home.social

#salttyphoon — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #salttyphoon, aggregated by home.social.

  1. 8 af de største amerikanske 🇺🇸 tele-selskaber har dannet et nyt center for at dele oplysninger om cyber-angreb

    Det nye Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, eller C2 ISAC, har til formål at dele data og forhindre en ny #SaltTyphoon telco masse-hacking kampagne

    Grundlæggeren omfatter AT & T, Charter, Comcast, Cox, Lumen, T-Mobile, Verizon og Zayo
    about.att.com/story/2026/c2-is

  2. 8 af de største amerikanske 🇺🇸 tele-selskaber har dannet et nyt center for at dele oplysninger om cyber-angreb

    Det nye Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, eller C2 ISAC, har til formål at dele data og forhindre en ny #SaltTyphoon telco masse-hacking kampagne

    Grundlæggeren omfatter AT & T, Charter, Comcast, Cox, Lumen, T-Mobile, Verizon og Zayo
    about.att.com/story/2026/c2-is

  3. 8 af de største amerikanske 🇺🇸 tele-selskaber har dannet et nyt center for at dele oplysninger om cyber-angreb

    Det nye Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, eller C2 ISAC, har til formål at dele data og forhindre en ny #SaltTyphoon telco masse-hacking kampagne

    Grundlæggeren omfatter AT & T, Charter, Comcast, Cox, Lumen, T-Mobile, Verizon og Zayo
    about.att.com/story/2026/c2-is

  4. 8 af de største amerikanske 🇺🇸 tele-selskaber har dannet et nyt center for at dele oplysninger om cyber-angreb

    Det nye Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, eller C2 ISAC, har til formål at dele data og forhindre en ny #SaltTyphoon telco masse-hacking kampagne

    Grundlæggeren omfatter AT & T, Charter, Comcast, Cox, Lumen, T-Mobile, Verizon og Zayo
    about.att.com/story/2026/c2-is

  5. 8 af de største amerikanske 🇺🇸 tele-selskaber har dannet et nyt center for at dele oplysninger om cyber-angreb

    Det nye Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, eller C2 ISAC, har til formål at dele data og forhindre en ny #SaltTyphoon telco masse-hacking kampagne

    Grundlæggeren omfatter AT & T, Charter, Comcast, Cox, Lumen, T-Mobile, Verizon og Zayo
    about.att.com/story/2026/c2-is

  6. Salt Typhoon nella PA italiana: Sistemi Informativi di IBM violata per due settimane, il cyberspionaggio cinese entra nella supply chain dello Stato

    Il gruppo APT cinese Salt Typhoon ha compromesso Sistemi Informativi, la controllata IBM che gestisce l'infrastruttura IT di ministeri, INPS, INAIL e banche italiane. Un'intrusione silenziosa durata circa due settimane, individuata a inizio maggio 2026: il caso più significativo di cyberspionaggio sulla supply chain digitale italiana dalla promulgazione della NIS2.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/salt-t

  7. Salt Typhoon nella PA italiana: Sistemi Informativi di IBM violata per due settimane, il cyberspionaggio cinese entra nella supply chain dello Stato

    Il gruppo APT cinese Salt Typhoon ha compromesso Sistemi Informativi, la controllata IBM che gestisce l'infrastruttura IT di ministeri, INPS, INAIL e banche italiane. Un'intrusione silenziosa durata circa due settimane, individuata a inizio maggio 2026: il caso più significativo di cyberspionaggio sulla supply chain digitale italiana dalla promulgazione della NIS2.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/salt-t

  8. Salt Typhoon nella PA italiana: Sistemi Informativi di IBM violata per due settimane, il cyberspionaggio cinese entra nella supply chain dello Stato

    Il gruppo APT cinese Salt Typhoon ha compromesso Sistemi Informativi, la controllata IBM che gestisce l'infrastruttura IT di ministeri, INPS, INAIL e banche italiane. Un'intrusione silenziosa durata circa due settimane, individuata a inizio maggio 2026: il caso più significativo di cyberspionaggio sulla supply chain digitale italiana dalla promulgazione della NIS2.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/salt-t

  9. Salt Typhoon nella PA italiana: Sistemi Informativi di IBM violata per due settimane, il cyberspionaggio cinese entra nella supply chain dello Stato

    Il gruppo APT cinese Salt Typhoon ha compromesso Sistemi Informativi, la controllata IBM che gestisce l'infrastruttura IT di ministeri, INPS, INAIL e banche italiane. Un'intrusione silenziosa durata circa due settimane, individuata a inizio maggio 2026: il caso più significativo di cyberspionaggio sulla supply chain digitale italiana dalla promulgazione della NIS2.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/salt-t

  10. Salt Typhoon nella PA italiana: Sistemi Informativi di IBM violata per due settimane, il cyberspionaggio cinese entra nella supply chain dello Stato

    Il gruppo APT cinese Salt Typhoon ha compromesso Sistemi Informativi, la controllata IBM che gestisce l'infrastruttura IT di ministeri, INPS, INAIL e banche italiane. Un'intrusione silenziosa durata circa due settimane, individuata a inizio maggio 2026: il caso più significativo di cyberspionaggio sulla supply chain digitale italiana dalla promulgazione della NIS2.

    insicurezzadigitale.com/salt-t

  11. 📰 IBM's Italian Subsidiary, a Key Infrastructure Provider, Hit by Cyberattack; China-Linked Salt Typhoon Suspected

    Major cyberattack hits IBM's Italian subsidiary, Sistemi Informativi, a key IT provider for public agencies. The China-linked APT group Salt Typhoon is the suspected culprit, highlighting severe supply chain risks. #CyberAttack #SaltTyphoon #IBM #Italy

    🔗 cyber.netsecops.io

  12. Salt Typhoon breach IBM subsidiary in Italy: a warning for Europe’s digital defenses

    Salt Typhoon breach IBM subsidiary in Italy: a warning for Europe’s digital defenses Pierluigi Paganini May 03, 2026…
    #Europe #EU #APT #China #Hacking #hackingnews #informationsecuritynews #ITInformationSecurity #PierluigiPaganini #SaltTyphoon #SecurityAffairs #SecurityNews
    europesays.com/europe/29895/

  13. Can anyone from the @signalapp team, the @eff, or #cdnpoli (maybe Hon. @Paulatics?) offer insights on how to best frame opposition this anti-privacy (anti #E2EE) #SaltTyphoon serving bill for Parliamentarians of each party?

    It is essential to Canadian's rights and security that bill #C22 be defeated.

    action.openmedia.org/page/1887

    #suerveillance #privacy #infosec

  14. Can anyone from the @signalapp team, the @eff, or #cdnpoli (maybe Hon. @Paulatics?) offer insights on how to best frame opposition this anti-privacy (anti #E2EE) #SaltTyphoon serving bill for Parliamentarians of each party?

    It is essential to Canadian's rights and security that bill #C22 be defeated.

    action.openmedia.org/page/1887

    #suerveillance #privacy #infosec

  15. Can anyone from the @signalapp team, the @eff, or #cdnpoli (maybe Hon. @Paulatics?) offer insights on how to best frame opposition this anti-privacy (anti #E2EE) #SaltTyphoon serving bill for Parliamentarians of each party?

    It is essential to Canadian's rights and security that bill #C22 be defeated.

    action.openmedia.org/page/1887

    #suerveillance #privacy #infosec

  16. Can anyone from the @signalapp team, the @eff, or #cdnpoli (maybe Hon. @Paulatics?) offer insights on how to best frame opposition this anti-privacy (anti #E2EE) #SaltTyphoon serving bill for Parliamentarians of each party?

    It is essential to Canadian's rights and security that bill #C22 be defeated.

    action.openmedia.org/page/1887

    #suerveillance #privacy #infosec

  17. Can anyone from the @signalapp team, the @eff, or #cdnpoli (maybe Hon. @Paulatics?) offer insights on how to best frame opposition this anti-privacy (anti #E2EE) #SaltTyphoon serving bill for Parliamentarians of each party?

    It is essential to Canadian's rights and security that bill #C22 be defeated.

    action.openmedia.org/page/1887

    #suerveillance #privacy #infosec

  18. Banning New Foreign #Routers Mistargets Products to Fix Real Problem
    #FCC cited “security gaps in foreign-made routers” leading to widespread #cyberattacks as justification for the ban, mentioning the high-profile attacks by #China's advanced persistent threat actors Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon. In addition to being far too broad, it won’t even affect many vulnerable devices that are most active in these types of attacks: #IoT and connected #smarthome devices.
    eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/bann

  19. Banning New Foreign #Routers Mistargets Products to Fix Real Problem
    #FCC cited “security gaps in foreign-made routers” leading to widespread #cyberattacks as justification for the ban, mentioning the high-profile attacks by #China's advanced persistent threat actors Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon. In addition to being far too broad, it won’t even affect many vulnerable devices that are most active in these types of attacks: #IoT and connected #smarthome devices.
    eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/bann

  20. Banning New Foreign Mistargets Products to Fix Real Problem
    cited “security gaps in foreign-made routers” leading to widespread as justification for the ban, mentioning the high-profile attacks by 's advanced persistent threat actors Volt, Flax, and . In addition to being far too broad, it won’t even affect many vulnerable devices that are most active in these types of attacks: and connected devices.
    eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/bann

  21. Banning New Foreign #Routers Mistargets Products to Fix Real Problem
    #FCC cited “security gaps in foreign-made routers” leading to widespread #cyberattacks as justification for the ban, mentioning the high-profile attacks by #China's advanced persistent threat actors Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon. In addition to being far too broad, it won’t even affect many vulnerable devices that are most active in these types of attacks: #IoT and connected #smarthome devices.
    eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/bann

  22. Banning New Foreign #Routers Mistargets Products to Fix Real Problem
    #FCC cited “security gaps in foreign-made routers” leading to widespread #cyberattacks as justification for the ban, mentioning the high-profile attacks by #China's advanced persistent threat actors Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon. In addition to being far too broad, it won’t even affect many vulnerable devices that are most active in these types of attacks: #IoT and connected #smarthome devices.
    eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/bann

  23. #FCC bans import of consumer #routers not made in #US over security threat — agency says foreign-made devices pose ‘unacceptable risk’ to US persons
    Blamed foreign-made routers for Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon #cyberattacks that hit critical American infrastructure, “routers in the #UnitedStates must have trusted supply chains so we are not providing foreign actors with a built-in backdoor to American homes, businesses, #criticalinfrastructure, and emergency services.” tomshardware.com/networking/ro

  24. #FCC bans import of consumer #routers not made in #US over security threat — agency says foreign-made devices pose ‘unacceptable risk’ to US persons
    Blamed foreign-made routers for Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon #cyberattacks that hit critical American infrastructure, “routers in the #UnitedStates must have trusted supply chains so we are not providing foreign actors with a built-in backdoor to American homes, businesses, #criticalinfrastructure, and emergency services.” tomshardware.com/networking/ro

  25. bans import of consumer not made in over security threat — agency says foreign-made devices pose ‘unacceptable risk’ to US persons
    Blamed foreign-made routers for Volt, Flax, and that hit critical American infrastructure, “routers in the must have trusted supply chains so we are not providing foreign actors with a built-in backdoor to American homes, businesses, , and emergency services.” tomshardware.com/networking/ro

  26. #FCC bans import of consumer #routers not made in #US over security threat — agency says foreign-made devices pose ‘unacceptable risk’ to US persons
    Blamed foreign-made routers for Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon #cyberattacks that hit critical American infrastructure, “routers in the #UnitedStates must have trusted supply chains so we are not providing foreign actors with a built-in backdoor to American homes, businesses, #criticalinfrastructure, and emergency services.” tomshardware.com/networking/ro

  27. #FCC bans import of consumer #routers not made in #US over security threat — agency says foreign-made devices pose ‘unacceptable risk’ to US persons
    Blamed foreign-made routers for Volt, Flax, and #SaltTyphoon #cyberattacks that hit critical American infrastructure, “routers in the #UnitedStates must have trusted supply chains so we are not providing foreign actors with a built-in backdoor to American homes, businesses, #criticalinfrastructure, and emergency services.” tomshardware.com/networking/ro

  28. YARA candidates from [PHIM] findings:

    → Substitution table triplet (.rdata, 0x10008898)
    → Export pattern K7UI_[digit]
    → Exception code 0xc0000409 on startup termination

    File IOC:
    SHA256: 8dfaa1f579de14bca8bb27c54a57dd87646a835969766ca9ddb81ecd9329f4e4
    Filename: K7UI.dll (K7 Antivirus masquerade)

    Full report (TLP:CLEAR), IOC bundle:
    github.com/seraphimdeck/SerapH

    Report ID: CTI-003
    Sample source: ESET malware-ioc (public)

    #FamousSparrow #SaltTyphoon #CTI #ThreatIntelligence #Infosec

  29. YARA candidates from [PHIM] findings:

    → Substitution table triplet (.rdata, 0x10008898)
    → Export pattern K7UI_[digit]
    → Exception code 0xc0000409 on startup termination

    File IOC:
    SHA256: 8dfaa1f579de14bca8bb27c54a57dd87646a835969766ca9ddb81ecd9329f4e4
    Filename: K7UI.dll (K7 Antivirus masquerade)

    Full report (TLP:CLEAR), IOC bundle:
    github.com/seraphimdeck/SerapH

    Report ID: CTI-003
    Sample source: ESET malware-ioc (public)

    #FamousSparrow #SaltTyphoon #CTI #ThreatIntelligence #Infosec

  30. FamousSparrow / SparrowDoor static analysis.
    Legacy variant (2019-2022), SHA256: 8dfaa1f579...

    4 findings not present in public vendor reporting
    at time of analysis (ESET, UK NCSC, Trend Micro, Microsoft)

    → Inverted anti-sandbox logic
    → Three-table substitution system
    → .text section entropy anomaly
    → 113 indirect call sites in 26KB binary

    Thread: [PHIM] findings only.
    Full report: github.com/seraphimdeck/SerapH

    #FamousSparrow #SaltTyphoon #MalwareAnalysis #CTI

  31. FamousSparrow / SparrowDoor static analysis.
    Legacy variant (2019-2022), SHA256: 8dfaa1f579...

    4 findings not present in public vendor reporting
    at time of analysis (ESET, UK NCSC, Trend Micro, Microsoft)

    → Inverted anti-sandbox logic
    → Three-table substitution system
    → .text section entropy anomaly
    → 113 indirect call sites in 26KB binary

    Thread: [PHIM] findings only.
    Full report: github.com/seraphimdeck/SerapH

    #FamousSparrow #SaltTyphoon #MalwareAnalysis #CTI

  32. @as400 @khalid @postmarketOS I'm daily driving a #Librem5 with #postmarketOS and I've tested reliable voice calling successfully with multiple carriers in two counties. Also, tested with #PureOS.

    Owners of older units may need to upgrade modem firmware and enable VoLTE manually. The real problem in my limited knowledge is carriers are blocking devices which are not on their 'approved list' or which they think are not VoLTE capable.

    Another, bigger questions is: why are people still using unencrypted legacy voice calls for personal communications in 2026?

    #SaltTyphoon

  33. @as400 @khalid @postmarketOS I'm daily driving a #Librem5 with #postmarketOS and I've tested reliable voice calling successfully with multiple carriers in two counties. Also, tested with #PureOS.

    Owners of older units may need to upgrade modem firmware and enable VoLTE manually. The real problem in my limited knowledge is carriers are blocking devices which are not on their 'approved list' or which they think are not VoLTE capable.

    Another, bigger questions is: why are people still using unencrypted legacy voice calls for personal communications in 2026?

    #SaltTyphoon

  34. @as400 @khalid @postmarketOS I'm daily driving a #Librem5 with #postmarketOS and I've tested reliable voice calling successfully with multiple carriers in two counties. Also, tested with #PureOS.

    Owners of older units may need to upgrade modem firmware and enable VoLTE manually. The real problem in my limited knowledge is carriers are blocking devices which are not on their 'approved list' or which they think are not VoLTE capable.

    Another, bigger questions is: why are people still using unencrypted legacy voice calls for personal communications in 2026?

    #SaltTyphoon

  35. @as400 @khalid @postmarketOS I'm daily driving a #Librem5 with #postmarketOS and I've tested reliable voice calling successfully with multiple carriers in two counties. Also, tested with #PureOS.

    Owners of older units may need to upgrade modem firmware and enable VoLTE manually. The real problem in my limited knowledge is carriers are blocking devices which are not on their 'approved list' or which they think are not VoLTE capable.

    Another, bigger questions is: why are people still using unencrypted legacy voice calls for personal communications in 2026?

    #SaltTyphoon

  36. @as400 @khalid @postmarketOS I'm daily driving a #Librem5 with #postmarketOS and I've tested reliable voice calling successfully with multiple carriers in two counties. Also, tested with #PureOS.

    Owners of older units may need to upgrade modem firmware and enable VoLTE manually. The real problem in my limited knowledge is carriers are blocking devices which are not on their 'approved list' or which they think are not VoLTE capable.

    Another, bigger questions is: why are people still using unencrypted legacy voice calls for personal communications in 2026?

    #SaltTyphoon

  37. Watching talks on AI and Security at NTCA RTime this week. Wondering what if anything the co-ops are going to have to say about #CALEA and #SaltTyphoon

    Any questions I should ask the presenters?

    Maybe what, if any, help they're getting from #CISA

    #Telecom

  38. Watching talks on AI and Security at NTCA RTime this week. Wondering what if anything the co-ops are going to have to say about #CALEA and #SaltTyphoon

    Any questions I should ask the presenters?

    Maybe what, if any, help they're getting from #CISA

    #Telecom

  39. Watching talks on AI and Security at NTCA RTime this week. Wondering what if anything the co-ops are going to have to say about #CALEA and #SaltTyphoon

    Any questions I should ask the presenters?

    Maybe what, if any, help they're getting from #CISA

    #Telecom

  40. Watching talks on AI and Security at NTCA RTime this week. Wondering what if anything the co-ops are going to have to say about #CALEA and #SaltTyphoon

    Any questions I should ask the presenters?

    Maybe what, if any, help they're getting from #CISA

    #Telecom

  41. Watching talks on AI and Security at NTCA RTime this week. Wondering what if anything the co-ops are going to have to say about #CALEA and #SaltTyphoon

    Any questions I should ask the presenters?

    Maybe what, if any, help they're getting from #CISA

    #Telecom

  42. Senator says #ATT , #Verizon blocking release of #SaltTyphoon #security assessment reports-Reuters

    Dem Sen #Cantwell said Verizon & AT&T are blocking release of key docs about an alleged massive #Chinese #spying operation that infiltrated US #telecom networks known as Salt Typhoon & wants their CEOs to appear before Congress to answer questions

    Cantwell asked both companies to turn over security assessments conducted by Alphabet #cybersecurity unit #Mandiant
    #privacy

    reuters.com/business/media-tel

  43. Senator says #ATT , #Verizon blocking release of #SaltTyphoon #security assessment reports-Reuters

    Dem Sen #Cantwell said Verizon & AT&T are blocking release of key docs about an alleged massive #Chinese #spying operation that infiltrated US #telecom networks known as Salt Typhoon & wants their CEOs to appear before Congress to answer questions

    Cantwell asked both companies to turn over security assessments conducted by Alphabet #cybersecurity unit #Mandiant
    #privacy

    reuters.com/business/media-tel

  44. Senator says #ATT , #Verizon blocking release of #SaltTyphoon #security assessment reports-Reuters

    Dem Sen #Cantwell said Verizon & AT&T are blocking release of key docs about an alleged massive #Chinese #spying operation that infiltrated US #telecom networks known as Salt Typhoon & wants their CEOs to appear before Congress to answer questions

    Cantwell asked both companies to turn over security assessments conducted by Alphabet #cybersecurity unit #Mandiant
    #privacy

    reuters.com/business/media-tel