#amerikaserikat — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #amerikaserikat, aggregated by home.social.
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Harga Emas XAU/USD Menguat, Ini Analisis Pergerakan Emas dan Level Penting yang Perlu Diperhatikan
Tradingan - Pergerakan #HargaEmas #dunia kembali menjadi perhatian #pelaku #pasar seiring menguatnya #XAU/USD terhadap #dolar #AmerikaSerikat. Berdasarkan #DataPasar terbaru, harga emas spot berada di kisaran US$4.342 per troy ounce, setelah mencatat kenaikan sekitar 2,39 persen pada penutupan perdagangan 8 Agustus 2026.
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Harga Emas XAU/USD Menguat, Ini Analisis Pergerakan Emas dan Level Penting yang Perlu Diperhatikan
Tradingan - Pergerakan #HargaEmas #dunia kembali menjadi perhatian #pelaku #pasar seiring menguatnya #XAU/USD terhadap #dolar #AmerikaSerikat. Berdasarkan #DataPasar terbaru, harga emas spot berada di kisaran US$4.342 per troy ounce, setelah mencatat kenaikan sekitar 2,39 persen pada penutupan perdagangan 8 Agustus 2026.
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Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
Rate this:
#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR
Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor
USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods
On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”
“USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”
The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”
“In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:
- The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
- The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”
According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”
“The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”
Call for written comment
“The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”
Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor
USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”
Related news:
In earlier news…
Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears
By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026
During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.
Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.
This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.
Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.
Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.
Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.
Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.
Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.
While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.
Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.
This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.
Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.
On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400
Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.
In related news:
- https://islami.co/bahaya-20-mei-2026-meninjau-ulang-perjanjian-art-indonesia-as/
- Criticism of the Indonesia-US Reciprocal Tariff Agreement [Catatan Kritis: Kesepakatan Tarif Timbal-Balik RI–AS 2025–2026: Menguatkan Ekstraktivisme, Menggerus Kedaulatan Indonesia], Mining Advocacy Network JATAM, 10 Maret 2026
- Key points of the Indonesia-US trade agreement, Reuters February 20, 2026
- Fact Sheet: Trump Administration Finalizes Trade Deal with Indonesia The White House February 19, 2026
- Indonesia-United States ART (2026), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 February 2026, Full Text
- Indonesia-China Strengthen Technology & Energy Cooperation Amid Trump Tariff Hike, Annisa Nurul Amara, Bisnis.com, April 18, 2025
- Indonesia revokes nickel ore mining permits in Raja Ampat after protest, Stanley Widianto and David Stanway, Reuters, June 10, 2025
- False Green Narratives: The Real Impact of the Nickel Mining Behind Electric Vehicles, Nofi Yendri Sudiar, Kompas.com, June 10, 2025
- Indonesia’s President Prabowo witnesses signing of agreement between GEM and PT Vale Indonesia to build HPAL nickel plant, GEM Co Ltd News, Nov 12, 2024
- China Downstream: The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy, Project Multatuli & Viriya Singgih, February 2, 2024
- https://usafacts.org/answers/what-is-the-average-us-tariff-rate-overall/countries/indonesia/
- https://www.ahp.id/understanding-the-new-u-s-indonesia-trade-agreement-and-what-it-means-for-businesses/
- https://www.rvia.org/news-insights/united-states-and-indonesia-sign-agreement-reciprocal-trade
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates -
Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War -
Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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#AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War -
Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?
Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.coBy M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026
Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.
Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.
Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.
Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.
Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.
The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.
Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.
The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.
FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.
Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.
Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.
Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.
The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.
The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.
Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.
He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.
The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.
The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.
“These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.
They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.
Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.
For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.
M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi
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Comment: Iran and an Islamic World Without a Political Center, Islami.co
Iran and an Islamic World Without a Political Center
By Virdika Rizky Utama, Islami.co, April 7, 2026
War often reveals things not apparent during peacetime. The conflict threatening Iran today not only highlights the tensions between Washington and Tehran. This development also makes apparent a more fundamental reality about the political state of the Islamic world. A region with a population of over one and a half billion people is facing a major geopolitical crisis without having a center of power capable of speaking on behalf of its common interest.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s ultimatum to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz immediately has many observers beginning to imagine the possibility of a broader military escalation. The narrow strait in the Persian Gulf is one of the world’s most crucial energy routes. Nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through these waters daily. Threats to the stability of this route immediately sparked international concern. Oil prices rose, and energy importing countries in Asia began to assess the potential economic risks that could arise.
World attention normally goes no further than the issue of energy and market stability. While this perspective is of course important, more interesting developments have become apparent about the political landscape of the region. The threat of major conflict in the heart of the Middle East has not resulted in meaningful political coordination among Muslim nations. Some governments have expressed concern through diplomatic statements, but these responses have not developed into more serious collective action.
This situation is no coincidence. The Islamic world is indeed experiencing a historical phase marked by profound political fragmentation. For centuries, there were power structures that provided a coordinating framework for vast areas with relatively similar civilizational identities. The Abbasid Caliphate played this role during the classical period. A similar role reappeared in the form of the Ottoman Caliphate which lasted until the early 20th century.
The collapse of the last caliphate in 1924 opened a new chapter in the region’s political history. The nation-state emerged as the dominant form of political organization in the Middle East and the Islamic world in general. This transformation gave birth to dozens of states with differing political orientations. The national interests of each country began to replace the framework of political solidarity that had previously existed.
Since then, the Islamic world has developed into a highly fragmented geopolitical space. Regional rivalries have shaped regional dynamics at different times. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, have often been fraught with prolonged tension. Over the past decade, Turkey has also pursued its own geopolitical agenda through an increasingly active foreign policy. Other Gulf states find themselves in a security configuration that relies heavily on the U.S.
This configuration makes a collective response to regional crises extremely difficult. Conflicts involving one Muslim country rarely generate broad strategic coordination among other states in the region. The solidarity of the Muslim community more often manifests itself in public sentiment and moral discussions. Political structures capable of translating this solidarity into shared policies are almost nonexistent.
This situation has been described in the international relations literature. Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order describes the Islamic world as a civilization lacking a single core state. Unlike other civilizations with a dominant center of power, the Muslim region comprises numerous states with their own regional ambitions. This image often sparks lengthy debate in the study of global politics, but the geopolitical reality of the Middle East in recent decades demonstrates that this description is not entirely inaccurate.
The absence of a political center makes the Middle East a frequent arena for global power struggles. The U.S. maintains a vast network of security alliances with a variety of Gulf states. Russia expands its influence through military involvement in the Syrian conflict. China also deepens economic ties with many countries in the region through investment and energy trade.
This great power competition is closely related to the region’s strategic value. The Middle East controls a significant portion of global energy reserves. Shipping lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz are crucial nodes in the global economic system. In his book Chokepoints, Edward Fishman explains that modern great powers often seek to control the global infrastructure hubs that determine trade and energy flows. Control over these hubs provides the ability to influence other countries’ economies without directly controlling territory.
Tensions between the U.S. and Iran demonstrate this geopolitical logic. Threats to the Strait of Hormuz immediately triggered a global response because the waterway determines the stability of the world’s energy supply. Asian countries, heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East, immediately felt the impact of any military developments in the region.
The Muslim world finds itself at the center of these dynamics without a political mechanism able to guide a collective response. Large populations and resource wealth do not automatically translate into collective political power. Muslim countries remain focused on their own national interests. Regional rivalries often deepen existing fragmentation.
The Iran crisis vividly demonstrates this reality. The threat of major conflict in the Muslim region has not generated significant political coordination among countries sharing a common civilizational identity. The Muslim world has witnessed the crisis unfolding from a relatively divided position.
This situation raises important questions about the future of regional politics. Without the ability to build stronger political coordination, any geopolitical crisis in the Middle East will continue to be influenced by the calculations of powers outside the Islamic world. Conflicts in Muslim regions will continue to be part of a broader global geopolitical game.
Wars often reveal layers of reality not visible during peacetime. The crisis threatening Iran today reveals more than just tensions between two countries. The developments reveal more fundamental questions about the political position of the Islamic world in the 21st-century global order.
Virdika Rizky Utama (x.com/virdikaa) is the Executive Director of PARA Syndicate (parasyndicate.org), a graduate of the Postgraduate Program in Political Science at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
This post is based on https://islami.co/iran-dan-dunia-islam-yang-kehilangan-pusat-politik/.
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Indonesia Should Withdraw from BoP: Indonesian Ulema Council
US-Israel Attack on Iran: MUI Urges Indonesian Government to Withdraw from Board of Peace for Gaza
Indonesian Ulema Council, March 1, 2026
The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) officially urged the Indonesian government to withdraw from the US Board of Peace (BoP) for Gaza, in a statement released March 1, 2026. The statement was issued by the MUI in response to the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026.
The MUI said the US, which is playing a central role in the management of the Palestinian conflict through the BoP, faces a major question. Is this strategy really aimed at a just peace, or just strengthening an unequal security architecture, and burying Palestinian independence?
“For this reason, the MUI urges the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the BoP, and believes it has been ineffective in realizing true independence in Palestine,” the MUI said in a statement issued on Sunday March 1, 2026.
MUI statement No. Kep-28/DP-MUI/III/2026 was signed by MUI Chair KH Anwar Iskandar and Secretary General Buya Amirsyah Tambunan.
The MUI believes in fact the opposite is occurring. US President Donald Trump is carrying out a joint attack against Iran with Israel, triggering a regional war involving a number of countries, both directly and through proxies.
The MUI calls on Muslims around the world to continue to pray for Almighty God’s assistance and protection for Muslims experiencing hardship, oppression, and disaster in different parts of the world.
“The MUI calls on the UN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to take maximum steps to stop the war and respect international law. The MUI believes that war will bring global harm,” said the statement.
The US-Israeli attacks on Iran have resulted in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) expresses its deep condolences for the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader and prays for his eternal rest.
The MUI condemned the US-backed Israeli attacks because they conflict with humanitarian values and the Preamble to Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution which countries “to participate in establishing a world order based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice.”
The MUI understands that Iran’s attacks against Gulf states are retaliation for the US and Israeli attacks targeting military bases. According to the MUI, Iran’s retaliatory attacks are justified, and protected by international law.
“Therefore, to avoid a wider escalation, the US and Israel must halt attacks on Iran as they violate Article 2 (4) of the UN Declaration.”
The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) considers the Israeli and US military attacks on Iran, which Iran has subsequently responded to, constitute a serious escalation with the potential to drag the Middle East into a wider conflict.
Not an isolated incident
“This situation should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but rather it should be seen as part of a larger geopolitical configuration. It is the duty and responsibility of all countries to achieve peace in order to provide maximum protection for civilians,” it stated.
Strategic motive
The MUI believes the strategic motive behind the attacks is a systematic attempt to weaken Iran’s strategic position in the region, and limit Iranian support for the struggle for Palestinian independence.
In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the MUI encourages countries to act as peacemakers in order to prevent military attacks with the potential to serve as instruments of political pressure aimed at securing Israel’s regional dominance over Palestine.
This post is based on https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-dan-israel-serang-iran-mui-desak-pemerintah-ri-mundur-dari-board-of-peace and https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/as-israel-serang-iran-majelis-ulama-indonesia-sampaikan-10-tausiyah. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership of the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times.
In related news:
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/04/12051261/surya-paloh-sebut-indonesia-tetap-di-board-of-peace-kecuali-dievaluasi-ulang
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/04/10164811/gelombang-desakan-agar-indonesia-hengkang-dari-board-of-peace-usai-serangan
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises
- https://islami.co/board-of-peace-konsesi-tambang-dan-hegemoni-atas-ormas-islam/
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/05/23531921/kumpulkan-ulama-prabowo-tekankan-persatuan-di-tengah-konflik-timur-tengah
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/05/23152941/kata-jimly-dan-gus-yahya-soal-prabowo-berbelasungkawa-untuk-khamenei
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/06/11280041/bukan-bop-waketum-mui-dorong-peran-pbb-dan-oki-damaikan-as-dengan-iran
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/06/10515321/ri-gabung-board-of-peace-muhadjir-kita-sekarang-mencoba-berjuang-dari-dalam
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/06/10445261/prabowo-ajak-ulama-dan-tokoh-ormas-islam-rapatkan-barisan-dukung-perdamaian
- https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/momen-keakraban-prabowo-dengan-ketum-mui-rais-aam-nu-dan-ketum-muhammadiyah
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-06/indonesia-says-pakistan-uae-back-prabowo-bid-for-iran-mediation
- https://open.spotify.com/episode/0tCWPoPhars03hdd3lJ12L?si=_CrDi40mSlmLB35WX25y7g
- https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/trump-iran-religious-war-crusades/
- https://www.hrw.org/id/news/2026/01/27/trumps-board-of-peace-puts-rights-abusers-in-charge-of-global-order
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/03/22/16501021/prabowo-tegaskan-tak-pernah-janji-sumbang-1-miliar-dollar-untuk-board-of
- https://www.kompas.com/tag/iuran-1-miliar-dollar?type=artikel
- https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/mar/30/world-without-rules-un-security-council-global-order
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/25/14442581/mantan-dubes-ri-ungkap-kekecewaan-iran-terhadap-sikap-indonesia
- https://islami.co/kenapa-nahdlyin-akar-rumput-tolak-board-of-peace-beda-dengan-ketum-pbnu-yang-justru-merangkul/
In earlier news…
Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble
By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025
(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?
Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.
There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.
If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.
Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine
The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.
By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.
Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.
Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.
More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.
The Palestine paradox
Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.
Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….
Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.
In related news:
- https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/19/trump-gaza-military-plan
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/02/10/13031811/indonesia-jangan-kirim-pasukan-perdamaian-ke-gaza
- Indonesia to Fill ISF Gaza Deputy Commander, Ready to Send 8,000 Personnel, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Fika Nurul Ulya, Ardito Ramadhan (Indonesian)
- House Speaker Puan Defends Prabowo Attending Gaza Peace Summit Despite Israel’s Presence, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Dani Prabowo (Indonesian)
- Pakistan Refuses to Rush to Send Troops to Gaza, Avoids Missions Other Than Peacekeeping, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Irawan Sapto Adhi (Indonesian)
- Prabowo Attends Gaza Peace Board Summit in the US Today, Signs Trump Tariffs Deal, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Robertus Belarminus (Indonesian)
- Civil Society Coalition Criticizes Indonesia’s US Foreign Policy for Lack of Public Involvement, NU Online, 2 March 2026, Mufidah Adzkia (Indonesian)
- https://www.tempo.co/politik/indonesia-keanggotaan-dewan-perdamaian-perang-iran-israel-2119105
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises
***
The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace
By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026
Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.
This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.
However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.
Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.
Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.comWhen the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?
A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.
Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.
Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.
What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.
Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.
The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.
By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?
International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.
If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?
In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.
This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.
Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.
Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.
The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.
A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.
PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain- Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
- Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
- Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
- Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
- “Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/
Rate this:
#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #InternationalLaw #Islam #israel #palestina #Palestine #PBB #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #Religion #un #UnitedNations #UnitedStates -
Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble by Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera
Indonesia’s Gaza Gamble
By Ronny P Sasmita for Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2025
(Excerpt) President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilization force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarizing political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?
Geopolitics is not a theater for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.
There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilizing actor in global diplomacy.
If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theater. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.
Erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine
The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator, rather than a follower of personalized diplomatic agendas.
By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimizing unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.
Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centered foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilizing force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.
Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognized neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognized peacekeeping norms.
More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.
The Palestine paradox
Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasizes international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favor creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.
Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity….
Read the whole piece at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/16/indonesias-gaza-gamble. Featured image credit: Protesters outside the US Embassy urge the Indonesian government to revoke its membership from the Board of Peace on March 3, 2026. Photo: REUTERS via The Straits Times. Image Credit: Excerpt – US President Donald Trump gestures towards Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, during a charter announcement for his Board of Peace in Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2026. [Denis Balibouse/Reuters via Al-Jazeera] Per Al-Jazeera Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economics Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank focused on geopolitics and geoeconomics. His commentary has appeared in leading Indonesian outlets and a number of international English-language publications. He regularly contributes analysis on international political economy, China’s economy, and global geoeconomic trends.
In related news:
- https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/19/trump-gaza-military-plan
- https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/02/10/13031811/indonesia-jangan-kirim-pasukan-perdamaian-ke-gaza
- Indonesia to Fill ISF Gaza Deputy Commander, Ready to Send 8,000 Personnel, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Fika Nurul Ulya, Ardito Ramadhan (Indonesian)
- House Speaker Puan Defends Prabowo Attending Gaza Peace Summit Despite Israel’s Presence, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Dani Prabowo (Indonesian)
- Pakistan Refuses to Rush to Send Troops to Gaza, Avoids Missions Other Than Peacekeeping, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Irawan Sapto Adhi (Indonesian)
- Prabowo Attends Gaza Peace Board Summit in the US Today, Signs Trump Tariffs Deal, Kompas.com, February 19, 2026, Adhyasta Dirgantara, Robertus Belarminus (Indonesian)
- Civil Society Coalition Criticizes Indonesia’s US Foreign Policy for Lack of Public Involvement, NU Online, 2 March 2026, Mufidah Adzkia (Indonesian)
- https://www.tempo.co/politik/indonesia-keanggotaan-dewan-perdamaian-perang-iran-israel-2119105
- https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-04/indonesia-says-board-of-peace-talks-paused-as-iran-crisis-rises
In earlier news…
The Illusion of Trump’s Board of Peace
By A.D. Agung Sulistyo, for Tempo.co January 30, 2026
Indonesia’s decision to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza is anything but neutral. It bristles with ethical problems.
This choice, made by Indonesia to participate in the Board of Peace for Gaza established by President Trump, is framed in familiar clichés: active involvement, a commitment to global stability, and a dedication to peace.
However, Indonesia’s membership in this U.S.-controlled peace forum actually presents a dilemma: stand firm in upholding the rules-based international order or participate and risk gradually diminishing the significance of the United Nations Charter.
Since World War II, peace has never stood alone as a goal in international law. It has always been accompanied by procedures, mandates, and limitations on power. Pursuing peace without a legal framework is akin to establishing a new, subtler form of domination. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining peace is entrusted to the Security Council. This is not because the institution is perfect, but because its authority is anchored in collective representation and legitimacy.
Photo by Ahsanul Haque Z on Pexels.comWhen the White House describes the Trump Board of Peace for Gaza as an initiative aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, a more fundamental question arises: Is world peace still governed by law, or is it beginning to be determined by those in power who are merely using legal language as a diplomatic facade?
A policy may appear to align with the UN’s objectives, but that does not automatically confer legal validity. A UN Security Council resolution is not a blank check. If a resolution does not explicitly establish a body—including its structure, mandate, and accountability—then legally that body does not exist.
Herein lies the tenuous nature of the White House’s claim. UN Security Council resolutions—under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—has never created new bodies through vague interpretations or ulterior motives. International organizational law recognizes the principle of express mandate which asserts that authority must be explicitly stated and cannot be assumed. Without this clarity an action is ultra vires—an action beyond the limits of legal authority.
Article 24 of the UN Charter clearly asserts that the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council. This is not merely a division of administrative duties; it is a constitutional rule in the post-1945 world order. If this function were carried out by another mechanism outside the authority, oversight, and accountability of the UN Security Council, it would amount to a tacit takeover.
What we are witnessing now is a hollowing out of the UN’s functions. The Charter is still cited, and resolutions are still referenced, but crucial decisions about peace are being transferred to a forum serving the interests of the powerful. This represents a new form of defiance against international law.
Indonesia’s decision to join is clearly not a neutral step. By participating, Indonesia indirectly acknowledges that peace can be discussed outside a mutually agreed legal framework. This involvement also indirectly reinforces the notion that the UN Charter is merely one option, no longer the primary foundation for international relations.
The Indonesian government’s policy is fundamentally problematic. For years, Indonesian diplomacy has consistently emphasized multilateralism and international law—not just as rhetoric, but as a core identity maintained since the dawn of independence.
By engaging in a peace mechanism outside the UN Charter, that position becomes tenuous. How can Indonesia assert its support for a rules-based order while simultaneously normalizing peace negotiated outside the law?
International legal theorists have long warned of the dangers of hegemonic multilateralism. It may appear benign—multilateral on the surface—but it is controlled by one party. The Trump Gaza Board of Peace exemplifies this pattern clearly. The initiative originates from the United States, leadership resides with Trump, the agenda is set in Washington, membership is selectively chosen, financial contributions are the price of entry, and there is no accountability to the UN General Assembly, which is meant to be representing the international community.
If peace is determined by the party who leads, funds, and wields informal veto power, it is fair to ask: Is this a global Board of Peace or merely the Board of America dressed up to appear legitimate?
In international legal theory, the UN is often regarded as a constitutional instrument of the international community. Its Charter is no ordinary treaty; it is the lex superior, the primary framework governing the exercise of power on a global scale. When mechanisms like the Board of Peace operate outside this framework, we witness what Martti Koskenniemi describes as the fragmentation of international law.
This fragmentation is not merely an academic concern; it reflects a tangible reality. Today, one major country forms a Board of Peace. Tomorrow, another could establish a Board of Stability or a Coalition for Order and claim alignment with UN resolutions. In such a scenario, the UN Charter gradually transforms from binding law into mere symbolism—referenced but no longer respected.
Supporters of the Board of Peace will undoubtedly argue that the world needs a quick solution, claiming that the UN is too slow, complicated, and often paralyzed. This argument has some merit. However, international law does not promise speed; it offers legitimacy and accountability.
Peace without a legal framework, even if at first blush it appears stable, is always tenuous from a normative perspective. History has shown that stability without legitimacy rarely endures.
The world is indeed changing, and international law must adapt. The question is whether Indonesia is prepared to build a world where peace is maintained not by law, but by the balance of power alone.
A.D. Agung Sulistyo is a researcher specializing in transnational law and public policy. He has previously worked as a researcher at both the PARA Syndicateand the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate. This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/ilusi-dewan-perdamaian-donald-trump-2111160.
PDIP Affirms Commitment to World Peace and Palestinian Rights Through the UN, Not Other Channels 31 Januari 2026 https://m.jpnn.com/news/pdip-tegaskan-komitmen-perdamaian-dunia-dan-hak-palestina-lewat-pbb-bukan-jalan-lain- Virdika Rizky Utama. “Indonesia Should Reconsider Decision to Join Trump’s Board of Peace.” Nikkei Asia, 27 Jan. 2026, asia.nikkei.com/opinion/indonesia-should-reconsider-decision-to-join-trump-s-board-of-peace.
- Hendrik Yaputra and Wibowo, E.A. (2026). Soal Dewan Perdamaian, PDIP: Indonesia Harus Bebas Aktif. [online] Tempo. Available at: https://www.tempo.co/politik/soal-dewan-perdamaian-pdip-indonesia-harus-bebas-aktif-2111541
- Tangkilisan, Yuda B. “Sovereignty on Seas: The Making of the Declaration of Djuanda 1957.” Www.atlantis-Press.com, Atlantis Press, 29 May 2023, www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/ahs-aprish-19/125987317.
- Nidžara Ahmetašević. “Gaza Is on Its Way to Becoming a Semi-Protectorate, Just like Bosnia.” Al Jazeera, Feb. 2026, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/1/gaza-is-on-its-way-to-becoming-a-semi-protectorate-just-like-bosnia
- “Op-Ed: Prabowo Government’s Directionless Diplomacy, Tempo.” Stories from Indonesia, 13 July 2025, storiesfromindonesia.com/2025/07/13/op-ed-prabowo-governments-directionless-diplomacy-tempo/
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#AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #ForeignPolicy #Gaza #InternationalLaw #palestina #Palestine #PBB #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #un #UnitedNations #UnitedStates -
The Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, from Tempo.co
Israel’s Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, Tempo.co
By Eka Yudha Saputra, for Tempo.co, August 12, 2025
The buildings of Indonesia’s Special Infectious Diseases Hospital on Galang Island in the Riau Islands look deserted. The hospital complex is less crowded now than it was during the COVID-19 pandemic when it was used to treat COVID-19 patients.
Now the hospital is again attracting attention after the Indonesian government floated plans to treat 2,000 Palestinians from Gaza who have been injured in the war with Israel. Nurdin, a resident of Galang Island, has no problem with using the facility for the treatment of Gazans. “It’s no problem because we’re helping,” he said when approached by Tempo magazine on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Last week, Indonesia’s Presidential Palace announced Galang Island as an option for accommodating Gaza refugees. Head of the Presidential Communications Office, Hasan Nasbi, said Galang Island was chosen because it’s separated from residential areas.
“It has been a refugee camp, and a COVID-19 treatment center. So in terms of security and comfort, residents could be managed,” Hasan said during a press conference at his office in Central Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
However, Hasan denied allegations that the evacuation was a relocation, emphasizing that it was a government measure to provide temporary medical treatment and humanitarian aid.
The idea of evacuating Gaza refugees resurfaced after the Israeli security cabinet approved Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to take over Gaza City in the northern Gaza Strip on August 8, 2025. The decision was announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office after 10 hours of deliberation.
“Israeli Defense Forces will prepare to take control of Gaza City, while distributing humanitarian aid to civilians outside the war zone,” the Israeli government said, as quoted from its official website.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono explained the reasons for choosing Galang Island as a temporary treatment facility. He explained that Indonesia’s willingness to accommodate Gaza refugees was conveyed by President Prabowo Subianto during his state tour of Middle Eastern countries and Turkey on April 9, 2025.
During the visit, Sugiono said, President Prabowo told Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states that Indonesia was willing to treat victims injured in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“At the time, it was also conveyed that Indonesia was open to treating children, the elderly, and women who needed medical treatment, in Indonesia, provided all the parties agreed,” Sugiono said in a statement in Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
Foreign Minister Sugiono said that during their meeting with GCC heads of state, President Prabowo said Indonesia was willing to treat 1,000 children and victims of the Gaza war. The evacuation wold have to be approved by countries directly neighboring Palestine, such as Jordan and Egypt, and especially the Palestinian Authority itself.
“We also have to prepare the technical details. So if it can be implemented at some point in time we are prepared,” said Sugiono.
To realize the plan, the Indonesian government is preparing a location to accommodate Gaza refugees in Indonesia. One option that has emerged is Galang Island. “The island was previously used to treat COVID-19 patients. So the infrastructure is already there. We are also still considering other alternatives,” he said.
However, Sugiono said the plan is still not finalized, and a budget has not discussed yet.
President Prabowo’s statement on April 9, 2025, came several days after Israeli media reported that several countries were willing to accommodate Gazans.
The Times of Israel reported on April 5, 2025, that the Israeli government had contacted several countries to relocate Gazans. A senior Israeli official said Israel had discussed the permanent relocation of Gazans with United States President Donald Trump. He said that several countries were interested in relocating Gazans.
When asked to confirm the Israeli media report, Foreign Minister Sugiono said the discussions were not related to Indonesia. “That’s between Israel and the United States,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan drew mixed responses from various quarters. Indonesian House of Representative Commission I member Tubagus Hasanuddin (PDIP-West Java IX) warned the government to be wary of Israeli traps. According Hasanuddin, an evacuation would have to be carried out with the consent of the Palestinians themselves.
“I ask if their citizens want to seek treatment in Indonesia. They would certainly be asking where they’d be going after they had recovered? What about employment and social security?” Hasanuddin told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Hasanuddin also said an evacuation process would also depend on Israeli permission because Gaza is currently still in a state of conflict and under Israeli military blockade. Moreover, Hasanuddin said, Israel would only grant access if Palestinians were not returned to Gaza.
Hasanuddin noted further that Israel and the United States have an interest in ensuring Palestinians leave their country. “If we want to accommodate them, we’ll help them, that’s fine, as long as they can return. If they’re not allowed to return, then we’re falling for a scam,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan also drew criticism from Smith Alhadar, a member of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Society for Middle Eastern Studies (ISMES).
He expressed surprise at President Prabowo’s continued push to evacuate Gazans from their homeland. According to Smith, the idea is politically risky. Moreover, he said, the evacuation proposal had been rejected by the Arab League at its Cairo summit in Egypt on March 4, 2025.
The idea was rejected again by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 7, 2025. “Accommodating around 2,000 Palestinian refugees is highly politically motivated. The move could facilitate the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to empty Gaza of Palestinians,” Smith said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Smith also believes the evacuation idea coincides with Trump’s import tariff policy against Indonesia. So he suspects the Indonesian government’s plan to evacuate Gazans is a bargaining chip to negotiate a reduction in import tariffs for Indonesia.
“Galang Island is certainly capable of accommodating more Palestinians. But if we do that, we aren’t helping Palestine, we’re eliminating it,” he said. “And domestically, President Prabowo’s government would face strong resistance from the community.”
Meanwhile, the national head of Islamic community organization Muhammadiyah, Anwar Abbas, has repeatedly rejected the plan. He emphasized that Donald Trump has said he wants to deport Gazans en masse to other countries, including Indonesia.
“If Indonesia wants to bring injured Gazans to Indonesia for treatment, Netanyahu and Trump would certainly be very happy and delighted with the plan,” Anwar Abbas told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
The deputy head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) said the evacuation plan would actually create new problems for Indonesia. “The best thing for Indonesia and the international community is to treat the sick and injured in Gaza itself, not transport them out of Gaza,” he said.
Dina Sulaeman, an international relations lecturer at Padjadjaran University in West Java province, said that not all humanitarian movements in international politics are good. She said the Indonesian government has to consider the geopolitical context and that Israel and the United States have shared interests.
Dina said the evacuation idea announced by President Prabowo in April 2025 actually threatened Indonesia’s image. Although Prabowo stated that an evacuation would have to be approved by Arab countries, Dina said it would be a success for the United States and Israel in carrying out their agenda.
“From the perspective of political framing, Israel and the United States had ‘successfully’ framed the idea that the countries with the largest Muslim populations have agreed to evacuate Gazans,” Dina said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Dina also said there was no guarantee Gazan refugees brought to Indonesia would be able to return to Gaza. She referred to Donald Trump’s statement when he announced his proposal to relocate millions of Gazans in February 2025.
In an interview with Fox News, Trump said the proposal to relocate Gazans did not include the return of Gazans to their land. Trump said Palestinians would not be allowed to return to their land under his proposal.
“At the time, Trump said he would evacuate Gazans in April. When asked if they could return, Trump had said, no,” Dina said. “Meanwhile, Israel does indeed want to occupy Gaza, and that has been explicitly stated in every statement they make.”
The evacuation of Gazans not only violates Palestinian sovereignty, but also violates international law. Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Indonesia, said that international humanitarian law prohibits the removal of local residents during times of war without their consent.
“The Palestinian people have to stay in Palestine, because the Palestinian issue is a land issue. The important thing for them is that their land cannot be taken by Israel,” Hikmahanto told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
According to Hikmahanto, the evacuation plan cannot simply be based on the approval of the Palestinian Authority. He said the Palestinian Authority rules the West Bank and is not recognized in Gaza. Furthermore, Turkey also rejected the evacuation proposal during President Prabowo’s visit.
This international law observer is confident the United States will certainly facilitate the evacuation of Gazans to Indonesia. “Even if they need treatment, it would be better in their own country, or in a neighboring country. We don’t want the people to see our government as following Israel’s wishes,” Hikmahanto said.
Eka Yudha Saputra is an alumnus of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia. He joined Tempo in 2018. A member of the Alliance of Independent Journalists, he covers legal issues, national politics, and international issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/politik/evakuasi-pengungsi-gaza-pulang-galang-2057787.
In related news:
- Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Plan Divides Muslims, Fulcrum, Singapore
- Gaza: Indonesia Could Settle Palestinians Ethnically Cleansed From Gaza By Trump, as per The Guardian
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/22/indonesia-plans-details-treat-2000-injured-palestinians-galang-island
- https://open.spotify.com/episode/5210kcFSNwQ07Ldds2DO5b?si=wC7PNeN0SNCCHHuTNdyZUg
Rate this:
#AmerikaSerikat #Egypt #Gaza #HumanRights #Indonesia #InternationalLaw #internationalAffairs #Jordan #palestina #Palestine #Politics #UnitedStates -
The Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, from Tempo.co
Israel’s Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, Tempo.co
By Eka Yudha Saputra, for Tempo.co, August 12, 2025
The buildings of Indonesia’s Special Infectious Diseases Hospital on Galang Island in the Riau Islands look deserted. The hospital complex is less crowded now than it was during the COVID-19 pandemic when it was used to treat COVID-19 patients.
Now the hospital is again attracting attention after the Indonesian government floated plans to treat 2,000 Palestinians from Gaza who have been injured in the war with Israel. Nurdin, a resident of Galang Island, has no problem with using the facility for the treatment of Gazans. “It’s no problem because we’re helping,” he said when approached by Tempo magazine on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Last week, Indonesia’s Presidential Palace announced Galang Island as an option for accommodating Gaza refugees. Head of the Presidential Communications Office, Hasan Nasbi, said Galang Island was chosen because it’s separated from residential areas.
“It has been a refugee camp, and a COVID-19 treatment center. So in terms of security and comfort, residents could be managed,” Hasan said during a press conference at his office in Central Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
However, Hasan denied allegations that the evacuation was a relocation, emphasizing that it was a government measure to provide temporary medical treatment and humanitarian aid.
The idea of evacuating Gaza refugees resurfaced after the Israeli security cabinet approved Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to take over Gaza City in the northern Gaza Strip on August 8, 2025. The decision was announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office after 10 hours of deliberation.
“Israeli Defense Forces will prepare to take control of Gaza City, while distributing humanitarian aid to civilians outside the war zone,” the Israeli government said, as quoted from its official website.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono explained the reasons for choosing Galang Island as a temporary treatment facility. He explained that Indonesia’s willingness to accommodate Gaza refugees was conveyed by President Prabowo Subianto during his state tour of Middle Eastern countries and Turkey on April 9, 2025.
During the visit, Sugiono said, President Prabowo told Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states that Indonesia was willing to treat victims injured in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“At the time, it was also conveyed that Indonesia was open to treating children, the elderly, and women who needed medical treatment, in Indonesia, provided all the parties agreed,” Sugiono said in a statement in Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
Foreign Minister Sugiono said that during their meeting with GCC heads of state, President Prabowo said Indonesia was willing to treat 1,000 children and victims of the Gaza war. The evacuation wold have to be approved by countries directly neighboring Palestine, such as Jordan and Egypt, and especially the Palestinian Authority itself.
“We also have to prepare the technical details. So if it can be implemented at some point in time we are prepared,” said Sugiono.
To realize the plan, the Indonesian government is preparing a location to accommodate Gaza refugees in Indonesia. One option that has emerged is Galang Island. “The island was previously used to treat COVID-19 patients. So the infrastructure is already there. We are also still considering other alternatives,” he said.
However, Sugiono said the plan is still not finalized, and a budget has not discussed yet.
President Prabowo’s statement on April 9, 2025, came several days after Israeli media reported that several countries were willing to accommodate Gazans.
The Times of Israel reported on April 5, 2025, that the Israeli government had contacted several countries to relocate Gazans. A senior Israeli official said Israel had discussed the permanent relocation of Gazans with United States President Donald Trump. He said that several countries were interested in relocating Gazans.
When asked to confirm the Israeli media report, Foreign Minister Sugiono said the discussions were not related to Indonesia. “That’s between Israel and the United States,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan drew mixed responses from various quarters. Indonesian House of Representative Commission I member Tubagus Hasanuddin (PDIP-West Java IX) warned the government to be wary of Israeli traps. According Hasanuddin, an evacuation would have to be carried out with the consent of the Palestinians themselves.
“I ask if their citizens want to seek treatment in Indonesia. They would certainly be asking where they’d be going after they had recovered? What about employment and social security?” Hasanuddin told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Hasanuddin also said an evacuation process would also depend on Israeli permission because Gaza is currently still in a state of conflict and under Israeli military blockade. Moreover, Hasanuddin said, Israel would only grant access if Palestinians were not returned to Gaza.
Hasanuddin noted further that Israel and the United States have an interest in ensuring Palestinians leave their country. “If we want to accommodate them, we’ll help them, that’s fine, as long as they can return. If they’re not allowed to return, then we’re falling for a scam,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan also drew criticism from Smith Alhadar, a member of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Society for Middle Eastern Studies (ISMES).
He expressed surprise at President Prabowo’s continued push to evacuate Gazans from their homeland. According to Smith, the idea is politically risky. Moreover, he said, the evacuation proposal had been rejected by the Arab League at its Cairo summit in Egypt on March 4, 2025.
The idea was rejected again by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 7, 2025. “Accommodating around 2,000 Palestinian refugees is highly politically motivated. The move could facilitate the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to empty Gaza of Palestinians,” Smith said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Smith also believes the evacuation idea coincides with Trump’s import tariff policy against Indonesia. So he suspects the Indonesian government’s plan to evacuate Gazans is a bargaining chip to negotiate a reduction in import tariffs for Indonesia.
“Galang Island is certainly capable of accommodating more Palestinians. But if we do that, we aren’t helping Palestine, we’re eliminating it,” he said. “And domestically, President Prabowo’s government would face strong resistance from the community.”
Meanwhile, the national head of Islamic community organization Muhammadiyah, Anwar Abbas, has repeatedly rejected the plan. He emphasized that Donald Trump has said he wants to deport Gazans en masse to other countries, including Indonesia.
“If Indonesia wants to bring injured Gazans to Indonesia for treatment, Netanyahu and Trump would certainly be very happy and delighted with the plan,” Anwar Abbas told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
The deputy head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) said the evacuation plan would actually create new problems for Indonesia. “The best thing for Indonesia and the international community is to treat the sick and injured in Gaza itself, not transport them out of Gaza,” he said.
Dina Sulaeman, an international relations lecturer at Padjadjaran University in West Java province, said that not all humanitarian movements in international politics are good. She said the Indonesian government has to consider the geopolitical context and that Israel and the United States have shared interests.
Dina said the evacuation idea announced by President Prabowo in April 2025 actually threatened Indonesia’s image. Although Prabowo stated that an evacuation would have to be approved by Arab countries, Dina said it would be a success for the United States and Israel in carrying out their agenda.
“From the perspective of political framing, Israel and the United States had ‘successfully’ framed the idea that the countries with the largest Muslim populations have agreed to evacuate Gazans,” Dina said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Dina also said there was no guarantee Gazan refugees brought to Indonesia would be able to return to Gaza. She referred to Donald Trump’s statement when he announced his proposal to relocate millions of Gazans in February 2025.
In an interview with Fox News, Trump said the proposal to relocate Gazans did not include the return of Gazans to their land. Trump said Palestinians would not be allowed to return to their land under his proposal.
“At the time, Trump said he would evacuate Gazans in April. When asked if they could return, Trump had said, no,” Dina said. “Meanwhile, Israel does indeed want to occupy Gaza, and that has been explicitly stated in every statement they make.”
The evacuation of Gazans not only violates Palestinian sovereignty, but also violates international law. Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Indonesia, said that international humanitarian law prohibits the removal of local residents during times of war without their consent.
“The Palestinian people have to stay in Palestine, because the Palestinian issue is a land issue. The important thing for them is that their land cannot be taken by Israel,” Hikmahanto told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
According to Hikmahanto, the evacuation plan cannot simply be based on the approval of the Palestinian Authority. He said the Palestinian Authority rules the West Bank and is not recognized in Gaza. Furthermore, Turkey also rejected the evacuation proposal during President Prabowo’s visit.
This international law observer is confident the United States will certainly facilitate the evacuation of Gazans to Indonesia. “Even if they need treatment, it would be better in their own country, or in a neighboring country. We don’t want the people to see our government as following Israel’s wishes,” Hikmahanto said.
Eka Yudha Saputra is an alumnus of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia. He joined Tempo in 2018. A member of the Alliance of Independent Journalists, he covers legal issues, national politics, and international issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/politik/evakuasi-pengungsi-gaza-pulang-galang-2057787.
In related news:
- Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Plan Divides Muslims, Fulcrum, Singapore
- Gaza: Indonesia Could Settle Palestinians Ethnically Cleansed From Gaza By Trump, as per The Guardian
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/22/indonesia-plans-details-treat-2000-injured-palestinians-galang-island
- https://open.spotify.com/episode/5210kcFSNwQ07Ldds2DO5b?si=wC7PNeN0SNCCHHuTNdyZUg
Rate this:
#AmerikaSerikat #Egypt #Gaza #HumanRights #Indonesia #InternationalLaw #internationalAffairs #Jordan #palestina #Palestine #Politics #UnitedStates -
The Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, from Tempo.co
Israel’s Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, Tempo.co
By Eka Yudha Saputra, for Tempo.co, August 12, 2025
The buildings of Indonesia’s Special Infectious Diseases Hospital on Galang Island in the Riau Islands look deserted. The hospital complex is less crowded now than it was during the COVID-19 pandemic when it was used to treat COVID-19 patients.
Now the hospital is again attracting attention after the Indonesian government floated plans to treat 2,000 Palestinians from Gaza who have been injured in the war with Israel. Nurdin, a resident of Galang Island, has no problem with using the facility for the treatment of Gazans. “It’s no problem because we’re helping,” he said when approached by Tempo magazine on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Last week, Indonesia’s Presidential Palace announced Galang Island as an option for accommodating Gaza refugees. Head of the Presidential Communications Office, Hasan Nasbi, said Galang Island was chosen because it’s separated from residential areas.
“It has been a refugee camp, and a COVID-19 treatment center. So in terms of security and comfort, residents could be managed,” Hasan said during a press conference at his office in Central Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
However, Hasan denied allegations that the evacuation was a relocation, emphasizing that it was a government measure to provide temporary medical treatment and humanitarian aid.
The idea of evacuating Gaza refugees resurfaced after the Israeli security cabinet approved Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to take over Gaza City in the northern Gaza Strip on August 8, 2025. The decision was announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office after 10 hours of deliberation.
“Israeli Defense Forces will prepare to take control of Gaza City, while distributing humanitarian aid to civilians outside the war zone,” the Israeli government said, as quoted from its official website.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono explained the reasons for choosing Galang Island as a temporary treatment facility. He explained that Indonesia’s willingness to accommodate Gaza refugees was conveyed by President Prabowo Subianto during his state tour of Middle Eastern countries and Turkey on April 9, 2025.
During the visit, Sugiono said, President Prabowo told Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states that Indonesia was willing to treat victims injured in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“At the time, it was also conveyed that Indonesia was open to treating children, the elderly, and women who needed medical treatment, in Indonesia, provided all the parties agreed,” Sugiono said in a statement in Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
Foreign Minister Sugiono said that during their meeting with GCC heads of state, President Prabowo said Indonesia was willing to treat 1,000 children and victims of the Gaza war. The evacuation wold have to be approved by countries directly neighboring Palestine, such as Jordan and Egypt, and especially the Palestinian Authority itself.
“We also have to prepare the technical details. So if it can be implemented at some point in time we are prepared,” said Sugiono.
To realize the plan, the Indonesian government is preparing a location to accommodate Gaza refugees in Indonesia. One option that has emerged is Galang Island. “The island was previously used to treat COVID-19 patients. So the infrastructure is already there. We are also still considering other alternatives,” he said.
However, Sugiono said the plan is still not finalized, and a budget has not discussed yet.
President Prabowo’s statement on April 9, 2025, came several days after Israeli media reported that several countries were willing to accommodate Gazans.
The Times of Israel reported on April 5, 2025, that the Israeli government had contacted several countries to relocate Gazans. A senior Israeli official said Israel had discussed the permanent relocation of Gazans with United States President Donald Trump. He said that several countries were interested in relocating Gazans.
When asked to confirm the Israeli media report, Foreign Minister Sugiono said the discussions were not related to Indonesia. “That’s between Israel and the United States,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan drew mixed responses from various quarters. Indonesian House of Representative Commission I member Tubagus Hasanuddin (PDIP-West Java IX) warned the government to be wary of Israeli traps. According Hasanuddin, an evacuation would have to be carried out with the consent of the Palestinians themselves.
“I ask if their citizens want to seek treatment in Indonesia. They would certainly be asking where they’d be going after they had recovered? What about employment and social security?” Hasanuddin told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Hasanuddin also said an evacuation process would also depend on Israeli permission because Gaza is currently still in a state of conflict and under Israeli military blockade. Moreover, Hasanuddin said, Israel would only grant access if Palestinians were not returned to Gaza.
Hasanuddin noted further that Israel and the United States have an interest in ensuring Palestinians leave their country. “If we want to accommodate them, we’ll help them, that’s fine, as long as they can return. If they’re not allowed to return, then we’re falling for a scam,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan also drew criticism from Smith Alhadar, a member of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Society for Middle Eastern Studies (ISMES).
He expressed surprise at President Prabowo’s continued push to evacuate Gazans from their homeland. According to Smith, the idea is politically risky. Moreover, he said, the evacuation proposal had been rejected by the Arab League at its Cairo summit in Egypt on March 4, 2025.
The idea was rejected again by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 7, 2025. “Accommodating around 2,000 Palestinian refugees is highly politically motivated. The move could facilitate the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to empty Gaza of Palestinians,” Smith said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Smith also believes the evacuation idea coincides with Trump’s import tariff policy against Indonesia. So he suspects the Indonesian government’s plan to evacuate Gazans is a bargaining chip to negotiate a reduction in import tariffs for Indonesia.
“Galang Island is certainly capable of accommodating more Palestinians. But if we do that, we aren’t helping Palestine, we’re eliminating it,” he said. “And domestically, President Prabowo’s government would face strong resistance from the community.”
Meanwhile, the national head of Islamic community organization Muhammadiyah, Anwar Abbas, has repeatedly rejected the plan. He emphasized that Donald Trump has said he wants to deport Gazans en masse to other countries, including Indonesia.
“If Indonesia wants to bring injured Gazans to Indonesia for treatment, Netanyahu and Trump would certainly be very happy and delighted with the plan,” Anwar Abbas told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
The deputy head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) said the evacuation plan would actually create new problems for Indonesia. “The best thing for Indonesia and the international community is to treat the sick and injured in Gaza itself, not transport them out of Gaza,” he said.
Dina Sulaeman, an international relations lecturer at Padjadjaran University in West Java province, said that not all humanitarian movements in international politics are good. She said the Indonesian government has to consider the geopolitical context and that Israel and the United States have shared interests.
Dina said the evacuation idea announced by President Prabowo in April 2025 actually threatened Indonesia’s image. Although Prabowo stated that an evacuation would have to be approved by Arab countries, Dina said it would be a success for the United States and Israel in carrying out their agenda.
“From the perspective of political framing, Israel and the United States had ‘successfully’ framed the idea that the countries with the largest Muslim populations have agreed to evacuate Gazans,” Dina said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Dina also said there was no guarantee Gazan refugees brought to Indonesia would be able to return to Gaza. She referred to Donald Trump’s statement when he announced his proposal to relocate millions of Gazans in February 2025.
In an interview with Fox News, Trump said the proposal to relocate Gazans did not include the return of Gazans to their land. Trump said Palestinians would not be allowed to return to their land under his proposal.
“At the time, Trump said he would evacuate Gazans in April. When asked if they could return, Trump had said, no,” Dina said. “Meanwhile, Israel does indeed want to occupy Gaza, and that has been explicitly stated in every statement they make.”
The evacuation of Gazans not only violates Palestinian sovereignty, but also violates international law. Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Indonesia, said that international humanitarian law prohibits the removal of local residents during times of war without their consent.
“The Palestinian people have to stay in Palestine, because the Palestinian issue is a land issue. The important thing for them is that their land cannot be taken by Israel,” Hikmahanto told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
According to Hikmahanto, the evacuation plan cannot simply be based on the approval of the Palestinian Authority. He said the Palestinian Authority rules the West Bank and is not recognized in Gaza. Furthermore, Turkey also rejected the evacuation proposal during President Prabowo’s visit.
This international law observer is confident the United States will certainly facilitate the evacuation of Gazans to Indonesia. “Even if they need treatment, it would be better in their own country, or in a neighboring country. We don’t want the people to see our government as following Israel’s wishes,” Hikmahanto said.
Eka Yudha Saputra is an alumnus of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia. He joined Tempo in 2018. A member of the Alliance of Independent Journalists, he covers legal issues, national politics, and international issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/politik/evakuasi-pengungsi-gaza-pulang-galang-2057787.
In related news:
- Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Plan Divides Muslims, Fulcrum, Singapore
- Gaza: Indonesia Could Settle Palestinians Ethnically Cleansed From Gaza By Trump, as per The Guardian
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/22/indonesia-plans-details-treat-2000-injured-palestinians-galang-island
- https://open.spotify.com/episode/5210kcFSNwQ07Ldds2DO5b?si=wC7PNeN0SNCCHHuTNdyZUg
Rate this:
#AmerikaSerikat #Egypt #Gaza #HumanRights #Indonesia #InternationalLaw #internationalAffairs #Jordan #palestina #Palestine #Politics #UnitedStates -
The Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, from Tempo.co
Israel’s Scam Behind Indonesia’s Plan to Accommodate Gaza Refugees, Tempo.co
By Eka Yudha Saputra, for Tempo.co, August 12, 2025
The buildings of Indonesia’s Special Infectious Diseases Hospital on Galang Island in the Riau Islands look deserted. The hospital complex is less crowded now than it was during the COVID-19 pandemic when it was used to treat COVID-19 patients.
Now the hospital is again attracting attention after the Indonesian government floated plans to treat 2,000 Palestinians from Gaza who have been injured in the war with Israel. Nurdin, a resident of Galang Island, has no problem with using the facility for the treatment of Gazans. “It’s no problem because we’re helping,” he said when approached by Tempo magazine on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Last week, Indonesia’s Presidential Palace announced Galang Island as an option for accommodating Gaza refugees. Head of the Presidential Communications Office, Hasan Nasbi, said Galang Island was chosen because it’s separated from residential areas.
“It has been a refugee camp, and a COVID-19 treatment center. So in terms of security and comfort, residents could be managed,” Hasan said during a press conference at his office in Central Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
However, Hasan denied allegations that the evacuation was a relocation, emphasizing that it was a government measure to provide temporary medical treatment and humanitarian aid.
The idea of evacuating Gaza refugees resurfaced after the Israeli security cabinet approved Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to take over Gaza City in the northern Gaza Strip on August 8, 2025. The decision was announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office after 10 hours of deliberation.
“Israeli Defense Forces will prepare to take control of Gaza City, while distributing humanitarian aid to civilians outside the war zone,” the Israeli government said, as quoted from its official website.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono explained the reasons for choosing Galang Island as a temporary treatment facility. He explained that Indonesia’s willingness to accommodate Gaza refugees was conveyed by President Prabowo Subianto during his state tour of Middle Eastern countries and Turkey on April 9, 2025.
During the visit, Sugiono said, President Prabowo told Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states that Indonesia was willing to treat victims injured in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
“At the time, it was also conveyed that Indonesia was open to treating children, the elderly, and women who needed medical treatment, in Indonesia, provided all the parties agreed,” Sugiono said in a statement in Jakarta on Thursday, August 7, 2025.
Foreign Minister Sugiono said that during their meeting with GCC heads of state, President Prabowo said Indonesia was willing to treat 1,000 children and victims of the Gaza war. The evacuation wold have to be approved by countries directly neighboring Palestine, such as Jordan and Egypt, and especially the Palestinian Authority itself.
“We also have to prepare the technical details. So if it can be implemented at some point in time we are prepared,” said Sugiono.
To realize the plan, the Indonesian government is preparing a location to accommodate Gaza refugees in Indonesia. One option that has emerged is Galang Island. “The island was previously used to treat COVID-19 patients. So the infrastructure is already there. We are also still considering other alternatives,” he said.
However, Sugiono said the plan is still not finalized, and a budget has not discussed yet.
President Prabowo’s statement on April 9, 2025, came several days after Israeli media reported that several countries were willing to accommodate Gazans.
The Times of Israel reported on April 5, 2025, that the Israeli government had contacted several countries to relocate Gazans. A senior Israeli official said Israel had discussed the permanent relocation of Gazans with United States President Donald Trump. He said that several countries were interested in relocating Gazans.
When asked to confirm the Israeli media report, Foreign Minister Sugiono said the discussions were not related to Indonesia. “That’s between Israel and the United States,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan drew mixed responses from various quarters. Indonesian House of Representative Commission I member Tubagus Hasanuddin (PDIP-West Java IX) warned the government to be wary of Israeli traps. According Hasanuddin, an evacuation would have to be carried out with the consent of the Palestinians themselves.
“I ask if their citizens want to seek treatment in Indonesia. They would certainly be asking where they’d be going after they had recovered? What about employment and social security?” Hasanuddin told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Hasanuddin also said an evacuation process would also depend on Israeli permission because Gaza is currently still in a state of conflict and under Israeli military blockade. Moreover, Hasanuddin said, Israel would only grant access if Palestinians were not returned to Gaza.
Hasanuddin noted further that Israel and the United States have an interest in ensuring Palestinians leave their country. “If we want to accommodate them, we’ll help them, that’s fine, as long as they can return. If they’re not allowed to return, then we’re falling for a scam,” he said.
The Indonesian government’s plan also drew criticism from Smith Alhadar, a member of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Society for Middle Eastern Studies (ISMES).
He expressed surprise at President Prabowo’s continued push to evacuate Gazans from their homeland. According to Smith, the idea is politically risky. Moreover, he said, the evacuation proposal had been rejected by the Arab League at its Cairo summit in Egypt on March 4, 2025.
The idea was rejected again by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 7, 2025. “Accommodating around 2,000 Palestinian refugees is highly politically motivated. The move could facilitate the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to empty Gaza of Palestinians,” Smith said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Smith also believes the evacuation idea coincides with Trump’s import tariff policy against Indonesia. So he suspects the Indonesian government’s plan to evacuate Gazans is a bargaining chip to negotiate a reduction in import tariffs for Indonesia.
“Galang Island is certainly capable of accommodating more Palestinians. But if we do that, we aren’t helping Palestine, we’re eliminating it,” he said. “And domestically, President Prabowo’s government would face strong resistance from the community.”
Meanwhile, the national head of Islamic community organization Muhammadiyah, Anwar Abbas, has repeatedly rejected the plan. He emphasized that Donald Trump has said he wants to deport Gazans en masse to other countries, including Indonesia.
“If Indonesia wants to bring injured Gazans to Indonesia for treatment, Netanyahu and Trump would certainly be very happy and delighted with the plan,” Anwar Abbas told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
The deputy head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) said the evacuation plan would actually create new problems for Indonesia. “The best thing for Indonesia and the international community is to treat the sick and injured in Gaza itself, not transport them out of Gaza,” he said.
Dina Sulaeman, an international relations lecturer at Padjadjaran University in West Java province, said that not all humanitarian movements in international politics are good. She said the Indonesian government has to consider the geopolitical context and that Israel and the United States have shared interests.
Dina said the evacuation idea announced by President Prabowo in April 2025 actually threatened Indonesia’s image. Although Prabowo stated that an evacuation would have to be approved by Arab countries, Dina said it would be a success for the United States and Israel in carrying out their agenda.
“From the perspective of political framing, Israel and the United States had ‘successfully’ framed the idea that the countries with the largest Muslim populations have agreed to evacuate Gazans,” Dina said when contacted by Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
Dina also said there was no guarantee Gazan refugees brought to Indonesia would be able to return to Gaza. She referred to Donald Trump’s statement when he announced his proposal to relocate millions of Gazans in February 2025.
In an interview with Fox News, Trump said the proposal to relocate Gazans did not include the return of Gazans to their land. Trump said Palestinians would not be allowed to return to their land under his proposal.
“At the time, Trump said he would evacuate Gazans in April. When asked if they could return, Trump had said, no,” Dina said. “Meanwhile, Israel does indeed want to occupy Gaza, and that has been explicitly stated in every statement they make.”
The evacuation of Gazans not only violates Palestinian sovereignty, but also violates international law. Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Indonesia, said that international humanitarian law prohibits the removal of local residents during times of war without their consent.
“The Palestinian people have to stay in Palestine, because the Palestinian issue is a land issue. The important thing for them is that their land cannot be taken by Israel,” Hikmahanto told Tempo on Monday, August 11, 2025.
According to Hikmahanto, the evacuation plan cannot simply be based on the approval of the Palestinian Authority. He said the Palestinian Authority rules the West Bank and is not recognized in Gaza. Furthermore, Turkey also rejected the evacuation proposal during President Prabowo’s visit.
This international law observer is confident the United States will certainly facilitate the evacuation of Gazans to Indonesia. “Even if they need treatment, it would be better in their own country, or in a neighboring country. We don’t want the people to see our government as following Israel’s wishes,” Hikmahanto said.
Eka Yudha Saputra is an alumnus of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Indonesia. He joined Tempo in 2018. A member of the Alliance of Independent Journalists, he covers legal issues, national politics, and international issues.
This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/politik/evakuasi-pengungsi-gaza-pulang-galang-2057787.
In related news:
- Op-Ed: Indonesia’s Gaza Plan Divides Muslims, Fulcrum, Singapore
- Gaza: Indonesia Could Settle Palestinians Ethnically Cleansed From Gaza By Trump, as per The Guardian
- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/22/indonesia-plans-details-treat-2000-injured-palestinians-galang-island
- https://open.spotify.com/episode/5210kcFSNwQ07Ldds2DO5b?si=wC7PNeN0SNCCHHuTNdyZUg
Rate this:
#AmerikaSerikat #Egypt #Gaza #HumanRights #Indonesia #InternationalLaw #internationalAffairs #Jordan #palestina #Palestine #Politics #UnitedStates -
https://www.fogolf.com/1024303/nyawa-donald-trump-diincar-musuh-hingga-jet-tempur-as-sergap-pesawat-misterius-di-atas-klub-golf/ Nyawa Donald Trump Diincar Musuh hingga Jet Tempur AS Sergap Pesawat Misterius di Atas Klub Golf #AmerikaSerikat #Donald #DonaldTrump #DonaldTrumpGolf #DonaldTrumpGolfing #F16 #JetTempur #trump #TrumpGolf
-
Short Story: Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
By Harry Aveling
BD general literary journal first published 2 June 1968 –Footnote No. 2.
The press did not dare to report these events in detail for fear that they might affect public feelings.” Sinar Harapan. 3rd February 1966 (quoted in A. Brackman: The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore 1970. p. 125).
The stories here were published in the two literary magazines. Horison and Sastra.
In Horison:
- Satyagraha Hoerip. “Pada Titik Kulminasi”, September 1966;
- Gerson Poyk. “Perempuan dan Anak-anaknya”, November 1966;
- Zulidahlan, “Maka Sempurnalah penderitaan saya di muka bumi”, March 1967;
- Sosiawan Nugroho, “Sebuah perjoangan kedl”, October 1967;
- Usamah. “Perang, dan manusia”, August 1969;
- Martin Aleida, “Malam kelabu”, February 1970.
In Sastra:
- Kipandjikusmin, “Bintang maut” , November 1967. and “Domba kain”, May 1968;
- H. G. Ugati, “Ancaman”, JuJy 1969;
- Mohammac Sjoekoer, “Maut” October 1969.
Two further stories are not included here:
- Umar Kayam, “Bawuk”, Horisrm, January 1970, and “Musim gugugur kembali di Connecticut”, October 1969, but are translated in my Indonesian Short Stories, forthcoming from Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), Hong Kong.
A further story by
- Kayam, “Kimono Biru Buat Isteri”, Horison, February 1974 and two others also on the Coup, will appear in a separate volume of translations of short stories by Umar Kayam.
This list of short stories on the coup originally appeared in the article by
- Satygraha Hoerip: “Pembrontakan Gestapu/PKI dalam Gerpen-cerpen Indonesia”, Budaya Jaya. February 1972.
Aveling, H. (1975). Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abortive Communist coup of 30th September 1965. Southeast Asian studies working paper, no. 6. Honolulu: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa. http://hdl.handle.net/10125/19379 [Accessed 30 Dec 2022] or https://storiesfromindonesia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/gestapu.pdf
Also look out for:
- M Shoim Anwar (2011) ‘Sulastri dan Empat Lelaki’, Ruang Sastra, 5 December 2011. Available at: https://ruangsastra.com/23277/sulastri-dan-empat-lelaki/ (Accessed: 30 December 2022).
- Perempuan dan Anak-Anaknya, Yoseph Yapi Taum & Antonius Sumarwan Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2021, ISBN 9786024815486 https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=HRMxEAAAQBAJ
Rate this:
#1965 #AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #Cerpen #CivilRights #GersonPoyk #History #HumanRights #Indonesia #Literature #NewOrder #OrdeBaru #Politics #Sastra #SatyagrahaHoerip #Sejarah #ShortStory #UmarKayam #Writers -
Short Story: Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
By Harry Aveling
BD general literary journal first published 2 June 1968 –Footnote No. 2.
The press did not dare to report these events in detail for fear that they might affect public feelings.” Sinar Harapan. 3rd February 1966 (quoted in A. Brackman: The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore 1970. p. 125).
The stories here were published in the two literary magazines. Horison and Sastra.
In Horison:
- Satyagraha Hoerip. “Pada Titik Kulminasi”, September 1966;
- Gerson Poyk. “Perempuan dan Anak-anaknya”, November 1966;
- Zulidahlan, “Maka Sempurnalah penderitaan saya di muka bumi”, March 1967;
- Sosiawan Nugroho, “Sebuah perjoangan kedl”, October 1967;
- Usamah. “Perang, dan manusia”, August 1969;
- Martin Aleida, “Malam kelabu”, February 1970.
In Sastra:
- Kipandjikusmin, “Bintang maut” , November 1967. and “Domba kain”, May 1968;
- H. G. Ugati, “Ancaman”, JuJy 1969;
- Mohammac Sjoekoer, “Maut” October 1969.
Two further stories are not included here:
- Umar Kayam, “Bawuk”, Horisrm, January 1970, and “Musim gugugur kembali di Connecticut”, October 1969, but are translated in my Indonesian Short Stories, forthcoming from Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), Hong Kong.
A further story by
- Kayam, “Kimono Biru Buat Isteri”, Horison, February 1974 and two others also on the Coup, will appear in a separate volume of translations of short stories by Umar Kayam.
This list of short stories on the coup originally appeared in the article by
- Satygraha Hoerip: “Pembrontakan Gestapu/PKI dalam Gerpen-cerpen Indonesia”, Budaya Jaya. February 1972.
Aveling, H. (1975). Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abortive Communist coup of 30th September 1965. Southeast Asian studies working paper, no. 6. Honolulu: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa. http://hdl.handle.net/10125/19379 [Accessed 30 Dec 2022] or https://storiesfromindonesia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/gestapu.pdf
Also look out for:
- M Shoim Anwar (2011) ‘Sulastri dan Empat Lelaki’, Ruang Sastra, 5 December 2011. Available at: https://ruangsastra.com/23277/sulastri-dan-empat-lelaki/ (Accessed: 30 December 2022).
- Perempuan dan Anak-Anaknya, Yoseph Yapi Taum & Antonius Sumarwan Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2021, ISBN 9786024815486 https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=HRMxEAAAQBAJ
Rate this:
#1965 #AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #Cerpen #CivilRights #GersonPoyk #History #HumanRights #Indonesia #Literature #NewOrder #OrdeBaru #Politics #Sastra #SatyagrahaHoerip #Sejarah #ShortStory #UmarKayam #Writers -
Short Story: Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
By Harry Aveling
BD general literary journal first published 2 June 1968 –Footnote No. 2.
The press did not dare to report these events in detail for fear that they might affect public feelings.” Sinar Harapan. 3rd February 1966 (quoted in A. Brackman: The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore 1970. p. 125).
The stories here were published in the two literary magazines. Horison and Sastra.
In Horison:
- Satyagraha Hoerip. “Pada Titik Kulminasi”, September 1966;
- Gerson Poyk. “Perempuan dan Anak-anaknya”, November 1966;
- Zulidahlan, “Maka Sempurnalah penderitaan saya di muka bumi”, March 1967;
- Sosiawan Nugroho, “Sebuah perjoangan kedl”, October 1967;
- Usamah. “Perang, dan manusia”, August 1969;
- Martin Aleida, “Malam kelabu”, February 1970.
In Sastra:
- Kipandjikusmin, “Bintang maut” , November 1967. and “Domba kain”, May 1968;
- H. G. Ugati, “Ancaman”, JuJy 1969;
- Mohammac Sjoekoer, “Maut” October 1969.
Two further stories are not included here:
- Umar Kayam, “Bawuk”, Horisrm, January 1970, and “Musim gugugur kembali di Connecticut”, October 1969,
but are translated in my Indonesian Short Stories, forthcoming from Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), Hong Kong.
A further story by
- Kayam, “Kimono Biru Buat Isteri”, Horison, February 1974 and two others also on the Coup, will appear in a separate volume of translations of short stories by Umar Kayam.
This list of short stories on the coup originally appeared in the article by
- Satygraha Hoerip: “Pembrontakan Gestapu/PKI dalam Gerpen-cerpen Indonesia”, Budaya Jaya. February 1972.
Aveling, H. (1975). Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abortive Communist coup of 30th September 1965. Southeast Asian studies working paper, no. 6. Honolulu: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa. http://hdl.handle.net/10125/19379 [Accessed 30 Dec 2022] or https://storiesfromindonesia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/gestapu.pdf
Also look out for:
- M Shoim Anwar (2011) ‘Sulastri dan Empat Lelaki’, Ruang Sastra, 5 December 2011. Available at: https://ruangsastra.com/23277/sulastri-dan-empat-lelaki/ (Accessed: 30 December 2022).
- Perempuan dan Anak-Anaknya, Yoseph Yapi Taum & Antonius Sumarwan Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2021, ISBN 9786024815486 https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=HRMxEAAAQBAJ
Rate this:
#1965 #AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #Cerpen #CivilRights #GersonPoyk #History #HumanRights #Indonesia #Literature #NewOrder #OrdeBaru #Politics #Sastra #SatyagrahaHoerip #Sejarah #ShortStory #UmarKayam #Writers -
Short Story: Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
Footnote No. 2 Dari Harry
By Harry Aveling
BD general literary journal first published 2 June 1968 –Footnote No. 2.
The press did not dare to report these events in detail for fear that they might affect public feelings.” Sinar Harapan. 3rd February 1966 (quoted in A. Brackman: The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, Donald Moore for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore 1970. p. 125).
The stories here were published in the two literary magazines. Horison and Sastra.
In Horison:
- Satyagraha Hoerip. “Pada Titik Kulminasi”, September 1966;
- Gerson Poyk. “Perempuan dan Anak-anaknya”, November 1966;
- Zulidahlan, “Maka Sempurnalah penderitaan saya di muka bumi”, March 1967;
- Sosiawan Nugroho, “Sebuah perjoangan kedl”, October 1967;
- Usamah. “Perang, dan manusia”, August 1969;
- Martin Aleida, “Malam kelabu”, February 1970.
In Sastra:
- Kipandjikusmin, “Bintang maut” , November 1967. and “Domba kain”, May 1968;
- H. G. Ugati, “Ancaman”, JuJy 1969;
- Mohammac Sjoekoer, “Maut” October 1969.
Two further stories are not included here:
- Umar Kayam, “Bawuk”, Horisrm, January 1970, and “Musim gugugur kembali di Connecticut”, October 1969, but are translated in my Indonesian Short Stories, forthcoming from Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), Hong Kong.
A further story by
- Kayam, “Kimono Biru Buat Isteri”, Horison, February 1974 and two others also on the Coup, will appear in a separate volume of translations of short stories by Umar Kayam.
This list of short stories on the coup originally appeared in the article by
- Satygraha Hoerip: “Pembrontakan Gestapu/PKI dalam Gerpen-cerpen Indonesia”, Budaya Jaya. February 1972.
Aveling, H. (1975). Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abortive Communist coup of 30th September 1965. Southeast Asian studies working paper, no. 6. Honolulu: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa. http://hdl.handle.net/10125/19379 [Accessed 30 Dec 2022] or https://storiesfromindonesia.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/gestapu.pdf
Also look out for:
- M Shoim Anwar (2011) ‘Sulastri dan Empat Lelaki’, Ruang Sastra, 5 December 2011. Available at: https://ruangsastra.com/23277/sulastri-dan-empat-lelaki/ (Accessed: 30 December 2022).
- Perempuan dan Anak-Anaknya, Yoseph Yapi Taum & Antonius Sumarwan Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2021, ISBN 9786024815486 https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=HRMxEAAAQBAJ
Rate this:
#1965 #AmerikaSerikat #ArmedForces #Cerpen #CivilRights #GersonPoyk #History #HumanRights #Indonesia #Literature #NewOrder #OrdeBaru #Politics #Sastra #SatyagrahaHoerip #Sejarah #ShortStory #UmarKayam #Writers