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#truecrypt — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #truecrypt, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. VeraCrypt to stop developing Windows application due to Microsoft revoking their driver signing certificate:

    sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/di

    Sorry to hear about this turn of events, but it was pretty much to be expected given the way the world is turning, and Microsoft being Microsoft.

    Switch to Linux if you can, and come give Shufflecake a try ;)

    #veracrypt #truecrypt #privacy #cryptography #plausibledeniability #shufflecake #microsof #windows #enshittification #surveillance #cypherpunk

  2. VeraCrypt to stop developing Windows application due to Microsoft revoking their driver signing certificate:

    sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/di

    Sorry to hear about this turn of events, but it was pretty much to be expected given the way the world is turning, and Microsoft being Microsoft.

    Switch to Linux if you can, and come give Shufflecake a try ;)

    #veracrypt #truecrypt #privacy #cryptography #plausibledeniability #shufflecake #microsof #windows #enshittification #surveillance #cypherpunk

  3. VeraCrypt to stop developing Windows application due to Microsoft revoking their driver signing certificate:

    sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/di

    We are sorry to hear this turn of events and we wish VeraCrypt team all the best. For us, Windows was never an option.

  4. VeraCrypt to stop developing Windows application due to Microsoft revoking their driver signing certificate:

    sourceforge.net/p/veracrypt/di

    We are sorry to hear this turn of events and we wish VeraCrypt team all the best. For us, Windows was never an option.

    #veracrypt #truecrypt #privacy #cryptography #plausibledeniability #shufflecake #microsof #windows #enshittification #surveillance #cypherpunk

  5. Hi @bsi gibt es einen Grund, wieso VeraCrypt nicht für VS-NfD und Geheim zugelassen ist obwohl ihr selbst sogar die Sicherheitsanalyse dafür gemacht habt?

    Fehlt es einfach nur in dieser Liste von euch bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Oeffentl
    oder steckt da mehr dahinter?

    Sicherheitsanalyse: bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Pu

    #VeraCrypt #TrueCrypt #Encryption #Security

  6. Hi @bsi gibt es einen Grund, wieso VeraCrypt nicht für VS-NfD und Geheim zugelassen ist obwohl ihr selbst sogar die Sicherheitsanalyse dafür gemacht habt?

    Fehlt es einfach nur in dieser Liste von euch bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Oeffentl
    oder steckt da mehr dahinter?

    Sicherheitsanalyse: bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Pu

    #VeraCrypt #TrueCrypt #Encryption #Security

  7. We are going to present Shufflecake and give some news and updates at a small upcoming event in Ticino, Switzerland, organized by the local CCC South Alps club: hny.indyfac.ch/schedule#shuffl

    Come to say hi!

  8. We are going to present Shufflecake and give some news and updates at a small upcoming event in Ticino, Switzerland, organized by the local CCC South Alps club: hny.indyfac.ch/schedule#shuffl

    Come to say hi!

    #shufflecake #ccc #switzerland #security #privacy #hacking #veracrypt #truecrypt

  9. Microsoft gave FBI a set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects’ laptops

    techcrunch.com/2026/01/23/micr

    Because, of course, by default, BitLocker recovery keys are uploaded to Microsoft’s cloud, and it looks like you need to pay for the privilege of having the Pro edition if you want to have the option of opting out.

    Reject this BS. Use proper disk encryption! Or, even better, if you care about plausible deniability, use Shufflecake! shufflecake.net/

    #shufflecake #truecrypt #veracrypt #microsoft #bitlocker #luks #security #privacy #fbi #surveillance

  10. Microsoft gave FBI a set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects’ laptops

    techcrunch.com/2026/01/23/micr

    Because, of course, by default, BitLocker recovery keys are uploaded to Microsoft’s cloud, and it looks like you need to pay for the privilege of having the Pro edition if you want to have the option of opting out.

    Reject this BS. Use proper disk encryption! Or, even better, if you care about plausible deniability, use Shufflecake! shufflecake.net/

    #shufflecake #truecrypt #veracrypt #microsoft #bitlocker #luks #security #privacy #fbi #surveillance

  11. We stumbled onto an interesting HackerNews submission about Graphene OS, the secure AOSP mobile OS. The topic is about the request for a GOS duress password feature that, instead of wiping the device (as it does now), unlocks a "decoy" user profile. A comment by a user claiming to be an official GOS community mod caught our attention. We would like to respond to the arguments of that user. [continue...]

  12. We stumbled onto an interesting HackerNews submission about Graphene OS, the secure AOSP mobile OS. The topic is about the request for a GOS duress password feature that, instead of wiping the device (as it does now), unlocks a "decoy" user profile. A comment by a user claiming to be an official GOS community mod caught our attention. We would like to respond to the arguments of that user. [continue...]

    #GrapheneOS #shufflecake #veracrypt #truecrypt #android #aosp #security #privacy #forensics

  13. Your encrypted files are evidence against you under coercion.
    Hidden volumes make it impossible to prove additional protected data even exists.
    youtu.be/AYju-LBGtBk

    #veracrypt #truecrypt #privacy #infosec

  14. I gave a talk on #shufflecake at the #oscw (open source cryptography workshop) in #sofia #bulgaria. Many thanks to Cindy Lin, Ioana Nedelcu, Elizaveta Tretiakova (#google) and Anna Weine (#mozilla) for organizing. #privacy #truecrypt #veracrypt #horizenlabs #zkverify

  15. @cesco_78 per la passwd dovrebbero farne due: una "sacrificabile" che "apparentemente" sblocca il telefono ma avvisa le forze dell'ordine, l'altra "quella vera". Un po' come faceva #illotempore #TrueCrypt con la Plausible deniability

  16. @cesco_78 per la passwd dovrebbero farne due: una "sacrificabile" che "apparentemente" sblocca il telefono ma avvisa le forze dell'ordine, l'altra "quella vera". Un po' come faceva #illotempore #TrueCrypt con la Plausible deniability

  17. War damals bei #truecrypt rausgekommen warum die nicht mehr weitermachen wollten?

  18. Вскрытие криптоконтейнера через дамп оперативной памяти

    Как говорится, Добрый день! Сегодня хотелось бы обсудить с вами тему криптоконтейнеров и их вскрытия. С каждым годом всё более острым становится вопрос безопасности данных, а также вопрос их надежного хранения. Именно в данном случае нам на помощь приходит технология хранения данных в криптоконтейнерах.

    habr.com/ru/articles/832028/

    #криптоконтейнер #шифрование #взлом #truecrypt

  19. @Ange cool idea, but that goes more in the direction of #steganography which is a different topic, that's why I didn't mention it. But, yes, that can be done! Actually, since #shufflecake (like #truecrypt and #veracrypt ) does not have cleartext headers, the same technique could be used seaminglessly!

  20. @Ange cool idea, but that goes more in the direction of #steganography which is a different topic, that's why I didn't mention it. But, yes, that can be done! Actually, since #shufflecake (like #truecrypt and #veracrypt ) does not have cleartext headers, the same technique could be used seaminglessly!

  21. From this week's Linux Update: Matthias Wübbeling shows you how to protect your data and operating system from prying eyes with @veracrypt linux-magazine.com/Issues/2024

  22. I'm doing some research for my WiP by retaking the Coursera Cryptography course. I think it hasn't been updated in the 10 or so years since I last did it.

    The lecturer actually references TrueCrypt as an example of disk encryption. TrueCrypt was abandoned in 2014 for reasons unknown. It's considered unsafe.

    #Cryptography #Coursera #TrueCrypt

  23. I'm doing some research for my WiP by retaking the Coursera Cryptography course. I think it hasn't been updated in the 10 or so years since I last did it.

    The lecturer actually references TrueCrypt as an example of disk encryption. TrueCrypt was abandoned in 2014 for reasons unknown. It's considered unsafe.

    #Cryptography #Coursera #TrueCrypt

  24. What is a #safeword in the context of plausible deniability? It's the idea that a user might want to have the "last resort" possibility to surrender to an adversary and prove that she has nothing to hide. The concept would be: If I'm caught by my CS teacher doing non-school activities on my laptop, I can use plausible deniability and be un-prosecutable in front of the principal, but if the police comes knocking at my door, I don't want to get in trouble and I want to comply - and PROVE that I am complying.

    With #TrueCrypt this is easy: just give up the decoy password to the principal and the real password to the police. In #Shufflecake and similar systems that's not so easy, because there are many layers of nested secrecy. So "the adversary does not know when he can stop torturing you" because he cannot trust you whatever you say.

    Is this good or bad?

    In the paper we make the following points.

    1) It is actually possible to implement a safeword even on systems such as Shufflecake. It's an easy trick really.

    2) The idea of a safeword is SUPER BAD for plausible deniability. Not only you should NOT USE a safeword, but the mere POSSIBILITY of having a safeword degrades the operational security of the scheme.

    3) This problem does not seem to have been addressed before on existing constructions, as all of them (even WoORAM-based ones) have the implicit possibility of creating a safeword.

    4) We propose an idea to make Shufflecake "safeword-free"! This is future work but it's definitely going to be implemented at some point. The idea is that we can make ANY kind of safeword-like feature impossible by implementing a nice hack to have potentially INFINITE nested volumes (rather than limited by an artificial hard-limit, which is 15 in the current implementation).

    Cool stuff IMHO.

  25. What is a #safeword in the context of plausible deniability? It's the idea that a user might want to have the "last resort" possibility to surrender to an adversary and prove that she has nothing to hide. The concept would be: If I'm caught by my CS teacher doing non-school activities on my laptop, I can use plausible deniability and be un-prosecutable in front of the principal, but if the police comes knocking at my door, I don't want to get in trouble and I want to comply - and PROVE that I am complying.

    With #TrueCrypt this is easy: just give up the decoy password to the principal and the real password to the police. In #Shufflecake and similar systems that's not so easy, because there are many layers of nested secrecy. So "the adversary does not know when he can stop torturing you" because he cannot trust you whatever you say.

    Is this good or bad?

    In the paper we make the following points.

    1) It is actually possible to implement a safeword even on systems such as Shufflecake. It's an easy trick really.

    2) The idea of a safeword is SUPER BAD for plausible deniability. Not only you should NOT USE a safeword, but the mere POSSIBILITY of having a safeword degrades the operational security of the scheme.

    3) This problem does not seem to have been addressed before on existing constructions, as all of them (even WoORAM-based ones) have the implicit possibility of creating a safeword.

    4) We propose an idea to make Shufflecake "safeword-free"! This is future work but it's definitely going to be implemented at some point. The idea is that we can make ANY kind of safeword-like feature impossible by implementing a nice hack to have potentially INFINITE nested volumes (rather than limited by an artificial hard-limit, which is 15 in the current implementation).

    Cool stuff IMHO.

  26. Ups, #boxcryptor is now part of #dropbox !? Wanted to test some scenarios, but creating an new account is no longer possible.

    Alternatives: #cryptomator what else? Should have an App / Software for android, ios, linux, windows.

    #encrypt #encryption #safety #privacy #endtoendencryption #filetransfer #security #isec #eds #encrypteddatastore #veracrypt #truecrypt #cybersafe #luks #encfs

  27. @Tokyo Outsider (337ppm) #VeraCrypt is a hard fork of and apparently a drop-in replacement for #TrueCrypt, created as a reaction upon the #NSA meddling. Would that be an option?

    This, by the way, is why I'm glad to be a Linux user. I can use #LUKS to encrypt entire systems except for the boot partition. Imagine being able to encrypt all partitions including all of C: on Windows upon system installation already with a free, open-source, third-party tool.