#nortel — Public Fediverse posts

@auxonic I had trouble finding parking there in the late 1990s too. NCC/Greenbelt rules don’t allow for parking structures, so it was a big surprise (or coup) when there was parking space built under Lab 6+.

And getting to/from #Nortel to South Keys was never a trip shorter than 90 minutes on the bus. April 6, 1999 was impossible to get home.

「後果將非常嚴重」：矽谷對AI泡沫破裂的擔憂正在升溫

BBC News 中文 2025-10-20 07:56:00 CST

How many of you have a mug in your kitchen with a dead URL on it?

#dotcom #Nortel

Spent half the day walking someone through the configuration of a Nortel Passport 6480 (original one not one of the Ericsson built ones) via phone with a person who's English was more broken then my Mandarin.

I need a drink. Scratch that I need a bottle of drinks.

Lesson learned: When a co-worker from 2 decades ago (who's at Telefónica these days) calls and asks you if you could do 'em a favour just ask what the favour is before you say yes.

#nortel #passport #MSS #router #telco #switch

I was having a little browse on Usenet for Nortel files. I didn't find the font, but I found Nortel Certification exams!

They require Java, which I'm happy to install as long as it's a version distributed by Sun.

Got the tests working! First question is easy anyway.

#nortel #sunmicrosystems #java #windows2000

Today's fun and games - wiring an RJ21 cable set for a Nortel BCM50 PBX. #voip #nortel #nortelBCM

In 2011, Arıkan started his own small company and took polar codes to Qualcomm and Seagate to see if they had interest in implementing the idea.

“I did prepare some slides and sent them, but none of the US companies were really interested in it,” he says.

He takes the blame for failing to ignite their interest. “I was an academic who did not know how to promote an idea. Perhaps I did not believe in the idea that strongly myself.”

Later, those companies did work on polar codes and got their own patents, but without the same vigor as Huawei.

“If it weren't for the persistent efforts of Huawei researchers,” Arıkan says, “polar codes would not be in 5G today.”

I asked him about the over-the-top Huawei ceremony immortalized in that YouTube video.
He told me that he'd received the invitation to visit in June 2018.
“I said, ‘What is the occasion?’
And they said, ‘Mr. Ren wants to give you an award,’” Arıkan recalls.

“I figured that Huawei is very happy because the standard has been made, and polar coding is definitely in it.”

He thought he would show up and there would be a pleasant conversation with the founder and some engineers. He might leave with a plaque.

Arıkan arrived in Shenzhen and stayed at a guest house on campus.
He had tea with Ren and was toasted by executives, including Wen Tong.
But he sensed that something bigger was afoot.

“They revealed the program to me one step at a time. I didn't know how big that room would be, what kind of building we would go into. They didn't tell me to dress nicely.” (He did anyway.)

An hour before the ceremony his hosts informed him that perhaps he should prepare a speech.
He hurriedly finished his remarks in the town car on the way to the ceremony.

“I have spent the last 30 years at Bilkent University doing research on a variety of problems that culminated in polar codes,” he told the crowd in his halting English.

“Today our roads cross on a happy occasion.”

The spectacle didn't go to Arıkan's head. “They were not honoring me,” he told me as we sat in his office.

“Huawei was saying, ‘We didn't steal this idea from anybody, and here is the originator of the idea.’

There is no question that Huawei is the most technologically sophisticated company in China.

Maybe for the first time in a thousand years, China is showing they are competing head to head with the rest of the world in technology.

The US could live with intellectual property theft, but it is much harder to live with being in competition with an equal power.

“Polar codes itself is not what's important,” he continued. “It is a symbol.

5G is totally different than the internet. It's like a global nervous system.

Huawei is the leading company in 5G. They will be around in 10, 20, 50 years
—you cannot say that about the US tech companies.

In the internet era, the US produced a few trillion-dollar companies.

Because of 5G, China will have 10 or more trillion-dollar companies.

Huawei and China now have the lead.”

US companies and the US government can no longer expect to beat China back with threats or indictments, even if they are sometimes warranted.

And it's not just telecom companies like Huawei.

For all the furor at the highest levels over whether the teen-oriented social app TikTok presented security issues, the real threat to American business was that its Chinese engineers had devised an AI-powered recommendation engine that Silicon Valley had not matched.

Arıkan says the experience has led him to respect Huawei
—and to provide a warning to the country where he learned information theory.

“I owe a lot to the US,” he says.
“I give you friendly advice:
You have to accept this as the new reality and deal with it accordingly.”

To paraphrase Shannon:
No one knows the future. But Huawei and China now have a hand in controlling it.

-- excerpts from:
https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-breakthrough/

by Steven Levy, editor at large at Wired.

Steven has written seven books, including Hackers, Crypto, Artificial Life, Insanely Great (a history of the Macintosh), and, most recently, In the Plex, the definitive story of Google. He attended Temple University and has a master’s degree in literature from Penn State.

#ErdalArıkan #5G #polarcodes
#RenZhengfei #Huawei #ChineseGovernment #ZTE #DOJ #intellectualproperty #Cisco #Nortel
#stevenlevy #Wired

In 2011, Arıkan started his own small company and took polar codes to Qualcomm and Seagate to see if they had interest in implementing the idea.

“I did prepare some slides and sent them, but none of the US companies were really interested in it,” he says.

He takes the blame for failing to ignite their interest. “I was an academic who did not know how to promote an idea. Perhaps I did not believe in the idea that strongly myself.”

Later, those companies did work on polar codes and got their own patents, but without the same vigor as Huawei.

“If it weren't for the persistent efforts of Huawei researchers,” Arıkan says, “polar codes would not be in 5G today.”

I asked him about the over-the-top Huawei ceremony immortalized in that YouTube video.
He told me that he'd received the invitation to visit in June 2018.
“I said, ‘What is the occasion?’
And they said, ‘Mr. Ren wants to give you an award,’” Arıkan recalls.

“I figured that Huawei is very happy because the standard has been made, and polar coding is definitely in it.”

He thought he would show up and there would be a pleasant conversation with the founder and some engineers. He might leave with a plaque.

Arıkan arrived in Shenzhen and stayed at a guest house on campus.
He had tea with Ren and was toasted by executives, including Wen Tong.
But he sensed that something bigger was afoot.

“They revealed the program to me one step at a time. I didn't know how big that room would be, what kind of building we would go into. They didn't tell me to dress nicely.” (He did anyway.)

An hour before the ceremony his hosts informed him that perhaps he should prepare a speech.
He hurriedly finished his remarks in the town car on the way to the ceremony.

“I have spent the last 30 years at Bilkent University doing research on a variety of problems that culminated in polar codes,” he told the crowd in his halting English.

“Today our roads cross on a happy occasion.”

The spectacle didn't go to Arıkan's head. “They were not honoring me,” he told me as we sat in his office.

“Huawei was saying, ‘We didn't steal this idea from anybody, and here is the originator of the idea.’

There is no question that Huawei is the most technologically sophisticated company in China.

Maybe for the first time in a thousand years, China is showing they are competing head to head with the rest of the world in technology.

The US could live with intellectual property theft, but it is much harder to live with being in competition with an equal power.

“Polar codes itself is not what's important,” he continued. “It is a symbol.

5G is totally different than the internet. It's like a global nervous system.

Huawei is the leading company in 5G. They will be around in 10, 20, 50 years
—you cannot say that about the US tech companies.

In the internet era, the US produced a few trillion-dollar companies.

Because of 5G, China will have 10 or more trillion-dollar companies.

Huawei and China now have the lead.”

US companies and the US government can no longer expect to beat China back with threats or indictments, even if they are sometimes warranted.

And it's not just telecom companies like Huawei.

For all the furor at the highest levels over whether the teen-oriented social app TikTok presented security issues, the real threat to American business was that its Chinese engineers had devised an AI-powered recommendation engine that Silicon Valley had not matched.

Arıkan says the experience has led him to respect Huawei
—and to provide a warning to the country where he learned information theory.

“I owe a lot to the US,” he says.
“I give you friendly advice:
You have to accept this as the new reality and deal with it accordingly.”

To paraphrase Shannon:
No one knows the future. But Huawei and China now have a hand in controlling it.

-- excerpts from:
https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-breakthrough/

by Steven Levy, editor at large at Wired.

Steven has written seven books, including Hackers, Crypto, Artificial Life, Insanely Great (a history of the Macintosh), and, most recently, In the Plex, the definitive story of Google. He attended Temple University and has a master’s degree in literature from Penn State.

#ErdalArıkan #5G #polarcodes
#RenZhengfei #Huawei #ChineseGovernment #ZTE #DOJ #intellectualproperty #Cisco #Nortel
#stevenlevy #Wired

In 2011, Arıkan started his own small company and took polar codes to Qualcomm and Seagate to see if they had interest in implementing the idea.

“I did prepare some slides and sent them, but none of the US companies were really interested in it,” he says.

He takes the blame for failing to ignite their interest. “I was an academic who did not know how to promote an idea. Perhaps I did not believe in the idea that strongly myself.”

Later, those companies did work on polar codes and got their own patents, but without the same vigor as Huawei.

“If it weren't for the persistent efforts of Huawei researchers,” Arıkan says, “polar codes would not be in 5G today.”

I asked him about the over-the-top Huawei ceremony immortalized in that YouTube video.
He told me that he'd received the invitation to visit in June 2018.
“I said, ‘What is the occasion?’
And they said, ‘Mr. Ren wants to give you an award,’” Arıkan recalls.

“I figured that Huawei is very happy because the standard has been made, and polar coding is definitely in it.”

He thought he would show up and there would be a pleasant conversation with the founder and some engineers. He might leave with a plaque.

Arıkan arrived in Shenzhen and stayed at a guest house on campus.
He had tea with Ren and was toasted by executives, including Wen Tong.
But he sensed that something bigger was afoot.

“They revealed the program to me one step at a time. I didn't know how big that room would be, what kind of building we would go into. They didn't tell me to dress nicely.” (He did anyway.)

An hour before the ceremony his hosts informed him that perhaps he should prepare a speech.
He hurriedly finished his remarks in the town car on the way to the ceremony.

“I have spent the last 30 years at Bilkent University doing research on a variety of problems that culminated in polar codes,” he told the crowd in his halting English.

“Today our roads cross on a happy occasion.”

The spectacle didn't go to Arıkan's head. “They were not honoring me,” he told me as we sat in his office.

“Huawei was saying, ‘We didn't steal this idea from anybody, and here is the originator of the idea.’

There is no question that Huawei is the most technologically sophisticated company in China.

Maybe for the first time in a thousand years, China is showing they are competing head to head with the rest of the world in technology.

The US could live with intellectual property theft, but it is much harder to live with being in competition with an equal power.

“Polar codes itself is not what's important,” he continued. “It is a symbol.

5G is totally different than the internet. It's like a global nervous system.

Huawei is the leading company in 5G. They will be around in 10, 20, 50 years
—you cannot say that about the US tech companies.

In the internet era, the US produced a few trillion-dollar companies.

Because of 5G, China will have 10 or more trillion-dollar companies.

Huawei and China now have the lead.”

US companies and the US government can no longer expect to beat China back with threats or indictments, even if they are sometimes warranted.

And it's not just telecom companies like Huawei.

For all the furor at the highest levels over whether the teen-oriented social app TikTok presented security issues, the real threat to American business was that its Chinese engineers had devised an AI-powered recommendation engine that Silicon Valley had not matched.

Arıkan says the experience has led him to respect Huawei
—and to provide a warning to the country where he learned information theory.

“I owe a lot to the US,” he says.
“I give you friendly advice:
You have to accept this as the new reality and deal with it accordingly.”

To paraphrase Shannon:
No one knows the future. But Huawei and China now have a hand in controlling it.

-- excerpts from:
https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-breakthrough/

by Steven Levy, editor at large at Wired.

Steven has written seven books, including Hackers, Crypto, Artificial Life, Insanely Great (a history of the Macintosh), and, most recently, In the Plex, the definitive story of Google. He attended Temple University and has a master’s degree in literature from Penn State.

#ErdalArıkan #5G #polarcodes
#RenZhengfei #Huawei #ChineseGovernment #ZTE #DOJ #intellectualproperty #Cisco #Nortel
#stevenlevy #Wired

In 2011, Arıkan started his own small company and took polar codes to Qualcomm and Seagate to see if they had interest in implementing the idea.

“I did prepare some slides and sent them, but none of the US companies were really interested in it,” he says.

He takes the blame for failing to ignite their interest. “I was an academic who did not know how to promote an idea. Perhaps I did not believe in the idea that strongly myself.”

Later, those companies did work on polar codes and got their own patents, but without the same vigor as Huawei.

“If it weren't for the persistent efforts of Huawei researchers,” Arıkan says, “polar codes would not be in 5G today.”

I asked him about the over-the-top Huawei ceremony immortalized in that YouTube video.
He told me that he'd received the invitation to visit in June 2018.
“I said, ‘What is the occasion?’
And they said, ‘Mr. Ren wants to give you an award,’” Arıkan recalls.

“I figured that Huawei is very happy because the standard has been made, and polar coding is definitely in it.”

He thought he would show up and there would be a pleasant conversation with the founder and some engineers. He might leave with a plaque.

Arıkan arrived in Shenzhen and stayed at a guest house on campus.
He had tea with Ren and was toasted by executives, including Wen Tong.
But he sensed that something bigger was afoot.

“They revealed the program to me one step at a time. I didn't know how big that room would be, what kind of building we would go into. They didn't tell me to dress nicely.” (He did anyway.)

An hour before the ceremony his hosts informed him that perhaps he should prepare a speech.
He hurriedly finished his remarks in the town car on the way to the ceremony.

“I have spent the last 30 years at Bilkent University doing research on a variety of problems that culminated in polar codes,” he told the crowd in his halting English.

“Today our roads cross on a happy occasion.”

The spectacle didn't go to Arıkan's head. “They were not honoring me,” he told me as we sat in his office.

“Huawei was saying, ‘We didn't steal this idea from anybody, and here is the originator of the idea.’

There is no question that Huawei is the most technologically sophisticated company in China.

Maybe for the first time in a thousand years, China is showing they are competing head to head with the rest of the world in technology.

The US could live with intellectual property theft, but it is much harder to live with being in competition with an equal power.

“Polar codes itself is not what's important,” he continued. “It is a symbol.

5G is totally different than the internet. It's like a global nervous system.

Huawei is the leading company in 5G. They will be around in 10, 20, 50 years
—you cannot say that about the US tech companies.

In the internet era, the US produced a few trillion-dollar companies.

Because of 5G, China will have 10 or more trillion-dollar companies.

Huawei and China now have the lead.”

US companies and the US government can no longer expect to beat China back with threats or indictments, even if they are sometimes warranted.

And it's not just telecom companies like Huawei.

For all the furor at the highest levels over whether the teen-oriented social app TikTok presented security issues, the real threat to American business was that its Chinese engineers had devised an AI-powered recommendation engine that Silicon Valley had not matched.

Arıkan says the experience has led him to respect Huawei
—and to provide a warning to the country where he learned information theory.

“I owe a lot to the US,” he says.
“I give you friendly advice:
You have to accept this as the new reality and deal with it accordingly.”

To paraphrase Shannon:
No one knows the future. But Huawei and China now have a hand in controlling it.

-- excerpts from:
https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-breakthrough/

by Steven Levy, editor at large at Wired.

Steven has written seven books, including Hackers, Crypto, Artificial Life, Insanely Great (a history of the Macintosh), and, most recently, In the Plex, the definitive story of Google. He attended Temple University and has a master’s degree in literature from Penn State.

#ErdalArıkan #5G #polarcodes
#RenZhengfei #Huawei #ChineseGovernment #ZTE #DOJ #intellectualproperty #Cisco #Nortel
#stevenlevy #Wired

In 2011, Arıkan started his own small company and took polar codes to Qualcomm and Seagate to see if they had interest in implementing the idea.

“I did prepare some slides and sent them, but none of the US companies were really interested in it,” he says.

He takes the blame for failing to ignite their interest. “I was an academic who did not know how to promote an idea. Perhaps I did not believe in the idea that strongly myself.”

Later, those companies did work on polar codes and got their own patents, but without the same vigor as Huawei.

“If it weren't for the persistent efforts of Huawei researchers,” Arıkan says, “polar codes would not be in 5G today.”

I asked him about the over-the-top Huawei ceremony immortalized in that YouTube video.
He told me that he'd received the invitation to visit in June 2018.
“I said, ‘What is the occasion?’
And they said, ‘Mr. Ren wants to give you an award,’” Arıkan recalls.

“I figured that Huawei is very happy because the standard has been made, and polar coding is definitely in it.”

He thought he would show up and there would be a pleasant conversation with the founder and some engineers. He might leave with a plaque.

Arıkan arrived in Shenzhen and stayed at a guest house on campus.
He had tea with Ren and was toasted by executives, including Wen Tong.
But he sensed that something bigger was afoot.

“They revealed the program to me one step at a time. I didn't know how big that room would be, what kind of building we would go into. They didn't tell me to dress nicely.” (He did anyway.)

An hour before the ceremony his hosts informed him that perhaps he should prepare a speech.
He hurriedly finished his remarks in the town car on the way to the ceremony.

“I have spent the last 30 years at Bilkent University doing research on a variety of problems that culminated in polar codes,” he told the crowd in his halting English.

“Today our roads cross on a happy occasion.”

The spectacle didn't go to Arıkan's head. “They were not honoring me,” he told me as we sat in his office.

“Huawei was saying, ‘We didn't steal this idea from anybody, and here is the originator of the idea.’

There is no question that Huawei is the most technologically sophisticated company in China.

Maybe for the first time in a thousand years, China is showing they are competing head to head with the rest of the world in technology.

The US could live with intellectual property theft, but it is much harder to live with being in competition with an equal power.

“Polar codes itself is not what's important,” he continued. “It is a symbol.

5G is totally different than the internet. It's like a global nervous system.

Huawei is the leading company in 5G. They will be around in 10, 20, 50 years
—you cannot say that about the US tech companies.

In the internet era, the US produced a few trillion-dollar companies.

Because of 5G, China will have 10 or more trillion-dollar companies.

Huawei and China now have the lead.”

US companies and the US government can no longer expect to beat China back with threats or indictments, even if they are sometimes warranted.

And it's not just telecom companies like Huawei.

For all the furor at the highest levels over whether the teen-oriented social app TikTok presented security issues, the real threat to American business was that its Chinese engineers had devised an AI-powered recommendation engine that Silicon Valley had not matched.

Arıkan says the experience has led him to respect Huawei
—and to provide a warning to the country where he learned information theory.

“I owe a lot to the US,” he says.
“I give you friendly advice:
You have to accept this as the new reality and deal with it accordingly.”

To paraphrase Shannon:
No one knows the future. But Huawei and China now have a hand in controlling it.

-- excerpts from:
https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-breakthrough/

by Steven Levy, editor at large at Wired.

Steven has written seven books, including Hackers, Crypto, Artificial Life, Insanely Great (a history of the Macintosh), and, most recently, In the Plex, the definitive story of Google. He attended Temple University and has a master’s degree in literature from Penn State.

#ErdalArıkan #5G #polarcodes
#RenZhengfei #Huawei #ChineseGovernment #ZTE #DOJ #intellectualproperty #Cisco #Nortel
#stevenlevy #Wired

One advantage Huawei had was the backing of its government.

US and European observers say China packs standards meetings with engineers who can be eyes and ears on the ground.

Rivals also complain that Chinese companies work together in lockstep; even ostensible competitors will set aside differences to support a compatriot business.

For a brief moment in the middle of 2016, it looked as if that national wall of support wouldn't hold.

In a preliminary round of the 5G New Radio standards process, the Chinese company #Lenovo expressed its preference for LDPC, because it was a more familiar technology.

That didn't last long.
Lenovo changed its opinion later that year.

Lenovo's founder, Liu Chuanzhi, called Ren Zhengfei to make sure that no offense was taken by the original stance.
Liu and other executives even drafted an open letter that read like a forced confession.

“We all agree that Chinese enterprises should be united and not be provoked by outsiders,” Liu and his colleagues wrote. “Stick to it … raise the banner of national industry, and finally defeat the international giants.”

Thus united behind polar codes, Chinese industry prepared to do battle at the final, critical stage
—the November 2016 engineering standards meetings held in Reno, Nevada.

The venue was the Peppermill resort and casino. Engineers, hunkered in hotel conference rooms arguing about block codes and channel capacity, had little time to enjoy the craps tables or eucalyptus steam rooms.

Simultaneous meetings to determine a number of standards kept engineers hopping from one conference room to the next, says Michael Thelander, a consultant specializing in wireless telecommunications.

“But polar coding versus LDPC, that was the hot topic,” he says.

On the night of Friday, November 18, the conference room was packed, and the meeting, which began in the evening, turned into a standoff.

Each company presented its work, including its testing results.

“The battle was pretty well drawn, with most of the Western vendors lining up behind LDPC,” says Kevin Krewell, a principal analyst at Tirias Research, who follows 5G.

Some Western companies backed polar codes too, but, significantly, all the Chinese companies did.

“There was no obvious winner in the whole game, but it was very clear that Huawei was not going to back down,” says Thelander, who was on the scene as an observer.

Neither would the LDPC side. “So we can sit there and spend six months fighting over this thing and delay 5G, or we compromise.”

So they did.
The standards committee split the signal-processing standard into two parts.

One technology could be used to send the #user #data.

The other would be applied to what was known as the #control #channel, which manages how that data moves.

The first function was assigned to LDPC, and the second to polar codes.

It was well into the wee hours when the agreement was finalized.

Huawei was ecstatic.
But it was not just Huawei's win; it was China's too.
Finally, a Chinese company was getting respect commensurate with its increasingly dominant power in the marketplace.

“Huawei-backed polar code entering the 5G standard has a symbolic meaning,” one observer told a reporter at the time.

“This is the first time a Chinese company has entered a telecommunications framework agreement, winning the right to be heard.”

Qualcomm professes to be fine with the result.
“It was very important for Huawei to get something,” says its CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.

“Huawei is actually quite good. They are a formidable company. And I think that's one thing that people need to acknowledge.”

#standard #Reed #Hundt #3GPP #5G #New #Radio #standards #Qualcomm #LDPC #Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

One advantage Huawei had was the backing of its government.

US and European observers say China packs standards meetings with engineers who can be eyes and ears on the ground.

Rivals also complain that Chinese companies work together in lockstep; even ostensible competitors will set aside differences to support a compatriot business.

For a brief moment in the middle of 2016, it looked as if that national wall of support wouldn't hold.

In a preliminary round of the 5G New Radio standards process, the Chinese company #Lenovo expressed its preference for LDPC, because it was a more familiar technology.

That didn't last long.
Lenovo changed its opinion later that year.

Lenovo's founder, Liu Chuanzhi, called Ren Zhengfei to make sure that no offense was taken by the original stance.
Liu and other executives even drafted an open letter that read like a forced confession.

“We all agree that Chinese enterprises should be united and not be provoked by outsiders,” Liu and his colleagues wrote. “Stick to it … raise the banner of national industry, and finally defeat the international giants.”

Thus united behind polar codes, Chinese industry prepared to do battle at the final, critical stage
—the November 2016 engineering standards meetings held in Reno, Nevada.

The venue was the Peppermill resort and casino. Engineers, hunkered in hotel conference rooms arguing about block codes and channel capacity, had little time to enjoy the craps tables or eucalyptus steam rooms.

Simultaneous meetings to determine a number of standards kept engineers hopping from one conference room to the next, says Michael Thelander, a consultant specializing in wireless telecommunications.

“But polar coding versus LDPC, that was the hot topic,” he says.

On the night of Friday, November 18, the conference room was packed, and the meeting, which began in the evening, turned into a standoff.

Each company presented its work, including its testing results.

“The battle was pretty well drawn, with most of the Western vendors lining up behind LDPC,” says Kevin Krewell, a principal analyst at Tirias Research, who follows 5G.

Some Western companies backed polar codes too, but, significantly, all the Chinese companies did.

“There was no obvious winner in the whole game, but it was very clear that Huawei was not going to back down,” says Thelander, who was on the scene as an observer.

Neither would the LDPC side. “So we can sit there and spend six months fighting over this thing and delay 5G, or we compromise.”

So they did.
The standards committee split the signal-processing standard into two parts.

One technology could be used to send the #user #data.

The other would be applied to what was known as the #control #channel, which manages how that data moves.

The first function was assigned to LDPC, and the second to polar codes.

It was well into the wee hours when the agreement was finalized.

Huawei was ecstatic.
But it was not just Huawei's win; it was China's too.
Finally, a Chinese company was getting respect commensurate with its increasingly dominant power in the marketplace.

“Huawei-backed polar code entering the 5G standard has a symbolic meaning,” one observer told a reporter at the time.

“This is the first time a Chinese company has entered a telecommunications framework agreement, winning the right to be heard.”

Qualcomm professes to be fine with the result.
“It was very important for Huawei to get something,” says its CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.

“Huawei is actually quite good. They are a formidable company. And I think that's one thing that people need to acknowledge.”

#standard #Reed #Hundt #3GPP #5G #New #Radio #standards #Qualcomm #LDPC #Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

One advantage Huawei had was the backing of its government.

US and European observers say China packs standards meetings with engineers who can be eyes and ears on the ground.

Rivals also complain that Chinese companies work together in lockstep; even ostensible competitors will set aside differences to support a compatriot business.

For a brief moment in the middle of 2016, it looked as if that national wall of support wouldn't hold.

In a preliminary round of the 5G New Radio standards process, the Chinese company #Lenovo expressed its preference for LDPC, because it was a more familiar technology.

That didn't last long.
Lenovo changed its opinion later that year.

Lenovo's founder, Liu Chuanzhi, called Ren Zhengfei to make sure that no offense was taken by the original stance.
Liu and other executives even drafted an open letter that read like a forced confession.

“We all agree that Chinese enterprises should be united and not be provoked by outsiders,” Liu and his colleagues wrote. “Stick to it … raise the banner of national industry, and finally defeat the international giants.”

Thus united behind polar codes, Chinese industry prepared to do battle at the final, critical stage
—the November 2016 engineering standards meetings held in Reno, Nevada.

The venue was the Peppermill resort and casino. Engineers, hunkered in hotel conference rooms arguing about block codes and channel capacity, had little time to enjoy the craps tables or eucalyptus steam rooms.

Simultaneous meetings to determine a number of standards kept engineers hopping from one conference room to the next, says Michael Thelander, a consultant specializing in wireless telecommunications.

“But polar coding versus LDPC, that was the hot topic,” he says.

On the night of Friday, November 18, the conference room was packed, and the meeting, which began in the evening, turned into a standoff.

Each company presented its work, including its testing results.

“The battle was pretty well drawn, with most of the Western vendors lining up behind LDPC,” says Kevin Krewell, a principal analyst at Tirias Research, who follows 5G.

Some Western companies backed polar codes too, but, significantly, all the Chinese companies did.

“There was no obvious winner in the whole game, but it was very clear that Huawei was not going to back down,” says Thelander, who was on the scene as an observer.

Neither would the LDPC side. “So we can sit there and spend six months fighting over this thing and delay 5G, or we compromise.”

So they did.
The standards committee split the signal-processing standard into two parts.

One technology could be used to send the #user #data.

The other would be applied to what was known as the #control #channel, which manages how that data moves.

The first function was assigned to LDPC, and the second to polar codes.

It was well into the wee hours when the agreement was finalized.

Huawei was ecstatic.
But it was not just Huawei's win; it was China's too.
Finally, a Chinese company was getting respect commensurate with its increasingly dominant power in the marketplace.

“Huawei-backed polar code entering the 5G standard has a symbolic meaning,” one observer told a reporter at the time.

“This is the first time a Chinese company has entered a telecommunications framework agreement, winning the right to be heard.”

Qualcomm professes to be fine with the result.
“It was very important for Huawei to get something,” says its CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.

“Huawei is actually quite good. They are a formidable company. And I think that's one thing that people need to acknowledge.”

#standard #Reed #Hundt #3GPP #5G #New #Radio #standards #Qualcomm #LDPC #Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

One advantage Huawei had was the backing of its government.

US and European observers say China packs standards meetings with engineers who can be eyes and ears on the ground.

Rivals also complain that Chinese companies work together in lockstep; even ostensible competitors will set aside differences to support a compatriot business.

For a brief moment in the middle of 2016, it looked as if that national wall of support wouldn't hold.

In a preliminary round of the 5G New Radio standards process, the Chinese company #Lenovo expressed its preference for LDPC, because it was a more familiar technology.

That didn't last long.
Lenovo changed its opinion later that year.

Lenovo's founder, Liu Chuanzhi, called Ren Zhengfei to make sure that no offense was taken by the original stance.
Liu and other executives even drafted an open letter that read like a forced confession.

“We all agree that Chinese enterprises should be united and not be provoked by outsiders,” Liu and his colleagues wrote. “Stick to it … raise the banner of national industry, and finally defeat the international giants.”

Thus united behind polar codes, Chinese industry prepared to do battle at the final, critical stage
—the November 2016 engineering standards meetings held in Reno, Nevada.

The venue was the Peppermill resort and casino. Engineers, hunkered in hotel conference rooms arguing about block codes and channel capacity, had little time to enjoy the craps tables or eucalyptus steam rooms.

Simultaneous meetings to determine a number of standards kept engineers hopping from one conference room to the next, says Michael Thelander, a consultant specializing in wireless telecommunications.

“But polar coding versus LDPC, that was the hot topic,” he says.

On the night of Friday, November 18, the conference room was packed, and the meeting, which began in the evening, turned into a standoff.

Each company presented its work, including its testing results.

“The battle was pretty well drawn, with most of the Western vendors lining up behind LDPC,” says Kevin Krewell, a principal analyst at Tirias Research, who follows 5G.

Some Western companies backed polar codes too, but, significantly, all the Chinese companies did.

“There was no obvious winner in the whole game, but it was very clear that Huawei was not going to back down,” says Thelander, who was on the scene as an observer.

Neither would the LDPC side. “So we can sit there and spend six months fighting over this thing and delay 5G, or we compromise.”

So they did.
The standards committee split the signal-processing standard into two parts.

One technology could be used to send the #user #data.

The other would be applied to what was known as the #control #channel, which manages how that data moves.

The first function was assigned to LDPC, and the second to polar codes.

It was well into the wee hours when the agreement was finalized.

Huawei was ecstatic.
But it was not just Huawei's win; it was China's too.
Finally, a Chinese company was getting respect commensurate with its increasingly dominant power in the marketplace.

“Huawei-backed polar code entering the 5G standard has a symbolic meaning,” one observer told a reporter at the time.

“This is the first time a Chinese company has entered a telecommunications framework agreement, winning the right to be heard.”

Qualcomm professes to be fine with the result.
“It was very important for Huawei to get something,” says its CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.

“Huawei is actually quite good. They are a formidable company. And I think that's one thing that people need to acknowledge.”

#standard #Reed #Hundt #3GPP #5G #New #Radio #standards #Qualcomm #LDPC #Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

One advantage Huawei had was the backing of its government.

US and European observers say China packs standards meetings with engineers who can be eyes and ears on the ground.

Rivals also complain that Chinese companies work together in lockstep; even ostensible competitors will set aside differences to support a compatriot business.

For a brief moment in the middle of 2016, it looked as if that national wall of support wouldn't hold.

In a preliminary round of the 5G New Radio standards process, the Chinese company #Lenovo expressed its preference for LDPC, because it was a more familiar technology.

That didn't last long.
Lenovo changed its opinion later that year.

Lenovo's founder, Liu Chuanzhi, called Ren Zhengfei to make sure that no offense was taken by the original stance.
Liu and other executives even drafted an open letter that read like a forced confession.

“We all agree that Chinese enterprises should be united and not be provoked by outsiders,” Liu and his colleagues wrote. “Stick to it … raise the banner of national industry, and finally defeat the international giants.”

Thus united behind polar codes, Chinese industry prepared to do battle at the final, critical stage
—the November 2016 engineering standards meetings held in Reno, Nevada.

The venue was the Peppermill resort and casino. Engineers, hunkered in hotel conference rooms arguing about block codes and channel capacity, had little time to enjoy the craps tables or eucalyptus steam rooms.

Simultaneous meetings to determine a number of standards kept engineers hopping from one conference room to the next, says Michael Thelander, a consultant specializing in wireless telecommunications.

“But polar coding versus LDPC, that was the hot topic,” he says.

On the night of Friday, November 18, the conference room was packed, and the meeting, which began in the evening, turned into a standoff.

Each company presented its work, including its testing results.

“The battle was pretty well drawn, with most of the Western vendors lining up behind LDPC,” says Kevin Krewell, a principal analyst at Tirias Research, who follows 5G.

Some Western companies backed polar codes too, but, significantly, all the Chinese companies did.

“There was no obvious winner in the whole game, but it was very clear that Huawei was not going to back down,” says Thelander, who was on the scene as an observer.

Neither would the LDPC side. “So we can sit there and spend six months fighting over this thing and delay 5G, or we compromise.”

So they did.
The standards committee split the signal-processing standard into two parts.

One technology could be used to send the #user #data.

The other would be applied to what was known as the #control #channel, which manages how that data moves.

The first function was assigned to LDPC, and the second to polar codes.

It was well into the wee hours when the agreement was finalized.

Huawei was ecstatic.
But it was not just Huawei's win; it was China's too.
Finally, a Chinese company was getting respect commensurate with its increasingly dominant power in the marketplace.

“Huawei-backed polar code entering the 5G standard has a symbolic meaning,” one observer told a reporter at the time.

“This is the first time a Chinese company has entered a telecommunications framework agreement, winning the right to be heard.”

Qualcomm professes to be fine with the result.
“It was very important for Huawei to get something,” says its CEO, Steve Mollenkopf.

“Huawei is actually quite good. They are a formidable company. And I think that's one thing that people need to acknowledge.”

#standard #Reed #Hundt #3GPP #5G #New #Radio #standards #Qualcomm #LDPC #Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Reaching consensus on the parts of a mobile platform is complicated. Decisions have to be made about dozens of specifications for transmission speeds, radio frequencies, security architecture, and the like.

To make that happen, engineers gather in a series of meetings every year to choose which new technologies will be deemed #standard in the next generation.

The stakes are high: The companies that provide the fundamental technology for 5G will be embedded in a global communications system for years to come.

So in the background are financial, nationalistic, and even geopolitical considerations.

“From the year 2001 to the present—three administrations—not enough attention has been paid to this,” says #Reed #Hundt, a former Federal Communications Commission chair during the Clinton administration.

Hundt is one of a number of current and former officials alarmed that the United States has no equivalent to Huawei
—that is, a major telecommunications company that both develops next-generation technology and builds it into equipment.

“In Europe, they have an Ericsson.
In Japan, they have companies.

And in China, they have not just Huawei but also ZTE.

But Huawei is the one that covers the whole range of products.”

All of this made Huawei's 5G standards bid an alarming prospect.

“Huawei's IP and standards are the wedge they intend to use to pry open the Western computing world,” Hundt says.

The body that develops 5G standards, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project ( #3GPP ), is an international umbrella organization of various telecommunications groups.

In 2016, it made a key decision on what was called #5G #New #Radio #standards
—the part that helped determine how data would be sent over 5G and how it would be checked for accuracy.

After spending millions, undergoing years of testing, and filing for multiple patents, Huawei was not going to pull punches at the critical juncture. It needed the certification of an official standard to cement its claim.

The problem was that reasonable people argued that other techniques would work just as well as polar codes to achieve error correction in the new framework.

Some suggested that a revamp of the current 4G protocol, turbo codes, would be sufficient.

Others, notably San Diego-based #Qualcomm, which makes chipsets for mobile technology, liked a third option:
Robert Gallager's old #LDPC idea, the one that had nearly reached the Shannon limit and had inspired Arıkan on his own intellectual journey.

Since the early 1960s, when Gallager proposed LDPC, technology had improved and the cost of commercial production was no longer prohibitive.

Qualcomm's R&D team developed it for 5G.

Though Erdal Arıkan did not know it at the time, his work would be squared off against that of his mentor in a competition that involved billions of dollars and an international clash of reputations.

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Reaching consensus on the parts of a mobile platform is complicated. Decisions have to be made about dozens of specifications for transmission speeds, radio frequencies, security architecture, and the like.

To make that happen, engineers gather in a series of meetings every year to choose which new technologies will be deemed #standard in the next generation.

The stakes are high: The companies that provide the fundamental technology for 5G will be embedded in a global communications system for years to come.

So in the background are financial, nationalistic, and even geopolitical considerations.

“From the year 2001 to the present—three administrations—not enough attention has been paid to this,” says #Reed #Hundt, a former Federal Communications Commission chair during the Clinton administration.

Hundt is one of a number of current and former officials alarmed that the United States has no equivalent to Huawei
—that is, a major telecommunications company that both develops next-generation technology and builds it into equipment.

“In Europe, they have an Ericsson.
In Japan, they have companies.

And in China, they have not just Huawei but also ZTE.

But Huawei is the one that covers the whole range of products.”

All of this made Huawei's 5G standards bid an alarming prospect.

“Huawei's IP and standards are the wedge they intend to use to pry open the Western computing world,” Hundt says.

The body that develops 5G standards, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project ( #3GPP ), is an international umbrella organization of various telecommunications groups.

In 2016, it made a key decision on what was called #5G #New #Radio #standards
—the part that helped determine how data would be sent over 5G and how it would be checked for accuracy.

After spending millions, undergoing years of testing, and filing for multiple patents, Huawei was not going to pull punches at the critical juncture. It needed the certification of an official standard to cement its claim.

The problem was that reasonable people argued that other techniques would work just as well as polar codes to achieve error correction in the new framework.

Some suggested that a revamp of the current 4G protocol, turbo codes, would be sufficient.

Others, notably San Diego-based #Qualcomm, which makes chipsets for mobile technology, liked a third option:
Robert Gallager's old #LDPC idea, the one that had nearly reached the Shannon limit and had inspired Arıkan on his own intellectual journey.

Since the early 1960s, when Gallager proposed LDPC, technology had improved and the cost of commercial production was no longer prohibitive.

Qualcomm's R&D team developed it for 5G.

Though Erdal Arıkan did not know it at the time, his work would be squared off against that of his mentor in a competition that involved billions of dollars and an international clash of reputations.

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Reaching consensus on the parts of a mobile platform is complicated. Decisions have to be made about dozens of specifications for transmission speeds, radio frequencies, security architecture, and the like.

To make that happen, engineers gather in a series of meetings every year to choose which new technologies will be deemed #standard in the next generation.

The stakes are high: The companies that provide the fundamental technology for 5G will be embedded in a global communications system for years to come.

So in the background are financial, nationalistic, and even geopolitical considerations.

“From the year 2001 to the present—three administrations—not enough attention has been paid to this,” says #Reed #Hundt, a former Federal Communications Commission chair during the Clinton administration.

Hundt is one of a number of current and former officials alarmed that the United States has no equivalent to Huawei
—that is, a major telecommunications company that both develops next-generation technology and builds it into equipment.

“In Europe, they have an Ericsson.
In Japan, they have companies.

And in China, they have not just Huawei but also ZTE.

But Huawei is the one that covers the whole range of products.”

All of this made Huawei's 5G standards bid an alarming prospect.

“Huawei's IP and standards are the wedge they intend to use to pry open the Western computing world,” Hundt says.

The body that develops 5G standards, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project ( #3GPP ), is an international umbrella organization of various telecommunications groups.

In 2016, it made a key decision on what was called #5G #New #Radio #standards
—the part that helped determine how data would be sent over 5G and how it would be checked for accuracy.

After spending millions, undergoing years of testing, and filing for multiple patents, Huawei was not going to pull punches at the critical juncture. It needed the certification of an official standard to cement its claim.

The problem was that reasonable people argued that other techniques would work just as well as polar codes to achieve error correction in the new framework.

Some suggested that a revamp of the current 4G protocol, turbo codes, would be sufficient.

Others, notably San Diego-based #Qualcomm, which makes chipsets for mobile technology, liked a third option:
Robert Gallager's old #LDPC idea, the one that had nearly reached the Shannon limit and had inspired Arıkan on his own intellectual journey.

Since the early 1960s, when Gallager proposed LDPC, technology had improved and the cost of commercial production was no longer prohibitive.

Qualcomm's R&D team developed it for 5G.

Though Erdal Arıkan did not know it at the time, his work would be squared off against that of his mentor in a competition that involved billions of dollars and an international clash of reputations.

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Reaching consensus on the parts of a mobile platform is complicated. Decisions have to be made about dozens of specifications for transmission speeds, radio frequencies, security architecture, and the like.

To make that happen, engineers gather in a series of meetings every year to choose which new technologies will be deemed #standard in the next generation.

The stakes are high: The companies that provide the fundamental technology for 5G will be embedded in a global communications system for years to come.

So in the background are financial, nationalistic, and even geopolitical considerations.

“From the year 2001 to the present—three administrations—not enough attention has been paid to this,” says #Reed #Hundt, a former Federal Communications Commission chair during the Clinton administration.

Hundt is one of a number of current and former officials alarmed that the United States has no equivalent to Huawei
—that is, a major telecommunications company that both develops next-generation technology and builds it into equipment.

“In Europe, they have an Ericsson.
In Japan, they have companies.

And in China, they have not just Huawei but also ZTE.

But Huawei is the one that covers the whole range of products.”

All of this made Huawei's 5G standards bid an alarming prospect.

“Huawei's IP and standards are the wedge they intend to use to pry open the Western computing world,” Hundt says.

The body that develops 5G standards, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project ( #3GPP ), is an international umbrella organization of various telecommunications groups.

In 2016, it made a key decision on what was called #5G #New #Radio #standards
—the part that helped determine how data would be sent over 5G and how it would be checked for accuracy.

After spending millions, undergoing years of testing, and filing for multiple patents, Huawei was not going to pull punches at the critical juncture. It needed the certification of an official standard to cement its claim.

The problem was that reasonable people argued that other techniques would work just as well as polar codes to achieve error correction in the new framework.

Some suggested that a revamp of the current 4G protocol, turbo codes, would be sufficient.

Others, notably San Diego-based #Qualcomm, which makes chipsets for mobile technology, liked a third option:
Robert Gallager's old #LDPC idea, the one that had nearly reached the Shannon limit and had inspired Arıkan on his own intellectual journey.

Since the early 1960s, when Gallager proposed LDPC, technology had improved and the cost of commercial production was no longer prohibitive.

Qualcomm's R&D team developed it for 5G.

Though Erdal Arıkan did not know it at the time, his work would be squared off against that of his mentor in a competition that involved billions of dollars and an international clash of reputations.

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Reaching consensus on the parts of a mobile platform is complicated. Decisions have to be made about dozens of specifications for transmission speeds, radio frequencies, security architecture, and the like.

To make that happen, engineers gather in a series of meetings every year to choose which new technologies will be deemed #standard in the next generation.

The stakes are high: The companies that provide the fundamental technology for 5G will be embedded in a global communications system for years to come.

So in the background are financial, nationalistic, and even geopolitical considerations.

“From the year 2001 to the present—three administrations—not enough attention has been paid to this,” says #Reed #Hundt, a former Federal Communications Commission chair during the Clinton administration.

Hundt is one of a number of current and former officials alarmed that the United States has no equivalent to Huawei
—that is, a major telecommunications company that both develops next-generation technology and builds it into equipment.

“In Europe, they have an Ericsson.
In Japan, they have companies.

And in China, they have not just Huawei but also ZTE.

But Huawei is the one that covers the whole range of products.”

All of this made Huawei's 5G standards bid an alarming prospect.

“Huawei's IP and standards are the wedge they intend to use to pry open the Western computing world,” Hundt says.

The body that develops 5G standards, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project ( #3GPP ), is an international umbrella organization of various telecommunications groups.

In 2016, it made a key decision on what was called #5G #New #Radio #standards
—the part that helped determine how data would be sent over 5G and how it would be checked for accuracy.

After spending millions, undergoing years of testing, and filing for multiple patents, Huawei was not going to pull punches at the critical juncture. It needed the certification of an official standard to cement its claim.

The problem was that reasonable people argued that other techniques would work just as well as polar codes to achieve error correction in the new framework.

Some suggested that a revamp of the current 4G protocol, turbo codes, would be sufficient.

Others, notably San Diego-based #Qualcomm, which makes chipsets for mobile technology, liked a third option:
Robert Gallager's old #LDPC idea, the one that had nearly reached the Shannon limit and had inspired Arıkan on his own intellectual journey.

Since the early 1960s, when Gallager proposed LDPC, technology had improved and the cost of commercial production was no longer prohibitive.

Qualcomm's R&D team developed it for 5G.

Though Erdal Arıkan did not know it at the time, his work would be squared off against that of his mentor in a competition that involved billions of dollars and an international clash of reputations.

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Today Huawei holds more than two-thirds of the polar code patent “families”
—10 times as many as its nearest competitor.

The general feeling in the field, Vardy said, was that Huawei “invested a lot of research time and effort into developing this idea.”

It seemed “all the other companies were at least a few years behind.”

But all that work and all those patents would be wasted if the technology didn't fit into the 5G platform.

“It has to be adopted by everybody,” Tong says.

“You have to convince the entire industry that this is good for 5G.”

If polar codes were to be the symbol of Huawei's superiority, there was one more hurdle:
“I had the responsibility,” Wen Tong says, “to make it a standard.”

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Today Huawei holds more than two-thirds of the polar code patent “families”
—10 times as many as its nearest competitor.

The general feeling in the field, Vardy said, was that Huawei “invested a lot of research time and effort into developing this idea.”

It seemed “all the other companies were at least a few years behind.”

But all that work and all those patents would be wasted if the technology didn't fit into the 5G platform.

“It has to be adopted by everybody,” Tong says.

“You have to convince the entire industry that this is good for 5G.”

If polar codes were to be the symbol of Huawei's superiority, there was one more hurdle:
“I had the responsibility,” Wen Tong says, “to make it a standard.”

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Today Huawei holds more than two-thirds of the polar code patent “families”
—10 times as many as its nearest competitor.

The general feeling in the field, Vardy said, was that Huawei “invested a lot of research time and effort into developing this idea.”

It seemed “all the other companies were at least a few years behind.”

But all that work and all those patents would be wasted if the technology didn't fit into the 5G platform.

“It has to be adopted by everybody,” Tong says.

“You have to convince the entire industry that this is good for 5G.”

If polar codes were to be the symbol of Huawei's superiority, there was one more hurdle:
“I had the responsibility,” Wen Tong says, “to make it a standard.”

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Today Huawei holds more than two-thirds of the polar code patent “families”
—10 times as many as its nearest competitor.

The general feeling in the field, Vardy said, was that Huawei “invested a lot of research time and effort into developing this idea.”

It seemed “all the other companies were at least a few years behind.”

But all that work and all those patents would be wasted if the technology didn't fit into the 5G platform.

“It has to be adopted by everybody,” Tong says.

“You have to convince the entire industry that this is good for 5G.”

If polar codes were to be the symbol of Huawei's superiority, there was one more hurdle:
“I had the responsibility,” Wen Tong says, “to make it a standard.”

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

Today Huawei holds more than two-thirds of the polar code patent “families”
—10 times as many as its nearest competitor.

The general feeling in the field, Vardy said, was that Huawei “invested a lot of research time and effort into developing this idea.”

It seemed “all the other companies were at least a few years behind.”

But all that work and all those patents would be wasted if the technology didn't fit into the 5G platform.

“It has to be adopted by everybody,” Tong says.

“You have to convince the entire industry that this is good for 5G.”

If polar codes were to be the symbol of Huawei's superiority, there was one more hurdle:
“I had the responsibility,” Wen Tong says, “to make it a standard.”

#Wen #Tong #5G #patents #Arıkan #polar #codes #Alexander #Vardy #Ido #Tal #Technion #Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

In 2009, Nortel filed for bankruptcy.

It had failed to adapt, disappointed its customers, and was ill-prepared to respond to new Chinese competition.
And there was that hack.

Huawei seized the moment.

Nortel's most valuable asset was the unmatched talent in its Ottawa research lab, known as the Canadian equivalent of the legendary Bell Labs.

For years, Huawei had been building up its research capacity, trying to shed its reputation as a low-cost provider whose tech came from purloining the discoveries of others. It had a number of R&D labs around the world.

Now, with Nortel's demise, it could pursue a bigger prize than market share:
technical mastery. And respect.

The head of research at Nortel's lab in Ottawa, #Wen #Tong, grew up in China and joined Nortel's wireless lab in 1995 after earning a doctorate at Concordia University in Montreal.

He had contributed to every generation of mobile technology and held 470 patents in the US.

If telecommunications companies staged a research scientist draft in 2009, Wen Tong would have been a first-round pick.

Now he was a free agent, and Google, Intel, and others courted him.

Tong picked Huawei. He wanted to keep his networking scientists together, and the team didn't want to leave Canada.

The Chinese company was happy to recruit the group and let them stay in place.

Huawei also promised them freedom to attack the signature challenge for networking science in the 21st century:
creating the infrastructure for #5G.

In this iteration of mobile platforms, billions of mobile devices would seamlessly connect to networks. It promised to transform the world in ways even the scientists could not imagine, and it would mean vast fortunes for those who produced the technology.

The race for #patents would be intense, a matter not only of profit but also national pride.

Not long after Tong joined Huawei, in 2009, a research paper came to his attention.

It was Erdal #Arıkan's discovery of #polar #codes.

Tong had helped produce the technology that provided the radio-transmission error correction for the current standard, known as turbo codes.

He thought the polar codes concept could be its replacement in 5G.

But the obstacles were considerable, and Tong originally couldn't interest his Canadian researchers in attacking the problem.

Then, in 2012, Huawei asked Tong to restructure its communications lab in China.
He took the opportunity to assign several smart young engineers to work on polar codes.

It involved the none-too-certain process of taking a mathematical theory and making it actually work in practical design, but they made progress and the team grew.

With each innovation, Huawei rushed to the patent office.

In 2013, Wen Tong asked Huawei's investment board for $600 million for 5G research.

“Very simple,” Tong says. “20 minutes, and they decided.”

The answer was yes, and a good deal of that money went into polar codes.

After Huawei came up with software that implemented the theory, the work shifted to testing and iterating. Eventually hundreds of engineers were involved.

Tong was not the only information scientist who had seen Arıkan's paper.
#Alexander #Vardy of the Jacobs School of Engineering at UC San Diego says the paper achieved “something that people were trying to do for 60 years.”

The challenge was that polar codes were not suited for 5G's short blocklengths
—the amount of 0s and 1s strung together.

Vardy and his postdoc, #Ido #Tal of the #Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, modified the error-correcting technology so it outperformed other state-of-the-art codes when applied to 5G's short blocklengths.

Vardy says he presented his findings in a conference in 2011.

“Huawei was there in the audience, and right after that they ran with it,” he says, seemingly without rancor.

(UC San Diego owns Vardy and Tal's patent and has licensed it to Samsung on a nonexclusive basis.)

#Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

In 2009, Nortel filed for bankruptcy.

It had failed to adapt, disappointed its customers, and was ill-prepared to respond to new Chinese competition.
And there was that hack.

Huawei seized the moment.

Nortel's most valuable asset was the unmatched talent in its Ottawa research lab, known as the Canadian equivalent of the legendary Bell Labs.

For years, Huawei had been building up its research capacity, trying to shed its reputation as a low-cost provider whose tech came from purloining the discoveries of others. It had a number of R&D labs around the world.

Now, with Nortel's demise, it could pursue a bigger prize than market share:
technical mastery. And respect.

The head of research at Nortel's lab in Ottawa, #Wen #Tong, grew up in China and joined Nortel's wireless lab in 1995 after earning a doctorate at Concordia University in Montreal.

He had contributed to every generation of mobile technology and held 470 patents in the US.

If telecommunications companies staged a research scientist draft in 2009, Wen Tong would have been a first-round pick.

Now he was a free agent, and Google, Intel, and others courted him.

Tong picked Huawei. He wanted to keep his networking scientists together, and the team didn't want to leave Canada.

The Chinese company was happy to recruit the group and let them stay in place.

Huawei also promised them freedom to attack the signature challenge for networking science in the 21st century:
creating the infrastructure for #5G.

In this iteration of mobile platforms, billions of mobile devices would seamlessly connect to networks. It promised to transform the world in ways even the scientists could not imagine, and it would mean vast fortunes for those who produced the technology.

The race for #patents would be intense, a matter not only of profit but also national pride.

Not long after Tong joined Huawei, in 2009, a research paper came to his attention.

It was Erdal #Arıkan's discovery of #polar #codes.

Tong had helped produce the technology that provided the radio-transmission error correction for the current standard, known as turbo codes.

He thought the polar codes concept could be its replacement in 5G.

But the obstacles were considerable, and Tong originally couldn't interest his Canadian researchers in attacking the problem.

Then, in 2012, Huawei asked Tong to restructure its communications lab in China.
He took the opportunity to assign several smart young engineers to work on polar codes.

It involved the none-too-certain process of taking a mathematical theory and making it actually work in practical design, but they made progress and the team grew.

With each innovation, Huawei rushed to the patent office.

In 2013, Wen Tong asked Huawei's investment board for $600 million for 5G research.

“Very simple,” Tong says. “20 minutes, and they decided.”

The answer was yes, and a good deal of that money went into polar codes.

After Huawei came up with software that implemented the theory, the work shifted to testing and iterating. Eventually hundreds of engineers were involved.

Tong was not the only information scientist who had seen Arıkan's paper.
#Alexander #Vardy of the Jacobs School of Engineering at UC San Diego says the paper achieved “something that people were trying to do for 60 years.”

The challenge was that polar codes were not suited for 5G's short blocklengths
—the amount of 0s and 1s strung together.

Vardy and his postdoc, #Ido #Tal of the #Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, modified the error-correcting technology so it outperformed other state-of-the-art codes when applied to 5G's short blocklengths.

Vardy says he presented his findings in a conference in 2011.

“Huawei was there in the audience, and right after that they ran with it,” he says, seemingly without rancor.

(UC San Diego owns Vardy and Tal's patent and has licensed it to Samsung on a nonexclusive basis.)

#Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

In 2009, Nortel filed for bankruptcy.

It had failed to adapt, disappointed its customers, and was ill-prepared to respond to new Chinese competition.
And there was that hack.

Huawei seized the moment.

Nortel's most valuable asset was the unmatched talent in its Ottawa research lab, known as the Canadian equivalent of the legendary Bell Labs.

For years, Huawei had been building up its research capacity, trying to shed its reputation as a low-cost provider whose tech came from purloining the discoveries of others. It had a number of R&D labs around the world.

Now, with Nortel's demise, it could pursue a bigger prize than market share:
technical mastery. And respect.

The head of research at Nortel's lab in Ottawa, #Wen #Tong, grew up in China and joined Nortel's wireless lab in 1995 after earning a doctorate at Concordia University in Montreal.

He had contributed to every generation of mobile technology and held 470 patents in the US.

If telecommunications companies staged a research scientist draft in 2009, Wen Tong would have been a first-round pick.

Now he was a free agent, and Google, Intel, and others courted him.

Tong picked Huawei. He wanted to keep his networking scientists together, and the team didn't want to leave Canada.

The Chinese company was happy to recruit the group and let them stay in place.

Huawei also promised them freedom to attack the signature challenge for networking science in the 21st century:
creating the infrastructure for #5G.

In this iteration of mobile platforms, billions of mobile devices would seamlessly connect to networks. It promised to transform the world in ways even the scientists could not imagine, and it would mean vast fortunes for those who produced the technology.

The race for #patents would be intense, a matter not only of profit but also national pride.

Not long after Tong joined Huawei, in 2009, a research paper came to his attention.

It was Erdal #Arıkan's discovery of #polar #codes.

Tong had helped produce the technology that provided the radio-transmission error correction for the current standard, known as turbo codes.

He thought the polar codes concept could be its replacement in 5G.

But the obstacles were considerable, and Tong originally couldn't interest his Canadian researchers in attacking the problem.

Then, in 2012, Huawei asked Tong to restructure its communications lab in China.
He took the opportunity to assign several smart young engineers to work on polar codes.

It involved the none-too-certain process of taking a mathematical theory and making it actually work in practical design, but they made progress and the team grew.

With each innovation, Huawei rushed to the patent office.

In 2013, Wen Tong asked Huawei's investment board for $600 million for 5G research.

“Very simple,” Tong says. “20 minutes, and they decided.”

The answer was yes, and a good deal of that money went into polar codes.

After Huawei came up with software that implemented the theory, the work shifted to testing and iterating. Eventually hundreds of engineers were involved.

Tong was not the only information scientist who had seen Arıkan's paper.
#Alexander #Vardy of the Jacobs School of Engineering at UC San Diego says the paper achieved “something that people were trying to do for 60 years.”

The challenge was that polar codes were not suited for 5G's short blocklengths
—the amount of 0s and 1s strung together.

Vardy and his postdoc, #Ido #Tal of the #Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, modified the error-correcting technology so it outperformed other state-of-the-art codes when applied to 5G's short blocklengths.

Vardy says he presented his findings in a conference in 2011.

“Huawei was there in the audience, and right after that they ran with it,” he says, seemingly without rancor.

(UC San Diego owns Vardy and Tal's patent and has licensed it to Samsung on a nonexclusive basis.)

#Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

In 2009, Nortel filed for bankruptcy.

It had failed to adapt, disappointed its customers, and was ill-prepared to respond to new Chinese competition.
And there was that hack.

Huawei seized the moment.

Nortel's most valuable asset was the unmatched talent in its Ottawa research lab, known as the Canadian equivalent of the legendary Bell Labs.

For years, Huawei had been building up its research capacity, trying to shed its reputation as a low-cost provider whose tech came from purloining the discoveries of others. It had a number of R&D labs around the world.

Now, with Nortel's demise, it could pursue a bigger prize than market share:
technical mastery. And respect.

The head of research at Nortel's lab in Ottawa, #Wen #Tong, grew up in China and joined Nortel's wireless lab in 1995 after earning a doctorate at Concordia University in Montreal.

He had contributed to every generation of mobile technology and held 470 patents in the US.

If telecommunications companies staged a research scientist draft in 2009, Wen Tong would have been a first-round pick.

Now he was a free agent, and Google, Intel, and others courted him.

Tong picked Huawei. He wanted to keep his networking scientists together, and the team didn't want to leave Canada.

The Chinese company was happy to recruit the group and let them stay in place.

Huawei also promised them freedom to attack the signature challenge for networking science in the 21st century:
creating the infrastructure for #5G.

In this iteration of mobile platforms, billions of mobile devices would seamlessly connect to networks. It promised to transform the world in ways even the scientists could not imagine, and it would mean vast fortunes for those who produced the technology.

The race for #patents would be intense, a matter not only of profit but also national pride.

Not long after Tong joined Huawei, in 2009, a research paper came to his attention.

It was Erdal #Arıkan's discovery of #polar #codes.

Tong had helped produce the technology that provided the radio-transmission error correction for the current standard, known as turbo codes.

He thought the polar codes concept could be its replacement in 5G.

But the obstacles were considerable, and Tong originally couldn't interest his Canadian researchers in attacking the problem.

Then, in 2012, Huawei asked Tong to restructure its communications lab in China.
He took the opportunity to assign several smart young engineers to work on polar codes.

It involved the none-too-certain process of taking a mathematical theory and making it actually work in practical design, but they made progress and the team grew.

With each innovation, Huawei rushed to the patent office.

In 2013, Wen Tong asked Huawei's investment board for $600 million for 5G research.

“Very simple,” Tong says. “20 minutes, and they decided.”

The answer was yes, and a good deal of that money went into polar codes.

After Huawei came up with software that implemented the theory, the work shifted to testing and iterating. Eventually hundreds of engineers were involved.

Tong was not the only information scientist who had seen Arıkan's paper.
#Alexander #Vardy of the Jacobs School of Engineering at UC San Diego says the paper achieved “something that people were trying to do for 60 years.”

The challenge was that polar codes were not suited for 5G's short blocklengths
—the amount of 0s and 1s strung together.

Vardy and his postdoc, #Ido #Tal of the #Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, modified the error-correcting technology so it outperformed other state-of-the-art codes when applied to 5G's short blocklengths.

Vardy says he presented his findings in a conference in 2011.

“Huawei was there in the audience, and right after that they ran with it,” he says, seemingly without rancor.

(UC San Diego owns Vardy and Tal's patent and has licensed it to Samsung on a nonexclusive basis.)

#Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

In 2009, Nortel filed for bankruptcy.

It had failed to adapt, disappointed its customers, and was ill-prepared to respond to new Chinese competition.
And there was that hack.

Huawei seized the moment.

Nortel's most valuable asset was the unmatched talent in its Ottawa research lab, known as the Canadian equivalent of the legendary Bell Labs.

For years, Huawei had been building up its research capacity, trying to shed its reputation as a low-cost provider whose tech came from purloining the discoveries of others. It had a number of R&D labs around the world.

Now, with Nortel's demise, it could pursue a bigger prize than market share:
technical mastery. And respect.

The head of research at Nortel's lab in Ottawa, #Wen #Tong, grew up in China and joined Nortel's wireless lab in 1995 after earning a doctorate at Concordia University in Montreal.

He had contributed to every generation of mobile technology and held 470 patents in the US.

If telecommunications companies staged a research scientist draft in 2009, Wen Tong would have been a first-round pick.

Now he was a free agent, and Google, Intel, and others courted him.

Tong picked Huawei. He wanted to keep his networking scientists together, and the team didn't want to leave Canada.

The Chinese company was happy to recruit the group and let them stay in place.

Huawei also promised them freedom to attack the signature challenge for networking science in the 21st century:
creating the infrastructure for #5G.

In this iteration of mobile platforms, billions of mobile devices would seamlessly connect to networks. It promised to transform the world in ways even the scientists could not imagine, and it would mean vast fortunes for those who produced the technology.

The race for #patents would be intense, a matter not only of profit but also national pride.

Not long after Tong joined Huawei, in 2009, a research paper came to his attention.

It was Erdal #Arıkan's discovery of #polar #codes.

Tong had helped produce the technology that provided the radio-transmission error correction for the current standard, known as turbo codes.

He thought the polar codes concept could be its replacement in 5G.

But the obstacles were considerable, and Tong originally couldn't interest his Canadian researchers in attacking the problem.

Then, in 2012, Huawei asked Tong to restructure its communications lab in China.
He took the opportunity to assign several smart young engineers to work on polar codes.

It involved the none-too-certain process of taking a mathematical theory and making it actually work in practical design, but they made progress and the team grew.

With each innovation, Huawei rushed to the patent office.

In 2013, Wen Tong asked Huawei's investment board for $600 million for 5G research.

“Very simple,” Tong says. “20 minutes, and they decided.”

The answer was yes, and a good deal of that money went into polar codes.

After Huawei came up with software that implemented the theory, the work shifted to testing and iterating. Eventually hundreds of engineers were involved.

Tong was not the only information scientist who had seen Arıkan's paper.
#Alexander #Vardy of the Jacobs School of Engineering at UC San Diego says the paper achieved “something that people were trying to do for 60 years.”

The challenge was that polar codes were not suited for 5G's short blocklengths
—the amount of 0s and 1s strung together.

Vardy and his postdoc, #Ido #Tal of the #Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, modified the error-correcting technology so it outperformed other state-of-the-art codes when applied to 5G's short blocklengths.

Vardy says he presented his findings in a conference in 2011.

“Huawei was there in the audience, and right after that they ran with it,” he says, seemingly without rancor.

(UC San Diego owns Vardy and Tal's patent and has licensed it to Samsung on a nonexclusive basis.)

#Ren #Zhengfei #Huawei #Chinese #government #ZTE #stolen #intellectual #property #Cisco #Department #Justice #Nortel #downloading #documents

IN 1987, AROUND the time Arıkan returned to Turkey, #Ren #Zhengfei, a 44-year-old former military engineer, began a company that traded telecom equipment.

He called it #Huawei, which translates roughly to “China has a promising future.”

Ren tried to distinguish his company by maintaining a fanatical devotion to customer service.

Frustrated with the unreliability of suppliers, Ren decided that Huawei would manufacture its own systems. Thus began a long process of building Huawei into a company that built and sold telecom equipment all along the chain, from base stations to handsets, and did so not only inside China but across the globe.

The rise of Huawei is painstakingly rendered in a small library of self-aggrandizing literature that the company publishes, including several volumes of quotes from its founder.

The theme of this opus is hard to miss, expressed in a variety of fighting analogies. In one such description, Tian Tao, the company's authorized Boswell, quotes Ren on how the company competed against the powerful international “elephants” that once dominated the field.

“Of course, Huawei is no match for an elephant, so it has to adopt the qualities of wolves:
a keen sense of smell, a strong competitive nature, a pack mentality, and a spirit of sacrifice.”

The hagiographies omit some key details about how the wolf got along.
For one, they dramatically underplay the role of the #Chinese #government, which in the 1990s offered loans and other financial support, in addition to policies that favored Chinese telecom companies over foreign ones.

(In a rare moment of candor on this issue, Ren himself admitted in an interview that Huawei would not exist if not for government support.)

With the government behind them, Chinese companies like Huawei and its domestic rival #ZTE came to dominate the national telecom equipment market.

Huawei had become the elephant.

Another subject one does not encounter in the company's library is the alleged use of #stolen #intellectual #property,
a charge the company denies.

“If you read the Western media about Huawei, you will find plenty of people who say that everything from Huawei was begged, borrowed, or stolen. And there is absolutely no truth in that,” says Brian Chamberlin, an executive adviser for Huawei's carrier group.

But in one notorious 2003 case, Huawei admitted using router software copied from #Cisco, though it insisted the use was very limited, and the sides negotiated a settlement that was “mutually beneficial.”

More recently, in February, the US #Department of #Justice filed a suit against the company charging it with “grow[ing] the worldwide business of Huawei … through the deliberate and repeated misappropriation of intellectual property.”

The indictment alleges Huawei has been engaging in these practices since at least 2000.

The Chinese government also provided support to help Huawei gain a foothold overseas, offering loans to customers that made Huawei's products more appealing.

One of Huawei's biggest foreign competitors was #Nortel, the dominant North American telecom company based in Canada.

But Nortel's business was struggling just at a time when competition from Chinese products was intensifying.

Then, in 2004, a Nortel security specialist named Brian Shields discovered that computers based in China, using passwords of Nortel executives, had been #downloading hundreds of #documents from the company.

“There's nothing they couldn't have gotten at,” Shields says.

Though no one ever publicly identified the hackers, and Ren denied any Huawei involvement, the episode added to the suspicion in the West that Huawei's success was not always achieved on the up and up.

IN 1987, AROUND the time Arıkan returned to Turkey, #Ren #Zhengfei, a 44-year-old former military engineer, began a company that traded telecom equipment.

He called it #Huawei, which translates roughly to “China has a promising future.”

Ren tried to distinguish his company by maintaining a fanatical devotion to customer service.

Frustrated with the unreliability of suppliers, Ren decided that Huawei would manufacture its own systems. Thus began a long process of building Huawei into a company that built and sold telecom equipment all along the chain, from base stations to handsets, and did so not only inside China but across the globe.

The rise of Huawei is painstakingly rendered in a small library of self-aggrandizing literature that the company publishes, including several volumes of quotes from its founder.

The theme of this opus is hard to miss, expressed in a variety of fighting analogies. In one such description, Tian Tao, the company's authorized Boswell, quotes Ren on how the company competed against the powerful international “elephants” that once dominated the field.

“Of course, Huawei is no match for an elephant, so it has to adopt the qualities of wolves:
a keen sense of smell, a strong competitive nature, a pack mentality, and a spirit of sacrifice.”

The hagiographies omit some key details about how the wolf got along.
For one, they dramatically underplay the role of the #Chinese #government, which in the 1990s offered loans and other financial support, in addition to policies that favored Chinese telecom companies over foreign ones.

(In a rare moment of candor on this issue, Ren himself admitted in an interview that Huawei would not exist if not for government support.)

With the government behind them, Chinese companies like Huawei and its domestic rival #ZTE came to dominate the national telecom equipment market.

Huawei had become the elephant.

Another subject one does not encounter in the company's library is the alleged use of #stolen #intellectual #property,
a charge the company denies.

“If you read the Western media about Huawei, you will find plenty of people who say that everything from Huawei was begged, borrowed, or stolen. And there is absolutely no truth in that,” says Brian Chamberlin, an executive adviser for Huawei's carrier group.

But in one notorious 2003 case, Huawei admitted using router software copied from #Cisco, though it insisted the use was very limited, and the sides negotiated a settlement that was “mutually beneficial.”

More recently, in February, the US #Department of #Justice filed a suit against the company charging it with “grow[ing] the worldwide business of Huawei … through the deliberate and repeated misappropriation of intellectual property.”

The indictment alleges Huawei has been engaging in these practices since at least 2000.

The Chinese government also provided support to help Huawei gain a foothold overseas, offering loans to customers that made Huawei's products more appealing.

One of Huawei's biggest foreign competitors was #Nortel, the dominant North American telecom company based in Canada.

But Nortel's business was struggling just at a time when competition from Chinese products was intensifying.

Then, in 2004, a Nortel security specialist named Brian Shields discovered that computers based in China, using passwords of Nortel executives, had been #downloading hundreds of #documents from the company.

“There's nothing they couldn't have gotten at,” Shields says.

Though no one ever publicly identified the hackers, and Ren denied any Huawei involvement, the episode added to the suspicion in the West that Huawei's success was not always achieved on the up and up.

IN 1987, AROUND the time Arıkan returned to Turkey, #Ren #Zhengfei, a 44-year-old former military engineer, began a company that traded telecom equipment.

He called it #Huawei, which translates roughly to “China has a promising future.”

Ren tried to distinguish his company by maintaining a fanatical devotion to customer service.

Frustrated with the unreliability of suppliers, Ren decided that Huawei would manufacture its own systems. Thus began a long process of building Huawei into a company that built and sold telecom equipment all along the chain, from base stations to handsets, and did so not only inside China but across the globe.

The rise of Huawei is painstakingly rendered in a small library of self-aggrandizing literature that the company publishes, including several volumes of quotes from its founder.

The theme of this opus is hard to miss, expressed in a variety of fighting analogies. In one such description, Tian Tao, the company's authorized Boswell, quotes Ren on how the company competed against the powerful international “elephants” that once dominated the field.

“Of course, Huawei is no match for an elephant, so it has to adopt the qualities of wolves:
a keen sense of smell, a strong competitive nature, a pack mentality, and a spirit of sacrifice.”

The hagiographies omit some key details about how the wolf got along.
For one, they dramatically underplay the role of the #Chinese #government, which in the 1990s offered loans and other financial support, in addition to policies that favored Chinese telecom companies over foreign ones.

(In a rare moment of candor on this issue, Ren himself admitted in an interview that Huawei would not exist if not for government support.)

With the government behind them, Chinese companies like Huawei and its domestic rival #ZTE came to dominate the national telecom equipment market.

Huawei had become the elephant.

Another subject one does not encounter in the company's library is the alleged use of #stolen #intellectual #property,
a charge the company denies.

“If you read the Western media about Huawei, you will find plenty of people who say that everything from Huawei was begged, borrowed, or stolen. And there is absolutely no truth in that,” says Brian Chamberlin, an executive adviser for Huawei's carrier group.

But in one notorious 2003 case, Huawei admitted using router software copied from #Cisco, though it insisted the use was very limited, and the sides negotiated a settlement that was “mutually beneficial.”

More recently, in February, the US #Department of #Justice filed a suit against the company charging it with “grow[ing] the worldwide business of Huawei … through the deliberate and repeated misappropriation of intellectual property.”

The indictment alleges Huawei has been engaging in these practices since at least 2000.

The Chinese government also provided support to help Huawei gain a foothold overseas, offering loans to customers that made Huawei's products more appealing.

One of Huawei's biggest foreign competitors was #Nortel, the dominant North American telecom company based in Canada.

But Nortel's business was struggling just at a time when competition from Chinese products was intensifying.

Then, in 2004, a Nortel security specialist named Brian Shields discovered that computers based in China, using passwords of Nortel executives, had been #downloading hundreds of #documents from the company.

“There's nothing they couldn't have gotten at,” Shields says.

Though no one ever publicly identified the hackers, and Ren denied any Huawei involvement, the episode added to the suspicion in the West that Huawei's success was not always achieved on the up and up.

IN 1987, AROUND the time Arıkan returned to Turkey, #Ren #Zhengfei, a 44-year-old former military engineer, began a company that traded telecom equipment.

He called it #Huawei, which translates roughly to “China has a promising future.”

Ren tried to distinguish his company by maintaining a fanatical devotion to customer service.

Frustrated with the unreliability of suppliers, Ren decided that Huawei would manufacture its own systems. Thus began a long process of building Huawei into a company that built and sold telecom equipment all along the chain, from base stations to handsets, and did so not only inside China but across the globe.

The rise of Huawei is painstakingly rendered in a small library of self-aggrandizing literature that the company publishes, including several volumes of quotes from its founder.

The theme of this opus is hard to miss, expressed in a variety of fighting analogies. In one such description, Tian Tao, the company's authorized Boswell, quotes Ren on how the company competed against the powerful international “elephants” that once dominated the field.

“Of course, Huawei is no match for an elephant, so it has to adopt the qualities of wolves:
a keen sense of smell, a strong competitive nature, a pack mentality, and a spirit of sacrifice.”

The hagiographies omit some key details about how the wolf got along.
For one, they dramatically underplay the role of the #Chinese #government, which in the 1990s offered loans and other financial support, in addition to policies that favored Chinese telecom companies over foreign ones.

(In a rare moment of candor on this issue, Ren himself admitted in an interview that Huawei would not exist if not for government support.)

With the government behind them, Chinese companies like Huawei and its domestic rival #ZTE came to dominate the national telecom equipment market.

Huawei had become the elephant.

Another subject one does not encounter in the company's library is the alleged use of #stolen #intellectual #property,
a charge the company denies.

“If you read the Western media about Huawei, you will find plenty of people who say that everything from Huawei was begged, borrowed, or stolen. And there is absolutely no truth in that,” says Brian Chamberlin, an executive adviser for Huawei's carrier group.

But in one notorious 2003 case, Huawei admitted using router software copied from #Cisco, though it insisted the use was very limited, and the sides negotiated a settlement that was “mutually beneficial.”

More recently, in February, the US #Department of #Justice filed a suit against the company charging it with “grow[ing] the worldwide business of Huawei … through the deliberate and repeated misappropriation of intellectual property.”

The indictment alleges Huawei has been engaging in these practices since at least 2000.

The Chinese government also provided support to help Huawei gain a foothold overseas, offering loans to customers that made Huawei's products more appealing.

One of Huawei's biggest foreign competitors was #Nortel, the dominant North American telecom company based in Canada.

But Nortel's business was struggling just at a time when competition from Chinese products was intensifying.

Then, in 2004, a Nortel security specialist named Brian Shields discovered that computers based in China, using passwords of Nortel executives, had been #downloading hundreds of #documents from the company.

“There's nothing they couldn't have gotten at,” Shields says.

Though no one ever publicly identified the hackers, and Ren denied any Huawei involvement, the episode added to the suspicion in the West that Huawei's success was not always achieved on the up and up.

IN 1987, AROUND the time Arıkan returned to Turkey, #Ren #Zhengfei, a 44-year-old former military engineer, began a company that traded telecom equipment.

He called it #Huawei, which translates roughly to “China has a promising future.”

Ren tried to distinguish his company by maintaining a fanatical devotion to customer service.

Frustrated with the unreliability of suppliers, Ren decided that Huawei would manufacture its own systems. Thus began a long process of building Huawei into a company that built and sold telecom equipment all along the chain, from base stations to handsets, and did so not only inside China but across the globe.

The rise of Huawei is painstakingly rendered in a small library of self-aggrandizing literature that the company publishes, including several volumes of quotes from its founder.

The theme of this opus is hard to miss, expressed in a variety of fighting analogies. In one such description, Tian Tao, the company's authorized Boswell, quotes Ren on how the company competed against the powerful international “elephants” that once dominated the field.

“Of course, Huawei is no match for an elephant, so it has to adopt the qualities of wolves:
a keen sense of smell, a strong competitive nature, a pack mentality, and a spirit of sacrifice.”

The hagiographies omit some key details about how the wolf got along.
For one, they dramatically underplay the role of the #Chinese #government, which in the 1990s offered loans and other financial support, in addition to policies that favored Chinese telecom companies over foreign ones.

(In a rare moment of candor on this issue, Ren himself admitted in an interview that Huawei would not exist if not for government support.)

With the government behind them, Chinese companies like Huawei and its domestic rival #ZTE came to dominate the national telecom equipment market.

Huawei had become the elephant.

Another subject one does not encounter in the company's library is the alleged use of #stolen #intellectual #property,
a charge the company denies.

“If you read the Western media about Huawei, you will find plenty of people who say that everything from Huawei was begged, borrowed, or stolen. And there is absolutely no truth in that,” says Brian Chamberlin, an executive adviser for Huawei's carrier group.

But in one notorious 2003 case, Huawei admitted using router software copied from #Cisco, though it insisted the use was very limited, and the sides negotiated a settlement that was “mutually beneficial.”

More recently, in February, the US #Department of #Justice filed a suit against the company charging it with “grow[ing] the worldwide business of Huawei … through the deliberate and repeated misappropriation of intellectual property.”

The indictment alleges Huawei has been engaging in these practices since at least 2000.

The Chinese government also provided support to help Huawei gain a foothold overseas, offering loans to customers that made Huawei's products more appealing.

One of Huawei's biggest foreign competitors was #Nortel, the dominant North American telecom company based in Canada.

But Nortel's business was struggling just at a time when competition from Chinese products was intensifying.

Then, in 2004, a Nortel security specialist named Brian Shields discovered that computers based in China, using passwords of Nortel executives, had been #downloading hundreds of #documents from the company.

“There's nothing they couldn't have gotten at,” Shields says.

Though no one ever publicly identified the hackers, and Ren denied any Huawei involvement, the episode added to the suspicion in the West that Huawei's success was not always achieved on the up and up.

@matdevdug and tons of #Nortel, #Alcatel, #Cisco and other network/Telcom equipment... gone. Never the same place again. But that's OK because #Intel bought us. (*spits*) yuck.

Growing up in Ottawa near the tech scene, you can't throw a stone without someone being former Nortel.

A fellow Canuck produced an amazing 2 part documentary on the rise and fall of Nortel, from Sir Graham Bell, Bell Labs, to the final patent buyout by an Apple led consortium.

Part1: The Company That Broke Canada
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6xwMIUPHss

Part2: What Killed Canada's Biggest Company
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDdC3-LT7pM

#nortel #networks #HPC

This #documentary is a real time commitment (beware: there's more than one part), but I had never really understood the story of #Nortel before watching.

When everything fell apart, I was a bit too early in my career to care or understand the massive impact this whole mess had on… everything—but especially #Canada.

It (and the larger dotcom bubble burst) did affect the trajectory of my career, but I didn’t realize how much of that probably stemmed from Nortel itself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6xwMIUPHss

And here's part two; just finished it a few minutes ago. Made some old scars twinge... #Nortel #Reckless #Hubris https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDdC3-LT7pM

If you didn't already catch it on nebula, I highly recommend this amazing documentary on Nortel.

https://youtu.be/I6xwMIUPHss?si=20iQam0L3G5YaD3y #nortel

:nkoinhaleorexhale:

Crud dealing with old Nortel hardware. Especially when lightning strikes nail out hardware.

On other hand, wooooooooo! I manage to figure out enough to get the VoIP phones back to working for external calls.

Lets say, a lot of dead ports and dead cards. And a lot of staring at Nortel documentation to figure out how all these darn cards talk to each other.

#PC #Nortel #Comptuer #IT