#new-cold-war — Public Fediverse posts

US shifts troops from Europe to contain China, expert says

Konstantin Blokhin said the US is reducing resources in Europe and redirecting forces to Japan, South Korea and…
#Europe #EU #BERLIN #China #containmentofChina #Germany #India #Japan #KonstantinBlokhin #newcoldwar #NEWS.ru #SouthKorea #Thailand #UnitedStates #USmilitarybases #ustroops #Washington
https://www.europesays.com/europe/29483/

NATO, a Cold War relic, is due for abolition – People’s World https://www.byteseu.com/1980057/ #China #ColdWar #Europe #history #imperialism #NATO #NewColdWar #Opinion

Russophobic Intellectuals Breed Support For Death and Destruction

https://murica.website/2026/03/russophobic-intellectuals-breed-support-for-death-and-destruction/

Russophobic Intellectuals Breed Support For Death and Destruction

https://murica.website/2026/03/russophobic-intellectuals-breed-support-for-death-and-destruction/

Russophobic Intellectuals Breed Support For Death and Destruction

https://murica.website/2026/03/russophobic-intellectuals-breed-support-for-death-and-destruction/

Russophobic Intellectuals Breed Support For Death and Destruction

https://murica.website/2026/03/russophobic-intellectuals-breed-support-for-death-and-destruction/

Russophobic Intellectuals Breed Support For Death and Destruction

https://murica.website/2026/03/russophobic-intellectuals-breed-support-for-death-and-destruction/

https://www.europesays.com/iran/31694/ The road to Beijing doesn’t run through Tehran #AirDefense #China #Iran #IranWar #NewColdWar #Tehran #XiJinping

For First Time in More Than 50 Years, U.S. and Russia Have No Agreements for the Regulation of Nuclear Weapons

https://murica.website/2026/02/for-first-time-in-more-than-50-years-u-s-and-russia-have-no-agreements-for-the-regulation-of-nuclear-weapons/

For First Time in More Than 50 Years, U.S. and Russia Have No Agreements for the Regulation of Nuclear Weapons

https://murica.website/2026/02/for-first-time-in-more-than-50-years-u-s-and-russia-have-no-agreements-for-the-regulation-of-nuclear-weapons/

Lithuania’s False Flag Counter-Revolution

https://murica.website/2026/02/lithuanias-false-flag-counter-revolution/

Lithuania’s False Flag Counter-Revolution

https://murica.website/2026/02/lithuanias-false-flag-counter-revolution/

Trump’s Greenland Threats Reveal A Revival Of U.S. Neo‑Colonial Strategy In The Arctic

Trump’s Greenland Threats Reveal A Revival Of U.S. Neo‑Colonial Strategy In The Arctic

By Uriel Araujo

By refusing to rule out force over Greenland, Trump has unsettled European allies and reframed Arctic geopolitics. The parallels with US pressure on Venezuela point to a consistent strategy rooted in resource control and strategic positioning. Greenland thus emerges as a potential test case for 21st-century neo-colonial power dynamics.

Copenhagen’s decision to summon the US ambassador this week is no mere diplomatic theatre. It is rather a response to a very real signal coming from Washington: Greenland is still on Washington’s strategic radar. In fact, by appointing a new special envoy to Greenland, the Trump administration is not merely reopening an old debate, but rather is reviving a doctrine.

The appointment of Jeff Landry as special envoy for Greenland has been framed by Washington as a matter of “coordination” and “dialogue.” Commentator Alexandra Sharp, writing for Foreign Policy, notes that the move revives US ambitions tied to strategic minerals, Arctic shipping routes, and military positioning.

Trump openly floated the idea of purchasing Greenland during his first term, only to face firm Danish rejection. What has changed now is not the underlying intent, but tone and timing. Trump’s recent statements — that Greenland is “essential for US security” and that “all options”, including force, remain open — should not necessarily be brushed off as mere rhetoric. By refusing to rule out military action against a NATO ally’s territory, Trump has compelled European capitals to treat his once-dismissed bravado as a genuine strategic contingency.

So much for the post-Cold War narrative that territorial revisionism was the monopoly of official adversaries. Denmark, for its part, has reacted sharply. The Danish foreign ministry, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, made clear that Greenland is not for sale and that any suggestion otherwise is unacceptable. European leaders have closed ranks, with France, Germany, and the EU Commission issuing statements backing Greenland’s sovereignty.

European unity, however should not be mistaken for confidence: officials understand that Trump’s threats are part of a broader pattern. Washington is simultaneously reviving its “all options” rhetoric toward Venezuela, signalling potential regime change. When one administration simultaneously signals openness to coercive action in the Arctic and the Caribbean, this is no coincidence. The logic here, far from ideological, is material enough.

Greenland, as it so happens, holds vast reserves of rare earths, uranium, and critical minerals increasingly vital to advanced technologies and military systems. Its geographic position also anchors US missile defence architecture and Arctic surveillance. Venezuela, meanwhile, remains home to the world’s largest proven oil reserves.

Trump’s rhetoric is often dismissed as bombast, yet in this case it aligns with long-standing US strategic documents that treat access denial, resource security, and chokepoint control as existential matters. The Arctic, in particular, has quietly moved from peripheral concern to a central theatre of the New Cold War.

As I previously noted, the next major Russia-West standoff could even take place in the Arctic — rather than Ukraine or the Middle East — due to NATO’s expanding presence and military buildup, which risks dangerous escalation. This includes Nordic expansion through Finland’s and Sweden’s accessions, alongside renewed US focus on Greenland, seen by Moscow as part of a broader encirclement strategy.

Moreover, melting ice is currently opening new shipping lanes and intensifying competition over seabed resources. No wonder Greenland’s strategic value has skyrocketed.

European outrage over American assertions on Greenland is understandable but arguably selective, given the long-standing US military primacy at Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule) under Danish sovereignty. In his own way, Trump is not inventing American dominance but openly declaring it, dispensing with euphemisms and ambiguity to the detriment of diplomatic decorum — preferring blunt clarity, however destabilizing.

Critics rightly call any coercion of Greenland reckless and legally untenable. Yet legality has seldom restrained American actions when vital strategic interests are at stake — as seen in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, and Syria — through creative reinterpretations of international norms. With its small population and weak defences, Greenland may appear to Washington as vulnerable enough to pressure without risking major escalation.

This does not necessarily mean annexation is imminent. It does mean leverage is being recalibrated. The special envoy post allows Washington to deepen ties directly with Greenlandic elites, bypassing Copenhagen where convenient. It also places Greenland squarely within Trump’s transactional framework: security guarantees in exchange for access, alignment, and eventual dependency.

The Venezuelan parallel reinforces the pattern. Both cases involve resource-rich territories, weak bargaining positions (especially in Greenland’s case), and narratives of “security necessity.” In both cases, Trump presents coercion not as aggression but as prudence. The huge difference is that the European allies happen to be implicated in Greenland, whereas Latin America has long been accustomed to US pressure. That asymmetry alone explains the sudden shock in Copenhagen and Brussels.

There is also a domestic angle. Trump’s base responds favourably to assertive postures that promise control over resources and borders. Greenland, framed as vital and vulnerable, fits neatly into this narrative. This does not mean that such threats are electoral theatre and nothing else. Instead, they are policy signals calibrated for multiple audiences at once.

None of this guarantees success, of course. European resistance, Greenlandic self-determination, and international backlash remain real constraints. But the signal has been sent. To put it simply, Trump is reasserting a 19th-century vocabulary in a 21st-century setting.

To what extent this strategy destabilizes the Arctic remains to be seen. One may recall that Trump is also pushing an Anglo-American administration to “rule” Palestine, in a neo-colonial fashion (clashing with Israel’s own projects). Greenland right now might thus also be a test case: a test of how far blunt power politics can go when wrapped in the language of security. Moreover, it is also a test of whether Europe can defend sovereignty without escalation in a divided NATO. And it is a reminder that, in Washington’s worldview, territory, resources, and leverage remain inseparable.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#DonaldTrump #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Greenland #NATO #NewColdWar #TheArctic #USA

Trump’s Greenland Threats Reveal A Revival Of U.S. Neo‑Colonial Strategy In The Arctic

Trump’s Greenland Threats Reveal A Revival Of U.S. Neo‑Colonial Strategy In The Arctic

By Uriel Araujo

By refusing to rule out force over Greenland, Trump has unsettled European allies and reframed Arctic geopolitics. The parallels with US pressure on Venezuela point to a consistent strategy rooted in resource control and strategic positioning. Greenland thus emerges as a potential test case for 21st-century neo-colonial power dynamics.

Copenhagen’s decision to summon the US ambassador this week is no mere diplomatic theatre. It is rather a response to a very real signal coming from Washington: Greenland is still on Washington’s strategic radar. In fact, by appointing a new special envoy to Greenland, the Trump administration is not merely reopening an old debate, but rather is reviving a doctrine.

The appointment of Jeff Landry as special envoy for Greenland has been framed by Washington as a matter of “coordination” and “dialogue.” Commentator Alexandra Sharp, writing for Foreign Policy, notes that the move revives US ambitions tied to strategic minerals, Arctic shipping routes, and military positioning.

Trump openly floated the idea of purchasing Greenland during his first term, only to face firm Danish rejection. What has changed now is not the underlying intent, but tone and timing. Trump’s recent statements — that Greenland is “essential for US security” and that “all options”, including force, remain open — should not necessarily be brushed off as mere rhetoric. By refusing to rule out military action against a NATO ally’s territory, Trump has compelled European capitals to treat his once-dismissed bravado as a genuine strategic contingency.

So much for the post-Cold War narrative that territorial revisionism was the monopoly of official adversaries. Denmark, for its part, has reacted sharply. The Danish foreign ministry, Lars Lokke Rasmussen, made clear that Greenland is not for sale and that any suggestion otherwise is unacceptable. European leaders have closed ranks, with France, Germany, and the EU Commission issuing statements backing Greenland’s sovereignty.

European unity, however should not be mistaken for confidence: officials understand that Trump’s threats are part of a broader pattern. Washington is simultaneously reviving its “all options” rhetoric toward Venezuela, signaling potential regime change. When one administration simultaneously signals openness to coercive action in the Arctic and the Caribbean, this is no coincidence. The logic here, far from ideological, is material enough.

Greenland, as it so happens, holds vast reserves of rare earths, uranium, and critical minerals increasingly vital to advanced technologies and military systems. Its geographic position also anchors US missile defence architecture and Arctic surveillance. Venezuela, meanwhile, remains home to the world’s largest proven oil reserves.

Trump’s rhetoric is often dismissed as bombast, yet in this case it aligns with long-standing US strategic documents that treat access denial, resource security, and chokepoint control as existential matters. The Arctic, in particular, has quietly moved from peripheral concern to a central theatre of the New Cold War.

As I previously noted, the next major Russia-West standoff could even take place in the Arctic — rather than Ukraine or the Middle East — due to NATO’s expanding presence and military buildup, which risks dangerous escalation. This includes Nordic expansion through Finland’s and Sweden’s accessions, alongside renewed US focus on Greenland, seen by Moscow as part of a broader encirclement strategy.

Moreover, melting ice is currently opening new shipping lanes and intensifying competition over seabed resources. No wonder Greenland’s strategic value has skyrocketed.

European outrage over American assertions on Greenland is understandable but arguably selective, given the long-standing US military primacy at Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule) under Danish sovereignty. In his own way, Trump is not inventing American dominance but openly declaring it, dispensing with euphemisms and ambiguity to the detriment of diplomatic decorum — preferring blunt clarity, however destabilizing.

Critics rightly call any coercion of Greenland reckless and legally untenable. Yet legality has seldom restrained American actions when vital strategic interests are at stake — as seen in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, and Syria — through creative reinterpretations of international norms. With its small population and weak defenses, Greenland may appear to Washington as vulnerable enough to pressure without risking major escalation.

This does not necessarily mean annexation is imminent. It does mean leverage is being recalibrated. The special envoy post allows Washington to deepen ties directly with Greenlandic elites, bypassing Copenhagen where convenient. It also places Greenland squarely within Trump’s transactional framework: security guarantees in exchange for access, alignment, and eventual dependency.

The Venezuelan parallel reinforces the pattern. Both cases involve resource-rich territories, weak bargaining positions (especially in Greenland’s case), and narratives of “security necessity.” In both cases, Trump presents coercion not as aggression but as prudence. The huge difference is that the European allies happen to be implicated in Greenland, whereas Latin America has long been accustomed to US pressure. That asymmetry alone explains the sudden shock in Copenhagen and Brussels.

There is also a domestic angle. Trump’s base responds favorably to assertive postures that promise control over resources and borders. Greenland, framed as vital and vulnerable, fits neatly into this narrative. This does not mean that such threats are electoral theater and nothing else. Instead, they are policy signals calibrated for multiple audiences at once.

None of this guarantees success, of course. European resistance, Greenlandic self-determination, and international backlash remain real constraints. But the signal has been sent. To put it simply, Trump is reasserting a 19th-century vocabulary in a 21st-century setting.

To what extent this strategy destabilizes the Arctic remains to be seen. One may recall that Trump is also pushing an Anglo-American administration to “rule” Palestine, in a neo-colonial fashion (clashing with Israel’s own projects). Greenland right now might thus also be a test case: a test of how far blunt power politics can go when wrapped in the language of security. Moreover, it is also a test of whether Europe can defend sovereignty without escalation in a divided NATO. And it is a reminder that, in Washington’s worldview, territory, resources, and leverage remain inseparable.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#DonaldTrump #EU #Europe #Geopolitics #Greenland #NATO #NewColdWar #TheArctic #USA

Russia Is Taking The Finnish Front Of The New Cold War Very Seriously

Russia Is Taking The Finnish Front Of The New Cold War Very Seriously

By Andrew Korybko

Medvedev’s article shows that Russia is prepared to tackle all Finnish-emanating threats from NATO.

Former Russian President and incumbent Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev published a scathing article at TASS in early September about “The New Finnish Doctrine: Stupidity, Lies, Ingratitude” in which he excoriated Finland for its former alliance with the Nazis and warned about new threats from it. This follows reports in May that Russia has been beefing up its defences along the Finnish frontier, which was analysed here and includes links to several briefings on this subject.

Much of Medvedev’s article is devoted to the WWII-era period, with special attention drawn to what the Supreme Court of Karelia (an autonomous republic in Russia bordering Finland) recognized last year as the Finnish Genocide of the Soviet People during that time. This focus is meant to remind Russians that Finland was once their country’s enemy even though Moscow showed mercy upon it after WWII in order to create a neutral buffer zone that formally remained in effect till Finland joined NATO in 2023.

Medvedev’s motive is to rally Russians in support of their country’s more muscular policy towards Finland in response to its new hostile policies since joining that bloc. These include compliance with Western sanctions and agreeing to let the US possibly use up to 15 military facilities. Moreover, NATO “is now intensively mastering all five operational environments of Suomi (how Finns refer to their country) – land, sea, air, space and cyberspace”, according to Medvedev. The threats are therefore multiplying.

He warned that Russia might pursue criminal liability for Finland’s WWII-era genocide of the Soviet People, since there’s no statute of limitations on this crime in international law, and demand more reparations if this trend continues as expected. His piece ended soon thereafter on the ominous note that Finland might lose its statehood “forever” if it participates in another war against Russia. The subtext is that this is an increasingly credible scenario that Russia is taking very seriously going forward.

It’s timely to re-evaluate the threat that NATO poses to Russia via Finland in light of this article. Prior to recent developments, it was thought by some in Russia that Finland’s formal membership in the bloc wouldn’t really change much since it was already a de facto member for decade, thus making this more of a symbolic achievement for NATO than a meaningful military-strategic one. What they didn’t foresee, however, was what Medvedev described as the “Ukrainization of Finland itself (that) took place quietly.”

This was brought about by the NATO-backed resurgence of ultra-nationalist sentiment in society that takes the form of ethno-territorial revanchist goals vis-à-vis Russia. To oversimplify a complex historical subject, Finno-Ugric people are indigenous to parts of modern-day Russia, including Karelia. Although they’ve integrated into society and are actually privileged in today’s Russia due to their minority status, which affords special rights for such groups, Finnish ultra-nationalists still want to annex their land.

The stage is accordingly being set for an escalation of New Cold War tensions between NATO and Russia along the Finnish frontier, thus serving as a triple extension of their already boiling ones in the Arctic, the Baltic, and Central Europe. Finland boasts the bloc’s largest land border with Russia by far, however, so NATO-related threats from there are more dangerous than from anywhere else. Russia is taking them very seriously though and is prepared to defend itself from any form of aggression that it might face.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#finland #geopolitics #nato #newColdWar #russia

Japan Might Challenge China Sooner Than Expected

Japan Might Challenge China Sooner Than Expected

By Andrew Korybko

The emerging result is a “return to history” in the sense of former regional leaders restoring their lost spheres of influence with US support and all that entails for worsening tensions with the Sino-Russo Entente.

It was recently assessed that “Japan Will Play A Much Greater Role In Advancing The American Agenda In Asia”, which its new ultra-nationalist Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has wasted no time in doing. Her first move in this direction was telling parliament that “If there are battleships and the use of force (by China against Taiwan), no matter how you think about it, it could constitute a survival-threatening situation.” That lingo refers to a legal term for activating the use of Japan’s “Self-Defense Forces” (SDF).

Although she didn’t elaborate, her controversial logic is presumably that China’s post-war control over Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (provided that it survives the conflict) could lead to it coercing Japan into unilateral strategic concessions, the possibility of which fuels fears of Chinese hegemony over Asia. Takaichi then evaded answering whether her government will abide by Japan’s three non-nuclear principles of no possession of nuclear weapons, no production thereof, and no hosting of others’.

The US’ nuclear submarine deal with South Korea, which was assessed here as making it an informal member of AUKUS, was followed by reports that Japan might clinch its own with the US. In that event, the maritime SDF would pose an even more formidable threat to the People’s Liberation Army-Navy than it already does, which the analysis hyperlinked to at the beginning of this one assessed to already pose a challenge to Russia per the opinion of Putin’s senior aide and leading naval specialist Nikolai Patrushev.

Recalling Japan’s close defence ties with the Philippines, both of which are the US’ mutual defence allies and between whom lies Taiwan, it’s clear that Japan is being empowered by the US to re-establish part of its lost regional sphere of influence in order to contain China on the Asian front of the New Cold War. This parallels the US’ empowerment of Poland for containing Russia on the European front of the New Cold War through the partial re-establishment its own lost regional sphere of influence.

The larger trend is that the US is inciting security dilemmas along the periphery of what can now be described as the Sino-Russo Entente, correspondingly through its mutual defence allies in Japan and Poland who are in turn part of Asia’s NATO-like AUKUS+ and NATO, for dividing-and-ruling Eurasia. Interestingly, just like Japan is now flirting with nuclear weapons, so too did Poland recently reaffirm that it wants to host French nukes and one day even develop its own. The US is expected to back these plans.

Trump 2.0 is therefore fine-tuning the Biden Administration’s “dual containment” of the Sino-Russo Entente, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described the US-led West’s policy as being, to which end it’s focusing more on “Leading From Behind” in order to optimize “burden-sharing”. The emerging result is a “return to history” in the sense of former regional leaders restoring their lost spheres of influence with US support and all that entails for worsening tensions with the Sino-Russo Entente.

China will never forget the Japanese genocide of its people during World War II while Russia commemorates the expulsion of the Poles from Moscow in 1612 every year on National Unity Day. Neither of these historical traumas are repeatable nowadays due to their nuclear deterrents, but the revival of their historical rivals certainly unsettles them, though it also unites their people in the face of these US-backed threats as the New Cold War continues to intensify with no end in sight.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#asia #china #eurasia #geopolitics #japan #newColdWar #philippines #russia #taiwan #usa

New Cold War At America’s Doorstep: Venezuela Resists, China And Russia Respond

New Cold War At America’s Doorstep: Venezuela Resists, China And Russia Respond

By Uriel Araujo

The US Navy’s arrival in the Caribbean intensifies Trump’s confrontation with Venezuela, raising the spectre of strikes. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow respond with strategic support for Caracas, underscoring the region’s multipolar turn — Latin America watches a high-risk gamble unfold.

The arrival of a major US aircraft carrier strike group in the Caribbean this week has sent shockwaves across Latin America, bringing back a new version of the Monroe Doctrine in the context of the New Cold War in the Hemisphere. The deployment marks the beginning of a massive Trump administration military operation framed as a twin “war on drugs” and “war on terror” campaign in a way that, ironically enough, is also reminiscent of the George W. Bush years.

CNN Brasil reports that Caracas has mobilized thousands of Russian-supplied missiles in response.

Washington’s messaging has been sufficiently vague to allow multiple interpretations, but broad enough to justify a sweeping regional buildup. The operation is unprecedented in scale, which raises the stakes for Venezuela and its allies, with the US selling the operation as an “anti-cartel” surge across the continent.

Adding yet another layer of complexity, US President Donald Trump reportedly has simultaneously floated the possibility of talks with his Venezuela counterpart Nicolás Maduro, in a move that shows, once more, Trump’s erratic diplomatic zig-zags. So much for strategic coherence.

Be as it may, the current American presidency is inaugurating a new stage in Washington’s continental security doctrine — one blending counterterrorism rhetoric with narco-politics, producing an elastic justification for power projection anywhere from the Andes to the Antilles.

The “war on drugs” rhetoric can hardly be taken seriously: it is worth noting, for one thing, that most of the drug supply fuelling the United States’ drug problems originates from Mexico and Colombia. According to estimates by US agencies themselves, around 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the US comes from Colombia and is trafficked into the country via Mexico.

Back in August I wrote that the US naval buildup was “about intimidation, not invasion — at least for now… but history teaches us that intimidation often precedes escalation”. At that time, such an assessment seemed cautious enough. But circumstances evolve, and the sheer scale of current deployments raises the question: are we approaching the threshold where intimidation morphs into direct military action?

Officially, Trump’s advisers deny any intention of invading Venezuela. Yet “denials” have historically served as preambles to escalation. On the other hand, as Asia Times puts it, bellicose signalling toward Venezuela turns out to be a “gift to China” , strengthening Beijing’s argument that Washington uses militarized coercion instead of diplomacy. Global perceptions matter, after all.

In any case, Caracas believes it is under existential threat — and acts accordingly. CNN’s Latin America desk has reported that Venezuela has asked both Russia and China for security assistance while CNN Brasil has reported the same, with additional details on military coordination requests.

Thus far, Moscow and Beijing have responded with rhetorical firmness but calibrated restraint. Still, warning signs abound. Alexey Zhuravlyov (deputy head of the Russian parliament’s defence committee) has been quoted as saying that Moscow could provide Venezuela with its intermediate-range ballistic Oreshnik missiles. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in turn, recently said that the Kremlin is “ready to fully act within the framework of the obligations that were mutually stipulated in this agreement with our Venezuelan friends.”

Beijing in turn has escalated its support by unveiling a new “zero-tariff” trade deal with Caracas during the Shanghai Expo 2025, an agreement announced by Venezuela’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, Coromoto Godoy. For Beijing, it provides a commercial and strategic entry point into the Western Hemisphere at the very moment Washington is tightening its sanctions amid tensions.

Such an alignment should not be underestimated. The crisis provides a strategic opening for China to strengthen its presence in Latin America while portraying itself as a stabilizing force. Unlike Washington, Beijing does not carry the baggage of decades of military interventions in the region. Underreported economic ties, infrastructure investments, and energy partnerships give China substantial leverage — enough to reshape regional diplomacy without firing a single shot. No wonder Chinese analysts frame Trump’s operation as a self-inflicted geopolitical loss for Washington.

If one examines Trump’s pattern — improvisational enough to produce shocks but cautious enough to avoid prolonged troop commitments (hence “TACO”) — a full-scale invasion still remains unlikely. However, targeted strikes or special operations raids cannot be ruled out. Limited action could be sold domestically as “decisive,” without entangling the US in occupation duties. Yet even limited strikes would still carry vast escalation risks.

Back in July 2025, I argued that Trump’s Venezuela policy was driven by “hyper-pragmatism” and corporate cost-benefit calculations, particularly regarding Chevron’s return to Caracas. If strikes destabilize Venezuelan oil fields, global supply could tighten overnight, driving prices upward. This would erode the foundations of Trump’s domestic economic message, not to mention it would create headaches for US energy companies operating — or trying to operate — in the region. The problem is that Washington does not always act according to pure rational economic logic, so extreme scenarios should not be dismissed so quickly.

The standoff in any case is a sovereignty crisis for Caracas; but also an opportunity for Russia and China in the context of the New Cold War. Moreover, it is a unity test for Latin America — and a high-risk gamble for the US.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

#brazil #china #donaldTrump #geopolitics #latinAmerica #newColdWar #russia #usa #venezuela

Anyway,

Trump and Xi are expected to talk about topics like: Tariffs, Fentanyl, Soybeans, Advanced Computer Chips, Rare Earths & Tik Tok.

#Trump apparently held #Xi in an extended handshake to greet him. Trump thinks they will have a successful meeting & Xi is a “tough negotiator.” Xi acknowledged Trump’s “recent enthusiasm for helping settle ‘various regional hotspot issues’ around the world,” & said #China and the #USA could help each other succeed.

/4 of 4🧵
#US #NewColdWar (?) #trade

“The last #nuclear weapon test in the United States was held in 1992, before former president George H.W. Bush implemented a moratorium on such tests at the conclusion of the Cold War.”

/3 of 4🧵
#USA #US #China #trump #Xi #NuclearWeapons #ColdWar #NewColdWar (?)

Trump posted on his social media that he directed the Pentagon to begin testing #nuclear weapons "on an equal basis" with #Russia & #China, abruptly inserting nuclear power into the discussion just before a “high-stakes trade summit” with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping.

The announcement ~”signaled a reversal of decades of #USA nuclear policy that could have far-reaching consequences for relations with #US adversaries…”

/2 of 4🧵
#XiJinping #Xi #trump #NuclearWeapons #NewColdWar

Good in-depth analysis here. #Geopolitics #Petrostates #NewColdWar #USImperialism #Extractivism

RE: https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:a5ho7ypozpn5qod5rnjjyg25/post/3m4b3qxi5h22q

The Recent Sino-US Dispute Over Taiwan’s Post-WWII Status Is A Sign Of The Times

The Recent Sino-US Dispute Over Taiwan’s Post-WWII Status Is A Sign Of The Times

By Andrew Korybko

As the New Cold War shifts from the US prioritizing Russia’s containment in Europe to China’s containment in Asia, so too is the trend of the US gradually revising the results of WWII in order to give it an edge on that front too.

The US’ de facto embassy in Taiwan emailed Reuters a statement in mid-September criticizing China’s reliance on WWII-era agreements in support of its claim to the island. They declared that “China intentionally mischaracterises World War Two-era documents, including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Treaty of San Francisco, to try to support its coercive campaign to subjugate Taiwan.” The latest twist in this dispute coincides with the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat.

For background, the 1943 Cairo Declaration states that Formosa (Taiwan’s colonial-era name) will be returned to the Republic of China (ROC); the 1945 Potsdam Declaration references Cairo and limits the geographic scope of Japanese sovereignty without mentioning Formosa; and the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco resulted in Japan officially renouncing its claim to Formosa while leaving its status unresolved. The ROC’s and People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) interpretations thereof will now be briefly summarized.

The Taiwan-based ROC considers itself to be China’s only legitimate government since it represents the League of Nations-recognized ROC despite that erstwhile organization’s UN successor expelling them in 1971 and replacing their permanent Security Council seat with the PRC. It thus interprets the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations as confirming its control over Taiwan while the PRC relies on the aforesaid decision, which recognized it as the only legitimate representative of China, to legally claim Taiwan.

The significance of the US’ de facto embassy in Taiwan criticizing China’s (formally the PRC’s) reliance on these WWII-era agreements (Reuters reminded readers that it considers the Treaty of San Francisco “illegal and invalid” since it wasn’t party to it) is that it’s a sign of the times. As the New Cold War shifts from the US prioritizing Russia’s containment in Europe to China’s containment in Asia, so too is the trend of the US gradually revising the results of WWII in order to give it an edge on that front too.

Russia believes that Germany’s remilitarization, Finland’s membership in NATO, and the push for neutral Austria to follow, all of which are backed by the US, prove that the US is gradually revising the results of WWII. Likewise, so too does it believe that Japan’s US-backed remilitarization is proof of the same, the view of which China shares as well. It was therefore predictable that the US would one day start to more assertively challenge China’s reliance on WWII-era agreements in support of its claim to Taiwan.

The world order always changes as history attests, but in these instances, associated processes are being weaponized by the US for containment purposes vis-à-vis what can nowadays be described as the Sino-Russo Entente in order to justify more aggressive policies against them on false legal bases. Permanent UNSC members Russia and China obviously wouldn’t agree to the abovementioned revisions, hence why the US is backing them unilaterally, which further accelerates the collapse of the post-WWII order.

The ideal scenario as envisaged in the UN Charter is for the UNSC to jointly pioneer a controlled transition to a new order that preserves the balance of power between them so as to reduce the risk of conflict during this period. That became impossible after the US’ unilateral withdrawal from arms control pacts with Russia dismantled the global security architecture, however, which inevitably led to it gradually revising the results of WWII and dangerously raising tensions with the Sino-Russo Entente.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

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#China #Geopolitics #NATO #NewColdWar #Taiwan #USA

Don’t Rule Out The Return Of US Troops To Bagram Airbase

Don’t Rule Out The Return Of US Troops To Bagram Airbase

By Andrew Korybko

The convergence of interests between the US, Pakistan, and the Taliban means that a compromise between them to this end can’t be ruled out no matter how unlikely it might appear to be right now.

Trump’s recent reaffirmation of his plans to return US troops to Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase was rejected by the Taliban, which was to be expected for appearance’s sake at this point while talks are reportedly underway, but another obstacle comes from Pakistan’s opposition. It recently released a joint statement with China, Iran, and Russia condemning the US’ plans. Nevertheless, since Pakistan would benefit from them and openly backs his Gaza plan, its statement shouldn’t be taken at face value.

Trump’s plans stand no chance of fulfilment without Pakistan facilitating the US’ military logistics. In exchange for its passive support, the de facto military junta expects that the US will:
1) help it defeat Islamabad-designated Taliban-backed terrorist groups (the Islamist TTP and the separatist BLA);
2) aid in subordinating Afghanistan as Pakistan’s junior partner for creating a regional sphere of influence; and
3) co-finance the PAKAFUZ railway for more robustly competing with the “North-South Transport Corridor”.

The US might accede to Pakistan’s requests given the importance that it places on returning US troops to Bagram Airbase. Its strategic objectives can be summarized as:
1) simultaneously threatening Russia, China, and Iran per Trump’s repeatedly confirmed interests;
2) profiting from Afghanistan’s reported $1 trillion worth of minerals; and
3) pioneering a southern vector of Western influence into Central Asia via Pakistan-Afghanistan for complementing the western one via Turkiye-Armenia-Azerbaijan.

For their part, the Taliban are expected to continue resisting these plans for the following three reasons:
1) they’re Pashtun ethno-nationalists who’ve historically refused to voluntarily subordinate themselves to anyone;
2) the recent memory of American occupation and circumstantially coerced junior partnership vis-à-vis Pakistan before that are still fresh in their minds; and
3) hosting US troops could ruin the Sino-Russo dimension of their foreign policy and thus derail their geostrategic balancing act.

Nevertheless, the newly restored US-Pak regional duopoly probably won’t stop them trying to advance their geostrategically aligned goals in Afghanistan, which could take the form of:
1) trying to buy off the Taliban in order to at least ensure the return of US troops to Bagram Airbase;
2) subverting Afghanistan by exploiting the Taliban’s fault lines to sow division within its ranks together with backing resistance (both ethnic and terrorist) to its rule; and
3) employing military force (in the least likely scenario).

It’s possible that a compromise could be reached for returning US troops to Bagram Airbase and possibly extracting Afghanistan’s minerals if the US:
1) bribes the Taliban by making generous monthly payments, unfreezing Afghanistan’s $9.5 billion-worth of US-based funds, and providing regular humanitarian aid through Pakistan;
2) guarantees Afghanistan’s security (vis-à-vis Pakistan) through a Qatari-like pact; and
3) makes no policy demands of the Taliban (possibly other than it ending support for the TTP and BLA).

In spite of the aforesaid proposal, such a deal might either not come to pass or last if:
1) the Taliban refuse to end support for the TTP and BLA (or lies that it will but is then exposed);
2) a hardline Taliban faction threatens civil war if this deal goes through; and/or
3) China far outmatches the US’ bribes in exchange for the Taliban keeping America out of Afghanistan.
It’s impossible to predict with certainty what’ll happen other than concluding that Afghanistan is now a theatre of intense New Cold War rivalry.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Afghanistan #China #Geopolitics #NewColdWar #Pakistan #USA

The First-Ever Polish-Swedish Joint Exercise Presages Closer Cooperation Against Russia

The First-Ever Polish-Swedish Joint Exercise Presages Closer Cooperation Against Russia

By Andrew Korybko

They have historical axes to grind against Russia after its imperial predecessor state was responsible for ending their Golden Ages as Great Powers.

Poland and Sweden just carried out their first-ever “short-notice exercise” (SNEX) in the Baltic following the signing of a military cooperation agreement at the beginning of September. This coincides with Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski warning that Poland will shoot down any Russian drones, missiles, or aircraft that enter its airspace. His words follow some Russian drones reportedly doing just that earlier in the month and Poland accusing Russian jets of violating a drilling platform’s safety zone shortly after.

The first incident was arguably caused by NATO jamming while the second – if true – might have been to gather intelligence on clandestine surveillance equipment there following reports that Poland started installing such over the summer on offshore infrastructure like wind farms. Polish-Russian tensions are therefore clearly intensifying, and the Baltic is increasingly becoming a significant theatre in the NATO-Russian front of the New Cold War, especially after Estonia accused Russia of violating its airspace there.

The first-ever Polish-Swedish joint exercise should thus be seen as strengthening NATO’s containment of Russia. President Karol Nawrocki declared in his inaugural speech in August that “I dream that in the long term, the Bucharest Nine will become the Bucharest Eleven, together with the Scandinavian countries. Yes, we, as Poles, in Central Europe and Eastern Europe, are responsible for building the strength of NATO’s eastern flank. And this should also be the international, geopolitical direction of my presidency.”

Scandinavia refers in this context to new NATO members Finland and Sweden, the first of which he visited in early September during the last leg of his first foreign trip while the second is the stronger of the two and the one with which Poland just carried out its first joint military exercise. He also reaffirmed what was conveyed above about his country’s envisaged regional sphere of influence during an interview with Lithuanian media where he claimed Polish responsibility for the Baltic States’ security.

The informally Polish-led “Three Seas Initiative” officially includes the EU’s formerly communist members, Austria, and Greece but is now conceptualized by Warsaw under Nawrocki’s leadership as de facto expanding to Scandinavia (Finland and Sweden) due to their shared interests in containing Russia. The growing ties between Poland and Sweden, which were hated rivals during the 17th century after the Swedish invasion (“Deluge”) killed around 1/3 of Poland’s population, will converge more in the Baltic.

Just as Poland is expected to play a greater role in the Baltic Sea in partnership with Sweden, so too is Sweden is expected to play a greater role in the Baltic States’ security in partnership with Poland, with the Polish-Swedish Baltic duopoly aspiring to jointly contain Russia all across this front. Bases in one another’s territory (perhaps a Polish air-naval one on Sweden’s island of Gotland?) and multilateral drills between Poland, Sweden, the Baltic States, and possibly also Finland, the UK, and the US could follow.

Poland and Sweden have historical axes to grind against Russia after its imperial predecessor state was responsible for ending their Golden Ages as Great Powers. They also have a shared history of influence over the Baltic States, Sweden’s mostly being over Estonia, Poland’s mostly over Lithuania, and varying periods of control over Latvia (many don’t know that some of it remained under Warsaw’s writ until the Third Partition of 1795). This poses an emerging threat to Russia that raises the risk of war with NATO.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#CEE #CentralAndEasternEurope #EU #Europe #Finland #Geopolitics #NATO #NewColdWar #Poland #Russia #Sweden #TheBaltics #UK #USA

Myanmar Is Shaping Up To Be The Next Front Of The Sino-US New Cold War

Myanmar Is Shaping Up To Be The Next Front Of The Sino-US New Cold War

By Andrew Korybko

China wants to retain access to Kachin State’s rare earths, the US wants to poach them, and their escalating competition over this part of Myanmar could make it the next New Cold War flashpoint.

Reuters reported that the US’ Myanmar policy might shift towards more diplomatic engagement with either the ruling junta or the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in an attempt to obtain access to the enormous rare earth mineral reserves in the second’s eponymous state. At present, the US is suspected of clandestinely supporting some of the armed anti-junta groups, but the KIA isn’t thought to have benefited due to their isolated position along Myanmar’s mountainous border with China and India.

This geography poses a challenge to the redirection of these resources from China to India for example regardless of Kachin State’s final political status, whether autonomous within a (con)federated Myanmar or independent, but that’s assuming that China doesn’t intervene. Reuters cited an expert on Kachin State who said that “If they want to transport the rare earths from these mines, which are all on the Chinese border, to India, there’s only one road. And the Chinese would certainly step in and stop it.”

The reports late last year about the joint security firm that China and Myanmar were planning at the time were analysed here and concluded that the risks associated with even a PMC-led intervention in support of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) make this scenario unlikely. For as important as CMEC is for helping China reduce its logistical dependence on the easily blockaded Strait of Malacca, Kachin’s rare earth minerals are even more important, so its calculations could change.

Nevertheless, China is known for advancing its national interests through hybrid economic-diplomatic means, not military force. It’s therefore much more probable that it might soon ramp up these efforts with either the junta, the KIA, or both to preempt any forthcoming US diplomatic campaign. The first scenario would aim to restore the military’s control over Kachin’s rare earth reserves, the second would work towards Kachin’s de facto independence, while the third would seek that state’s autonomy.

In the order that they were mentioned: the military is on the backfoot in Kachin despite over four years of Chinese support so it’s unlikely that any new approach by China will reverse this trend; China’s decades of engagement with eastern Shan State’s de facto independent United Wa State Army (including over rare earths) could serve as a precedent for something similar with the KIA; while seeking Kachin’s autonomy in a Chinese-mediated political settlement would be the best-case scenario for Beijing.

In any case, it’s unimaginable that China will let the US poach Kachin’s rare earth reserves without making any attempt to preempt this powerplay, so the Sino-US rivalry in Myanmar is expected to intensify. Kachin is at the centre of this struggle, which his nowadays driven by access to that region’s rare earths even though it used to be about CMEC, with Myanmar’s political future (centralized, decentralized, devolved, or partitioned) only being a means to the aforementioned end.

China has the edge over the US due to geography (including the nearness of its rare earth processing facilities), its existing ties with both the junta and the KIA, and the allure that any new approach (possibly linked to CMEC) could have for facilitating a pragmatic deal between them. That said, the US might at the very least try to provoke an armed Chinese intervention of some sort to embroil it in a quagmire even if the odds of this scenario are low, all as part of their escalating New Cold War rivalry over Myanmar.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#China #Geopolitics #Myanmar #NewColdWar #USA

Ceasefire In The Crosshairs: Thailand, Cambodia, And The Proxy Front Of The New Cold War

Ceasefire In The Crosshairs: Thailand, Cambodia, And The Proxy Front Of The New Cold War

By Uriel Araujo

The recent ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia comes amid coup rumours in Bangkok, Chinese support for Phnom Penh, and Trump’s boasts of “bringing peace.” Beneath the surface, the border dispute reflects US–China rivalry, ASEAN’s militarization, and the proxy battles of an unfolding new Cold War.

The ink is barely dry on the ceasefire agreement between Thailand and Cambodia, and yet the situation on their contested frontier remains fraught with tension. Thailand — still shaken by rumours of a looming military coup — remains a key US ally. Cambodia, in turn, leans heavily on Beijing for military aid and strategic backing. This has turned what would otherwise be a localized border skirmish into a vivid microcosm of the Second Cold War, complete with proxy alignments, diplomatic manoeuvring, and strategic signalling.

The July clashes, some of the fiercest in years, left dozens dead and displaced communities along the border. The territorial disputes — rooted, as they are, in old maps, colonial legacies, and contested temples — are nothing new. One may recall that in 2011, fighting around the Preah Vihear temple briefly brought the two nations to the brink of full-scale war. Yet what makes the present confrontation distinctive is not merely the geography of the dispute but the geopolitical arena in which it unfolds. Southeast Asia has become one of the most militarized regions of the Global South, and the Thai–Cambodian crisis fits neatly into this broader pattern.

Cambodia relies heavily on China. Beijing has poured billions into Cambodian infrastructure, while upgrading the strategically located Ream Naval Base and deepening military cooperation through exercises such as “Golden Dragon”. Thailand, on the other hand, remains tied to Washington. The US has long relied on Bangkok as a partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy, frequently hosting military exercises such as Cobra Gold, and remains committed to bolstering Thai defence capabilities. Thus, the border, to some extent, has also become a stage on which the rivalry between China and the US plays out by proxy.

Amid escalating violence in July, Donald Trump — back in the spotlight as a political kingmaker — has boasted of his personal role in “bringing peace.” Reportedly, it was indeed a blunt phone call from Trump to Thai leadership that helped pave the way for a ceasefire, after he threatened both countries with tariffs unless they agreed to halt hostilities. Yet this narrative, celebrated in some quarters as evidence of Trump’s diplomatic genius, actually obscures far more than it reveals.

Trump’s methods — blunt pressure and punitive threats — are hardly about reconciliation. It is about leverage, as usual. Threatening tariffs on both countries’ exports amid a fragile regional economy is nothing short of coercive. Be as it may, it worked, apparently, at least in the short term. But in doing so, Trump reaffirmed the pattern whereby Washington uses trade as a cudgel in geopolitical disputes, thereby deepening resentment in the region.

What goes underreported in much of the Western press is how this conflict intersects with the militarization of ASEAN. Defence budgets across Southeast Asia have soared, and joint exercises have become routine. Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and others are modernizing their fleets and missile systems at a pace not seen before. As I’ve argued elsewhere (pertaining to the Indo-Pacific arms race), the proliferation of new missile systems and naval platforms is reshaping the region’s security architecture. The Thai–Cambodian border dispute, viewed through this lens, is thus not merely a historical quarrel but a node in the wider militarized chessboard of the Indo-Pacific Region.

In any case, it would of course be misleading to reduce the conflict purely to Great Power competition. Nationalism does play a decisive role. Cambodian leaders have long invoked historical grievances against Thailand to rally public sentiment. Thai elites, for their part, have used the border as a pressure valve amid domestic crises.

So much for the trumpist narrative of a neatly brokered peace. The ceasefire may hold for now, but thus far, none of the underlying dynamics — political instability in Bangkok, Cambodia’s dependency on China, the militarization of ASEAN, and US aggressive attempts to preserve hegemony — have been resolved.

One may not help to notice that China, for its part, has taken a markedly different approach than the US. Beijing in fact has publicly urged both sides to reconcile, offering mediation and deeper cooperation within the ASEAN framework. Unlike Washington’s punitive threats, Beijing’s language of partnership and regional development is more palatable to local governments. No wonder many ASEAN states, even those somewhat wary of China’s intentions, find this approach less abrasive.

From a Chinese perspective, maintaining stability in Cambodia, where Beijing has invested heavily, and ensuring that Thailand does not drift fully back into Washington’s orbit are key objectives. The Thai–Cambodian conflict, thereby, became a platform for China to signal its willingness to act as a regional stabilizer — a role that stands in sharp contrast to Washington’s more confrontational posture.

The Thai–Cambodian border dispute reveals the contours of the Second Cold War. Proxy alignments are evident, and diplomatic manoeuvring is equally on display, from Trump’s tariff threats to Beijing’s reconciliation proposals. And strategic signalling resonates through every move, whether it be military exercises, naval upgrades, or the mere threat of escalation.

Quite overlooked by mainstream coverage is how fragile these ceasefires are. The militarization of ASEAN ensures that future disputes — whether in the South China Sea, the Mekong basin, or along the Thai–Cambodian frontier — will be shaped not only by local grievances but by the gravitational pull of superpower rivalry. This is what the “New Cold War” is about.

To sum it up, the ceasefire announced in Malaysia may buy time, but it does not resolve the fundamental question: can ASEAN countries maintain sovereignty and stability in the shadow of escalating US–China competition? As the Indo-Pacific arms race accelerates, and as domestic political crises in Bangkok and Phnom Penh intertwine with external pressures, the Thai–Cambodian border is less a local dispute than a symbol of the turbulent world order taking shape before our eyes.

Trump may claim victory for “bringing peace.” Thus far, however, peace remains provisional at best. The Thai–Cambodian conflict is not over (no conflict ever is now, it seems): it has merely been folded into the larger drama of the New Cold War.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#ASEAN #Cambodia #China #Geopolitics #NewColdWar #Thailand #USA

Why Did The US Raise The Terrorist Designation For A Group Of Anti-Chinese Militants In Pakistan?

Why Did The US Raise The Terrorist Designation For A Group Of Anti-Chinese Militants In Pakistan?

By Andrew Korybko

One would think that the US would consider such a group to be an ally in its New Cold War with China.

The US’ systemic rivalry with China over the contours of the emerging world order has made many assume that it backs all opponents of the People’s Republic, from neighbouring states with whom Beijing has territorial disputes to terrorist groups, yet a recent move just shattered this perception. The State Department abruptly raised the “Balochistan Liberation Army’s” (BLA) 2019 “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” designation to a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” amidst the US-Pakistani rapprochement.

The BLA is veritably a terrorist group whose last well-known attack was its deadly hijacking of the Jaffar Express earlier this spring, which followed an upsurge of other terrorist attacks over the past three years, including against projects connected to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is the flagship project of China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and was envisaged as giving it direct access to the Indian Ocean for preemptively mitigating the effects of any future US blockade of the Malacca Strait.

This series of megaprojects has stalled in recent years for a variety of reasons ranging from corruption to Pakistan’s political dysfunction since April 2022’s post-modern coup and especially the BLA’s spree of terrorist attacks afterwards which exploited the state’s new focus on crushing the opposition. Given the outsized role that the BLA has played in subverting CPEC, which the US hitherto turned a blind eye to for reasons of strategic convenience despite its existing terrorist designation, it should be a de facto US ally.

Instead, its terrorist designation was just raised, thus naturally prompting the question of why. The rapidly evolving regional and global contexts help answer that. Not only has the US entered into a rapprochement with Pakistan, but it’s also seeking one with China too as proven by Trump’s eagerness to reach a trade deal and his muted criticism of it as of late. This could respectively reshape the region and the world alike if these dual rapprochements successfully derail India’s rise as a Great Power.

By raising the BLA’s terrorist designation, the US is signalling that it’ll stop opposing CPEC as part of what might be a grand compromise with China, with this concession being aimed at reviving BRI’s flagship so as to further strengthen the Sino-Pak alliance against India. Getting CPEC back on track could also offset the incipient Sino-Indo rapprochement since it was CPEC’s announcement a decade ago that sparked the latest phase of their rivalry due to it transiting through Indian-claimed but Pakistani-controlled territory.

The grand strategic goal that the US is pursuing is the “G2”/“Chimerica” scenario of dividing the world with China after it failed to restore unipolarity, which requires containing, subordinating, and possibly even “Balkanizing” India since its rise as a Great Power would ruin these plans. Indian analyst Surya Kanegaonkar suspects that the BLA’s new designation could precede a US-Pakistani attempt to place India on the Financial Action Task Force on the pretext that it backs this group. He might be proven right.

All told, the importance of the BLA’s new terrorist designation is that it corroborates claims that the US is using its new rapprochement with Pakistan to advance a more globally significant one with China, both of which are driven in large part by their shared interest in derailing India’s rise as a Great Power. Whether or not the US-Pakistani rapprochement holds, a US-Chinese one is secured, and/or India is contained, the fact is that the US is attempting another powerplay, which follows its latest against Russia.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Balochistan #BLA #China #DonaldTrump #Geopolitics #NewColdWar #Pakistan #Terrorists #USA

把数据权力从私人公司手里拿走，集中到政府手里 - 准确说是政府的情报系统手里，而且能将其实施制度化。这是中国与美国之间的一个重要区别。（美国在此是相反的 ，私人利益集团以各种形式购买决策权，从而控制政策和政治辩论）

数据权力（或者说数据主权），是中美冷战中的关键部分，它扮演着多重角色 - 从筹码到资本，从经济到国安 … 几乎关系到每一个阶段的谈判和博弈。（https://iyouport.substack.com/p/bb3?utm_source=publication-search ）
“国家网络身份认证”这一举措意味着一个大幅迈进的国家主义行动。
北京正在为冷战的深化积累筹码。

作为数字用户您应该早已知道，不论数据掌握在谁的手里 - 国家还是公司、政府还是资本家 - 都是对我们每个人的隐私的剥夺。

IYP的安全系列培训教材还在准备中。它追求成为一个多管齐下的资源系统，包括数字、心理、人际等等；我们需要尽可能走在前面，兵来将挡的反应力已经越来越难以适应当前的局势了。

随时欢迎各界有能力的朋友加入防御创意项目 - 以任何您喜欢的方式。

#China #USA #datasovereignty #NewColdWar

Thought experiment poll.
If Russia effectively collapsed in some way tomorrow, either into various Republics, or into a democratic progressive country (ha!), neither of which wanted anything to do with nuclear weapons and they unilaterally rid themselves of every warhead and missile. Would the USA follow suit?
#Polls #Russia #Ukraine #USA #ColdWar #NewColdWar #War #NuclearWeapons

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Two Years Straight

Here’s What I Learned From Analysing The New Cold War Every Day For Two Years Straight

By Andrew Korybko

These five trends are considered to be the most significant grand strategic ones that are expected to have the greatest impact on the global systemic transition across the coming year.

I’m a Moscow-based American political analyst with a PhD. in Political Science from MGIMO, and this is my second yearly review of the New Cold War after I published my first on the one-year anniversary of the special military operation (SMO) here. I’ve been analysing the New Cold War every day since 24 February 2022, beginning at now-defunct OneWorld till mid-2022 and continuing at my Substack to the present. Here’s what I learned from doing this daily for my second year straight:

———-

* Sino-US Bi-Multipolarity Has Given Way To Tri-Multipolarity

The Sino-US bi-multipolar system that characterized the years before the SMO has since evolved into tri-multipolarity as a result of India’s successful rise as a globally significant Great Power. The emerging world order is now shaped by the interplay between the US-led West’s Golden Billion, the Sino–Russo Entente, and the informally Indian-led Global South within which are several independent Great Powers. With time, the system will reach the stage of complex multipolarity (“multiplexity”), its final form.

* “Fortress Europe” Is The US’ New Project For Containing Russia

The failure of Kiev’s counteroffensive prompted the US to consider backup plans for containing Russia after it became obvious that NATO couldn’t strategically defeat its opponent in Ukraine. Poland’s subordination to Germany after Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s return to power enabled that country to resume its superpower trajectory with US support for accelerating the construction of “Fortress Europe”, which will fulfil this goal while freeing up American forces to redeploy to Asia for containing China.

* Western Military-Industrial Wherewithal Is Weaker Than Expected

Germany won’t become a superpower anytime soon nor will the US more muscularly contain China in the coming future either since Western military-industrial wherewithal is weaker than expected as proven by the counteroffensive’s failure and the inability to replenish lost stocks that were given to Kiev. The New York Times even confirmed last September that Russia is far ahead of NATO in the “race of logistics”/“war of attrition”, which explains why the Ukrainian Conflict began to wind down lately too.

* Any Deliberately Calculated Sino-US Crisis Has Likely Been Delayed

Building upon the last observation, it’s likely that any deliberately calculated Sino-US crisis has been delayed till at least the end of the decade owing to the fact that America’s surprisingly weak military-industrial complex requires time to rearm America, replenish its stockpiles, and arm regional allies. A comparatively minor crisis might occur by miscalculation, perhaps due to the Sino-Filipino dispute, but the US would struggle to manage a major one of its own making, let alone fight a major war right now.

* The Broader Red Sea Region Is The New Global South Flashpoint

The primary route for Euro-Asian trade has been disrupted by the Houthi’s blockade and security remains uncertain even if the aforesaid is lifted due to Somalia assembling a regional coalition – Eritrea, Egypt, and potentially Turkiye and the US – to stop Ethiopia’s plans to open a naval base in Somaliland. The interests of all the key Great Powers – the US, China, the EU, Russia, India – converge in the broader Red Sea Region, which thus makes it the new Global South flashpoint to keep a close eye on.

———-

These five trends are considered to be the most significant grand strategic ones, though that doesn’t mean that others like those taking place in the Sahel or the acceleration of financial multipolarity processes aren’t important. They’re just the ones that are expected to have the greatest impact on the global systemic transition across the coming year for the reasons that were explained. Hopefully my insight can inspire other analysts to refocus their work and consequently improve the quality thereof.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Voice of East.

7 Courses in 1 – Diploma in Business Management

#Africa #China #Europe #Geopolitics #India #NATO #NewColdWar #Russia #TheWest #Ukraine #USA