#prabowogibran — Public Fediverse posts

Op-Ed: Does Indonesia’s Largest Religious Organization Nahdlatul Ulama Need An Anti-Corruption Body?

Gus Yahya and Gus Kikin

By Muhammad Hanifuddin for Islami.co, Sept 13, 2026

Both of the newly inaugurated leaders of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are true “NU blue blood.” The villages of Leteh in Rembang district and Tebuireng in Jombang district are villages that have been inextricably linked with Nahdlatul Ulama for generations. The Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in villages of Leteh and Tebuireng are custodians of the scholarly lineages (sanad) of the archipelago’s Islamic scholars (ulama).

So it is no surprise that these two figures possess abundant social capital. Both well deserve to be referred to using the respectful title of endearment “Gus,” even today, even though both should by now be addressed using the more formal title “Kiai” as senior religious teachers. In addition, neither man’s personal abilities are in doubt. There is consequently no reason to frame them as being in competition with each other—except in the eyes of political brokers.

Both also have impressive ideas and records of service. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya (Kyai Haji Yahya Cholil Staquf) has fulfilled his mandate as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). His annual “state of the association” address, or accountability report, was accepted by acclamation at NU’s national congress at Tambak Beras held from August 27 to 31, 2026.

Likewise, Gus Kikin (Kiai Haji Abdul Hakim Mahfudz) has demonstrated a calm leadership style as chair of NU’s East Java provincial leadership council (PWNU). At the same time, he has continued to lead the Tebuireng pesantren, a role for which he was prepared even before the passing of the previous leader Kiai Haji Sholahuddin Wahid (1942-2020). Gus Kikin has continued and developed Gus Sholah’s legacy, and Tebuireng has continued to prosper. His managerial experience in the oil industry has meant that Gus Kikin has not faced any significant difficulties in leading Tebuireng.

At NU’s 34th Congress in Lampung, Gus Yahya published a book titled “PBNU: The Great Struggle of Nahdlatul Ulama” (PBNU: Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama). The book presents Gus Yahya’s ideas, particularly his vision, mission and aspirations for his time serving on NU’s national leadership council (PBNU).

His dream is ambitious and global: to lead NU in building world civilization—not merely at the local level, much less only at the national level. I have read the book numerous times. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya’s leadership has largely followed the ideas he set out in it. Much has already been achieved, including the establishment of a system of governance, digitization and the strategic positioning of NU.

If we examine the matter closely, we can understand—though we are of course free to disagree—why Gus Yahya has appeared “close” to government programs, both during the government of former president Joko Widodo and under Indonesia’s current president Prabowo Subianto. All of this can be seen as part of an effort to place NU within a broader sphere of service.

Similarly, at this year’s 35th Congress in Tambak Beras in NU’s East Java heartland city of Jombang, Gus Kikin published a book titled “An Exposition of the Fundamental Laws” (Syarah Qanun Asasi). The book elaborates on NU’s fundamental values. On many occasions, Gus Kikin has emphasized that, if entrusted with the position of chair of the PBNU, he would revive the organization’s fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi).

Previously, at the Lampung Congress, Gus Yahya also sought to revive the ideas of former NU leader and Indonesia’s fourth president Gus Dur (1940-2009). Both aspirations are laudable. They arise from roughly the same concern: how NU can remain firmly grounded in the legacy of its predecessors while also responding to the challenges of present times.

In the introduction to Syarah Qanun Asasi, Gus Kikin states that the book is written to reintroduce the thought of NU’s founding spiritual anti-colonial nationalist founder, Hadlaratussyaikh Hasyim Asy’ari (1875–1947), in a complete, profound and contextualized form. The book is intended to guide NU as it enters its second century, ensuring that its path of service follows the vision of its founders.

Gus Yahya often expresses a similar spirit: Let us practice NU according to the madhhab (school of interpretation within Islamic jurisprudence) of its founders—and no other.

After the 35th Congress, Gus Kikin was inaugurated as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). He is continuing much of the legacy left by Gus Yahya’s leadership.

Given these similarities, we should show both men our deepest respect. Gus Yahya’s leadership has given NU a distinct character and genuine renewed fervor. Likewise, we should give Gus Kikin the time and opportunity to serve and to reintroduce the values of the fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi) as NU enters its second century.

What, then, should be made of the allegations of bribery and manipulation of the Congress? Does NU need an institution responsible for law enforcement and prevention? Is there an urgent need for NU to establish an anti-bribery institution modeled on the national anti-corruption commission (KPK)?

These questions cannot be left unresolved. NU needs a dignified and clear solution consistent with the values passed down by its founders. May a path to a resolution ultimately be found.

Muhammad Hanifuddin is a professor at Darus-Sunnah International Institute for Hadith Sciences and the Political Literacy Institute Ciputat activist. This post is based on https://islami.co/gus-yahya-dan-gus-kikin/. Photo via Islami.co.

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#Corruption #Election #ElectionCampaign #Islam #KPK #NahdlatulUlama #NU #OpEd #Pemilu #Pemilu2029 #PKB #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion

Op-Ed: Does Indonesia’s Largest Religious Organization Nahdlatul Ulama Need An Anti-Corruption Body?

Gus Yahya and Gus Kikin

By Muhammad Hanifuddin for Islami.co, Sept 13, 2026

Both of the newly inaugurated leaders of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are true “NU blue blood.” The villages of Leteh in Rembang district and Tebuireng in Jombang district are villages that have been inextricably linked with Nahdlatul Ulama for generations. The Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in villages of Leteh and Tebuireng are custodians of the scholarly lineages (sanad) of the archipelago’s Islamic scholars (ulama).

So it is no surprise that these two figures possess abundant social capital. Both well deserve to be referred to using the respectful title of endearment “Gus,” even today, even though both should by now be addressed using the more formal title “Kiai” as senior religious teachers. In addition, neither man’s personal abilities are in doubt. There is consequently no reason to frame them as being in competition with each other—except in the eyes of political brokers.

Both also have impressive ideas and records of service. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya (Kyai Haji Yahya Cholil Staquf) has fulfilled his mandate as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). His annual “state of the association” address, or accountability report, was accepted by acclamation at NU’s national congress at Tambak Beras held from August 27 to 31, 2026.

Likewise, Gus Kikin (Kiai Haji Abdul Hakim Mahfudz) has demonstrated a calm leadership style as chair of NU’s East Java provincial leadership council (PWNU). At the same time, he has continued to lead the Tebuireng pesantren, a role for which he was prepared even before the passing of the previous leader Kiai Haji Sholahuddin Wahid (1942-2020). Gus Kikin has continued and developed Gus Sholah’s legacy, and Tebuireng has continued to prosper. His managerial experience in the oil industry has meant that Gus Kikin has not faced any significant difficulties in leading Tebuireng.

At NU’s 34th Congress in Lampung, Gus Yahya published a book titled “PBNU: The Great Struggle of Nahdlatul Ulama” (PBNU: Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama). The book presents Gus Yahya’s ideas, particularly his vision, mission and aspirations for his time serving on NU’s national leadership council (PBNU).

His dream is ambitious and global: to lead NU in building world civilization—not merely at the local level, much less only at the national level. I have read the book numerous times. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya’s leadership has largely followed the ideas he set out in it. Much has already been achieved, including the establishment of a system of governance, digitization and the strategic positioning of NU.

If we examine the matter closely, we can understand—though we are of course free to disagree—why Gus Yahya has appeared “close” to government programs, both during the government of former president Joko Widodo and under Indonesia’s current president Prabowo Subianto. All of this can be seen as part of an effort to place NU within a broader sphere of service.

Similarly, at this year’s 35th Congress in Tambak Beras in NU’s East Java heartland city of Jombang, Gus Kikin published a book titled “An Exposition of the Fundamental Laws” (Syarah Qanun Asasi). The book elaborates on NU’s fundamental values. On many occasions, Gus Kikin has emphasized that, if entrusted with the position of chair of the PBNU, he would revive the organization’s fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi).

Previously, at the Lampung Congress, Gus Yahya also sought to revive the ideas of former NU leader and Indonesia’s fourth president Gus Dur (1940-2009). Both aspirations are laudable. They arise from roughly the same concern: how NU can remain firmly grounded in the legacy of its predecessors while also responding to the challenges of present times.

In the introduction to Syarah Qanun Asasi, Gus Kikin states that the book is written to reintroduce the thought of NU’s founding spiritual anti-colonial nationalist founder, Hadlaratussyaikh Hasyim Asy’ari (1875–1947), in a complete, profound and contextualized form. The book is intended to guide NU as it enters its second century, ensuring that its path of service follows the vision of its founders.

Gus Yahya often expresses a similar spirit: Let us practice NU according to the madhhab (school of interpretation within Islamic jurisprudence) of its founders—and no other.

After the 35th Congress, Gus Kikin was inaugurated as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). He is continuing much of the legacy left by Gus Yahya’s leadership.

Given these similarities, we should show both men our deepest respect. Gus Yahya’s leadership has given NU a distinct character and genuine renewed fervor. Likewise, we should give Gus Kikin the time and opportunity to serve and to reintroduce the values of the fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi) as NU enters its second century.

What, then, should be made of the allegations of bribery and manipulation of the Congress? Does NU need an institution responsible for law enforcement and prevention? Is there an urgent need for NU to establish an anti-bribery institution modeled on the national anti-corruption commission (KPK)?

These questions cannot be left unresolved. NU needs a dignified and clear solution consistent with the values passed down by its founders. May a path to a resolution ultimately be found.

Muhammad Hanifuddin is a professor at Darus-Sunnah International Institute for Hadith Sciences and the Political Literacy Institute Ciputat activist. This post is based on https://islami.co/gus-yahya-dan-gus-kikin/. Photo via Islami.co.

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#Corruption #Election #ElectionCampaign #Islam #KPK #NahdlatulUlama #NU #OpEd #Pemilu #Pemilu2029 #PKB #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion

Op-Ed: Does Indonesia’s Largest Religious Organization Nahdlatul Ulama Need An Anti-Corruption Body?

Gus Yahya and Gus Kikin

By Muhammad Hanifuddin for Islami.co, Sept 13, 2026

Both of the newly inaugurated leaders of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are true “NU blue blood.” The villages of Leteh in Rembang district and Tebuireng in Jombang district are villages that have been inextricably linked with Nahdlatul Ulama for generations. The Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in villages of Leteh and Tebuireng are custodians of the scholarly lineages (sanad) of the archipelago’s Islamic scholars (ulama).

So it is no surprise that these two figures possess abundant social capital. Both well deserve to be referred to using the respectful title of endearment “Gus,” even today, even though both should by now be addressed using the more formal title “Kiai” as senior religious teachers. In addition, neither man’s personal abilities are in doubt. There is consequently no reason to frame them as being in competition with each other—except in the eyes of political brokers.

Both also have impressive ideas and records of service. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya (Kyai Haji Yahya Cholil Staquf) has fulfilled his mandate as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). His annual “state of the association” address, or accountability report, was accepted by acclamation at NU’s national congress at Tambak Beras held from August 27 to 31, 2026.

Likewise, Gus Kikin (Kiai Haji Abdul Hakim Mahfudz) has demonstrated a calm leadership style as chair of NU’s East Java provincial leadership council (PWNU). At the same time, he has continued to lead the Tebuireng pesantren, a role for which he was prepared even before the passing of the previous leader Kiai Haji Sholahuddin Wahid (1942-2020). Gus Kikin has continued and developed Gus Sholah’s legacy, and Tebuireng has continued to prosper. His managerial experience in the oil industry has meant that Gus Kikin has not faced any significant difficulties in leading Tebuireng.

At NU’s 34th Congress in Lampung, Gus Yahya published a book titled “PBNU: The Great Struggle of Nahdlatul Ulama” (PBNU: Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama). The book presents Gus Yahya’s ideas, particularly his vision, mission and aspirations for his time serving on NU’s national leadership council (PBNU).

His dream is ambitious and global: to lead NU in building world civilization—not merely at the local level, much less only at the national level. I have read the book numerous times. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya’s leadership has largely followed the ideas he set out in it. Much has already been achieved, including the establishment of a system of governance, digitization and the strategic positioning of NU.

If we examine the matter closely, we can understand—though we are of course free to disagree—why Gus Yahya has appeared “close” to government programs, both during the government of former president Joko Widodo and under Indonesia’s current president Prabowo Subianto. All of this can be seen as part of an effort to place NU within a broader sphere of service.

Similarly, at this year’s 35th Congress in Tambak Beras in NU’s East Java heartland city of Jombang, Gus Kikin published a book titled “An Exposition of the Fundamental Laws” (Syarah Qanun Asasi). The book elaborates on NU’s fundamental values. On many occasions, Gus Kikin has emphasized that, if entrusted with the position of chair of the PBNU, he would revive the organization’s fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi).

Previously, at the Lampung Congress, Gus Yahya also sought to revive the ideas of former NU leader and Indonesia’s fourth president Gus Dur (1940-2009). Both aspirations are laudable. They arise from roughly the same concern: how NU can remain firmly grounded in the legacy of its predecessors while also responding to the challenges of present times.

In the introduction to Syarah Qanun Asasi, Gus Kikin states that the book is written to reintroduce the thought of NU’s founding spiritual anti-colonial nationalist founder, Hadlaratussyaikh Hasyim Asy’ari (1875–1947), in a complete, profound and contextualized form. The book is intended to guide NU as it enters its second century, ensuring that its path of service follows the vision of its founders.

Gus Yahya often expresses a similar spirit: Let us practice NU according to the madhhab (school of interpretation within Islamic jurisprudence) of its founders—and no other.

After the 35th Congress, Gus Kikin was inaugurated as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). He is continuing much of the legacy left by Gus Yahya’s leadership.

Given these similarities, we should show both men our deepest respect. Gus Yahya’s leadership has given NU a distinct character and genuine renewed fervor. Likewise, we should give Gus Kikin the time and opportunity to serve and to reintroduce the values of the fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi) as NU enters its second century.

What, then, should be made of the allegations of bribery and manipulation of the Congress? Does NU need an institution responsible for law enforcement and prevention? Is there an urgent need for NU to establish an anti-bribery institution modeled on the national anti-corruption commission (KPK)?

These questions cannot be left unresolved. NU needs a dignified and clear solution consistent with the values passed down by its founders. May a path to a resolution ultimately be found.

Muhammad Hanifuddin is a professor at Darus-Sunnah International Institute for Hadith Sciences and the Political Literacy Institute Ciputat activist. This post is based on https://islami.co/gus-yahya-dan-gus-kikin/. Photo via Islami.co.

Rate this:

#Corruption #Election #ElectionCampaign #Islam #KPK #NahdlatulUlama #NU #OpEd #Pemilu #Pemilu2029 #PKB #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion

Op-Ed: Does Indonesia’s Largest Religious Organization Nahdlatul Ulama Need An Anti-Corruption Body?

Gus Yahya and Gus Kikin

By Muhammad Hanifuddin for Islami.co, Sept 13, 2026

Both of the newly inaugurated leaders of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are true “NU blue blood.” The villages of Leteh in Rembang district and Tebuireng in Jombang district are villages that have been inextricably linked with Nahdlatul Ulama for generations. The Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) in villages of Leteh and Tebuireng are custodians of the scholarly lineages (sanad) of the archipelago’s Islamic scholars (ulama).

So it is no surprise that these two figures possess abundant social capital. Both well deserve to be referred to using the respectful title of endearment “Gus,” even today, even though both should by now be addressed using the more formal title “Kiai” as senior religious teachers. In addition, neither man’s personal abilities are in doubt. There is consequently no reason to frame them as being in competition with each other—except in the eyes of political brokers.

Both also have impressive ideas and records of service. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya (Kyai Haji Yahya Cholil Staquf) has fulfilled his mandate as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). His annual “state of the association” address, or accountability report, was accepted by acclamation at NU’s national congress at Tambak Beras held from August 27 to 31, 2026.

Likewise, Gus Kikin (Kiai Haji Abdul Hakim Mahfudz) has demonstrated a calm leadership style as chair of NU’s East Java provincial leadership council (PWNU). At the same time, he has continued to lead the Tebuireng pesantren, a role for which he was prepared even before the passing of the previous leader Kiai Haji Sholahuddin Wahid (1942-2020). Gus Kikin has continued and developed Gus Sholah’s legacy, and Tebuireng has continued to prosper. His managerial experience in the oil industry has meant that Gus Kikin has not faced any significant difficulties in leading Tebuireng.

At NU’s 34th Congress in Lampung, Gus Yahya published a book titled “PBNU: The Great Struggle of Nahdlatul Ulama” (PBNU: Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama). The book presents Gus Yahya’s ideas, particularly his vision, mission and aspirations for his time serving on NU’s national leadership council (PBNU).

His dream is ambitious and global: to lead NU in building world civilization—not merely at the local level, much less only at the national level. I have read the book numerous times. Over the past five years, Gus Yahya’s leadership has largely followed the ideas he set out in it. Much has already been achieved, including the establishment of a system of governance, digitization and the strategic positioning of NU.

If we examine the matter closely, we can understand—though we are of course free to disagree—why Gus Yahya has appeared “close” to government programs, both during the government of former president Joko Widodo and under Indonesia’s current president Prabowo Subianto. All of this can be seen as part of an effort to place NU within a broader sphere of service.

Similarly, at this year’s 35th Congress in Tambak Beras in NU’s East Java heartland city of Jombang, Gus Kikin published a book titled “An Exposition of the Fundamental Laws” (Syarah Qanun Asasi). The book elaborates on NU’s fundamental values. On many occasions, Gus Kikin has emphasized that, if entrusted with the position of chair of the PBNU, he would revive the organization’s fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi).

Previously, at the Lampung Congress, Gus Yahya also sought to revive the ideas of former NU leader and Indonesia’s fourth president Gus Dur (1940-2009). Both aspirations are laudable. They arise from roughly the same concern: how NU can remain firmly grounded in the legacy of its predecessors while also responding to the challenges of present times.

In the introduction to Syarah Qanun Asasi, Gus Kikin states that the book is written to reintroduce the thought of NU’s founding spiritual anti-colonial nationalist founder, Hadlaratussyaikh Hasyim Asy’ari (1875–1947), in a complete, profound and contextualized form. The book is intended to guide NU as it enters its second century, ensuring that its path of service follows the vision of its founders.

Gus Yahya often expresses a similar spirit: Let us practice NU according to the madhhab (school of interpretation within Islamic jurisprudence) of its founders—and no other.

After the 35th Congress, Gus Kikin was inaugurated as the chair of NU’s national leadership council (PBNU). He is continuing much of the legacy left by Gus Yahya’s leadership.

Given these similarities, we should show both men our deepest respect. Gus Yahya’s leadership has given NU a distinct character and genuine renewed fervor. Likewise, we should give Gus Kikin the time and opportunity to serve and to reintroduce the values of the fundamental laws (Qanun Asasi) as NU enters its second century.

What, then, should be made of the allegations of bribery and manipulation of the Congress? Does NU need an institution responsible for law enforcement and prevention? Is there an urgent need for NU to establish an anti-bribery institution modeled on the national anti-corruption commission (KPK)?

These questions cannot be left unresolved. NU needs a dignified and clear solution consistent with the values passed down by its founders. May a path to a resolution ultimately be found.

Muhammad Hanifuddin is a professor at Darus-Sunnah International Institute for Hadith Sciences and the Political Literacy Institute Ciputat activist. This post is based on https://islami.co/gus-yahya-dan-gus-kikin/. Photo via Islami.co.

Rate this:

#Corruption #Election #ElectionCampaign #Islam #KPK #NahdlatulUlama #NU #OpEd #Pemilu #Pemilu2029 #PKB #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion

Prabowo’s Nutrition Agency Shake-Up Reveals Deeper Structural Problems, Fulcrum.sg

Prabowo’s Nutrition Agency Shake-Up Reveals Deeper Structural Problems

By Made Supriatma for Fulcrum.sg, July 9, 2026

President Prabowo’s recent decision to replace Dadan Hindayana as head of the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) did little to address the serious structural problems plaguing the institution. Dadan had overseen the administration’s flagship Free Nutritious Meals programme (or MBG, Makan Bergizi Gratis) but the policy remains deeply flawed in its design and implementation. Consuming nearly 7 per cent of Indonesia’s state budget, MBG has become one of the most controversial initiatives of the Prabowo administration. Policy analysts and protesters have pointed to the programme as contributing to Indonesia’s recent fiscal pressures. Read the whole piece here..

Prabowo’s Nutrition Agency Shake-Up Reveals Deeper Structural Problems

In related news:

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#Corruption #Economy #Education #Election #ElectionCampaign #Governance #Health #MadeSupriatma #Pemilu #Pemilu2029 #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Reblog

Prabowo-Jokowi Aren’t Close Anymore, Apa Kata Tempo? Podcast

Prabowo-Jokowi Aren’t Close Anymore

Apa Kata Tempo? Podcast, June 24, 2026

Relations between Indonesia’s President Prabowo and the country’s most recent former president Joko Widodo are reported to be cooling.

The rift stems from the fact that President Prabowo’s Vice President, Gibran Rakabuming Raka – who is former president Widodo’s son—has not been give a role inside President Prabowo’s government.

Joko Widodo’s hopes of seeing Gibran run as Prabowo’s running mate again in the country’s next presidential election in 2029 is at risk of falling apart, as the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party chair plans to seek a different running mate. The friction is ultimately beneficial for the public, believes Tempo, as a healthy democracy requires contestation.

Listen below, on Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get good podcasts.

Visit s.id/bacatempo (when the dds attack is over) to get a discount on a Tempo Digital subscription.

Download the Tempo app to read Tempo’s in-depth coverage.

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Featured image credit “Lebaran Dinasti Jokowi” by Tempo cartoonist Yuyun Nurrachman.

https://open.firstory.me/story/cmqrjwfde0bwg01wwbvayem0p

In earlier news…

The Onset of ‘De-Jokowi-sation’ in Indonesian Politics?

By Made Supriatma, for Fulcrum.sg, June 23, 2025

Eight months into the job, President Prabowo Subianto appears to have started trimming the sails of his powerful predecessor.

After nearly a month of mounting controversy, a group calling itself the Forum of Retired TNI Soldiers (FPP) has submitted a letter to Indonesia’s Parliament and People’s Consultative Assembly, urging the initiation of impeachment proceedings against Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka. President Prabowo Subianto has signalled…

Read the whole piece at Fulcum.sg, The Onset of ‘De-Jokowi-sation’ in Indonesian Politics?

Also read:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/12/10/08283511/jokowi-sebut-ada-operasi-politik-dan-orang-besar-di-balik-isu-ijazah-palsu
• Prabowo and Jokowi’s cozy relationship in Solo, dismissing rumors of a breakup? Kompas.com (Indonesian) 22 July 2025
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/02/22295951/profil-lodewyk-pusung-eks-pangdam-yang-dicopot-dari-wakil-kepala-bgn
• https://www.tempo.co/mingguan/edisi/8289

Prabowo-Jokowi Hot and Cold, Tempo Magazine, 21 June 2026 Edition

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#Djojohadikusumo #FriedRice #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #Jokowi #Jokowism #MadeSupriatma #News #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto

Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

• The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
• The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

Call for written comment

“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

Related news:

• https://www.hcamag.com/ca/specialization/employment-law/canada-tables-tougher-forced-labour-import-bill/578932

In earlier news…

Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

In related news:

• https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
• Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
• Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
• Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
• Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
• Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
• Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
• False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
• Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
• China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
• https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
• https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
• https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade

Rate this:

#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates

Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

• The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
• The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

Call for written comment

“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

Related news:

• https://www.hcamag.com/ca/specialization/employment-law/canada-tables-tougher-forced-labour-import-bill/578932

In earlier news…

Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

In related news:

• https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
• Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
• Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
• Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
• Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
• Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
• Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
• False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
• Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
• China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
• https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
• https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
• https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade

Rate this:

#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates

Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

• The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
• The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

Call for written comment

“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

Related news:

• https://www.hcamag.com/ca/specialization/employment-law/canada-tables-tougher-forced-labour-import-bill/578932

In earlier news…

Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

In related news:

• https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
• Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
• Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
• Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
• Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
• Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
• Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
• False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
• Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
• China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
• https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
• https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
• https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade

Rate this:

#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates

Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

• The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
• The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

Call for written comment

“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

Related news:

• https://www.hcamag.com/ca/specialization/employment-law/canada-tables-tougher-forced-labour-import-bill/578932

In earlier news…

Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

In related news:

• https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
• Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
• Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
• Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
• Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
• Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
• Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
• False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
• Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
• China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
• https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
• https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
• https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade

Rate this:

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Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

• The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
• The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

Call for written comment

“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

Related news:

• https://www.hcamag.com/ca/specialization/employment-law/canada-tables-tougher-forced-labour-import-bill/578932

In earlier news…

Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

In related news:

• https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
• Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
• Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
• Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
• Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
• Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
• Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
• False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
• Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
• China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
• https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
• https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
• https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade

Rate this:

#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates

UNIFIL Deaths: Indonesia Calls on UN to Name Those Responsible, Kompas

UN Security Council condemns deaths of Indonesian peacekeepers in Lebanon, Al-Jazeera

April 2, 2026

Al-Jazeera reports the UN Security Council (UNSC) have issued a joint statement condemning “incidents that led to the deaths of three Indonesian peacekeepers” from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

However, the 15-member statement did not mention Israel, which has launched a military invasion of southern Lebanon, or Hezbollah, which has been fighting Israeli forces there. The statement also did not say who was responsible for the attacks, reported Lyndal Rowlands and Zaid Sabah for Al-Jazeera on April 2, 2026 for the station’s Live Updates feed.

Meanwhile, the UNSC statement comes just as Indonesians are calling on the UN to “name names” regarding the perpetrators of the fatal attacks on peacekeepers, Kompas.com reports.

Singgih Wiryono for Kompas reports the UNSC has been called on to be brave enough to disclose the perpetrators of the attack on the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) which resulted in the deaths of three Indonesian Armed Forces/TNI soldiers.

University of Indonesia International Law expert Hikmahanto Juwana said UNIFIL’s investigation into the incident has to be independent.

“And at the right time we have to  clearly state who is responsible so there are no attempts to guess or protect those who should be held  responsible,” said Hikmahanto via text message, Wednesday April 1, 2026, reported Kompas.

Hikmahanto also said Indonesia has to ask countries and conflicting parties to provide strong protection for peacekeepers.

If there is no guarantee, Indonesia has to firmly say it will not contribute to peacekeeping forces in the future. “And if anyone falls victim to an attack, there has to be accountability,” he said.

The same thing was also said directly by Indonesia’s Permanent Representative of the UN, Umar, who was present at the emergency session of the UNSC held Tuesday March 31, 2026. In the session, the UNSC was also urged to take action over the results of the investigation by holding the perpetrators legally accountable.

Al-Jazeera

The latest UNSC statement, according to Al-Jazeera, said  “several incidents” have affected UNIFIL in southern Lebanon in recent days, including two deadly explosions, and that they happened “against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities along the Blue Line”.

The council “wished a speedy and full recovery to those who were injured” and “paid tribute to the dedication and service of all United Nations peacekeepers who risk their lives in the cause of international peace”.

Council members, including the US, also reaffirmed their “full support” for UNIFIL and “their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon”.

This post is based on reports from Kompas and Al-Jazeera.

In related news:

• Photos: Funeral ceremony for Indonesian peacekeeper killed in Lebanon, Al-Jazeera, April 5, 2026
• ISF Gaza: Indonesia to Form Key Component of International Force in Gaza, MFA
• Gaza Peace Summit, Indonesia’s Armed Forces Instructed to Ready Peacekeeping Forces, Kompas.com
• Indonesia Should Withdraw from BoP: Indonesian Ulema Council
• Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Plan Divides Muslims, Fulcrum, Singapore
• Op-Ed: Mesir Dalam Pusaran Gaza Oleh Lisa Anderson, Majalah Foreign Affairs

Reaksi Sosmed

https://twitter.com/pandji/status/2040728445966266647?s=20

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Op-Ed: So Much for Efficiency: The Empty Promise of Prabowo’s Diplomatic Travels, Tempo.co

So Much for Efficiency: The Empty Promise of Prabowo’s Diplomatic Travels

Tempo.co Editorial, April 1, 2026

When it comes to overseas trips, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto is an example of a leader who does not practice what he preaches. On a number of occasions, he has instructed his subordinates to cut back on overseas travel under the pretext of promoting budget efficiency. Cutting the costs of overseas service, he has argued, is a key way to save on unproductive budget outlays.

Instead of leading by example, however, Prabowo has gone back on his own word. On the contrary, he has frequently traveled abroad during the first 17 months of his government. Currently, he is visiting Japan and South Korea. Just a month ago, he was on a trip to the US, the UK, Jordan, and the UAE.

Counting from his inauguration in October 2024, Prabowo has conducted 49 overseas trips—the highest number of all previous presidents. During the same time frame, Joko Widodo went on 22 overseas visits, while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made 15 overseas trips.

These overseas visits clearly constitute a squandering of public funds—a practice Prabowo has loudly claimed he is actively eradicating. The Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios) has estimated the cost of a single presidential overseas visit can reach Rp. 20 billion ($1.2 million), covering everything from aircraft operational costs, accommodation, meals, and logistics, to protocol services.

During Prabowo’s time in office, the budget allocated for overseas official travel has ballooned. This is not solely due to the frequency of his trips, but also because of the sheer size of the entourage that accompanies him. When he first took office, he consistently utilized two aircraft configured for first-class travel. One plane was reserved for President Prabowo and his inner circle—his closest aides—such as Foreign Minister Sugiono and Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya. The second plane has been designated for the bureaucrats and diplomats accompanying the delegation. Prabowo has turned a blind eye to the situation, continuing his travels abroad even as the nation’s finances has come under pressure. By February 2026, the government had incurred a deficit of Rp 135 trillion ($8.1 billion). Meanwhile, the economic situation facing the public continues to be precarious. Yet, Prabowo has chosen to travel, incurring costs amounting to tens of billions of rupiah for a single trip.

As a result of these overseas trips, Prabowo has frequently neglected domestic issues that in reality demand priority attention from the central government. On several occasions, he has even chosen to fly to friendly nations despite critical domestic crises unfolding at home.

In early December 2025, he traveled to Pakistan and Russia just as floods and landslides were ravaging the regions of Aceh and North Sumatra. Prior to that, in August 2025, he decided to depart for China, even though demonstrations demanding the dissolution of Indonesia’s House of Representatives had just erupted in Jakarta and other major cities.

Prabowo claims his overseas visits are undertaken in the interest of the people and to boost the country’s economy. On his return from each trip, Prabowo and his team have asserted they have secured investment commitments totaling hundreds of trillions of rupiah. However, the cooperative agreements achieved have only been Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs); there has been no evidence of any tangible investment benefiting the Indonesian public.

The problem is it is difficult to realize these bilateral agreements when Prabowo acts on the diplomatic stage in isolation, making decisions entirely on his own. It has become common knowledge among diplomats that Prabowo and his team never involve career bureaucrats in their processes. He does not even share the details of agreements concluded for subsequent follow-up action.

If the success of overseas visits is to be measured by the yardstick of economic diplomacy, Prabowo could be deemed a complete failure. This is evident in the trade agreements reached with the United States; the reciprocal tariff agreement, in fact, ended up yielding greater benefits for the US.

Rather than shuttling back and forth across the globe without producing any concrete results, Prabowo should be focusing his efforts on resolving the myriad domestic issues facing the country. If Prabowo’s stated reason for traveling is to boost investment, he ought to first address the regularity environment, law enforcement, and governance issues—absolute prerequisites for facilitating ease of doing business and improving the investment climate.

Investment will flow in naturally once the variety of business bottlenecks are resolved, rendering it unnecessary for the President to frequently travel to other nations.

Without domestic reforms, Prabowo’s overseas tours will only serve to reinforce a widely held belief: that he simply enjoys traveling and is trying to establish his presence alongside other world leaders.

This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/diplomasi-indonesia-prabowo-subianto-2125784. Featured image credit: SecDef Prabowo Subianto at the Kremlin 31 July 2024 with Russian President Vladimir Putin (kemhan.go.id) https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/12/21461111/prabowo-dianggap-tepat-pilih-putin-daripada-ke-ktt-g7-di-rusia-jadi-tamu.

In related news:

• Cabinet Secretary Teddy: President Prabowo to Pray Eid al-Adha with Indonesian Citizens at Indonesia’s Embassy in Paris,
  Kompas.com, May 26, 2026
• Cabinet Secretary, ministerial salary cuts to be discussed soon, AntaraNews,  April 7, 2026
• Prabowo Meets Vladimir Putin in Russia, Kompas.com, December 10, 2025
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/12/17244081/prabowo-batal-ke-ktt-g7-pilih-temui-putin-di-rusia
• Russian security chief boosts ties with Indonesia’s Subianto, by Matt Ford with AP, AFP for Deutsche Welle, February 25, 2025
• Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Cairo gambit: A strategic pivot towards the Middle East, Middle East Monitor, April 15, 2025
• https://www.tempo.co/foto/arsip/setelah-larang-iphone-16-di-indonesia-presiden-prabowo-bahas-investasi-perusahaan-amerika-serikat-dengan-usindo-1167021
• https://islami.co/ironi-politik-luar-negeri-presiden-prabowo/
• https://open.spotify.com/episode/3uuEOwZ65LXDn4TiktGQ0M?si=mH58SS70SFWewaHuOnqeMA&t=2748
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-13/putin-highlights-economic-ties-at-talks-with-indonesia-s-prabowo
• https://www.tempo.co/info-tempo/kuasa-usaha-kedubes-irak-kunjungi-megawati-bahas-geopolitik-di-timur-tengah-2132092
• Prabowo Kenang Masa Muda Selalu ke Les Invalides Saat ke Paris, Kini Disambut Megah di Sana Kompas.com, 28 Mei 2026, Rahel Narda Chaterine, Jessi Carina
• Gerindra Respons Kritik soal Prabowo ke Perancis dan Program 1.098 Sapi Kurban Kompas.com, 28 Mei 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Jessi Carina
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/01/21130051/teddy-bongkar-alasan-prabowo-kerap-ke-luar-negeri-dunia-sedang-krisis-harus
• https://open.spotify.com/podcast-chapter/033uK8xuY7NiUH4oeBirCY?si=JIi5SeOeRLCpGaP9k2XU8w

Rate this:

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Op-Ed: So Much for Efficiency: The Empty Promise of Prabowo’s Diplomatic Travels, Tempo.co

So Much for Efficiency: The Empty Promise of Prabowo’s Diplomatic Travels

Tempo.co Editorial, April 1, 2026

When it comes to overseas trips, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto stands as an example of a leader who does not practice what he preaches. On a number of occasions, he has instructed his subordinates to cut back on overseas travel under the pretext of promoting budget efficiency. Cutting the costs of overseas service, he has argued, is a key way to save on unproductive budget outlays.

Instead of leading by example, however, Prabowo has gone back on his own word. On the contrary, he has frequently traveled abroad during the first 17 months of his government. Currently, he is visiting Japan and South Korea. Just a month ago, he was on a trip to the US, the UK, Jordan, and the UAE.

Counting from his inauguration in October 2024, Prabowo has conducted 49 overseas trips—the highest number of all previous presidents. During the same time frame, Joko Widodo went on 22 overseas visits, while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made 15 overseas trips.

These overseas visits clearly constitute a squandering of public funds—a practice Prabowo has loudly claimed he is actively eradicating. The Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios) has estimated the cost of a single presidential overseas visit can reach Rp. 20 billion ($1.2 million), covering everything from aircraft operational costs, accommodation, meals, and logistics, to protocol services.

During Prabowo’s time in office, the budget allocated for overseas official travel has ballooned. This is not solely due to the frequency of his trips, but also because of the sheer size of the entourage that accompanies him. When he first took office, he consistently utilized two aircraft configured for first-class travel. One plane was reserved for President Prabowo and his inner circle—his closest aides—such as Foreign Minister Sugiono and Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya. The second plane has been designated for the bureaucrats and diplomats accompanying the delegation. Prabowo has turned a blind eye to the situation, continuing his travels abroad even as the nation’s finances has come under pressure. By February 2026, the government had incurred a deficit of Rp 135 trillion ($8.1 billion). Meanwhile, the economic situation facing the public continues to be precarious. Yet, Prabowo has chosen to travel, incurring costs amounting to tens of billions of rupiah for a single trip.

As a result of these overseas trips, Prabowo has frequently neglected domestic issues that in reality demand priority attention from the central government. On several occasions, he has even chosen to fly to friendly nations despite critical domestic crises unfolding at home.

In early December 2025, he traveled to Pakistan and Russia just as floods and landslides were ravaging the regions of Aceh and North Sumatra. Prior to that, in August 2025, he decided to depart for China, even though demonstrations demanding the dissolution of Indonesia’s House of Representatives had just erupted in Jakarta and other major cities.

Prabowo claims his overseas visits are undertaken in the interest of the people and to boost the country’s economy. On his return from each trip, Prabowo and his team have asserted they have secured investment commitments totaling hundreds of trillions of rupiah. However, the cooperative agreements achieved have only been Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs); there has been no evidence of any tangible investment benefiting the Indonesian public.

The problem is it is difficult to realize these bilateral agreements when Prabowo acts on the diplomatic stage in isolation, making decisions entirely on his own. It has become common knowledge among diplomats that Prabowo and his team never involve career bureaucrats in their processes. He does not even share the details of agreements concluded for subsequent follow-up action.

If the success of overseas visits is to be measured by the yardstick of economic diplomacy, Prabowo could be deemed a complete failure. This is evident in the trade agreements reached with the United States; the reciprocal tariff agreement, in fact, ended up yielding greater benefits for the US.

Rather than shuttling back and forth across the globe without producing any concrete results, Prabowo should be focusing his efforts on resolving the myriad domestic issues facing the country. If Prabowo’s stated reason for traveling is to boost investment, he ought to first address the regularity environment, law enforcement, and governance issues—absolute prerequisites for facilitating ease of doing business and improving the investment climate.

Investment will flow in naturally once the variety of business bottlenecks are resolved, rendering it unnecessary for the President to frequently travel to other nations.

Without domestic reforms, Prabowo’s overseas tours will only serve to reinforce a widely held belief: that he simply enjoys traveling and is trying to establish his presence alongside other world leaders.

This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/diplomasi-indonesia-prabowo-subianto-2125784.

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Elections: Major Teddy Indra Wijaya, Defense Minister Prabowo’s Aide and President Widodo’s Former Aide, Creating Controversy, Kompas

Major Teddy Indra Wijaya, Defense Minister Prabowo’s Aide and President Joko Widodo’s Former Aide, Creating Controversy

By Fitria Chusna Farisa for Kompas.com, December 18, 2023

JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com – An aide to former Indonesian army general and Indonesia’s current Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, Major Teddy Indra Wijaya, has been attracting some attention.

The reason is his presence at the first nationally televised debate of the 2024 presidential election candidates, organized by Indonesia’s General Elections Commission (KPU) on Tuesday (12/12/2023).

The debate featured the three presidential candidates standing in the upcoming 2024 presidential election, including former army general and current Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto.

During the debate, Major Teddy was visible seated among the campaign team of Minister Prabowo Subianto and his vice presidential running mate, President Joko Widodo’s son, Mr. Gibran Rakabuming Raka. He was positioned right behind Mr. Gibran.

Major Teddy was also seated close to prominent members of the Prabowo-Gibran national campaign team, such as the Campaign Advisory Board members General (Retd.) Wiranto (a former aide to President Soeharto and former chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces) and General (Retd.) Agum Gumelar. He was dressed in light blue attire, matching the campaign style of clothing being used by Minister Prabowo and Mr. Gibran and members of their national campaign team.

Major Teddy’s presence at the presidential debate has sparked controversy because of his status as a serving member of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

Currently Indonesia’s Elections Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) is reviewing allegations that Major Teddy may have breached the neutrality of the Indonesian military in relation to involvement in elections.

“We are currently conducting an evaluation; we await the outcome today,” said the Chairman of the Elections Supervisory Board Mr. Rahmat Bagja, speaking in Central Jakarta’s Pasar Baru district on Monday (18/12/2023).

Mr. Bagja stated that this evaluation was at the Board’s own initiative. The Elections Supervisory Board conceded it was investigating several viral videos on social media concerning Major Teddy’s presence during the presidential debate.

However, Mr. Bagja said that the Elections Supervisory Board would only present allegations and recommendations regarding whether Major Teddy may have breached the neutrality of the military or not.

If proven, the authority to impose sanctions and penalties lies with the chief of the Armed Forces. “Whether sanctions are imposed or not is at the discretion of the Armed Forces chief. We will process allegations where allegations of breaches arise,” he said.

So who is Major Teddy?

Profile of Teddy Indra Wijaya

Major Teddy Indra Wijaya is an Indonesian Armed Forces officer who is a member of the Army’s Special Forces Command or Kopassus. He is an alumnus of Taruna Nusantara Senior High School in Magelang, Central Java.1

After completing high school, Teddy pursued further education at Indonesia’s Military Academy (Akmil) graduating in 2011.

With three years of military service, Major Teddy’s career soared. While holding the rank of First Lieutenant (Lettu), he was entrusted with the task of serving as an aide to President Joko Widodo during the President’s first term from 2014 to 2019. After this, he pursued further military education in the United States.

Ranger Tab

During his studies in the US, the Red Beret Corps soldier was remarkably successful. According to the official Armed Forces Army website, Major Teddy succeeded in achieving the ranger tab, indicating he meets the qualifications for elite US Army troops or the US Army Ranger School.

Ranger School itself is the most elite soldier education program in the US Army, producing US Army Ranger graduates for the 75th Ranger Regiment. The School operates a grueling selection process, including physical endurance, land navigation, tactical tests, and leadership assessments. The graduation rate ranges from 20 to 25 per cent of the total student population.

In November 2019, Major Teddy emerged as the top graduate of the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, earning the title of International Honor Graduate from among 185 officer students, consisting of 171 American officers, and 14 foreign officers.

On his return to Indonesia, Teddy, now holding the rank of Major, was entrusted with serving as an aide to Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto in President Joko Widodo’s “Advanced Indonesia Cabinet”.

Previously Mentioned by Prabowo

Recently Minister Prabowo referred in public to Major Teddy being a former aide to President Joko Widodo. This occurred during his attendance at a joint prayer event with clerics from Banten province, held at the residence of former Lebak district head Mr. Mulyadi Jayabaya on Sunday (3/12/2023).

During the event, Minister Prabowo spoke for over 35 minutes, during which time he quipped that he could have spoken for two hours, but that his aide, none other than Major Teddy, was already giving him the eye. It was then that Minister Prabowo revealed Teddy’s past as aide to President Widodo.

However, he said for reasons unknown, Major Teddy was now assigned to accompany him. “Ladies and gentlemen, my aide has been giving me the eye. Standing in front of me, his eyes are fixed on me. He used to be Jokowi’s (President Joko Widodo’s) aide. But for some reason he’s now been assigned to me,” Minister Prabowo stated.

Minister Prabowo then discussed the direction of President Widodo’s support in the 2024 presidential election. He admitted that he wouldn’t dare to claim that President Widido supported him, but he would let the public make their own assumptions based on the aide currently supporting him.

“I dare not claim and cannot say that President Jokowi (Joko Widodo) supports me. But, perhaps you can figure it out for yourself,” said Minister Prabowo, who was met with applause.

This article is based on https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/12/18/16300231/sosok-mayor-teddy-ajudan-prabowo-eks-ajudan-jokowi-yang-kini-tuai. Featured image credit: Teddy Indra Wijaya (left) still holding the rank of major, accompanying (then) Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto at the Presidential Palace, Jakarta, July 8, 2024 (Tempo/Subekti) https://www.tempo.co/politik/komunikasi-prabowo-teddy-indra-wijaya-2081010.

Meanwhile in social media

https://twitter.com/kompascom/status/2041475912445968595?s=20

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• https://open.spotify.com/episode/3cmtKiSHMmVL5heSgmNGgz?si=40d2Qv5mQti_Lc7OLBVOxg
• https://www.tempo.co/video/arsip/bisakah-amien-rais-dijerat-pidana-menuduh-teddy-wijaya-gay-2134543
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• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/30/21530221/letkol-teddy-beri-kejutan-ajak-siswa-sekolah-rakyat-nonton-paskibraka-di
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• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/13/11512301/profil-mayor-teddy-dari-ajudan-jokowi-prabowo-hingga-jadi-wadanyonif-para
• https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1863038/prabowo-dan-mayor-teddy-kenakan-baret-merah-saat-hut-kopassus-siapa-saja-yang-boleh-memakainya
• https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1860082/namanya-disebut-di-sidang-mk-soal-netralitas-tni-berikut-profil-mayor-teddy-ajudan-prabowo
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• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/12/18/16205611/bawaslu-sebut-panglima-tni-yang-berwenang-beri-sanksi-ke-ajudan-prabowo
• https://www.kompas.com/tag/mayor-teddy-indra-wijaya
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• https://video.kompas.com/watch/1100893/adc-prabowo-mayor-teddy-tertangkap-kamera-hadiri-debat-capres-ini-respons-bawaslu

https://youtu.be/mC9Laq5gcQk?si=dT5GisTtMttczg56

Footnotes:

1. Taruna Nusantara – “Patriots of The Archipelago” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taruna_Nusantara. ↩︎

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Indonesia Should Withdraw from BoP: Indonesian Ulema Council

US-Israel Attack on Iran: MUI Urges Indonesian Government to Withdraw from Board of Peace for Gaza

Indonesian Ulema Council, March 1, 2026

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) officially urged the Indonesian government to withdraw from the US Board of Peace (BoP) for Gaza, in a statement released March 1, 2026. The statement was issued by the MUI in response to the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026.

The MUI said the US, which is playing a central role in the management of the Palestinian conflict through the BoP, faces a major question. Is this strategy really aimed at a just peace, or just strengthening an unequal security architecture, and burying Palestinian independence?

“For this reason, the MUI urges the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the BoP, and believes it has been ineffective in realizing true independence in Palestine,” the MUI said in a statement issued on Sunday March 1, 2026.

MUI statement No. Kep-28/DP-MUI/III/2026 was signed by MUI Chair KH Anwar Iskandar and Secretary General Buya Amirsyah Tambunan.

The MUI believes in fact the opposite is occurring. US President Donald Trump is carrying out a joint attack against Iran with Israel, triggering a regional war involving a number of countries, both directly and through proxies.

The MUI calls on Muslims around the world to continue to pray for Almighty God’s assistance and protection for Muslims experiencing hardship, oppression, and disaster in different parts of the world.

“The MUI calls on the UN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to take maximum steps to stop the war and respect international law. The MUI believes that war will bring global harm,” said the statement.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran have resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) expresses its deep condolences for the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader and prays for his eternal rest.

The MUI condemned the US-backed Israeli attacks because they conflict with humanitarian values ​​and the Preamble to Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution which countries “to participate in establishing a world order based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice.”

The MUI understands that Iran’s attacks against Gulf states are retaliation for the US and Israeli attacks targeting military bases. According to the MUI, Iran’s retaliatory attacks are justified, and protected by international law.

“Therefore, to avoid a wider escalation, the US and Israel must halt attacks on Iran as they violate Article 2 (4) of the UN Declaration.”

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) considers the Israeli and US military attacks on Iran, which Iran has subsequently responded to, constitute a serious escalation with the potential to drag the Middle East into a wider conflict.

Not an isolated incident

“This situation should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but rather it should be seen as part of a larger geopolitical configuration. It is the duty and responsibility of all countries to achieve peace in order to provide maximum protection for civilians,” it stated.

Strategic motive

The MUI believes the strategic motive behind the attacks is a systematic attempt to weaken Iran’s strategic position in the region, and limit Iranian support for the struggle for Palestinian independence.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the MUI encourages countries to act as peacemakers in order to prevent military attacks with the potential to serve as instruments of political pressure aimed at securing Israel’s regional dominance over Palestine.

This post is based on https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-dan-israel-serang-iran-mui-desak-pemerintah-ri-mundur-dari-board-of-peace and https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-israel-serang-iran-majelis-ulama-indonesia-sampaikan-10-tausiyah. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times.

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In earlier news…

Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble

By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025

(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….

Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.

In related news:

• https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/19/trump-gaza-military-plan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/02/10/13031811/indonesia-jangan-kirim-pasukan-perdamaian-ke-gaza
• Indonesia to Fill ISF Gaza Deputy Commander, Ready to Send 8,000 Personnel, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Fika Nurul Ulya, Ardito Ramadhan (Indonesian)
• House Speaker Puan Defends Prabowo Attending Gaza Peace Summit Despite Israel’s Presence, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Dani Prabowo (Indonesian)
• Pakistan Refuses to Rush to Send Troops to Gaza, Avoids Missions Other Than Peacekeeping, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Irawan Sapto Adhi (Indonesian)
• Prabowo Attends Gaza Peace Board Summit in the US Today, Signs Trump Tariffs Deal, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Robertus Belarminus (Indonesian)
• Civil Society Coalition Criticizes Indonesia’s US Foreign Policy for Lack of Public Involvement, NU Online, 2 March 2026, Mufidah Adzkia (Indonesian)
• https://www.tempo.co/politik/indonesia-keanggotaan-dewan-perdamaian-perang-iran-israel-2119105
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises

***

The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace

By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026

Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.

This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.

However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.

Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.

Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.com

When the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?

A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.

Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.

Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.

What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.

Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.

The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.

By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?

International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.

If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?

In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.

This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.

Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.

Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.

The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.

A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.

PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain

In related news:

• Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
• Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
• Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
• Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
• “Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/

Rate this:

#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #InternationalLaw #Islam #israel #palestina #Palestine #PBB #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion #un #UnitedNations #UnitedStates

Indonesia Should Withdraw from BoP: Indonesian Ulema Council

US-Israel Attack on Iran: MUI Urges Indonesian Government to Withdraw from Board of Peace for Gaza

Indonesian Ulema Council, March 1, 2026

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) officially urged the Indonesian government to withdraw from the US Board of Peace (BoP) for Gaza, in a statement released March 1, 2026. The statement was issued by the MUI in response to the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026.

The MUI said the US, which is playing a central role in the management of the Palestinian conflict through the BoP, faces a major question. Is this strategy really aimed at a just peace, or just strengthening an unequal security architecture, and burying Palestinian independence?

“For this reason, the MUI urges the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the BoP, and believes it has been ineffective in realizing true independence in Palestine,” the MUI said in a statement issued on Sunday March 1, 2026.

MUI statement No. Kep-28/DP-MUI/III/2026 was signed by MUI Chair KH Anwar Iskandar and Secretary General Buya Amirsyah Tambunan.

The MUI believes in fact the opposite is occurring. US President Donald Trump is carrying out a joint attack against Iran with Israel, triggering a regional war involving a number of countries, both directly and through proxies.

The MUI calls on Muslims around the world to continue to pray for Almighty God’s assistance and protection for Muslims experiencing hardship, oppression, and disaster in different parts of the world.

“The MUI calls on the UN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to take maximum steps to stop the war and respect international law. The MUI believes that war will bring global harm,” said the statement.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran have resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) expresses its deep condolences for the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader and prays for his eternal rest.

The MUI condemned the US-backed Israeli attacks because they conflict with humanitarian values ​​and the Preamble to Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution which countries “to participate in establishing a world order based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice.”

The MUI understands that Iran’s attacks against Gulf states are retaliation for the US and Israeli attacks targeting military bases. According to the MUI, Iran’s retaliatory attacks are justified, and protected by international law.

“Therefore, to avoid a wider escalation, the US and Israel must halt attacks on Iran as they violate Article 2 (4) of the UN Declaration.”

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) considers the Israeli and US military attacks on Iran, which Iran has subsequently responded to, constitute a serious escalation with the potential to drag the Middle East into a wider conflict.

Not an isolated incident

“This situation should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but rather it should be seen as part of a larger geopolitical configuration. It is the duty and responsibility of all countries to achieve peace in order to provide maximum protection for civilians,” it stated.

Strategic motive

The MUI believes the strategic motive behind the attacks is a systematic attempt to weaken Iran’s strategic position in the region, and limit Iranian support for the struggle for Palestinian independence.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the MUI encourages countries to act as peacemakers in order to prevent military attacks with the potential to serve as instruments of political pressure aimed at securing Israel’s regional dominance over Palestine.

This post is based on https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-dan-israel-serang-iran-mui-desak-pemerintah-ri-mundur-dari-board-of-peace and https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-israel-serang-iran-majelis-ulama-indonesia-sampaikan-10-tausiyah. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times.

In related news:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/04/12051261/surya-paloh-sebut-indonesia-tetap-di-board-of-peace-kecuali-dievaluasi-ulang
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/04/10164811/gelombang-desakan-agar-indonesia-hengkang-dari-board-of-peace-usai-serangan
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises
• https://islami.co/board-of-peace-konsesi-tambang-dan-hegemoni-atas-ormas-islam/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/05/23531921/kumpulkan-ulama-prabowo-tekankan-persatuan-di-tengah-konflik-timur-tengah
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/05/23152941/kata-jimly-dan-gus-yahya-soal-prabowo-berbelasungkawa-untuk-khamenei
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/06/11280041/bukan-bop-waketum-mui-dorong-peran-pbb-dan-oki-damaikan-as-dengan-iran
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/06/10515321/ri-gabung-board-of-peace-muhadjir-kita-sekarang-mencoba-berjuang-dari-dalam
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/06/10445261/prabowo-ajak-ulama-dan-tokoh-ormas-islam-rapatkan-barisan-dukung-perdamaian
• https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/momen-keakraban-prabowo-dengan-ketum-mui-rais-aam-nu-dan-ketum-muhammadiyah
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-06/indonesia-says-pakistan-uae-back-prabowo-bid-for-iran-mediation
• https://open.spotify.com/episode/0tCWPoPhars03hdd3lJ12L?si=_CrDi40mSlmLB35WX25y7g
• https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/trump-iran-religious-war-crusades/
• https://www.hrw.org/id/news/2026/01/27/trumps-board-of-peace-puts-rights-abusers-in-charge-of-global-order
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/22/16501021/prabowo-tegaskan-tak-pernah-janji-sumbang-1-miliar-dollar-untuk-board-of
• https://www.kompas.com/tag/iuran-1-miliar-dollar?type=artikel
• https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/mar/30/world-without-rules-un-security-council-global-order
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/25/14442581/mantan-dubes-ri-ungkap-kekecewaan-iran-terhadap-sikap-indonesia
• https://islami.co/kenapa-nahdlyin-akar-rumput-tolak-board-of-peace-beda-dengan-ketum-pbnu-yang-justru-merangkul/

In earlier news…

Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble

By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025

(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….

Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.

In related news:

• https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/19/trump-gaza-military-plan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/02/10/13031811/indonesia-jangan-kirim-pasukan-perdamaian-ke-gaza
• Indonesia to Fill ISF Gaza Deputy Commander, Ready to Send 8,000 Personnel, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Fika Nurul Ulya, Ardito Ramadhan (Indonesian)
• House Speaker Puan Defends Prabowo Attending Gaza Peace Summit Despite Israel’s Presence, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Dani Prabowo (Indonesian)
• Pakistan Refuses to Rush to Send Troops to Gaza, Avoids Missions Other Than Peacekeeping, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Irawan Sapto Adhi (Indonesian)
• Prabowo Attends Gaza Peace Board Summit in the US Today, Signs Trump Tariffs Deal, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Robertus Belarminus (Indonesian)
• Civil Society Coalition Criticizes Indonesia’s US Foreign Policy for Lack of Public Involvement, NU Online, 2 March 2026, Mufidah Adzkia (Indonesian)
• https://www.tempo.co/politik/indonesia-keanggotaan-dewan-perdamaian-perang-iran-israel-2119105
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises

***

The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace

By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026

Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.

This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.

However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.

Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.

Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.com

When the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?

A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.

Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.

Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.

What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.

Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.

The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.

By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?

International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.

If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?

In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.

This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.

Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.

Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.

The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.

A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.

PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain

In related news:

• Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
• Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
• Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
• Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
• “Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/

Rate this:

#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #InternationalLaw #Islam #israel #palestina #Palestine #PBB #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion #un #UnitedNations #UnitedStates

Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble by Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera

Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble

By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025

(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….

Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.

In related news:

• https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/19/trump-gaza-military-plan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/02/10/13031811/indonesia-jangan-kirim-pasukan-perdamaian-ke-gaza
• Indonesia to Fill ISF Gaza Deputy Commander, Ready to Send 8,000 Personnel, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Fika Nurul Ulya, Ardito Ramadhan (Indonesian)
• House Speaker Puan Defends Prabowo Attending Gaza Peace Summit Despite Israel’s Presence, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Dani Prabowo (Indonesian)
• Pakistan Refuses to Rush to Send Troops to Gaza, Avoids Missions Other Than Peacekeeping, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Irawan Sapto Adhi (Indonesian)
• Prabowo Attends Gaza Peace Board Summit in the US Today, Signs Trump Tariffs Deal, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Robertus Belarminus (Indonesian)
• Civil Society Coalition Criticizes Indonesia’s US Foreign Policy for Lack of Public Involvement, NU Online, 2 March 2026, Mufidah Adzkia (Indonesian)
• https://www.tempo.co/politik/indonesia-keanggotaan-dewan-perdamaian-perang-iran-israel-2119105
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises

In earlier news…

The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace

By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026

Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.

This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.

However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.

Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.

Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.com

When the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?

A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.

Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.

Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.

What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.

Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.

The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.

By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?

International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.

If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?

In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.

This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.

Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.

Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.

The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.

A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.

PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain

In related news:

• Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
• Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
• Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
• Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
• “Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/

Rate this:

#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #InternationalLaw #palestina #Palestine #PBB #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #un #UnitedNations #UnitedStates

Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble by Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera

Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble

By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025

(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….

Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.

In related news:

• https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/19/trump-gaza-military-plan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/02/10/13031811/indonesia-jangan-kirim-pasukan-perdamaian-ke-gaza
• Indonesia to Fill ISF Gaza Deputy Commander, Ready to Send 8,000 Personnel, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Fika Nurul Ulya, Ardito Ramadhan (Indonesian)
• House Speaker Puan Defends Prabowo Attending Gaza Peace Summit Despite Israel’s Presence, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Dani Prabowo (Indonesian)
• Pakistan Refuses to Rush to Send Troops to Gaza, Avoids Missions Other Than Peacekeeping, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Irawan Sapto Adhi (Indonesian)
• Prabowo Attends Gaza Peace Board Summit in the US Today, Signs Trump Tariffs Deal, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Robertus Belarminus (Indonesian)
• Civil Society Coalition Criticizes Indonesia’s US Foreign Policy for Lack of Public Involvement, NU Online, 2 March 2026, Mufidah Adzkia (Indonesian)
• https://www.tempo.co/politik/indonesia-keanggotaan-dewan-perdamaian-perang-iran-israel-2119105
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises

In earlier news…

The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace

By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026

Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.

This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.

However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.

Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.

Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.com

When the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?

A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.

Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.

Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.

What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.

Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.

The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.

By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?

International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.

If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?

In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.

This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.

Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.

Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.

The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.

A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.

PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain

In related news:

• Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
• Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
• Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
• Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
• “Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/

Rate this:

#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #InternationalLaw #palestina #Palestine #PBB #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #un #UnitedNations #UnitedStates

ISF Gaza: Indonesia to Form Key Component of International Force in Gaza, MFA

Indonesia to Form Key Component of International Force in Gaza, Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Voice of Indonesia

By Ahmad Fauzi Iyabu for VOI, October 23, 2025

VOI JAKARTA – The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Indonesia is ready to send peacekeeping troops to the Gaza Strip, with preparations and coordination currently underway, emphasizing that the deployment would be carried out under a United Nations auspices.

Indonesian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang said this in response to Arab media reports that Indonesia would be one of the countries serving as a key component of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in the Gaza Strip.

“The Indonesian government continues to closely monitor developments in Gaza and fully supports post-war reconstruction efforts,” Yvonne told Indonesia’s government owned overseas news service Voice of Indonesia (VOI.id) on Thursday, October 23.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang. (VOI/Fauzi)

“As Indonesia’s President indicated in his speech at the recent UN General Assembly, Indonesia stands ready to contribute concretely by sending peacekeeping troops, should the UN Security Council produce an official mandate,” she said.

Earlier, Arab media outlets reported, citing sources familiar with the ISF, that Egypt is expected to lead a joint international force in Gaza under a UN Security Council mandate.

According to Saudi English-language news service Arab News, the contingent would include Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the Abu Dhabi-based English language news outlet, The National, citing sources familiar with the matter, claimed that the number of troops deployed from the four countries would be around 4,000. However, the distribution of troops from each of the countries cited was not specified.

The Nation reported its sources said, “the International Stabilisation Force will be made up of at least 4,000 troops from Egypt, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Indonesia. Egypt, in collaboration with the US, will be seeking a UN Security Council resolution establishing the force and spelling out its mandate.”

Quoting President Prabowo’s address regarding Indonesia’s readiness to send 20,000 troops at the 80th UN General Assembly last month, Yvonne said that preparations and coordination are currently underway.

“Currently, Indonesia is in the preparation and coordination stage between agencies. In principle, every deployment takes place in accord with UN decisions following UN frameworks,” Yvonne stated.

“The Indonesian President has expressed Indonesia’s readiness to send 20,000 peacekeepers. Naturally implementation will be adjusted to the needs and mandate set by the UN,” she concluded.

Meanwhile, The Guardian reported over the weekend that the proposed force would have broad powers similar to those granted to international forces in Haiti to combat armed groups. According to the Guardian, “Turkey, Indonesia and Azerbaijan are also being billed alongside Egypt as the main troop contributors. Egypt is still being consulted on whether the force should be a full UN-led operation.”

Washington is reported to support a UN mandate for the mission, without making it a full-fledged UN peacekeeping operation.

The National’s sources, however, said the force would not include heavy weapons, relying solely on self-defense firearms and armored vehicles.

The force would initially be deployed in areas from which the Israeli military has withdrawn under the first phase of the plan, the sources claimed.

The force would later expand its deployment area as the Israeli military forces further withdrawals under the plan.

They would work alongside approximately 3,000 Palestinians appointed by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority. The Palestinians would be responsible for intelligence gathering and preventive security in Gaza, the sources said.

Some of them have been trained by Egypt and Jordan. However, the ISF troops would not enter the proposed Israeli security line, which would run along the Gaza side of the border, extending 1.5 km in depth in some areas.

The proposed force’s mandate is to include overseeing the construction of a field hospital to take account of the significant damage to health facilities in the area. The force is also to be mandated to repair bakeries and other vital infrastructure.

The deployment of the stabilization force as known is to be part of the second phase of United States’ peace proposal, which includes potentially problematic steps such as Hamas’ disarmament, long-term ceasefire negotiations, Hamas’ future, and Gaza’s post-war governance.

Yvonne emphasized that Indonesia’s willingness to participate affirms the country’s principle of having an independent and active foreign policy.

“The step affirms Indonesia’s commitment to continuing to play an active role in maintaining peace and assisting in the reconstruction of Gaza in accordance with the country’s principles of an independent and active foreign policy and based on an international mandate,” Yvonne concluded.

Meanwhile, senior researcher at Indonesia’s National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Irine Hiraswari Gayatri, commented separately in an opinion piece for NU Online, “Even if Indonesia deploys peacekeepers or engages in mediation, the outcomes could be mixed or counterproductive. A failed peacekeeping mission, for instance, might tarnish Indonesia’s reputation rather than enhance it.”

This post is based on https://voi.id/berita/526762/indonesia-dikabarkan-akan-menjadi-komponen-utama-pasukan-internasional-di-gaza-begini-penjelasan-kemlu. Featured image credit: UN troops from Indonesia. (Wikimedia Commons/3116 akbarur ilmi).

In related news:

• https://nu.or.id/opini/indonesia-s-middle-east-dilemma-can-moral-diplomacy-deliver-real-peace-MWBw5
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/06/09/op-ed-indonesias-gaza-plan-divides-muslims-fulcrum-singapore/
• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/18/egypt-expected-to-lead-global-stabilisation-force-in-gaza-say-diplomats
• https://dawnmena.org/un-security-council-impose-arms-embargo-end-to-siege-and-fact-finding-mission-in-international-stabilization-force-resolution
• https://nu.or.id/nasional/pbb-desak-israel-patuhi-putusan-baru-mahkamah-internasional-soal-gaza-WYKp3
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-aims-international-gaza-force-deployment-early-next-year-say-us-officials-2025-12-12/
• https://dawnmena.org/u-s-advocacy-groups-urge-united-states-and-partners-to-reject-azerbaijani-role-in-gaza-security-force/
• Jordanian, Indonesian leaders urge dialogue to ease regional tensions, Xinhua, 2026-02-26
• https://kemlu.go.id/berita/berita/penjelasan-posisi-indonesia-terkait-isf
• https://www.tempo.co/politik/ini-empat-batasan-nasional-indonesia-untuk-misi-isf-di-gaza-2117229
• https://m.antaranews.com/video/5442910/kemlu-ungkap-empat-batasan-nasional-tni-untuk-isf-di-gaza

Rate this:

#ArmedForces #Artikel #Colonialism #Decolonization #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #Indonesia #inspiration #InternationalLaw #News #NU #palestina #Palestine #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto

ISF Gaza: Indonesia to Form Key Component of International Force in Gaza, MFA

Indonesia to Form Key Component of International Force in Gaza, Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Voice of Indonesia

By Ahmad Fauzi Iyabu for VOI, October 23, 2025

VOI JAKARTA – The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Indonesia is ready to send peacekeeping troops to the Gaza Strip, with preparations and coordination currently underway, emphasizing that the deployment would be carried out under a United Nations auspices.

Indonesian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang said this in response to Arab media reports that Indonesia would be one of the countries serving as a key component of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in the Gaza Strip.

“The Indonesian government continues to closely monitor developments in Gaza and fully supports post-war reconstruction efforts,” Yvonne told Indonesia’s government owned overseas news service Voice of Indonesia (VOI.id) on Thursday, October 23.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yvonne Mewengkang. (VOI/Fauzi)

“As Indonesia’s President indicated in his speech at the recent UN General Assembly, Indonesia stands ready to contribute concretely by sending peacekeeping troops, should the UN Security Council produce an official mandate,” she said.

Earlier, Arab media outlets reported, citing sources familiar with the ISF, that Egypt is expected to lead a joint international force in Gaza under a UN Security Council mandate.

According to Saudi English-language news service Arab News, the contingent would include Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the Abu Dhabi-based English language news outlet, The National, citing sources familiar with the matter, claimed that the number of troops deployed from the four countries would be around 4,000. However, the distribution of troops from each of the countries cited was not specified.

The Nation reported its sources said, “the International Stabilisation Force will be made up of at least 4,000 troops from Egypt, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Indonesia. Egypt, in collaboration with the US, will be seeking a UN Security Council resolution establishing the force and spelling out its mandate.”

Quoting President Prabowo’s address regarding Indonesia’s readiness to send 20,000 troops at the 80th UN General Assembly last month, Yvonne said that preparations and coordination are currently underway.

“Currently, Indonesia is in the preparation and coordination stage between agencies. In principle, every deployment takes place in accord with UN decisions following UN frameworks,” Yvonne stated.

“The Indonesian President has expressed Indonesia’s readiness to send 20,000 peacekeepers. Naturally implementation will be adjusted to the needs and mandate set by the UN,” she concluded.

Meanwhile, The Guardian reported over the weekend that the proposed force would have broad powers similar to those granted to international forces in Haiti to combat armed groups. According to the Guardian, “Turkey, Indonesia and Azerbaijan are also being billed alongside Egypt as the main troop contributors. Egypt is still being consulted on whether the force should be a full UN-led operation.”

Washington is reported to support a UN mandate for the mission, without making it a full-fledged UN peacekeeping operation.

The National’s sources, however, said the force would not include heavy weapons, relying solely on self-defense firearms and armored vehicles.

The force would initially be deployed in areas from which the Israeli military has withdrawn under the first phase of the plan, the sources claimed.

The force would later expand its deployment area as the Israeli military forces further withdrawals under the plan.

They would work alongside approximately 3,000 Palestinians appointed by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority. The Palestinians would be responsible for intelligence gathering and preventive security in Gaza, the sources said.

Some of them have been trained by Egypt and Jordan. However, the ISF troops would not enter the proposed Israeli security line, which would run along the Gaza side of the border, extending 1.5 km in depth in some areas.

The proposed force’s mandate is to include overseeing the construction of a field hospital to take account of the significant damage to health facilities in the area. The force is also to be mandated to repair bakeries and other vital infrastructure.

The deployment of the stabilization force as known is to be part of the second phase of United States’ peace proposal, which includes potentially problematic steps such as Hamas’ disarmament, long-term ceasefire negotiations, Hamas’ future, and Gaza’s post-war governance.

Yvonne emphasized that Indonesia’s willingness to participate affirms the country’s principle of having an independent and active foreign policy.

“The step affirms Indonesia’s commitment to continuing to play an active role in maintaining peace and assisting in the reconstruction of Gaza in accordance with the country’s principles of an independent and active foreign policy and based on an international mandate,” Yvonne concluded.

Meanwhile, senior researcher at Indonesia’s National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Irine Hiraswari Gayatri, commented separately in an opinion piece for NU Online, “Even if Indonesia deploys peacekeepers or engages in mediation, the outcomes could be mixed or counterproductive. A failed peacekeeping mission, for instance, might tarnish Indonesia’s reputation rather than enhance it.”

This post is based on https://voi.id/berita/526762/indonesia-dikabarkan-akan-menjadi-komponen-utama-pasukan-internasional-di-gaza-begini-penjelasan-kemlu. Featured image credit: UN troops from Indonesia. (Wikimedia Commons/3116 akbarur ilmi).

In related news:

• https://nu.or.id/opini/indonesia-s-middle-east-dilemma-can-moral-diplomacy-deliver-real-peace-MWBw5
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/06/09/op-ed-indonesias-gaza-plan-divides-muslims-fulcrum-singapore/
• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/18/egypt-expected-to-lead-global-stabilisation-force-in-gaza-say-diplomats
• https://dawnmena.org/un-security-council-impose-arms-embargo-end-to-siege-and-fact-finding-mission-in-international-stabilization-force-resolution
• https://nu.or.id/nasional/pbb-desak-israel-patuhi-putusan-baru-mahkamah-internasional-soal-gaza-WYKp3
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-aims-international-gaza-force-deployment-early-next-year-say-us-officials-2025-12-12/
• https://dawnmena.org/u-s-advocacy-groups-urge-united-states-and-partners-to-reject-azerbaijani-role-in-gaza-security-force/
• Jordanian, Indonesian leaders urge dialogue to ease regional tensions, Xinhua, 2026-02-26
• https://kemlu.go.id/berita/berita/penjelasan-posisi-indonesia-terkait-isf
• https://www.tempo.co/politik/ini-empat-batasan-nasional-indonesia-untuk-misi-isf-di-gaza-2117229
• https://m.antaranews.com/video/5442910/kemlu-ungkap-empat-batasan-nasional-tni-untuk-isf-di-gaza

Rate this:

#ArmedForces #Artikel #Colonialism #Decolonization #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #Indonesia #inspiration #InternationalLaw #News #NU #palestina #Palestine #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto

Reblog: The Onset of ‘De-Jokowi-sation’ in Indonesian Politics? by Made Supriatma for Fulcrum.sg

Eight months into the job, President Prabowo Subianto appears to have started trimming the sails of his powerful predecessor.

After nearly a month of mounting controversy, a group calling itself the Forum of Retired TNI Soldiers (FPP) has submitted a letter to Indonesia’s Parliament and People’s Consultative Assembly, urging the initiation of impeachment proceedings against Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka. President Prabowo Subianto has signalled…

The Onset of ‘De-Jokowi-sation’ in Indonesian Politics?

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• Prabowo and Jokowi’s cozy relationship in Solo, dismissing rumors of a breakup? Kompas.com (Indonesian) 22 July 2025
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/02/22295951/profil-lodewyk-pusung-eks-pangdam-yang-dicopot-dari-wakil-kepala-bgn
• https://www.tempo.co/mingguan/edisi/8289

Hot and Cold Prabowo-Jokowi, Tempo Magazine 21 June 2026 Edition

Rate this:

#Djojohadikusumo #FriedRice #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #Jokowi #Jokowism #MadeSupriatma #News #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto

Journal Article: Narratives To Power, by South East Asia Research SOAS UoL

Narratives to power: The case of the Djojohadikusumo family dynasty over four generations

By Jemma Purdey & Jemma Purdey, South East Asia Research SOAS UoL, October 18, 2018

Abstract

At all levels of politics in Indonesia today, political families have a central place. The families of previous presidents and dynasties in regional and local politics have all been central to Indonesia’s decentralised and increasingly personality-driven democracy.

This article presents preliminary work on a biographical study of one of Indonesia’s most prominent and enduring political dynasties, the Djojohadikusumo family, who have held positions of power in key national institutions across four generations.

The study aims to improve our understanding of how this family has conceived itself within political structures as they have shifted over four generations. What characteristics of the dynasty can be identified as enabling its adaptability? How much do external and structural forces sustain the dynasty as a central player? And how much is it sustained by characteristics that are internal, historical, psychological, and culturally specific to the family unit?

Notes

1. Mackie J (2010) Patrimonialism: The new order and beyond. In: Aspinall E and G. Fealy (eds) Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy. Acton: ANU ePress, pp. 81–98.

2. Robison R and Hadiz V (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon; Aspinall E (2005) Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Aspinall E (2005) Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia. South East Asia Research 13(2): 117–156; Buehler M (2010) Decentralisation and local democracy in Indonesia: The marginalisation of the public sphere. In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 267–185; Choi N (2011) Local Politics in Indonesia: Pathways to Power. London: Routledge; Winters JA (2011) Oligarchy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; Ford M and Pepinsky TB (2013) Beyond oligarchy? Critical exchanges on political power and material inequality in Indonesia. Indonesia 96(1): 1–9.

3. Sidel JT (2005) Bossism and democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an alternative framework for the study of “local strongmen”. In: Harris J, Stokke K and Tornquist O (eds) Politicising Democracy: Local Politics and Democratisation in Developing Countries. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51–74.

4. Heryanto A (2010) Entertainment, domestication and dispersal: Street politics as popular culture. In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 181–198; Tomsa D (2010) The Indonesian party system after the 2009 elections: Towards stability? In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 141–159.

5. Buehler (2010); Sidel (2005).

6. Erb M and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds) (2009) Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada). Singapore: ISEAS; Buehler M (2013) Married with children. Inside Indonesia 112. Available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/married-with-children.

7. Chen J and Adhi Priamarizki (2014) Why abolishing direct local elections undermines Indonesia’s democracy. East Asia Forum, 9 October. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/10/09/why-abolishing-direct-local-elections-undermines-indonesias-democracy/.

8. Purdey J (2014) US back flip Modi ban a fillip for Prabowo. Jakarta Post, 23 May. Available at: http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/23/us-backflip-modi-ban-a-fillip-prabowo.html.

…

South East Asia Research Volume 24, 2016 – Issue 3: Special issue: Political families in Southeast Asia; Cite this article: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659728

Featured image credit “Lebaran Dinasti Jokowi” Karya Kartunis Tempo Yuyun Nurrachman.

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https://twitter.com/detikcom/status/1843000773388685687

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/20/21080041/prabowo-ngaku-emosional-dengar-kata-psi-dulu-ayah-saya-pernah-jadi-ketua-psi
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/07/19/06255511/pelantikan-3-wamen-dianggap-demi-kepentingan-politik-jokowi-dan-prabowo
• https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html and https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2010/07/21/journal-article-narratives-to-power-by-south-east-asia-research-soas-uol-copy/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2023/11/21/elections-titiek-soeharto-joins-prabowo-gibrans-campaign-team-as-advisor-luhuts-nephew-appointed-treasurer/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/06/08/17330871/kekayaan-fantastis-rita-widyasari-eks-bupati-kukar-yang-puluhan-mobil-dan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/04/25/11284961/csis-mayoritas-caleg-muda-terpilih-di-dpr-terindikasi-dinasti-politik
• https://majalah.tempo.co/read/kartun/171255/lebaran-dinasti-jokowi
• Elections: “Dynasty Politics” of President Joko Widodo Rejected by Students, Tempo
• Post-Election: The History of House Inquiry Committees (Hak Angket DPR)
• Married with children, Inside Indonesia
• https://www.newmandala.org/memorys-muse/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/01/17231281/fahri-hamzah-dan-murid-sumitro-dirikan-sumitro-institute-hidupkan-lagi

Rate this:

#Asia #Democracy #Development #Djojohadikusumo #ElectionCampaign #Elections #History #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #Megawati #News #Pembangunan #Pemilu1997 #Pemilu2014 #Pemilu2019 #Pemilu2024 #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PolitikDinasti #PrabowoGibran #Puan

Journal Article: Narratives To Power, by South East Asia Research SOAS UoL

Narratives to power: The case of the Djojohadikusumo family dynasty over four generations

By Jemma Purdey & Jemma Purdey, South East Asia Research SOAS UoL, October 18, 2018

Abstract

At all levels of politics in Indonesia today, political families have a central place. The families of previous presidents and dynasties in regional and local politics have all been central to Indonesia’s decentralised and increasingly personality-driven democracy.

This article presents preliminary work on a biographical study of one of Indonesia’s most prominent and enduring political dynasties, the Djojohadikusumo family, who have held positions of power in key national institutions across four generations.

The study aims to improve our understanding of how this family has conceived itself within political structures as they have shifted over four generations. What characteristics of the dynasty can be identified as enabling its adaptability? How much do external and structural forces sustain the dynasty as a central player? And how much is it sustained by characteristics that are internal, historical, psychological, and culturally specific to the family unit?

Notes

1. Mackie J (2010) Patrimonialism: The new order and beyond. In: Aspinall E and G. Fealy (eds) Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy. Acton: ANU ePress, pp. 81–98.

2. Robison R and Hadiz V (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon; Aspinall E (2005) Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Aspinall E (2005) Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia. South East Asia Research 13(2): 117–156; Buehler M (2010) Decentralisation and local democracy in Indonesia: The marginalisation of the public sphere. In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 267–185; Choi N (2011) Local Politics in Indonesia: Pathways to Power. London: Routledge; Winters JA (2011) Oligarchy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; Ford M and Pepinsky TB (2013) Beyond oligarchy? Critical exchanges on political power and material inequality in Indonesia. Indonesia 96(1): 1–9.

3. Sidel JT (2005) Bossism and democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Towards an alternative framework for the study of “local strongmen”. In: Harris J, Stokke K and Tornquist O (eds) Politicising Democracy: Local Politics and Democratisation in Developing Countries. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51–74.

4. Heryanto A (2010) Entertainment, domestication and dispersal: Street politics as popular culture. In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 181–198; Tomsa D (2010) The Indonesian party system after the 2009 elections: Towards stability? In: Aspinall E and Mietzner M (eds) Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 141–159.

5. Buehler (2010); Sidel (2005).

6. Erb M and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds) (2009) Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada). Singapore: ISEAS; Buehler M (2013) Married with children. Inside Indonesia 112. Available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/married-with-children.

7. Chen J and Adhi Priamarizki (2014) Why abolishing direct local elections undermines Indonesia’s democracy. East Asia Forum, 9 October. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/10/09/why-abolishing-direct-local-elections-undermines-indonesias-democracy/.

8. Purdey J (2014) US back flip Modi ban a fillip for Prabowo. Jakarta Post, 23 May. Available at: http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/23/us-backflip-modi-ban-a-fillip-prabowo.html.

…

South East Asia Research Volume 24, 2016 – Issue 3: Special issue: Political families in Southeast Asia; Cite this article: https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659728

Featured image credit “Lebaran Dinasti Jokowi” Karya Kartunis Tempo Yuyun Nurrachman.

In related news:

https://twitter.com/detikcom/status/1843000773388685687

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/20/21080041/prabowo-ngaku-emosional-dengar-kata-psi-dulu-ayah-saya-pernah-jadi-ketua-psi
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/07/19/06255511/pelantikan-3-wamen-dianggap-demi-kepentingan-politik-jokowi-dan-prabowo
• https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html and https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2010/07/21/journal-article-narratives-to-power-by-south-east-asia-research-soas-uol-copy/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2023/11/21/elections-titiek-soeharto-joins-prabowo-gibrans-campaign-team-as-advisor-luhuts-nephew-appointed-treasurer/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/06/08/17330871/kekayaan-fantastis-rita-widyasari-eks-bupati-kukar-yang-puluhan-mobil-dan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/04/25/11284961/csis-mayoritas-caleg-muda-terpilih-di-dpr-terindikasi-dinasti-politik
• https://majalah.tempo.co/read/kartun/171255/lebaran-dinasti-jokowi
• Elections: “Dynasty Politics” of President Joko Widodo Rejected by Students, Tempo
• Post-Election: The History of House Inquiry Committees (Hak Angket DPR)
• Married with children, Inside Indonesia
• https://www.newmandala.org/memorys-muse/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/01/17231281/fahri-hamzah-dan-murid-sumitro-dirikan-sumitro-institute-hidupkan-lagi

Rate this:

#Asia #Democracy #Development #Djojohadikusumo #ElectionCampaign #Elections #History #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #Megawati #News #Pembangunan #Pemilu1997 #Pemilu2014 #Pemilu2019 #Pemilu2024 #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PolitikDinasti #PrabowoGibran #Puan

Reblog: Koleksi Tempo Doeloe, Neneng Usman

Collection From The Old Days By Neneng Usman

Welcome! We sell rare, authentic, and high-quality antiques and vintage items. Republished from https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html

Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Reminiscences From Three Historical Periods by Margono Djojohadikusumo, grandfather of Prabowo Subianto, Chairman of Indonesia’s Gerindra Party.

Memories from Three Eras
Reminiscences From Three Historical Periods by Margono Djojohadikusumo

A Family Tradition Put into Writing

Reprint of the 1969 Jakarta edition

1963 in Kuala Lumpur, Margono Djojohadikusumo (seated right) Prabowo Subianto (top right), Hasjim Djojohadikusumo (seated center)

With mother (Dora Sigar) in Kuala Lumpur, 1963
Prabowo Subianto in the middle

Extended family in Purworejo, Central Java in 1918

1926, mother of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,
the grandmother of Prabowo Subianto, making batik fabric

Eid al-Fitr Jakarta 1957

Two uncles of Prabowo Subianto who died in 1946
in Serpong, Tangerang, during the guerrilla war against the Dutch*

1947, Colonel TB. Simatupang and Major Daan Jahja,
Later Lieutenant General and Major General, in 1966, by the grave of Subianto Djojohadikusumo (uncle of Prabowo Subianto)

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (father of Prabowo Subianto),
center, to the right of Mohammad Hatta (Vice President)

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo
(father of Prabowo Subianto) far left, front

This book about the extended family of Prabowo Subianto, Chairman of Indonesia’s Gerindra Party (Great Indonesia Movement Party) and presidential candidate of the Republic of Indonesia, was written by Margono Djojohadikusumo, the father of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and grandfather of Prabowo Subianto and Hasjim Djojohadikusumo.

Titled “Reminiscences From Three Historical Periods: A family tradition put into writing,” it is a family record published in Dutch (not Indonesian) with many family photos from the old days (1918, 1926, etc.). Please see some of the photos above. It is printed in hardcover format, with 191 pages. The book is in excellent condition.

A rare and ancient book it is seldom to be found. Prabowo’s grandfather himself (Margono Djojohadikusumo) tells the story of the family’s history through three historical periods: the Dutch period, the Japanese period, and the post-independence period. For those who support the Gerindra Party, this is a must-have book. Prabowo Subianto is expected to run for President of Indonesia in 2019.

*1 comment: Anonymous, July 14, 2014, 21:07 Regarding Mr. Prabowo’s uncles, named Soebianto and Soeyono, who fell in the Battle of Lengkong, Tangerang. This was a battle against Japanese troops who were to be disarmed in 1946. So please verify this further because I believe it was not against the Dutch army. Thanks.

Republished from https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html. Other copies are available at https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/djojohadikusumo-margono/. Featured image credit: Eko Nugroho, Carnival trap 1 2018, resin, wire, upcycled plastic, iron and synthetic polymer paint, Purchased 2018 NGA https://digital.nga.gov.au/archive/contemporaryworlds/works.cfm%3Fwrkirn=325766.html

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• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/20/21080041/prabowo-ngaku-emosional-dengar-kata-psi-dulu-ayah-saya-pernah-jadi-ketua-psi
• https://www.newmandala.org/memorys-muse/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/01/17231281/fahri-hamzah-dan-murid-sumitro-dirikan-sumitro-institute-hidupkan-lagi

Rate this:

#Asia #Development #Djojohadikusumo #History #Indonesia #News #Pembangunan #Pemilu1997 #Pemilu2014 #Pemilu2019 #Pemilu2024 #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PolitikDinasti #PrabowoGibran

Reblog: Koleksi Tempo Doeloe, Neneng Usman

Collection From the Old Days

By Neneng Usman

Welcome! We sell rare, authentic, and high-quality antiques and vintage items. (Republished from Koleksi Tempo Doeloe, by Neneng Usman)

Wednesday, July 21, 2010
“Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods” by Margono Djojohadikusumo, grandfather of Prabowo Subianto, Chair of Indonesia’s Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party.

“Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods”
“Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods” by Margono Djojohadikusumo

A Written Account of a Family Tradition

Reprint of the 1969 Jakarta edition

1963, Kuala Lumpur. Grandparents and grandchildren (Sumitro’s children) in Malaysia. Margono Djojohadikusumo (seated right) Prabowo Subianto (top right), Hasjim Djojohadikusumo (seated center).

1963, Kuala Lumpur. Mother (Dora Sigar) and children,
Prabowo Subianto in the middle.

The extended family in 1918 in Purworedjo, Central Java. (See paragraph 18 of the text.) Sumitro is one year old and Saroso with his left hand on his hip is 9 years old.

Subianto.

Mother of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,
the grandmother of Prabowo Subianto, making batik fabric, in 1926.

Eid al-Fitr, Jakarta 1957.

Two uncles of Prabowo Subianto who were killed on 26 January 1946 in Serpong, Tangerang, during the guerrilla war against the Dutch.*

1947, Colonel TB. Simatupang and Major Daan Jahja,
Later Lieutenant General and Major General, in 1966, at the grave of Subianto Djojohadikusumo, uncle of Prabowo Subianto.

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (father of Prabowo Subianto),
center, to the right of Mohammad Hatta (Vice President)

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo
(father of Prabowo Subianto) far left, front

This book about the extended family of Prabowo Subianto, Chair of Indonesia’s Gerindra Party and presidential candidate of the Republic of Indonesia, was written by Margono Djojohadikusumo, the father of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and grandfather of Prabowo Subianto and Hasjim Djojohadikusumo.

Titled “Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods: A Written Account of a Family Tradition,” it is a family record published in Dutch (not Indonesian) with many family photos from the old days (1918, 1926, etc.). Please see some of the photos above. It is printed in hardcover format, with 191 pages. The book is in excellent condition.

A rare and ancient book, it is seldom available. Prabowo’s grandfather himself (Margono Djojohadikusumo) tells the story of the family’s history throughout three historical periods: the Dutch period, the Japanese period, and the post-independence period. For those who support the Gerindra Party, this is a must-have book. Prabowo Subianto is expected to run for President of Indonesia in 2019.

*1 comment: By Anonymous, July 14, 2014, 21:07 Regarding Mr. Prabowo’s uncles named Soebianto and Soeyono who were killed in the Battle of Lengkong, Tangerang. This was a battle against Japanese troops who were to be disarmed in 1946. So please verify this further because I believe it was not against the Dutch army. Thanks.

This post is a reblog based the post https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html. Copies available at https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/djojohadikusumo-margono/. Featured image credit: Eko Nugroho, Carnival trap 1 2018, https://indoartnow.com/artworks/26932.

In related news:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/20/21080041/prabowo-ngaku-emosional-dengar-kata-psi-dulu-ayah-saya-pernah-jadi-ketua-psi
• https://www.newmandala.org/memorys-muse/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/01/17231281/fahri-hamzah-dan-murid-sumitro-dirikan-sumitro-institute-hidupkan-lagi
• https://www.jejaktamboen.com/2016/01/biografi-sumitro-djojohadikusumo.html
• https://link.springer.com/rwe/10.1007/978-981-99-7276-0_38-1
• https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sumitro_Djojohadikusumo
• https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/djojohadikusumo-margono/

Rate this:

#Asia #Development #Djojohadikusumo #History #Indonesia #News #Pembangunan #Pemilu1997 #Pemilu2014 #Pemilu2019 #Pemilu2024 #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PolitikDinasti #PrabowoGibran

Reblog: Koleksi Tempo Doeloe, Neneng Usman

Collection From the Old Days

By Neneng Usman

Welcome! We sell rare, authentic, and high-quality antiques and vintage items. (Republished from Koleksi Tempo Doeloe, by Neneng Usman)

Wednesday, July 21, 2010
“Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods” by Margono Djojohadikusumo, grandfather of Prabowo Subianto, Chair of Indonesia’s Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party.

“Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods”
“Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods” by Margono Djojohadikusumo

A Written Account of a Family Tradition

Reprint of the 1969 Jakarta edition

1963, Kuala Lumpur. Grandparents and grandchildren (Sumitro’s children) in Malaysia. Margono Djojohadikusumo (seated right) Prabowo Subianto (top right), Hasjim Djojohadikusumo (seated center).

1963, Kuala Lumpur. Mother (Dora Sigar) and children,
Prabowo Subianto in the middle.

The extended family in 1918 in Purworedjo, Central Java. (See paragraph 18 of the text.) Sumitro is one year old and Saroso with his left hand on his hip is 9 years old.

Subianto.

Mother of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,
the grandmother of Prabowo Subianto, making batik fabric, in 1926.

Eid al-Fitr, Jakarta 1957.

Two uncles of Prabowo Subianto who were killed on 26 January 1946 in Serpong, Tangerang, during the guerrilla war against the Dutch.*

1947, Colonel TB. Simatupang and Major Daan Jahja,
Later Lieutenant General and Major General, in 1966, at the grave of Subianto Djojohadikusumo, uncle of Prabowo Subianto.

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (father of Prabowo Subianto),
center, to the right of Mohammad Hatta (Vice President)

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo
(father of Prabowo Subianto) far left, front

This book about the extended family of Prabowo Subianto, Chair of Indonesia’s Gerindra Party and presidential candidate of the Republic of Indonesia, was written by Margono Djojohadikusumo, the father of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and grandfather of Prabowo Subianto and Hasjim Djojohadikusumo.

Titled “Reminiscences from Three Historical Periods: A Written Account of a Family Tradition,” it is a family record published in Dutch (not Indonesian) with many family photos from the old days (1918, 1926, etc.). Please see some of the photos above. It is printed in hardcover format, with 191 pages. The book is in excellent condition.

A rare and ancient book, it is seldom available. Prabowo’s grandfather himself (Margono Djojohadikusumo) tells the story of the family’s history throughout three historical periods: the Dutch period, the Japanese period, and the post-independence period. For those who support the Gerindra Party, this is a must-have book. Prabowo Subianto is expected to run for President of Indonesia in 2019.

*1 comment: By Anonymous, July 14, 2014, 21:07 Regarding Mr. Prabowo’s uncles named Soebianto and Soeyono who were killed in the Battle of Lengkong, Tangerang. This was a battle against Japanese troops who were to be disarmed in 1946. So please verify this further because I believe it was not against the Dutch army. Thanks.

This post is a reblog based the post https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html. Copies available at https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/djojohadikusumo-margono/. Featured image credit: Eko Nugroho, Carnival trap 1 2018, https://indoartnow.com/artworks/26932.

In related news:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/20/21080041/prabowo-ngaku-emosional-dengar-kata-psi-dulu-ayah-saya-pernah-jadi-ketua-psi
• https://www.newmandala.org/memorys-muse/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/01/17231281/fahri-hamzah-dan-murid-sumitro-dirikan-sumitro-institute-hidupkan-lagi
• https://www.jejaktamboen.com/2016/01/biografi-sumitro-djojohadikusumo.html
• https://link.springer.com/rwe/10.1007/978-981-99-7276-0_38-1
• https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sumitro_Djojohadikusumo
• https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/djojohadikusumo-margono/

Rate this:

#Asia #Development #Djojohadikusumo #History #Indonesia #News #Pembangunan #Pemilu1997 #Pemilu2014 #Pemilu2019 #Pemilu2024 #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PolitikDinasti #PrabowoGibran

Reblog: Koleksi Tempo Doeloe, Neneng Usman

Collection From The Old Days By Neneng Usman

Welcome! We sell rare, authentic, and high-quality antiques and vintage items. Republished from https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html

Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Reminiscences From Three Historical Periods by Margono Djojohadikusumo, grandfather of Prabowo Subianto, Chairman of Indonesia’s Gerindra Party.

Memories from Three Eras
Reminiscences From Three Historical Periods by Margono Djojohadikusumo

A Family Tradition Put into Writing

Reprint of the 1969 Jakarta edition

1963 in Kuala Lumpur, Margono Djojohadikusumo (seated right) Prabowo Subianto (top right), Hasjim Djojohadikusumo (seated center)

With mother (Dora Sigar) in Kuala Lumpur, 1963
Prabowo Subianto in the middle

Extended family in Purworejo, Central Java in 1918

1926, mother of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,
the grandmother of Prabowo Subianto, making batik fabric

Eid al-Fitr Jakarta 1957

Two uncles of Prabowo Subianto who died in 1946
in Serpong, Tangerang, during the guerrilla war against the Dutch*

1947, Colonel TB. Simatupang and Major Daan Jahja,
Later Lieutenant General and Major General, in 1966, by the grave of Subianto Djojohadikusumo (uncle of Prabowo Subianto)

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (father of Prabowo Subianto),
center, to the right of Mohammad Hatta (Vice President)

Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo
(father of Prabowo Subianto) far left, front

This book about the extended family of Prabowo Subianto, Chairman of Indonesia’s Gerindra Party (Great Indonesia Movement Party) and presidential candidate of the Republic of Indonesia, was written by Margono Djojohadikusumo, the father of Prof. Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and grandfather of Prabowo Subianto and Hasjim Djojohadikusumo.

Titled “Reminiscences From Three Historical Periods: A family tradition put into writing,” it is a family record published in Dutch (not Indonesian) with many family photos from the old days (1918, 1926, etc.). Please see some of the photos above. It is printed in hardcover format, with 191 pages. The book is in excellent condition.

A rare and ancient book it is seldom to be found. Prabowo’s grandfather himself (Margono Djojohadikusumo) tells the story of the family’s history through three historical periods: the Dutch period, the Japanese period, and the post-independence period. For those who support the Gerindra Party, this is a must-have book. Prabowo Subianto is expected to run for President of Indonesia in 2019.

*1 comment: Anonymous, July 14, 2014, 21:07 Regarding Mr. Prabowo’s uncles, named Soebianto and Soeyono, who fell in the Battle of Lengkong, Tangerang. This was a battle against Japanese troops who were to be disarmed in 1946. So please verify this further because I believe it was not against the Dutch army. Thanks.

Republished from https://koleksitempodoeloe.blogspot.com/2010/07/buku-kenangan-dari-3-jaman-oleh-margono.html. Other copies are available at https://www.abebooks.com/book-search/author/djojohadikusumo-margono/. Featured image credit: Eko Nugroho, Carnival trap 1 2018, resin, wire, upcycled plastic, iron and synthetic polymer paint, Purchased 2018 NGA https://digital.nga.gov.au/archive/contemporaryworlds/works.cfm%3Fwrkirn=325766.html

In related news:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/20/21080041/prabowo-ngaku-emosional-dengar-kata-psi-dulu-ayah-saya-pernah-jadi-ketua-psi
• https://www.newmandala.org/memorys-muse/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/01/17231281/fahri-hamzah-dan-murid-sumitro-dirikan-sumitro-institute-hidupkan-lagi

Rate this:

#Asia #Development #Djojohadikusumo #History #Indonesia #News #Pembangunan #Pemilu1997 #Pemilu2014 #Pemilu2019 #Pemilu2024 #PoliticalFamily #Politics #Politik #PolitikDinasti #PrabowoGibran

Rewriting History: Hegemony and the Writing of History in Indonesia

Hegemony and the Writing of History in Indonesia

A number of scholars have engaged with themes related to hegemony and the writing of history in Indonesia, but not all of them explicitly invoke Antonio Gramsci’s ideas in their work. Here’s a very brief look at some of their engagement with Gramsci’s concepts:

1. Benedict Anderson – Although Anderson does not explicitly frame his work in terms of Gramsci’s hegemony, his analysis of nationalism and the construction of collective identities resonates with Gramscian ideas about cultural hegemony and the role of narratives in shaping social consciousness.
2. Ruth McVey – McVey’s work often touches on themes of power and historical narrative, and while she may not directly cite Gramsci, her analysis of the political context of history writing in Indonesia aligns with Gramscian concepts of hegemony and the struggle over historical interpretation.
3. David T. Hill – Hill’s scholarship on Indonesian history and politics engages with the dynamics of power and identity, but he does not consistently frame his arguments through a Gramscian lens. However, his work can be interpreted in light of Gramsci’s ideas about cultural dominance.
4. John Roosa – Roosa explicitly engages with Gramsci’s ideas in his analysis of the 1965-66 anti-communist massacres and the construction of historical narratives in Indonesia. He examines how hegemonic narratives are created and contested, making a clear connection to Gramscian theory.
5. Geoffrey Robinson – Robinson’s work on historical memory and violence in Indonesia incorporates elements of Gramsci’s thought, particularly regarding the role of dominant narratives in shaping public memory. While he may not always explicitly reference Gramsci, his analysis aligns with the concept of hegemony.
6. Ariel Heryanto – “…critically examines what media and screen culture reveal about the ways urban-based Indonesians attempted to redefine their identity in the first decade of this century. Through a richly nuanced analysis of their expressions and representations across screen culture (cinema, television and social media), [] analyses the waves of energy and optimism, and the disillusionment, disorientation and despair, that arose in the power vacuum after the dramatic collapse of the militaristic New Order government. The overall narrative provides much reason for optimism, but it also suggests that the deep reservoir of creativity that gave rise to Indonesia’s local hybrid modernities has been targeted by competing groups of modernists, who favour a narrow definition of what it means to be Indonesian.” Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture. (Kyoto CSEAS Series on Asian Studies; Vol. 13). NUS Press. 2014.

Some of these scholars do not explicitly apply Gramsci’s ideas in their work, but their analyses often resonate with or can be interpreted through a Gramscian framework. This is particularly so  concerning the dynamics of power, culture, and historical narrative in Indonesia. John Roosa is the most explicit in his application of Gramsci’s concepts.

Srihadi Soedarsono. Green Togas. 1971. Oil on canvas.

In earlier news…

In Indonesia, fears grow that dark past may be rewritten with government’s new history books, Reuters

By Ananda Teresia and Gayatri Suroyo for Reuters, May 19, 2025

JAKARTA, May 19 (Reuters) – The Indonesian government’s plan to release new history books has sparked concerns that some of the country’s darkest chapters could be recast to show President Prabowo Subianto and late authoritarian ruler Suharto in a favorable light.

The 10-volume series would have an Indonesia-centric narrative and aims “to reinvent the Indonesian identity,” Culture Minister Fadli Zon told Reuters in an interview.

Several historians said the commissioning of the books presents an opportunity for historical revisionism at a time when Indonesia’s younger generations – largely responsible for Prabowo’s resounding election victory last year – have little or no memory of Suharto’s 1966-1998 New Order era.

Prabowo openly praises Suharto, who was once his father-in-law, and is increasingly turning to the military to carry out his government’s vision.

Prabowo has also been accused of rights abuses while in the military, including involvement in the kidnapping of student activists during riots in 1998 – allegations he has repeatedly denied and which Fadli said had been debunked.

New Art Movement, Project 1: Supermarket Fantasy World Exhibition at Jakarta Arts Center 1987

Asvi Warman Adam, a leading historian who used to work at the National Research and Innovation Agency, said he was calling on academics to lobby lawmakers to scrutinize what he said would be “propaganda”.

“I suspect there is an intention to legitimize the ruling regime … such as by excluding gross human rights violations in 1998 linked to Prabowo,” he said, adding that he expected the government would soon confer the posthumous title of “National Hero” on Suharto.

Pakoe Boewono IX, Soesoehoenan van Soerakarta ca 1866 – https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=urn:gvn:KITLV01:26762

Asked about concerns by some analysts and historians that the books could be used as propaganda, be politicized and omit human rights abuses that have been linked to Prabowo and Suharto, Fadli said: “History will be written correctly“.

The president’s office did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the new books.

Prabowo has previously said that former activists were his supporters. Fadli, who has authored a book that defended Prabowo’s actions as a special forces commander during Suharto’s 32-year rule, added that neither he nor Prabowo would be involved in the editorial process.

The books, which Fadli said were commissioned last year, will chronicle the history of humankind in Indonesia from homo erectus to Dutch colonization to Prabowo’s election. They will be authored and edited by about 100 historians and Fadli says he wants them ready by August 17, Indonesia’s Independence Day.

Mass Killings in Focus

Made Supriatma, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said he believes the government will use the same playbook as Suharto, who released a six-volume book series in 1975 titled, “The National History of Indonesia” that he said glorified the military and was fraught with inaccuracies. “Prabowo’s history within this republic is not good, to be frank… Do they dare to write that?” said Made.

Group in a field

Jajat Burhanuddin, a historian involved in the project, said so far there has been no state intervention. The 1998 kidnappings and torture of student activists would be included, he said, although he declined to say whether Prabowo would be mentioned in those accounts.

Another key focus for historians will be how the books portray the mass killings of communists and sympathizers in 1965 and 1966, led by military and Islamic leaders. Some historians estimate more than half a million people were killed.

Detachement op Borneo Hoeloe Soengai, 28 Februari 1949

No investigation has been conducted into the killings, which were in response to the murder of generals [dubitably] by the communist party in an abortive [military putsch]. Suharto rose to power in the aftermath and remained president until 1998, when he stepped down during a popular uprising and economic crisis after allegations of corruption and nepotism.

The 1965 events continue to be debated in Indonesia. Fadli said the new books would not take a deeper look into the massacres. Fadli, who was among the student activists who demonstrated against Suharto, now speaks highly of the former ruler, highlighting economic achievements in his early presidency, including slashing poverty and tackling inflation. “My opinion has always been for a long time that Suharto should be considered a national hero,” he said.

Reporting by Ananda Teresia and Gayatri Suroyo; Additional reporting by Zahra Matarani; Reuters original editing by Martin Petty and Edwina Gibbs

This article is based on https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-fears-grow-that-dark-past-may-be-rewritten-with-governments-new-2025-05-19/.

In related news:

• https://www.tempo.co/politik/-aliansi-keterbukaan-sejarah-desak-pemerintah-cabut-penulisan-ulang-sejarah-2059178
• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/15/historical-amnesia-indonesia-delays-plans-to-release-amended-history-books-amid-backlash
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/03/05504821/silat-lidah-fadli-zon-bantah-pemerkosaan-massal-1998-sampai-bikin-anggota
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/02/09385041/pdi-p-minta-penulisan-sejarah-disetop-fadli-zon-ingatkan-pesan-bung-karno
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/07/02/09512121/hari-ini-fadli-zon-rapat-bareng-dpr-bahas-penulisan-sejarah
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/25/17415321/komnas-perempuan-kecam-fadli-zon-52-korban-pemerkosaan-itu-tidak-massal
• https://open.spotify.com/episode/38QpL2Uxq0EdP3TCYpc1Aw?si=t0QbKgShT9yiai3XoNyuyg
• https://projectmultatuli.org/tionghoa-indonesia-di-bawah-bayang-bayang-genosida-pengetahuan/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/16/18272571/sentil-fadli-zon-soal-pemerkosaan-massal-1998-bambang-pacul-jangan-sok-benar
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/15/13491541/membaca-kembali-penyesalan-habibie-atas-pemerkosaan-massal-1998-saat-fadli
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/11/22254991/sambangi-kejagung-komnas-ham-dorong-13-kasus-pelanggaran-ham-berat-segera
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/09/06112411/pro-kontra-penulisan-ulang-sejarah-indonesia-dengan-tone-positif
• Authors’ Team Guarantees New Version of History Can Be Criticized and Is Not Propaganda
• PDI-P Legislators Concerned Rewritten History Will Remove Soekarno
• House Commission X Admits It Does Not Know Details of Government’s Rewritten History
• President Prabowo Opines on History of Foreign Interference: From Madiun 1948, DI/TII Rebellion, to Snouck Hurgronje
• President Prabowo Mentions In Passing, History of the 1948 Madiun Rebellion Will Be Improved
• https://www.suaramerdeka.com/semarang-raya/0415120028/hanya-ada-di-semarang-gedung-tua-tempat-pidato-menggelegar-bung-karno-dan-saksi-bisu-lahirnya-pki
• Chega! The final report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, Jakarta 2013
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2008/07/12/op-ed-diplomasi-gaya-menlu-downer-kalau-tidak-berhasil-membully-lagi-oleh-hamish-mcdonald/
• https://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/1998/0798miller.html
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/11/17/op-ed-the-two-faces-of-human-rights-under-indonesias-new-government/
• https://nbasis.wordpress.com/2025/06/13/hegemoni-dan-resistensi-dekonstruksi-narasi-kolonial-dalam-historiografi-tanah-batak/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/01/01/museum-sebagai-mesin-pengetahuan-wacana-orientalisme-dalam-kritik-edward-said/
• https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/21/the-netherlands-returns-119-stolen-sculptures-to-nigeria
• Aveling, H. (1975). Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abortive Communist coup of 30th September 1965. Southeast Asian studies working paper, no. 6. Honolulu: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa
• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/14/the-time-of-monsters-everyone-is-quoting-gramsci-but-what-did-he-actually-say
• https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2025-86-2025-indonesias-year-of-historical-identity-controversy-by-max-lane/

Rate this:

#Djojohadikusumo #Education #Hegemony #History #Indonesia #NewOrder #OrdeBaru #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #PressFreedom #Sejarah

Energy Transition: What’s the True Cost of Your Nickel? Greenpeace International

What’s the True Cost of Your Nickel? Greenpeace Pictures of the Week

Greenpeace International, 6 June 2025

Greenpeace Indonesia activists, alongside four young West Papuans from the Raja Ampat archipelago in Eastern Indonesia, staged a peaceful protest today at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference to expose the devastating environmental and social consequences of nickel mining and smelting.

The activists deployed a banner reading, “What’s the True Cost of Your Nickel?” and unfurled others with messages: “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” and “Save Raja Ampat from Nickel Mining.”

The protest extended beyond the conference hall, with Greenpeace Indonesia activists and Papuan youth displaying banners in the exhibition area outside.

Messages such as “Nikel Bukan Masa Depan” (Nickel is Not the Future) and “Save Raja Ampat the Last Paradise” were prominently displayed amidst industry booths and attendees.

This post is based on https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/.

© Dhemas Reviyanto / Greenpeace – https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/

In related news:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/08/15/11583091/prabowo-dapat-laporan-ada-1063-tambang-ilegal-kerugiannya-minimal-rp-300
• MIND ID Reshuffles Board of Directors and Commissioners, Son of Former VP and Defense Force Chief Try Sutrisno Becomes Director of Risk Management, Kompas.com, 11 June 2025
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/11/11484641/dukung-pencabutan-izin-tambang-4-perusahaan-di-raja-ampat-ravindra-airlangga
• https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-raja-ampat-nickel-mining-suspend-a73cccb78485f7c8e3e785193d0bbede
• Criticizing Nickel Industrialization, Greenpeace Activists Hold Protest at International Nickel Conference in Jakarta, Greenpeace Indonesia (Indonesian)
• Raja Ampat: A Biodiversity Paradise Hit by a Global Dilemma, Kompas.com (Indonesian)
• First 100 Days of North Maluku Governor Sherly Tjoanda: Rising Criminalization and Widening Ecological Destruction, Mining Advocacy Network (Indonesian)
• https://jatam.org/id/lengkap/Polda-Malut-Kriminalisasi-Warga-Maba-Halmahera
• The Third Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference & Expo 2025 in Jakarta
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/09/01225281/tambang-nikel-di-pulau-batang-pele-raja-ampat-ada-di-hutan-lindung
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/09/00581871/pemerintah-sebut-tambang-nikel-pulau-kawei-raja-ampat-melebihi-batas
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/08/23565041/menteri-lh-izin-lingkungan-tambang-raja-ampat-diterbitkan-bupati-pada-2006
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/08/23310321/pemerintah-perkarakan-pencemaran-pulau-manuran-raja-ampat-ke-ranah-hukum
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/08/22593791/anggota-dpr-sebut-tambang-ilegal-papua-dibekingi-aparat-tni-laporkan
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/08/12481851/anggota-dpr-duga-penerbitan-izin-tambang-di-raja-ampat-diwarnai-kkn
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/06/08/16531901/kementerian-lingkungan-hidup-segel-tambang-nikel-pt-asp-di-raja-ampat
• The fate of the O’Hongana Manyawa indigenous people around Tesla’s supply chain in Halmahera by Viriya Singgih, BBC News Indonesia, 1 Agustus 2024
• Raffi Ahmad’s Business Tentacles: Supported by the President’s Family, Nickel Bosses, and Golkar Party Officials, By Alfian Putra Abdi, Project Multatuli, 17 October 2024
• The Apocalypse Has Arrived: Like a slow moving apocalypse, moment by moment, by Iqbal Lubis, Bollo.id, 28 October 2024

In earlier news…

The Suffering Behind the War of Words Between Former Widodo Trade Minister Tom Lembong and Ministers Luhut & Bahlil

Press Release, Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM), Jan 26, 2024

Indonesia’s Investment Minister Bahlil Lahadalia and Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Gen. (Retd.) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan have issued strong responses to remarks made by Thomas Lembong, co-head of the national presidential election campaign of candidates Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, about Indonesia’s nickel processing policy and electric vehicle industry.

In a recent post by the podcast Total Politik, Lembong, a former Trade Minister and head of Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), criticized the extensive smelting initiatives, warning that domestic oversupply risks could depress nickel prices.(1) He also highlighted Tesla’s shift in China to Lithium Ferro Phosphate (LFP) batteries, which eliminates the need for nickel altogether.(2)

https://youtu.be/f9fT1LyJumQ?si=KG9mlF5z64rw0ZWn

The ensuing war of words reflects a focus among Indonesia’s political elite on industrial priorities rather than the welfare of impacted communities. Neither Lembong, nor Ministers Luhut and Bahlil, have publicly acknowledged the detrimental effects of nickel downstreaming on local populations, which has left many impoverished while boosting industry profits.(3) Nickel extraction expansion has displaced communities, polluted water sources, damaged marine ecosystems, degraded forests, and triggered health crises, violence, criminalization, and workplace accidents—some resulting in fatalities.

Also Read: Elections: China Downstream, The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy By Project Multatuli

This dire situation is evident across Indonesia’s major nickel industrial estates, from PT Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) in Morowali in southern Sulawesi, PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry in North Morowali, Virtue Dragon Nickel Industry in Konawe, Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park (IWIP) in Central Halmahera in Maluku province, to the industrial complexes on Obi Island under the Harita Group’s control.

The political and business dynamics of these clashes, set against the backdrop of Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election, reveal more than just the flaws in President Joko Widodo’s accelerated nickel downstreaming agenda. Co-ordinating Minister Luhut and Minister Bahlil’s opposition to Lembong’s criticisms could be seen as defending vested interests within Indonesia’s political-business complex.(4)

Minister Bahlil, for instance, has ties to PT Meta Mineral Pradana, a nickel mining company with two concessions in North Konawe, Southeast Sulawesi, owned by his PT Papua Bersama Unggul (90% ownership) and PT Rifa Capital (10%).

Similarly, Co-ordinating Minister Luhut’s stake connects him to PT Energi Kreasi Bersama (Electrum), a joint venture between PT GoTo Gojek Tokopedia Tbk and PT TBS Energi Utama Tbk (TOBA), a company owned by Luhut. Electrum focuses on developing an integrated electric vehicle ecosystem, from manufacturing electric motorcycles and battery technology to battery swapping stations and charging infrastructure. Through GoTo, Luhut’s interests align with Garibaldi “Boy” Thohir, a recent vocal supporter of the presidential election candidates Prabowo Subianto and President Joko Widodo’s son Gibran.(5) Boy Thohir holds shares in and sits on the Board of Commissioners of GoTo.(6)

Ultimately, the high-profile clash involving Tom Lembong, Luhut, and Bahlil appears to prioritize personal and industrial interests over the environmental and social toll of nickel extraction. The nickel debate, rather than addressing the plight of affected communities or mitigating environmental destruction, seems geared toward securing political gains in Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election.

Also Read: Transition: Mass Movements NU and Muhammadiyah To Get Cabinet Posts in New Government After Accepting Mining Permits, Tempo

Regardless of whether Tesla relies on Indonesian nickel, mining operations in Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua continue unabated, with scant regard for the suffering of residents and ongoing environmental degradation.

• [1] Tom Lembong Kritik Kondisi Nikel Indonesia! #totalpolitik #tomlembong #nikel #pilpres2024
• [2] https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/4-benefits-of-lfp-batteries/
• [3] https://www.jatam.org/hilirisasi-nikel-untungkan-pebisnis-miskinkan-warga/
• [4] https://pemilu.jatam.org/
• [5] https://www.jatam.org/dukungan-boy-thohir-cs-ke-prabowo-gibran-pemilu-2024-dikendalikan-bohir/
• [6] https://www.gotocompany.com/about-us#board-of-commissioners

This article is based on https://jatam.org/id/lengkap/derita-warga-di-balik-saling-serang-tom-lembong-vs-luhut-bahlil

In related news:

• https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1935811/kecelakaan-kerja-berulang-di-smelter-nikel-tak-ada-efek-jera-bagi-perusahaan
• https://metro.tempo.co/read/1934709/kejagung-klaim-penetapan-tersangka-tom-lembong-bukan-politisasi
• https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/tom-lembong-dijerat-tersangka-impor-gula-usai-kejagung-periksa-90-saksi-23oNLvdtnvf
• https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/tom-lembong-saat-digiring-dan-diborgol-ke-mobil-tahanan-menyerahkan-ke-tuhan-23oNeSyyzzs
• https://asiasociety.org/node/30643/asia-society-victoria-distinguished-fellowship
• https://www.kompas.tv/nasional/481266/respons-tom-lembong-usai-dilaporkan-ke-bawaslu-kami-hormati-proses-hukum

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#China #CleanEnergy #climateChange #Democracy #Energy #EnergyTransition #Environment #EV #HumanRights #Indonesia #LingkunganHidup #Mining #News #Nickel #nikel #Papua #pilpres2024 #Politics #PrabowoGibran #renewableEnergy #sustainability #tomlembong #totalpolitik

Economic Outlook: Budget Cuts Spark Negative Reactions Across Indonesia

Indonesia’s Budget Cuts Spark Reactions Across the Nation

Based on reporting by Tempo.co contributors, February 18 to 21, 2025

JAKARTA/SEMARANG — Indonesia’s recent budget cuts, as reported by Tempo.co, mandated by President Prabowo Subianto’s Presidential Instruction No. 1/2025, have triggered a wave of reactions from government officials, student organizations, and the general public. The cuts, which aim to reallocate funds toward President Prabowo Subianto’s flagship initiatives, including the Free Nutritious Meals Program, have drawn both support and criticism.

Provincial Impact: Jakarta’s Response

Jakarta’s Provincial Government is among the regions affected, with its central government aid reduced by Rp 38 billion. Despite this, popular PDI-P Deputy Governor Rano Karno stated the reduction was manageable, considering Jakarta’s goal to boost its locally generated revenue to Rp 130 trillion in the coming year. “The reduction is not large and will not significantly impact our key programs,” Karno told Tempo on February 21, 2025. He added that (the province’s) efficiency measures would focus on non-essential expenditures, such as official travel. Cyril Raoul Hakim, communications coordinator for Jakarta’s transition team, emphasized that increasing locally generated revenue would reduce the province’s dependence on central government funding.

Student Protests: “Dark Indonesia”

While regional governments like Jakarta view the cuts as manageable, student organizations nationwide have voiced strong opposition. On February 17, 2025, hundreds of students from various universities staged protests under the banner of “Indonesia Gelap” (Dark Indonesia), organized by an alliance of campus student representative organizations (BEM SI). According to alliance coordinator Satria Naufal Putra Ansar, the protests reflect widespread fear and frustration over government policies that students believe undermine education and social welfare.

Education is free

Students’ key demands include:

1. Repeal Presidential Instruction No. 1/2025: Students demand the cancellation of the budget cuts, particularly those affecting education.
2. Reject Revisions to the Draft Law on Mineral and Coal Mining: They oppose granting mining licenses to universities, citing risks to academic independence and environmental sustainability.
3. Evaluate the Free Nutritious Meals Program (MBG): Students argue the program should be reassessed to ensure it targets those most in need without draining education funds. Dedi Irwansyah, President of the student representative organization at Andalas University (UNAND), noted that while improving nutrition is important, the free school lunch program should not come at the expense of education programs.
4. Reconsider Budget Cuts to Higher Education: Concerns that reduced budgets could hinder academic development and limit campus facilities.
5. Pass an Asset Confiscation Law: BEM SI called for swift legislation to combat corruption by seizing illicitly acquired assets.
6. Pay Unpaid Allowances for Professors: Students demanded the payment of overdue allowances for public university professors.
7. Base Policies on Scientific Research: Protesters urged the government to develop evidence-based policies that prioritize public welfare.
8. Streamline Government Spending: Reduce the size and costs of the Cabinet and cancel proposed amendments to laws relating to the military, police, and judiciary.

Efficiency, yeah right

Student Protest in Semarang

On February 18, 2025, students from the Semarang Alliance for Justice gathered in front of the Central Java Governor’s office. Photographs captured by Tempo’s Budi Purwanto show students holding banners denouncing the budget cuts, with some participants raising fists in protest. The demonstration, part of the broader “Dark Indonesia” movement, highlighted concerns that funding reductions would negatively affect higher education and limit opportunities for students and faculty.

Yeah, right! – Ndasmu

Calls for Broader Reform

The protests also addressed broader governance issues, with students demanding the government halt policies not supported by scientific research. They called for the reinstatement of performance allowances for public university professors, frozen since 2020 due to budget pressures. The student alliance also urged the government to expedite legislation allowing the confiscation of illicit assets, a measure they believe is crucial for combating corruption.

Student sit in outside the office of Central Java’s Governor

Government Stance and Ongoing Debate

The government has defended its budget cuts as essential for maintaining fiscal stability, citing the need to meet debt obligations and support priority programs. However, critics argue that reallocating funds to initiatives like the President’s free school lunch program may come at the expense of long-term investments in education and infrastructure. With protests continuing and provincial governments adjusting to reduced budgets, the debate over Indonesia’s fiscal priorities is set to continue.

This article is based on reports published by Tempo.co, with contributions from Oyuk Ivani Siagian, Mega Putri Mahadewi, Melynda Dwi Puspita, Haura Hamidah, and Budi Purwanto, and is not authorized. Sources include https://www.tempo.co/politik/wagub-rano-karno-ungkap-pemprov-jakarta-kena-pemangkasan-anggaran-rp-38-miliar-1210297; https://www.tempo.co/politik/daftar-panjang-tuntutan-mahasiswa-untuk-prabowo-dalam-aksi-indonesia-gelap-1209055; and https://www.tempo.co/foto/arsip/aksi-gabungan-mahasiswa-semarang-untuk-indonesia-gelap-1208978

In related news:

• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/05/21/16443511/rocky-gerung-desak-prabowo-lumpuhkan-kabinetnya-reshuffle-isi-dengan-energi
• https://www.tempo.co/arsip/penggembosan-aksi-indonesia-gelap-1210809
• https://www.tempo.co/tag/indonesia-gelap
• https://www.tempo.co/arsip/inisiator-demonstrasi-indonesia-gelap–1210810
• https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ikn-inkonsistensi-prabowo-1212668
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2023/12/18/social-media-storm-as-team-anies-muhaimin-responds-to-vulgar-expletives-from-prabowo/

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#Bansos #Corruption #Debt #Democracy #Economics #FiscalPolicy #Gibran #GolkarParty #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #LaborRights #money #NationalEconomy #News #Pemilu2024 #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #StudentDemonstrations #Unemployment

Op-Ed: The Politicization of Former Trade Minister’s Arrest

Editorial: The Politicization of Former Trade Minister Tom Lembong’s Arrest

From Tempo.co, November 10, 2024

The arrest of one Widodo-era Trade Minister, and government critic, Tom Lembong, raises troubling questions. Given the lack of evidence of corruption to justify the arrest, political motives appear to be overshadowing the rule of law.

The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office seems to have increasingly abandoned the principle of equal treatment under the law. Under the government of President Joko Widodo, the office has frequently acted as a “hammer” against those opposed to government interests. The naming of Thomas Trikasih Lembong, known as Tom Lembong, as a suspect in a sugar importation corruption investigation indicates that this practice is being continued under the government of recently-inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto.

Tom Lembong, who served as President Joko Widodo’s Trade Minister from 2015 to 2016, is accused of improperly authorizing the importation of 105,000 tons of sugar. Prosecutors allege the decision cost state revenue approximately 400 billion rupiah (around US$25.6 million), representing the profits notionally earned by eight private sector importing companies. Prosecutors argue that these profits would have gone to the state revenue if state-owned enterprise trading companies had conducted the importations.

Selective Pursuit of Justice

Equality under the law appears to be missing, as prosecutors have limited their investigation to Lembong’s tenure as Trade Minister. Similar policies during the tenures of other Widodo government Trade Ministers have not been investigated. During the two terms of President Joko Widodo, six individuals served as Trade Minister, including Rachmat Gobel (Nasdem Party), Enggartiasto Lukita (Nasdem Party), Agus Suparmanto (National Awakening Party), Muhammad Lutfi, and Zulkifli Hasan (National Mandate Party). All authorized sugar importations of varying quantities.

Moreover, prosecutors have selectively utilized findings from a 2017 audit by the national Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK). The audit report, covering the tenures of Trade Ministers Rachmat Gobel, Tom Lembong, and Enggartiasto Lukita, identified irregularities in the importation of 1.96 million tons of sugar. The audit noted that the importations were not coordinated by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, lacked technical approvals from the Ministry of Agriculture, and were unsupported by data relating to sugar requirements.

Vague Charges

Lembong is charged under Articles 2(1) and 3 of Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Law, provisions often used to indict officials accused of making decisions that allegedly cause government financial losses. These articles are notoriously flexible, encompassing acts that enrich individuals or corporations by exploiting their positions, resulting in financial harm to state revenue.

Legal Case or Political Theater?

Prosecutors have yet to present compelling evidence, such as a clear money trail, to justify Lembong’s arrest. This has fueled suspicions that the case may be politically motivated—a hallmark of the Joko Widodo’s government.

Lembong initially played a central role in Joko Widodo’s 2014 presidential election campaign, which led to his appointments as Head of the Investment Coordinating Board, and later as Trade Minister. However, after being dismissed from cabinet in 2016, he aligned himself with other sidelined officials, including Anies Baswedan, then the Minister of Education. Lembong has since supported Anies, now a presidential election candidate for 2024.

During the campaign, Lembong was embroiled in debates with team of candidate Prabowo Subianto, particularly on nickel downstreaming policies. Candidate Subianto’s vice-presidential running Gibran, the son of President Joko Widodo, explicitly mentioned Lembong during a vice-presidential debate on January 21, 2024. Speculation has arisen that Lembong’s arrest is linked to these political tensions.

Upholding Justice, Not Politics

Prosecutors have to present robust evidence in court. If their cases rests solely on procedural errors, the Attorney General’s Office risks becoming a political instrument. This concern deepens should similar accusations are not leveled at other former trade minister who implemented identical importation policies.

President Prabowo Subianto, as the Attorney General’s superior, must ensure that the justice system under his government remains impartial and untainted by political influence.

This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/penahanan-tom-lembong-1166151.

In related news:

• https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2024/10/30/former-minister-thomas-lembong-arrested-in-sugar-import-graft-case.html
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-arrests-former-trade-minister-sugar-import-graft-case-2024-10-30/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/10/30/transition-after-12-month-investigation-no-money-trail-to-former-widodo-minister-in-sugar-corruption-probe-admits-ago/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/10/29/energy-transition-the-suffering-behind-the-war-of-words-between-tom-lembong-and-ministers-luhut-bahlil/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/10/29/transition-arrest-of-former-widodo-trade-minister-tom-lembong-is-not-political-claims-indonesias-ago/
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/11/19/transition-widodo-trade-minister-tom-lembong-framed-former-nation-deputy-police-chief/
• https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/30/trump-irs-suit-reopened
• https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/judge-probes-whether-trump-defrauded-the-court-to-create-1-8-billion-anti-weaponization-fund/
• https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/01/11485851/pdip-indonesia-menjadi-negara-otoriter-populis-sejak-periode-ke-2-jokowi

Rate this:

#Asia #AttorneyGeneral #Business #Courts #Economics #Elections #Governance #HumanRights #IMF #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #NewOrder #News #Nickel #nikel #OrdeBaru #pilpres2024 #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #RuleOfLaw #TempoMagazine #TomLembong #totalpolitik

China: Indonesian president-elect visits China after decade of close ties, Reuters.com

New Indonesia leader visits China, promises close ties

By Reuters, April 2, 2024

Indonesia’s President-elect Prabowo Subianto is expected to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Monday for high-level talks, less than two months after winning the race to lead Southeast Asia’s biggest economy. Prabowo is visiting at Xi’s invitation to discuss two-way ties, even though the 72-year-old political veteran will only be sworn in as […]

New Indonesia leader visits China, promises close ties, by Reuters, April 2, 2024 Featured image credit: The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, made his first state visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Saturday, November 9, 2024. (Photo: BPMI Setpres/Muchlis Jr)

In related news:

April 2024 Visit

• https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/indonesias-prabowo-meets-chinas-xi-on-first-visit-since-election/
• https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesian-president-elect-visits-china-after-decade-close-ties-2024-04-01/
• https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/04/prabowos-diplomatic-debut-in-china-and-japan?lang=en

November 2024 Visit

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_presidential_trips_made_by_Prabowo_Subianto
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/11/12/chinas-gem-and-pt-vale-indonesia-sign-deal-to-build-hpal-nickel-smelter-plant-gem-co-ltd-news/
• https://setkab.go.id/kunjungan-kenegaraan-perdana-presiden-prabowo-disambut-upacara-kenegaraan-oleh-presiden-xi-jinping/
• https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7631997/di-depan-pengusaha-china-prabowo-kerja-sama-jalan-menuju-kemakmuran

Malaysia-China-USA

• https://fulcrum.sg/neutrality-by-sector-malaysias-geoeconomic-alignment-under-anwar/

Rate this:

#ASEAN #China #Democracy #ElectionCampaign #Elections #Indonesia #InternationalLaw #Japan #Malaysia #Politics #PrabowoGibran #Reblog

Indonesian president-elect visits China after decade of close ties, detiknews.com

In Front of Chinese Businessmen, Prabowo: Cooperation is the Path to Prosperity

By Isal Mawardi, detikNews Sunday, November 10, 2024

Indonesia’s President-elect Prabowo Subianto is expected to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Monday for high-level talks, less than two months after winning the race to lead Southeast Asia’s biggest economy. Prabowo is visiting at Xi’s invitation to discuss two-way ties, even though the 72-year-old political veteran will only be sworn in as […]

In Front of Chinese Businessmen, Prabowo: Cooperation is the Path to Prosperity, by Isal Mawardi, detikNews Sunday, November 10, 2024 Featured image credit: The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, made his first state visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Saturday, November 9, 2024. (Photo: BPMI Setpres/Muchlis Jr)

In related news:

• https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/04/prabowos-diplomatic-debut-in-china-and-japan?lang=en
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_presidential_trips_made_by_Prabowo_Subianto
• https://storiesfromindonesia.com/2024/11/12/chinas-gem-and-pt-vale-indonesia-sign-deal-to-build-hpal-nickel-smelter-plant-gem-co-ltd-news/
• https://setkab.go.id/kunjungan-kenegaraan-perdana-presiden-prabowo-disambut-upacara-kenegaraan-oleh-presiden-xi-jinping/
• https://fulcrum.sg/neutrality-by-sector-malaysias-geoeconomic-alignment-under-anwar/

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#ASEAN #China #Democracy #ElectionCampaign #Elections #Indonesia #InternationalLaw #Japan #Malaysia #Politics #PrabowoGibran #Reblog