#nickel — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #nickel, aggregated by home.social.
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"I wouldn't go out with you," she said furiously "for all the tea in China!"
He furrowed his brow. "Hmm... how about for all the oranges in Spain?"
"What? No!"
"All the mahogany in Peru?"
"Definitely not."
"Fine. How about metals. Maybe all the silver in Mexico?"
"No!"
"All the #nickel in Indonesia?"
"Nickel? You're coming at me with nickel?"
He sighed. "Fine then. Gemstones. All the emeralds in Colombia?"
She hesitated. "Well. Maybe for *all* of them."
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"I wouldn't go out with you," she said furiously "for all the tea in China!"
He furrowed his brow. "Hmm... how about for all the oranges in Spain?"
"What? No!"
"All the mahogany in Peru?"
"Definitely not."
"Fine. How about metals. Maybe all the silver in Mexico?"
"No!"
"All the #nickel in Indonesia?"
"Nickel? You're coming at me with nickel?"
He sighed. "Fine then. Gemstones. All the emeralds in Colombia?"
She hesitated. "Well. Maybe for *all* of them."
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RE: https://wandering.shop/@wss366/116894859391979891
More commonly spelled #nickel, but it's the same word!
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RE: https://wandering.shop/@wss366/116894859391979891
More commonly spelled #nickel, but it's the same word!
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The big reason I wanted to make something like this was... well, there were two reasons, I guess? One for stability. That's just obvious I think. But the _second_ reason was that the leads from my power supply were getting kind of corroded just from the fumes of the electrolyte being energised and I'm very pleased to say that this clearly stops that problem entirely. A+++ would print again.
Also I can report that the plastic seemed as unaffected by all of this as one would think and hope. But it's good to see it work as hoped.
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The big reason I wanted to make something like this was... well, there were two reasons, I guess? One for stability. That's just obvious I think. But the _second_ reason was that the leads from my power supply were getting kind of corroded just from the fumes of the electrolyte being energised and I'm very pleased to say that this clearly stops that problem entirely. A+++ would print again.
Also I can report that the plastic seemed as unaffected by all of this as one would think and hope. But it's good to see it work as hoped.
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well that used a lot of nickel in kind of an interesting pattern
I _think_ the end - which was just as protected as these sides - got entirely drawn off, so I'm quite happy about that really
(continued from https://mastodon.murkworks.net/@moira/116858048009037257 )
I was a little worried that I'd end up with two solid bars of untouched metal down the sides but it clearly gets thinner on the way down so I think despite the lesser access to the electrolyte, it still gets picked up for plating and that's good!
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well that used a lot of nickel in kind of an interesting pattern
I _think_ the end - which was just as protected as these sides - got entirely drawn off, so I'm quite happy about that really
(continued from https://mastodon.murkworks.net/@moira/116858048009037257 )
I was a little worried that I'd end up with two solid bars of untouched metal down the sides but it clearly gets thinner on the way down so I think despite the lesser access to the electrolyte, it still gets picked up for plating and that's good!
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I made a new nickel strip holder for electroplating
hopefully the plastic is okay to use, i will find out
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I made a new nickel strip holder for electroplating
hopefully the plastic is okay to use, i will find out
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#Lateinamerika muss sich vor dem Ansturm auf Mineralien schützen #Bergbau #Rohstoffe
Die Energiewende hat Mineralien wie #Kupfer, #Lithium und #Nickel zu strategischen Rohstoffen für die Weltwirtschaft gemacht, die nun auf eine kontinuierliche und stabile Versorgung mit diesen Ressourcen angewiesen ist. In Lateinamerika befinden sich einige der weltweit größten Vorkommen an kritischen Mineralien. Auf #Chile und #Peru entfallen etwa 40 % der Kupferreserven.
https://latina-press.com/news/345599-lateinamerika-muss-sich-vor-dem-ansturm-auf-mineralien-schuetzen/ -
Reporterre
Des batteries de voiture aux missiles : quand une raffinerie « verte » sert l’industrie militaire
https://mcinformactions.net/des-batteries-de-voiture-aux-missiles-quand-une-raffinerie-verte-sert-l.html
#cobalt #nickel #extraction #batteries #armement -
Des batteries de voiture aux missiles : quand une raffinerie «verte» sert l’ #industrie #militaire
Présentée comme un fleuron de l’industrie verte, une #raffinerie de #cobalt et de #nickel destinés aux batteries électriques va naître près de #Bordeaux. Mais derrière cette vitrine, l’entreprise servira aussi l’industrie militaire. https://reporterre.net/Sous-couvert-de-transition-ecologique-une-raffinerie-francaise-servira-l-industrie
Le projet #Emme pour Electro Mobility Materials #Europe https://www.emme-sas.com/
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Des batteries de voiture aux missiles : quand une raffinerie «verte» sert l’ #industrie #militaire
Présentée comme un fleuron de l’industrie verte, une #raffinerie de #cobalt et de #nickel destinés aux batteries électriques va naître près de #Bordeaux. Mais derrière cette vitrine, l’entreprise servira aussi l’industrie militaire. https://reporterre.net/Sous-couvert-de-transition-ecologique-une-raffinerie-francaise-servira-l-industrie
Le projet #Emme https://mastodon.social/@la_voix/tagged/Emme
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Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
L’inox europeo si rialza mentre il nichel resta ostaggio della geopolitica
https://www.metallirari.com/inox-europeo-rialza-nichel-resta-ostaggio-geopolitica/
Dalla Cina all’Indonesia, il mercato del nichel entra in una nuova fase tra scarsità e protezionismo verde.
#Nickel #AcciaioInox #CBAM #LME #Indonesia #Cina #Sulphur #Batterie #Metalli #Commodity #Acciaio #TransizioneEnergetica #Geopolitica #MateriePrime #Inox #Mercati -
Ooh… a #Nitinol experiment. Remember the dodgy explanation by #Buehler🪄✨discovering✨ the magic properties of Nitinol after three years of hard work through a random demonstration?
source “The Story of Nitinol: The Serendipitous Discovery of the Memory Metal and Its Applications”, Chemistry and History, June 1997
#Nickel / #Titanium / #MaterialsScience / #Chemistry / #NickelTitaniumNavalOrdanceLaboratory / #Wang / #austenite #martensite <https://nnci.net/sites/default/files/2020-02/Story%20of%20Nitinol.pdf>
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Ooh… a #Nitinol experiment. Remember the dodgy explanation by #Buehler🪄✨discovering✨ the magic properties of Nitinol after three years of hard work through a random demonstration?
source “The Story of Nitinol: The Serendipitous Discovery of the Memory Metal and Its Applications”, Chemistry and History, June 1997
#Nickel / #Titanium / #MaterialsScience / #Chemistry / #NickelTitaniumNavalOrdanceLaboratory / #Wang / #austenite #martensite <https://nnci.net/sites/default/files/2020-02/Story%20of%20Nitinol.pdf>
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Clean energy's nickel rush is heading straight for some of Earth's richest ecosystems https://phys.org/news/2026-05-energy-nickel-straight-earth-richest.html
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Clean energy's nickel rush is heading straight for some of Earth's richest ecosystems https://phys.org/news/2026-05-energy-nickel-straight-earth-richest.html
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Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War -
Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War -
Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War -
Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War -
Scientists achieve massive breakthrough on an alternative to #LithiumIon batteries — why this 'significant advancement' matters
by Laurelle Stelle, January 13, 2026
"Researchers have recently discovered a way to make an efficient battery out of #zinc — an inexpensive, commonly found metal — instead of the #RareMetals used in lithium batteries.
"Most rechargeable batteries today are lithium-ion batteries, which include other metals like cobalt and nickel, Tech Xplore reports. As electric vehicles (#EVs) and large-scale energy storage get more common, we'll need more and more of those metals — but because they're uncommon, the costs are often massive.
"Many researchers are working on cheaper battery options to reduce or replace these metals. One Chinese company has created a car powered by a #SodiumBattery, and a University of Maryland researcher has invented a partly #BiodegradableBattery made of zinc and #CrabShells. Researchers have even found not one but two ways to store energy in ordinary #sand.
"According to Tech Xplore, this new project, led by Xiulei 'David' Ji of Oregon State University, offers yet another alternative to lithium-ion batteries: accessible, efficient zinc metal batteries.
"The secret is a new electrolyte developed by Ji and his team, Tech Xplore explains. A battery electrolyte is a liquid inside the battery that helps aid the chemical reactions to store and release energy.
"Unfortunately, past electrolytes in #ZincBatteries were not very efficient. Much of the energy stored in the battery was previously used up in extra, unwanted chemical reactions. Not only did that mean the battery couldn't release as much energy as it had put into it, but it also generated dangerous hydrogen gas. This meant that zinc wasn't practical for #RechargeableBatteries.
"Ji's team has created a new electrolyte formula that almost eliminates these unwanted reactions, Tech Xplore reports. It forms a protective coating on the zinc component of the battery that prevents that type of energy loss. A similar protective coating is what allows lithium-ion batteries to release more than 99% of the charging energy. The new zinc battery releases 99.95% of the energy it is charged with on each cycle.
"Not only is the zinc battery efficient, but it's also safer than a lithium-ion battery, according to Tech Xplore. The new electrolyte isn't flammable, while the ones used in lithium-ion batteries often are combustible. Both zinc and the components of the electrolyte are also cheaper and more common than the materials used in lithium-ion batteries.
" 'The breakthrough represents a significant advancement toward making zinc metal batteries more accessible to consumers,' Ji told OSU News and Research Communications. "These batteries are essential for the installation of additional solar and wind farms. In addition, they offer a secure and efficient solution for home energy storage, as well as energy storage modules for communities that are vulnerable to natural disasters.
"Thanks to the work of Ji and his team, Tech Xplore suggests rechargeable zinc batteries are likely to hit the market in the near future."
Source:
https://tech.yahoo.com/science/articles/scientists-just-made-massive-breakthrough-121500329.html#SolarPunkSunday #LithiumBatteryAlternatives #ZincBatteries #BiodegradableBatteries #CrabShells #Cobalt #Nickel #Lithium #Technology #TechnologyBreakthrough
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Scientists achieve massive breakthrough on an alternative to #LithiumIon batteries — why this 'significant advancement' matters
by Laurelle Stelle, January 13, 2026
"Researchers have recently discovered a way to make an efficient battery out of #zinc — an inexpensive, commonly found metal — instead of the #RareMetals used in lithium batteries.
"Most rechargeable batteries today are lithium-ion batteries, which include other metals like cobalt and nickel, Tech Xplore reports. As electric vehicles (#EVs) and large-scale energy storage get more common, we'll need more and more of those metals — but because they're uncommon, the costs are often massive.
"Many researchers are working on cheaper battery options to reduce or replace these metals. One Chinese company has created a car powered by a #SodiumBattery, and a University of Maryland researcher has invented a partly #BiodegradableBattery made of zinc and #CrabShells. Researchers have even found not one but two ways to store energy in ordinary #sand.
"According to Tech Xplore, this new project, led by Xiulei 'David' Ji of Oregon State University, offers yet another alternative to lithium-ion batteries: accessible, efficient zinc metal batteries.
"The secret is a new electrolyte developed by Ji and his team, Tech Xplore explains. A battery electrolyte is a liquid inside the battery that helps aid the chemical reactions to store and release energy.
"Unfortunately, past electrolytes in #ZincBatteries were not very efficient. Much of the energy stored in the battery was previously used up in extra, unwanted chemical reactions. Not only did that mean the battery couldn't release as much energy as it had put into it, but it also generated dangerous hydrogen gas. This meant that zinc wasn't practical for #RechargeableBatteries.
"Ji's team has created a new electrolyte formula that almost eliminates these unwanted reactions, Tech Xplore reports. It forms a protective coating on the zinc component of the battery that prevents that type of energy loss. A similar protective coating is what allows lithium-ion batteries to release more than 99% of the charging energy. The new zinc battery releases 99.95% of the energy it is charged with on each cycle.
"Not only is the zinc battery efficient, but it's also safer than a lithium-ion battery, according to Tech Xplore. The new electrolyte isn't flammable, while the ones used in lithium-ion batteries often are combustible. Both zinc and the components of the electrolyte are also cheaper and more common than the materials used in lithium-ion batteries.
" 'The breakthrough represents a significant advancement toward making zinc metal batteries more accessible to consumers,' Ji told OSU News and Research Communications. "These batteries are essential for the installation of additional solar and wind farms. In addition, they offer a secure and efficient solution for home energy storage, as well as energy storage modules for communities that are vulnerable to natural disasters.
"Thanks to the work of Ji and his team, Tech Xplore suggests rechargeable zinc batteries are likely to hit the market in the near future."
Source:
https://tech.yahoo.com/science/articles/scientists-just-made-massive-breakthrough-121500329.html#SolarPunkSunday #LithiumBatteryAlternatives #ZincBatteries #BiodegradableBatteries #CrabShells #Cobalt #Nickel #Lithium #Technology #TechnologyBreakthrough
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#Winemaking acid powers cleaner way for cobalt-nickel recovery from #BatteryWaste
Scientists use #TartaricAcid and electrowinning to split #cobalt and #nickel from battery waste for cleaner #recycling.
By Neetika Walter
Mar 11, 2026"Scientists have developed a cleaner way to separate cobalt and nickel from lithium-ion battery materials using an electrochemical technique boosted by a naturally occurring acid commonly associated with wine.
[...]
"The researchers say the approach could be particularly useful for '#UrbanMining,' the process of recovering valuable #minerals from discarded #electronics and spent #batteries. Countries with limited mining resources are increasingly looking to #recycling to secure supplies of critical materials.
" '#Electrowinning’s edge in urban mining gives us a practical pathway to turn battery waste into a valuable resource for cobalt and nickel, while also helping the United States reduce its reliance on foreign supply chains,' Liu says."
Learn more:
https://interestingengineering.com/energy/bioacid-electrowinning-cobalt-nickel-battery-recycling#SolarPunkSunday #Technology #TechnologyBreakthrough #LionBatteries #BatteryRecycling #CriticalMinerals
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#Winemaking acid powers cleaner way for cobalt-nickel recovery from #BatteryWaste
Scientists use #TartaricAcid and electrowinning to split #cobalt and #nickel from battery waste for cleaner #recycling.
By Neetika Walter
Mar 11, 2026"Scientists have developed a cleaner way to separate cobalt and nickel from lithium-ion battery materials using an electrochemical technique boosted by a naturally occurring acid commonly associated with wine.
[...]
"The researchers say the approach could be particularly useful for '#UrbanMining,' the process of recovering valuable #minerals from discarded #electronics and spent #batteries. Countries with limited mining resources are increasingly looking to #recycling to secure supplies of critical materials.
" '#Electrowinning’s edge in urban mining gives us a practical pathway to turn battery waste into a valuable resource for cobalt and nickel, while also helping the United States reduce its reliance on foreign supply chains,' Liu says."
Learn more:
https://interestingengineering.com/energy/bioacid-electrowinning-cobalt-nickel-battery-recycling#SolarPunkSunday #Technology #TechnologyBreakthrough #LionBatteries #BatteryRecycling #CriticalMinerals
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Costi energetici e materie prime spingono Marcegaglia ad alzare i prezzi dei tubi inox dal 18 maggio
https://www.metallirari.com/breakingnews28/
#AcciaioInox #StainlessSteel #TubiInox #Marcegaglia #SteelIndustry #IndustriaSiderurgica #PrezziAcciaio #Acciaio #Inox #SteelMarket #Metalli #Nickel #Energia #Logistica #Industria #Manufacturing #MercatoAcciaio #Siderurgia #TubiSaldati #EuropaIndustriale -
#NICKI #ALBEK multi-search-tag-explorer.allgraph.ro/advanced-sea... #NICKEL #CITY #OPERA www.perplexity.ai/search/new?q... Semantic CLUSTERS: The Bridge between Humans and Artificial Intelligence. NOSTR.com - Jumble: jumble.social/users/npub1j...
MultiSearch Tag Explorer -
Mineradora canadense encerra operações em Cuba devido ao endurecimento das sanções dos EUA
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Mineradora canadense encerra operações em Cuba devido ao endurecimento das sanções dos EUA
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Gironde : installation d'une usine en zone inondable
Dans un arrêté du 5 mai, le #préfet de #Gironde autorise la modification du plan d'urbanisme de #Bordeaux Métropole. L'entreprise #EMME, qui souhaite construire une usine de traitement de #nickel et #cobalt en bord de #Garonne https://mastodon.social/@la_voix/116121597967667568 devrait ainsi pouvoir s'implanter en zone inondable, au grand regret des opposants au projet. https://france3-regions.franceinfo.fr/nouvelle-aquitaine/gironde/bordeaux/aucun-respect-de-la-democratie-le-prefet-de-gironde-modifie-le-plan-local-d-urbanisme-pour-l-installation-d-une-usine-en-zone-inondable-3347908.html
#actu #info #information #actualite #environnement #societe #politique
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Hormuz entra in fabbrica: come la geopolitica alza i costi del nichel
https://www.metallirari.com/hormuz-entra-fabbrica-geopolitica-alza-costi-nichel/
Il rimbalzo del nichel (+27% nel 2026) porta sollievo ai grandi produttori, ma la crisi di approvvigionamento dello zolfo mette sotto pressione gli impianti indonesiani.
#nichel #nichel2026 #nickel #HPAL #MHP #Vale #NickelIndustries #Indonesia #zolfo #sulfur #HormuzStrait #batterie #criticalmetals #metallirari #commodities #LME #transizionenergetica #miningIndonesia #ENC #prezzoNichel -
Nickel associations of Indonesia, Philippines sign agreement on nickel cooperation
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Nickel associations of Indonesia, Philippines sign agreement on nickel cooperation
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Answer: "No."
Most #CriticalMinerals are on #IndigenousLands. Will miners respect #TribalSovereignty?
by Taylar Dawn Stagner, March 26, 2025
"#Mining — whether for #FossilFuels or, increasingly, the critical minerals in high demand today — has a long history of perpetuating violence against #IndigenousPeople. Forcibly removing tribal communities to get to natural resources tied to their homelands has been the rule, not the exception, for centuries.
"Today, more than half of the mineral deposits needed for a global energy transition — including #lithium, #cobalt, #copper, and #nickel to make things like #batteries and #SolarPanels — are found near or beneath Indigenous lands.
"In 2007, the United Nations adopted a resolution called the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [#UNDRIP] that included the right to free, prior, and informed consent to the use of their lands, a concept known as #FPIC. This principle protects #IndigenousPeoples from being forcibly relocated, provides suitable avenues for redress of past injustices, and gives tribes and communities the right to consent to — and the right to refuse — #extractive industry projects like #mining.
"There’s a lot at stake: When followed, FPIC promises a process that gives Indigenous peoples a voice in how their homelands are used, as well as the right to say no to development altogether. And when it’s not, which is the vast majority of the time, #TribalCommunities are further #disenfranchised, facing #violence and #ForcedRelocation as their #sovereignty and rights are ignored.
"There are an estimated 5,000 tribal communities around the world, encompassing roughly 476 million people across 90 countries, according to the U.N. Different tribes have different opinions on mining, but rarely is their legal right to refuse extraction projects recognized, even under the 2007 declaration.
"Grist talked with five experts to better understand what free, prior, and informed consent should look like in this new era of mineral extraction. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity."
#CanPol #CanadaPol #BigOilAndGas #LandBack #IndigenousSovereignty #TribalSovereignty #LithiumMining #RecycleLithium #LithiumAlternatives #RecycleCopper
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Answer: "No."
Most #CriticalMinerals are on #IndigenousLands. Will miners respect #TribalSovereignty?
by Taylar Dawn Stagner, March 26, 2025
"#Mining — whether for #FossilFuels or, increasingly, the critical minerals in high demand today — has a long history of perpetuating violence against #IndigenousPeople. Forcibly removing tribal communities to get to natural resources tied to their homelands has been the rule, not the exception, for centuries.
"Today, more than half of the mineral deposits needed for a global energy transition — including #lithium, #cobalt, #copper, and #nickel to make things like #batteries and #SolarPanels — are found near or beneath Indigenous lands.
"In 2007, the United Nations adopted a resolution called the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [#UNDRIP] that included the right to free, prior, and informed consent to the use of their lands, a concept known as #FPIC. This principle protects #IndigenousPeoples from being forcibly relocated, provides suitable avenues for redress of past injustices, and gives tribes and communities the right to consent to — and the right to refuse — #extractive industry projects like #mining.
"There’s a lot at stake: When followed, FPIC promises a process that gives Indigenous peoples a voice in how their homelands are used, as well as the right to say no to development altogether. And when it’s not, which is the vast majority of the time, #TribalCommunities are further #disenfranchised, facing #violence and #ForcedRelocation as their #sovereignty and rights are ignored.
"There are an estimated 5,000 tribal communities around the world, encompassing roughly 476 million people across 90 countries, according to the U.N. Different tribes have different opinions on mining, but rarely is their legal right to refuse extraction projects recognized, even under the 2007 declaration.
"Grist talked with five experts to better understand what free, prior, and informed consent should look like in this new era of mineral extraction. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity."
#CanPol #CanadaPol #BigOilAndGas #LandBack #IndigenousSovereignty #TribalSovereignty #LithiumMining #RecycleLithium #LithiumAlternatives #RecycleCopper
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"Critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt and nickel are becoming the “oil of the 21st century” as the scramble for precious metals deepens poverty and creates public health crises in some of the world’s most vulnerable communities, a report by the UN’s water thinktank has found.
The investigation by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH) concluded that the growing demand for lithium, cobalt and nickel used in batteries and microchips is draining water supplies, eroding agriculture and exposing communities to toxic heavy metals.
An estimated 456bn litres of water were used to extract 240,000 tonnes of lithium in 2024, the researchers found, with little of the financial benefit or technological advances from the green energy transition or AI boom reaching the affected communities.
“Critical minerals are quickly becoming the oil of the 21st century,” said Kaveh Madani, director of UNU-INWEH and the 2026 Stockholm water prize laureate.
“What we are selling as a solution to sustainability is actively hurting people somewhere else in the world. How can we then call the transition green or clean?”
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), growth in demand for key energy minerals has been strong in recent years, with lithium demand rising by nearly 30% in 2024. The production of rare earths almost tripled between 2010 and 2023 as demand for electric vehicles (EVs) and powerful computer chips has soared.
The report found that while EVs may reduce emissions by consumers in North America and Europe, the environmental and health costs are borne by communities far away, in the mining regions of Africa and Latin America."
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"Critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt and nickel are becoming the “oil of the 21st century” as the scramble for precious metals deepens poverty and creates public health crises in some of the world’s most vulnerable communities, a report by the UN’s water thinktank has found.
The investigation by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH) concluded that the growing demand for lithium, cobalt and nickel used in batteries and microchips is draining water supplies, eroding agriculture and exposing communities to toxic heavy metals.
An estimated 456bn litres of water were used to extract 240,000 tonnes of lithium in 2024, the researchers found, with little of the financial benefit or technological advances from the green energy transition or AI boom reaching the affected communities.
“Critical minerals are quickly becoming the oil of the 21st century,” said Kaveh Madani, director of UNU-INWEH and the 2026 Stockholm water prize laureate.
“What we are selling as a solution to sustainability is actively hurting people somewhere else in the world. How can we then call the transition green or clean?”
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), growth in demand for key energy minerals has been strong in recent years, with lithium demand rising by nearly 30% in 2024. The production of rare earths almost tripled between 2010 and 2023 as demand for electric vehicles (EVs) and powerful computer chips has soared.
The report found that while EVs may reduce emissions by consumers in North America and Europe, the environmental and health costs are borne by communities far away, in the mining regions of Africa and Latin America."
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https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/apr/29/critical-minerals-are-oil-of-21st-century-as-demand-fuels-poverty-and-pollution-in-poorer-countries; https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:10642/UNU-INWEH-Critical-Minerals-Water-Insecurity-and-Injustice.pdf. "Critical #minerals such as #lithium, #cobalt & #nickel are becoming the 'oil of the 21st century' as the scramble for precious #metals deepens #poverty & creates #publichealth #crises in some of the world’s most #vulnerable #communities, a report by the UN’s #water #thinktank has found."
