home.social

#energytransition — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #energytransition, aggregated by home.social.

  1. China has added 1.7 TW of wind and solar in ten years ☀️🌪

    That is MORE THAN its entire power system in 2015, when it was already the world's largest.

    Those renewables are now starting to push coal down as 🇨🇳's #energytransition enters a new phase.

    ember-energy.org/lat...

  2. China has added 1.7 TW of wind and solar in ten years ☀️🌪

    That is MORE THAN its entire power system in 2015, when it was already the world's largest.

    Those renewables are now starting to push coal down as 🇨🇳's #energytransition enters a new phase.

    ember-energy.org/lat...

  3. China has added 1.7 TW of wind and solar in ten years ☀️🌪

    That is MORE THAN its entire power system in 2015, when it was already the world's largest.

    Those renewables are now starting to push coal down as 🇨🇳's #energytransition enters a new phase.

    ember-energy.org/lat...

  4. Australia's Mining Sector Targets Electrification Push to Curb Diesel Reliance

    Australia's mining sector is on a mission to ditch diesel and go electric, driven by a pressing need to reduce its staggering 32 million litres-per-day fuel consumption - and a sobering wake-up call from the Iran crisis that left the industry vulnerable to soaring diesel prices.

    osintsights.com/australias-min

    #MiningSectorElectrification #Australia #EnergyTransition #SupplyChain #NationalSecurity

  5. Today, the Trump-Netanyahu mess in the Middle East has driven up EU natural gas price even higher: 77 €/MWh now.
    When gas-fired power plants set the electricity price in Europe, that's €130 per electric MWh in fuel cost alone.

    Insulate buildings, electrify processes, grow renewable electricity.
    #fossilfuels #gas #energytransition

  6. Today, the Trump-Netanyahu mess in the Middle East has driven up EU natural gas price even higher: 77 €/MWh now.
    When gas-fired power plants set the electricity price in Europe, that's €130 per electric MWh in fuel cost alone.

    Insulate buildings, electrify processes, grow renewable electricity.
    #fossilfuels #gas #energytransition

  7. Today, the Trump-Netanyahu mess in the Middle East has driven up EU natural gas price even higher: 77 €/MWh now.
    When gas-fired power plants set the electricity price in Europe, that's €130 per electric MWh in fuel cost alone.

    Insulate buildings, electrify processes, grow renewable electricity.
    #fossilfuels #gas #energytransition

  8. Today, the Trump-Netanyahu mess in the Middle East has driven up EU natural gas price even higher: 77 €/MWh now.
    When gas-fired power plants set the electricity price in Europe, that's €130 per electric MWh in fuel cost alone.

    Insulate buildings, electrify processes, grow renewable electricity.
    #fossilfuels #gas #energytransition

  9. Today, the Trump-Netanyahu mess in the Middle East has driven up EU natural gas price even higher: 77 €/MWh now.
    When gas-fired power plants set the electricity price in Europe, that's €130 per electric MWh in fuel cost alone.

    Insulate buildings, electrify processes, grow renewable electricity.
    #fossilfuels #gas #energytransition

  10. U.S. Department of ‌Energy to loan Nextera up to $1.9 billion to support the restart of its 615MW Duane Arnold Energy ​Center in Iowa. The nuclear plant has signed a 25 year electricity agreement with Alphabet/Google.

    #EnergyMastodon #EnergyTransition #AI #DataCenter #Google #Climate #Nuclear

    reuters.com/business/energy/ne

  11. U.S. Department of ‌Energy to loan Nextera up to $1.9 billion to support the restart of its 615MW Duane Arnold Energy ​Center in Iowa. The nuclear plant has signed a 25 year electricity agreement with Alphabet/Google.

    #EnergyMastodon #EnergyTransition #AI #DataCenter #Google #Climate #Nuclear

    reuters.com/business/energy/ne

  12. U.S. Department of ‌Energy to loan Nextera up to $1.9 billion to support the restart of its 615MW Duane Arnold Energy ​Center in Iowa. The nuclear plant has signed a 25 year electricity agreement with Alphabet/Google.

    #EnergyMastodon #EnergyTransition #AI #DataCenter #Google #Climate #Nuclear

    reuters.com/business/energy/ne

  13. U.S. Department of ‌Energy to loan Nextera up to $1.9 billion to support the restart of its 615MW Duane Arnold Energy ​Center in Iowa. The nuclear plant has signed a 25 year electricity agreement with Alphabet/Google.

    #EnergyMastodon #EnergyTransition #AI #DataCenter #Google #Climate #Nuclear

    reuters.com/business/energy/ne

  14. U.S. Department of ‌Energy to loan Nextera up to $1.9 billion to support the restart of its 615MW Duane Arnold Energy ​Center in Iowa. The nuclear plant has signed a 25 year electricity agreement with Alphabet/Google.

    #EnergyMastodon #EnergyTransition #AI #DataCenter #Google #Climate #Nuclear

    reuters.com/business/energy/ne

  15. The global energy race | Barclays

    From efficiency to resilience: energy’s new capital cycle For decades, energy flowed through a highly integrated global economy,…
    #EuropeSays #Britain #Europe #EU #Barclays #2026 #article #disruption #Economics #energytransition #Global #ImpactSeries #industrials #Media&Communications #research #Sectorevolution
    europesays.com/britain/119858/

  16. 🚨 NEW | Fossil fuel use has peaked in 8 of 11 tracked industrial sectors in China, as clean power takes over work once done by coal and oil.

    🇨🇳’s #energytransition has entered a phase of "building while breaking"

    Highlights from #CETR2026 🧵1/8

    China Energy Transition Review...

  17. 🚨 NEW | Fossil fuel use has peaked in 8 of 11 tracked industrial sectors in China, as clean power takes over work once done by coal and oil.

    🇨🇳’s #energytransition has entered a phase of "building while breaking"

    Highlights from #CETR2026 🧵1/8

    China Energy Transition Review...

  18. 🚨 NEW | Fossil fuel use has peaked in 8 of 11 tracked industrial sectors in China, as clean power takes over work once done by coal and oil.

    🇨🇳’s #energytransition has entered a phase of "building while breaking"

    Highlights from #CETR2026 🧵1/8

    China Energy Transition Review...

  19. 🚨 NEW | Fossil fuel use has peaked in 8 of 11 tracked industrial sectors in China, as clean power takes over work once done by coal and oil.

    🇨🇳’s #energytransition has entered a phase of "building while breaking"

    Highlights from #CETR2026 🧵1/8

    China Energy Transition Review...

  20. 🚨 NEW | Fossil fuel use has peaked in 8 of 11 tracked industrial sectors in China, as clean power takes over work once done by coal and oil.

    🇨🇳’s #energytransition has entered a phase of "building while breaking"

    Highlights from #CETR2026 🧵1/8

    China Energy Transition Review...

  21. OUT NOW 📨 The September edition of #EmberCurrent is here, featuring Türkiye & the Caucasus Regional Lead, Ufuk Alparslan, covering the country’s #energytransition as it prepares to host #COP31 🇹🇷

    Read the latest edition: ember-energy.org/lat...

  22. OUT NOW 📨 The September edition of #EmberCurrent is here, featuring Türkiye & the Caucasus Regional Lead, Ufuk Alparslan, covering the country’s #energytransition as it prepares to host #COP31 🇹🇷

    Read the latest edition: ember-energy.org/lat...

  23. OUT NOW 📨 The September edition of #EmberCurrent is here, featuring Türkiye & the Caucasus Regional Lead, Ufuk Alparslan, covering the country’s #energytransition as it prepares to host #COP31 🇹🇷

    Read the latest edition: ember-energy.org/lat...

  24. Voters will likely have the chance to decide this fall whether to ban political spending in state elections by Michigan’s regulated utilities and large government contractors.

    #EnergyMastodon #Corruption #climate #EnergyTransition #DarkMoney

    bridgemi.com/michigan-governme

  25. New piece on who is actually funding Australia's renewable energy opposition in regional communities.

    The climate obstruction playbook has moved on from denial. Delay is cheaper and more durable. You don't need to win the argument. You just need to prevent a decision from being made.

    Follow the money, and you don't find a farmer's hat. Gina Rinehart's company donated $4.5 million to the IPA in a single two-year period. Fossil fuel interests donated nearly $4 million to major parties in 2023-24. Australia's $16,900 disclosure threshold keeps most of it invisible for up to 18 months.

    The cruellest part: the playbook takes the genuine experience of being exploited by outside interests and weaponises it to defend the exploiters.

    gaggl.com/blogs/2026-07-02-who

    #RegionalAustralia #EnergyTransition #ClimateObstruction #DarkMoney #FossilFuels #RenewableEnergy #AustralianPolitics #Transparency #CommunityEnergy

  26. "The EU's done climate change the economist's way, pricing CO2 emissions & incentivising global adoption.
    "But it's outflanked by China's greentech mercantilism, developed mainly for non-environmental reasons, & Trump's accidental Iran war carbon price hike."

    archived from FT: archive.is/DXmqh

    #pricing #economics #solar #renewables #energy #markets #pollution #climatePolicy #energyTransition #economics #greenTransition #cleanTech #carbonPricing #carbon #CO2 #sarcasm

  27. Indonesia fails to stop importation of goods made with forced labor: USTR

    Indonesia Included in USTR Findings and Proposes Action in Investigations into Failures to Take Action on Trade in Goods Made with Forced Labor

    USTR Makes Findings and Proposes Action in 60 Section 301 Investigations Relating to Failures to Take Action on Trade in Forced Labor Goods

    On June 02, 2026, the U. S. Trade Representative issued a decision “under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 that the acts … of 60 economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under Section 301(b) of the Trade Act.”

    “USTR has prepared a comprehensive report, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, that supports the findings in each investigation.”

    The USTR decided that “the failure of each of the 60 investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and thus is actionable under Section 301(b)(1) of the Trade Act.”

    “In particular, the U.S. Trade Representative determined:

    • The following 54 economies have failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; the Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Chile; China, People’s Republic of; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Egypt; El Salvador; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; South Korea; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Vietnam.
    • The following six economies have failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor: Canada; Ecuador, the European Union; Indonesia; Mexico; and Pakistan.”

    According to the decision, “The failure of each of the investigated economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition is unreasonable because it: (1) undermines the universal aim of eliminating forced labor; (2) permits firms that avail themselves of forced labor to produce goods at lower cost and thereby distort market conditions for firms that do not use forced labor; (3) undermines the profitability of firms that do not use forced labor; and (4) contributes to the circumvention of existing forced labor import prohibitions.”

    “The failure of each of the above-listed economies to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition burdens or restricts U.S. commerce by subjecting U.S. producers to unfair competition from forced labor goods both in export markets and the U.S. market, and by displacing foreign goods produced without forced labor or forced labor inputs into the United States and other markets.”

    Call for written comment

    “The U.S. Trade Representative has also determined to propose responsive actions in these investigations. As set out in the Federal Register notice, the public is invited to provide written comments by July 6, 2026, on the proposed actions.”

    Hearings into failure to enforce ban on goods produced using forced labor

    USTR will hold hearings about the proposed actions on July 7, 2026. As set out in the Federal Register notice, interested persons are invited to submit requests to appear at the hearing by June 22.”

    Related news:

    In earlier news…

    Indonesia–China partnership more fragile than it appears

    By Klaus Heinrich Raditio, Driyarkara School of Philosophy, and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia, Universitas Indonesia, East Asia Forum, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), April 28, 2026

    During the presidency of Joko Widodo, China became more central to Indonesia than at any point in the past. Widodo left office with China as Indonesia’s second-largest source of foreign investment. China also emerged as the largest export destination for Indonesia’s nickel-processing hubs that supported Indonesia’s ambition to build a downstream mineral industry.

    Through these developments, Widodo transformed the Indonesia–China comprehensive strategic partnership from a largely diplomatic symbol into one underpinned by significant economic cooperation.

    This impression appeared to deepen during the first year of Prabowo Subianto’s presidency. Jakarta seemed open to Beijing’s proposal for joint development in the South China Sea through a controversial joint statement. A 2+2 dialogue mechanism was established between their foreign and defence ministries in April 2025. Two months later, they inaugurated an integrated electric-vehicle battery manufacturing centre in Indonesia. Against this backdrop, some observers began to argue that Indonesia was ‘sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China’.

    Yet the trajectory appeared to shift in the second year Prabowo’s presidency. In July 2025, the framework for a US–Indonesian reciprocal trade agreement was announced, with the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade signed in February 2026. Under the arrangement, US tariffs on Indonesian goods would decrease from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. Though the reduction was welcomed, the agreement was widely perceived in Indonesia as unfair. The decision raised questions about Indonesia’s bargaining power in negotiations with Washington while also casting uncertainty over the future of Indonesia–China strategic relations.

    Three provisions of the agreement are particularly notable.

    Article 3.3 on digital trade stipulates Indonesia must communicate with the United States before entering into a new digital trade agreement with another country that could jeopardize essential US interests. It represents a clear attempt by Washington to constrain Indonesia’s cooperation with China in the digital economy. China’s Digital Silk Road already has a strong presence in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia is among its key destinations in the region with Chinese firms accounting for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market.

    Article 5.1 requires Indonesia adopt equivalently restrictive measures if the United States imposes trade restrictions on imports from a ‘third country’ for economic or national security reasons. This clause could constrain Indonesia’s economic engagement with China — Washington’s principal strategic competitor.

    Article 6.1 deals with critical minerals. It requires Indonesia to restrict foreign-owned processing facilities’ excess production by ensuring conformity with Indonesia’s mining quota. And it bars foreign-owned industrial parks and processing facilities from receiving preferential legal entitlements.

    While the language of ‘foreign-owned’ is nominally neutral, it obscures a specific reality — a substantial majority of Indonesia’s nickel processing facilities are backed by Chinese capital. The industrial parks in Morowali, Weda Bay and elsewhere were built on Chinese investment — the very foundation of the economic partnership that Widodo cultivated. Article 6.1 effectively subjects that foundation to new restrictions negotiated not with Beijing but with Washington.

    Collectively, these provisions of the agreement restrict a wide spectrum of Indonesia’s engagement with China. Despite the comprehensive strategic partnership supposedly being at its strongest, Jakarta obliged to the provisions. Indeed, by agreeing to controversial provisions that could potentially target a ‘third country’, Indonesia appears willing to disregard China’s strategic interests.

    This highlights a key difference between Widodo and Prabowo in managing relations with major powers. Widodo maintained close engagement with China but not necessarily at the expense of US–Indonesian relations. By contrast, Prabowo appears to accommodate US interests in a manner that risks undermining Indonesia’s strong engagement with China, albeit incidentally.

    Despite the positive trajectory of the post-Suharto era and Widodo’s further deepening of economic ties, Indonesia–China relations still rest on a fragile foundation.

    On the Chinese side, Beijing frequently emphasises multilateralism and engagement with the Global South, including through its vision of a ‘community of shared future’. Yet if China seeks to maintain Indonesia as a key partner amid growing geopolitical competition, it must ensure that the relationship rests on deeper and more solid foundations. A purely pragmatic partnership driven by short-term economic interests may prove insufficient… Read the whole piece at https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/04/28/indonesia-china-partnership-more-fragile-than-it-appears/. Ardhitya Eduard Yeremiais Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia. Klaus Heinrich Raditio is Lecturer in Chinese Politics at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1777370400

    Featured image credit: Greenpeace Indonesia activists unfurl banner “Nickel Mines Destroy Lives” as Deputy Foreign Minister Arief Havas Oegroseno delivers speech at the Indonesia Critical Minerals Conference 2025, Jakarta. https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers-2/63070/aktivis-greenpeace-aksi-di-konferensi-nikel-internasional/ and https://www.greenpeace.org/international/story/75271/greenpeace-pictures-of-the-week-23/ ©Dhemas Reviyanto/Greenpeace.

    In related news:

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #China #CleanEnergy #Economics #Economy #Energy #EnergyTransition #ForeignPolicy #Indonesia #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #PrabowoGibran #PrabowoSubianto #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #tariffs #UnitedStates
  28. China’s Offshore Solar Giant Is Real, and It’s Doing the Most

    Click to watch: China’s HG14 offshore solar project turns the sea into a power grid, with fish farming reportedly sharing the space below.

    Dear Cherubs, China has done what it so often does with infrastructure: taken a perfectly sensible idea and scaled it up until it looks like a dare. Off Dongying, in Shandong province, CHN Energy says it has brought online a 1-gigawatt open-sea offshore solar project built with 2,934 PV platforms, more than 2.3 million modules, and 11,736 steel piles hammered into the seabed. In other words, it is solar power, but with a shipping-industry gym membership.

    A SEA OF PANELS

    This is not your garden-variety floating array. CHN Energy describes the project as a fixed-pile offshore PV system, designed to sit about 8 kilometers from shore and handle waves, tides, strong winds, and seasonal sea ice without immediately filing for retirement. pv magazine reported that the panels are mounted on 60-by-35-meter steel platforms, tilted at 15 degrees, and connected through a 66-kilovolt subsea cable system with onshore transmission infrastructure. So yes, the engineering is serious. The drama is mostly in the size.

    WHY IT MATTERS

    The developer says the plant should generate about 1.78 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year, enough to meet the needs of roughly 2.67 million urban residents, while avoiding around 1.34 million tons of carbon dioxide and saving more than 500,000 tons of standard coal. Those are company estimates, so treat them as reported projections rather than holy scripture, but the basic point is hard to miss: this is a very large clean-power machine with a very large ambition. CHN Energy also says the site uses a “PV-above, farming-below” model, mixing power generation with aquaculture. Multi-use land? More like multi-use sea.

    The timing is not random either. Reuters reported that China connected the world’s largest solar farm in Xinjiang in 2024, and The Guardian reported in June 2025 that China added 198 gigawatts of solar and 46 gigawatts of wind in just the first five months of the year, with installed solar capacity passing 1,000 gigawatts. So this offshore project is not a quirky one-off; it is part of a national habit of building renewable energy at a scale that makes other countries look like they are still printing brochures.

    The hot take is simple: the future of solar may not always be rooftops and deserts. Sometimes it looks like a steel fortress at sea, built to wrestle weather, salinity, and gravity into submission. For readers who enjoy the bigger-picture angle on energy megaprojects, thisclaimer.com also tracks similar scale-and-geopolitics stories with a very internet-friendly sense of proportion.

    Sources list
    CHN Energy — https://www.ceic.com/gjnyjtwwEn/xwzx/202411/c315e1982ebc4a68844a7473a2734d18.shtml
    pv magazine International — https://www.pv-magazine.com/2025/12/29/china-commissions-worlds-largest-1-gw-open-sea-offshore-solar-project/
    Reuters — https://www.reuters.com/world/china/worlds-biggest-solar-farm-comes-online-chinas-xinjiang-2024-06-03/
    The Guardian — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/26/china-breaks-more-records-with-massive-build-up-of-wind-and-solar-power
    thisclaimer.com — https://thisclaimer.com
    YouTube — https://www.youtube.com/@thisclaimer?sub_confirmation=1

    The Thisclaimer logo blends a classic warning symbol with a brain icon to represent critical thinking, curiosity, and thoughtful disclaimers. #China #cleanPower #climateChange #climateTech #dongying #energy #energyTransition #environment #marineEngineering #offshoreSolar #renewableEnergy #shandong #solarFarm #sustainability
  29. Is Indonesia’s Nickel Industry Honeymoon on the Rocks?


    Indonesia’s Nickel Industry is Being Squeezed from Inside and Outside. Is the Honeymoon Over? Tempo.co

    By M. Faiz Zaki for Tempo.co, May 18, 2026

    Indonesia’s nickel industry is under pressure. The Iran-Israel war, backed by the United States, has created a global energy crisis that has driven energy prices sharply higher and impacted industrial production in Indonesia.

    Arif Perdanakusumah, chairman of the Indonesian Nickel Industry Forum (FINI), said domestic pressures are increasingly squeezing the industry. “Including regulation and business uncertainty.” He spoke with Tempo.co on May 13.

    Arif noted that the nickel ore production quota in this year’s work plan and budget (RKAB) was set at 270 million tons, down from the 2025 RKAB of 379 million tons.

    Despite the cut in the quota, the benchmark price for nickel (HMA) has jumped from about US$14,599 per dry metric ton (dmt) in December 2025 to roughly US$17,802 per dmt.

    Even so, this year’s quota is below industry demand of 340–350 million tons, based on production capacity, installed capacity, and the production capability of nickel processing and refining projects.

    The large demand is driven by several new projects, particularly high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) projects, which require 40 to 50 million tons of ore. HPAL is a technology that produces high-quality nickel specifically for supplying the requirements of electric vehicle batteries.

    Arif explained that nickel companies were also impacted by a decree issued by the energy and mineral resources minister (Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026) that amended an earlier regulation (No. 268.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2025) that provided for Guidelines for Setting Benchmark Prices for the Sale of Metallic Mineral Commodities and Coal. The change affects the mineral benchmark price (HPM) used for limonite ore, the feedstock for HPAL plants. “Our current calculations show that if companies operate with the existing cost structure they will eventually incur losses and bleed,” said Arif.

    The decree affects the nickel limonite pricing formula: a previous benchmark near US$17 per ton moved to US$43 per ton now while the market price sits at US$28 per ton. This price spike automatically increases the production cost of one ton of nickel mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP) by US$4,000 to $5,000, putting companies at risk of losses.

    FINI has submitted an alternative pricing formula and urged the government to reconsider the limonite benchmark, arguing the current level will kill the HPAL industry.

    Roy Arman Arfandy, president director of PT Trimegah Bangun Persada Tbk (also known as Harita Nickel), said a planned rise in mining royalties would sharply cut company profits. He added that at a 10 percent margin and with planned export duties, the company would be unprofitable—an outcome compounded by soaring diesel costs which have roughly doubled from about Rp15,000 per liter to about Rp30,000 per liter. “The situation is actually difficult for the nickel industry,” Roy said.

    Energy and mineral resources minister Bahlil Lahadalia and finance minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa recently agreed to delay implementing the higher mining royalties and planned export duties which had been scheduled to take effect June 1, 2026.

    Roy also said company finances are threatened by new rules on foreign-exchange repatriation from resource exports (DHE), set to take effect the same day. The industry still faces a proposed windfall tax, and a 15 percent global minimum tax, despite earlier incentives such as tax allowances and holidays granted to pioneer industries.

    The industry also faces mounting financial risks as many nickel producers remain heavily reliant on bank loans and could see rising levels of bad debt, Arif Perdanakusumah said.

    The sector has also been hit by a skyrocketing increase in sulfur prices — from about US$200 to US$250 per ton in 2023 to US$1,137 per ton on May 13, 2026. Sulfur is processed into sulfuric acid which is used to leach low‑grade nickel. Arif said roughly 80 percent of global sulfur supply originates in the Middle East and that sulfur now accounts for around 56 percent of HPAL project costs, up from roughly 25 percent.

    Arif urged the government to develop a nickel‑industry roadmap to bolster domestic supply and provide policy stability. He said industry players were caught off guard by the sudden changes to the RKAB quota and other measures. “Policy stability is what we actually want,” he said.

    He predicted that the pressure on the nickel industry this year would also ripple beyond the mining and manufacturing. He said that one of the most affected areas would be food vendors and boarding houses, typically used by industry employees, as the number of workers is expected to decrease.

    The complaints expressed by business leaders in the nickel industry are similar to those voiced by Chinese companies investing in Indonesia. Through the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia, they have already written to Indonesia’s President Prabowo, urging improvements to the investment climate in Indonesia.

    The letter was sent primarily because many Chinese companies have invested and contributed to economic growth, job creation, improved industrial performance, and the implementation of social programs in Indonesia, but are now under pressure from overly strict regulations, heavy law enforcement, and allegations of corruption and extortion from the authorities.

    “These problems have severely disrupted normal business operations, directly undermined long-term investment confidence, and causing widespread concern among Chinese investment companies regarding the current business environment and their future development in Indonesia,” the statement, quoting from the letter, said.

    The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also questioned the nickel ore production quota which was cut by more than 70 percent. The impact they feel is disruptive to the development of downstream industries for new and renewable energy and stainless steel.

    They also complained about the mandatory foreign exchange retention (DHE) requirement, which creates high levels of uncertainty for resource exporters who are required to deposit 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks for at least one year. They see this regulation as detrimental to company liquidity and long-term operations.

    Responding to the complaints of Chinese business operators, Deputy Minister of Investment and Downstreaming Todotua Pasaribu said the letter expressing concerns to the Indonesian government was reasonable, given the current situation. He also confirmed there would be a meeting with Chinese investors about this issue. “We consider this a positive step that provides input to the government,” he said.

    For the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming, Todotua said, creating a conducive investment climate is a key priority for the government. Investors directly also have to process a variety of commodities that Indonesia possesses. The benefits include greater employment and stronger economic growth.

    M. Faiz Zaki has been a journalist at Tempo since 2022. He graduated from the Anthropology Program at Airlangga University, Surabaya. He usually covers legal and crime issues.

    This post is based on https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/industri-nikel-tertekan-geopolitik-kebijakan-pemerintah-2136386. Featured image credit: Workers using fire-resistant clothing remove nickel ore from a furnace during the furnace process at PT Vale Indonesia Tbk’s smelter in Sorowako, East Luwu, South Sulawesi, October 21, 2025. ANTARA/Nova Wahyudi

    Rate this:

    #AgreementOnReciprocalTrade #AmerikaSerikat #Business #China #CleanEnergy #EnergyTransition #EV #Governance #Greenwashing #Indonesia #Iran #Law #Maluku #Mining #Nickel #nikel #Pertambangan #Politics #RegionalIndonesia #Sulawesi #Tariff #UnitedStates #War
  30. Japonya’da kömür bazlı santraller çıkışı artıyor, Orta Doğu savaşları LNG fiyatlarını yükselterek doğal gaz seviyelerini düşürüyor. Şirketler yenilenebilir yakıtları daha yoğun şekilde üretebilir, maliyetleri optimize edebilir ve karbon emisyonlarını azaltabilir.

    🚩 #EnergyTransition #CoalPower #LNGPrices #EnergyMarkets

  31. europesays.com/iran/18821/ The war on Iran will speed the transition away from fossil fuels and toward nuclear energy, creating strategic challenges for the United States #EnergyTransition #IranWar #NuclearEnergy #NuclearRenaissance #PersianGulf

  32. How a Small Group of Wealthy People Shapes What You Think.
    Senate hearing exposes how mining billionaire Gina Rinehart's $4.5 million funded the IPA think tank, revealing Australia's billionaire propaganda network that shapes public opinion on climate, energy, and policy.

    #auspol #mediawatch #billionairepower #thinktanks #politicalinfluence #propaganda #climatepolitics #energytransition #fossilfuels #corporatepower #democracy #publicinterest #ipa #mininglobby #wealthandpower

    youtube.com/watch?v=0yFKNtpBkv8

  33. The crackpot king loses his bid to shut down offshore wind

    Back in January, I wondered whether wind investors had standing to sue the Trump administration over the inauguration day memorandum suspending all federal approvals for offshore wind projects. It turns out the answer is yes, but the investors I had in mind — individual and big name institutional investors — are not the stakeholders who prevailed at the Massachusetts District Court yesterday in State of New York et al. v. Trump.

    Instead, it was a coalition of states “with investments in wind development” and the Alliance for Clean Energy New York, whose members face the prospect of “billions of dollars in stranded investments.” These plaintiffs showed “ample evidence” that they were harmed by the federal government’s actions, and they also satisfied the court that the pause in wind development was unlawful, “a final agency action that is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.”

    This is obviously a welcome outcome, and it will allow some major offshore wind projects to get back on track. (I’m unsure whether this one court victory will do much to lift wind energy stocks over the near term, but shares of both Ørsted and Vestas jumped briefly on the news. )

    What I found even more compelling as I read through the order this morning is the route Judge Saris travels to reach her finding that the actions taken by the agencies are arbitrary and capricious. Here, she makes some important distinctions about the limits of presidential directives and agencies’ reliance on them:

    the Agency Defendants candidly concede that the sole factor they considered in deciding to stop issuing permits was the President’s direction to do so.

    Further, given that the Wind Order constitutes a change of course from decades of agencies’ issuing (or denying) permits related to wind energy projects, the Agency Defendants were required, at minimum, to “provide a reasoned explanation for the change” and to “display awareness that [they were] changing position….” They failed to do so. Instead, they implemented the Wind Order on Inauguration Day without elucidating the “reasons for the new policy.”

    To put it bluntly, just because the president doesn’t like offshore wind and has drooled out some crackpot ideas about the harm it does (it drives whales crazy, the noise causes cancer, etc.), that’s not sufficient ground for policy change:

    …And even assuming, arguendo, that the Wind Memo itself could be characterized as the Agency Defendants’ own explanation for their manner of implementing it, the Wind Memo does not provide adequate explanation: It merely includes a single sentence citing “various alleged legal deficiencies underlying” wind permitting, “potential inadequacies in various environmental reviews,” and the possibility that these vaguely defined issues “may lead to grave harm.” Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8363 (emphases added). The Court is “unable to divine or fathom a relationship between” this cursory sentence “and the immense scope of the moratorium” on all wind energy authorizations. …Whatever level of explanation is required when deviating from longstanding agency practice, this is not it.

    The big takeaway here is that federal agencies —the organs of the much-maligned administrative state — are not merely (or not always) instruments of this president’s erratic will and syphilitic delusions. It’s a common-sense finding that should be read expansively against ongoing efforts to destroy independent agencies and establish personalist rule.

    Update 5 January 2026: Just before the holidays, the Trump administration issued a second stop work order, based on “national security” concerns. They tried this move before and it didn’t work; I am not sure why they think it will work this time around. I was struck by what I guess I would call the Orwellian stupidity of the letter communicating this order from Matthew Giacona, former offshore oil lobbyist and current Acting Director of the Bureau of Ocean Management.

    In November 2025, the Department of War (DoW) completed an additional assessment regarding the national security implications of offshore wind projects, and provided senior leadership at the Department of the Interior with new classified information, including the rapid evolution of relevant adversary technologies and the resulting direct impacts to national security from offshore wind projects. These impacts are heightened by the projects’ sensitive location on the East Coast and the potential to cause serious, immediate, and irreparable harm to our great nation. 

    Type your email…

    Subscribe

    #administrativeState #bureaucracy #corruption #deconstructionOfTheAdministrativeState #energyTransition #kakistocracy #offshoreWind #orsted #politicsOfTheEnergyTransition #renewableEnergy #renewables #vestas #windEnergy
  34. "#Ocean-based #solar arrays that can handle #waves of up to four meters could be ready for commercial deployment within a year, and systems able to withstand 10-meter high swells will take at least three years to perfect, according to Ocean Sun."

    #EnergyTransition #OffshoreSolar
    bloomberg.com/news/features/20