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  1. ITREB USA presents Critical Conversations: "Exploring the #Shi’i tradition: Understanding the Continuity of #Imamate", where we explore the vision of the Imams' guidance across the centuries on ethic of the spirit of inquiry and compassion, and sharing. This Critical Conversation features Dr. Hussein Rashid and is moderated by Dr. Naaila Hudani.

    #Islam #Muslim #Ismaili #Shiah

    youtube.com/watch?v=G2hSZhSVpj

  2. ITREB USA presents Critical Conversations: "Exploring the #Shi’i tradition: Understanding the Continuity of #Imamate", where we explore the vision of the Imams' guidance across the centuries on ethic of the spirit of inquiry and compassion, and sharing. This Critical Conversation features Dr. Hussein Rashid and is moderated by Dr. Naaila Hudani.

    #Islam #Muslim #Ismaili #Shiah

    youtube.com/watch?v=G2hSZhSVpj

  3. ITREB USA presents Critical Conversations: "Exploring the #Shi’i tradition: Understanding the Continuity of #Imamate", where we explore the vision of the Imams' guidance across the centuries on ethic of the spirit of inquiry and compassion, and sharing. This Critical Conversation features Dr. Hussein Rashid and is moderated by Dr. Naaila Hudani.

    #Islam #Muslim #Ismaili #Shiah

    youtube.com/watch?v=G2hSZhSVpj

  4. ITREB USA presents Critical Conversations: "Exploring the #Shi’i tradition: Understanding the Continuity of #Imamate", where we explore the vision of the Imams' guidance across the centuries on ethic of the spirit of inquiry and compassion, and sharing. This Critical Conversation features Dr. Hussein Rashid and is moderated by Dr. Naaila Hudani.

    #Islam #Muslim #Ismaili #Shiah

    youtube.com/watch?v=G2hSZhSVpj

  5. ⬆️

    #Hussein's favorite son #Abdullah approached the #British as a supplicant who feared that the #YoungTurks were going to depose his father.

    He lied to the British that rival #Arab chiefs were ready to bury mutual hatchets and unite to rise against the #Turks, in exchange for British support similar to that in #Afghanistan where locals enjoyed self-rule but #Britain handled all foreign affairs.

    The British rebuffed Abdullah's overtures at the time, but came back after #ThievesBanquet

    ⬇️

  6. RT @[email protected]

    🏴 Jamais dans notre pays on ne devrait mourir d'enseigner.

    🏴 Beaucoup de monde, beaucoup d'émotion, beaucoup de tristesse à #Conflans lors du rassemblement en mémoire de notre collègue assassiné.

    #Libertédexpression
    #LibertéDenseigner
    #HussardNoir

    🐦🔗: twitter.com/stylos_les/status/

  7. Media Appearance: God at the Movies

    God at the Movies: The Enduring Influence of Religion in Film

    “Marvel is doing some interesting things with religion,” says Hussein Rashid, assistant dean for Religion and Public Life at Harvard Divinity School. He mentions Loki and Thor about Norse Gods, and Moon Knightabout Egyptian Gods. “I am really curious to see if they will explor

    husseinrashid.com/2024/04/medi

    #MediaAppearances #media #movies

  8. WBUR: Faith leaders reflect on difficult questions as Israel-Hamas war colors holy days

    Faith leaders reflect on difficult questions as Israel-Hamas war colors holy days

    Rabbi Josh Franklin, Pastor and author Henry Brinton and Muslim elder Hussein Rashid answer the question, "What is the most difficult question you

    husseinrashid.com/2024/03/wbur

    #MediaAppearances #Religion #interfaith

  9. District 214 hosts World Religions Summit, explores religious diversity in a multicultural society

    District 214 hosts World Religions Summit, explores religious diversity in a multicultural society

    The all-day summit brought together 75 students from four schools, cl

    husseinrashid.com/2024/03/dist

    #Events #MediaAppearances #Religion #Conference #education #ReligiousLiteracy

  10. Podcast: Generation M: Time and Again

    The great journalist Ahmed Ali Akbar invited be to his recap show of Ms. Marvel to talk Episode 5, "Time and Again," about Partition.

    You can find the episode here.

    husseinrashid.com/2023/12/podc

    #MediaAppearances #Religion #comics #history #MsMarvel #MsMarvel #partition #SouthAsia #television

  11. WBUR Here and Now: Community leader on uptick in Islamophobia amid mideast conflict

    Here & Now host Scott Tong asks Rabbi Josh Stanton and Muslim elder Hussein Rashidhow they are counseling and consoling their flock during this time of heightened anger, hatred and violence becaus

    husseinrashid.com/2023/10/wbur

    #Interfaith #MediaAppearances #Religion #antisemitism #conflict #hope #Islamophobia

  12. Quoted in RNS Story on Daredevil

    Marvel’s latest adversary for ‘Daredevil’ exposes its blindness to antisemitic art

    Not everyone sees the “Daredevil” images as only antisemitic. “The image also seems to pull on anti-Arab imagery,” said Hussein Rashid, an independent scholar whose focus is religion and comics.

    “The use of symbols against an adversary or The Adversar

    husseinrashid.com/2023/10/quot

    #MediaAppearances #Religion #comics

  13. ⬆️ November 1914: Anwar #Pasha of #Turkey aligns with #CentralPowers (#Germany and #Austria-#Hungary) and enters the #GreatWar.

    Early 1915: #Russia tells #EntentePartners it wants #Constantinople (now #Istanbul) & #Dardanelles; #Britain & #France reluctantly agree.

    #Balfour, #Churchill, & #Kitchener favor annexation of #Arabia, #Palestine, #Mesopotamia (#Iraq) from #Ottomans; #EdwardGrey opposes.

    A separate #intrigue was playing out between Turkey, #Arab leaders, & #Hussein (Sharif of Mecca)
    ⬇️

  14. ⬆️
    #Hussein was LIVID.

    He was under the impression that the #British had agreed to the #DamascusProtocol document, prepared by #Arab secret societies #AlFatat & #AlAhd, declaring that Arabs would revolt in alliance with #UK. In return, UK would recognize Arab independence in the area specified by the Damascus Protocol, as they were ESSENTIAL to the well-being of any future #Arab State

    But British had offered VAGUE borders. Immediately after outbreak of #WWI, #McMahon took up the border issue

    ⬇️

  15. ⬆️
    #Hussein was LIVID.

    He was under the impression that the #British had agreed to the #DamascusProtocol document, prepared by #Arab secret societies #AlFatat & #AlAhd, declaring that Arabs would revolt in alliance with #UK. In return, UK would recognize Arab independence in the area specified by the Damascus Protocol, as they were ESSENTIAL to the well-being of any future #Arab State

    But British had offered VAGUE borders. Immediately after outbreak of #WWI, #McMahon took up the border issue

    ⬇️

  16. Hands as the Language of Thought: Correcting a Kant Attribution

    There is a line about hands that travels well. It reads cleanly, carries an air of philosophical dignity, and arrives in print wearing the name of Immanuel Kant. “The hand is the visible part of the brain,” runs the most common English form, or, in an older rendering, “the hand is the outer brain of man.” The phrase appears in publishing copy, in teaching materials, on Goodreads quotation pages, in popular psychology, in surgical textbooks, in neurology lectures, and in essays on sign language and gesture. It has the shape of something Kant should have said. The difficulty is that no reliable evidence supports treating it as a verified Kant statement.

    This is a small instance in the larger pathology of quotation culture, where an author’s prestige is borrowed to underwrite a sentence he never wrote. The case of the hand, though, carries particular weight, because the sentence is invoked precisely where philosophical authority is wanted, in discussions of embodiment, cognition, touch, manual skill, and the expressive life of the hand. Writers reach for Kant when they want to seal the argument. If the seal is counterfeit, the argument has to stand on its own, and the discipline has to notice the forgery.

    What Kant Actually Wrote About Hands

    Kant wrote about hands more than once, and he wrote about them carefully. In 1768, in his short essay Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, he uses the human hand as his signature example of incongruent counterparts, two objects that share all internal geometric properties and still cannot be superimposed on one another. A right hand and a left hand have identical measurements, identical topology, identical internal relations, and still they will not coincide. The example exposes something about absolute space that relational accounts cannot accommodate. The hand, in this essay, functions as a philosophical instrument, a test case for the metaphysics of orientation.

    Thirty years later, in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht of 1798, Kant returns to the hand through a different doorway. There he treats the sense of touch, seated in the fingertips and their nerve endings, as the sense that allows the human being to work out the three-dimensional shape of a solid body through direct contact. Kant goes so far as to say that without this organ-sense no concept of corporeal shape could be formed at all. Touch, in the Anthropology, carries a cognitive load that vision alone cannot sustain.

    These are recognizable Kant passages, and they are philosophically rich. They give the hand a significant role in his thinking about space, orientation, embodiment, and the conditions under which objects become objects for us. What they do not give us is the famous sentence now repeated in his name.

    The Authority Behind the Attribution

    The trail of the attribution leads to a specific book published in 1925 by David Katz. A biographical note earns its place here, because Katz’s authority is what carried the Kant line forward for a century, and the weight of that authority bears directly on how the legend survived.

    Katz was born in Kassel on 1 October 1884 into a Jewish family, and he studied at Göttingen from 1902 under Georg Elias Müller, whose institute was among the leading centers of experimental psychology in Europe. He took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1906 with a dissertation on the psychology of temporal comparison, and he served as Müller’s assistant from 1907 to 1919, with his volunteer service in the First World War interrupting that work from 1914 to 1918. His 1911 habilitation on color perception, later published as Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, was examined by Müller and by Edmund Husserl. That second reviewer matters here, because it places Katz directly inside the phenomenological tradition at its source, with Husserl himself certifying the 1911 work. After the First World War, Katz spent a short stretch at the Technical University of Hannover on the psychology of prosthetic limbs for wounded veterans, a subject that bears on the concerns of the 1925 book more than has generally been noticed.

    From 1919 until 1933, Katz held the chair of psychology and education at Rostock, and in 1933 the Nazi regime stripped him of that position. He moved first to Manchester, where he worked in T. H. Pear’s laboratory on tactile and gustatory perception, then briefly in London, and in 1937 he took the first Swedish chair of psychology at Stockholm University, the Eneroth chair, becoming a Swedish citizen the same year. He presided over the Thirteenth International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951 and died there on 2 February 1953. The figure whose 1925 sentence about Kant and the hand has been circulating, unchecked, for a century was a serious psychologist with phenomenological credentials certified by Husserl and a research record that runs from color to touch to prosthetics to Gestalt. That is the weight the undocumented attribution has been carrying.

    Where the Quotation Actually Comes From

    In Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, or The World of Touch, Katz writes that Kant once called the hand das äußere Gehirn des Menschen, the outer brain of man. That passage is where most modern quotation chains terminate when traced backward with any rigor. The English variant “the visible part of the brain” appears to be a loose later translation of the Katz-transmitted German phrase, carrying the same undocumented attribution into new languages without retrieving a new source.

    Two features of the Katz passage matter. First, Katz supplies no citation to any Kant text. He provides no volume, no essay, no letter, no lecture transcript. He states the attribution as received wisdom and moves on. Second, the footnote that sits at precisely that point in the Katz text does not lead the reader to Kant at all. It leads to Gerhart Hauptmann, the Nobel-laureate playwright, whose prose passage on the hand Katz quotes in an exalted, almost liturgical register. The Kant attribution and the Hauptmann citation share a footnote, and the Kant portion of that pairing goes undocumented.

    That is the entire basis, so far as the scholarship can currently establish, for the modern circulation of the line as a Kant quotation. A single undocumented attribution in a 1925 monograph on touch, carrying all the authority of a Husserl-certified Göttingen psychologist with a major research record, absorbed into the secondary literature, and repeated without verification for a century.

    Why the Quotation Travels So Well

    The sentence survives because it sounds like Kant. The compression is Kantian in style. Sensation, cognition, and anatomy bind together in a single gesture. The cadence matches the tone of the Anthropology passage on touch closely enough that a reader who encounters both in the same afternoon will remember them as a single thought. The line also carries the epigrammatic finish that quotation culture demands.

    The phrase travels because it pays an intellectual tax that many writers want paid. When someone argues that the hand is a thinking organ, or that manual skill shapes cognition, or that touch is constitutive of our grasp of the world, Kant’s name closes the argument faster than a paragraph of evidence. The quotation does the work of a citation without requiring a citation to exist.

    There is a further, less obvious reason for the sentence’s stubborn life. It has a ready home in at least four disciplines that want it to be Kantian. Philosophers of embodied cognition cite it against Cartesian disembodiment. Hand surgeons and occupational therapists lean on the line to dignify their practice. Neurology textbooks reach for it in their introductions to motor cortex maps. Teachers of signed languages sometimes mobilize a version of it in arguments that signed languages are languages of the hand as the mind’s direct instrument. Each of these fields has a stake in keeping the line in circulation, and none of them has a native incentive to audit its provenance.

    The Scholarly Correction

    A careful study of the hand in Kant, published in a Hungarian philosophical journal at Eszterházy Károly University, observes that the hand never becomes an explicit, thematic center of Kant’s philosophy in the way that later phenomenology would make it. Merleau-Ponty takes up the hand as a chiasmic site of touching and being touched. Heidegger develops handedness, Zuhandenheit, as a defining feature of the being of equipment. Husserl analyzes the double sensation of one hand touching the other. These are explicit philosophical theses about the hand. The hand, in Kant, plays a different role from the thematic centrality later phenomenology will give it. It appears as an example, a test case, and a sense-organ of decisive cognitive importance, which is already a great deal, though it falls short of the hand-centered metaphysics the misattributed quotation implies.

    The quotation legend, though small, distorts philosophy. It suggests that Kant produced a compressed aphorism on the hand as the extension of the mind. What the actual texts show is something else: a careful argument about incongruent counterparts in 1768, and a careful account of touch as shape-sense in 1798. The misattributed sentence flattens both arguments into a Hallmark version of themselves, and then hangs the name Kant on the flattened version.

    The Responsible Formula

    Writers who want Kantian authority without philological error have a narrow path open to them. The 1768 essay on incongruent counterparts grounds the claim that Kant treated the hand as a philosophically significant object. The Anthropology of 1798 grounds the claim that Kant treated touch, seated in the fingertips, as cognitively constitutive of our concept of bodily shape. Writers who wish to credit Kant with the aphorism about the outer brain can honestly describe it as a twentieth-century attribution traceable at least to David Katz in 1925, for which no secure primary Kant passage has yet been established. The formula runs longer than the elegant false quotation, and it will not fit on a poster, though it has the advantage of being accurate.

    The broader point reaches past Kant. Quotation legends grow because the citation economy rewards speed and punishes verification. A writer who takes the time to trace a line to its actual source pays a cost in word count, in footnotes, and in the appearance of pedantry. A writer who accepts the received attribution on trust pays no such cost, and the received attribution grows stronger with every unverified repetition. Over a century, a footnote in a book on touch becomes a Kant quotation in a surgical textbook, and the discipline stops noticing.

    Hands, Thought, and Signed Languages

    One further reason to care about this correction comes from the linguistics of American Sign Language and the other signed languages of the world. The proposition that the hand is the mind’s instrument is no idle metaphor in Deaf communities or among sign linguists. The hand is the articulatory site of natural human languages with their own phonology, morphology, and syntax, documented since William Stokoe’s 1960 Sign Language Structure opened the field of sign linguistics. Signed languages are languages of the hand in a literal, structural sense, and the evidence for that structural status is empirical and extensive.

    When the falsely attributed Kant line is imported into defenses of signed language, or into gestural theories of cognition, it smuggles in a spurious authority and obscures the actual argument. The work has what it needs already, which is the record of the languages themselves and the descriptive and theoretical work of the linguists who study them. Kant’s signature adds nothing to that record. A fake Kant quotation weakens the record by mortgaging the argument to a line that will not survive a footnote check. Signed languages deserve better citation hygiene than quotation culture has given them.

    Conclusion

    The hand has a real place in Kant’s philosophy. It is the example that cracks open absolute space in 1768. It becomes the organ of touch that makes three-dimensional shape thinkable in 1798. Those two passages are worth reading and worth quoting in Kant’s name. The third sentence, the famous one about the hand as the visible or outer part of the brain, is a twentieth-century attribution that has outrun its evidence. Responsible writing can name it for what it is, a Katz-transmitted attribution from 1925 with no verified Kant source behind it. The legend will keep moving, because legends do, though it does not have to move through our pages unchallenged. A sentence about hands deserves to be held in the hand and checked.

    #asl #attribution #concept #hands #history #kant #knowing #meaning #philosophy #research #thought
  17. Hands as the Language of Thought: Correcting a Kant Attribution

    There is a line about hands that travels well. It reads cleanly, carries an air of philosophical dignity, and arrives in print wearing the name of Immanuel Kant. “The hand is the visible part of the brain,” runs the most common English form, or, in an older rendering, “the hand is the outer brain of man.” The phrase appears in publishing copy, in teaching materials, on Goodreads quotation pages, in popular psychology, in surgical textbooks, in neurology lectures, and in essays on sign language and gesture. It has the shape of something Kant should have said. The difficulty is that no reliable evidence supports treating it as a verified Kant statement.

    This is a small instance in the larger pathology of quotation culture, where an author’s prestige is borrowed to underwrite a sentence he never wrote. The case of the hand, though, carries particular weight, because the sentence is invoked precisely where philosophical authority is wanted, in discussions of embodiment, cognition, touch, manual skill, and the expressive life of the hand. Writers reach for Kant when they want to seal the argument. If the seal is counterfeit, the argument has to stand on its own, and the discipline has to notice the forgery.

    What Kant Actually Wrote About Hands

    Kant wrote about hands more than once, and he wrote about them carefully. In 1768, in his short essay Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, he uses the human hand as his signature example of incongruent counterparts, two objects that share all internal geometric properties and still cannot be superimposed on one another. A right hand and a left hand have identical measurements, identical topology, identical internal relations, and still they will not coincide. The example exposes something about absolute space that relational accounts cannot accommodate. The hand, in this essay, functions as a philosophical instrument, a test case for the metaphysics of orientation.

    Thirty years later, in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht of 1798, Kant returns to the hand through a different doorway. There he treats the sense of touch, seated in the fingertips and their nerve endings, as the sense that allows the human being to work out the three-dimensional shape of a solid body through direct contact. Kant goes so far as to say that without this organ-sense no concept of corporeal shape could be formed at all. Touch, in the Anthropology, carries a cognitive load that vision alone cannot sustain.

    These are recognizable Kant passages, and they are philosophically rich. They give the hand a significant role in his thinking about space, orientation, embodiment, and the conditions under which objects become objects for us. What they do not give us is the famous sentence now repeated in his name.

    The Authority Behind the Attribution

    The trail of the attribution leads to a specific book published in 1925 by David Katz. A biographical note earns its place here, because Katz’s authority is what carried the Kant line forward for a century, and the weight of that authority bears directly on how the legend survived.

    Katz was born in Kassel on 1 October 1884 into a Jewish family, and he studied at Göttingen from 1902 under Georg Elias Müller, whose institute was among the leading centers of experimental psychology in Europe. He took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1906 with a dissertation on the psychology of temporal comparison, and he served as Müller’s assistant from 1907 to 1919, with his volunteer service in the First World War interrupting that work from 1914 to 1918. His 1911 habilitation on color perception, later published as Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, was examined by Müller and by Edmund Husserl. That second reviewer matters here, because it places Katz directly inside the phenomenological tradition at its source, with Husserl himself certifying the 1911 work. After the First World War, Katz spent a short stretch at the Technical University of Hannover on the psychology of prosthetic limbs for wounded veterans, a subject that bears on the concerns of the 1925 book more than has generally been noticed.

    From 1919 until 1933, Katz held the chair of psychology and education at Rostock, and in 1933 the Nazi regime stripped him of that position. He moved first to Manchester, where he worked in T. H. Pear’s laboratory on tactile and gustatory perception, then briefly in London, and in 1937 he took the first Swedish chair of psychology at Stockholm University, the Eneroth chair, becoming a Swedish citizen the same year. He presided over the Thirteenth International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951 and died there on 2 February 1953. The figure whose 1925 sentence about Kant and the hand has been circulating, unchecked, for a century was a serious psychologist with phenomenological credentials certified by Husserl and a research record that runs from color to touch to prosthetics to Gestalt. That is the weight the undocumented attribution has been carrying.

    Where the Quotation Actually Comes From

    In Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, or The World of Touch, Katz writes that Kant once called the hand das äußere Gehirn des Menschen, the outer brain of man. That passage is where most modern quotation chains terminate when traced backward with any rigor. The English variant “the visible part of the brain” appears to be a loose later translation of the Katz-transmitted German phrase, carrying the same undocumented attribution into new languages without retrieving a new source.

    Two features of the Katz passage matter. First, Katz supplies no citation to any Kant text. He provides no volume, no essay, no letter, no lecture transcript. He states the attribution as received wisdom and moves on. Second, the footnote that sits at precisely that point in the Katz text does not lead the reader to Kant at all. It leads to Gerhart Hauptmann, the Nobel-laureate playwright, whose prose passage on the hand Katz quotes in an exalted, almost liturgical register. The Kant attribution and the Hauptmann citation share a footnote, and the Kant portion of that pairing goes undocumented.

    That is the entire basis, so far as the scholarship can currently establish, for the modern circulation of the line as a Kant quotation. A single undocumented attribution in a 1925 monograph on touch, carrying all the authority of a Husserl-certified Göttingen psychologist with a major research record, absorbed into the secondary literature, and repeated without verification for a century.

    Why the Quotation Travels So Well

    The sentence survives because it sounds like Kant. The compression is Kantian in style. Sensation, cognition, and anatomy bind together in a single gesture. The cadence matches the tone of the Anthropology passage on touch closely enough that a reader who encounters both in the same afternoon will remember them as a single thought. The line also carries the epigrammatic finish that quotation culture demands.

    The phrase travels because it pays an intellectual tax that many writers want paid. When someone argues that the hand is a thinking organ, or that manual skill shapes cognition, or that touch is constitutive of our grasp of the world, Kant’s name closes the argument faster than a paragraph of evidence. The quotation does the work of a citation without requiring a citation to exist.

    There is a further, less obvious reason for the sentence’s stubborn life. It has a ready home in at least four disciplines that want it to be Kantian. Philosophers of embodied cognition cite it against Cartesian disembodiment. Hand surgeons and occupational therapists lean on the line to dignify their practice. Neurology textbooks reach for it in their introductions to motor cortex maps. Teachers of signed languages sometimes mobilize a version of it in arguments that signed languages are languages of the hand as the mind’s direct instrument. Each of these fields has a stake in keeping the line in circulation, and none of them has a native incentive to audit its provenance.

    The Scholarly Correction

    A careful study of the hand in Kant, published in a Hungarian philosophical journal at Eszterházy Károly University, observes that the hand never becomes an explicit, thematic center of Kant’s philosophy in the way that later phenomenology would make it. Merleau-Ponty takes up the hand as a chiasmic site of touching and being touched. Heidegger develops handedness, Zuhandenheit, as a defining feature of the being of equipment. Husserl analyzes the double sensation of one hand touching the other. These are explicit philosophical theses about the hand. The hand, in Kant, plays a different role from the thematic centrality later phenomenology will give it. It appears as an example, a test case, and a sense-organ of decisive cognitive importance, which is already a great deal, though it falls short of the hand-centered metaphysics the misattributed quotation implies.

    The quotation legend, though small, distorts philosophy. It suggests that Kant produced a compressed aphorism on the hand as the extension of the mind. What the actual texts show is something else: a careful argument about incongruent counterparts in 1768, and a careful account of touch as shape-sense in 1798. The misattributed sentence flattens both arguments into a Hallmark version of themselves, and then hangs the name Kant on the flattened version.

    The Responsible Formula

    Writers who want Kantian authority without philological error have a narrow path open to them. The 1768 essay on incongruent counterparts grounds the claim that Kant treated the hand as a philosophically significant object. The Anthropology of 1798 grounds the claim that Kant treated touch, seated in the fingertips, as cognitively constitutive of our concept of bodily shape. Writers who wish to credit Kant with the aphorism about the outer brain can honestly describe it as a twentieth-century attribution traceable at least to David Katz in 1925, for which no secure primary Kant passage has yet been established. The formula runs longer than the elegant false quotation, and it will not fit on a poster, though it has the advantage of being accurate.

    The broader point reaches past Kant. Quotation legends grow because the citation economy rewards speed and punishes verification. A writer who takes the time to trace a line to its actual source pays a cost in word count, in footnotes, and in the appearance of pedantry. A writer who accepts the received attribution on trust pays no such cost, and the received attribution grows stronger with every unverified repetition. Over a century, a footnote in a book on touch becomes a Kant quotation in a surgical textbook, and the discipline stops noticing.

    Hands, Thought, and Signed Languages

    One further reason to care about this correction comes from the linguistics of American Sign Language and the other signed languages of the world. The proposition that the hand is the mind’s instrument is no idle metaphor in Deaf communities or among sign linguists. The hand is the articulatory site of natural human languages with their own phonology, morphology, and syntax, documented since William Stokoe’s 1960 Sign Language Structure opened the field of sign linguistics. Signed languages are languages of the hand in a literal, structural sense, and the evidence for that structural status is empirical and extensive.

    When the falsely attributed Kant line is imported into defenses of signed language, or into gestural theories of cognition, it smuggles in a spurious authority and obscures the actual argument. The work has what it needs already, which is the record of the languages themselves and the descriptive and theoretical work of the linguists who study them. Kant’s signature adds nothing to that record. A fake Kant quotation weakens the record by mortgaging the argument to a line that will not survive a footnote check. Signed languages deserve better citation hygiene than quotation culture has given them.

    Conclusion

    The hand has a real place in Kant’s philosophy. It is the example that cracks open absolute space in 1768. It becomes the organ of touch that makes three-dimensional shape thinkable in 1798. Those two passages are worth reading and worth quoting in Kant’s name. The third sentence, the famous one about the hand as the visible or outer part of the brain, is a twentieth-century attribution that has outrun its evidence. Responsible writing can name it for what it is, a Katz-transmitted attribution from 1925 with no verified Kant source behind it. The legend will keep moving, because legends do, though it does not have to move through our pages unchallenged. A sentence about hands deserves to be held in the hand and checked.

    #asl #attribution #concept #hands #history #kant #knowing #meaning #philosophy #research #thought
  18. Hands as the Language of Thought: Correcting a Kant Attribution

    There is a line about hands that travels well. It reads cleanly, carries an air of philosophical dignity, and arrives in print wearing the name of Immanuel Kant. “The hand is the visible part of the brain,” runs the most common English form, or, in an older rendering, “the hand is the outer brain of man.” The phrase appears in publishing copy, in teaching materials, on Goodreads quotation pages, in popular psychology, in surgical textbooks, in neurology lectures, and in essays on sign language and gesture. It has the shape of something Kant should have said. The difficulty is that no reliable evidence supports treating it as a verified Kant statement.

    This is a small instance in the larger pathology of quotation culture, where an author’s prestige is borrowed to underwrite a sentence he never wrote. The case of the hand, though, carries particular weight, because the sentence is invoked precisely where philosophical authority is wanted, in discussions of embodiment, cognition, touch, manual skill, and the expressive life of the hand. Writers reach for Kant when they want to seal the argument. If the seal is counterfeit, the argument has to stand on its own, and the discipline has to notice the forgery.

    What Kant Actually Wrote About Hands

    Kant wrote about hands more than once, and he wrote about them carefully. In 1768, in his short essay Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, he uses the human hand as his signature example of incongruent counterparts, two objects that share all internal geometric properties and still cannot be superimposed on one another. A right hand and a left hand have identical measurements, identical topology, identical internal relations, and still they will not coincide. The example exposes something about absolute space that relational accounts cannot accommodate. The hand, in this essay, functions as a philosophical instrument, a test case for the metaphysics of orientation.

    Thirty years later, in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht of 1798, Kant returns to the hand through a different doorway. There he treats the sense of touch, seated in the fingertips and their nerve endings, as the sense that allows the human being to work out the three-dimensional shape of a solid body through direct contact. Kant goes so far as to say that without this organ-sense no concept of corporeal shape could be formed at all. Touch, in the Anthropology, carries a cognitive load that vision alone cannot sustain.

    These are recognizable Kant passages, and they are philosophically rich. They give the hand a significant role in his thinking about space, orientation, embodiment, and the conditions under which objects become objects for us. What they do not give us is the famous sentence now repeated in his name.

    The Authority Behind the Attribution

    The trail of the attribution leads to a specific book published in 1925 by David Katz. A biographical note earns its place here, because Katz’s authority is what carried the Kant line forward for a century, and the weight of that authority bears directly on how the legend survived.

    Katz was born in Kassel on 1 October 1884 into a Jewish family, and he studied at Göttingen from 1902 under Georg Elias Müller, whose institute was among the leading centers of experimental psychology in Europe. He took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1906 with a dissertation on the psychology of temporal comparison, and he served as Müller’s assistant from 1907 to 1919, with his volunteer service in the First World War interrupting that work from 1914 to 1918. His 1911 habilitation on color perception, later published as Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, was examined by Müller and by Edmund Husserl. That second reviewer matters here, because it places Katz directly inside the phenomenological tradition at its source, with Husserl himself certifying the 1911 work. After the First World War, Katz spent a short stretch at the Technical University of Hannover on the psychology of prosthetic limbs for wounded veterans, a subject that bears on the concerns of the 1925 book more than has generally been noticed.

    From 1919 until 1933, Katz held the chair of psychology and education at Rostock, and in 1933 the Nazi regime stripped him of that position. He moved first to Manchester, where he worked in T. H. Pear’s laboratory on tactile and gustatory perception, then briefly in London, and in 1937 he took the first Swedish chair of psychology at Stockholm University, the Eneroth chair, becoming a Swedish citizen the same year. He presided over the Thirteenth International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951 and died there on 2 February 1953. The figure whose 1925 sentence about Kant and the hand has been circulating, unchecked, for a century was a serious psychologist with phenomenological credentials certified by Husserl and a research record that runs from color to touch to prosthetics to Gestalt. That is the weight the undocumented attribution has been carrying.

    Where the Quotation Actually Comes From

    In Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, or The World of Touch, Katz writes that Kant once called the hand das äußere Gehirn des Menschen, the outer brain of man. That passage is where most modern quotation chains terminate when traced backward with any rigor. The English variant “the visible part of the brain” appears to be a loose later translation of the Katz-transmitted German phrase, carrying the same undocumented attribution into new languages without retrieving a new source.

    Two features of the Katz passage matter. First, Katz supplies no citation to any Kant text. He provides no volume, no essay, no letter, no lecture transcript. He states the attribution as received wisdom and moves on. Second, the footnote that sits at precisely that point in the Katz text does not lead the reader to Kant at all. It leads to Gerhart Hauptmann, the Nobel-laureate playwright, whose prose passage on the hand Katz quotes in an exalted, almost liturgical register. The Kant attribution and the Hauptmann citation share a footnote, and the Kant portion of that pairing goes undocumented.

    That is the entire basis, so far as the scholarship can currently establish, for the modern circulation of the line as a Kant quotation. A single undocumented attribution in a 1925 monograph on touch, carrying all the authority of a Husserl-certified Göttingen psychologist with a major research record, absorbed into the secondary literature, and repeated without verification for a century.

    Why the Quotation Travels So Well

    The sentence survives because it sounds like Kant. The compression is Kantian in style. Sensation, cognition, and anatomy bind together in a single gesture. The cadence matches the tone of the Anthropology passage on touch closely enough that a reader who encounters both in the same afternoon will remember them as a single thought. The line also carries the epigrammatic finish that quotation culture demands.

    The phrase travels because it pays an intellectual tax that many writers want paid. When someone argues that the hand is a thinking organ, or that manual skill shapes cognition, or that touch is constitutive of our grasp of the world, Kant’s name closes the argument faster than a paragraph of evidence. The quotation does the work of a citation without requiring a citation to exist.

    There is a further, less obvious reason for the sentence’s stubborn life. It has a ready home in at least four disciplines that want it to be Kantian. Philosophers of embodied cognition cite it against Cartesian disembodiment. Hand surgeons and occupational therapists lean on the line to dignify their practice. Neurology textbooks reach for it in their introductions to motor cortex maps. Teachers of signed languages sometimes mobilize a version of it in arguments that signed languages are languages of the hand as the mind’s direct instrument. Each of these fields has a stake in keeping the line in circulation, and none of them has a native incentive to audit its provenance.

    The Scholarly Correction

    A careful study of the hand in Kant, published in a Hungarian philosophical journal at Eszterházy Károly University, observes that the hand never becomes an explicit, thematic center of Kant’s philosophy in the way that later phenomenology would make it. Merleau-Ponty takes up the hand as a chiasmic site of touching and being touched. Heidegger develops handedness, Zuhandenheit, as a defining feature of the being of equipment. Husserl analyzes the double sensation of one hand touching the other. These are explicit philosophical theses about the hand. The hand, in Kant, plays a different role from the thematic centrality later phenomenology will give it. It appears as an example, a test case, and a sense-organ of decisive cognitive importance, which is already a great deal, though it falls short of the hand-centered metaphysics the misattributed quotation implies.

    The quotation legend, though small, distorts philosophy. It suggests that Kant produced a compressed aphorism on the hand as the extension of the mind. What the actual texts show is something else: a careful argument about incongruent counterparts in 1768, and a careful account of touch as shape-sense in 1798. The misattributed sentence flattens both arguments into a Hallmark version of themselves, and then hangs the name Kant on the flattened version.

    The Responsible Formula

    Writers who want Kantian authority without philological error have a narrow path open to them. The 1768 essay on incongruent counterparts grounds the claim that Kant treated the hand as a philosophically significant object. The Anthropology of 1798 grounds the claim that Kant treated touch, seated in the fingertips, as cognitively constitutive of our concept of bodily shape. Writers who wish to credit Kant with the aphorism about the outer brain can honestly describe it as a twentieth-century attribution traceable at least to David Katz in 1925, for which no secure primary Kant passage has yet been established. The formula runs longer than the elegant false quotation, and it will not fit on a poster, though it has the advantage of being accurate.

    The broader point reaches past Kant. Quotation legends grow because the citation economy rewards speed and punishes verification. A writer who takes the time to trace a line to its actual source pays a cost in word count, in footnotes, and in the appearance of pedantry. A writer who accepts the received attribution on trust pays no such cost, and the received attribution grows stronger with every unverified repetition. Over a century, a footnote in a book on touch becomes a Kant quotation in a surgical textbook, and the discipline stops noticing.

    Hands, Thought, and Signed Languages

    One further reason to care about this correction comes from the linguistics of American Sign Language and the other signed languages of the world. The proposition that the hand is the mind’s instrument is no idle metaphor in Deaf communities or among sign linguists. The hand is the articulatory site of natural human languages with their own phonology, morphology, and syntax, documented since William Stokoe’s 1960 Sign Language Structure opened the field of sign linguistics. Signed languages are languages of the hand in a literal, structural sense, and the evidence for that structural status is empirical and extensive.

    When the falsely attributed Kant line is imported into defenses of signed language, or into gestural theories of cognition, it smuggles in a spurious authority and obscures the actual argument. The work has what it needs already, which is the record of the languages themselves and the descriptive and theoretical work of the linguists who study them. Kant’s signature adds nothing to that record. A fake Kant quotation weakens the record by mortgaging the argument to a line that will not survive a footnote check. Signed languages deserve better citation hygiene than quotation culture has given them.

    Conclusion

    The hand has a real place in Kant’s philosophy. It is the example that cracks open absolute space in 1768. It becomes the organ of touch that makes three-dimensional shape thinkable in 1798. Those two passages are worth reading and worth quoting in Kant’s name. The third sentence, the famous one about the hand as the visible or outer part of the brain, is a twentieth-century attribution that has outrun its evidence. Responsible writing can name it for what it is, a Katz-transmitted attribution from 1925 with no verified Kant source behind it. The legend will keep moving, because legends do, though it does not have to move through our pages unchallenged. A sentence about hands deserves to be held in the hand and checked.

    #asl #attribution #concept #hands #history #kant #knowing #meaning #philosophy #research #thought
  19. Hands as the Language of Thought: Correcting a Kant Attribution

    There is a line about hands that travels well. It reads cleanly, carries an air of philosophical dignity, and arrives in print wearing the name of Immanuel Kant. “The hand is the visible part of the brain,” runs the most common English form, or, in an older rendering, “the hand is the outer brain of man.” The phrase appears in publishing copy, in teaching materials, on Goodreads quotation pages, in popular psychology, in surgical textbooks, in neurology lectures, and in essays on sign language and gesture. It has the shape of something Kant should have said. The difficulty is that no reliable evidence supports treating it as a verified Kant statement.

    This is a small instance in the larger pathology of quotation culture, where an author’s prestige is borrowed to underwrite a sentence he never wrote. The case of the hand, though, carries particular weight, because the sentence is invoked precisely where philosophical authority is wanted, in discussions of embodiment, cognition, touch, manual skill, and the expressive life of the hand. Writers reach for Kant when they want to seal the argument. If the seal is counterfeit, the argument has to stand on its own, and the discipline has to notice the forgery.

    What Kant Actually Wrote About Hands

    Kant wrote about hands more than once, and he wrote about them carefully. In 1768, in his short essay Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, he uses the human hand as his signature example of incongruent counterparts, two objects that share all internal geometric properties and still cannot be superimposed on one another. A right hand and a left hand have identical measurements, identical topology, identical internal relations, and still they will not coincide. The example exposes something about absolute space that relational accounts cannot accommodate. The hand, in this essay, functions as a philosophical instrument, a test case for the metaphysics of orientation.

    Thirty years later, in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht of 1798, Kant returns to the hand through a different doorway. There he treats the sense of touch, seated in the fingertips and their nerve endings, as the sense that allows the human being to work out the three-dimensional shape of a solid body through direct contact. Kant goes so far as to say that without this organ-sense no concept of corporeal shape could be formed at all. Touch, in the Anthropology, carries a cognitive load that vision alone cannot sustain.

    These are recognizable Kant passages, and they are philosophically rich. They give the hand a significant role in his thinking about space, orientation, embodiment, and the conditions under which objects become objects for us. What they do not give us is the famous sentence now repeated in his name.

    The Authority Behind the Attribution

    The trail of the attribution leads to a specific book published in 1925 by David Katz. A biographical note earns its place here, because Katz’s authority is what carried the Kant line forward for a century, and the weight of that authority bears directly on how the legend survived.

    Katz was born in Kassel on 1 October 1884 into a Jewish family, and he studied at Göttingen from 1902 under Georg Elias Müller, whose institute was among the leading centers of experimental psychology in Europe. He took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1906 with a dissertation on the psychology of temporal comparison, and he served as Müller’s assistant from 1907 to 1919, with his volunteer service in the First World War interrupting that work from 1914 to 1918. His 1911 habilitation on color perception, later published as Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, was examined by Müller and by Edmund Husserl. That second reviewer matters here, because it places Katz directly inside the phenomenological tradition at its source, with Husserl himself certifying the 1911 work. After the First World War, Katz spent a short stretch at the Technical University of Hannover on the psychology of prosthetic limbs for wounded veterans, a subject that bears on the concerns of the 1925 book more than has generally been noticed.

    From 1919 until 1933, Katz held the chair of psychology and education at Rostock, and in 1933 the Nazi regime stripped him of that position. He moved first to Manchester, where he worked in T. H. Pear’s laboratory on tactile and gustatory perception, then briefly in London, and in 1937 he took the first Swedish chair of psychology at Stockholm University, the Eneroth chair, becoming a Swedish citizen the same year. He presided over the Thirteenth International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951 and died there on 2 February 1953. The figure whose 1925 sentence about Kant and the hand has been circulating, unchecked, for a century was a serious psychologist with phenomenological credentials certified by Husserl and a research record that runs from color to touch to prosthetics to Gestalt. That is the weight the undocumented attribution has been carrying.

    Where the Quotation Actually Comes From

    In Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, or The World of Touch, Katz writes that Kant once called the hand das äußere Gehirn des Menschen, the outer brain of man. That passage is where most modern quotation chains terminate when traced backward with any rigor. The English variant “the visible part of the brain” appears to be a loose later translation of the Katz-transmitted German phrase, carrying the same undocumented attribution into new languages without retrieving a new source.

    Two features of the Katz passage matter. First, Katz supplies no citation to any Kant text. He provides no volume, no essay, no letter, no lecture transcript. He states the attribution as received wisdom and moves on. Second, the footnote that sits at precisely that point in the Katz text does not lead the reader to Kant at all. It leads to Gerhart Hauptmann, the Nobel-laureate playwright, whose prose passage on the hand Katz quotes in an exalted, almost liturgical register. The Kant attribution and the Hauptmann citation share a footnote, and the Kant portion of that pairing goes undocumented.

    That is the entire basis, so far as the scholarship can currently establish, for the modern circulation of the line as a Kant quotation. A single undocumented attribution in a 1925 monograph on touch, carrying all the authority of a Husserl-certified Göttingen psychologist with a major research record, absorbed into the secondary literature, and repeated without verification for a century.

    Why the Quotation Travels So Well

    The sentence survives because it sounds like Kant. The compression is Kantian in style. Sensation, cognition, and anatomy bind together in a single gesture. The cadence matches the tone of the Anthropology passage on touch closely enough that a reader who encounters both in the same afternoon will remember them as a single thought. The line also carries the epigrammatic finish that quotation culture demands.

    The phrase travels because it pays an intellectual tax that many writers want paid. When someone argues that the hand is a thinking organ, or that manual skill shapes cognition, or that touch is constitutive of our grasp of the world, Kant’s name closes the argument faster than a paragraph of evidence. The quotation does the work of a citation without requiring a citation to exist.

    There is a further, less obvious reason for the sentence’s stubborn life. It has a ready home in at least four disciplines that want it to be Kantian. Philosophers of embodied cognition cite it against Cartesian disembodiment. Hand surgeons and occupational therapists lean on the line to dignify their practice. Neurology textbooks reach for it in their introductions to motor cortex maps. Teachers of signed languages sometimes mobilize a version of it in arguments that signed languages are languages of the hand as the mind’s direct instrument. Each of these fields has a stake in keeping the line in circulation, and none of them has a native incentive to audit its provenance.

    The Scholarly Correction

    A careful study of the hand in Kant, published in a Hungarian philosophical journal at Eszterházy Károly University, observes that the hand never becomes an explicit, thematic center of Kant’s philosophy in the way that later phenomenology would make it. Merleau-Ponty takes up the hand as a chiasmic site of touching and being touched. Heidegger develops handedness, Zuhandenheit, as a defining feature of the being of equipment. Husserl analyzes the double sensation of one hand touching the other. These are explicit philosophical theses about the hand. The hand, in Kant, plays a different role from the thematic centrality later phenomenology will give it. It appears as an example, a test case, and a sense-organ of decisive cognitive importance, which is already a great deal, though it falls short of the hand-centered metaphysics the misattributed quotation implies.

    The quotation legend, though small, distorts philosophy. It suggests that Kant produced a compressed aphorism on the hand as the extension of the mind. What the actual texts show is something else: a careful argument about incongruent counterparts in 1768, and a careful account of touch as shape-sense in 1798. The misattributed sentence flattens both arguments into a Hallmark version of themselves, and then hangs the name Kant on the flattened version.

    The Responsible Formula

    Writers who want Kantian authority without philological error have a narrow path open to them. The 1768 essay on incongruent counterparts grounds the claim that Kant treated the hand as a philosophically significant object. The Anthropology of 1798 grounds the claim that Kant treated touch, seated in the fingertips, as cognitively constitutive of our concept of bodily shape. Writers who wish to credit Kant with the aphorism about the outer brain can honestly describe it as a twentieth-century attribution traceable at least to David Katz in 1925, for which no secure primary Kant passage has yet been established. The formula runs longer than the elegant false quotation, and it will not fit on a poster, though it has the advantage of being accurate.

    The broader point reaches past Kant. Quotation legends grow because the citation economy rewards speed and punishes verification. A writer who takes the time to trace a line to its actual source pays a cost in word count, in footnotes, and in the appearance of pedantry. A writer who accepts the received attribution on trust pays no such cost, and the received attribution grows stronger with every unverified repetition. Over a century, a footnote in a book on touch becomes a Kant quotation in a surgical textbook, and the discipline stops noticing.

    Hands, Thought, and Signed Languages

    One further reason to care about this correction comes from the linguistics of American Sign Language and the other signed languages of the world. The proposition that the hand is the mind’s instrument is no idle metaphor in Deaf communities or among sign linguists. The hand is the articulatory site of natural human languages with their own phonology, morphology, and syntax, documented since William Stokoe’s 1960 Sign Language Structure opened the field of sign linguistics. Signed languages are languages of the hand in a literal, structural sense, and the evidence for that structural status is empirical and extensive.

    When the falsely attributed Kant line is imported into defenses of signed language, or into gestural theories of cognition, it smuggles in a spurious authority and obscures the actual argument. The work has what it needs already, which is the record of the languages themselves and the descriptive and theoretical work of the linguists who study them. Kant’s signature adds nothing to that record. A fake Kant quotation weakens the record by mortgaging the argument to a line that will not survive a footnote check. Signed languages deserve better citation hygiene than quotation culture has given them.

    Conclusion

    The hand has a real place in Kant’s philosophy. It is the example that cracks open absolute space in 1768. It becomes the organ of touch that makes three-dimensional shape thinkable in 1798. Those two passages are worth reading and worth quoting in Kant’s name. The third sentence, the famous one about the hand as the visible or outer part of the brain, is a twentieth-century attribution that has outrun its evidence. Responsible writing can name it for what it is, a Katz-transmitted attribution from 1925 with no verified Kant source behind it. The legend will keep moving, because legends do, though it does not have to move through our pages unchallenged. A sentence about hands deserves to be held in the hand and checked.

    #asl #attribution #concept #hands #history #kant #knowing #meaning #philosophy #research #thought
  20. Hands as the Language of Thought: Correcting a Kant Attribution

    There is a line about hands that travels well. It reads cleanly, carries an air of philosophical dignity, and arrives in print wearing the name of Immanuel Kant. “The hand is the visible part of the brain,” runs the most common English form, or, in an older rendering, “the hand is the outer brain of man.” The phrase appears in publishing copy, in teaching materials, on Goodreads quotation pages, in popular psychology, in surgical textbooks, in neurology lectures, and in essays on sign language and gesture. It has the shape of something Kant should have said. The difficulty is that no reliable evidence supports treating it as a verified Kant statement.

    This is a small instance in the larger pathology of quotation culture, where an author’s prestige is borrowed to underwrite a sentence he never wrote. The case of the hand, though, carries particular weight, because the sentence is invoked precisely where philosophical authority is wanted, in discussions of embodiment, cognition, touch, manual skill, and the expressive life of the hand. Writers reach for Kant when they want to seal the argument. If the seal is counterfeit, the argument has to stand on its own, and the discipline has to notice the forgery.

    What Kant Actually Wrote About Hands

    Kant wrote about hands more than once, and he wrote about them carefully. In 1768, in his short essay Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, he uses the human hand as his signature example of incongruent counterparts, two objects that share all internal geometric properties and still cannot be superimposed on one another. A right hand and a left hand have identical measurements, identical topology, identical internal relations, and still they will not coincide. The example exposes something about absolute space that relational accounts cannot accommodate. The hand, in this essay, functions as a philosophical instrument, a test case for the metaphysics of orientation.

    Thirty years later, in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht of 1798, Kant returns to the hand through a different doorway. There he treats the sense of touch, seated in the fingertips and their nerve endings, as the sense that allows the human being to work out the three-dimensional shape of a solid body through direct contact. Kant goes so far as to say that without this organ-sense no concept of corporeal shape could be formed at all. Touch, in the Anthropology, carries a cognitive load that vision alone cannot sustain.

    These are recognizable Kant passages, and they are philosophically rich. They give the hand a significant role in his thinking about space, orientation, embodiment, and the conditions under which objects become objects for us. What they do not give us is the famous sentence now repeated in his name.

    The Authority Behind the Attribution

    The trail of the attribution leads to a specific book published in 1925 by David Katz. A biographical note earns its place here, because Katz’s authority is what carried the Kant line forward for a century, and the weight of that authority bears directly on how the legend survived.

    Katz was born in Kassel on 1 October 1884 into a Jewish family, and he studied at Göttingen from 1902 under Georg Elias Müller, whose institute was among the leading centers of experimental psychology in Europe. He took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1906 with a dissertation on the psychology of temporal comparison, and he served as Müller’s assistant from 1907 to 1919, with his volunteer service in the First World War interrupting that work from 1914 to 1918. His 1911 habilitation on color perception, later published as Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, was examined by Müller and by Edmund Husserl. That second reviewer matters here, because it places Katz directly inside the phenomenological tradition at its source, with Husserl himself certifying the 1911 work. After the First World War, Katz spent a short stretch at the Technical University of Hannover on the psychology of prosthetic limbs for wounded veterans, a subject that bears on the concerns of the 1925 book more than has generally been noticed.

    From 1919 until 1933, Katz held the chair of psychology and education at Rostock, and in 1933 the Nazi regime stripped him of that position. He moved first to Manchester, where he worked in T. H. Pear’s laboratory on tactile and gustatory perception, then briefly in London, and in 1937 he took the first Swedish chair of psychology at Stockholm University, the Eneroth chair, becoming a Swedish citizen the same year. He presided over the Thirteenth International Congress of Psychology in Stockholm in 1951 and died there on 2 February 1953. The figure whose 1925 sentence about Kant and the hand has been circulating, unchecked, for a century was a serious psychologist with phenomenological credentials certified by Husserl and a research record that runs from color to touch to prosthetics to Gestalt. That is the weight the undocumented attribution has been carrying.

    Where the Quotation Actually Comes From

    In Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, or The World of Touch, Katz writes that Kant once called the hand das äußere Gehirn des Menschen, the outer brain of man. That passage is where most modern quotation chains terminate when traced backward with any rigor. The English variant “the visible part of the brain” appears to be a loose later translation of the Katz-transmitted German phrase, carrying the same undocumented attribution into new languages without retrieving a new source.

    Two features of the Katz passage matter. First, Katz supplies no citation to any Kant text. He provides no volume, no essay, no letter, no lecture transcript. He states the attribution as received wisdom and moves on. Second, the footnote that sits at precisely that point in the Katz text does not lead the reader to Kant at all. It leads to Gerhart Hauptmann, the Nobel-laureate playwright, whose prose passage on the hand Katz quotes in an exalted, almost liturgical register. The Kant attribution and the Hauptmann citation share a footnote, and the Kant portion of that pairing goes undocumented.

    That is the entire basis, so far as the scholarship can currently establish, for the modern circulation of the line as a Kant quotation. A single undocumented attribution in a 1925 monograph on touch, carrying all the authority of a Husserl-certified Göttingen psychologist with a major research record, absorbed into the secondary literature, and repeated without verification for a century.

    Why the Quotation Travels So Well

    The sentence survives because it sounds like Kant. The compression is Kantian in style. Sensation, cognition, and anatomy bind together in a single gesture. The cadence matches the tone of the Anthropology passage on touch closely enough that a reader who encounters both in the same afternoon will remember them as a single thought. The line also carries the epigrammatic finish that quotation culture demands.

    The phrase travels because it pays an intellectual tax that many writers want paid. When someone argues that the hand is a thinking organ, or that manual skill shapes cognition, or that touch is constitutive of our grasp of the world, Kant’s name closes the argument faster than a paragraph of evidence. The quotation does the work of a citation without requiring a citation to exist.

    There is a further, less obvious reason for the sentence’s stubborn life. It has a ready home in at least four disciplines that want it to be Kantian. Philosophers of embodied cognition cite it against Cartesian disembodiment. Hand surgeons and occupational therapists lean on the line to dignify their practice. Neurology textbooks reach for it in their introductions to motor cortex maps. Teachers of signed languages sometimes mobilize a version of it in arguments that signed languages are languages of the hand as the mind’s direct instrument. Each of these fields has a stake in keeping the line in circulation, and none of them has a native incentive to audit its provenance.

    The Scholarly Correction

    A careful study of the hand in Kant, published in a Hungarian philosophical journal at Eszterházy Károly University, observes that the hand never becomes an explicit, thematic center of Kant’s philosophy in the way that later phenomenology would make it. Merleau-Ponty takes up the hand as a chiasmic site of touching and being touched. Heidegger develops handedness, Zuhandenheit, as a defining feature of the being of equipment. Husserl analyzes the double sensation of one hand touching the other. These are explicit philosophical theses about the hand. The hand, in Kant, plays a different role from the thematic centrality later phenomenology will give it. It appears as an example, a test case, and a sense-organ of decisive cognitive importance, which is already a great deal, though it falls short of the hand-centered metaphysics the misattributed quotation implies.

    The quotation legend, though small, distorts philosophy. It suggests that Kant produced a compressed aphorism on the hand as the extension of the mind. What the actual texts show is something else: a careful argument about incongruent counterparts in 1768, and a careful account of touch as shape-sense in 1798. The misattributed sentence flattens both arguments into a Hallmark version of themselves, and then hangs the name Kant on the flattened version.

    The Responsible Formula

    Writers who want Kantian authority without philological error have a narrow path open to them. The 1768 essay on incongruent counterparts grounds the claim that Kant treated the hand as a philosophically significant object. The Anthropology of 1798 grounds the claim that Kant treated touch, seated in the fingertips, as cognitively constitutive of our concept of bodily shape. Writers who wish to credit Kant with the aphorism about the outer brain can honestly describe it as a twentieth-century attribution traceable at least to David Katz in 1925, for which no secure primary Kant passage has yet been established. The formula runs longer than the elegant false quotation, and it will not fit on a poster, though it has the advantage of being accurate.

    The broader point reaches past Kant. Quotation legends grow because the citation economy rewards speed and punishes verification. A writer who takes the time to trace a line to its actual source pays a cost in word count, in footnotes, and in the appearance of pedantry. A writer who accepts the received attribution on trust pays no such cost, and the received attribution grows stronger with every unverified repetition. Over a century, a footnote in a book on touch becomes a Kant quotation in a surgical textbook, and the discipline stops noticing.

    Hands, Thought, and Signed Languages

    One further reason to care about this correction comes from the linguistics of American Sign Language and the other signed languages of the world. The proposition that the hand is the mind’s instrument is no idle metaphor in Deaf communities or among sign linguists. The hand is the articulatory site of natural human languages with their own phonology, morphology, and syntax, documented since William Stokoe’s 1960 Sign Language Structure opened the field of sign linguistics. Signed languages are languages of the hand in a literal, structural sense, and the evidence for that structural status is empirical and extensive.

    When the falsely attributed Kant line is imported into defenses of signed language, or into gestural theories of cognition, it smuggles in a spurious authority and obscures the actual argument. The work has what it needs already, which is the record of the languages themselves and the descriptive and theoretical work of the linguists who study them. Kant’s signature adds nothing to that record. A fake Kant quotation weakens the record by mortgaging the argument to a line that will not survive a footnote check. Signed languages deserve better citation hygiene than quotation culture has given them.

    Conclusion

    The hand has a real place in Kant’s philosophy. It is the example that cracks open absolute space in 1768. It becomes the organ of touch that makes three-dimensional shape thinkable in 1798. Those two passages are worth reading and worth quoting in Kant’s name. The third sentence, the famous one about the hand as the visible or outer part of the brain, is a twentieth-century attribution that has outrun its evidence. Responsible writing can name it for what it is, a Katz-transmitted attribution from 1925 with no verified Kant source behind it. The legend will keep moving, because legends do, though it does not have to move through our pages unchallenged. A sentence about hands deserves to be held in the hand and checked.

    #asl #attribution #concept #hands #history #kant #knowing #meaning #philosophy #research #thought
  21. See Photos of Princess Charlotte Throughout the Years as She Celebrates Her 11th Birthday

    Princess CharlotteCredit: Samir Hussein/WireImage The princess is growing up fast! Princess Charlotte Elizabeth Diana, the second child of…
    #RoyalFamilies #Royal #Royals #Europe #Europa #EU #buckinghampalace #CarlosAlcaraz #katemiddleton #princewilliam #princesscharlotte #PrincessEugenie #royal #RoyalFamily #royals #troopingthecolour
    europesays.com/2960633/

  22. Atomwaffen für Europa?

    Lügen, Leugnung, Verharmlosung, Vertuschung, Legenden, Täuschung, Illusionen und Selbstbetrug

    In keinem anderen Politikfeld spielen diese Faktoren eine so starke Rolle wie bei der militärischen Rüstung. Und ganz besonders dann, wenn es – wie bereit 85 Jahre, seit der Entwicklung von Atombomben zunächst in den USA – um atomare Massenvernichtungsmittel geht und auch im Zusammenhang damit um die sogenannte zivile Nutzung der nuklearen Technologie.

    Fast alle genannten Faktoren aus den letzten 85 Jahren sind auch relevant für die anschwellende Debatte darüber, ob Europa sich eine eigenständige, von den USA möglichst unabhängige Atomwaffenkapazität anschaffen soll. Wobei mit Europa von jetzt ab immer gemeint sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union, also der EU, und die europäischen NATO-Mitglieder. Das sind ja bis auf wenige Ausnahmen dieselben Staaten.
    Ein kurzer Überblick über die Geschichte:

    1) Verharmlosung, Vertuschung, Leugnung

    Seit Anfang der 40er Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts wurden weltweit 2056 unterirdische und oberirdische atomare Explosionstests durchgeführt. Zunächst von den USA, ab 1949 auch von der Sowjetunion sowie in der Folge von Großbritannien, Frankreich und von China. Der letzte Test fand 1980 statt. Viele hunderttausend Menschen und ihre Umwelt sind durch die radioaktive Strahlung betroffen worden. Die Opfer dieser Atomwaffentests werden bis heute geleugnet oder verharmlost. Diese Menschen sind kaum jemals entschädigt worden.

    Das 1996 von der UNO-Generalversammlung beschlossene umfassende Verbot von atomaren Explosionstests – der Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – ist zwar bis heute nicht in Kraft getreten. Doch seit den 90er Jahren gilt ein Testmoratorium und finden Atomwaffentests nur noch durch Computersimulationen statt. Aber das Pentagon, inzwischen unter Trump in „Kriegsministerium“ umbenannt, drängt schon lange darauf, wieder unterirdische oder gar überirdische Atomwaffentests zuzulassen, weil die angeblich notwendige „Modernisierung“ – ein euphemistischer, verharmlosender Begriff – der Atomwaffen, um sie noch schrecklicher, noch zerstörungsstärker, noch zielgenauer, noch weniger berechenbar für den Feind zu machen, sich nur mit unterirdischen oder gar oberirdischen Explosionstests bewerkstelligen lasse. Und Donald Trump hat vor wenigen Monaten angekündigt, daß er solche Tests wieder aufnehmen will. Wenn das tatsächlich passiert, muß man davon ausgehen, das Russland genauso handeln wird und dann in Europa mindestens auch Frankreich. Und die anderen Atomwaffenstaaten – Israel, Indien, Pakistan sowie Nordkorea könnten dann ebenfalls wieder atomare Explosionstests durchfhren.

    2. Lüge

    Die Atomwaffenabwürfe auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki am 6. und 9. August 1945 mit den bekannten katastrophalen Folgen wurden und werden bis heute in der amerikanischen Geschichtsschreibung und in vielen Schulbüchern damit gerechtfertigt, sie seien notwendig gewesen, um Japan zur Kapitulation zu zwingen. Das ist eine glatte Lüge. Der japanische Kaiser hatte längst seine Kapitulationsbereitschaft nach Washington gemeldet, aber die beiden Atombomben wurden dennoch abgeworfen. Vor allem deswegen, weil die USA nicht wollten, dass die sowjetischen Truppen, die damals aus dem Norden Japans auf Tokio vorrückten, den Sieg in diesem Krieg reklamieren.

    3. Verharmlosung

    In den 1950er Jahren hat der damalige westdeutsche Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer die Atomwaffen als „eine andere Form der Artillerie“ verharmlost und verlangt, dass die Bundeswehr Atomwaffen in nationaler Verfügung bekommen sollte. Das haben die USA zum Glück damals nicht zugelassen. Stattdessen wurde das Modell der sogenannten nuklearen Teilhabe etabliert, unter dem in der damalige westdeutsche Bundesrepublik sowie in vier weiteren andere NATO- Staaten amerikanische Atomwaffen stationiert wurden, die im Ernstfall von den US-Miltärs auch an die Streitkräfte der jeweiligen Stationierungsländer weitergegeben und von diesen eingesetzt werden können.

    4. Täuschung

    Franz Josef Strauß, der Militärminister und Atomminister im Kabinett Adenauer, hat die Energiekonzerne der westdeutschen Bundesregublik damals gegen deren bessere betriebswirtschaftliche Erkenntnis, gegen alle volkswirtschaftliche Vernunft, sowie gegen alle ökologischen und Sicherheitsbedenken mit Milliardensubventionen dazu genötigt, auf die Atomenergie zu setzen. Das eigentliche Motiv von Strauß war, dass Westdeutschland alle Technologien und Anlagen erhält, die zur Entwicklung von Atomwaffen erforderlich sind – Atomkraftwerke und Anlagen zur Urananreicherung, sowie schnelle Brüter oder Wiederaufbereitungsanlagen, um Plutonium zu beschaffen – also die beiden Verfahren, um waffenfähiges atomares Spaltmaterial zu gewinnen. Dieses Ziel hat Strauß ja auch fast vollständig erreicht bis auf die zur Plutoniumgewinnung gedachte Wiederaufbereitungsanlage im bayerischen Wackersdorf, deren Bau durch massive Proteste und Widerstand der Anti-AKW-Bewegung verhindert werden konnte.

    5. Selbstbetrug

    In den 1950er Jahren gab es in Westeuropa eine große grundsätzliche Kampagne gegen Atomwaffen unter dem Motto „Kampf dem Atomtod“. Sie ging von Großbritannien aus, aber damals gingen auch in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik und in den anderen NATO-Staaten hunderttausende Menschen auf die Straße. In Westdeutschland ging diese Kampagne Ende der 1950er Jahre zu Ende, im Wesentlichen weil die Führungen der bis dahin aktiv beteiligten Sozialdemokratie, der Gewerkschaften sowie großer Teile der evangelischen Kirche ihren Frieden mit der Atomwaffe schlossen.

    Die Führung der evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland – der EKD-Rat- veröffentlichte 1959 die sogenannte Heidelberger These: „Die Kirche muss die Beteiligung an dem Versuch, durch das Dasein von Atomwaffen einen Frieden in Freiheit zu sichern, als eine heute noch mögliche christliche Handlungsweise anerkennen.“

    Dieses „heute noch“ von vor 65 Jahren ist seitdem immer wieder verlängert worden durch den Rat der EKD in einer Reihe vom Rat so bezeichneter „Friedensdenkschriften“. Die letzte Denkschrift wurde im November 2025 veröffentlicht. Sie hat mit Friedensdenkschrift überhaupt nichts mehr zu tun, sondern ist eine einzige Rechtfertigung der Aufrüstungspolitik, wie sie im Moment in Deutschland und anderen Ländern betrieben wird. Und mit Blick auf die Atomwaffen geht die Formulierung in der Denkschrift sogar noch weiter als bisher, indem sie auch die Option einer eigenständigen atomaren Bewaffnung Europas offenhält.

    Der Selbstbetrug liegt darin, dass die Denkschrift einerseits weiterhin behauptet, die Bereithaltung von Atomwaffen zur Abschreckung und damit auch die Androhung ihres Einsatzes sei auch für Christen legitim. Aber andererseits sei man gegen den Einsatz. Das geht natürlich nicht. Entweder oder: Wenn man glaubwürdig abschrecken will und androht, ist man natürlich auch bereit, einzusetzen. Sonst verliert diese Androhung an Glaubwürdigkeit. Das ist Selbstbetrug. Damit hat sich zumindest die Führung der evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland weitgehend verabschiedet als glaubwürdiger Akteur in der friedenspolitischen Debatte.

    An der Basis der evangelischen Kirche gibt es allerdings massiven Widerspruch, und Gegenschriften mit guten theologischen, moralisch-ethischen und politischen Gegenargumenten zu der Denkschrift.

    6. Illusion

    1949 zündete auch die Sowjetunion ihre erste Atomwaffe. Es begann der atomare Rüstungswettlauf zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion. Doch 1962 erklärte der damalige Pentagonchef Robert McNamara in der Kennedy-Administration: „Jetzt haben wir und die Sowjets jeweils 400 atomare Sprengköpfe. Das reicht zur gegenseitigen Abschreckung. Das reicht zur gegenseitigen Vernichtung. Mit diesen insgesamt 800 Atomsprengköpfen können wir sogar die ganze Welt mehrfach vernichten. Daher können wir aufhören mit dem atomaren Rüstungswettlauf.“

    Eine schöne Illusion des Pentagonchefs. Denn seit Urzeiten ist dem Rüstungswettlauf inhärent ein tiefes gegenseitiges Mißtrauen, die jeweils andere Seite würde immer mehr Waffen produzieren und wahrscheinlich heimlich neue, gefährlichere Waffen und Munitionen entwickeln. Das begann in Urzeiten, als die Menschen zunächst nur ein Messer oder eine Streitaxt hatten. Dann entwickelt einer den Speer und ist damit in der Lage, den anderen auch aus sicherer Entfernung abzustechen. Der andere entwickelt auch einen Speer. Im Mittelalter entwickelt eine Seite Kanonenkugeln, um Stadtmauern zu überwinden, der andere dann natürlich auch.

    Einige Jahre nach McNamaras illusionären Worten entwickelten zunächst die USA und dann auch die Sowjetunion Mehrfachsprechköpfe für ihre Atomraketen. Zum Ende des Kalten Krieges, Mitte der 80er Jahre, kurz bevor Michail Gorbatschow im März 1985 in Moskau Generalsekretär der Kommunistischen Partei und dann Präsident wurde, hatten allein die Sowjetunion und die USA 70.000 einsatzfähige Atomsprengköpfe. Dazu kamen noch die etwa über 2000 insgesamt von Großbritannien, Frankreich, Israel, Indien und Pakistan.

    Diese inhärente Logik des Rüstungswettlaufes wurde im Bereich der Atomwaffen seit den späten 1960er Jahren mehrfach durch Rüstungskontroll- und Abrüstungsverträge zeitweise unterbrochen, aber nie beendet. Und seit Anfang des Jahrtausends wurde alle relevanten Verträge zunächst von den USA und dann zum Teil auch von Rußland aufgekündigt (ABM, INF), oder sie sind ausgelaufen (New START), derzeit ohne Aussicht auf Verhandlung über ein Nachfolgeabkommen.

    7. Legende

    Die zentrale Rechtfertigung für die Existenz von Atomwaffen seit fast 80 Jahren, ist die Behauptung, die gegenseitige Abschreckung und Vernichtungsdrohung habe in den 40 Jahren des Kalten Krieges (1949-1989) den Frieden gesichert.

    Zur dieser Legende hier lediglich zwei von vielen möglichen Einwänden:

    Erstens: Gab es jemals einen sicheren, gerichtsfesten Beweis, daß die Sowjetuion vorhatte, die Teilungslinie zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa, die Stalin, Rooselvelt und Churchill im Februar 1945 in Jalta festgelegt hatten, durch einen militärischen Anfriff auf das Territorium der NATO zu überschreiten? Ich kenne einen solchen Beweis nicht. Und umgekehrt kenne ich auch keinen sicheren, gerichtsfesten Beweis dafür, daß die USA jemals die Absicht hatte zu einem militärischen Angriff auf das Territorium des Warschauer Paktes.

    Mein zweiter Einwand: Diese Legende von der Sicherung des Friedens durch gegenseitge atomare Abschreckung unterschlägt, dass die Welt in diesen 40 Jahren mindestens 31 mal – wie inzwischern veröffentlichte Dokumente belegen – schon mit anderthalb Beinen über dem Abgrund stand, weil entweder in Moskau oder in Washington die Fehlwahrnehmung bestand, die andere Seite habe bereits auf den roten Knopf gedrückt oder sei kurz davor.

    In diesen 40 Jahren des Kalten Krieges konnten all diese Situationen noch gerade rechtzeitig entschärft werden, weil es Kommunikationskanäle zwischen Washington und Moskau gab, unter anderem das „Rote Telefon“. Und es gab immer noch ausreichende zeitliche Spielräume und damit Entscheidungs- und Eingriffsmöglichkeiten für Politiker und Militärs auf beiden Seiten. Das ist heute immer weniger der Fall angesichts der rüstungstechnologischen Entwicklung: Raketen und andere Waffen sowie Munitionen werden immer schneller, zielgenauer, zerstörungsstärker sowie flexibler einsetzbar. Damit werden sie immer bedrohlicher und immer weniger berechenbar für die tatsächliche oder vermeintlich angegriffene andere Seite. Zudem werden durch die zunehmende Automatisierung von Waffen und Munition die Entscheidungen über ihren Einsatz immer weiter der Kontrolle durch Menschen entzogen. Durch den Einsatz von KI wird diese hochgefährliche, weil destabilisierende Entwicklung noch weiter verschärft.

    Ob für die Entschärfung gefährlicher Situationen notwendige Kommunikationskanäle zwischen den USA und Russland derzeit überhaupt noch existieren, ist unklar. Schließlich verstärken öffentliche Erwägungen westlicher Militärs – darunter Generäle der Bundeswehr – über einen präventiven/präemptiven Einsatz von Waffensystemen wie den zur Stationierung in Deutschland ab diesem Jahr vorgesehenen US-Mittelstreckenwaffen – gegen Ziele in Russland die Nervosität in Moskau. Das gilt auch umgekehrt.

    8. Widerlegte Legende

    Mit der Legende vom gesicherten Frieden durch gegenseitige atomare Abschreickung wird ja behauptet, Atomwaffen seien Instrumente zur Verhinderung von Kriegen. Diese Behauptung wird aktuell durch Rußlands völkerrechtswidrigen Krieg gegen die Ukraine widerlegt. Nur mit den Atomwaffen Russlands in der Hinterhand sowie mit gelegentlichen Drohungen, sie auch einzusetzen, konnte Putin diesen konventionellen Krieg gegen das Nachbarland überhaupt beginnen und bis heute fortsetzen. Denn Putin kalkulierte zutreffend, daß die militärische Unterstützung des Westens/der NATO- und EU-Staaten für die Verteidigungsstreitkräfte der Ukraine nicht so weit gehen würde, daß das in den westlichen Hauptstädten politisch postulierte und in Kiev als „Sieg“ definierte Ziel einer Niederlage Rußlands durch Vertreibung aller russischen Truppen vom Territorium der Ukraine inklusive der Krim tatsächlich erreicht würde. Dabei ist die Drohung mit Atomwaffen, um einen konventionellen Krieg zu führen, keineswegs neu. Die USA hatten im Goldkrieg gegen Irak vom Frühjahr 1991 auf ihren Kriegsschiffen im Persischen Golf Atomwaffen stationiert und dem irakischen Herrscher Saddam Hussien mit dem Einsatz dieser Atomwaffen gedroht, sollte Hussein die damals tatsächlich im Irak noch vorhandenen Chemiwaffen einsetzen. Das tat Hussein nicht. Die USA setzten auch keine Atomwaffen ein, dafür aber die damals neu entwickelten Raketen und Artilleriegeschosse, deren Sprengköpfe gehärtet waren durch abgereichertes Uran, auf englisch: Depleted Uranium. Mit verheerenden Folgen für die Bevölkerung vor allem im Südirak, wo die Krebsrate unter der Bevölkerung um ein Vielfaches anstieg. Auch tausende US-amerikanische und britische Soldaten, die im Krieg gegen Irak eingesetzt wurden, erkrankten in der Folge. Die Chemiewaffenbestände Iraks wurde nach Ende des Golfkriegs im April 1991 unter UN0-Aufsicht vollständig zerstört.

    9. Lüge

    Dennoch rechtfertigten US-Präsident George Bush und der britische Premierminister Tony Blair ihren völkerrechtswidrigen Krieg gegen Irak (3. Golfkrieg) vom Frühjahr 2003 mit der Lüge, Irak habe weiterhin chemische und darüber hinaus auch biologische und atomare Massenvernichtungswaffen. Dieser völkermörderische Krieg hatte fürchterliche Folgen. Über eine Million Iraker*innen wurden unmittelbar im Krieg getötet oder starben in der Folge, weil die amerikanischen und britischen Streitkräfte in großem Ausmaß überlebensnotwendige zivile Infrastruktur im Irak (Wasserleitungen, Elektrizitätswerke und Stromleitungen, Produkstionsstätten für Nahrungsmittel etc.) zerstört hatten. Wenn es gerecht in dieser Welt zugehen würde, wären Bush und Blair vom Internationalen Strafgerichtshof zu lebernslanger Haft verurteilt worden und säßen jetzt im Gefängnis. Stattdessen spielt Blair als zweiter Mann hinter Donald Trump in dessen sogenannten „Friedensrat“ für den Gazastreifen erneut eine unheilvolle Rolle im Nahen Osten.

    Die USA und Großbritannien schufen mit dem Krieg gegen Irakvon 2003 und während der nachfolgenden achtjährigen Besatzung des Landes den Nährboden für die Entstehung des sogenannten „Islamischen Staats“, der dann nach dem Abzug der US-Besatzungstruppen ab 2014 ein Drittel des Iraks sowie über die Hälfte des sysrischen Territums eroberte .

    10. Gefährliche Legenden

    Hätte Irak zumindest ein kleines Atomwaffenarsenal besessen, wäre das Land nie von den USA und Großbritannien angegriffen worden: so lautete damals in manchen Hauptstädten nicht nur des Globalen Südens die Schlußfogerung aus dem Krieg, an dessen Ende Saddam Hussein von den US-Streitkräften gefangen genommen und ermordet wurde. Diese Schlußfolgerung stärkte die Militärs und Sicherheitspolitiker, die eine Beschaffung von Atomwaffen für Ihr Land befürworten, weil sie darin die einzig verläßliche Versicherung sehen, niemals von einem anderen Land angegriffen zu werden. Diese Verarbeitung des Irakkrieges schwächt die politische Bindungskraft des Abkommens zur Nichtverbreitung von Atomwaffen, Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Dasselbe gilt für die weitverbreitete Behauptung, die Ukraine wäre niemals von Russland angegriffen worden, wenn sie nicht mit Unterzeichnung des Budapester Memorandums im Jahr 1994 auf die damals noch auf ihrem Territorium lagernden Atomwaffen aus sowjetischen Zeiten verzichtet hätte. Diese Legende ist gefährlicher Unsinn. Denn die Atomwaffen, die damals noch in der Ukraine und auch in Weißrußland und in Kasachstan lagerten, waren zu jedem Zeitpunkt seit dem Ende der Sowjetunion im Dezember 1991 unter vollständiger Kontrolle Moskaus. Die Ukraine hatte zu keinem Zeitpunkt eine eigenständige Atomwaffenkapazität, mit der sie Russland hätte abschrecken und den im Februar 2022 begonnen Angriffskrieg gegen ihr Land verhindern können.

    Wie 2003 im Krieg gegen Irak dienen auch im aktuellen völkerrechtswidrigen Krieg Israels und der USA gegen Iran angeblich vorhandene Atomwaffen als Rechtfertigung. Der Lüge von Netanjahu und Trump, Iran habe kurz vor der Fertigstellung einer Atombombe gestanden und stelle daher eine unmittelbare Bedrohung vor allem für Israel dar, haben die US-Geheimdienste eindeutig widersprochen. Dieser Krieg gegen Iran wird möglicherweise noch gravierendere Auswirkungen haben als der Irakktrieg von 2003: für die 90 Millionenn IranerInnen,und für die Stabilität ihre Landes, in dem es im schlimmsten Fall zu einem blutigen Bürgerkrieg kommen könnte. Und darüber hinaus für die Stabilität und die weitere militärische und sicherheitspolitische Entwicklung in der ganzen Region Westasien (Naher und Mittlerer Osten). Und auch für den atomaren Nichtverbreitungsvertrag (NPT). Saudi Arbeien, Ägypten, die Trükei, Irak, Syrien – sie alle werden ihre Schlußfolgerungen aus diesem israelisch-amerikanischen Krieg ziehen. Und sie werden mit Sicherheit die unilaterale Atomwaffenhegemonie Israels in Westasien nicht auf Dauer dulden. Im schlimmsten Fall könnte es in Westasien zu einem Rüstungswettlauf mit atomaren, chemischen und biologischen Massenvernichtungswaffen kommen.

    Atomwaffen in/für Europa

    Schon der aktuelle Status von Atomwaffen in den europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten der NATO sowie der Türkei stößt bei Staaten außerhalb Europas auf Kritik und Mißtrauen. Und dies völlig zu Recht. Denn zwei dieser Staaten – Frankreich und Großbritannien – besitzen Atomwaffen und weigern sich, genauso wie die drei anderen „offiziellen“ Atomwaffenmächte USA, China und Russland, seit jetzt 65 Jahren beharrlich, ihre Verpflichtung aus dem 1970 vereinbarten NPT zur Abrüstung ihrer atomaren Arsenale nachzukommen. Darüber hinaus sind in fünf weiteren Staaten – Deutschland, den Niederladen, Belgien, Italien und der Türkei – im Rahmen der sogenannten „nuklearen Teilhabe“ Atombomben der USA stationiert, die im Kriegsfall auch an die Luftstreitkräfte dieser fünf Länder zum Einsatz übergeben werden können. Das ist aus Sicht vieler KritikerInnen – auch nach meiner Einschätzung – zumindest ein Verstoß gegen den Geist des NPT, wenn nicht sogar gegen den Buchstaben dieses Vertrages.

    Jegliche Form der Erweiterung dieses Status Quo, sei es durch die Mitverfügung Deutschlands und anderer Staaten über die Atomwaffen Frankreichs oder Großbritanniens, durch die Ausweitung der Teilhabe an Atomwaffen der USA durch ihre Stationierung in Polen oder anderen bislang atomwaffenfreien Ländern oder gar durch die Entwicklung von eigenen Atomwaffen durch welches europäische Land auch immer, würde mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit zu einem Ende des NPT führen.

    Die Debatte über eine eigenständige, von den USA unabhängige atomare Abschreckungskapazität Europas wird ja nicht erst seit Rußlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine geführt und unter Verweis auf die angebliche Absicht und angebliche militärische Fähigkeit Russlands, nach diesem Krieg die baltischen Staaten, Polen sowie spätestens zum Ende dieses Jahrzehnts auch Deutschland und andere NATO-Staaten anzugreifen. Dieses Bedohungszenario ist völlig überzogen und unseriös. Es gibt keinerlei Äußerungen Putins oder von Mitgliedern der Führung in Moskau, die diese Absicht erkennen lassen. Und die Regierung Putin wäre angesichts der militärischen Kräfteverhältnisse zwischen den NATO-Staaten und Rußland auch gar nicht in der Lage, einen solchen Krieg zu führen. Die Friedensbewegung wird diesem überzogenen Bedrohungsszenario, das ja zur Rechtfertigung der derzeitigen Aufrüstung und zur innergesellschaftlichen Militarisierung dient, allerdings nur glaubwürdig und mit Erfolg in der Öffentlichkeit widersprechen können, wenn sie den tatsächlichen heißen Krieg, den Rußland gegen die Ukraine führt, genauso klar als völkerrechtswidrig verurteilt, wie sie auch völkerrechtswidrige Kriege des Westens verurteilt hat. Da gibt es in Teilen der Friedensbewegung leider ziemliche Defizite.

    Die Debatte um Atomwaffen für Europa begann bereits, nachdem Donald Trump in seinem ersten Präsidentschaftswahlkampf im Sommer 2016 die NATO für „obsolet“ erklärte. Bereits am Tag nach der ersten Amtseinführung Trumps im Januar 2017 erklärte der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Roderich Kiesewetter im ARD-Fernsehen, jetzt könne sich „Europa nicht mehr auf den nuklearen Schutzschirm der USA verlassen“, und erhob die Forderung nach Schaffung einer eigenständigen atomaren Bewaffung der EU. Konkret schlug Kiesewetter eine Mitverfügung Deutschlands über Frankreichs Atomwaffen vor. Im Wahlkampf zum EU-Parlament Anfang 2024 erhob dann auch die damalige sozialdemokratische Spitzenkandidatin Katharina Barley diese Forderung. Entsprechende Forderungen und Vorschläge werden seitdem immer häufiger laut angesichts der offensichtlichen Kumpanei zwischen Trump und Putin mit Blick auf den Ukrainekrieg, und weil die NATO-kritischen Äußerungen von Mitgliedern der Administration in Washington in Trumps zweiter Amtseit seit Anfang 2025 deutlich zugenommen haben. In der Debatte über eine militärische Unterstützung für Trumps völkerrechtswidrigen Krieg gegen Iran beschimpfte der US-Präsident die unwilligen europäischen Verbündeten als „unzuverlässig“ und „undankbar“ und drohte mit einem Austritt der USA aus der Militärallianz. Doch es ist ein Fehler, all die diesbezüglichen Äußerungen aus Washington für bare Münze zu halten. Sie werden überbewertet und instrumentalisiert, um die miltärische Aufrüstung der EU zu propagieren bis hin zu einer eigenständigen, von den USA unabhängigen atomaren Bewaffnung.

    Natürlich verfolgt die Trump-Administration-noch stärker als all ihre Vorgänger, und dank Rußlands völkerrechtwidrigem Krieg gegen die Ukraine auch viel erfolgreicher, das Ziel, die finanziellen Lasten in der NATO umzuverteilen und die Europäer zu mehr Militärausgaben zu drängen. Doch davon abgesehen hat sich das grundlegende Interesse der USA an der NATO seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 1949 auch unter Trump nicht verändert: die Militärallianz ist für ihre Führungsmacht das wichtigste Instrument zur Einflußnahme in und Kontrolle über Europa. Auch die Existenz von US-Militärbasen in Deutschland und anderen Staaten Europas sowie deren Nutzung für Washingtons globale Kriege und Drohneneinsätze wären ohne die NATO nicht möglich. All das wird auch Trump nicht aufgeben.

    Die deutsche Debatte über Atomwaffen für Europa bezog sich zunächst nur auf das Modell einer Mitverfügung Deutschlands über die atomaren Arsenale Frankreichs und/oder Großbritanniens. Wobei von Goßbritannien seit dem EU-Austritt des Landes (Brexit) zumindest vorerst nicht mehr die Rede ist. Das Recht auf Mitverfügung reklamierte bereits Westdeutschlands sozial-liberale Regierung unter Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt. Als sie mit der Ratifizierung des NPT im Jahr 1972 den völkerrechtlichen Verzicht auf Atomwaffen erklärte, machte sie den Vorbehalt, daß dieser Verzicht nicht mehr gelte, wenn es im Zuge der europäischen Integration (wie sie inzwischen mit der EU erreicht ist) zu einer gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Europas komme. Dann müßten auch die dann noch in Europa existierenden Atomwaffen vergemeinschaftet werden und Deutschland eine Mitverfügung – einen „zweiten Schlüssel“ – über diese Waffen erhalten. Im 4+2-Abkommen vom September 1990 wurde lediglich der Verzicht des wiedervereinigten Deutschland auf „die Entwicklung, den Besitz, die Lagerung und die Weitergabe“ von Atomwaffen vereinbart. Das Begehren der DDR-Delegation bei den 4+2-Verhandlungen, auch den Verzicht auf „Mitverfügung über Atomwaffen anderer Staaten“ in den Vertrag aufzunehmen, wurde von der westdeutschen Verhandlungsdelegation abgelehnt.

    Inzwischen ist den Befürwortern allerdings immer deutlicher geworden, daß eine Mitverfügung Deutschlands oder anderer Staaten über die Atomwaffen Frankreichs für Paris nicht in Frage kommt. Präsident Emmanuel Macron schlug Anfang dieses Jahres lediglich vor, französische Atomwaffen vorwärts zu stationieren auf das Territorium Deutschlands. Diese Waffen sollen aber unter alleiniger Verfügung und Einsatzkontrolle durch Frankreich bleiben. Paris ist vor allem daran interessiert, daß sich Deutschland finanziell an der viele Milliarden teuren „Modernisierung der Force de Frappe“ beteiligt. Daher werden in jüngster Zeit immer mehr Stimmen laut – vor allem in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (FAZ) – die ähnlich wie Konrad Adenauer in den 1950er Jahren für die nationale Beschaffung und Alleinverfügung Deutschlands von und über Atomwaffen plädieren. Sie argumentieren, da sich seit 1970 und erneut seit 1990 die geopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen grundlegend geändert hätten, sei auch eine Revision der im Rahmen des NPT und des 4+2-Abkommens eingegangenen völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen Deutschlands zum Atomwaffenverzicht erforderlich – sei es durch Aufkündung bzw. Austritt aus diesen Verträgen oder durch deren Neuverhandlung und Korrektur. Eine Aufkündigung oder der Austritt aus internationalen Verträgen ist grundsätzlich möglich unter Beachtung bestimmter Fristen und formaler Verfahrensregeln. Als Problem sehen die Befürworter eines solchens Vorgehens lediglich, daß nach einer Aufkündigung des 4+2-Vertrages milliardenschwere Reparationsforderungen auf die Bundesrepublik als Nachfolgestaat von NAZI-Deutchland zukommen könnten, die mit diesem Abkommen für endültig abgegolten erklärt wurden.

    Über Andreas Zumach:

    Andreas Zumach ist freier Journalist, Buchautor, Vortragsreferent und Moderator, Berlin. Von 1988- 2020 UNO- Korrespondent in Genf, für "die tageszeitung" (taz) in Berlin sowie für weitere Zeitungen, Rundfunk- und Fernsehanstalten. Seine Beiträge sind in der Regel Übernahmen von taz.de, mit freundlicher Genehmigung von Autor und Verlag.

  23. @dockwalk Never believe in what you read in the newspapers or on the Internet. Its usually geared to serve specific interest. It is owned by specific interest. Always keep in mind how Saddam Hussein was FRAMED for weapons of mass destruction and the culprits are enjoying a holiday. We live in a world that only exists for the elite. They allow us to rant and complain so long as we don't disrupt the 'beehive' and 'queen' in charge. #newsmedia #politic

  24. Der britische Spielfilm „Ein Festtag“ von Eva Husson erzählt von einer nicht-standesgemäßen Liebesgeschichte. Im Mittelpunkt steht ein Dienstmädchen.
    Spielfilm über unkonventionelle Liebe: Zeitebenen vernetzen
  25. Pook-Emu Bee: Links For 04-24-26

    I am a bit late today because I had a rush assignment to take care of. But now that it has been taken care of, I present for your enjoyment today's edition of Pook-Emu Bee links (note that "we" will be off until Sunday or Monday since tomorrow's links will be packaged in The Newsletter Leaf Journal.) 1. Massive fire rages at historic NYC church rebuilt after devastating inferno 138 years ago, wild photos show (Zoe Hussain for the New York Post. April 23, 2026.) Terrible news. I hope it ends […]

    social.emucafe.org/naferrell/p

  26. Ende Februar geht es an der Katholischen Akademie in Berlin um "Religiöse Autorität und politische Ordnung". Mit dabei sind L.M. Saccone (@freieuniversitaet), A. Kura (@HumboldtUni), Th. Würtz (auch #FU) & N. El-Hussein.

    🗓️ 20.02.2026
    ⏰ 18:00 Uhr
    🌐 is.gd/71yXKk

    #fu