#intelme — Public Fediverse posts

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-12-11 · 17:34 UTC

There's a page on me_cleaner GitHub started in 2016. where people still post results with motherboards they have. The fact it is being updated to this day IMO speaks for itself:

me_cleaner status

Topics: Intel Management Engine

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 16:09 UTC

I cannot emphasize enough how crucial the Win-Raid Forum is for finding information about Intel Management Engine. Bookmarking here the main forum section and several pinned or long-standing reference threads.

Drivers, Firmware and Tools for ME 16+

Disable & Remove Intel Ibex Peak ME 6.0 Ignition firmware

Unlock Intel Flash Descriptor Read/Write Access Permissions for SPI Servicing

Intel (CS)ME, (CS)TXE, (CS)SPS, GSC, PMC, PCHC, PHY & OROM Firmware Repositories

Clean Dumped Intel Engine (CS)ME/(CS)TXE Regions with Data Initialization

ME Analyzer: Intel Engine Firmware Analysis Tool Discussion

Intel (Conv.Sec.) Trusted Execution Engine: Drivers, Firmware and Tools

Intel (CS) Management Engine: Drivers, Firmware and Tools (2-15)

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:35 UTC

After preparing the modified image with me_cleaner, the next step was flashing it. Only the ME region should be written back, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched. With FPT, this is done using a specific command-line option that limits the operation to that region.

Some motherboards have an FDO (Flash Descriptor Override) jumper that temporarily unlocks ME access. On this board, the jumper had to be shorted during flashing; otherwise, FPT refused to write. It is unclear how the manufacturer’s own tool was able to flash ME before, possibly through another privileged path.

After the modified ME firmware was successfully written, the system rebooted normally. It worked fine as long as the FDO jumper stayed shorted. Once the jumper was removed, the next boot showed a HECI error on the POST screen, requiring a manual confirmation with F1. Re-enabling the jumper made the error disappear again.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:35 UTC

After preparing the modified image with me_cleaner, the next step was flashing it. Only the ME region should be written back, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched. With FPT, this is done using a specific command-line option that limits the operation to that region.

Some motherboards have an FDO (Flash Descriptor Override) jumper that temporarily unlocks ME access. On this board, the jumper had to be shorted during flashing; otherwise, FPT refused to write. It is unclear how the manufacturer’s own tool was able to flash ME before, possibly through another privileged path.

After the modified ME firmware was successfully written, the system rebooted normally. It worked fine as long as the FDO jumper stayed shorted. Once the jumper was removed, the next boot showed a HECI error on the POST screen, requiring a manual confirmation with F1. Re-enabling the jumper made the error disappear again.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:35 UTC

After preparing the modified image with me_cleaner, the next step was flashing it. Only the ME region should be written back, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched. With FPT, this is done using a specific command-line option that limits the operation to that region.

Some motherboards have an FDO (Flash Descriptor Override) jumper that temporarily unlocks ME access. On this board, the jumper had to be shorted during flashing; otherwise, FPT refused to write. It is unclear how the manufacturer’s own tool was able to flash ME before, possibly through another privileged path.

After the modified ME firmware was successfully written, the system rebooted normally. It worked fine as long as the FDO jumper stayed shorted. Once the jumper was removed, the next boot showed a HECI error on the POST screen, requiring a manual confirmation with F1. Re-enabling the jumper made the error disappear again.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:35 UTC

After preparing the modified image with me_cleaner, the next step was flashing it. Only the ME region should be written back, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched. With FPT, this is done using a specific command-line option that limits the operation to that region.

Some motherboards have an FDO (Flash Descriptor Override) jumper that temporarily unlocks ME access. On this board, the jumper had to be shorted during flashing; otherwise, FPT refused to write. It is unclear how the manufacturer’s own tool was able to flash ME before, possibly through another privileged path.

After the modified ME firmware was successfully written, the system rebooted normally. It worked fine as long as the FDO jumper stayed shorted. Once the jumper was removed, the next boot showed a HECI error on the POST screen, requiring a manual confirmation with F1. Re-enabling the jumper made the error disappear again.

#intelme #firmware #uefi #bios

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:35 UTC

After preparing the modified image with me_cleaner, the next step was flashing it. Only the ME region should be written back, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched. With FPT, this is done using a specific command-line option that limits the operation to that region.

Some motherboards have an FDO (Flash Descriptor Override) jumper that temporarily unlocks ME access. On this board, the jumper had to be shorted during flashing; otherwise, FPT refused to write. It is unclear how the manufacturer’s own tool was able to flash ME before, possibly through another privileged path.

After the modified ME firmware was successfully written, the system rebooted normally. It worked fine as long as the FDO jumper stayed shorted. Once the jumper was removed, the next boot showed a HECI error on the POST screen, requiring a manual confirmation with F1. Re-enabling the jumper made the error disappear again.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:22 UTC

On most boards, BIOS and ME regions are protected in different ways. The first layer of protection is cryptographic signing, but there are also hardware-level locks. Some chipsets use special BIOS variables called Protected Range Registers that completely disable writes to certain regions.

In other cases, the board must be switched into a special state called manufacturing mode before flashing is allowed. How this is done depends on the board — sometimes through a hidden jumper, sometimes through an internal setting.

Working around these protections safely requires reading the exact documentation for the board and the chipset. The same method rarely works twice.

On my board, the Intel ME firmware is generation 8.x, which is supported by me_cleaner. The manufacturer provides BIOS and ME together in a single image, so me_cleaner can process it directly.

The FPT tool also supports the flash chip used here. That makes it possible to dump and reflash only the ME region, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:22 UTC

On most boards, BIOS and ME regions are protected in different ways. The first layer of protection is cryptographic signing, but there are also hardware-level locks. Some chipsets use special BIOS variables called Protected Range Registers that completely disable writes to certain regions.

In other cases, the board must be switched into a special state called manufacturing mode before flashing is allowed. How this is done depends on the board — sometimes through a hidden jumper, sometimes through an internal setting.

Working around these protections safely requires reading the exact documentation for the board and the chipset. The same method rarely works twice.

On my board, the Intel ME firmware is generation 8.x, which is supported by me_cleaner. The manufacturer provides BIOS and ME together in a single image, so me_cleaner can process it directly.

The FPT tool also supports the flash chip used here. That makes it possible to dump and reflash only the ME region, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:22 UTC

On most boards, BIOS and ME regions are protected in different ways. The first layer of protection is cryptographic signing, but there are also hardware-level locks. Some chipsets use special BIOS variables called Protected Range Registers that completely disable writes to certain regions.

In other cases, the board must be switched into a special state called manufacturing mode before flashing is allowed. How this is done depends on the board — sometimes through a hidden jumper, sometimes through an internal setting.

Working around these protections safely requires reading the exact documentation for the board and the chipset. The same method rarely works twice.

On my board, the Intel ME firmware is generation 8.x, which is supported by me_cleaner. The manufacturer provides BIOS and ME together in a single image, so me_cleaner can process it directly.

The FPT tool also supports the flash chip used here. That makes it possible to dump and reflash only the ME region, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched.

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:22 UTC

On most boards, BIOS and ME regions are protected in different ways. The first layer of protection is cryptographic signing, but there are also hardware-level locks. Some chipsets use special BIOS variables called Protected Range Registers that completely disable writes to certain regions.

In other cases, the board must be switched into a special state called manufacturing mode before flashing is allowed. How this is done depends on the board — sometimes through a hidden jumper, sometimes through an internal setting.

Working around these protections safely requires reading the exact documentation for the board and the chipset. The same method rarely works twice.

On my board, the Intel ME firmware is generation 8.x, which is supported by me_cleaner. The manufacturer provides BIOS and ME together in a single image, so me_cleaner can process it directly.

The FPT tool also supports the flash chip used here. That makes it possible to dump and reflash only the ME region, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched.

#intelme #firmware #uefi #bios

Try Stuff @[email protected] · 2025-11-05 · 15:22 UTC

On most boards, BIOS and ME regions are protected in different ways. The first layer of protection is cryptographic signing, but there are also hardware-level locks. Some chipsets use special BIOS variables called Protected Range Registers that completely disable writes to certain regions.

In other cases, the board must be switched into a special state called manufacturing mode before flashing is allowed. How this is done depends on the board — sometimes through a hidden jumper, sometimes through an internal setting.

Working around these protections safely requires reading the exact documentation for the board and the chipset. The same method rarely works twice.

On my board, the Intel ME firmware is generation 8.x, which is supported by me_cleaner. The manufacturer provides BIOS and ME together in a single image, so me_cleaner can process it directly.

The FPT tool also supports the flash chip used here. That makes it possible to dump and reflash only the ME region, leaving the rest of the BIOS untouched.

https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-the-intel-management-engine-a-backdoor/

#bios #uefi #firmware #intelme

Sergio @[email protected] · 2025-04-17 · 19:08 UTC

It gets creepier...

#intel
#ime
#intelme
#security

#intel #ime #intelme #security

Sergio @[email protected] · 2025-04-17 · 19:08 UTC

It gets creepier...

https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-the-intel-management-engine-a-backdoor/

#intel
#ime
#intelme
#security

#intel #ime #intelme #security

🅴🆁🆄🅰 🇷🇺 @[email protected] · 2024-11-23 · 20:01 UTC

Почти на любой не особо древней материнской плате можно использовать NVMe-диск M.2 вставленный через PCI-адаптер (PCI x4) в какой-нибудь из нескольких PCI-слотов (желательно с четырьмя и более каналами).
В таком случае SATA-диски проигрывают по скорости в несколько раз, даже при наличии на материнской плате поддержки лишь древней второй версии #PCIe (PCIe v.2). На вполне конкретных примерах вместо 390 Мб/с наблюдается стабильные 1,7 Гб/с.

Загрузка системы на NVMe
Обычно, людей останавливает тот момент, что BIOS (точнее EFI) древних материнских платах не позволяет загружаться с NVMe-дисков, но это не является проблемой в случае таких систем как линуксы.
Т.е. сама по себе система (ОС) может располагаться на nvme-диске, но загрузчик системы с #initramfs и образом ядра при этом на совершенно другом диске или же вообще на вынимаемом носителе.
Для запуска системы нужен boot-раздел весьма скромный по размерам, хватит и 200-300 мегабайт. И располагаться таковой boot-раздел может хоть на flash'ке, хоть на SD-карточке или же быть разделом на SATA-диске.

Как работает загрузка ОС?
При включении питания #UEFI, оно же #EFI, читает записи в своей энергонезависимой памяти #NVRAM в поисках информации о том, какие EFI System Partition (ESP) на каких носителях следует использовать в каком порядке.
#ESP это обычный раздел (partition) с файловой системой FAT16 или FAT32, которую прекрасно понимает EFI-система и на ней смотрит файлы являющиеся загрузчиками сродни: #rEFInd, #GRUB или #systemd-boot
Так же, в качестве загрузчика может быть и специально собранный образ ядра ОС — например, т.н. EFI boot stub.

Или проще добавить поддержку #NVMe?
Иногда вполне реально научить комп грузиться с NVMe. Надо взять «Intel ME Tools» и снять дамп SPI Flash чипа на материнской плате, а в снятый образ EFI-системы добавить NVMe-драйвер (через «UEFI Tool»). После чего, уже пропатченный образ записывается обратно в SPI Flash чип на материнской плате.

Доводилось такое выполнять, используя «Flash Programming Tool» (fpt.exe) из пакета «Intel ME Tools» и это не из под Windows, а из под #FreeDOS. Создавая загрузочную флешку через dd и докидывая на неё один файл «fpt.exe».
Не сказать чтобы удобно, но дампить и шить из под Windows требует сперва установить и саму эту ОС и нужные драйвера от материнской платы вместе с Intel ME/AMT. И выходит, что в ряде случаев проще и быстрее лишние пару раз загрузиться с флешки.

В более поздних версиях «Intel ME Tools» для более новых материнских плат (чипсетов, PCH) появился вариант «Flash Programming Tool» и для линухов. Ненаглядный «flashrom» в ряде случаев бесполезен, может снять дамп лишь с одного из чипов, коих обычно две штуки. Т.е. вместо 12 Мб сделает дамп лишь 8 Мб, то же FPT во время работы показывает с какого SPI-чипа сколько снято или в него записано.

#nvme #nvmessd #linux #hardware #intel #IntelME #lang_ru @Russia

#esp #efi #nvme #grub #uefi #pcie

🅴🆁🆄🅰 🇷🇺 @[email protected] · 2024-11-23 · 20:01 UTC

Почти на любой не особо древней материнской плате можно использовать NVMe-диск M.2 вставленный через PCI-адаптер (PCI x4) в какой-нибудь из нескольких PCI-слотов (желательно с четырьмя и более каналами).
В таком случае SATA-диски проигрывают по скорости в несколько раз, даже при наличии на материнской плате поддержки лишь древней второй версии #PCIe (PCIe v.2). На вполне конкретных примерах вместо 390 Мб/с наблюдается стабильные 1,7 Гб/с.

Загрузка системы на NVMe
Обычно, людей останавливает тот момент, что BIOS (точнее EFI) древних материнских платах не позволяет загружаться с NVMe-дисков, но это не является проблемой в случае таких систем как линуксы.
Т.е. сама по себе система (ОС) может располагаться на nvme-диске, но загрузчик системы с #initramfs и образом ядра при этом на совершенно другом диске или же вообще на вынимаемом носителе.
Для запуска системы нужен boot-раздел весьма скромный по размерам, хватит и 200-300 мегабайт. И располагаться таковой boot-раздел может хоть на flash'ке, хоть на SD-карточке или же быть разделом на SATA-диске.

Как работает загрузка ОС?
При включении питания #UEFI, оно же #EFI, читает записи в своей энергонезависимой памяти #NVRAM в поисках информации о том, какие EFI System Partition (ESP) на каких носителях следует использовать в каком порядке.
#ESP это обычный раздел (partition) с файловой системой FAT16 или FAT32, которую прекрасно понимает EFI-система и на ней смотрит файлы являющиеся загрузчиками сродни: #rEFInd, #GRUB или #systemd-boot В качестве загрузчика может быть и специально собранный образ ядра ОС — т.н. EFI boot stub.

Добавить поддержку NVMe?
Вполне реально научить комп грузиться с NVMe. Надо взять «Intel ME Tools» b снять дамп SPI Flash чипа на материнской плате, а в снятый образ добавить NVMe-драйвер (через «UEFI Tool»). После чего, уже пропатченный образ записывается обратно в SPI Flash чип на материнской плате.

Доводилось такое выполнять, используя «Flash Programming Tool» (fpt.exe) из пакета «Intel ME Tools» и это не из под Windows, а из под #FreeDOS. Создавая загрузочную флешку через dd и докидывая на неё один файл «fpt.exe».
Не сказать чтобы удобно, но дампить и шить из под Windows требует сперва установить и саму эту ОС и нужные драйвера от материнской платы вместе с Intel ME/AMT. И выходит, что в ряде случаев проще и быстрее лишние пару раз загрузиться с флешки.

В более поздних версиях «Intel ME Tools» для более новых материнских плат (чипсетов, PCH) появился вариант «Flash Programming Tool» и для линухов. Ненаглядный «flashrom» в ряде случаев бесполезен, может снять дамп лишь с одного из чипов, коих обычно две штуки. Т.е. вместо 12 Мб сделает дамп лишь 8 Мб, то же FPT во время работы показывает с какого SPI-чипа сколько снято или в него записано.

#nvme #nvmessd #linux #hardware #intel #IntelME #lang_ru @Russia

#pcie #uefi #grub #nvme #efi #esp

NovaCustom @[email protected] · 2024-06-29 · 14:10 UTC

🔋 Disabling the Intel Management Engine (ME) leads to battery draining in suspend mode due to modern standby (S0ix). In this guide, we will workaround this issue by setting up a suspend-then-hibernate policy.

https://novacustom.com/prevent-battery-draining-while-suspending-with-me-disabled-linux/

https://novacustom.com/prevent-battery-draining-while-suspending-with-me-disabled-linux/

NovaCustom @[email protected] · 2024-06-29 · 14:10 UTC

🔋 Disabling the Intel Management Engine (ME) leads to battery draining in suspend mode due to modern standby (S0ix). In this guide, we will workaround this issue by setting up a suspend-then-hibernate policy.

https://novacustom.com/prevent-battery-draining-while-suspending-with-me-disabled-linux/

NovaCustom @[email protected] · 2024-06-29 · 14:10 UTC

🔋 Disabling the Intel Management Engine (ME) leads to battery draining in suspend mode due to modern standby (S0ix). In this guide, we will workaround this issue by setting up a suspend-then-hibernate policy.

https://novacustom.com/prevent-battery-draining-while-suspending-with-me-disabled-linux/

NovaCustom @[email protected] · 2024-06-29 · 14:10 UTC

🔋 Disabling the Intel Management Engine (ME) leads to battery draining in suspend mode due to modern standby (S0ix). In this guide, we will workaround this issue by setting up a suspend-then-hibernate policy.

https://novacustom.com/prevent-battery-draining-while-suspending-with-me-disabled-linux/

#laptopbattery #s0ix #intelme #ime #coreboot

NovaCustom @[email protected] · 2024-06-29 · 14:10 UTC

🔋 Disabling the Intel Management Engine (ME) leads to battery draining in suspend mode due to modern standby (S0ix). In this guide, we will workaround this issue by setting up a suspend-then-hibernate policy.

https://eclypsium.com/blog/linux-commands-to-check-the-state-of-firmware/

IT News @[email protected] · 2024-01-05 · 09:25 UTC

Enabling Intel AMT For BIOS-over-WiFi - Intel ME, AMT, SMT, V-Pro… All of these acronyms are kind of intimidating, all we ... - https://hackaday.com/2024/01/05/enabling-intel-amt-for-bios-over-wifi/ #intelmanagementengine #managementengine #computerhacks #securityhacks #intelamt #intelsmt #spiflash #intelme #intel #bios #uefi #ime #rom #me

#me #rom #ime #uefi #bios #intel

IT News @[email protected] · 2024-01-05 · 09:25 UTC

Enabling Intel AMT For BIOS-over-WiFi - Intel ME, AMT, SMT, V-Pro… All of these acronyms are kind of intimidating, all we ... - https://hackaday.com/2024/01/05/enabling-intel-amt-for-bios-over-wifi/ #intelmanagementengine #managementengine #computerhacks #securityhacks #intelamt #intelsmt #spiflash #intelme #intel #bios #uefi #ime #rom #me

#me #rom #ime #uefi #bios #intel

IT News @[email protected] · 2024-01-05 · 09:25 UTC

Enabling Intel AMT For BIOS-over-WiFi - Intel ME, AMT, SMT, V-Pro… All of these acronyms are kind of intimidating, all we ... - https://hackaday.com/2024/01/05/enabling-intel-amt-for-bios-over-wifi/ #intelmanagementengine #managementengine #computerhacks #securityhacks #intelamt #intelsmt #spiflash #intelme #intel #bios #uefi #ime #rom #me

#me #rom #ime #uefi #bios #intel

IT News @[email protected] · 2024-01-05 · 09:25 UTC

Enabling Intel AMT For BIOS-over-WiFi - Intel ME, AMT, SMT, V-Pro… All of these acronyms are kind of intimidating, all we ... - https://hackaday.com/2024/01/05/enabling-intel-amt-for-bios-over-wifi/ #intelmanagementengine #managementengine #computerhacks #securityhacks #intelamt #intelsmt #spiflash #intelme #intel #bios #uefi #ime #rom #me

#intelmanagementengine #managementengine #computerhacks #securityhacks #intelamt #intelsmt

IT News @[email protected] · 2024-01-05 · 09:25 UTC

Enabling Intel AMT For BIOS-over-WiFi - Intel ME, AMT, SMT, V-Pro… All of these acronyms are kind of intimidating, all we ... - https://hackaday.com/2024/01/05/enabling-intel-amt-for-bios-over-wifi/ #intelmanagementengine #managementengine #computerhacks #securityhacks #intelamt #intelsmt #spiflash #intelme #intel #bios #uefi #ime #rom #me

#me #rom #ime #uefi #bios #intel

Tyson, Chicken Rancher 🐓 @[email protected] · 2023-07-26 · 22:15 UTC

My colleague's put together a collection of #Linux commands you can use to check the hardware and firmware on your machines, including #SecureBoot, #UEFI, #BIOS, #IntelME, #TPM, and more.

Bookmark for reference!

#linux #secureboot #uefi #bios #intelme #tpm

Tyson, Chicken Rancher 🐓 @[email protected] · 2023-07-26 · 22:15 UTC

My colleague's put together a collection of #Linux commands you can use to check the hardware and firmware on your machines, including #SecureBoot, #UEFI, #BIOS, #IntelME, #TPM, and more.

Bookmark for reference!

https://eclypsium.com/blog/linux-commands-to-check-the-state-of-firmware/

#linux #secureboot #uefi #bios #intelme #tpm

Tyson, Chicken Rancher 🐓 @[email protected] · 2023-07-26 · 22:15 UTC

My colleague's put together a collection of #Linux commands you can use to check the hardware and firmware on your machines, including #SecureBoot, #UEFI, #BIOS, #IntelME, #TPM, and more.

Bookmark for reference!

https://eclypsium.com/blog/linux-commands-to-check-the-state-of-firmware/

#linux #secureboot #uefi #bios #intelme #tpm

Tyson, Chicken Rancher 🐓 @[email protected] · 2023-07-26 · 22:15 UTC

My colleague's put together a collection of #Linux commands you can use to check the hardware and firmware on your machines, including #SecureBoot, #UEFI, #BIOS, #IntelME, #TPM, and more.

Bookmark for reference!

https://eclypsium.com/blog/linux-commands-to-check-the-state-of-firmware/

#tpm #intelme #bios #uefi #secureboot #linux

Tyson, Chicken Rancher 🐓 @[email protected] · 2023-07-26 · 22:15 UTC

My colleague's put together a collection of #Linux commands you can use to check the hardware and firmware on your machines, including #SecureBoot, #UEFI, #BIOS, #IntelME, #TPM, and more.

Bookmark for reference!

https://eclypsium.com/blog/linux-commands-to-check-the-state-of-firmware/

#linux #secureboot #uefi #bios #intelme #tpm

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:53 UTC

We try our best to bring back privacy, security and an eco-friendly life by setting up refurbished and secure laptops with Intel ME disabled! You can support us by purchasing a monocles laptop on https://store.monocles.eu/produkt/monocles-book-1/
Or wait for our instructions on how to flash our modified BIOS/UEFI and disable Intel ME yourself (Sidenote: You need technical knowledge and special devices to disable Intel ME).
(Part 4/4)

#monocles #coreboot #privacy #security #intelme

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:53 UTC

We try our best to bring back privacy, security and an eco-friendly life by setting up refurbished and secure laptops with Intel ME disabled! You can support us by purchasing a monocles laptop on https://store.monocles.eu/produkt/monocles-book-1/
Or wait for our instructions on how to flash our modified BIOS/UEFI and disable Intel ME yourself (Sidenote: You need technical knowledge and special devices to disable Intel ME).
(Part 4/4)

#monocles #coreboot #privacy #security #intelme

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:53 UTC

We try our best to bring back privacy, security and an eco-friendly life by setting up refurbished and secure laptops with Intel ME disabled! You can support us by purchasing a monocles laptop on https://store.monocles.eu/produkt/monocles-book-1/
Or wait for our instructions on how to flash our modified BIOS/UEFI and disable Intel ME yourself (Sidenote: You need technical knowledge and special devices to disable Intel ME).
(Part 4/4)

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:53 UTC

We try our best to bring back privacy, security and an eco-friendly life by setting up refurbished and secure laptops with Intel ME disabled! You can support us by purchasing a monocles laptop on https://store.monocles.eu/produkt/monocles-book-1/
Or wait for our instructions on how to flash our modified BIOS/UEFI and disable Intel ME yourself (Sidenote: You need technical knowledge and special devices to disable Intel ME).
(Part 4/4)

#monocles #coreboot #privacy #security #intelme

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:52 UTC

Read more about it in the public wikipedia article:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine

There you will also find mentioned monocles for commercial ME disablement: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine#Commercial_ME_disablement
(Part 3/4)

#monocles #coreboot #privacy #security #intelme

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:52 UTC

Read more about it in the public wikipedia article:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine

There you will also find mentioned monocles for commercial ME disablement: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine#Commercial_ME_disablement
(Part 3/4)

#monocles #coreboot #privacy #security #intelme

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:52 UTC

Read more about it in the public wikipedia article:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine

There you will also find mentioned monocles for commercial ME disablement: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine#Commercial_ME_disablement
(Part 3/4)

monocles @[email protected] · 2023-07-21 · 16:52 UTC

Read more about it in the public wikipedia article:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine

There you will also find mentioned monocles for commercial ME disablement: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine#Commercial_ME_disablement
(Part 3/4)