#articulation — Public Fediverse posts
Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #articulation, aggregated by home.social.
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#articulation : a joint or juncture between bones in the skeleton
- French: Articulation
- German: die Artikulation
- Italian: articolazione / giuntura
- Portuguese: articulação
- Spanish: articulación
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Fill in missing or incorrect translations @ https://wordofthehour.org/r/translations
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https://www.europesays.com/be-fr/30748/ du terrain aux thermes, le mouvement comme médicament #ActivitéPhysiqueAdaptée #AntiInflammatoire #articulation #Autonomie #BalarucLesBains #BE #BEFr #Belgique #Belgium #Bienêtre #CureThermale #Douleur #Health #isométrie #kinésithérapeute #MaisonSportSanté #MOBILITE #muscle #phlébologie #Prévention #rhumatologie #Santé #thermalisme #ThierryLacroix #TonicitéMusculaire
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Articulate people share exactly how they mastered speaking confidently and concisely
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Articulate people share exactly how they mastered speaking confidently and concisely
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Articulate people share exactly how they mastered speaking confidently and concisely
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What is a mood?
There’s a rather unique theory of moods from Christopher Bollas expressed in The Shadow of the Object. He writes (loc 259) that they are “storehouses of unthought known states arriving, apparently out of nowhere, as simple existential facts that envelop up”. There are two things I like about this account:
- The idea of the “storehouse of unthought known states”: they are past states which have become frozen in some way in our unconscious personal idiom. We got stuck in them in the past and, when they return, we get stuck in them in the present.
- This stuckness is experienced phenomenologically as an envelopment. The mood surrounds us, constitutes a sudden atmosphere to our being, cuts us off from the air of the object world.
There’s a positive kernel to this analysis in that he sees them as “perhaps awaiting that day when they can be understood and then either transformed into symbolic derivatives or forgotten” (loc 329). In this sense there’s an emancipatory possibility for moods, particularly when we are in them (isn’t that idiom telling…?) such that we have an opportunity to reach a symbolisation which eluded us at the time. What is going on now, in this moment, with what I am feeling? How is it different from what I was feeling only hours ago? We rarely feel moods settle down on us but their presence is striking once they have: a moment of awareness that offers an opportunity. He writes on loc 1787 of how moods shape our relation to the other:
A curious feature of being in a mood is that it does not totally restrict one’s ability to communicate with the Other. A person can be both in a mood and capable of dealing with phenomena outside the mood space. Yet to an onlooker it is clear that the person who is inside a mood is also not present in some private and fundamental way and this absence marks out the territory of mood space. The space in which a person experiences a mood is created, in my view, both by the territorial implications of the individual’s difference in being and by the Other’s recognition of such a state as a legitimate area in which self experiencing has limited priority over self‒Other relating. It is a space, therefore, that is often licensed by a recognition of its necessity.
What is this necessity? Bollas notes how often we intuit that someone in a mood needs space to emerge from it out of their choice. To try to reach them, particularly to go in and get them out, will be a mistake. He sees moods as fundamentally conserving something from the past. From loc 1692:
Moods typical of a person’s character frequently conserve something that was but is no longer. I will call that experience-memory stored in the internal world a ‘conservative object’. A conservative object is a being state preserved intact within a person’s internal world: it is not intended to change, and acts as a mnemic container of a particular self state conserved because it is linked to the child self’s continuing negotiation with some aspect of the early parental environment.
A child left to solve a problem beyond their capabilities will often write that problem into the fabric of their identity, preserving it as a potentiality which comes to the fore in parallel situations in future. In a mood comes the possibility of reopening the problem as an adult with greater capabilities. It’s not just symbolising what was formerly left beyond the symbolic, it’s a case of finding some movement through the mood (rather than simply waiting for it to pass). It’s getting a grip as an adult on the transformational object that eluded the child: the possibility of resolving, diffusing or transcending what has been experienced as a continual tendency to get stuck on a certain terrain. He continues on loc 2052:
Consequently moods are often the existential registers of the moment of a breakdown between a child and his parents, and they partly indicate the parent’s own developmental arrest, in that the parent was unable to deal appropriately with the child’s particular maturational needs. What had been a self experience in the child, one that could have been integrated into the child’s continuing self development, was rejected by the parents, who failed to perform adequately as ordinary ‘transformational objects’, so that a self state was destined to be frozen by the child into what I have called a conservative object – subsequently represented only through moods.
#articulation #christopherBollas #moods #TheShadowOfTheObject
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What is a mood?
There’s a rather unique theory of moods from Christopher Bollas expressed in The Shadow of the Object. He writes (loc 259) that they are “storehouses of unthought known states arriving, apparently out of nowhere, as simple existential facts that envelop up”. There are two things I like about this account:
- The idea of the “storehouse of unthought known states”: they are past states which have become frozen in some way in our unconscious personal idiom. We got stuck in them in the past and, when they return, we get stuck in them in the present.
- This stuckness is experienced phenomenologically as an envelopment. The mood surrounds us, constitutes a sudden atmosphere to our being, cuts us off from the air of the object world.
There’s a positive kernel to this analysis in that he sees them as “perhaps awaiting that day when they can be understood and then either transformed into symbolic derivatives or forgotten” (loc 329). In this sense there’s an emancipatory possibility for moods, particularly when we are in them (isn’t that idiom telling…?) such that we have an opportunity to reach a symbolisation which eluded us at the time. What is going on now, in this moment, with what I am feeling? How is it different from what I was feeling only hours ago? We rarely feel moods settle down on us but their presence is striking once they have: a moment of awareness that offers an opportunity. He writes on loc 1787 of how moods shape our relation to the other:
A curious feature of being in a mood is that it does not totally restrict one’s ability to communicate with the Other. A person can be both in a mood and capable of dealing with phenomena outside the mood space. Yet to an onlooker it is clear that the person who is inside a mood is also not present in some private and fundamental way and this absence marks out the territory of mood space. The space in which a person experiences a mood is created, in my view, both by the territorial implications of the individual’s difference in being and by the Other’s recognition of such a state as a legitimate area in which self experiencing has limited priority over self‒Other relating. It is a space, therefore, that is often licensed by a recognition of its necessity.
What is this necessity? Bollas notes how often we intuit that someone in a mood needs space to emerge from it out of their choice. To try to reach them, particularly to go in and get them out, will be a mistake. He sees moods as fundamentally conserving something from the past. From loc 1692:
Moods typical of a person’s character frequently conserve something that was but is no longer. I will call that experience-memory stored in the internal world a ‘conservative object’. A conservative object is a being state preserved intact within a person’s internal world: it is not intended to change, and acts as a mnemic container of a particular self state conserved because it is linked to the child self’s continuing negotiation with some aspect of the early parental environment.
A child left to solve a problem beyond their capabilities will often write that problem into the fabric of their identity, preserving it as a potentiality which comes to the fore in parallel situations in future. In a mood comes the possibility of reopening the problem as an adult with greater capabilities. It’s not just symbolising what was formerly left beyond the symbolic, it’s a case of finding some movement through the mood (rather than simply waiting for it to pass). It’s getting a grip as an adult on the transformational object that eluded the child: the possibility of resolving, diffusing or transcending what has been experienced as a continual tendency to get stuck on a certain terrain. He continues on loc 2052:
Consequently moods are often the existential registers of the moment of a breakdown between a child and his parents, and they partly indicate the parent’s own developmental arrest, in that the parent was unable to deal appropriately with the child’s particular maturational needs. What had been a self experience in the child, one that could have been integrated into the child’s continuing self development, was rejected by the parents, who failed to perform adequately as ordinary ‘transformational objects’, so that a self state was destined to be frozen by the child into what I have called a conservative object – subsequently represented only through moods.
#articulation #christopherBollas #moods #TheShadowOfTheObject
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What is a mood?
There’s a rather unique theory of moods from Christopher Bollas expressed in The Shadow of the Object. He writes (loc 259) that they are “storehouses of unthought known states arriving, apparently out of nowhere, as simple existential facts that envelop up”. There are two things I like about this account:
- The idea of the “storehouse of unthought known states”: they are past states which have become frozen in some way in our unconscious personal idiom. We got stuck in them in the past and, when they return, we get stuck in them in the present.
- This stuckness is experienced phenomenologically as an envelopment. The mood surrounds us, constitutes a sudden atmosphere to our being, cuts us off from the air of the object world.
There’s a positive kernel to this analysis in that he sees them as “perhaps awaiting that day when they can be understood and then either transformed into symbolic derivatives or forgotten” (loc 329). In this sense there’s an emancipatory possibility for moods, particularly when we are in them (isn’t that idiom telling…?) such that we have an opportunity to reach a symbolisation which eluded us at the time. What is going on now, in this moment, with what I am feeling? How is it different from what I was feeling only hours ago? We rarely feel moods settle down on us but their presence is striking once they have: a moment of awareness that offers an opportunity. He writes on loc 1787 of how moods shape our relation to the other:
A curious feature of being in a mood is that it does not totally restrict one’s ability to communicate with the Other. A person can be both in a mood and capable of dealing with phenomena outside the mood space. Yet to an onlooker it is clear that the person who is inside a mood is also not present in some private and fundamental way and this absence marks out the territory of mood space. The space in which a person experiences a mood is created, in my view, both by the territorial implications of the individual’s difference in being and by the Other’s recognition of such a state as a legitimate area in which self experiencing has limited priority over self‒Other relating. It is a space, therefore, that is often licensed by a recognition of its necessity.
What is this necessity? Bollas notes how often we intuit that someone in a mood needs space to emerge from it out of their choice. To try to reach them, particularly to go in and get them out, will be a mistake. He sees moods as fundamentally conserving something from the past. From loc 1692:
Moods typical of a person’s character frequently conserve something that was but is no longer. I will call that experience-memory stored in the internal world a ‘conservative object’. A conservative object is a being state preserved intact within a person’s internal world: it is not intended to change, and acts as a mnemic container of a particular self state conserved because it is linked to the child self’s continuing negotiation with some aspect of the early parental environment.
A child left to solve a problem beyond their capabilities will often write that problem into the fabric of their identity, preserving it as a potentiality which comes to the fore in parallel situations in future. In a mood comes the possibility of reopening the problem as an adult with greater capabilities. It’s not just symbolising what was formerly left beyond the symbolic, it’s a case of finding some movement through the mood (rather than simply waiting for it to pass). It’s getting a grip as an adult on the transformational object that eluded the child: the possibility of resolving, diffusing or transcending what has been experienced as a continual tendency to get stuck on a certain terrain. He continues on loc 2052:
Consequently moods are often the existential registers of the moment of a breakdown between a child and his parents, and they partly indicate the parent’s own developmental arrest, in that the parent was unable to deal appropriately with the child’s particular maturational needs. What had been a self experience in the child, one that could have been integrated into the child’s continuing self development, was rejected by the parents, who failed to perform adequately as ordinary ‘transformational objects’, so that a self state was destined to be frozen by the child into what I have called a conservative object – subsequently represented only through moods.
#articulation #christopherBollas #moods #TheShadowOfTheObject
-
What is a mood?
There’s a rather unique theory of moods from Christopher Bollas expressed in The Shadow of the Object. He writes (loc 259) that they are “storehouses of unthought known states arriving, apparently out of nowhere, as simple existential facts that envelop up”. There are two things I like about this account:
- The idea of the “storehouse of unthought known states”: they are past states which have become frozen in some way in our unconscious personal idiom. We got stuck in them in the past and, when they return, we get stuck in them in the present.
- This stuckness is experienced phenomenologically as an envelopment. The mood surrounds us, constitutes a sudden atmosphere to our being, cuts us off from the air of the object world.
There’s a positive kernel to this analysis in that he sees them as “perhaps awaiting that day when they can be understood and then either transformed into symbolic derivatives or forgotten” (loc 329). In this sense there’s an emancipatory possibility for moods, particularly when we are in them (isn’t that idiom telling…?) such that we have an opportunity to reach a symbolisation which eluded us at the time. What is going on now, in this moment, with what I am feeling? How is it different from what I was feeling only hours ago? We rarely feel moods settle down on us but their presence is striking once they have: a moment of awareness that offers an opportunity. He writes on loc 1787 of how moods shape our relation to the other:
A curious feature of being in a mood is that it does not totally restrict one’s ability to communicate with the Other. A person can be both in a mood and capable of dealing with phenomena outside the mood space. Yet to an onlooker it is clear that the person who is inside a mood is also not present in some private and fundamental way and this absence marks out the territory of mood space. The space in which a person experiences a mood is created, in my view, both by the territorial implications of the individual’s difference in being and by the Other’s recognition of such a state as a legitimate area in which self experiencing has limited priority over self‒Other relating. It is a space, therefore, that is often licensed by a recognition of its necessity.
What is this necessity? Bollas notes how often we intuit that someone in a mood needs space to emerge from it out of their choice. To try to reach them, particularly to go in and get them out, will be a mistake. He sees moods as fundamentally conserving something from the past. From loc 1692:
Moods typical of a person’s character frequently conserve something that was but is no longer. I will call that experience-memory stored in the internal world a ‘conservative object’. A conservative object is a being state preserved intact within a person’s internal world: it is not intended to change, and acts as a mnemic container of a particular self state conserved because it is linked to the child self’s continuing negotiation with some aspect of the early parental environment.
A child left to solve a problem beyond their capabilities will often write that problem into the fabric of their identity, preserving it as a potentiality which comes to the fore in parallel situations in future. In a mood comes the possibility of reopening the problem as an adult with greater capabilities. It’s not just symbolising what was formerly left beyond the symbolic, it’s a case of finding some movement through the mood (rather than simply waiting for it to pass). It’s getting a grip as an adult on the transformational object that eluded the child: the possibility of resolving, diffusing or transcending what has been experienced as a continual tendency to get stuck on a certain terrain. He continues on loc 2052:
Consequently moods are often the existential registers of the moment of a breakdown between a child and his parents, and they partly indicate the parent’s own developmental arrest, in that the parent was unable to deal appropriately with the child’s particular maturational needs. What had been a self experience in the child, one that could have been integrated into the child’s continuing self development, was rejected by the parents, who failed to perform adequately as ordinary ‘transformational objects’, so that a self state was destined to be frozen by the child into what I have called a conservative object – subsequently represented only through moods.
#articulation #christopherBollas #moods #TheShadowOfTheObject
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Demystifying the unconscious: building the meshwork in everyday life
When you’re reading a book a certain phrase will sometime stand out to you. When you’re listening to music a certain lyric is heard with a greater force than the others. When you’re listening to a friend a particular image they use will sometimes feel oddly prominent. These are common experiences which all embody the role of unconscious communication in the sense that an aspect of what you encounter evokes something in you which is not immediately present to your consciousness.
These experiences often prompt reflection and elaboration. We might play the song on repeat, dwell on the phrase from the book or find ourselves returning to the unsettling image. There are a wide range of mental activities associated with such reflection and elaboration. It might be quite analytical (“why did that bother me so much?”) just as easily as aesthetic (i.e. continually returning to a track over the course of the day) or creative (i.e. writing something as you mull over what you’ve read). In doing so these actions often lead to further things which grab our attention, move us in some way and direct our attention in ways which cannot be explained by what is immediately present in your consciousness. In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud described this in terms of a network:
The dream thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings: they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium.
We can explore this meshwork through free association, creative practice and through analysis. But we build the meshwork through everyday actions of objects in the world evoking things in us which lead us to act in a range of ways. Bollas suggests in The Evocative Object World a kind of magnetism in which “organised inner compositions … attract further impressions and serve as the self’s creative articulation of the inner compositions themselves” (pg 30). If we’re already occupied by a particular effect of a recent object then things are likely to evoked in us which reflect that as associations bind together into particular clusters within the meshwork. Crucially this is something we can do with other people outside analysis. Indeed it’s a common experience as Bollas suggests on pg 14:
Indeed, in free dialogue, when two people free associate in the course of a long conversation, as is typical of friends, they create unconscious lines of thought, working associatively, as they jump from one topic to the next. This is easy to do because we are open to such unconscious mutual inlfuence when relaxed in the presence of another.
This process is underway across all communication. What we encounter in others evokes things in us which are not reducible to the contents of our consciousness i.e. it’s all the reactions we are having which aren’t simply a matter of what we are explicitly thinking about. The same process is happening in reverse in ways which lead the other person to act in relation to us, much as we are acting in relation to them. This in turn then produces an emergent relational layer which provides its own source of evocative objects which feed into the interaction.
What makes the analytical process unique is that it formalises this feature of interaction in order to make it apparent. The analyst’s subjectivity is used as a device to bring the unconscious into explicit form as an object for the interaction. However the practice of free association itself can be done just as readily outside of this setting, even if it might remain restricted to the preconscious:
The treatment is begun by the patient being required to put himself in the position of an attentive and dispassionate self-observer, merely to read off all the time the surface of his consciousness, and on the one hand to make a duty of the most complete honesty while on the other not to hold back from any communication, even if (1) he feels that it is too disagreeable or if (2) he judges that it is nonsensical or (3) too unimportant or (4) irrelevant to what is being looked for. It is uniformly found that precisely those ideas which provoke these mentioned reactions are of particular value in discovering the forgotten material.
In practice this is attending to what comes to mind and how you react to it. Then narrating it internally or externally, with a view to evoking something else. It’s the same mode of relating to evocative objects, it’s just that an internal object is evoking something within you. The things you feel reticent to explore are exactly what is most interesting to do this with. It also suggests a parallel practice of cultural engagement centred on dwelling on what is evoked when reading, watching, listening etc. This isn’t delving into repressed contents strictly speaking but it enables a generative engagement with unconscious process with the capacity to change one’s relationship to it.
The thing which fascinates me here is the relationship between evocation and articulation. When objects evoke something within us they are contributing to the meshwork and through our articulation, trying to put what has been evoked into words, we are steering the subsequent elaboration of that meshwork. This is the essence of creativity I think: the relationship between what Freud called the ‘psychic intensities’ of everyday life (contributions to the meshwork and the stuff of dreams) and practices of symbolic expression which remain in contact with those psychic intensities.
#articulation #associations #dreams #Freud #meshwork #Network #thought #unconscious
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Demystifying the unconscious: building the meshwork in everyday life
When you’re reading a book a certain phrase will sometime stand out to you. When you’re listening to music a certain lyric is heard with a greater force than the others. When you’re listening to a friend a particular image they use will sometimes feel oddly prominent. These are common experiences which all embody the role of unconscious communication in the sense that an aspect of what you encounter evokes something in you which is not immediately present to your consciousness.
These experiences often prompt reflection and elaboration. We might play the song on repeat, dwell on the phrase from the book or find ourselves returning to the unsettling image. There are a wide range of mental activities associated with such reflection and elaboration. It might be quite analytical (“why did that bother me so much?”) just as easily as aesthetic (i.e. continually returning to a track over the course of the day) or creative (i.e. writing something as you mull over what you’ve read). In doing so these actions often lead to further things which grab our attention, move us in some way and direct our attention in ways which cannot be explained by what is immediately present in your consciousness. In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud described this in terms of a network:
The dream thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings: they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium.
We can explore this meshwork through free association, creative practice and through analysis. But we build the meshwork through everyday actions of objects in the world evoking things in us which lead us to act in a range of ways. Bollas suggests in The Evocative Object World a kind of magnetism in which “organised inner compositions … attract further impressions and serve as the self’s creative articulation of the inner compositions themselves” (pg 30). If we’re already occupied by a particular effect of a recent object then things are likely to evoked in us which reflect that as associations bind together into particular clusters within the meshwork. Crucially this is something we can do with other people outside analysis. Indeed it’s a common experience as Bollas suggests on pg 14:
Indeed, in free dialogue, when two people free associate in the course of a long conversation, as is typical of friends, they create unconscious lines of thought, working associatively, as they jump from one topic to the next. This is easy to do because we are open to such unconscious mutual inlfuence when relaxed in the presence of another.
This process is underway across all communication. What we encounter in others evokes things in us which are not reducible to the contents of our consciousness i.e. it’s all the reactions we are having which aren’t simply a matter of what we are explicitly thinking about. The same process is happening in reverse in ways which lead the other person to act in relation to us, much as we are acting in relation to them. This in turn then produces an emergent relational layer which provides its own source of evocative objects which feed into the interaction.
What makes the analytical process unique is that it formalises this feature of interaction in order to make it apparent. The analyst’s subjectivity is used as a device to bring the unconscious into explicit form as an object for the interaction. However the practice of free association itself can be done just as readily outside of this setting, even if it might remain restricted to the preconscious:
The treatment is begun by the patient being required to put himself in the position of an attentive and dispassionate self-observer, merely to read off all the time the surface of his consciousness, and on the one hand to make a duty of the most complete honesty while on the other not to hold back from any communication, even if (1) he feels that it is too disagreeable or if (2) he judges that it is nonsensical or (3) too unimportant or (4) irrelevant to what is being looked for. It is uniformly found that precisely those ideas which provoke these mentioned reactions are of particular value in discovering the forgotten material.
In practice this is attending to what comes to mind and how you react to it. Then narrating it internally or externally, with a view to evoking something else. It’s the same mode of relating to evocative objects, it’s just that an internal object is evoking something within you. The things you feel reticent to explore are exactly what is most interesting to do this with. It also suggests a parallel practice of cultural engagement centred on dwelling on what is evoked when reading, watching, listening etc. This isn’t delving into repressed contents strictly speaking but it enables a generative engagement with unconscious process with the capacity to change one’s relationship to it.
The thing which fascinates me here is the relationship between evocation and articulation. When objects evoke something within us they are contributing to the meshwork and through our articulation, trying to put what has been evoked into words, we are steering the subsequent elaboration of that meshwork. This is the essence of creativity I think: the relationship between what Freud called the ‘psychic intensities’ of everyday life (contributions to the meshwork and the stuff of dreams) and practices of symbolic expression which remain in contact with those psychic intensities.
#articulation #associations #dreams #Freud #meshwork #Network #thought #unconscious
-
Demystifying the unconscious: building the meshwork in everyday life
When you’re reading a book a certain phrase will sometime stand out to you. When you’re listening to music a certain lyric is heard with a greater force than the others. When you’re listening to a friend a particular image they use will sometimes feel oddly prominent. These are common experiences which all embody the role of unconscious communication in the sense that an aspect of what you encounter evokes something in you which is not immediately present to your consciousness.
These experiences often prompt reflection and elaboration. We might play the song on repeat, dwell on the phrase from the book or find ourselves returning to the unsettling image. There are a wide range of mental activities associated with such reflection and elaboration. It might be quite analytical (“why did that bother me so much?”) just as easily as aesthetic (i.e. continually returning to a track over the course of the day) or creative (i.e. writing something as you mull over what you’ve read). In doing so these actions often lead to further things which grab our attention, move us in some way and direct our attention in ways which cannot be explained by what is immediately present in your consciousness. In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud described this in terms of a network:
The dream thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings: they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium.
We can explore this meshwork through free association, creative practice and through analysis. But we build the meshwork through everyday actions of objects in the world evoking things in us which lead us to act in a range of ways. Bollas suggests in The Evocative Object World a kind of magnetism in which “organised inner compositions … attract further impressions and serve as the self’s creative articulation of the inner compositions themselves” (pg 30). If we’re already occupied by a particular effect of a recent object then things are likely to evoked in us which reflect that as associations bind together into particular clusters within the meshwork. Crucially this is something we can do with other people outside analysis. Indeed it’s a common experience as Bollas suggests on pg 14:
Indeed, in free dialogue, when two people free associate in the course of a long conversation, as is typical of friends, they create unconscious lines of thought, working associatively, as they jump from one topic to the next. This is easy to do because we are open to such unconscious mutual inlfuence when relaxed in the presence of another.
This process is underway across all communication. What we encounter in others evokes things in us which are not reducible to the contents of our consciousness i.e. it’s all the reactions we are having which aren’t simply a matter of what we are explicitly thinking about. The same process is happening in reverse in ways which lead the other person to act in relation to us, much as we are acting in relation to them. This in turn then produces an emergent relational layer which provides its own source of evocative objects which feed into the interaction.
What makes the analytical process unique is that it formalises this feature of interaction in order to make it apparent. The analyst’s subjectivity is used as a device to bring the unconscious into explicit form as an object for the interaction. However the practice of free association itself can be done just as readily outside of this setting, even if it might remain restricted to the preconscious:
The treatment is begun by the patient being required to put himself in the position of an attentive and dispassionate self-observer, merely to read off all the time the surface of his consciousness, and on the one hand to make a duty of the most complete honesty while on the other not to hold back from any communication, even if (1) he feels that it is too disagreeable or if (2) he judges that it is nonsensical or (3) too unimportant or (4) irrelevant to what is being looked for. It is uniformly found that precisely those ideas which provoke these mentioned reactions are of particular value in discovering the forgotten material.
In practice this is attending to what comes to mind and how you react to it. Then narrating it internally or externally, with a view to evoking something else. It’s the same mode of relating to evocative objects, it’s just that an internal object is evoking something within you. The things you feel reticent to explore are exactly what is most interesting to do this with. It also suggests a parallel practice of cultural engagement centred on dwelling on what is evoked when reading, watching, listening etc. This isn’t delving into repressed contents strictly speaking but it enables a generative engagement with unconscious process with the capacity to change one’s relationship to it.
The thing which fascinates me here is the relationship between evocation and articulation. When objects evoke something within us they are contributing to the meshwork and through our articulation, trying to put what has been evoked into words, we are steering the subsequent elaboration of that meshwork. This is the essence of creativity I think: the relationship between what Freud called the ‘psychic intensities’ of everyday life (contributions to the meshwork and the stuff of dreams) and practices of symbolic expression which remain in contact with those psychic intensities.
#articulation #associations #dreams #Freud #meshwork #Network #thought #unconscious
-
Demystifying the unconscious: building the meshwork in everyday life
When you’re reading a book a certain phrase will sometime stand out to you. When you’re listening to music a certain lyric is heard with a greater force than the others. When you’re listening to a friend a particular image they use will sometimes feel oddly prominent. These are common experiences which all embody the role of unconscious communication in the sense that an aspect of what you encounter evokes something in you which is not immediately present to your consciousness.
These experiences often prompt reflection and elaboration. We might play the song on repeat, dwell on the phrase from the book or find ourselves returning to the unsettling image. There are a wide range of mental activities associated with such reflection and elaboration. It might be quite analytical (“why did that bother me so much?”) just as easily as aesthetic (i.e. continually returning to a track over the course of the day) or creative (i.e. writing something as you mull over what you’ve read). In doing so these actions often lead to further things which grab our attention, move us in some way and direct our attention in ways which cannot be explained by what is immediately present in your consciousness. In the Interpretation of Dreams Freud described this in terms of a network:
The dream thoughts to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings: they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium.
We can explore this meshwork through free association, creative practice and through analysis. But we build the meshwork through everyday actions of objects in the world evoking things in us which lead us to act in a range of ways. Bollas suggests in The Evocative Object World a kind of magnetism in which “organised inner compositions … attract further impressions and serve as the self’s creative articulation of the inner compositions themselves” (pg 30). If we’re already occupied by a particular effect of a recent object then things are likely to evoked in us which reflect that as associations bind together into particular clusters within the meshwork. Crucially this is something we can do with other people outside analysis. Indeed it’s a common experience as Bollas suggests on pg 14:
Indeed, in free dialogue, when two people free associate in the course of a long conversation, as is typical of friends, they create unconscious lines of thought, working associatively, as they jump from one topic to the next. This is easy to do because we are open to such unconscious mutual inlfuence when relaxed in the presence of another.
This process is underway across all communication. What we encounter in others evokes things in us which are not reducible to the contents of our consciousness i.e. it’s all the reactions we are having which aren’t simply a matter of what we are explicitly thinking about. The same process is happening in reverse in ways which lead the other person to act in relation to us, much as we are acting in relation to them. This in turn then produces an emergent relational layer which provides its own source of evocative objects which feed into the interaction.
What makes the analytical process unique is that it formalises this feature of interaction in order to make it apparent. The analyst’s subjectivity is used as a device to bring the unconscious into explicit form as an object for the interaction. However the practice of free association itself can be done just as readily outside of this setting, even if it might remain restricted to the preconscious:
The treatment is begun by the patient being required to put himself in the position of an attentive and dispassionate self-observer, merely to read off all the time the surface of his consciousness, and on the one hand to make a duty of the most complete honesty while on the other not to hold back from any communication, even if (1) he feels that it is too disagreeable or if (2) he judges that it is nonsensical or (3) too unimportant or (4) irrelevant to what is being looked for. It is uniformly found that precisely those ideas which provoke these mentioned reactions are of particular value in discovering the forgotten material.
In practice this is attending to what comes to mind and how you react to it. Then narrating it internally or externally, with a view to evoking something else. It’s the same mode of relating to evocative objects, it’s just that an internal object is evoking something within you. The things you feel reticent to explore are exactly what is most interesting to do this with. It also suggests a parallel practice of cultural engagement centred on dwelling on what is evoked when reading, watching, listening etc. This isn’t delving into repressed contents strictly speaking but it enables a generative engagement with unconscious process with the capacity to change one’s relationship to it.
The thing which fascinates me here is the relationship between evocation and articulation. When objects evoke something within us they are contributing to the meshwork and through our articulation, trying to put what has been evoked into words, we are steering the subsequent elaboration of that meshwork. This is the essence of creativity I think: the relationship between what Freud called the ‘psychic intensities’ of everyday life (contributions to the meshwork and the stuff of dreams) and practices of symbolic expression which remain in contact with those psychic intensities.
#articulation #associations #dreams #Freud #meshwork #Network #thought #unconscious
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An Attempt at a Compelling Articulation of Forth's Practical Strengths and Eter
https://im-just-lee.ing/forth-why-cb234c03.txt
#HackerNews #Forth #Programming #Articulation #Practical #Strengths #HackerNews
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#articulation : a joint or juncture between bones in the skeleton
- French: Articulation
- German: die Artikulation
- Italian: articolazione / giuntura
- Portuguese: articulação
- Spanish: articulación
------------
Fill in missing or incorrect translations @ https://wordofthehour.org/r/translations
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https://www.europesays.com/fr/482507/ Ils ont juste changé leur façon de marcher… et la douleur a disparu #AntiInflammatoire #arthrose #ArthroseDuGenou #Articulation #Cartilage #FR #France #Genou #Health #Invalidité #Kinésithérapie #MaladieDégénérative #marché #Santé
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LLMs become more dangerous as they rapidly get easier to use
This is a concise summary by Ethan Mollick of what I increasingly see as a key factor driving the evolution of consumer-facing LLMs:
Using AI well used to be a pretty challenging process which involved crafting a prompt using techniques like chain-of-thought along with learning tips and tricks to get the most out of your AI. In a recent series of experiments, however, we have discovered that these techniques don’t really help anymore. Powerful AI models are just getting better at doing what you ask them to or even figuring out what you want and going beyond what you ask (and no, threatening them or being nice to them does not seem to help on average).
What limited truth there was to the inflated discourse of ‘prompt engineering’ has largely evaporated at this point, leaving us in a strange position. The conversational approach I’ve always advocated, literally treating the LLM as an interlocutor analogous to a human collaborator, remains the best way of getting the most out of these systems. But neither this nor ‘prompt engineering’ is necessary to get LLMs to perform usefully in real world contexts.
This seems like an obviously positive thing for users. However my concern is the burden of articulation with LLMs, explaining what you want in a clear and substantive way, was a necessary condition for responsible use of LLMs. This burden was never sustainable at the level of a commercially viable product. It presupposed a consistent level of reflexivity, a degree of cultural capital and a fluency with writing which was always incompatible with the kind of mass market software that has a user base of one billion plus.
However it did ensure that users were thinking carefully about their use because you literally couldn’t produce valuable outcomes with an LLM unless you were doing this. Now it’s very easy to get LLMs to infer what you want, with success much of the time to at least some degree. What’s lost in the process is the reflexivity which came prior to use (i.e. the moment when you stopped to think “what am I actually asking Claude to do here?”) and the learning which came through reflecting on the output and the related interaction it generates, as your sense of what you were trying to do is refined and expanded through dialogue.
This is how Claude Opus 4 glossed my analysis here. It conveyed my own words back to me but it did it in a way which surfaced an element (“the pause”) which was only latent in my original phrasing (“the moment when”), leading me to reflect more on the temporal dimension to “the burden of articulation”:
The “burden of articulation” you describe served as a kind of productive friction – it forced users to crystallize their thinking before engaging with the tool. There’s something valuable in that pause, that moment of having to translate a vague intention into clear language. It’s reminiscent of how writing itself can clarify thinking, or how explaining a problem to someone else often helps you understand it better yourself.
In this sense friction with LLMs was a positive thing because it necessitated meta-cognition. The optimisation of the human-model interaction erodes a feature which I would argue was immensely important, even if its value is only manifested outside of the interaction itself. It doesn’t I think level the playing field because those with the necessary capital and fluency can still use LLMs in a deeper and more reflective way, with better outcomes emerging from the process.
But it does create worrying implications for organisations which build this practice into their roles. Earlier today I heard Cory Doctorow use the brilliant analogy of asbestos to describe LLMs being incorporated into digital infrastructure in ways which we will likely later have to remove at immense cost. What’s the equivalent analogy for the social practice of those operating within the organisations?
https://soundcloud.com/qanonanonymous/cory-doctorow-destroys-enshitification-e338
#articulation #chatbots #coryDoctorow #LLMs #metacognition #promptEngineering #prompting #reflexivity
-
LLMs become more dangerous as they rapidly get easier to use
This is a concise summary by Ethan Mollick of what I increasingly see as a key factor driving the evolution of consumer-facing LLMs:
Using AI well used to be a pretty challenging process which involved crafting a prompt using techniques like chain-of-thought along with learning tips and tricks to get the most out of your AI. In a recent series of experiments, however, we have discovered that these techniques don’t really help anymore. Powerful AI models are just getting better at doing what you ask them to or even figuring out what you want and going beyond what you ask (and no, threatening them or being nice to them does not seem to help on average).
What limited truth there was to the inflated discourse of ‘prompt engineering’ has largely evaporated at this point, leaving us in a strange position. The conversational approach I’ve always advocated, literally treating the LLM as an interlocutor analogous to a human collaborator, remains the best way of getting the most out of these systems. But neither this nor ‘prompt engineering’ is necessary to get LLMs to perform usefully in real world contexts.
This seems like an obviously positive thing for users. However my concern is the burden of articulation with LLMs, explaining what you want in a clear and substantive way, was a necessary condition for responsible use of LLMs. This burden was never sustainable at the level of a commercially viable product. It presupposed a consistent level of reflexivity, a degree of cultural capital and a fluency with writing which was always incompatible with the kind of mass market software that has a user base of one billion plus.
However it did ensure that users were thinking carefully about their use because you literally couldn’t produce valuable outcomes with an LLM unless you were doing this. Now it’s very easy to get LLMs to infer what you want, with success much of the time to at least some degree. What’s lost in the process is the reflexivity which came prior to use (i.e. the moment when you stopped to think “what am I actually asking Claude to do here?”) and the learning which came through reflecting on the output and the related interaction it generates, as your sense of what you were trying to do is refined and expanded through dialogue.
This is how Claude Opus 4 glossed my analysis here. It conveyed my own words back to me but it did it in a way which surfaced an element (“the pause”) which was only latent in my original phrasing (“the moment when”), leading me to reflect more on the temporal dimension to “the burden of articulation”:
The “burden of articulation” you describe served as a kind of productive friction – it forced users to crystallize their thinking before engaging with the tool. There’s something valuable in that pause, that moment of having to translate a vague intention into clear language. It’s reminiscent of how writing itself can clarify thinking, or how explaining a problem to someone else often helps you understand it better yourself.
In this sense friction with LLMs was a positive thing because it necessitated meta-cognition. The optimisation of the human-model interaction erodes a feature which I would argue was immensely important, even if its value is only manifested outside of the interaction itself. It doesn’t I think level the playing field because those with the necessary capital and fluency can still use LLMs in a deeper and more reflective way, with better outcomes emerging from the process.
But it does create worrying implications for organisations which build this practice into their roles. Earlier today I heard Cory Doctorow use the brilliant analogy of asbestos to describe LLMs being incorporated into digital infrastructure in ways which we will likely later have to remove at immense cost. What’s the equivalent analogy for the social practice of those operating within the organisations?
https://soundcloud.com/qanonanonymous/cory-doctorow-destroys-enshitification-e338
#articulation #chatbots #coryDoctorow #LLMs #metacognition #promptEngineering #prompting #reflexivity
-
LLMs become more dangerous as they rapidly get easier to use
This is a concise summary by Ethan Mollick of what I increasingly see as a key factor driving the evolution of consumer-facing LLMs:
Using AI well used to be a pretty challenging process which involved crafting a prompt using techniques like chain-of-thought along with learning tips and tricks to get the most out of your AI. In a recent series of experiments, however, we have discovered that these techniques don’t really help anymore. Powerful AI models are just getting better at doing what you ask them to or even figuring out what you want and going beyond what you ask (and no, threatening them or being nice to them does not seem to help on average).
What limited truth there was to the inflated discourse of ‘prompt engineering’ has largely evaporated at this point, leaving us in a strange position. The conversational approach I’ve always advocated, literally treating the LLM as an interlocutor analogous to a human collaborator, remains the best way of getting the most out of these systems. But neither this nor ‘prompt engineering’ is necessary to get LLMs to perform usefully in real world contexts.
This seems like an obviously positive thing for users. However my concern is the burden of articulation with LLMs, explaining what you want in a clear and substantive way, was a necessary condition for responsible use of LLMs. This burden was never sustainable at the level of a commercially viable product. It presupposed a consistent level of reflexivity, a degree of cultural capital and a fluency with writing which was always incompatible with the kind of mass market software that has a user base of one billion plus.
However it did ensure that users were thinking carefully about their use because you literally couldn’t produce valuable outcomes with an LLM unless you were doing this. Now it’s very easy to get LLMs to infer what you want, with success much of the time to at least some degree. What’s lost in the process is the reflexivity which came prior to use (i.e. the moment when you stopped to think “what am I actually asking Claude to do here?”) and the learning which came through reflecting on the output and the related interaction it generates, as your sense of what you were trying to do is refined and expanded through dialogue.
This is how Claude Opus 4 glossed my analysis here. It conveyed my own words back to me but it did it in a way which surfaced an element (“the pause”) which was only latent in my original phrasing (“the moment when”), leading me to reflect more on the temporal dimension to “the burden of articulation”:
The “burden of articulation” you describe served as a kind of productive friction – it forced users to crystallize their thinking before engaging with the tool. There’s something valuable in that pause, that moment of having to translate a vague intention into clear language. It’s reminiscent of how writing itself can clarify thinking, or how explaining a problem to someone else often helps you understand it better yourself.
In this sense friction with LLMs was a positive thing because it necessitated meta-cognition. The optimisation of the human-model interaction erodes a feature which I would argue was immensely important, even if its value is only manifested outside of the interaction itself. It doesn’t I think level the playing field because those with the necessary capital and fluency can still use LLMs in a deeper and more reflective way, with better outcomes emerging from the process.
But it does create worrying implications for organisations which build this practice into their roles. Earlier today I heard Cory Doctorow use the brilliant analogy of asbestos to describe LLMs being incorporated into digital infrastructure in ways which we will likely later have to remove at immense cost. What’s the equivalent analogy for the social practice of those operating within the organisations?
https://soundcloud.com/qanonanonymous/cory-doctorow-destroys-enshitification-e338
#articulation #chatbots #coryDoctorow #LLMs #metacognition #promptEngineering #prompting #reflexivity
-
LLMs become more dangerous as they rapidly get easier to use
This is a concise summary by Ethan Mollick of what I increasingly see as a key factor driving the evolution of consumer-facing LLMs:
Using AI well used to be a pretty challenging process which involved crafting a prompt using techniques like chain-of-thought along with learning tips and tricks to get the most out of your AI. In a recent series of experiments, however, we have discovered that these techniques don’t really help anymore. Powerful AI models are just getting better at doing what you ask them to or even figuring out what you want and going beyond what you ask (and no, threatening them or being nice to them does not seem to help on average).
What limited truth there was to the inflated discourse of ‘prompt engineering’ has largely evaporated at this point, leaving us in a strange position. The conversational approach I’ve always advocated, literally treating the LLM as an interlocutor analogous to a human collaborator, remains the best way of getting the most out of these systems. But neither this nor ‘prompt engineering’ is necessary to get LLMs to perform usefully in real world contexts.
This seems like an obviously positive thing for users. However my concern is the burden of articulation with LLMs, explaining what you want in a clear and substantive way, was a necessary condition for responsible use of LLMs. This burden was never sustainable at the level of a commercially viable product. It presupposed a consistent level of reflexivity, a degree of cultural capital and a fluency with writing which was always incompatible with the kind of mass market software that has a user base of one billion plus.
However it did ensure that users were thinking carefully about their use because you literally couldn’t produce valuable outcomes with an LLM unless you were doing this. Now it’s very easy to get LLMs to infer what you want, with success much of the time to at least some degree. What’s lost in the process is the reflexivity which came prior to use (i.e. the moment when you stopped to think “what am I actually asking Claude to do here?”) and the learning which came through reflecting on the output and the related interaction it generates, as your sense of what you were trying to do is refined and expanded through dialogue.
This is how Claude Opus 4 glossed my analysis here. It conveyed my own words back to me but it did it in a way which surfaced an element (“the pause”) which was only latent in my original phrasing (“the moment when”), leading me to reflect more on the temporal dimension to “the burden of articulation”:
The “burden of articulation” you describe served as a kind of productive friction – it forced users to crystallize their thinking before engaging with the tool. There’s something valuable in that pause, that moment of having to translate a vague intention into clear language. It’s reminiscent of how writing itself can clarify thinking, or how explaining a problem to someone else often helps you understand it better yourself.
In this sense friction with LLMs was a positive thing because it necessitated meta-cognition. The optimisation of the human-model interaction erodes a feature which I would argue was immensely important, even if its value is only manifested outside of the interaction itself. It doesn’t I think level the playing field because those with the necessary capital and fluency can still use LLMs in a deeper and more reflective way, with better outcomes emerging from the process.
But it does create worrying implications for organisations which build this practice into their roles. Earlier today I heard Cory Doctorow use the brilliant analogy of asbestos to describe LLMs being incorporated into digital infrastructure in ways which we will likely later have to remove at immense cost. What’s the equivalent analogy for the social practice of those operating within the organisations?
https://soundcloud.com/qanonanonymous/cory-doctorow-destroys-enshitification-e338
#articulation #chatbots #coryDoctorow #LLMs #metacognition #promptEngineering #prompting #reflexivity
-
LLMs become more dangerous as they rapidly get easier to use
This is a concise summary by Ethan Mollick of what I increasingly see as a key factor driving the evolution of consumer-facing LLMs:
Using AI well used to be a pretty challenging process which involved crafting a prompt using techniques like chain-of-thought along with learning tips and tricks to get the most out of your AI. In a recent series of experiments, however, we have discovered that these techniques don’t really help anymore. Powerful AI models are just getting better at doing what you ask them to or even figuring out what you want and going beyond what you ask (and no, threatening them or being nice to them does not seem to help on average).
What limited truth there was to the inflated discourse of ‘prompt engineering’ has largely evaporated at this point, leaving us in a strange position. The conversational approach I’ve always advocated, literally treating the LLM as an interlocutor analogous to a human collaborator, remains the best way of getting the most out of these systems. But neither this nor ‘prompt engineering’ is necessary to get LLMs to perform usefully in real world contexts.
This seems like an obviously positive thing for users. However my concern is the burden of articulation with LLMs, explaining what you want in a clear and substantive way, was a necessary condition for responsible use of LLMs. This burden was never sustainable at the level of a commercially viable product. It presupposed a consistent level of reflexivity, a degree of cultural capital and a fluency with writing which was always incompatible with the kind of mass market software that has a user base of one billion plus.
However it did ensure that users were thinking carefully about their use because you literally couldn’t produce valuable outcomes with an LLM unless you were doing this. Now it’s very easy to get LLMs to infer what you want, with success much of the time to at least some degree. What’s lost in the process is the reflexivity which came prior to use (i.e. the moment when you stopped to think “what am I actually asking Claude to do here?”) and the learning which came through reflecting on the output and the related interaction it generates, as your sense of what you were trying to do is refined and expanded through dialogue.
This is how Claude Opus 4 glossed my analysis here. It conveyed my own words back to me but it did it in a way which surfaced an element (“the pause”) which was only latent in my original phrasing (“the moment when”), leading me to reflect more on the temporal dimension to “the burden of articulation”:
The “burden of articulation” you describe served as a kind of productive friction – it forced users to crystallize their thinking before engaging with the tool. There’s something valuable in that pause, that moment of having to translate a vague intention into clear language. It’s reminiscent of how writing itself can clarify thinking, or how explaining a problem to someone else often helps you understand it better yourself.
In this sense friction with LLMs was a positive thing because it necessitated meta-cognition. The optimisation of the human-model interaction erodes a feature which I would argue was immensely important, even if its value is only manifested outside of the interaction itself. It doesn’t I think level the playing field because those with the necessary capital and fluency can still use LLMs in a deeper and more reflective way, with better outcomes emerging from the process.
But it does create worrying implications for organisations which build this practice into their roles. Earlier today I heard Cory Doctorow use the brilliant analogy of asbestos to describe LLMs being incorporated into digital infrastructure in ways which we will likely later have to remove at immense cost. What’s the equivalent analogy for the social practice of those operating within the organisations?
https://soundcloud.com/qanonanonymous/cory-doctorow-destroys-enshitification-e338
#articulation #chatbots #coryDoctorow #LLMs #metacognition #promptEngineering #prompting #reflexivity
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#articulation : a joint or juncture between bones in the skeleton
- French: Articulation
- German: die Artikulation
- Italian: articolazione / giuntura
- Portuguese: articulação
- Spanish: articulación
------------
See previous words @ https://wordofthehour.org/r/past
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Why You Should Move Your Site Away from Weebly (YC W07)
https://www.articulation.blog/p/why-you-should-move-your-site-away-from-weebly
#ycombinator #articulation #blog #website_creator #website_builder #free -
Why You Should Move Your Site Away from Weebly (YC W07)
https://www.articulation.blog/p/why-you-should-move-your-site-away-from-weebly
#ycombinator #articulation #blog #website_creator #website_builder #free -
Why You Should Move Your Site Away from Weebly (YC W07)
https://www.articulation.blog/p/why-you-should-move-your-site-away-from-weebly
#ycombinator #articulation #blog #website_creator #website_builder #free -
Why You Should Move Your Site Away from Weebly (YC W07)
https://www.articulation.blog/p/why-you-should-move-your-site-away-from-weebly
#ycombinator #articulation #blog #website_creator #website_builder #free -
#articulation : a joint or juncture between bones in the skeleton
- French: Articulation
- German: die Artikulation
- Italian: articolazione / giuntura
- Portuguese: articulação
- Spanish: articulación
------------
See previous words @ https://wordofthehour.org/r/past
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Pour tous les problèmes D'articulation https://adminshopify18.wordpress.com/2024/12/09/pour-tous-les-problemes-darticulation/ #Articulation, #Dos, #Genou, #Ligament, #Pied
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From The Body Keeps the Score by Bessel van der Kolk pg 51:
All trauma is preverbal. Shakespeare captures this state of speechless terror in Macbeth, after the murdered king’s body is discovered: ‘Oh horror! horror! horror! Tongue nor heart cannot conceive nor name thee! Confusion now hath made his masterpiece!’ Under extreme conditions people may scream obscenities, call for their mothers, howl in terror, or simply shut down. Victims of assaults and accidents sit mute and frozen in emergency rooms; traumatized children ‘lose their tongues’ and refuse to speak. Photographs of combat soldiers show hollow-eyed men staring mutely into a void.
Even years later traumatized people often have enormous difficulty telling other people what has happened to them. Their bodies reexperience terror, rage, and helplessness, as well as the impulse to fight or flee, but these feelings are almost impossible to articulate. Trauma by nature drives us to the edge of comprehension, cutting us off from language based on common experience or an imaginable past.
This doesn’t mean that people can’t talk about a tragedy that has befallen them. Sooner or later most survivors, like the veterans in chapter 1, come up with what many of them call their ‘cover story’ that offers some explanation for their symptoms and behavior for public consumption. These stories, however, rarely capture the inner truth of the experience. It is enormously difficult to organize one’s experience into language.
https://markcarrigan.net/2024/10/12/all-trauma-is-preverbal/
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I came home recently to find that my request to a gardener to “cut back the shrubs” led him to absolutely decimate them:
What does ‘cut back’ mean? I meant slightly trim overgrowth but leave them otherwise intact. It was a text I sent while travelling and listening to a podcast, without putting much real thought into it. To him it meant significantly reduce the quantity of the shrub. The problem was my instruction rather than the gardener’s execution. I gave a vague and misleading request which was easy to misinterpret.
I would suggest this is what many users do with LLMs. It often leads them to blame the machine for what was actually a failure on their part to provide adequate instructions. Prompting requires clarity about your intentions, which is something most of us lack at least some of the time.
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AI Forensic Linguistic Circuit Boards
So how’s that AI analysis coming along on the Zodiac Killer cards and letters?
Don Seawater posts to OPORDAnalytical.com, Nov. 12, 2013, explaining there are as many as “40-50 letters” from Arthur Leigh Allen to Phyllis Seawater.
(Click image to enlarge in separate browsing tab.)Well, come on, Law Enforcement and Netflix, what is taking so long?!
— Please remind me again on how the Unabomber was eventually identified. —
The community Forensic Linguists are ready . . .
Data! Data! We cannot make bricks without clay (or straw).BRING ON THE LETTERS!
Here’s some Ackerman Industry analysis for you. Check out these forensic linguistic circuit boards.
Any questions?
People,
(“If it . . . quacks like a duck . . .”)The Zodiac killer was Arthur Leigh Allen.
Word Choice Not By Chance! Phraseology Not Random! Non-Contextual AND Contextual Idiolect Matches Not Accidental!
Aston, Berkeley, Cambridge, Cardiff, Carnegie Mellon, Chicago, Fresno State, Glasgow, Harvard, Hofstra, ILE, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, UMass, Yale, York . . . ?
What say ye? . . .Put this in your stylometric chatbots and vape it.
[Performs mic drop with disembodied robot arm in place of mic]
Arthur Leigh Allen’s First letter (p.1) from Atascadero State Hospital
to Phyllis Hensley Seawater (1976)
R.P. Ackerman performs Diction and Phraseology Parallel Analysis on scans from originals
uploaded to YouTube by the Seawater family, Oct. 26, 2021 Arthur Leigh Allen’s First letter (p.2) from Atascadero State Hospital
to Phyllis Hensley Seawater (1976)
R.P. Ackerman performs Diction and Phraseology Parallel Analysis on scans from originals
uploaded to YouTube by the Seawater family, Oct. 26, 2021 [office src="https://onedrive.live.com/embed?resid=C5ACC3A97C0D4108%211379&authkey=!AG7lAoKWXvYdVzk&em=2" width="1200" height="600"]Arthur Leigh Allen’s Second letter (six pages) from Atascadero State Hospital
Arthur Leigh Allen’s letter to Phyllis Hensley Seawater re: Phone Tapping and Melvin Belli
to Phyllis Hensley Seawater (Dec. 7, 1976)
R.P. Ackerman performs Diction and Phraseology Parallel Analysis on scans from originals
uploaded to YouTube by the Seawater family, Oct. 31, 2021
[If PDF scrolling embed does not open on screen, click link to open in new browser tab.]
(June 13, 1992 – 2 ½ mos. before Allen’s death)
R.P. Ackerman performs Diction and Phraseology Parallel Analysis on scans from originals
uploaded to YouTube by the Seawater family, Nov. 8, 2021© 2024-2026 Robert Peter Ackerman
zodiacconfessed.wordpress.comRelated Posts
Other Blog Topics
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
Arthur Leigh Allen’s Lake Berryessa Map Sketch
2024: The Curious Case of the Year in The Zodiac Killer Research
#AI #allen #arthur #articulation #ArtificialIntelligence #author #benicia #bot #cards #chatbot #collocation #corpus #envelopes #evidence #ForensicCriminology #ForensicLinguistics #gaviota #idiolect #lee #leigh #letters #linguistic #machineLearning #mailed #murder #Napa #neuralNetwork #phoneme #phonic #psycholinguistics #Riverside #SanFrancisco #scrape #scraping #sent #serial #solution #stylometry #Vallejo #WebDataExtraction #WebHarvesting #WebScraping #writing #ZodiacKiller -
@etcetera curieux de mieux appréhender les contraintes autour du genoux droit, du bassin et des lombaires dans la deuxième photographie. Tensions, étirements, compressions au niveau des muscles, tendons, ligaments et os. #tenségrité #articulation
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https://youtu.be/q4KF3ZP4wzY I've always felt that articulation is the most human part of making music. Maybe even the most difficult thing for software to emulate. #music #musictheory #articulation
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#articulation : a joint or juncture between bones in the skeleton
- French: Articulation
- German: die Artikulation
- Italian: articolazione / giuntura
- Portuguese: articulação
- Spanish: articulación
------------
See previous words @ https://wordofthehour.org/r/past
