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#statecapitalism — Public Fediverse posts

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  1. Trotsky, Lénine, Staline : la révolution permanente ou le détour par le capitalisme d’État ?

    Vouloir “sauter” le capitalisme au nom d’une révolution permanente peut conduire non au communisme, mais à un capitalisme d’État. Marx pensait plutôt une dialectique du développement historique, où le communisme émerge des contradictions du capitalisme lui-même. #Marx #Trotsky #Lenin #Stalin #StateCapitalism La thèse de la “révolution permanente” chez Trotsky pose une question…

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  2. Trotsky, Lénine, Staline : la révolution permanente ou le détour par le capitalisme d’État ?

    Vouloir “sauter” le capitalisme au nom d’une révolution permanente peut conduire non au communisme, mais à un capitalisme d’État. Marx pensait plutôt une dialectique du développement historique, où le communisme émerge des contradictions du capitalisme lui-même. #Marx #Trotsky #Lenin #Stalin #StateCapitalism La thèse de la “révolution permanente” chez Trotsky pose une question…

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  3. L’exploitation au-delà des formes de domination

    La forme du dominateur importe moins que la permanence de l’exploitation. Tant que les producteurs restent séparés de la décision sur la production, ils demeurent dominés — par le capital privé ou par la bureaucratie d’État. #Marxism #Exploitation #Workers #StateCapitalism #Class Du point de vue marxiste, la question décisive n’est pas seulement de savoir qui possède juridiquement les moyens de production.

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  4. L’exploitation au-delà des formes de domination

    La forme du dominateur importe moins que la permanence de l’exploitation. Tant que les producteurs restent séparés de la décision sur la production, ils demeurent dominés — par le capital privé ou par la bureaucratie d’État. #Marxism #Exploitation #Workers #StateCapitalism #Class Du point de vue marxiste, la question décisive n’est pas seulement de savoir qui possède juridiquement les moyens de production.

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  5. L’exploitation au-delà des formes de domination

    La forme du dominateur importe moins que la permanence de l’exploitation. Tant que les producteurs restent séparés de la décision sur la production, ils demeurent dominés — par le capital privé ou par la bureaucratie d’État. #Marxism #Exploitation #Workers #StateCapitalism #Class Du point de vue marxiste, la question décisive n’est pas seulement de savoir qui possède juridiquement les moyens de production.

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  6. L’exploitation au-delà des formes de domination

    La forme du dominateur importe moins que la permanence de l’exploitation. Tant que les producteurs restent séparés de la décision sur la production, ils demeurent dominés — par le capital privé ou par la bureaucratie d’État. #Marxism #Exploitation #Workers #StateCapitalism #Class Du point de vue marxiste, la question décisive n’est pas seulement de savoir qui possède juridiquement les moyens de production.

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  7. L’exploitation au-delà des formes de domination

    La forme du dominateur importe moins que la permanence de l’exploitation. Tant que les producteurs restent séparés de la décision sur la production, ils demeurent dominés — par le capital privé ou par la bureaucratie d’État. #Marxism #Exploitation #Workers #StateCapitalism #Class Du point de vue marxiste, la question décisive n’est pas seulement de savoir qui possède juridiquement les moyens de production.

    homohortus31.wordpress.com/202

  8. (2) on Trump/Xi 2026
    I remember the “kerfuffle” in 1972 when during War on Vietnam ‘Nixon the Crook’ met with ‘Mao the Cult’ and the fallout amongst authoritarian Left and Right alike.
    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_vis

    Australian Labour Govt Opposition leader in 1971; as Prime Minister 1973 Whitlam began trade deals with China’s State Capitalists too

    theconversation.com/50-years-a

    #Capitalism #stateCapitalism

  9. (2) on Trump/Xi 2026
    I remember the “kerfuffle” in 1972 when during War on Vietnam ‘Nixon the Crook’ met with ‘Mao the Cult’ and the fallout amongst authoritarian Left and Right alike.
    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_vis

    Australian Labour Govt Opposition leader in 1971; as Prime Minister 1973 Whitlam began trade deals with China’s State Capitalists too

    theconversation.com/50-years-a

    #Capitalism #stateCapitalism

  10. (2) on Trump/Xi 2026
    I remember the “kerfuffle” in 1972 when during War on Vietnam ‘Nixon the Crook’ met with ‘Mao the Cult’ and the fallout amongst authoritarian Left and Right alike.
    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_vis

    Australian Labour Govt Opposition leader in 1971; as Prime Minister 1973 Whitlam began trade deals with China’s State Capitalists too

    theconversation.com/50-years-a

    #Capitalism #stateCapitalism

  11. (2) on Trump/Xi 2026
    I remember the “kerfuffle” in 1972 when during War on Vietnam ‘Nixon the Crook’ met with ‘Mao the Cult’ and the fallout amongst authoritarian Left and Right alike.
    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_vis

    Australian Labour Govt Opposition leader in 1971; as Prime Minister 1973 Whitlam began trade deals with China’s State Capitalists too

    theconversation.com/50-years-a

    #Capitalism #stateCapitalism

  12. (2) on Trump/Xi 2026
    I remember the “kerfuffle” in 1972 when during War on Vietnam ‘Nixon the Crook’ met with ‘Mao the Cult’ and the fallout amongst authoritarian Left and Right alike.
    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_vis

    Australian Labour Govt Opposition leader in 1971; as Prime Minister 1973 Whitlam began trade deals with China’s State Capitalists too

    theconversation.com/50-years-a

    #Capitalism #stateCapitalism

  13. US ECONOMY SHIFTS, STATE TAKES A BIGGER HAND IN BUSINESS

    The US government is now more involved in business, acting like an investor. This changes how companies make decisions, especially with foreign trade.

    #StateCapitalism, #USBusiness, #EconomicShift, #GovernmentIntervention, #CorporateAmerica

    newsletter.tf/us-government-ge

  14. US ECONOMY SHIFTS, STATE TAKES A BIGGER HAND IN BUSINESS

    The US government is now more involved in business, acting like an investor. This changes how companies make decisions, especially with foreign trade.

    #StateCapitalism, #USBusiness, #EconomicShift, #GovernmentIntervention, #CorporateAmerica

    newsletter.tf/us-government-ge

  15. "Direct, transactional government intervention in companies to secure critical industries and serve other policy ends will inevitably lead to favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, and lower growth. Frontier companies are already pulling away from their competitors; discretionary intervention may further increase market concentration and widen the gap between the large incumbents and industry champions that benefit from government deals and access and the companies that do not.

    Even for the businesses that benefit, the new discretionary state capitalism is a mixed blessing. They will face rising uncertainty and risk falling into governments’ cross hairs as everything from antitrust approvals to international mergers and acquisitions becomes less subject to predictable rules and more subject to the whim of political processes. Governments, meanwhile, may be eager to use the full range of tools available to them, but a heavy-handed, volatile state can quickly dampen economic activity and competition. Discretionary policymaking can distort corporate behavior, pushing companies to focus less on productivity and more on lobbying for political favor. And perhaps most important, a government will not succeed in securing its country’s economic future through investment in critical technology and manufacturing unless it also addresses underlying constraints, such as labor availability, skills gaps, or a burdensome regulatory environment. Economic history is littered with experiments in state capitalism that ended in failure, including U.S. price controls in the 1970s, which contributed to energy shortages and did little to tame inflation, and the 1975 nationalization of British Leyland Motor Corporation, which struggled mightily despite billions in government investment and was eventually dissolved. Policymakers keen on muscular intervention today must tread carefully or risk meeting the same fate."

    foreignaffairs.com/united-stat
    #USA #Trump #StateCapitalism #Kleptocracy

  16. "Direct, transactional government intervention in companies to secure critical industries and serve other policy ends will inevitably lead to favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, and lower growth. Frontier companies are already pulling away from their competitors; discretionary intervention may further increase market concentration and widen the gap between the large incumbents and industry champions that benefit from government deals and access and the companies that do not.

    Even for the businesses that benefit, the new discretionary state capitalism is a mixed blessing. They will face rising uncertainty and risk falling into governments’ cross hairs as everything from antitrust approvals to international mergers and acquisitions becomes less subject to predictable rules and more subject to the whim of political processes. Governments, meanwhile, may be eager to use the full range of tools available to them, but a heavy-handed, volatile state can quickly dampen economic activity and competition. Discretionary policymaking can distort corporate behavior, pushing companies to focus less on productivity and more on lobbying for political favor. And perhaps most important, a government will not succeed in securing its country’s economic future through investment in critical technology and manufacturing unless it also addresses underlying constraints, such as labor availability, skills gaps, or a burdensome regulatory environment. Economic history is littered with experiments in state capitalism that ended in failure, including U.S. price controls in the 1970s, which contributed to energy shortages and did little to tame inflation, and the 1975 nationalization of British Leyland Motor Corporation, which struggled mightily despite billions in government investment and was eventually dissolved. Policymakers keen on muscular intervention today must tread carefully or risk meeting the same fate."

    foreignaffairs.com/united-stat
    #USA #Trump #StateCapitalism #Kleptocracy

  17. "Direct, transactional government intervention in companies to secure critical industries and serve other policy ends will inevitably lead to favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, and lower growth. Frontier companies are already pulling away from their competitors; discretionary intervention may further increase market concentration and widen the gap between the large incumbents and industry champions that benefit from government deals and access and the companies that do not.

    Even for the businesses that benefit, the new discretionary state capitalism is a mixed blessing. They will face rising uncertainty and risk falling into governments’ cross hairs as everything from antitrust approvals to international mergers and acquisitions becomes less subject to predictable rules and more subject to the whim of political processes. Governments, meanwhile, may be eager to use the full range of tools available to them, but a heavy-handed, volatile state can quickly dampen economic activity and competition. Discretionary policymaking can distort corporate behavior, pushing companies to focus less on productivity and more on lobbying for political favor. And perhaps most important, a government will not succeed in securing its country’s economic future through investment in critical technology and manufacturing unless it also addresses underlying constraints, such as labor availability, skills gaps, or a burdensome regulatory environment. Economic history is littered with experiments in state capitalism that ended in failure, including U.S. price controls in the 1970s, which contributed to energy shortages and did little to tame inflation, and the 1975 nationalization of British Leyland Motor Corporation, which struggled mightily despite billions in government investment and was eventually dissolved. Policymakers keen on muscular intervention today must tread carefully or risk meeting the same fate."

    foreignaffairs.com/united-stat
    #USA #Trump #StateCapitalism #Kleptocracy

  18. "Direct, transactional government intervention in companies to secure critical industries and serve other policy ends will inevitably lead to favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, and lower growth. Frontier companies are already pulling away from their competitors; discretionary intervention may further increase market concentration and widen the gap between the large incumbents and industry champions that benefit from government deals and access and the companies that do not.

    Even for the businesses that benefit, the new discretionary state capitalism is a mixed blessing. They will face rising uncertainty and risk falling into governments’ cross hairs as everything from antitrust approvals to international mergers and acquisitions becomes less subject to predictable rules and more subject to the whim of political processes. Governments, meanwhile, may be eager to use the full range of tools available to them, but a heavy-handed, volatile state can quickly dampen economic activity and competition. Discretionary policymaking can distort corporate behavior, pushing companies to focus less on productivity and more on lobbying for political favor. And perhaps most important, a government will not succeed in securing its country’s economic future through investment in critical technology and manufacturing unless it also addresses underlying constraints, such as labor availability, skills gaps, or a burdensome regulatory environment. Economic history is littered with experiments in state capitalism that ended in failure, including U.S. price controls in the 1970s, which contributed to energy shortages and did little to tame inflation, and the 1975 nationalization of British Leyland Motor Corporation, which struggled mightily despite billions in government investment and was eventually dissolved. Policymakers keen on muscular intervention today must tread carefully or risk meeting the same fate."

    foreignaffairs.com/united-stat
    #USA #Trump #StateCapitalism #Kleptocracy

  19. "Direct, transactional government intervention in companies to secure critical industries and serve other policy ends will inevitably lead to favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, and lower growth. Frontier companies are already pulling away from their competitors; discretionary intervention may further increase market concentration and widen the gap between the large incumbents and industry champions that benefit from government deals and access and the companies that do not.

    Even for the businesses that benefit, the new discretionary state capitalism is a mixed blessing. They will face rising uncertainty and risk falling into governments’ cross hairs as everything from antitrust approvals to international mergers and acquisitions becomes less subject to predictable rules and more subject to the whim of political processes. Governments, meanwhile, may be eager to use the full range of tools available to them, but a heavy-handed, volatile state can quickly dampen economic activity and competition. Discretionary policymaking can distort corporate behavior, pushing companies to focus less on productivity and more on lobbying for political favor. And perhaps most important, a government will not succeed in securing its country’s economic future through investment in critical technology and manufacturing unless it also addresses underlying constraints, such as labor availability, skills gaps, or a burdensome regulatory environment. Economic history is littered with experiments in state capitalism that ended in failure, including U.S. price controls in the 1970s, which contributed to energy shortages and did little to tame inflation, and the 1975 nationalization of British Leyland Motor Corporation, which struggled mightily despite billions in government investment and was eventually dissolved. Policymakers keen on muscular intervention today must tread carefully or risk meeting the same fate."

    foreignaffairs.com/united-stat
    #USA #Trump #StateCapitalism #Kleptocracy

  20. State Capitalism – Be careful what you ask for!
    Good Read!

    By anointing winners and losers, State Capitalism may well create an enduring snake pit of favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, lower growth, and stunted innovation. And it’s not just losers that lose, the “winners” will also face rising uncertainty and risk of falling out of favor with business operations subject to unpredictable rules and to the flights of fancy of political actors.

    Access to foreign markets will become more uncertain/possibly curtailed as more and more countries seek to promote domestic champions and reduce dependence on foreign goods. Ultimately, state capitalism is self-defeating. The U.S. has maintained its lead over China due to the dynamism of open markets and the predictability of the rule of law. Replacing a system of economic rules with a system powered by political whims will be geopolitical economic malpractice. foreignaffairs.com/united-stat #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #Politics #Markets #Risk #Business #Innovation

  21. State Capitalism – Be careful what you ask for!
    Good Read!

    By anointing winners and losers, State Capitalism may well create an enduring snake pit of favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, lower growth, and stunted innovation. And it’s not just losers that lose, the “winners” will also face rising uncertainty and risk of falling out of favor with business operations subject to unpredictable rules and to the flights of fancy of political actors.

    Access to foreign markets will become more uncertain/possibly curtailed as more and more countries seek to promote domestic champions and reduce dependence on foreign goods. Ultimately, state capitalism is self-defeating. The U.S. has maintained its lead over China due to the dynamism of open markets and the predictability of the rule of law. Replacing a system of economic rules with a system powered by political whims will be geopolitical economic malpractice. foreignaffairs.com/united-stat #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #Politics #Markets #Risk #Business #Innovation

  22. State Capitalism – Be careful what you ask for!
    Good Read!

    By anointing winners and losers, State Capitalism may well create an enduring snake pit of favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, lower growth, and stunted innovation. And it’s not just losers that lose, the “winners” will also face rising uncertainty and risk of falling out of favor with business operations subject to unpredictable rules and to the flights of fancy of political actors.

    Access to foreign markets will become more uncertain/possibly curtailed as more and more countries seek to promote domestic champions and reduce dependence on foreign goods. Ultimately, state capitalism is self-defeating. The U.S. has maintained its lead over China due to the dynamism of open markets and the predictability of the rule of law. Replacing a system of economic rules with a system powered by political whims will be geopolitical economic malpractice. foreignaffairs.com/united-stat #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #Politics #Markets #Risk #Business #Innovation

  23. State Capitalism – Be careful what you ask for!
    Good Read!

    By anointing winners and losers, State Capitalism may well create an enduring snake pit of favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, lower growth, and stunted innovation. And it’s not just losers that lose, the “winners” will also face rising uncertainty and risk of falling out of favor with business operations subject to unpredictable rules and to the flights of fancy of political actors.

    Access to foreign markets will become more uncertain/possibly curtailed as more and more countries seek to promote domestic champions and reduce dependence on foreign goods. Ultimately, state capitalism is self-defeating. The U.S. has maintained its lead over China due to the dynamism of open markets and the predictability of the rule of law. Replacing a system of economic rules with a system powered by political whims will be geopolitical economic malpractice. foreignaffairs.com/united-stat #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #Politics #Markets #Risk #Business #Innovation

  24. State Capitalism – Be careful what you ask for!
    Good Read!

    By anointing winners and losers, State Capitalism may well create an enduring snake pit of favoritism, inefficiency, higher costs, lower growth, and stunted innovation. And it’s not just losers that lose, the “winners” will also face rising uncertainty and risk of falling out of favor with business operations subject to unpredictable rules and to the flights of fancy of political actors.

    Access to foreign markets will become more uncertain/possibly curtailed as more and more countries seek to promote domestic champions and reduce dependence on foreign goods. Ultimately, state capitalism is self-defeating. The U.S. has maintained its lead over China due to the dynamism of open markets and the predictability of the rule of law. Replacing a system of economic rules with a system powered by political whims will be geopolitical economic malpractice. foreignaffairs.com/united-stat

  25. Trump’s State Capitalism

    The U.S. government has increasingly become a brokerage[1] platform for elite business capital accumulation goals camouflaged under a national security agenda. Anyone who has read my latest book, U.S.-Russian Commercial Relations 1763-1933: Origins of ...

    murica.website/2026/01/trumps-

  26. Trump’s State Capitalism

    The U.S. government has increasingly become a brokerage[1] platform for elite business capital accumulation goals camouflaged under a national security agenda. Anyone who has read my latest book, U.S.-Russian Commercial Relations 1763-1933: Origins of ...

    murica.website/2026/01/trumps-

  27. "The Trump administration has continued to snap up stakes in other private firms, most notably mining companies involved in the production of rare earth minerals and other raw materials used in technology"
    Approaching the Chinese model, just from the opposite direction? #nationalisation #statecapitalism
    aje.io/jimbw7

  28. "The Trump administration has continued to snap up stakes in other private firms, most notably mining companies involved in the production of rare earth minerals and other raw materials used in technology"
    Approaching the Chinese model, just from the opposite direction? #nationalisation #statecapitalism
    aje.io/jimbw7

  29. "The Trump administration has continued to snap up stakes in other private firms, most notably mining companies involved in the production of rare earth minerals and other raw materials used in technology"
    Approaching the Chinese model, just from the opposite direction? #nationalisation #statecapitalism
    aje.io/jimbw7

  30. "The Trump administration has continued to snap up stakes in other private firms, most notably mining companies involved in the production of rare earth minerals and other raw materials used in technology"
    Approaching the Chinese model, just from the opposite direction? #nationalisation #statecapitalism
    aje.io/jimbw7

  31. "The Trump administration has continued to snap up stakes in other private firms, most notably mining companies involved in the production of rare earth minerals and other raw materials used in technology"
    Approaching the Chinese model, just from the opposite direction? #nationalisation #statecapitalism
    aje.io/jimbw7

  32. "Given what we know about the limited net surplus actually squeezed from agriculture and the scale of human loss, a softer, more balanced socialist strategy looks economically plausible and morally preferable. A reformed NEP with hard investment targets could have delivered comparable industrial capacity by the early 1940s, with fewer long-term distortions and a very different distribution of gains.

    But plausibility on paper isn’t the same as political feasibility in 1928–32. Information was thin; the leadership’s worldview was siege-minded, which was hardly irrational given the collapse of collective-security efforts after 1933 and, ultimately, the 1941 German invasion; and incentives inside the party-state pushed toward command solutions. From that vantage point, the crash path felt “inevitable,” even if it wasn’t in a strict economic sense. The late-1980s debates in the Soviet Union revived the counterfactuals, including the idea that Lenin might have kept a mixed economy longer. As Alec Nove cautioned in the last edition of An Economic History of the USSR, it’s far from obvious he would have chosen differently had he lived into the 1930s.

    So, I land here: a more humane path was possible, but not likely under the beliefs, threats, and institutions of the time. The lesson isn’t that speed always justifies the means. It’s that the means shape the society you end up with, long after the steel is rolled and the machines are built."

    deveconhub.com/was-stalin-nece

    #Russia #USSR #Stalin #Industrialization #NEP #Lenin #StateCapitalism

  33. "Given what we know about the limited net surplus actually squeezed from agriculture and the scale of human loss, a softer, more balanced socialist strategy looks economically plausible and morally preferable. A reformed NEP with hard investment targets could have delivered comparable industrial capacity by the early 1940s, with fewer long-term distortions and a very different distribution of gains.

    But plausibility on paper isn’t the same as political feasibility in 1928–32. Information was thin; the leadership’s worldview was siege-minded, which was hardly irrational given the collapse of collective-security efforts after 1933 and, ultimately, the 1941 German invasion; and incentives inside the party-state pushed toward command solutions. From that vantage point, the crash path felt “inevitable,” even if it wasn’t in a strict economic sense. The late-1980s debates in the Soviet Union revived the counterfactuals, including the idea that Lenin might have kept a mixed economy longer. As Alec Nove cautioned in the last edition of An Economic History of the USSR, it’s far from obvious he would have chosen differently had he lived into the 1930s.

    So, I land here: a more humane path was possible, but not likely under the beliefs, threats, and institutions of the time. The lesson isn’t that speed always justifies the means. It’s that the means shape the society you end up with, long after the steel is rolled and the machines are built."

    deveconhub.com/was-stalin-nece

    #Russia #USSR #Stalin #Industrialization #NEP #Lenin #StateCapitalism

  34. "Given what we know about the limited net surplus actually squeezed from agriculture and the scale of human loss, a softer, more balanced socialist strategy looks economically plausible and morally preferable. A reformed NEP with hard investment targets could have delivered comparable industrial capacity by the early 1940s, with fewer long-term distortions and a very different distribution of gains.

    But plausibility on paper isn’t the same as political feasibility in 1928–32. Information was thin; the leadership’s worldview was siege-minded, which was hardly irrational given the collapse of collective-security efforts after 1933 and, ultimately, the 1941 German invasion; and incentives inside the party-state pushed toward command solutions. From that vantage point, the crash path felt “inevitable,” even if it wasn’t in a strict economic sense. The late-1980s debates in the Soviet Union revived the counterfactuals, including the idea that Lenin might have kept a mixed economy longer. As Alec Nove cautioned in the last edition of An Economic History of the USSR, it’s far from obvious he would have chosen differently had he lived into the 1930s.

    So, I land here: a more humane path was possible, but not likely under the beliefs, threats, and institutions of the time. The lesson isn’t that speed always justifies the means. It’s that the means shape the society you end up with, long after the steel is rolled and the machines are built."

    deveconhub.com/was-stalin-nece

    #Russia #USSR #Stalin #Industrialization #NEP #Lenin #StateCapitalism

  35. "Given what we know about the limited net surplus actually squeezed from agriculture and the scale of human loss, a softer, more balanced socialist strategy looks economically plausible and morally preferable. A reformed NEP with hard investment targets could have delivered comparable industrial capacity by the early 1940s, with fewer long-term distortions and a very different distribution of gains.

    But plausibility on paper isn’t the same as political feasibility in 1928–32. Information was thin; the leadership’s worldview was siege-minded, which was hardly irrational given the collapse of collective-security efforts after 1933 and, ultimately, the 1941 German invasion; and incentives inside the party-state pushed toward command solutions. From that vantage point, the crash path felt “inevitable,” even if it wasn’t in a strict economic sense. The late-1980s debates in the Soviet Union revived the counterfactuals, including the idea that Lenin might have kept a mixed economy longer. As Alec Nove cautioned in the last edition of An Economic History of the USSR, it’s far from obvious he would have chosen differently had he lived into the 1930s.

    So, I land here: a more humane path was possible, but not likely under the beliefs, threats, and institutions of the time. The lesson isn’t that speed always justifies the means. It’s that the means shape the society you end up with, long after the steel is rolled and the machines are built."

    deveconhub.com/was-stalin-nece

    #Russia #USSR #Stalin #Industrialization #NEP #Lenin #StateCapitalism

  36. "Given what we know about the limited net surplus actually squeezed from agriculture and the scale of human loss, a softer, more balanced socialist strategy looks economically plausible and morally preferable. A reformed NEP with hard investment targets could have delivered comparable industrial capacity by the early 1940s, with fewer long-term distortions and a very different distribution of gains.

    But plausibility on paper isn’t the same as political feasibility in 1928–32. Information was thin; the leadership’s worldview was siege-minded, which was hardly irrational given the collapse of collective-security efforts after 1933 and, ultimately, the 1941 German invasion; and incentives inside the party-state pushed toward command solutions. From that vantage point, the crash path felt “inevitable,” even if it wasn’t in a strict economic sense. The late-1980s debates in the Soviet Union revived the counterfactuals, including the idea that Lenin might have kept a mixed economy longer. As Alec Nove cautioned in the last edition of An Economic History of the USSR, it’s far from obvious he would have chosen differently had he lived into the 1930s.

    So, I land here: a more humane path was possible, but not likely under the beliefs, threats, and institutions of the time. The lesson isn’t that speed always justifies the means. It’s that the means shape the society you end up with, long after the steel is rolled and the machines are built."

    deveconhub.com/was-stalin-nece

    #Russia #USSR #Stalin #Industrialization #NEP #Lenin #StateCapitalism

  37. 💯 👉"Critics of socialism argue that it is a cop-out to say that the USSR was not socialist. But it seems clear that in practical terms, those running the system were trying to beat capitalism at its own game. They were not only imprisoned in a competitive logic but also bound by its limited horizons.

    Of course, this does not tell us what the Soviet economic system was. To pose that question, as some did in the USSR, was to step outside the ruling order and to invite retribution. The job of the economists that Feygin discusses was to help the system work better.

    Yet even some of those who were at the center of these “insider” debates could not help wondering exactly what the USSR was. Feygin in particular instances Yakov Kronrod, who spent four decades or more trying to think not only about reform but also about value relations and the question of alienation and exploitation in the Soviet system (David Mandel’s book on Konrod, Democracy, Plan, and Market, is not cited, however).

    In the event, the USSR and the wider Soviet-led bloc collapsed, becoming the “ruin” of Feygin’s title. It failed to catch up with (let alone overtake) the West, and it failed to satisfy the aspirations of its own population. The idea of socialism from above, directed by a plan, has not really recovered. When we think, therefore, of going beyond capitalism, we must think about different ends as well as different means.

    A bottom-up, participative system might well be messy in different ways, but it would have to engage people. In the USSR, Soviet workers were never the knowing agents of their own fate. They figured only as a constraint..." 👈💯

    jacobin.com/2025/11/soviet-eco

    #SovietUnion #USSR #Socialism #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #EconomicDemocracy #Gorbatchev #Perestroika

  38. 💯 👉"Critics of socialism argue that it is a cop-out to say that the USSR was not socialist. But it seems clear that in practical terms, those running the system were trying to beat capitalism at its own game. They were not only imprisoned in a competitive logic but also bound by its limited horizons.

    Of course, this does not tell us what the Soviet economic system was. To pose that question, as some did in the USSR, was to step outside the ruling order and to invite retribution. The job of the economists that Feygin discusses was to help the system work better.

    Yet even some of those who were at the center of these “insider” debates could not help wondering exactly what the USSR was. Feygin in particular instances Yakov Kronrod, who spent four decades or more trying to think not only about reform but also about value relations and the question of alienation and exploitation in the Soviet system (David Mandel’s book on Konrod, Democracy, Plan, and Market, is not cited, however).

    In the event, the USSR and the wider Soviet-led bloc collapsed, becoming the “ruin” of Feygin’s title. It failed to catch up with (let alone overtake) the West, and it failed to satisfy the aspirations of its own population. The idea of socialism from above, directed by a plan, has not really recovered. When we think, therefore, of going beyond capitalism, we must think about different ends as well as different means.

    A bottom-up, participative system might well be messy in different ways, but it would have to engage people. In the USSR, Soviet workers were never the knowing agents of their own fate. They figured only as a constraint..." 👈💯

    jacobin.com/2025/11/soviet-eco

    #SovietUnion #USSR #Socialism #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #EconomicDemocracy #Gorbatchev #Perestroika

  39. 💯 👉"Critics of socialism argue that it is a cop-out to say that the USSR was not socialist. But it seems clear that in practical terms, those running the system were trying to beat capitalism at its own game. They were not only imprisoned in a competitive logic but also bound by its limited horizons.

    Of course, this does not tell us what the Soviet economic system was. To pose that question, as some did in the USSR, was to step outside the ruling order and to invite retribution. The job of the economists that Feygin discusses was to help the system work better.

    Yet even some of those who were at the center of these “insider” debates could not help wondering exactly what the USSR was. Feygin in particular instances Yakov Kronrod, who spent four decades or more trying to think not only about reform but also about value relations and the question of alienation and exploitation in the Soviet system (David Mandel’s book on Konrod, Democracy, Plan, and Market, is not cited, however).

    In the event, the USSR and the wider Soviet-led bloc collapsed, becoming the “ruin” of Feygin’s title. It failed to catch up with (let alone overtake) the West, and it failed to satisfy the aspirations of its own population. The idea of socialism from above, directed by a plan, has not really recovered. When we think, therefore, of going beyond capitalism, we must think about different ends as well as different means.

    A bottom-up, participative system might well be messy in different ways, but it would have to engage people. In the USSR, Soviet workers were never the knowing agents of their own fate. They figured only as a constraint..." 👈💯

    jacobin.com/2025/11/soviet-eco

    #SovietUnion #USSR #Socialism #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #EconomicDemocracy #Gorbatchev #Perestroika

  40. 💯 👉"Critics of socialism argue that it is a cop-out to say that the USSR was not socialist. But it seems clear that in practical terms, those running the system were trying to beat capitalism at its own game. They were not only imprisoned in a competitive logic but also bound by its limited horizons.

    Of course, this does not tell us what the Soviet economic system was. To pose that question, as some did in the USSR, was to step outside the ruling order and to invite retribution. The job of the economists that Feygin discusses was to help the system work better.

    Yet even some of those who were at the center of these “insider” debates could not help wondering exactly what the USSR was. Feygin in particular instances Yakov Kronrod, who spent four decades or more trying to think not only about reform but also about value relations and the question of alienation and exploitation in the Soviet system (David Mandel’s book on Konrod, Democracy, Plan, and Market, is not cited, however).

    In the event, the USSR and the wider Soviet-led bloc collapsed, becoming the “ruin” of Feygin’s title. It failed to catch up with (let alone overtake) the West, and it failed to satisfy the aspirations of its own population. The idea of socialism from above, directed by a plan, has not really recovered. When we think, therefore, of going beyond capitalism, we must think about different ends as well as different means.

    A bottom-up, participative system might well be messy in different ways, but it would have to engage people. In the USSR, Soviet workers were never the knowing agents of their own fate. They figured only as a constraint..." 👈💯

    jacobin.com/2025/11/soviet-eco

    #SovietUnion #USSR #Socialism #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #EconomicDemocracy #Gorbatchev #Perestroika

  41. 💯 👉"Critics of socialism argue that it is a cop-out to say that the USSR was not socialist. But it seems clear that in practical terms, those running the system were trying to beat capitalism at its own game. They were not only imprisoned in a competitive logic but also bound by its limited horizons.

    Of course, this does not tell us what the Soviet economic system was. To pose that question, as some did in the USSR, was to step outside the ruling order and to invite retribution. The job of the economists that Feygin discusses was to help the system work better.

    Yet even some of those who were at the center of these “insider” debates could not help wondering exactly what the USSR was. Feygin in particular instances Yakov Kronrod, who spent four decades or more trying to think not only about reform but also about value relations and the question of alienation and exploitation in the Soviet system (David Mandel’s book on Konrod, Democracy, Plan, and Market, is not cited, however).

    In the event, the USSR and the wider Soviet-led bloc collapsed, becoming the “ruin” of Feygin’s title. It failed to catch up with (let alone overtake) the West, and it failed to satisfy the aspirations of its own population. The idea of socialism from above, directed by a plan, has not really recovered. When we think, therefore, of going beyond capitalism, we must think about different ends as well as different means.

    A bottom-up, participative system might well be messy in different ways, but it would have to engage people. In the USSR, Soviet workers were never the knowing agents of their own fate. They figured only as a constraint..." 👈💯

    jacobin.com/2025/11/soviet-eco

    #SovietUnion #USSR #Socialism #Capitalism #StateCapitalism #EconomicDemocracy #Gorbatchev #Perestroika