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#nikel — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #nikel, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  2. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  3. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  4. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #unitedstates #tariffs #sulawesi #regionalindonesia #prabowosubianto #prabowogibran
  5. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #china #cleanenergy #economics #economy
  6. Walk News @[email protected] ·

    walknews.com/1320810/ Chinese nickel giants seek alternatives to Indonesia in Africa #Africa #Afrika #China #Indonesia #Nikel #アフリカ

    #africa #afrika #china #indonesia #nikel #アフリカ
  7. Walk News @[email protected] ·

    walknews.com/1320810/ Chinese nickel giants seek alternatives to Indonesia in Africa #Africa #Afrika #China #Indonesia #Nikel #アフリカ

    #africa #afrika #china #indonesia #nikel #アフリカ
  8. Walk News @[email protected] ·

    walknews.com/1320810/ Chinese nickel giants seek alternatives to Indonesia in Africa #Africa #Afrika #China #Indonesia #Nikel #アフリカ

    #アフリカ #nikel #indonesia #china #afrika #africa
  9. Walk News @[email protected] ·

    walknews.com/1318937/ Chinese nickel giants seek alternatives to Indonesia in Africa #Africa #Afrika #China #Indonesia #Nikel #アフリカ

    #africa #afrika #china #indonesia #nikel #アフリカ
  10. Walk News @[email protected] ·

    walknews.com/1318937/ Chinese nickel giants seek alternatives to Indonesia in Africa #Africa #Afrika #China #Indonesia #Nikel #アフリカ

    #africa #afrika #china #indonesia #nikel #アフリカ
  11. Walk News @[email protected] ·

    walknews.com/1318937/ Chinese nickel giants seek alternatives to Indonesia in Africa #Africa #Afrika #China #Indonesia #Nikel #アフリカ

    #アフリカ #nikel #indonesia #china #afrika #africa
  12. Österreich @[email protected] ·

    europesays.com/at/167391/ Kult-Rocker Rio Reiser: So erinnert Husum an den Musiker #AT #Austria #Berlin #Entertainment #HollowSkai #Husum #KarlPhilippMoritz #MariusDelMestre #Mestre #Music #Musik #Musikgruppe #Nikel #Österreich #RalphMöbius #RioReiser #RockPop #TonSteineScherben #UMusik #Unterhaltung

    #unterhaltung #umusik #tonsteinescherben #rockpop #rioreiser #ralphmobius
  13. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  14. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  15. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  16. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #war #unitedstates #tariff #sulawesi #regionalindonesia #politics
  17. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
    #agreementonreciprocaltrade #amerikaserikat #business #china #cleanenergy #energytransition
  18. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: re: [NSFW] comic, shark, lizard, gay, nippleplay, pecs

    Comic - Alternate Payment
    Pages 5,6,7,8
    Commission for Sharky (telegram)

    His hunk shark oc Shane and my hot oc Nikel found an alternative way to resolve a situation in the middle of the forest!

    #furry #bara #orgasm #cum #cumming #TraditionalArt #shark #lizard #comic #lizard #sharky #shark #nikel #gaysex #pecs #bigpecs #nipples #internal #nippleplay #nipplefetish

    #furry #bara #orgasm #cum #cumming #traditionalart
  19. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: re: [NSFW] comic, shark, lizard, gay, nippleplay, pecs

    Comic - Alternate Payment
    Pages 5,6,7,8
    Commission for Sharky (telegram)

    His hunk shark oc Shane and my hot oc Nikel found an alternative way to resolve a situation in the middle of the forest!

    #furry #bara #orgasm #cum #cumming #TraditionalArt #shark #lizard #comic #lizard #sharky #shark #nikel #gaysex #pecs #bigpecs #nipples #internal #nippleplay #nipplefetish

    #furry #bara #orgasm #cum #cumming #traditionalart
  20. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: re: [NSFW] comic, shark, lizard, gay, nippleplay, pecs

    Comic - Alternate Payment
    Pages 5,6,7,8
    Commission for Sharky (telegram)

    His hunk shark oc Shane and my hot oc Nikel found an alternative way to resolve a situation in the middle of the forest!

    #furry #bara #orgasm #cum #cumming #TraditionalArt #shark #lizard #comic #lizard #sharky #shark #nikel #gaysex #pecs #bigpecs #nipples #internal #nippleplay #nipplefetish

    #nipplefetish #nippleplay #internal #nipples #bigpecs #pecs
  21. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: [NSFW] comic, shark, lizard, gay, nippleplay, pecs

    Comic - Alternate Payment
    Pages 1,2,3,4
    Commission for Sharky (telegram)

    His hunk shark oc Shane and my hot oc Nikel found an alternative way to resolve a situation in the middle of the forest!

    #furry #FurryArt #furrybara #pecs #nipples #nippleplay #nipplefetish #gay #comic #TraditionalArt #shark #lizard #Nikel #bara #muscular #biceps #muscles #gaysex

    #furry #furryart #furrybara #pecs #nipples #nippleplay
  22. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: [NSFW] comic, shark, lizard, gay, nippleplay, pecs

    Comic - Alternate Payment
    Pages 1,2,3,4
    Commission for Sharky (telegram)

    His hunk shark oc Shane and my hot oc Nikel found an alternative way to resolve a situation in the middle of the forest!

    #furry #FurryArt #furrybara #pecs #nipples #nippleplay #nipplefetish #gay #comic #TraditionalArt #shark #lizard #Nikel #bara #muscular #biceps #muscles #gaysex

    #furry #furryart #furrybara #pecs #nipples #nippleplay
  23. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: [NSFW] comic, shark, lizard, gay, nippleplay, pecs

    Comic - Alternate Payment
    Pages 1,2,3,4
    Commission for Sharky (telegram)

    His hunk shark oc Shane and my hot oc Nikel found an alternative way to resolve a situation in the middle of the forest!

    #furry #FurryArt #furrybara #pecs #nipples #nippleplay #nipplefetish #gay #comic #TraditionalArt #shark #lizard #Nikel #bara #muscular #biceps #muscles #gaysex

    #gaysex #muscles #biceps #muscular #bara #nikel
  24. Terviral @[email protected] ·

    Video Viral Safety China vs Control Room Morowali 2025: Fakta, Kontroversi, dan Dampaknya

    #Terviral - #Video #viral #Safety #China vs #Control #Room #Morowali memicu perbincangan publik di #Indonesia. Simak #fakta lengkap, #kontroversi, serta dampaknya bagi #industri #nikel nasional. Industri nikel di Morowali, Sulawesi Tengah, kembali menjadi sorotan publik setelah muncul sebuah video viral yang memperlihatkan ketegangan antara pekerja asal China (Safety Officer)…

    terviral.id/video-viral-safety

    #nikel #industri #kontroversi #fakta #indonesia #morowali
  25. Dashthefox @[email protected] ·
    CW: [NSFW] dirty talk, pecs, nipples, gay, lizard

    I just want to show you this little teaser for a comic I'll be posting soon!
    Featuring Nikel and another surprise character that already appeared here!
    Expect alot of TIDDIES! >:3

    #lizard #nikel #bara #BaraFurry #male #manly #pecs #nipples #tiddies #nippleplay #TraditionalArt #wip #WIPWednesday #comic #gay #art #MastoArt #ArtistsOnMastodon #nsfw

    #nsfw #artistsonmastodon #mastoart #art #gay #comic
  26. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Energy Transition: What’s the True Cost of Your Nickel? Greenpeace International

    What’s the True Cost of Your Nickel? Greenpeace Pictures of the Week

    Greenpeace International, 6 June 2025

    Greenpeace Indonesia activists, alongside four young West Papuans from the Raja Ampat archipelago in Eastern Indonesia, staged a peaceful protest today at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference to expose the devastating environmental and social consequences of nickel mining and smelting.

    The activists deployed a banner reading, “What’s the True Cost of Your Nickel?” and unfurled others with messages: “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” and “Save Raja Ampat from Nickel Mining.”

    The protest extended beyond the conference hall, with Greenpeace Indonesia activists and Papuan youth displaying banners in the exhibition area outside.

    Messages such as “Nikel Bukan Masa Depan” (Nickel is Not the Future) and “Save Raja Ampat the Last Paradise” were prominently displayed amidst industry booths and attendees.

    This post is based on https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/.

    © Dhemas Reviyanto / Greenpeace – https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/

    In related news:

    In earlier news…

    The Suffering Behind the War of Words Between Former Widodo Trade Minister Tom Lembong and Ministers Luhut & Bahlil

    Press Release, Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM), Jan 26, 2024

    Indonesia’s Investment Minister Bahlil Lahadalia and Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Gen. (Retd.) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan have issued strong responses to remarks made by Thomas Lembong, co-head of the national presidential election campaign of candidates Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, about Indonesia’s nickel processing policy and electric vehicle industry.

    In a recent post by the podcast Total Politik, Lembong, a former Trade Minister and head of Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM), criticized the extensive smelting initiatives, warning that domestic oversupply risks could depress nickel prices.(1) He also highlighted Tesla’s shift in China to Lithium Ferro Phosphate (LFP) batteries, which eliminates the need for nickel altogether.(2)

    https://youtu.be/f9fT1LyJumQ?si=KG9mlF5z64rw0ZWn

    The ensuing war of words reflects a focus among Indonesia’s political elite on industrial priorities rather than the welfare of impacted communities. Neither Lembong, nor Ministers Luhut and Bahlil, have publicly acknowledged the detrimental effects of nickel downstreaming on local populations, which has left many impoverished while boosting industry profits.(3) Nickel extraction expansion has displaced communities, polluted water sources, damaged marine ecosystems, degraded forests, and triggered health crises, violence, criminalization, and workplace accidents—some resulting in fatalities.

    Also Read: Elections: China Downstream, The Tentacles of Indonesia’s Nickel Oligarchy By Project Multatuli

    This dire situation is evident across Indonesia’s major nickel industrial estates, from PT Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) in Morowali in southern Sulawesi, PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry in North Morowali, Virtue Dragon Nickel Industry in Konawe, Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park (IWIP) in Central Halmahera in Maluku province, to the industrial complexes on Obi Island under the Harita Group’s control.

    The political and business dynamics of these clashes, set against the backdrop of Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election, reveal more than just the flaws in President Joko Widodo’s accelerated nickel downstreaming agenda. Co-ordinating Minister Luhut and Minister Bahlil’s opposition to Lembong’s criticisms could be seen as defending vested interests within Indonesia’s political-business complex.(4)

    Minister Bahlil, for instance, has ties to PT Meta Mineral Pradana, a nickel mining company with two concessions in North Konawe, Southeast Sulawesi, owned by his PT Papua Bersama Unggul (90% ownership) and PT Rifa Capital (10%).

    Similarly, Co-ordinating Minister Luhut’s stake connects him to PT Energi Kreasi Bersama (Electrum), a joint venture between PT GoTo Gojek Tokopedia Tbk and PT TBS Energi Utama Tbk (TOBA), a company owned by Luhut. Electrum focuses on developing an integrated electric vehicle ecosystem, from manufacturing electric motorcycles and battery technology to battery swapping stations and charging infrastructure. Through GoTo, Luhut’s interests align with Garibaldi “Boy” Thohir, a recent vocal supporter of the presidential election candidates Prabowo Subianto and President Joko Widodo’s son Gibran.(5) Boy Thohir holds shares in and sits on the Board of Commissioners of GoTo.(6)

    Ultimately, the high-profile clash involving Tom Lembong, Luhut, and Bahlil appears to prioritize personal and industrial interests over the environmental and social toll of nickel extraction. The nickel debate, rather than addressing the plight of affected communities or mitigating environmental destruction, seems geared toward securing political gains in Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election.

    Also Read: Transition: Mass Movements NU and Muhammadiyah To Get Cabinet Posts in New Government After Accepting Mining Permits, Tempo

    Regardless of whether Tesla relies on Indonesian nickel, mining operations in Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua continue unabated, with scant regard for the suffering of residents and ongoing environmental degradation.

    This article is based on https://jatam.org/id/lengkap/derita-warga-di-balik-saling-serang-tom-lembong-vs-luhut-bahlil

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #China #CleanEnergy #climateChange #Democracy #Energy #EnergyTransition #Environment #EV #HumanRights #Indonesia #LingkunganHidup #Mining #News #Nickel #nikel #Papua #pilpres2024 #Politics #PrabowoGibran #renewableEnergy #sustainability #tomlembong #totalpolitik
    #totalpolitik #tomlembong #sustainability #renewableenergy #prabowogibran #politics
  27. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    Pertambangan #Nikel di Kepulauan #RajaAmpat
    Pemerintah #Indonesia memberikan izin pertambangan kepada PT Mulia Raymond Perkasa untuk operasi pertambangan nikel di pulau Manyaifun dan Batang Pele. Bisnis ini menimbulkan ancaman serius terhadap kehidupan masyarakat, perairan laut, hutan, ekologi dan keanekaragaman hayati ekosistem bawah laut dan darat di kabupaten Raja Ampat.
    #masyarakatadat menolak! #indigenouspeople protest!

    hutanhujan.org/updates/13795/a

    #nikel #rajaampat #indonesia #masyarakatadat #indigenouspeople
  28. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    Pertambangan #Nikel di Kepulauan #RajaAmpat
    Pemerintah #Indonesia memberikan izin pertambangan kepada PT Mulia Raymond Perkasa untuk operasi pertambangan nikel di pulau Manyaifun dan Batang Pele. Bisnis ini menimbulkan ancaman serius terhadap kehidupan masyarakat, perairan laut, hutan, ekologi dan keanekaragaman hayati ekosistem bawah laut dan darat di kabupaten Raja Ampat.
    #masyarakatadat menolak! #indigenouspeople protest!

    hutanhujan.org/updates/13795/a

    #indigenouspeople #masyarakatadat #indonesia #rajaampat #nikel
  29. Stories From Indonesia @[email protected] ·

    Op-Ed: The Politicization of Former Trade Minister’s Arrest

    Editorial: The Politicization of Former Trade Minister Tom Lembong’s Arrest

    From Tempo.co, November 10, 2024

    The arrest of one Widodo-era Trade Minister, and government critic, Tom Lembong, raises troubling questions. Given the lack of evidence of corruption to justify the arrest, political motives appear to be overshadowing the rule of law.

    The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office seems to have increasingly abandoned the principle of equal treatment under the law. Under the government of President Joko Widodo, the office has frequently acted as a “hammer” against those opposed to government interests. The naming of Thomas Trikasih Lembong, known as Tom Lembong, as a suspect in a sugar importation corruption investigation indicates that this practice is being continued under the government of recently-inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto.

    Tom Lembong, who served as President Joko Widodo’s Trade Minister from 2015 to 2016, is accused of improperly authorizing the importation of 105,000 tons of sugar. Prosecutors allege the decision cost state revenue approximately 400 billion rupiah (around US$25.6 million), representing the profits notionally earned by eight private sector importing companies. Prosecutors argue that these profits would have gone to the state revenue if state-owned enterprise trading companies had conducted the importations.

    Selective Pursuit of Justice

    Equality under the law appears to be missing, as prosecutors have limited their investigation to Lembong’s tenure as Trade Minister. Similar policies during the tenures of other Widodo government Trade Ministers have not been investigated. During the two terms of President Joko Widodo, six individuals served as Trade Minister, including Rachmat Gobel (Nasdem Party), Enggartiasto Lukita (Nasdem Party), Agus Suparmanto (National Awakening Party), Muhammad Lutfi, and Zulkifli Hasan (National Mandate Party). All authorized sugar importations of varying quantities.

    Moreover, prosecutors have selectively utilized findings from a 2017 audit by the national Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK). The audit report, covering the tenures of Trade Ministers Rachmat Gobel, Tom Lembong, and Enggartiasto Lukita, identified irregularities in the importation of 1.96 million tons of sugar. The audit noted that the importations were not coordinated by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, lacked technical approvals from the Ministry of Agriculture, and were unsupported by data relating to sugar requirements.

    Vague Charges

    Lembong is charged under Articles 2(1) and 3 of Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Law, provisions often used to indict officials accused of making decisions that allegedly cause government financial losses. These articles are notoriously flexible, encompassing acts that enrich individuals or corporations by exploiting their positions, resulting in financial harm to state revenue.

    Legal Case or Political Theater?

    Prosecutors have yet to present compelling evidence, such as a clear money trail, to justify Lembong’s arrest. This has fueled suspicions that the case may be politically motivated—a hallmark of the Joko Widodo’s government.

    Lembong initially played a central role in Joko Widodo’s 2014 presidential election campaign, which led to his appointments as Head of the Investment Coordinating Board, and later as Trade Minister. However, after being dismissed from cabinet in 2016, he aligned himself with other sidelined officials, including Anies Baswedan, then the Minister of Education. Lembong has since supported Anies, now a presidential election candidate for 2024.

    During the campaign, Lembong was embroiled in debates with team of candidate Prabowo Subianto, particularly on nickel downstreaming policies. Candidate Subianto’s vice-presidential running Gibran, the son of President Joko Widodo, explicitly mentioned Lembong during a vice-presidential debate on January 21, 2024. Speculation has arisen that Lembong’s arrest is linked to these political tensions.

    Upholding Justice, Not Politics

    Prosecutors have to present robust evidence in court. If their cases rests solely on procedural errors, the Attorney General’s Office risks becoming a political instrument. This concern deepens should similar accusations are not leveled at other former trade minister who implemented identical importation policies.

    President Prabowo Subianto, as the Attorney General’s superior, must ensure that the justice system under his government remains impartial and untainted by political influence.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/kolom/penahanan-tom-lembong-1166151.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #Asia #AttorneyGeneral #Business #Courts #Economics #Elections #Governance #HumanRights #IMF #Indonesia #JokoWidodo #NewOrder #News #Nickel #nikel #OrdeBaru #pilpres2024 #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #RuleOfLaw #TempoMagazine #TomLembong #totalpolitik
    #totalpolitik #tomlembong #tempomagazine #ruleoflaw #regionalindonesia #prabowosubianto
  30. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/petisi/1287/tol
    Pulau #Palawan merupakan cagar #biosfer #UNESCO yang secara ekologis dan budaya sangat unik. Tapi pemerintah #Filipina ingin memperluas wilayah pertambangan di wilayah #masyarakatadat dan #hutanhujan .
    Peralihan ke masa yang rendah #karbon menyebabkan naiknya permintaan bahan mineral #nikel untuk produksi #mobillistrik . Pertambangan nikel ini mengancam hutan tropis di Palawan.
    No to #Nickel #mining in #indigenous territories and #rainforest

    #palawan #biosfer #unesco #filipina #masyarakatadat #hutanhujan
  31. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/petisi/1287/tol
    Pulau #Palawan merupakan cagar #biosfer #UNESCO yang secara ekologis dan budaya sangat unik. Tapi pemerintah #Filipina ingin memperluas wilayah pertambangan di wilayah #masyarakatadat dan #hutanhujan .
    Peralihan ke masa yang rendah #karbon menyebabkan naiknya permintaan bahan mineral #nikel untuk produksi #mobillistrik . Pertambangan nikel ini mengancam hutan tropis di Palawan.
    No to #Nickel #mining in #indigenous territories and #rainforest

    #palawan #biosfer #unesco #filipina #masyarakatadat #hutanhujan
  32. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/petisi/1287/tol
    Pulau #Palawan merupakan cagar #biosfer #UNESCO yang secara ekologis dan budaya sangat unik. Tapi pemerintah #Filipina ingin memperluas wilayah pertambangan di wilayah #masyarakatadat dan #hutanhujan .
    Peralihan ke masa yang rendah #karbon menyebabkan naiknya permintaan bahan mineral #nikel untuk produksi #mobillistrik . Pertambangan nikel ini mengancam hutan tropis di Palawan.
    No to #Nickel #mining in #indigenous territories and #rainforest

    #rainforest #indigenous #mining #nickel #mobillistrik #nikel
  33. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12031/p
    Pulau #Sulawesi adalah pusat industri #nickel untuk #e-mobilitas di seluruh dunia. Perusakan #lingkunganhidup, #hutanhujan dan sumber kehidupan masyarakat dan #indigenous people adalah bencana besar. Satu tim perempuan dari Selamatkan #HutanHujan datang ke #sulawesi
    Perjalanan kami di #Sulawesi telah menunjukkan bagaimana dramatisnya dampak perluasan pertambangan #nikel bagi manusia dan alam. Dan seiring dengan peralihan #energi maka ancaman akan semakin tajam.

    #sulawesi #nikel #e #lingkunganhidup #hutanhujan #indigenous
  34. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12031/p
    Pulau #Sulawesi adalah pusat industri #nickel untuk #e-mobilitas di seluruh dunia. Perusakan #lingkunganhidup, #hutanhujan dan sumber kehidupan masyarakat dan #indigenous people adalah bencana besar. Satu tim perempuan dari Selamatkan #HutanHujan datang ke #sulawesi
    Perjalanan kami di #Sulawesi telah menunjukkan bagaimana dramatisnya dampak perluasan pertambangan #nikel bagi manusia dan alam. Dan seiring dengan peralihan #energi maka ancaman akan semakin tajam.

    #sulawesi #nikel #e #lingkunganhidup #hutanhujan #indigenous
  35. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12031/p
    Pulau #Sulawesi adalah pusat industri #nickel untuk #e-mobilitas di seluruh dunia. Perusakan #lingkunganhidup, #hutanhujan dan sumber kehidupan masyarakat dan #indigenous people adalah bencana besar. Satu tim perempuan dari Selamatkan #HutanHujan datang ke #sulawesi
    Perjalanan kami di #Sulawesi telah menunjukkan bagaimana dramatisnya dampak perluasan pertambangan #nikel bagi manusia dan alam. Dan seiring dengan peralihan #energi maka ancaman akan semakin tajam.

    #sulawesi #nikel #e #lingkunganhidup #hutanhujan #indigenous
  36. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12031/p
    Pulau #Sulawesi adalah pusat industri #nickel untuk #e-mobilitas di seluruh dunia. Perusakan #lingkunganhidup, #hutanhujan dan sumber kehidupan masyarakat dan #indigenous people adalah bencana besar. Satu tim perempuan dari Selamatkan #HutanHujan datang ke #sulawesi
    Perjalanan kami di #Sulawesi telah menunjukkan bagaimana dramatisnya dampak perluasan pertambangan #nikel bagi manusia dan alam. Dan seiring dengan peralihan #energi maka ancaman akan semakin tajam.

    #nickel #energi #indigenous #hutanhujan #lingkunganhidup #e
  37. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12257/h
    Cadangan besar #nikel dan #pasir di #Indonesia terletak di #Sulawesi dan #maluku #Indonesia ingin menjadi pemimpin pasar dunia di sektor baterai #mobillistrik . Pertambangan #nikel dan #pasir berdampak pada perusakan #lingkungan dan #hutanhujan yang masif dan mengancam kehidupan #masyarakat dan #indigenous people.
    .#Nickel #Sand #IKN #emobility

    #nikel #pasir #indonesia #sulawesi #maluku #mobillistrik
  38. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12257/h
    Cadangan besar #nikel dan #pasir di #Indonesia terletak di #Sulawesi dan #maluku #Indonesia ingin menjadi pemimpin pasar dunia di sektor baterai #mobillistrik . Pertambangan #nikel dan #pasir berdampak pada perusakan #lingkungan dan #hutanhujan yang masif dan mengancam kehidupan #masyarakat dan #indigenous people.
    .#Nickel #Sand #IKN #emobility

    #nikel #pasir #indonesia #sulawesi #maluku #mobillistrik
  39. Selamatkan Hutan Hujan @[email protected] ·

    hutanhujan.org/updates/12257/h
    Cadangan besar #nikel dan #pasir di #Indonesia terletak di #Sulawesi dan #maluku #Indonesia ingin menjadi pemimpin pasar dunia di sektor baterai #mobillistrik . Pertambangan #nikel dan #pasir berdampak pada perusakan #lingkungan dan #hutanhujan yang masif dan mengancam kehidupan #masyarakat dan #indigenous people.
    .#Nickel #Sand #IKN #emobility

    #emobility #ikn #sand #nickel #indigenous #masyarakat
  40. Bah Non ! @[email protected] ·

    L’État français pourrait financer les projets de déforestation de Weda Bay, la plus grande mine de nickel au monde

    L’entreprise française Eramet, désireuse de se positionner sur le marché de l’automobile électrique dans les années à venir, souhaite faire sortir de terre (en Indonésie) une nouvelle usine, « Sonic Bay », permettant de transformer directement le minerai et d’ainsi l’adapter à la demande de l’industrie

    https://lareleveetlapeste.fr/letat-francais-pourrait-financer-les-projets-de-deforestation-de-weda-bay-la-plus-grande-mine-de-nickel-au-monde/

    #deforestation #extractivisme #automobile #nikel #France #Indonésie

    #france #indonesie #automobile #deforestation #extractivisme #nikel
  41. Bah Non ! @[email protected] ·

    L’État français pourrait financer les projets de déforestation de Weda Bay, la plus grande mine de nickel au monde

    L’entreprise française Eramet, désireuse de se positionner sur le marché de l’automobile électrique dans les années à venir, souhaite faire sortir de terre (en Indonésie) une nouvelle usine, « Sonic Bay », permettant de transformer directement le minerai et d’ainsi l’adapter à la demande de l’industrie

    https://lareleveetlapeste.fr/letat-francais-pourrait-financer-les-projets-de-deforestation-de-weda-bay-la-plus-grande-mine-de-nickel-au-monde/

    #deforestation #extractivisme #automobile #nikel #France #Indonésie

    #france #indonesie #automobile #deforestation #extractivisme #nikel
  42. Bah Non ! @[email protected] ·

    L’État français pourrait financer les projets de déforestation de Weda Bay, la plus grande mine de nickel au monde

    L’entreprise française Eramet, désireuse de se positionner sur le marché de l’automobile électrique dans les années à venir, souhaite faire sortir de terre (en Indonésie) une nouvelle usine, « Sonic Bay », permettant de transformer directement le minerai et d’ainsi l’adapter à la demande de l’industrie

    https://lareleveetlapeste.fr/letat-francais-pourrait-financer-les-projets-de-deforestation-de-weda-bay-la-plus-grande-mine-de-nickel-au-monde/

    #deforestation #extractivisme #automobile #nikel #France #Indonésie

    #france #indonesie #automobile #deforestation #extractivisme #nikel
  43. Bah Non ! @[email protected] ·

    L’État français pourrait financer les projets de déforestation de Weda Bay, la plus grande mine de nickel au monde

    L’entreprise française Eramet, désireuse de se positionner sur le marché de l’automobile électrique dans les années à venir, souhaite faire sortir de terre (en Indonésie) une nouvelle usine, « Sonic Bay », permettant de transformer directement le minerai et d’ainsi l’adapter à la demande de l’industrie

    https://lareleveetlapeste.fr/letat-francais-pourrait-financer-les-projets-de-deforestation-de-weda-bay-la-plus-grande-mine-de-nickel-au-monde/

    #deforestation #extractivisme #automobile #nikel #France #Indonésie

    #nikel #extractivisme #deforestation #automobile #indonesie #france