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#nickel — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #nickel, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  2. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  3. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  4. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #unitedstates #tariffs #sulawesi #regionalindonesia #prabowosubianto #prabowogibran
  5. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  6. Metalli Rari @[email protected] ·

    L’inox europeo si rialza mentre il nichel resta ostaggio della geopolitica
    metallirari.com/inox-europeo-r
    Dalla Cina all’Indonesia, il mercato del nichel entra in una nuova fase tra scarsità e protezionismo verde.
    #Nickel #AcciaioInox #CBAM #LME #Indonesia #Cina #Sulphur #Batterie #Metalli #Commodity #Acciaio #TransizioneEnergetica #Geopolitica #MateriePrime #Inox #Mercati

    #nickel #acciaioinox #cbam #lme #indonesia #cina
  7. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  8. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  9. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  10. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #war #unitedstates #tariff #sulawesi #regionalindonesia #politics
  11. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  12. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    Scientists achieve massive breakthrough on an alternative to #LithiumIon batteries — why this 'significant advancement' matters

    by Laurelle Stelle, January 13, 2026

    "Researchers have recently discovered a way to make an efficient battery out of #zinc — an inexpensive, commonly found metal — instead of the #RareMetals used in lithium batteries.

    "Most rechargeable batteries today are lithium-ion batteries, which include other metals like cobalt and nickel, Tech Xplore reports. As electric vehicles (#EVs) and large-scale energy storage get more common, we'll need more and more of those metals — but because they're uncommon, the costs are often massive.

    "Many researchers are working on cheaper battery options to reduce or replace these metals. One Chinese company has created a car powered by a #SodiumBattery, and a University of Maryland researcher has invented a partly #BiodegradableBattery made of zinc and #CrabShells. Researchers have even found not one but two ways to store energy in ordinary #sand.

    "According to Tech Xplore, this new project, led by Xiulei 'David' Ji of Oregon State University, offers yet another alternative to lithium-ion batteries: accessible, efficient zinc metal batteries.

    "The secret is a new electrolyte developed by Ji and his team, Tech Xplore explains. A battery electrolyte is a liquid inside the battery that helps aid the chemical reactions to store and release energy.

    "Unfortunately, past electrolytes in #ZincBatteries were not very efficient. Much of the energy stored in the battery was previously used up in extra, unwanted chemical reactions. Not only did that mean the battery couldn't release as much energy as it had put into it, but it also generated dangerous hydrogen gas. This meant that zinc wasn't practical for #RechargeableBatteries.

    "Ji's team has created a new electrolyte formula that almost eliminates these unwanted reactions, Tech Xplore reports. It forms a protective coating on the zinc component of the battery that prevents that type of energy loss. A similar protective coating is what allows lithium-ion batteries to release more than 99% of the charging energy. The new zinc battery releases 99.95% of the energy it is charged with on each cycle.

    "Not only is the zinc battery efficient, but it's also safer than a lithium-ion battery, according to Tech Xplore. The new electrolyte isn't flammable, while the ones used in lithium-ion batteries often are combustible. Both zinc and the components of the electrolyte are also cheaper and more common than the materials used in lithium-ion batteries.

    " 'The breakthrough represents a significant advancement toward making zinc metal batteries more accessible to consumers,' Ji told OSU News and Research Communications. "These batteries are essential for the installation of additional solar and wind farms. In addition, they offer a secure and efficient solution for home energy storage, as well as energy storage modules for communities that are vulnerable to natural disasters.

    "Thanks to the work of Ji and his team, Tech Xplore suggests rechargeable zinc batteries are likely to hit the market in the near future."

    Source:
    tech.yahoo.com/science/article

    #SolarPunkSunday #LithiumBatteryAlternatives #ZincBatteries #BiodegradableBatteries #CrabShells #Cobalt #Nickel #Lithium #Technology #TechnologyBreakthrough

    #lithiumion #zinc #raremetals #evs #sodiumbattery #biodegradablebattery
  13. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    Scientists achieve massive breakthrough on an alternative to #LithiumIon batteries — why this 'significant advancement' matters

    by Laurelle Stelle, January 13, 2026

    "Researchers have recently discovered a way to make an efficient battery out of #zinc — an inexpensive, commonly found metal — instead of the #RareMetals used in lithium batteries.

    "Most rechargeable batteries today are lithium-ion batteries, which include other metals like cobalt and nickel, Tech Xplore reports. As electric vehicles (#EVs) and large-scale energy storage get more common, we'll need more and more of those metals — but because they're uncommon, the costs are often massive.

    "Many researchers are working on cheaper battery options to reduce or replace these metals. One Chinese company has created a car powered by a #SodiumBattery, and a University of Maryland researcher has invented a partly #BiodegradableBattery made of zinc and #CrabShells. Researchers have even found not one but two ways to store energy in ordinary #sand.

    "According to Tech Xplore, this new project, led by Xiulei 'David' Ji of Oregon State University, offers yet another alternative to lithium-ion batteries: accessible, efficient zinc metal batteries.

    "The secret is a new electrolyte developed by Ji and his team, Tech Xplore explains. A battery electrolyte is a liquid inside the battery that helps aid the chemical reactions to store and release energy.

    "Unfortunately, past electrolytes in #ZincBatteries were not very efficient. Much of the energy stored in the battery was previously used up in extra, unwanted chemical reactions. Not only did that mean the battery couldn't release as much energy as it had put into it, but it also generated dangerous hydrogen gas. This meant that zinc wasn't practical for #RechargeableBatteries.

    "Ji's team has created a new electrolyte formula that almost eliminates these unwanted reactions, Tech Xplore reports. It forms a protective coating on the zinc component of the battery that prevents that type of energy loss. A similar protective coating is what allows lithium-ion batteries to release more than 99% of the charging energy. The new zinc battery releases 99.95% of the energy it is charged with on each cycle.

    "Not only is the zinc battery efficient, but it's also safer than a lithium-ion battery, according to Tech Xplore. The new electrolyte isn't flammable, while the ones used in lithium-ion batteries often are combustible. Both zinc and the components of the electrolyte are also cheaper and more common than the materials used in lithium-ion batteries.

    " 'The breakthrough represents a significant advancement toward making zinc metal batteries more accessible to consumers,' Ji told OSU News and Research Communications. "These batteries are essential for the installation of additional solar and wind farms. In addition, they offer a secure and efficient solution for home energy storage, as well as energy storage modules for communities that are vulnerable to natural disasters.

    "Thanks to the work of Ji and his team, Tech Xplore suggests rechargeable zinc batteries are likely to hit the market in the near future."

    Source:
    tech.yahoo.com/science/article

    #SolarPunkSunday #LithiumBatteryAlternatives #ZincBatteries #BiodegradableBatteries #CrabShells #Cobalt #Nickel #Lithium #Technology #TechnologyBreakthrough

    #lithiumion #zinc #raremetals #evs #sodiumbattery #biodegradablebattery
  14. GLOBAL Visibility aéPiot - by aePiot.ro @[email protected] ·

    #NICKI #ALBEK multi-search-tag-explorer.allgraph.ro/advanced-sea... #NICKEL #CITY #OPERA www.perplexity.ai/search/new?q... Semantic CLUSTERS: The Bridge between Humans and Artificial Intelligence. NOSTR.com - Jumble: jumble.social/users/npub1j...

    MultiSearch Tag Explorer

    #nicki #albek #nickel #city #opera
  15. Metalli Rari @[email protected] ·

    Hormuz entra in fabbrica: come la geopolitica alza i costi del nichel
    metallirari.com/hormuz-entra-f
    Il rimbalzo del nichel (+27% nel 2026) porta sollievo ai grandi produttori, ma la crisi di approvvigionamento dello zolfo mette sotto pressione gli impianti indonesiani.
    #nichel #nichel2026 #nickel #HPAL #MHP #Vale #NickelIndustries #Indonesia #zolfo #sulfur #HormuzStrait #batterie #criticalmetals #metallirari #commodities #LME #transizionenergetica #miningIndonesia #ENC #prezzoNichel

    #nichel #nichel2026 #nickel #hpal #mhp #vale
  16. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    Answer: "No."

    Most #CriticalMinerals are on #IndigenousLands. Will miners respect #TribalSovereignty?

    by Taylar Dawn Stagner, March 26, 2025

    "#Mining — whether for #FossilFuels or, increasingly, the critical minerals in high demand today — has a long history of perpetuating violence against #IndigenousPeople. Forcibly removing tribal communities to get to natural resources tied to their homelands has been the rule, not the exception, for centuries.

    "Today, more than half of the mineral deposits needed for a global energy transition — including #lithium, #cobalt, #copper, and #nickel to make things like #batteries and #SolarPanels — are found near or beneath Indigenous lands.

    "In 2007, the United Nations adopted a resolution called the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [#UNDRIP] that included the right to free, prior, and informed consent to the use of their lands, a concept known as #FPIC. This principle protects #IndigenousPeoples from being forcibly relocated, provides suitable avenues for redress of past injustices, and gives tribes and communities the right to consent to — and the right to refuse — #extractive industry projects like #mining.

    "There’s a lot at stake: When followed, FPIC promises a process that gives Indigenous peoples a voice in how their homelands are used, as well as the right to say no to development altogether. And when it’s not, which is the vast majority of the time, #TribalCommunities are further #disenfranchised, facing #violence and #ForcedRelocation as their #sovereignty and rights are ignored.

    "There are an estimated 5,000 tribal communities around the world, encompassing roughly 476 million people across 90 countries, according to the U.N. Different tribes have different opinions on mining, but rarely is their legal right to refuse extraction projects recognized, even under the 2007 declaration.

    "Grist talked with five experts to better understand what free, prior, and informed consent should look like in this new era of mineral extraction. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity."

    Read more:
    ictnews.org/news/most-critical

    #CanPol #CanadaPol #BigOilAndGas #LandBack #IndigenousSovereignty #TribalSovereignty #LithiumMining #RecycleLithium #LithiumAlternatives #RecycleCopper

    #criticalminerals #indigenouslands #tribalsovereignty #mining #fossilfuels #indigenouspeople
  17. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    Answer: "No."

    Most #CriticalMinerals are on #IndigenousLands. Will miners respect #TribalSovereignty?

    by Taylar Dawn Stagner, March 26, 2025

    "#Mining — whether for #FossilFuels or, increasingly, the critical minerals in high demand today — has a long history of perpetuating violence against #IndigenousPeople. Forcibly removing tribal communities to get to natural resources tied to their homelands has been the rule, not the exception, for centuries.

    "Today, more than half of the mineral deposits needed for a global energy transition — including #lithium, #cobalt, #copper, and #nickel to make things like #batteries and #SolarPanels — are found near or beneath Indigenous lands.

    "In 2007, the United Nations adopted a resolution called the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [#UNDRIP] that included the right to free, prior, and informed consent to the use of their lands, a concept known as #FPIC. This principle protects #IndigenousPeoples from being forcibly relocated, provides suitable avenues for redress of past injustices, and gives tribes and communities the right to consent to — and the right to refuse — #extractive industry projects like #mining.

    "There’s a lot at stake: When followed, FPIC promises a process that gives Indigenous peoples a voice in how their homelands are used, as well as the right to say no to development altogether. And when it’s not, which is the vast majority of the time, #TribalCommunities are further #disenfranchised, facing #violence and #ForcedRelocation as their #sovereignty and rights are ignored.

    "There are an estimated 5,000 tribal communities around the world, encompassing roughly 476 million people across 90 countries, according to the U.N. Different tribes have different opinions on mining, but rarely is their legal right to refuse extraction projects recognized, even under the 2007 declaration.

    "Grist talked with five experts to better understand what free, prior, and informed consent should look like in this new era of mineral extraction. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity."

    Read more:
    ictnews.org/news/most-critical

    #CanPol #CanadaPol #BigOilAndGas #LandBack #IndigenousSovereignty #TribalSovereignty #LithiumMining #RecycleLithium #LithiumAlternatives #RecycleCopper

    #criticalminerals #indigenouslands #tribalsovereignty #mining #fossilfuels #indigenouspeople
  18. Las Vegas Raiders @[email protected] ·

    Raiders are going to run into a huge roster issue everyone wishes to have now that the 2026 NFL Draft is over

    The Las Vegas Raiders are facing a roster issue every team wants, but that doesn’t make it any…
    #NFL #LasVegasRaiders #LasVegas #Raiders #53manroster #Cornerback #Football #nickel #slot
    rawchili.com/nfl/877337/

    #nfl #lasvegasraiders #lasvegas #raiders #53manroster #cornerback
  19. NFL News @[email protected] ·

    Raiders are going to run into a huge roster issue everyone wishes to have now that the 2026 NFL Draft is over rawchili.com/nfl/877337/ #53ManRoster #Cornerback #Football #LasVegas #LasVegasRaiders #LasVegas #LasVegasRaiders #NFL #nickel #Raiders #slot

    #53manroster #cornerback #football #lasvegas #lasvegasraiders #nfl
  20. Metalli Rari @[email protected] ·

    Il nichel corre ai massimi degli ultimi 2 anni sui timori per la produzione dell’Indonesia
    metallirari.com/breakingnews60/
    #Nichel #Nickel #Metalli #MetalliRari #MateriePrime #Commodities #LME #LondonMetalExchange #Indonesia #Miniere #Mining #Mercati #Industria #AcciaioInox #Batterie #TransizioneEnergetica #PrezziMetalli #EconomiaGlobale #SupplyChain #Geopolitica #Zolfo #MercatoMetalli #Investimenti #IndustriaMetallurgica #CommodityMarket #AnalisiMercati #TradingMetalli #CrisiMateriePrime #NewsEconomia

    #nichel #nickel #metalli #metallirari #materieprime #commodities
  21. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    #SodiumIonBatteries offer an alternative to tricky #lithium

    Oct 26th 2023

    Excerpt: "Fortunately, lithium is not the only game in town. As we report this week, a clutch of firms are making batteries based on sodium, lithium’s elemental cousin. Since sodium’s chemical properties are very similar to those of lithium, it too makes for good batteries. And sodium, which is found in the salt in #seawater, is thousands of times more abundant on Earth than lithium and cheaper to get at. Most of the companies using sodium to make batteries today are also Chinese. But pursuing the technology in the West might be a surer route to energy security than relying heavily on lithium.

    "Besides its abundance, sodium has other advantages. The best lithium batteries use #cobalt and #nickel in their electrodes. Nickel, like lithium, is in short supply. #Mining it on land is #EnvironmentallyDestructive. Proposals to grab it from the #seabed instead have caused rows. A good deal of the world’s cobalt, meanwhile, is extracted from small mines in the #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo, where #ChildLabour is common and working conditions are dire. Sodium batteries, by contrast, can use #electrodes built from #iron and #manganese [and wood #lignin], which are plentiful and uncontroversial. Since the chemical components are cheap, a scaled-up industry should be able to produce batteries that cost less than their lithium counterparts.

    "Sodium is not a perfect replacement for lithium. It is heavier, meaning sodium batteries will weigh more than lithium ones of an equivalent capacity. That is likely to rule them out in some cases where lightness is paramount. But for other applications, such as #GridStorage or #HomeBatteries, weight is irrelevant. Several Chinese carmakers are even beginning to put sodium batteries in #ElectricVehicles."

    Read more:
    economist.com/leaders/2023/10/

    Archived version:
    archive.ph/7x6JX

    #SolarPunkSunday #EnergyStorage #SodiumIon #NewTechnology #GiantLeap #Reuse #WasteReuse #NoLithiumMining #NoMining

    #sodiumionbatteries #lithium #seawater #cobalt #nickel #mining
  22. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    #SodiumIonBatteries offer an alternative to tricky #lithium

    Oct 26th 2023

    Excerpt: "Fortunately, lithium is not the only game in town. As we report this week, a clutch of firms are making batteries based on sodium, lithium’s elemental cousin. Since sodium’s chemical properties are very similar to those of lithium, it too makes for good batteries. And sodium, which is found in the salt in #seawater, is thousands of times more abundant on Earth than lithium and cheaper to get at. Most of the companies using sodium to make batteries today are also Chinese. But pursuing the technology in the West might be a surer route to energy security than relying heavily on lithium.

    "Besides its abundance, sodium has other advantages. The best lithium batteries use #cobalt and #nickel in their electrodes. Nickel, like lithium, is in short supply. #Mining it on land is #EnvironmentallyDestructive. Proposals to grab it from the #seabed instead have caused rows. A good deal of the world’s cobalt, meanwhile, is extracted from small mines in the #DemocraticRepublicOfCongo, where #ChildLabour is common and working conditions are dire. Sodium batteries, by contrast, can use #electrodes built from #iron and #manganese [and wood #lignin], which are plentiful and uncontroversial. Since the chemical components are cheap, a scaled-up industry should be able to produce batteries that cost less than their lithium counterparts.

    "Sodium is not a perfect replacement for lithium. It is heavier, meaning sodium batteries will weigh more than lithium ones of an equivalent capacity. That is likely to rule them out in some cases where lightness is paramount. But for other applications, such as #GridStorage or #HomeBatteries, weight is irrelevant. Several Chinese carmakers are even beginning to put sodium batteries in #ElectricVehicles."

    Read more:
    economist.com/leaders/2023/10/

    Archived version:
    archive.ph/7x6JX

    #SolarPunkSunday #EnergyStorage #SodiumIon #NewTechnology #GiantLeap #Reuse #WasteReuse #NoLithiumMining #NoMining

    #sodiumionbatteries #lithium #seawater #cobalt #nickel #mining
  23. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    New method converts old phones and paper industry #waste into #GreenBattery tech

    Scientists have created a sustainable, cost-effective, and highly efficient solution that promotes a #CircularEconomy while supporting the transition to greener #EnergyStorage.

    By
    Mrigakshi Dixit
    Feb 20, 2026 06:59 AM EST

    "A new sustainable method turns discarded #MobilePhoneBatteries and industrial lignin into a powerhouse material for #SodiumIon batteries.

    "It is a stunning example of circular economy innovation. Rather than letting these materials sit in #landfills or go up in smoke, the team from China is giving the waste a high-tech second life.

    "When tested as a sodium-ion battery anode, this composite of #nickel-#cobalt sulfides and #lignin-derived carbon delivered electrochemical results."

    Read more:
    interestingengineering.com/ene

    #SolarPunkSunday #CellPhoneBatteries #Reuse #SodiumIonBatteries #NewTechnology #GiantLeap #EWaste #EWasteRecycling #EWasteReuse

    #waste #greenbattery #circulareconomy #energystorage #mobilephonebatteries #sodiumion
  24. DoomsdaysCW @[email protected] ·

    New method converts old phones and paper industry #waste into #GreenBattery tech

    Scientists have created a sustainable, cost-effective, and highly efficient solution that promotes a #CircularEconomy while supporting the transition to greener #EnergyStorage.

    By
    Mrigakshi Dixit
    Feb 20, 2026 06:59 AM EST

    "A new sustainable method turns discarded #MobilePhoneBatteries and industrial lignin into a powerhouse material for #SodiumIon batteries.

    "It is a stunning example of circular economy innovation. Rather than letting these materials sit in #landfills or go up in smoke, the team from China is giving the waste a high-tech second life.

    "When tested as a sodium-ion battery anode, this composite of #nickel-#cobalt sulfides and #lignin-derived carbon delivered electrochemical results."

    Read more:
    interestingengineering.com/ene

    #SolarPunkSunday #CellPhoneBatteries #Reuse #SodiumIonBatteries #NewTechnology #GiantLeap #EWaste #EWasteRecycling #EWasteReuse

    #waste #greenbattery #circulareconomy #energystorage #mobilephonebatteries #sodiumion
  25. michael @[email protected] ·

    For some reason the posts in my slow thread don't bridge to bluesky, although the post at the top did. So I just have to toot today's #CurrentBiology feature again: proseandpassion.blogspot.com/2 #science #ecology #metals #recycling #phytomining #resources #nickel #gold #rareEarthElements

    #currentbiology #science #ecology #metals #recycling #phytomining
  26. michael @[email protected] ·

    For some reason the posts in my slow thread don't bridge to bluesky, although the post at the top did. So I just have to toot today's #CurrentBiology feature again: proseandpassion.blogspot.com/2 #science #ecology #metals #recycling #phytomining #resources #nickel #gold #rareEarthElements

    #currentbiology #science #ecology #metals #recycling #phytomining
  27. Karl Voit :emacs: :orgmode: @[email protected] ·

    This is an awesome website in case you want to learn anything about #batteries and how to handle them properly: batteryuniversity.com/articles

    #battery #LiIon #Lead #Nickel #storage #safety #charging #discharging

    #batteries #battery #liion #lead #nickel #storage
  28. Karl Voit :emacs: :orgmode: @[email protected] ·

    This is an awesome website in case you want to learn anything about #batteries and how to handle them properly: batteryuniversity.com/articles

    #battery #LiIon #Lead #Nickel #storage #safety #charging #discharging

    #batteries #battery #liion #lead #nickel #storage
  29. Bagolina @[email protected] ·

    En #Indonésie, la plus grande mine de #nickel au monde, Weda Bay Nickel exploitée par le géant chinois de l’acier #Tsingshan et le groupe minier français #Eramet déloge une tribu
    lnc.nc/article/pacifique/mines
    Dans la jungle de l’île de Halmahera, à 2 400 km à l’est de #Jakarta vit la tribu des Hongana Manyawa ("peuple de la forêt") dont 500 membres mènent une vie nomade Bokum montre à une équipe de l’AFP comment la vaste concession minière de Weda Bay Nickel défigure ses terres tribales.

    #indonesie #nickel #tsingshan #eramet #jakarta
  30. Bagolina @[email protected] ·

    En #Indonésie, la plus grande mine de #nickel au monde, Weda Bay Nickel exploitée par le géant chinois de l’acier #Tsingshan et le groupe minier français #Eramet déloge une tribu
    lnc.nc/article/pacifique/mines
    Dans la jungle de l’île de Halmahera, à 2 400 km à l’est de #Jakarta vit la tribu des Hongana Manyawa ("peuple de la forêt") dont 500 membres mènent une vie nomade Bokum montre à une équipe de l’AFP comment la vaste concession minière de Weda Bay Nickel défigure ses terres tribales.

    #indonesie #nickel #tsingshan #eramet #jakarta
  31. Bagolina @[email protected] ·

    En #Indonésie, la plus grande mine de #nickel au monde, Weda Bay Nickel exploitée par le géant chinois de l’acier #Tsingshan et le groupe minier français #Eramet déloge une tribu
    lnc.nc/article/pacifique/mines
    Dans la jungle de l’île de Halmahera, à 2 400 km à l’est de #Jakarta vit la tribu des Hongana Manyawa ("peuple de la forêt") dont 500 membres mènent une vie nomade Bokum montre à une équipe de l’AFP comment la vaste concession minière de Weda Bay Nickel défigure ses terres tribales.

    #indonesie #nickel #tsingshan #eramet #jakarta
  32. Bagolina @[email protected] ·

    En #Indonésie, la plus grande mine de #nickel au monde, Weda Bay Nickel exploitée par le géant chinois de l’acier #Tsingshan et le groupe minier français #Eramet déloge une tribu
    lnc.nc/article/pacifique/mines
    Dans la jungle de l’île de Halmahera, à 2 400 km à l’est de #Jakarta vit la tribu des Hongana Manyawa ("peuple de la forêt") dont 500 membres mènent une vie nomade Bokum montre à une équipe de l’AFP comment la vaste concession minière de Weda Bay Nickel défigure ses terres tribales.

    #jakarta #eramet #tsingshan #nickel #indonesie
  33. Berggeist @[email protected] ·

    @binbash
    Von vernickelten #Ketten (die rosten nicht) rate ich ab, da #Nickel ein hohes #Allergiepotential hat und zu juckenden Hautrötungen führen kann.
    Bei Connex gibt es Ketten mit #Messing- und Black Coating-Beschichtung, aber diese sind dann nicht mehr silbrig glänzend.
    Connex vertreibt übrigends selbst Armbänder, leider aus vernickelten Ketten...

    #ketten #nickel #allergiepotential #messing
  34. Berggeist @[email protected] ·

    @binbash
    Von vernickelten #Ketten (die rosten nicht) rate ich ab, da #Nickel ein hohes #Allergiepotential hat und zu juckenden Hautrötungen führen kann.
    Bei Connex gibt es Ketten mit #Messing- und Black Coating-Beschichtung, aber diese sind dann nicht mehr silbrig glänzend.
    Connex vertreibt übrigends selbst Armbänder, leider aus vernickelten Ketten...

    #ketten #nickel #allergiepotential #messing
  35. Berggeist @[email protected] ·

    @binbash
    Von vernickelten #Ketten (die rosten nicht) rate ich ab, da #Nickel ein hohes #Allergiepotential hat und zu juckenden Hautrötungen führen kann.
    Bei Connex gibt es Ketten mit #Messing- und Black Coating-Beschichtung, aber diese sind dann nicht mehr silbrig glänzend.
    Connex vertreibt übrigends selbst Armbänder, leider aus vernickelten Ketten...

    #ketten #nickel #allergiepotential #messing
  36. Peter Riley @[email protected] ·

    projectmultatuli.org/en/betwee

    projectmultatuli.org/en/beijin

    #capitalism #indonesia #Morowali #Nickel #Sulawesi #Labormovement #organize #solidarity #unions

    #capitalism #indonesia #morowali #nickel #sulawesi #labormovement
  37. Peter Riley @[email protected] ·

    @GreenSyndicalistLeft
    @GreenSyndicalist

    projectmultatuli.org/en/betwee

    projectmultatuli.org/en/beijin

    #Capitalism #Indonesia #Morowali #Nickel #Sulawesi #LaborMovement #Organize #OHS #Solidarity #unions

    #capitalism #indonesia #morowali #nickel #sulawesi #labormovement
  38. Peter Riley @[email protected] ·

    21 Nickel workers killed and 2 injured
    industriall-union.org/another-

    April 28 Worker’s Memorial Day
    industriall-union.org/indonesi

    ohsrep.org.au/international_ne

    #Capitalism #Indonesia #Morowali #Nickel #Sulawesi #labormovement #organize #OHS #solidarity #unions National Industrial Workers Union Federation (SPN)

    #capitalism #indonesia #morowali #nickel #sulawesi #labormovement
  39. Peter Riley @[email protected] ·

    chinalaborwatch.org/chinese-ni

    #Capitalism #Indonesia #Morowali #Nickel #Sulawesi
    #labormovement #organize #solidarity
    #Unions
    Morowali Mining and Energy Industry Workers Union (SBIPE)

    #capitalism #indonesia #morowali #nickel #sulawesi #labormovement
  40. Tino Eberl @[email protected] ·

    Ein neues Verfahren aus #China könnte das #Recycling von #Lithium-Ionen-Akkus revolutionieren.

    n-tv.de/wissen/Neues-Zitronens

    Mit #Zitronensäure als einziger #Chemikalie werden fast 100% der Metalle wie #Lithium, #Nickel und #Kobalt zurückgewonnen – effizient, umweltfreundlich und mit deutlich weniger #Energieverbrauch.

    Dieses Verfahren senkt #CO2Emissionen und macht #Akkus nachhaltiger.

    #Recycling #LithiumIonenAkkus #Nachhaltigkeit #Energiewende #Innovation #Elektromobilität

    #china #recycling #lithium #zitronensaure #chemikalie #nickel
  41. Tino Eberl @[email protected] ·

    Ein neues Verfahren aus #China könnte das #Recycling von #Lithium-Ionen-Akkus revolutionieren.

    n-tv.de/wissen/Neues-Zitronens

    Mit #Zitronensäure als einziger #Chemikalie werden fast 100% der Metalle wie #Lithium, #Nickel und #Kobalt zurückgewonnen – effizient, umweltfreundlich und mit deutlich weniger #Energieverbrauch.

    Dieses Verfahren senkt #CO2Emissionen und macht #Akkus nachhaltiger.

    #Recycling #LithiumIonenAkkus #Nachhaltigkeit #Energiewende #Innovation #Elektromobilität

    #china #recycling #lithium #zitronensaure #chemikalie #nickel
  42. Tino Eberl @[email protected] ·

    Ein neues Verfahren aus #China könnte das #Recycling von #Lithium-Ionen-Akkus revolutionieren.

    n-tv.de/wissen/Neues-Zitronens

    Mit #Zitronensäure als einziger #Chemikalie werden fast 100% der Metalle wie #Lithium, #Nickel und #Kobalt zurückgewonnen – effizient, umweltfreundlich und mit deutlich weniger #Energieverbrauch.

    Dieses Verfahren senkt #CO2Emissionen und macht #Akkus nachhaltiger.

    #Recycling #LithiumIonenAkkus #Nachhaltigkeit #Energiewende #Innovation #Elektromobilität

    #china #recycling #lithium #zitronensaure #chemikalie #nickel
  43. Tino Eberl @[email protected] ·

    Ein neues Verfahren aus #China könnte das #Recycling von #Lithium-Ionen-Akkus revolutionieren.

    n-tv.de/wissen/Neues-Zitronens

    Mit #Zitronensäure als einziger #Chemikalie werden fast 100% der Metalle wie #Lithium, #Nickel und #Kobalt zurückgewonnen – effizient, umweltfreundlich und mit deutlich weniger #Energieverbrauch.

    Dieses Verfahren senkt #CO2Emissionen und macht #Akkus nachhaltiger.

    #Recycling #LithiumIonenAkkus #Nachhaltigkeit #Energiewende #Innovation #Elektromobilität

    #elektromobilitat #innovation #energiewende #nachhaltigkeit #lithiumionenakkus #akkus
  44. Tino Eberl @[email protected] ·

    Ein neues Verfahren aus #China könnte das #Recycling von #Lithium-Ionen-Akkus revolutionieren.

    n-tv.de/wissen/Neues-Zitronens

    Mit #Zitronensäure als einziger #Chemikalie werden fast 100% der Metalle wie #Lithium, #Nickel und #Kobalt zurückgewonnen – effizient, umweltfreundlich und mit deutlich weniger #Energieverbrauch.

    Dieses Verfahren senkt #CO2Emissionen und macht #Akkus nachhaltiger.

    #Recycling #LithiumIonenAkkus #Nachhaltigkeit #Energiewende #Innovation #Elektromobilität

    #china #recycling #lithium #zitronensaure #chemikalie #nickel
  45. Richard @richardvenusfo ·

    Something I have used a lot this year and is excellent github.com/RichardScottOZ/geos - a fork of the original with a few updates and also doing some things in - it is really well done and has pretty good models available too - with a Canada focus. I would have put a million documents through it roughly.

    #nrcan #portuguese #brazil #opensource #nlp #datascience
  46. Rückruf-Portal @[email protected] ·

    UPDATE: #RÜCKRUF | #WARNUNG | 'Überdosis' #NICKEL in zahlreichen (z. Zt. 6) SIX und ACCESSORIES #Ohrstecker-Varianten von #BEELINE > auch #ROSSMANN bestätigt Verkauf und bietet Rücknahme an bit.ly/3B5UwMt (PDF)

    #ruckruf #warnung #nickel #ohrstecker #beeline #rossmann
  47. Rückruf-Portal @[email protected] ·

    #RÜCKRUF | #WARNUNG | #MÜLLER-Info zum Produktrückruf zahlreicher (z. Zt. 6) #Ohrstecker-Varianten von #BEELINE: Bei Weiterverwendung droht unangenehmes 'chronisches Kontaktekzem' durch #NICKEL bit.ly/3VpvEaD (PDF)

    Weitere aktuelle Meldungen der letzten Tage: bit.ly/31n95wE

    #ruckruf #warnung #muller #ohrstecker #beeline #nickel