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#infops — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #infops, aggregated by home.social.

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  1. FRI JAN/23: ⚛️🕵️🧑‍💻🧑‍🏫 I will be presenting a webinar on online information disorder phenomena and tactics, and on investigation of these, for the Secular Student Alliance
    🗓️ secularstudents.org/webinars/e

    #OSINT #SOCMINT #infOps #mediaLit #socialMedia #platforms #disinfo #misinfo

  2. FRI JAN/23: ⚛️🕵️🧑‍💻🧑‍🏫 I will be presenting a webinar on online information disorder phenomena and tactics, and on investigation of these, for the Secular Student Alliance
    🗓️ secularstudents.org/webinars/e

    #OSINT #SOCMINT #infOps #mediaLit #socialMedia #platforms #disinfo #misinfo

  3. 🧑‍💻🕵️🤖🛡 I was featured on Intel Focus' Intelligence Spotlight podcast, speaking with Qais Alamdar about information warfare evolving in the age of AI, and the challenges and opportunities for researchers and OSINT/SOCMINT investigators in the counter-infops/-misinfo space.
    🎧▶️ intelfocus.org/podcasts/inside

    #OSINT #SOCMINT #AI #genAI #infowar #infops #disinfo #misinfo #natsec

  4. 🧑‍💻🕵️🤖🛡 I was featured on Intel Focus' Intelligence Spotlight podcast, speaking with Qais Alamdar about information warfare evolving in the age of AI, and the challenges and opportunities for researchers and OSINT/SOCMINT investigators in the counter-infops/-misinfo space.
    🎧▶️ intelfocus.org/podcasts/inside

    #OSINT #SOCMINT #AI #genAI #infowar #infops #disinfo #misinfo #natsec

  5. 🇬🇧🧑‍💻🗯🗳 I just featured in a live stream at Nathan Ormond’s channel “Digital Gnosis”, talking about influence operations, misinformation, propaganda, and strategies of political polarisation in the UK.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=SOZRvelQP1A

    #infops #misinformation #disinformation #propaganda #UK #politics #polarization #OSINT #SOCMINT #astroturfing

  6. 🇬🇧🧑‍💻🗯🗳 I just featured in a live stream at Nathan Ormond’s channel “Digital Gnosis”, talking about influence operations, misinformation, propaganda, and strategies of political polarisation in the UK.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=SOZRvelQP1A

    #infops #misinformation #disinformation #propaganda #UK #politics #polarization #OSINT #SOCMINT #astroturfing

  7. 🕵️🧑‍💻👺🌏 My seminar at the @maxplanckgesellschaft Institute for Human Development's Center for Humans and Machines; on my investigation of a high-spend, months-long, cross-platform, international, merc-proxied influence operation; and on my investigation of patterns and infrastructure of misinformation spread fomenting the 2024 UK summer riots; has been published by the institute.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=HMnA0uflj6
    📄 mpib-berlin.mpg.de/events/3989

    #UK #Europe #infops #disinfo #misinfo #platforms #OSINT #SOCMINT

  8. 🕵️🧑‍💻👺🌏 My seminar at the @maxplanckgesellschaft Institute for Human Development's Center for Humans and Machines; on my investigation of a high-spend, months-long, cross-platform, international, merc-proxied influence operation; and on my investigation of patterns and infrastructure of misinformation spread fomenting the 2024 UK summer riots; has been published by the institute.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=HMnA0uflj6
    📄 mpib-berlin.mpg.de/events/3989

    #UK #Europe #infops #disinfo #misinfo #platforms #OSINT #SOCMINT

  9. 🧑‍💻📲📲🧑‍💻 ARTE just released its documentary on the "phone farm" phenomenon in Vietnam: industrial-scale online astroturfing enabled by specialized software providers and a market in hacked/boilerplate accounts. It features my and @marcowenjones' findings from our investigation last year of an influence operation that employed one of these outfits.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=sjW-jdKpsw (👀 13:37)

    #infops #phoneFarms #Vietnam #inauthentic #astroturfing #OSINT #TheQatarPlot #Meta #Facebook #platforms #socialMedia

  10. 🧑‍💻📲📲🧑‍💻 ARTE just released its documentary on the "phone farm" phenomenon in Vietnam: industrial-scale online astroturfing enabled by specialized software providers and a market in hacked/boilerplate accounts. It features my and @marcowenjones' findings from our investigation last year of an influence operation that employed one of these outfits.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=sjW-jdKpsw (👀 13:37)

    #infops #phoneFarms #Vietnam #inauthentic #astroturfing #OSINT #TheQatarPlot #Meta #Facebook #platforms #socialMedia

  11. 🧑‍💻🕵️🧑‍🏫🇬🇧 The recording of my and @marcowenjones' webinar for the Central London Humanists, on our investigations of international cross-platform influence operation "The Qatar Plot", and of misinformation spread during the Southport-spinoff riots that followed in the UK, has been published.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=OmmTWleCCX

    #misinformation #SouthportRiots #UK #infops #influenceOperations #disinformation #astroturfing #socialMedia #webinar

  12. 🧑‍💻🕵️🧑‍🏫🇬🇧 The recording of my and @marcowenjones' webinar for the Central London Humanists, on our investigations of international cross-platform influence operation "The Qatar Plot", and of misinformation spread during the Southport-spinoff riots that followed in the UK, has been published.
    ▶️ youtube.com/watch?v=OmmTWleCCX

    #misinformation #SouthportRiots #UK #infops #influenceOperations #disinformation #astroturfing #socialMedia #webinar

  13. 〝Issue One recently hosted a panel discussion to dig deeper into the issues covered in our most recent report: "Flooding the Gap: How Big Tech’s Failures Empowered Foreign Adversaries and Undermined the 2024 U.S. Election."〞
    youtube.com/watch?v=9L_Tf027V6

    #FIMI #infops #tech #platforms #elections

  14. 〝Issue One recently hosted a panel discussion to dig deeper into the issues covered in our most recent report: "Flooding the Gap: How Big Tech’s Failures Empowered Foreign Adversaries and Undermined the 2024 U.S. Election."〞
    youtube.com/watch?v=9L_Tf027V6

    #FIMI #infops #tech #platforms #elections

  15. «Researchers at non-profit organisation Reset Tech, Check First and EU DisinfoLab found evidence of co-ordinated posts about Georgescu on social media and stated that Meta had also failed to enforce its own policies, which “demonstrates Meta’s failure to follow the European Commission’s recommendations to comply with the DSA”.»

    ft.com/content/2855bf6f-4b40-4

    #Romania #elections #EU #infops #DSA #regulation #tech #platorms #democracy

  16. «Researchers at non-profit organisation Reset Tech, Check First and EU DisinfoLab found evidence of co-ordinated posts about Georgescu on social media and stated that Meta had also failed to enforce its own policies, which “demonstrates Meta’s failure to follow the European Commission’s recommendations to comply with the DSA”.»

    ft.com/content/2855bf6f-4b40-4

    #Romania #elections #EU #infops #DSA #regulation #tech #platorms #democracy

  17. Worth noting: both known American gov-run covert astroturfed online influence operations ("ChinaAngVirus"; and the CENTCOM psyop exposed in "Twitter Files" #8, and separately analyzed by SIO/Graphika) started during the first Trump administration. We can expect to see more of this during the second.

    #Trump #astroturfing #disinformation #infops

  18. Worth noting: both known American gov-run covert astroturfed online influence operations ("ChinaAngVirus"; and the CENTCOM psyop exposed in "Twitter Files" #8, and separately analyzed by SIO/Graphika) started during the first Trump administration. We can expect to see more of this during the second.

    #Trump #astroturfing #disinformation #infops

  19. Day 3/3 of the workshop on misinformation, influence operations, and open-source intelligence that I've been delivering for the Center for Humans and Machines at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. Loved sharing the knowledge here.

    #OSINT #infops #misinfo #workshop #Berlin

  20. Day 3/3 of the workshop on misinformation, influence operations, and open-source intelligence that I've been delivering for the Center for Humans and Machines at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. Loved sharing the knowledge here.

    #OSINT #infops #misinfo #workshop #Berlin

  21. Presenting a seminar on my investigations of influence operations and misinformation bursts, with the Center for Humans and Machines at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin today.

    Seminar details: mpib-berlin.mpg.de/events/3989

    #misinformation #infops #Berlin #seminars #OSINT #Research

  22. Presenting a seminar on my investigations of influence operations and misinformation bursts, with the Center for Humans and Machines at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin today.

    Seminar details: mpib-berlin.mpg.de/events/3989

    #misinformation #infops #Berlin #seminars #OSINT #Research

  23. «“Comment sections designed to foster reader engagement lack robust security measures, allowing bad actors to post freely, change identities, and create the illusion of genuine grassroots campaigns rather than orchestrated propaganda.”»

    wired.com/story/russia-disinfo

    #Trump #Disinformation #Russia #infops #DailyMail #astroturfing

  24. «“Comment sections designed to foster reader engagement lack robust security measures, allowing bad actors to post freely, change identities, and create the illusion of genuine grassroots campaigns rather than orchestrated propaganda.”»

    wired.com/story/russia-disinfo

    #Trump #Disinformation #Russia #infops #DailyMail #astroturfing

  25. 〝Muslims in Michigan began seeing pro-Israel ads this fall praising Vice President Kamala Harris for marrying a Jewish man and backing the Jewish state. Jews in Pennsylvania, meanwhile, saw ads from the same group with the opposite message: Harris wanted to stop U.S. arms shipments to Israel.〞
    washingtonpost.com/politics/20

    #infops #America #elections #swingStates #politics #falsePositives #disinformation

  26. 〝Muslims in Michigan began seeing pro-Israel ads this fall praising Vice President Kamala Harris for marrying a Jewish man and backing the Jewish state. Jews in Pennsylvania, meanwhile, saw ads from the same group with the opposite message: Harris wanted to stop U.S. arms shipments to Israel.〞
    washingtonpost.com/politics/20

    #infops #America #elections #swingStates #politics #falsePositives #disinformation

  27. TUE NOV/19: 🗞🧑‍💻🕵️🧑‍🏫 Join me in Berlin or via Webex at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, with its Center for Humans and Machines, presenting a seminar about recent influence operations and misinformation bursts I've been investigating.
    🔗 mpib-berlin.mpg.de/events/3989

    #Berlin #seminar #misinformation #infops #Disinformation #investigation #research #OSINT

  28. TUE NOV/19: 🗞🧑‍💻🕵️🧑‍🏫 Join me in Berlin or via Webex at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, with its Center for Humans and Machines, presenting a seminar about recent influence operations and misinformation bursts I've been investigating.
    🔗 mpib-berlin.mpg.de/events/3989

    #Berlin #seminar #misinformation #infops #Disinformation #investigation #research #OSINT

  29. Just wanted to remind everyone that the bait-and-switch operation "Our America", run by staff at MRC and other right-wing entities, is still operational, and has now gone full-blown against Kamala Harris, especially targeting Hispanic Americans.

    Exposé at @fwiwnews by @kylewilsontharp: fwiw.news/p/whose-america-righ

    #elections #infops #America #USA #politics #HarrisWalz2024 #Hispanics

  30. Just wanted to remind everyone that the bait-and-switch operation "Our America", run by staff at MRC and other right-wing entities, is still operational, and has now gone full-blown against Kamala Harris, especially targeting Hispanic Americans.

    Exposé at @fwiwnews by @kylewilsontharp: fwiw.news/p/whose-america-righ

    #elections #infops #America #USA #politics #HarrisWalz2024 #Hispanics

  31. 〝One such effort is Head-Post, which publishes daily content about U.S. politics in both English and Spanish. Its Spanish website lists two names identified as reporters with what appear to be AI-generated headshots. Neither author, both of whom have pumped out thousands of posts since last year, has a record of writing for other publications.〞

    wsj.com/politics/national-secu

    #Russia #Iran #Spanish #Hispanic #voting #elections #USA #America #propaganda #infops

  32. 〝One such effort is Head-Post, which publishes daily content about U.S. politics in both English and Spanish. Its Spanish website lists two names identified as reporters with what appear to be AI-generated headshots. Neither author, both of whom have pumped out thousands of posts since last year, has a record of writing for other publications.〞

    wsj.com/politics/national-secu

    #Russia #Iran #Spanish #Hispanic #voting #elections #USA #America #propaganda #infops

  33. «But the broad goal of these efforts has not changed: to sow discord and chaos in hopes of discrediting American democracy in the eyes of the world. The campaigns, though, have evolved, adapting to a changing media landscape and the proliferation of new tools that make it easy to fool credulous audiences.»

    nytimes.com/2024/10/29/technol

    #America #elections #Disinformation #infops #USA #Iran #Russia #China

  34. «But the broad goal of these efforts has not changed: to sow discord and chaos in hopes of discrediting American democracy in the eyes of the world. The campaigns, though, have evolved, adapting to a changing media landscape and the proliferation of new tools that make it easy to fool credulous audiences.»

    nytimes.com/2024/10/29/technol

    #America #elections #Disinformation #infops #USA #Iran #Russia #China

  35. «Storm-1516 and R-FBI network members have spread at least 54 different disinformation narratives online since August 2023, according to Clemson and CNN’s analysis. Of the 10 most recent narratives, seven focus on US politics – none are supported by any evidence.»

    cnn.com/2024/10/30/europe/russ

    #Elections #america #USA #Disinformation #disinfo #Russia #infops

  36. «Storm-1516 and R-FBI network members have spread at least 54 different disinformation narratives online since August 2023, according to Clemson and CNN’s analysis. Of the 10 most recent narratives, seven focus on US politics – none are supported by any evidence.»

    cnn.com/2024/10/30/europe/russ

    #Elections #america #USA #Disinformation #disinfo #Russia #infops

  37. «He cited the example of one such campaign, dubbed "Doppelgänger," which was recently uncovered and involved cloned websites, fabricated articles, and misleading social media posts that mimicked established European media outlets to push pro-Russian narratives.»

    dw.com/en/russian-disinformati

    #disinformation #Russia #Germany #doppelganger #infops

  38. «He cited the example of one such campaign, dubbed "Doppelgänger," which was recently uncovered and involved cloned websites, fabricated articles, and misleading social media posts that mimicked established European media outlets to push pro-Russian narratives.»

    dw.com/en/russian-disinformati

    #disinformation #Russia #Germany #doppelganger #infops

  39. 〝Patterns across groups of pages strongly suggested someone created the accounts in batches. Of the 124 inauthentic “Denise Jones” pages, 19 shared the name “Denise Jones Online” followed by a five-digit number. Many “Denise Jones” pages also included identical page descriptions. For example, 18 of them use the tagline “Hi there, want more beer?” in their description.〞

    fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/10/ni

    #Spamouflage #infops #disinfo #botnets #authenticity #socialMedia #platforms

  40. 〝Patterns across groups of pages strongly suggested someone created the accounts in batches. Of the 124 inauthentic “Denise Jones” pages, 19 shared the name “Denise Jones Online” followed by a five-digit number. Many “Denise Jones” pages also included identical page descriptions. For example, 18 of them use the tagline “Hi there, want more beer?” in their description.〞

    fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/10/ni

    #Spamouflage #infops #disinfo #botnets #authenticity #socialMedia #platforms

  41. 〝The Facebook pages had a combined 190,000 followers and some of their posts had been shared by Reform UK candidates. Claims stemming from Russian state media were also being promoted by the pages, including criticism of Western support for Ukraine and misinformation about Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.〞
    abc.net.au/news/2024-10-02/exp

    #Russia #Ukraine #elections #UK #disinformation #infops

  42. 〝The Facebook pages had a combined 190,000 followers and some of their posts had been shared by Reform UK candidates. Claims stemming from Russian state media were also being promoted by the pages, including criticism of Western support for Ukraine and misinformation about Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.〞
    abc.net.au/news/2024-10-02/exp

    #Russia #Ukraine #elections #UK #disinformation #infops

  43. From @ridt: 〝In short, the SDA did not keep running campaigns and receiving funding despite being repeatedly exposed. It was able to keep running campaigns precisely because its work was exposed by its adversaries.〞

    foreignaffairs.com/russia/lies

    #Russia #Doppelganger #disinformation #strategy #infops

  44. From @ridt: 〝In short, the SDA did not keep running campaigns and receiving funding despite being repeatedly exposed. It was able to keep running campaigns precisely because its work was exposed by its adversaries.〞

    foreignaffairs.com/russia/lies

    #Russia #Doppelganger #disinformation #strategy #infops

  45. 〝The batch accounts — the 10 new accounts — are not very active. Each account has roughly 100 posts or reposts over the last two years. The batch accounts were inactive for one year but were awoken after the first Trump assassination attempt.〞
    voanews.com/a/china-s-influenc

    #China #PRC #USA #America #elections #infops #Spamouflage #MAGAflage #Trump

  46. 〝The batch accounts — the 10 new accounts — are not very active. Each account has roughly 100 posts or reposts over the last two years. The batch accounts were inactive for one year but were awoken after the first Trump assassination attempt.〞
    voanews.com/a/china-s-influenc

    #China #PRC #USA #America #elections #infops #Spamouflage #MAGAflage #Trump

  47. 〝In Western countries “including the United States, we started to work covertly,” Simonyan said. “We organized a number of guerrilla projects. I won’t say if these are the projects about which the United States is accusing us, or different ones.”〞
    washingtonpost.com/world/2024/

    #Russia #disinformation #infops #RT #media #America

  48. 〝In Western countries “including the United States, we started to work covertly,” Simonyan said. “We organized a number of guerrilla projects. I won’t say if these are the projects about which the United States is accusing us, or different ones.”〞
    washingtonpost.com/world/2024/

    #Russia #disinformation #infops #RT #media #America

  49. «When a handful of employees at RT, the Russian state television network formerly known as Russia Today, allegedly offered to provide lucrative payments to the talking heads of Tenet Media, a Tennessee-based far-right influencer team, borrowing boats to reach the sea was exactly what they had in mind.»

    theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/

    #infops #propaganda #TenetMedia #Russia #Authoritarianism #America

  50. «When a handful of employees at RT, the Russian state television network formerly known as Russia Today, allegedly offered to provide lucrative payments to the talking heads of Tenet Media, a Tennessee-based far-right influencer team, borrowing boats to reach the sea was exactly what they had in mind.»

    theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/

    #infops #propaganda #TenetMedia #Russia #Authoritarianism #America

  51. «Such influencers typically don’t start out peddling rumours and disinformation. But some notice that, once they start talking about a certain controversial topic, they receive more engagement on social media. The more they talk about it, the more people ‘like’ and share what they have to say, leading algorithms to recommend their content even more.»

    nature.com/articles/d41586-024

    #disinfo #infops #books #bookReview #audienceCapture

  52. «Such influencers typically don’t start out peddling rumours and disinformation. But some notice that, once they start talking about a certain controversial topic, they receive more engagement on social media. The more they talk about it, the more people ‘like’ and share what they have to say, leading algorithms to recommend their content even more.»

    nature.com/articles/d41586-024

    #disinfo #infops #books #bookReview #audienceCapture