#post-quantum-cryptography — Public Fediverse posts

https://winbuzzer.com/2026/07/02/microsoft-speeds-quantum-safe-roadmap-toward-2029-xcxwbn/

Microsoft's quantum-safe roadmap targets 2029 as customers face quantum-resistant cryptography planning, data-exposure risk, and migration pressure.

#MicrosoftSecurity #Microsoft #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumComputing #Encryption #Cybersecurity

https://winbuzzer.com/2026/07/02/microsoft-speeds-quantum-safe-roadmap-toward-2029-xcxwbn/

Microsoft's quantum-safe roadmap targets 2029 as customers face quantum-resistant cryptography planning, data-exposure risk, and migration pressure.

#MicrosoftSecurity #Microsoft #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumComputing #Encryption #Cybersecurity

https://winbuzzer.com/2026/07/02/microsoft-speeds-quantum-safe-roadmap-toward-2029-xcxwbn/

Microsoft's quantum-safe roadmap targets 2029 as customers face quantum-resistant cryptography planning, data-exposure risk, and migration pressure.

#MicrosoftSecurity #Microsoft #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumComputing #Encryption #Cybersecurity

https://winbuzzer.com/2026/07/02/microsoft-speeds-quantum-safe-roadmap-toward-2029-xcxwbn/

Microsoft's quantum-safe roadmap targets 2029 as customers face quantum-resistant cryptography planning, data-exposure risk, and migration pressure.

#MicrosoftSecurity #Microsoft #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumComputing #Encryption #Cybersecurity

https://winbuzzer.com/2026/07/02/microsoft-speeds-quantum-safe-roadmap-toward-2029-xcxwbn/

Microsoft's quantum-safe roadmap targets 2029 as customers face quantum-resistant cryptography planning, data-exposure risk, and migration pressure.

#MicrosoftSecurity #Microsoft #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumComputing #Encryption #Cybersecurity

Are we any closer to the Quantum Apocalypse?

Another day, another urgent pronouncement on the need to transition to post-quantum cryptography ASAP: this one from the White House, in the form of an Executive Order requiring certain “high value” systems to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the end of 2030 (for key exchange) or 2031 (for signatures). This brings forward the date slightly compared to previous guidance, which disallows quantum-vulnerable crypto for US Federal systems by 2035. But is this urgency justified?

First, an important note: as you can probably tell already, I’m going to pour some skepticism on this sense of urgency. I don’t think cryptographically-relevant quantum computers are coming soon. However, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be prepared! The risk that they might appear soon is non-negligible, and the impact of them appearing for many applications is catastrophic. Sensible timelines to mitigate known threats are justified, panic-induced rushing is not. On with the article…

Filippo Valsorda wrote a good piece about why he believes this urgency is justified, and that we need to be moving faster towards a post-quantum world. He cites two papers that dramatically reduce the estimates for how many qubits are needed to break classical cryptography (in this case elliptic curves) using a quantum computer. He writes:

“Overall, it looks like everything is moving: the hardware is getting better, the algorithms are getting cheaper, the requirements for error correction are getting lower.”

But is the hardware getting better? This is where I have doubts. Initial timelines for quantum computing from Google and IBM were extremely optimistic. Just 5 years ago, Google suggested they would have a fault-tolerant quantum computer with 1,000,000 physical qubits by 2029. They are currently at 105. So just 4 orders of magnitude to go in the next 3 years. IBM were a bit more conservative, anticipating 100,000 qubits by 2033. They are currently at 156 qubits.

Sam Jacques has been updating a useful chart every year, showing the current state of quantum computing progress. Below shows a comparison of the first chart he published in 2023 and the most recent one in 2026. What can clearly be seen is how better analysis has moved attacks down and to the left, but actual hardware progress has remained stubbornly in that little grey box, with a tiny nudge upwards on reducing the error rate.

Now, you may say that there has been good progress on improving error correction. For example, at the end of 2024, Google announced “below threshold” quantum error correction. Surely a sign of good progress, even if the number of qubits was behind schedule. Once you’ve cracked error correction, the qubits will come thick and fast: an atomic explosion of qubits, if you will. (If you believe this then it doesn’t really matter how much more efficient the attacks become on paper: all that matters is how soon the hardware arrives). But I do wonder how that announcement was different from the announcement Google made almost 2 years earlier stating “For the first time ever, our Quantum AI researchers have experimentally demonstrated that it’s possible to reduce errors by increasing the number of qubits.” Call me skeptical, but if you were really making progress then would you need to put out re-runs of results you’ve already announced? Are there new chips coming that build on this breakthrough to give us the large numbers of usable qubits we’ve been promised?

Maybe I’m about to be proved wrong by new announcements, or maybe all of the companies and governments involved in the entire world have suddenly decided to keep their progress hush-hush. But from my point of view as an outsider looking in, it all looks suspiciously like progress on quantum computing has stalled rather than the sky being about to fall on our heads.

To reiterate: I still think it is sensible to be working right now on transitioning to post-quantum encryption (in a hybrid). But I am deeply skeptical of the idea that we need to rush things because quantum computers are arriving any second now. As I said in “Are we overthinking post-quantum cryptography?”, I think if you’re not beholden to the diktats of an insane autocrat, making minimal adjustments to ensure you can counter “store now, decrypt later” attacks is sensible. Wholesale replacement of all of your cryptography with post-quantum alternatives is IMO still in the realm of something to start thinking about, not a burning crisis that needs immediate attention.

The key things to consider have nothing to do with PQC at all: Can I change algorithms easily and securely? Do I need to be using public key cryptography, or will symmetric cryptography do instead? (Hint: if it doesn’t cross a trust boundary, then the answer is almost always “yes”). Can I avoid digital signatures (the post-quantum ones are mostly crap)? Can I avoid cryptography entirely? (E.g., moving from “stateless” JWTs to good old-fashioned stateful tokens/cookies).

Are we any closer to the Quantum Apocalypse?

Another day, another urgent pronouncement on the need to transition to post-quantum cryptography ASAP: this one from the White House, in the form of an Executive Order requiring certain “high value” systems to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the end of 2030 (for key exchange) or 2031 (for signatures). This brings forward the date slightly compared to previous guidance, which disallows quantum-vulnerable crypto for US Federal systems by 2035. But is this urgency justified?

First, an important note: as you can probably tell already, I’m going to pour some skepticism on this sense of urgency. I don’t think cryptographically-relevant quantum computers are coming soon. However, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be prepared! The risk that they might appear soon is non-negligible, and the impact of them appearing for many applications is catastrophic. Sensible timelines to mitigate known threats are justified, panic-induced rushing is not. On with the article…

Filippo Valsorda wrote a good piece about why he believes this urgency is justified, and that we need to be moving faster towards a post-quantum world. He cites two papers that dramatically reduce the estimates for how many qubits are needed to break classical cryptography (in this case elliptic curves) using a quantum computer. He writes:

“Overall, it looks like everything is moving: the hardware is getting better, the algorithms are getting cheaper, the requirements for error correction are getting lower.”

But is the hardware getting better? This is where I have doubts. Initial timelines for quantum computing from Google and IBM were extremely optimistic. Just 5 years ago, Google suggested they would have a fault-tolerant quantum computer with 1,000,000 physical qubits by 2029. They are currently at 105. So just 4 orders of magnitude to go in the next 3 years. IBM were a bit more conservative, anticipating 100,000 qubits by 2033. They are currently at 156 qubits.

Sam Jacques has been updating a useful chart every year, showing the current state of quantum computing progress. Below shows a comparison of the first chart he published in 2023 and the most recent one in 2026. What can clearly be seen is how better analysis has moved attacks down and to the left, but actual hardware progress has remained stubbornly in that little grey box, with a tiny nudge upwards on reducing the error rate.

Now, you may say that there has been good progress on improving error correction. For example, at the end of 2024, Google announced “below threshold” quantum error correction. Surely a sign of good progress, even if the number of qubits was behind schedule. Once you’ve cracked error correction, the qubits will come thick and fast: an atomic explosion of qubits, if you will. (If you believe this then it doesn’t really matter how much more efficient the attacks become on paper: all that matters is how soon the hardware arrives). But I do wonder how that announcement was different from the announcement Google made almost 2 years earlier stating “For the first time ever, our Quantum AI researchers have experimentally demonstrated that it’s possible to reduce errors by increasing the number of qubits.” Call me skeptical, but if you were really making progress then would you need to put out re-runs of results you’ve already announced? Are there new chips coming that build on this breakthrough to give us the large numbers of usable qubits we’ve been promised?

Maybe I’m about to be proved wrong by new announcements, or maybe all of the companies and governments involved in the entire world have suddenly decided to keep their progress hush-hush. But from my point of view as an outsider looking in, it all looks suspiciously like progress on quantum computing has stalled rather than the sky being about to fall on our heads.

To reiterate: I still think it is sensible to be working right now on transitioning to post-quantum encryption (in a hybrid). But I am deeply skeptical of the idea that we need to rush things because quantum computers are arriving any second now. As I said in “Are we overthinking post-quantum cryptography?”, I think if you’re not beholden to the diktats of an insane autocrat, making minimal adjustments to ensure you can counter “store now, decrypt later” attacks is sensible. Wholesale replacement of all of your cryptography with post-quantum alternatives is IMO still in the realm of something to start thinking about, not a burning crisis that needs immediate attention.

The key things to consider have nothing to do with PQC at all: Can I change algorithms easily and securely? Do I need to be using public key cryptography, or will symmetric cryptography do instead? (Hint: if it doesn’t cross a trust boundary, then the answer is almost always “yes”). Can I avoid digital signatures (the post-quantum ones are mostly crap)? Can I avoid cryptography entirely? (E.g., moving from “stateless” JWTs to good old-fashioned stateful tokens/cookies).

Are we any closer to the Quantum Apocalypse?

Another day, another urgent pronouncement on the need to transition to post-quantum cryptography ASAP: this one from the White House, in the form of an Executive Order requiring certain “high value” systems to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the end of 2030 (for key exchange) or 2031 (for signatures). This brings forward the date slightly compared to previous guidance, which disallows quantum-vulnerable crypto for US Federal systems by 2035. But is this urgency justified?

First, an important note: as you can probably tell already, I’m going to pour some skepticism on this sense of urgency. I don’t think cryptographically-relevant quantum computers are coming soon. However, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be prepared! The risk that they might appear soon is non-negligible, and the impact of them appearing for many applications is catastrophic. Sensible timelines to mitigate known threats are justified, panic-induced rushing is not. On with the article…

Filippo Valsorda wrote a good piece about why he believes this urgency is justified, and that we need to be moving faster towards a post-quantum world. He cites two papers that dramatically reduce the estimates for how many qubits are needed to break classical cryptography (in this case elliptic curves) using a quantum computer. He writes:

“Overall, it looks like everything is moving: the hardware is getting better, the algorithms are getting cheaper, the requirements for error correction are getting lower.”

But is the hardware getting better? This is where I have doubts. Initial timelines for quantum computing from Google and IBM were extremely optimistic. Just 5 years ago, Google suggested they would have a fault-tolerant quantum computer with 1,000,000 physical qubits by 2029. They are currently at 105. So just 4 orders of magnitude to go in the next 3 years. IBM were a bit more conservative, anticipating 100,000 qubits by 2033. They are currently at 156 qubits.

Sam Jacques has been updating a useful chart every year, showing the current state of quantum computing progress. Below shows a comparison of the first chart he published in 2023 and the most recent one in 2026. What can clearly be seen is how better analysis has moved attacks down and to the left, but actual hardware progress has remained stubbornly in that little grey box, with a tiny nudge upwards on reducing the error rate.

Now, you may say that there has been good progress on improving error correction. For example, at the end of 2024, Google announced “below threshold” quantum error correction. Surely a sign of good progress, even if the number of qubits was behind schedule. Once you’ve cracked error correction, the qubits will come thick and fast: an atomic explosion of qubits, if you will. (If you believe this then it doesn’t really matter how much more efficient the attacks become on paper: all that matters is how soon the hardware arrives). But I do wonder how that announcement was different from the announcement Google made almost 2 years earlier stating “For the first time ever, our Quantum AI researchers have experimentally demonstrated that it’s possible to reduce errors by increasing the number of qubits.” Call me skeptical, but if you were really making progress then would you need to put out re-runs of results you’ve already announced? Are there new chips coming that build on this breakthrough to give us the large numbers of usable qubits we’ve been promised?

Maybe I’m about to be proved wrong by new announcements, or maybe all of the companies and governments involved in the entire world have suddenly decided to keep their progress hush-hush. But from my point of view as an outsider looking in, it all looks suspiciously like progress on quantum computing has stalled rather than the sky being about to fall on our heads.

To reiterate: I still think it is sensible to be working right now on transitioning to post-quantum encryption (in a hybrid). But I am deeply skeptical of the idea that we need to rush things because quantum computers are arriving any second now. As I said in “Are we overthinking post-quantum cryptography?”, I think if you’re not beholden to the diktats of an insane autocrat, making minimal adjustments to ensure you can counter “store now, decrypt later” attacks is sensible. Wholesale replacement of all of your cryptography with post-quantum alternatives is IMO still in the realm of something to start thinking about, not a burning crisis that needs immediate attention.

The key things to consider have nothing to do with PQC at all: Can I change algorithms easily and securely? Do I need to be using public key cryptography, or will symmetric cryptography do instead? (Hint: if it doesn’t cross a trust boundary, then the answer is almost always “yes”). Can I avoid digital signatures (the post-quantum ones are mostly crap)? Can I avoid cryptography entirely? (E.g., moving from “stateless” JWTs to good old-fashioned stateful tokens/cookies).

Are we any closer to the Quantum Apocalypse?

Another day, another urgent pronouncement on the need to transition to post-quantum cryptography ASAP: this one from the White House, in the form of an Executive Order requiring certain “high value” systems to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the end of 2030 (for key exchange) or 2031 (for signatures). This brings forward the date slightly compared to previous guidance, which disallows quantum-vulnerable crypto for US Federal systems by 2035. But is this urgency justified?

First, an important note: as you can probably tell already, I’m going to pour some skepticism on this sense of urgency. I don’t think cryptographically-relevant quantum computers are coming soon. However, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be prepared! The risk that they might appear soon is non-negligible, and the impact of them appearing for many applications is catastrophic. Sensible timelines to mitigate known threats are justified, panic-induced rushing is not. On with the article…

Filippo Valsorda wrote a good piece about why he believes this urgency is justified, and that we need to be moving faster towards a post-quantum world. He cites two papers that dramatically reduce the estimates for how many qubits are needed to break classical cryptography (in this case elliptic curves) using a quantum computer. He writes:

“Overall, it looks like everything is moving: the hardware is getting better, the algorithms are getting cheaper, the requirements for error correction are getting lower.”

But is the hardware getting better? This is where I have doubts. Initial timelines for quantum computing from Google and IBM were extremely optimistic. Just 5 years ago, Google suggested they would have a fault-tolerant quantum computer with 1,000,000 physical qubits by 2029. They are currently at 105. So just 4 orders of magnitude to go in the next 3 years. IBM were a bit more conservative, anticipating 100,000 qubits by 2033. They are currently at 156 qubits.

Sam Jacques has been updating a useful chart every year, showing the current state of quantum computing progress. Below shows a comparison of the first chart he published in 2023 and the most recent one in 2026. What can clearly be seen is how better analysis has moved attacks down and to the left, but actual hardware progress has remained stubbornly in that little grey box, with a tiny nudge upwards on reducing the error rate.

Now, you may say that there has been good progress on improving error correction. For example, at the end of 2024, Google announced “below threshold” quantum error correction. Surely a sign of good progress, even if the number of qubits was behind schedule. Once you’ve cracked error correction, the qubits will come thick and fast: an atomic explosion of qubits, if you will. (If you believe this then it doesn’t really matter how much more efficient the attacks become on paper: all that matters is how soon the hardware arrives). But I do wonder how that announcement was different from the announcement Google made almost 2 years earlier stating “For the first time ever, our Quantum AI researchers have experimentally demonstrated that it’s possible to reduce errors by increasing the number of qubits.” Call me skeptical, but if you were really making progress then would you need to put out re-runs of results you’ve already announced? Are there new chips coming that build on this breakthrough to give us the large numbers of usable qubits we’ve been promised?

Maybe I’m about to be proved wrong by new announcements, or maybe all of the companies and governments involved in the entire world have suddenly decided to keep their progress hush-hush. But from my point of view as an outsider looking in, it all looks suspiciously like progress on quantum computing has stalled rather than the sky being about to fall on our heads.

To reiterate: I still think it is sensible to be working right now on transitioning to post-quantum encryption (in a hybrid). But I am deeply skeptical of the idea that we need to rush things because quantum computers are arriving any second now. As I said in “Are we overthinking post-quantum cryptography?”, I think if you’re not beholden to the diktats of an insane autocrat, making minimal adjustments to ensure you can counter “store now, decrypt later” attacks is sensible. Wholesale replacement of all of your cryptography with post-quantum alternatives is IMO still in the realm of something to start thinking about, not a burning crisis that needs immediate attention.

The key things to consider have nothing to do with PQC at all: Can I change algorithms easily and securely? Do I need to be using public key cryptography, or will symmetric cryptography do instead? (Hint: if it doesn’t cross a trust boundary, then the answer is almost always “yes”). Can I avoid digital signatures (the post-quantum ones are mostly crap)? Can I avoid cryptography entirely? (E.g., moving from “stateless” JWTs to good old-fashioned stateful tokens/cookies).

https://www.europesays.com/ie/?p=556760 Enter Helios: quantum computer sets high watermark for accuracy #Block2 #Éire #HeliosQuantumComputer #IE #Ireland #NatureMagazine #Physics #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantinuum #QuantumComputing #Science #SystemModelH2 #TheConversation

https://www.europesays.com/uk/1053165/ Enter Helios: quantum computer sets high watermark for accuracy #Block2 #HeliosQuantumComputer #NatureMagazine #Physics #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantinuum #QuantumComputing #Science #SystemModelH2 #TheConversation #UK #UnitedKingdom

https://www.europesays.com/news/44695/ White House PQC order ‘lights a fire’ under post-quantum transition #BillWright #DarrenGuccione #GarfieldJones #Headlines #MattHartman #NationalInstituteOfStandardsAndTechnology #News #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumComputing #TopStories

The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the #Tor network’s #TLS layer is making progress! 😎 We are now at 44.57% of relays supporting the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid handshake. This number is up from 34.65% in March.

I’ve uploaded a list of relays and their scan results from yesterday on https://ahf.me/tor-tls-pqc/2026-06-18/ and wrote an email to the tor-relays@ mailing-list summarising the results in https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/message/IY7FJU5XDSZ2O4SKUTN5VJFRLBRHYZ6W/

#cryptography #postquantumcryptography #pqc

The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the #Tor network’s #TLS layer is making progress! 😎 We are now at 44.57% of relays supporting the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid handshake. This number is up from 34.65% in March.

I’ve uploaded a list of relays and their scan results from yesterday on https://ahf.me/tor-tls-pqc/2026-06-18/ and wrote an email to the tor-relays@ mailing-list summarising the results in https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/message/IY7FJU5XDSZ2O4SKUTN5VJFRLBRHYZ6W/

#cryptography #postquantumcryptography #pqc

The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the #Tor network’s #TLS layer is making progress! 😎 We are now at 44.57% of relays supporting the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid handshake. This number is up from 34.65% in March.

I’ve uploaded a list of relays and their scan results from yesterday on https://ahf.me/tor-tls-pqc/2026-06-18/ and wrote an email to the tor-relays@ mailing-list summarising the results in https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/message/IY7FJU5XDSZ2O4SKUTN5VJFRLBRHYZ6W/

#cryptography #postquantumcryptography #pqc

The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the #Tor network’s #TLS layer is making progress! 😎 We are now at 44.57% of relays supporting the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid handshake. This number is up from 34.65% in March.

I’ve uploaded a list of relays and their scan results from yesterday on https://ahf.me/tor-tls-pqc/2026-06-18/ and wrote an email to the tor-relays@ mailing-list summarising the results in https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/message/IY7FJU5XDSZ2O4SKUTN5VJFRLBRHYZ6W/

#cryptography #postquantumcryptography #pqc

The transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography in the #Tor network’s #TLS layer is making progress! 😎 We are now at 44.57% of relays supporting the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid handshake. This number is up from 34.65% in March.

I’ve uploaded a list of relays and their scan results from yesterday on https://ahf.me/tor-tls-pqc/2026-06-18/ and wrote an email to the tor-relays@ mailing-list summarising the results in https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]/message/IY7FJU5XDSZ2O4SKUTN5VJFRLBRHYZ6W/

#cryptography #postquantumcryptography #pqc

Security Leaders Scramble to Accelerate Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition

The pressing question isn't when quantum computers will crack today's encryption, but whether organizations will be prepared to make the switch to post-quantum cryptography before it's too late. With only 8% of SSH servers currently making the transition, experts warn that the time to act is now.

https://osintsights.com/security-leaders-scramble-to-accelerate-post-quantum-cryptography-transition?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social

#PostquantumCryptography #CryptographyTransition #QuantumComputing #EmergingThreats #Encryption

Let's Encrypt is announcing that they'll support Merkle Tree Certificates:

https://letsencrypt.org/2026/06/03/pq-certs.html

#TLS #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC

Let's Encrypt is announcing that they'll support Merkle Tree Certificates:

https://letsencrypt.org/2026/06/03/pq-certs.html

#TLS #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC

Let's Encrypt is announcing that they'll support Merkle Tree Certificates:

https://letsencrypt.org/2026/06/03/pq-certs.html

#TLS #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC

Let's Encrypt is announcing that they'll support Merkle Tree Certificates:

https://letsencrypt.org/2026/06/03/pq-certs.html

#TLS #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC

Let's Encrypt is announcing that they'll support Merkle Tree Certificates:

https://letsencrypt.org/2026/06/03/pq-certs.html

#TLS #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC

Rocky Linux 10.2 arrives with post-quantum crypto, Wi-Fi 7 support, and Flatpak Firefox

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/rocky-linux-10-2-post-quantum-flatpak-firefox/

Rocky Linux 10.2 arrives with post-quantum crypto, Wi-Fi 7 support, and Flatpak Firefox

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/rocky-linux-10-2-post-quantum-flatpak-firefox/

El lado del mal - Los Papers Académicos de los algoritmos PQC de Autenticación y Firma Digital en la Ronda 3 del NIST https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/05/los-papers-academicos-de-los-algoritmos.html #Quantum #PQC #PostQuantumCryptography #Autenticación #FirmaDigial #Papers #NIST

El lado del mal - Los Papers Académicos de los algoritmos PQC de Autenticación y Firma Digital en la Ronda 3 del NIST https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/05/los-papers-academicos-de-los-algoritmos.html #Quantum #PQC #PostQuantumCryptography #Autenticación #FirmaDigial #Papers #NIST

El lado del mal - Los Papers Académicos de los algoritmos PQC de Autenticación y Firma Digital en la Ronda 3 del NIST https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/05/los-papers-academicos-de-los-algoritmos.html #Quantum #PQC #PostQuantumCryptography #Autenticación #FirmaDigial #Papers #NIST

El lado del mal - Los Papers Académicos de los algoritmos PQC de Autenticación y Firma Digital en la Ronda 3 del NIST https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/05/los-papers-academicos-de-los-algoritmos.html #Quantum #PQC #PostQuantumCryptography #Autenticación #FirmaDigial #Papers #NIST

El lado del mal - Los Papers Académicos de los algoritmos PQC de Autenticación y Firma Digital en la Ronda 3 del NIST https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/05/los-papers-academicos-de-los-algoritmos.html #Quantum #PQC #PostQuantumCryptography #Autenticación #FirmaDigial #Papers #NIST

Crypto4A launches quantum-safe rival to AWS Secrets Manager

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/canadian-quantum-safe-secrets-manager/

Crypto4A launches quantum-safe rival to AWS Secrets Manager

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/canadian-quantum-safe-secrets-manager/

Crypto4A launches quantum-safe rival to AWS Secrets Manager

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/canadian-quantum-safe-secrets-manager/

Crypto4A launches quantum-safe rival to AWS Secrets Manager

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/canadian-quantum-safe-secrets-manager/

Crypto4A launches quantum-safe rival to AWS Secrets Manager

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/canadian-quantum-safe-secrets-manager/

RHEL 10.2 turns Linux into an AI-powered enterprise weapon

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/red-hat-enterprise-linux-10-2-ai-tools/

RHEL 10.2 turns Linux into an AI-powered enterprise weapon

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/red-hat-enterprise-linux-10-2-ai-tools/

RHEL 10.2 turns Linux into an AI-powered enterprise weapon

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/red-hat-enterprise-linux-10-2-ai-tools/

RHEL 10.2 turns Linux into an AI-powered enterprise weapon

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/red-hat-enterprise-linux-10-2-ai-tools/

RHEL 10.2 turns Linux into an AI-powered enterprise weapon

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://nerds.xyz/2026/05/red-hat-enterprise-linux-10-2-ai-tools/

SSL Labs checks the TLS-config of servers for PQC (post-quantum cryptography) key exchanges now.

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

#SSLlabs #SSLtest #qualys #pqc #tls #postQuantumCryptography #infosec

SSL Labs checks the TLS-config of servers for PQC (post-quantum cryptography) key exchanges now.

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

#SSLlabs #SSLtest #qualys #pqc #tls #postQuantumCryptography #infosec

SSL Labs checks the TLS-config of servers for PQC (post-quantum cryptography) key exchanges now.

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

#SSLlabs #SSLtest #qualys #pqc #tls #postQuantumCryptography #infosec

SSL Labs checks the TLS-config of servers for PQC (post-quantum cryptography) key exchanges now.

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

#SSLlabs #SSLtest #qualys #pqc #tls #postQuantumCryptography #infosec

SSL Labs checks the TLS-config of servers for PQC (post-quantum cryptography) key exchanges now.

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

#SSLlabs #SSLtest #qualys #pqc #tls #postQuantumCryptography #infosec

Weekend Reading from TechAptitude!

Get to know new Cryptography Standards (FIPS 20-3, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, FIPS 206) developed by NIST to withstand quantum attacks and prevent the so-called “Q-Day”. Q-Day is an estimate of the point in time when quantum computers will be able to reliably break existing RSA-2048 cryptography. https://techaptitude.substack.com/p/quantum-technologies-nist-drives #PQC #NIST #Cryptography #Q_Day #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantum #Encryption #CryptographyAlgorithms #TechAptitude

Weekend Reading from TechAptitude!

Get to know new Cryptography Standards (FIPS 20-3, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, FIPS 206) developed by NIST to withstand quantum attacks and prevent the so-called “Q-Day”. Q-Day is an estimate of the point in time when quantum computers will be able to reliably break existing RSA-2048 cryptography. https://techaptitude.substack.com/p/quantum-technologies-nist-drives #PQC #NIST #Cryptography #Q_Day #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantum #Encryption #CryptographyAlgorithms #TechAptitude

Weekend Reading from TechAptitude!

Get to know new Cryptography Standards (FIPS 20-3, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, FIPS 206) developed by NIST to withstand quantum attacks and prevent the so-called “Q-Day”. Q-Day is an estimate of the point in time when quantum computers will be able to reliably break existing RSA-2048 cryptography. https://techaptitude.substack.com/p/quantum-technologies-nist-drives #PQC #NIST #Cryptography #Q_Day #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantum #Encryption #CryptographyAlgorithms #TechAptitude

Weekend Reading from TechAptitude!

Get to know new Cryptography Standards (FIPS 20-3, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, FIPS 206) developed by NIST to withstand quantum attacks and prevent the so-called “Q-Day”. Q-Day is an estimate of the point in time when quantum computers will be able to reliably break existing RSA-2048 cryptography. https://techaptitude.substack.com/p/quantum-technologies-nist-drives #PQC #NIST #Cryptography #Q_Day #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantum #Encryption #CryptographyAlgorithms #TechAptitude

Weekend Reading from TechAptitude!

Get to know new Cryptography Standards (FIPS 20-3, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, FIPS 206) developed by NIST to withstand quantum attacks and prevent the so-called “Q-Day”. Q-Day is an estimate of the point in time when quantum computers will be able to reliably break existing RSA-2048 cryptography. https://techaptitude.substack.com/p/quantum-technologies-nist-drives #PQC #NIST #Cryptography #Q_Day #PostQuantumCryptography #Quantum #Encryption #CryptographyAlgorithms #TechAptitude

Hybrid Crypto Gains Traction in Quantum-Safe Security Push

By combining post-quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution, hybrid crypto approaches provide a robust security solution that protects systems even if one layer is compromised. This layered defense offsets the weaknesses of each, ensuring a stronger safeguard against emerging quantum threats.

https://osintsights.com/hybrid-crypto-gains-traction-in-quantum-safe-security-push?utm_source=mastodon&utm_medium=social

#PostquantumCryptography #QuantumKeyDistribution #HybridCrypto #QuantumsafeSecurity #Cryptography

RE: https://partychickens.net/@mason/116514703013503570

'some governments will require the tools that they use to support post-quantum cryptography in the near future. This means that a lot of companies want post-quantum cryptography, and people will begin to expect it from serious projects'

#cryptography #publicPolicy #quantumComputing #postQuantumCryptography

RE: https://partychickens.net/@mason/116514703013503570

'some governments will require the tools that they use to support post-quantum cryptography in the near future. This means that a lot of companies want post-quantum cryptography, and people will begin to expect it from serious projects'

#cryptography #publicPolicy #quantumComputing #postQuantumCryptography

RE: https://partychickens.net/@mason/116514703013503570

'some governments will require the tools that they use to support post-quantum cryptography in the near future. This means that a lot of companies want post-quantum cryptography, and people will begin to expect it from serious projects'

#cryptography #publicPolicy #quantumComputing #postQuantumCryptography

RE: https://partychickens.net/@mason/116514703013503570

'some governments will require the tools that they use to support post-quantum cryptography in the near future. This means that a lot of companies want post-quantum cryptography, and people will begin to expect it from serious projects'

#cryptography #publicPolicy #quantumComputing #postQuantumCryptography

Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys

https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/04/25/quantum-computers-are-not-a-threat-to-128-bit-symmetric-keys/

Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/04/25/quantum-computers-are-not-a-threat-to-128-bit-symmetric-keys/

Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys

https://web.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/04/25/quantum-computers-are-not-a-threat-to-128-bit-symmetric-keys/

Hast anyone Seen #postquantumcryptography life in Action?
What so you think of IT?
This company offers secure Quantum Key Distribution by sending Photons over Fiber. *impossible of eavesdropping*.... They say

Here is the Link to the comapny:
Quantum Security, Now and Forever. | zerothird
https://www.zerothird.com/

#security

Hast anyone Seen #postquantumcryptography life in Action?
What so you think of IT?
This company offers secure Quantum Key Distribution by sending Photons over Fiber. *impossible of eavesdropping*.... They say

Here is the Link to the comapny:
Quantum Security, Now and Forever. | zerothird
https://www.zerothird.com/

#security