home.social

#telemessage — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #telemessage, aggregated by home.social.

  1. @[email protected] Das heißt doch, wenn #Macron (nach #Informationsfreiheitsanfrage) veröffentlicht (weil jede #Löschung bei #Signal sich nur auf die eigene #Kopie der #Nachricht auswirkt, nicht auf die Kopie des Gesprächspartners), dass von der Leyen zugesagt hat, die #Chatkontrolle zu verbieten, #Tiktok zu verbieten, nur noch das #Fediverse zu verwenden für Veröffentlichungen der EU in sozialen Medien, #Photovoltaik in der Normandie mit 5 Fantastillionen Euro zu fördern, Verbrennerautos ab #November in der #EU zu verbieten, die #VisionZero in der EU bis #Dezember umzusetzen, innereuropäische Flüge ab #Januar zu verbieten, dann kann von der Leyen nie beweisen, dass das nicht stimmt. Hätte sie doch #Telemessage als #SignalApp verwendet...

    @netzpolitik_feed @Volksverpetzer @fragdenstaat @derpostillon @mimikama @Freiheitsrechte @umwelthilfe.bsky.social @jon @tazgetroete @ndaktuell @ZEITONLINE @heiseonline

  2. 🎉 Behold, the latest gift to the #open-source world: a tool that helps you make sense of the #TeleMessage data leak, because who wouldn't want to dive into the dumpster fire 🔥 that is yet another insecure messaging app? 🤡 Just don't forget to bring your own data—after all, that's half the fun! 🎁
    micahflee.com/telemessage-expl #data-leak #insecure-messaging #app-security #data-analysis #HackerNews #ngated

  3. A week after that #hack, the #CISA recommended that users "discontinue use of the product" barring any mitigating instructions about how to use the app from #Smarsh.

    Jake Williams, a fmr #NationalSecurity Agency #cyber specialist, said that, even if the intercepted text messages were innocuous, the wealth of #metadata - the who & when of the #leaked conversations & chat groups - posed a #counterintelligence risk.

    #Trump #Signalgate #Signal #Telemessage #InfoSec #idiocracy

  4. "It is not true that an #archivingsolution properly preserves the security offered by an end-to-end encrypted messaging app like #Signal. Ordinarily, only someone sending a Signal message and their intended recipient will be able to read the contents of the message. #TeleMessage essentially adds a #3rdparty to that conversation by sending copies of those messages somewhere else for storage. If not stored securely, those copies could in turn be susceptible to monitoring…"

    404media.co/the-signal-clone-t

  5. "On Thursday Reuters published a photograph of Waltz checking his mobile phone during a cabinet meeting held by Donald Trump. The screen appears to show messages from various top level government officials, including JD Vance, Tulsi Gabbard, and Marco Rubio.

    At the bottom of Waltz’s phone’s screen is a message that looks like Signal’s regular PIN verification message. This sometimes appears to encourage users to remember their PIN, which can stop people from taking over their account.

    But the message is slightly different: it asks Waltz to verify his “TM SGNL PIN.” This is not the message that is displayed on an official version of Signal.

    Instead TM SGNL appears to refer to a piece of software from a company called TeleMessage which makes clones of popular messaging apps but adds an archiving capability to each of them. A page on TeleMessage’s website tells users how to install “TM SGNL.” On that page, it describes how the tool can “capture” Signal messages on iOS, Android, and desktop."

    404media.co/mike-waltz-acciden

    #USA #Trump #Signal #Messaging #Privacy #DigitalArchiving #TeleMessage