabad and Kabul breaking out?
To understand what’s happening, one may recall that Afghanistan has long refused to recognize the Durand Line — the 1,600-mile boundary demarcated by the British in 1893. That boundary cuts through the Pashtun heartland, dividing tribes, communities and families. This matters, among other things, because Pashtun ethnic group forms the Taliban’s core, supplying most leaders, fighters, and support in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They dominate key regions like Kandahar and remain essential to the group’s post-2021 power.
In any case, no Afghan government — including the current Taliban regime — has ever formally accepted the Durand Line as legitimate. The decision by Pakistan, especially since the 2000s, to fence and militarize large stretches of the border in the name of curbing militant movement has only exacerbated local tension, as the barrier physically severs customary cross-border life.
Since the Taliban took over in 2021, Pakistan has experienced a dramatic increase in attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which claims to seek an Islamic regime in Pakistan. Islamabad regularly accuses the Afghan Taliban of harbouring, supporting or giving sanctuary to TTP cadres. The Taliban government denies this. Still, a 2024 UN report indicated that the TTP “received substantial logistical and operational support” from Afghan territory. The ideological affinities between TTP and the Afghan Taliban complicate the picture: they share much of the same extremist worldview, even if their immediate aims diverge.
In recent months, Islamabad has sought to “take the fight” into Afghanistan to combat cross-border terrorism (as researcher Umair Jamal puts it, writing for The Diplomat), thereby redefining red lines. From Pakistan’s reframed perspective, then, any attack that is believed to originate from Afghan soil — even by non-state actors — may now invite punitive response on Afghan territory.
In any case, this Afghanistan-Pakistan flare is not happening in a vacuum. Pakistan is already a target, overtly or covertly, of tensions with both Iran and India, making it vulnerable on multiple fronts.
For example, back in January 2024, I commented on rising Iranian-Pakistan friction, noting that Iran’s growing regional influence, border disputes (especially in Balochistan), and anxieties about Pakistan’s posture in West Asia had the potential to strain the fabric of Eurasian cooperation.
This matters because Iran and Pakistan share membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and both are tied to the Ashgabat Agreement, intended to knit Persian Gulf to Central Asia corridors. Any interstate friction among them threatens connectivity goals in Eurasia.
Meanwhile, the India-Pakistan rivalry is hardly dormant. In May 2025 I already covered the possibility of an emergent Afghanistan-India alignment (against Pakistan): historically the Taliban was a Pakistani ally, but recent reports suggest increasing Indian outreach to Kabul, unsettling Islamabad. This adds some perspective to what is happening now. India sees Taliban engagement as a counterweight to Pakistan, and Islamabad fears being encircled diplomatically.
To complicate matters further, Pakistan already wrestles with internal insurgencies. In June I wrote that Pakistan’s multi-front crisis in conflict with Baloch separatists, exacerbated by ISKP tensions, risks morphing into a broader Eurasian conflagration.
Elsewhere, I’ve emphasized how such Indo-Pak rivalry has global ramifications, far beyond Kashmir — intersecting with Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. And only recently, I argued that water disputes between India and Pakistan — especially around hydropolitics and floods — are being securitized and may spiral unpredictably.
Thus, taken together, Pakistan is squeezed. It must juggle pressures from Afghanistan, India’s manoeuvres, and Iran’s ongoing border tensions. No wonder Islamabad might adopt a more aggressive posture: as a matter of fact, it may see no safe option other than to project power outward to preempt further threats. The problem is that it backfires and escalates.
Right now, one can immediately think of two scenarios: either a controlled standoff with occasional flare-ups or escalation into limited war. A third scenario would be a proxy conflagration with external actors and unpredictable outcomes.
In any case, a new conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan would not stay confined. It could ripple outward, challenging regional Eurasian stability, fracturing multilateral institutions, and dragging in actors well beyond the frontier. Albeit still underreported, the crisis could prove a pivot in Eurasian geopolitics. It is thus time for mechanisms such as SCO and even BRICS to creatively mediate. Moscow can also play a key role, by mediating and encouraging dialogue, using the “Moscow Format” and also acting as a “neutral convener”.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.
7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management
#AfghanTaliban #Afghanistan #BRICS #China #Eurasia #Geopolitics #India #Iran #Kashmir #Pakistan #SCO #Taliban #TehreekITalibanPakistan #TTP #USA
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India & Russia 10 Hidden Secrets of an Unbreakable Friendship Cold War to BRICS 2025!
#india #russia #strategicpartnership #geopolitics #defensetrade #brics #sco #coldwar #indianhistory #russiaindiafriendship #narendramodi #indiragandhi #vladimirputin
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India & Russia 10 Hidden Secrets of an Unbreakable Friendship Cold War to BRICS 2025!
#india #russia #strategicpartnership #geopolitics #defensetrade #brics #sco #coldwar #indianhistory #russiaindiafriendship #narendramodi #indiragandhi #vladimirputin
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Walking to studio in London to discuss the future of English football with Steve Parish #CPFC. And we’ll play an interview I’ve done with the new chair of the Independent Football Regulator David Kogan. Plus loads of #ENG, #SCO @[email protected] Sunday Edition 10-12 UK.
