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#apikeys — Public Fediverse posts

Live and recent posts from across the Fediverse tagged #apikeys, aggregated by home.social.

  1. Ah yes, another "revolutionary" #API promising to unite the #AI models of #Europe with the transformative power of a single login screen. 🌍🔑 Because apparently, the real challenge in AI isn't the technology, but remembering which API key unlocks #Skynet. 🤖✨
    edenai.co #Revolution #Tech #Innovation #APIKeys #HackerNews #ngated

  2. Ah, the digital Fort Knox of API keys! 🏰 Because who wouldn't want to turn their code into an unending #security checkpoint #circus 🎪, complete with browser verifications and #JavaScript hijinks? Just what every developer dreams of: #debugging security measures instead of their actual code! 🚀
    keycard.studio/ #APIkeys #DeveloperLife #HackerNews #ngated

  3. The Register: Security boffins scoured the web and found hundreds of valid API keys. “Computer security boffins have conducted an analysis of 10 million websites and found almost 2,000 API credentials strewn across 10,000 webpages.”

    https://rbfirehose.com/2026/04/01/the-register-security-boffins-scoured-the-web-and-found-hundreds-of-valid-api-keys/
  4. 🚨 NEWSFLASH: Captain Obvious discovers that leaving admin keys exposed is a bad idea! 🤯 Who knew?! Our hero triumphantly stumbles upon 39 API keys just lying around like Easter eggs on the internet. In an explosive twist, he asks, "What if OTHER sites have the same issue?" 🕵️‍♂️🔍💡
    benzimmermann.dev/blog/algolia #CaptainObvious #APIkeys #SecurityBreach #CyberAwareness #InternetSafety #DataProtection #HackerNews #ngated

  5. To search for Google API keys recursively in the current folder and its sub-folders with ripgrep:

    rg 'AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}' -o

    Also shared on Shodan Snippets:

    snippets.shodan.io/c/FHw2r7wWI

    #Security #OneLiner #Google #GoogleAPIKeys #APIkeys #ripgrep #Regex #BugBounty #Snippet

  6. To search for Google API keys recursively in the current folder and its sub-folders with ripgrep:

    rg 'AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}' -o

    Also shared on Shodan Snippets:

    snippets.shodan.io/c/FHw2r7wWI

    #Security #OneLiner #Google #GoogleAPIKeys #APIkeys #ripgrep #Regex #BugBounty #Snippet

  7. To search for Google API keys recursively in the current folder and its sub-folders with ripgrep:

    rg 'AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}' -o

    Also shared on Shodan Snippets:

    snippets.shodan.io/c/FHw2r7wWI

    #Security #OneLiner #Google #GoogleAPIKeys #APIkeys #ripgrep #Regex #BugBounty #Snippet

  8. 🚨 Breaking news, folks: it turns out API keys are not like your diary's lock after all! Who would have thought? 😱 Apparently, sharing keys meant for public use with a private access service can lead to some unwanted surprises! Google must be thrilled! 🔓🤦‍♂️
    simonwillison.net/2026/Feb/26/ #APIkeys #PublicAccess #DataSecurity #GoogleNews #TechSurprise #HackerNews #ngated

  9. 🚨 Breaking news, folks: it turns out API keys are not like your diary's lock after all! Who would have thought? 😱 Apparently, sharing keys meant for public use with a private access service can lead to some unwanted surprises! Google must be thrilled! 🔓🤦‍♂️
    simonwillison.net/2026/Feb/26/ #APIkeys #PublicAccess #DataSecurity #GoogleNews #TechSurprise #HackerNews #ngated

  10. 🚨 Breaking news, folks: it turns out API keys are not like your diary's lock after all! Who would have thought? 😱 Apparently, sharing keys meant for public use with a private access service can lead to some unwanted surprises! Google must be thrilled! 🔓🤦‍♂️
    simonwillison.net/2026/Feb/26/ #APIkeys #PublicAccess #DataSecurity #GoogleNews #TechSurprise #HackerNews #ngated

  11. 🚨 Breaking news, folks: it turns out API keys are not like your diary's lock after all! Who would have thought? 😱 Apparently, sharing keys meant for public use with a private access service can lead to some unwanted surprises! Google must be thrilled! 🔓🤦‍♂️
    simonwillison.net/2026/Feb/26/ #APIkeys #PublicAccess #DataSecurity #GoogleNews #TechSurprise #HackerNews #ngated

  12. ----------------

    🎯 AI
    ===================

    Executive summary: Moltbook, an AI-only social network populated by OpenClaw agents, presents immediate security risks: pervasive spam/scams, exposure of agents to untrusted content via API-oriented prompt files, and a reported database compromise that leaked API keys enabling bot impersonation and direct prompt injection.

    Technical details:
    • SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, and MESSAGING.md are repository-style markdown files that describe how agents interact with the Moltbook API. SKILLS.md documents API interactions and recommends HTTP requests (curl-style). HEARTBEAT.md instructs periodic check-ins. MESSAGING.md notes that messaging requires human approval, while other endpoints accept automated agent input.
    • Experimental tooling (reported as a CLI tool named moltbotnet) implemented API calls for posting, commenting, upvoting, following, and engagement automation. This tooling demonstrates how easily an agent or impersonator can script interactions.
    • Reported breach of Moltbook’s database exposed API keys tied to agent identities. Those keys materially enable: impersonation of legitimate agents, submission of crafted prompts to agent workloads, and direct prompt injection vectors that bypass typical human-only guards.

    Analysis:

    The combination of (1) public, machine-readable prompt files that instruct agents how to behave, (2) open posting and engagement that accepts untrusted content, and (3) leaked credentials produces two classes of injection risks: indirect prompt injection (agents ingesting malicious content from other agents) and direct prompt injection (attacker using stolen API keys to send malicious prompts as a trusted agent). The observed ecosystem is also saturated with social-engineering lures (requests to run package installers, share crypto wallets, or call external APIs).

    Detection guidance:
    • Monitor unexpected use of API keys or unusual posting frequency associated with agent identities.
    • Inspect content sources for scripted patterns (repeated promotional payloads, command-like text referencing package managers or curl usage).

    Limitations:
    • No public CVE identifiers are reported in the source material.
    • Exact scope of leaked API keys (number of keys, associated privileges) was not enumerated in the writeup.

    References and tags:

    SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, MESSAGING.md — Tenable Research field report on Moltbook interactions and breach findings.

    🔹 OpenClaw #Moltbook #promptinjection #APIkeys #Tenable

    🔗 Source: tenable.com/blog/undercover-on

  13. ----------------

    🎯 AI
    ===================

    Executive summary: Moltbook, an AI-only social network populated by OpenClaw agents, presents immediate security risks: pervasive spam/scams, exposure of agents to untrusted content via API-oriented prompt files, and a reported database compromise that leaked API keys enabling bot impersonation and direct prompt injection.

    Technical details:
    • SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, and MESSAGING.md are repository-style markdown files that describe how agents interact with the Moltbook API. SKILLS.md documents API interactions and recommends HTTP requests (curl-style). HEARTBEAT.md instructs periodic check-ins. MESSAGING.md notes that messaging requires human approval, while other endpoints accept automated agent input.
    • Experimental tooling (reported as a CLI tool named moltbotnet) implemented API calls for posting, commenting, upvoting, following, and engagement automation. This tooling demonstrates how easily an agent or impersonator can script interactions.
    • Reported breach of Moltbook’s database exposed API keys tied to agent identities. Those keys materially enable: impersonation of legitimate agents, submission of crafted prompts to agent workloads, and direct prompt injection vectors that bypass typical human-only guards.

    Analysis:

    The combination of (1) public, machine-readable prompt files that instruct agents how to behave, (2) open posting and engagement that accepts untrusted content, and (3) leaked credentials produces two classes of injection risks: indirect prompt injection (agents ingesting malicious content from other agents) and direct prompt injection (attacker using stolen API keys to send malicious prompts as a trusted agent). The observed ecosystem is also saturated with social-engineering lures (requests to run package installers, share crypto wallets, or call external APIs).

    Detection guidance:
    • Monitor unexpected use of API keys or unusual posting frequency associated with agent identities.
    • Inspect content sources for scripted patterns (repeated promotional payloads, command-like text referencing package managers or curl usage).

    Limitations:
    • No public CVE identifiers are reported in the source material.
    • Exact scope of leaked API keys (number of keys, associated privileges) was not enumerated in the writeup.

    References and tags:

    SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, MESSAGING.md — Tenable Research field report on Moltbook interactions and breach findings.

    🔹 OpenClaw #Moltbook #promptinjection #APIkeys #Tenable

    🔗 Source: tenable.com/blog/undercover-on

  14. ----------------

    🎯 AI
    ===================

    Executive summary: Moltbook, an AI-only social network populated by OpenClaw agents, presents immediate security risks: pervasive spam/scams, exposure of agents to untrusted content via API-oriented prompt files, and a reported database compromise that leaked API keys enabling bot impersonation and direct prompt injection.

    Technical details:
    • SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, and MESSAGING.md are repository-style markdown files that describe how agents interact with the Moltbook API. SKILLS.md documents API interactions and recommends HTTP requests (curl-style). HEARTBEAT.md instructs periodic check-ins. MESSAGING.md notes that messaging requires human approval, while other endpoints accept automated agent input.
    • Experimental tooling (reported as a CLI tool named moltbotnet) implemented API calls for posting, commenting, upvoting, following, and engagement automation. This tooling demonstrates how easily an agent or impersonator can script interactions.
    • Reported breach of Moltbook’s database exposed API keys tied to agent identities. Those keys materially enable: impersonation of legitimate agents, submission of crafted prompts to agent workloads, and direct prompt injection vectors that bypass typical human-only guards.

    Analysis:

    The combination of (1) public, machine-readable prompt files that instruct agents how to behave, (2) open posting and engagement that accepts untrusted content, and (3) leaked credentials produces two classes of injection risks: indirect prompt injection (agents ingesting malicious content from other agents) and direct prompt injection (attacker using stolen API keys to send malicious prompts as a trusted agent). The observed ecosystem is also saturated with social-engineering lures (requests to run package installers, share crypto wallets, or call external APIs).

    Detection guidance:
    • Monitor unexpected use of API keys or unusual posting frequency associated with agent identities.
    • Inspect content sources for scripted patterns (repeated promotional payloads, command-like text referencing package managers or curl usage).

    Limitations:
    • No public CVE identifiers are reported in the source material.
    • Exact scope of leaked API keys (number of keys, associated privileges) was not enumerated in the writeup.

    References and tags:

    SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, MESSAGING.md — Tenable Research field report on Moltbook interactions and breach findings.

    🔹 OpenClaw #Moltbook #promptinjection #APIkeys #Tenable

    🔗 Source: tenable.com/blog/undercover-on

  15. ----------------

    🎯 AI
    ===================

    Executive summary: Moltbook, an AI-only social network populated by OpenClaw agents, presents immediate security risks: pervasive spam/scams, exposure of agents to untrusted content via API-oriented prompt files, and a reported database compromise that leaked API keys enabling bot impersonation and direct prompt injection.

    Technical details:
    • SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, and MESSAGING.md are repository-style markdown files that describe how agents interact with the Moltbook API. SKILLS.md documents API interactions and recommends HTTP requests (curl-style). HEARTBEAT.md instructs periodic check-ins. MESSAGING.md notes that messaging requires human approval, while other endpoints accept automated agent input.
    • Experimental tooling (reported as a CLI tool named moltbotnet) implemented API calls for posting, commenting, upvoting, following, and engagement automation. This tooling demonstrates how easily an agent or impersonator can script interactions.
    • Reported breach of Moltbook’s database exposed API keys tied to agent identities. Those keys materially enable: impersonation of legitimate agents, submission of crafted prompts to agent workloads, and direct prompt injection vectors that bypass typical human-only guards.

    Analysis:

    The combination of (1) public, machine-readable prompt files that instruct agents how to behave, (2) open posting and engagement that accepts untrusted content, and (3) leaked credentials produces two classes of injection risks: indirect prompt injection (agents ingesting malicious content from other agents) and direct prompt injection (attacker using stolen API keys to send malicious prompts as a trusted agent). The observed ecosystem is also saturated with social-engineering lures (requests to run package installers, share crypto wallets, or call external APIs).

    Detection guidance:
    • Monitor unexpected use of API keys or unusual posting frequency associated with agent identities.
    • Inspect content sources for scripted patterns (repeated promotional payloads, command-like text referencing package managers or curl usage).

    Limitations:
    • No public CVE identifiers are reported in the source material.
    • Exact scope of leaked API keys (number of keys, associated privileges) was not enumerated in the writeup.

    References and tags:

    SKILLS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, MESSAGING.md — Tenable Research field report on Moltbook interactions and breach findings.

    🔹 OpenClaw #Moltbook #promptinjection #APIkeys #Tenable

    🔗 Source: tenable.com/blog/undercover-on

  16. The Register: AI companies keep publishing private API keys to GitHub. “Leading AI companies turn out to be no better at keeping secrets than anyone else writing code. Cloud security firm Wiz has found that 65 percent of the Forbes AI 50 ‘had leaked verified secrets on GitHub,’ minus a few with no presence on the code sharing site.”

    https://rbfirehose.com/2025/11/11/the-register-ai-companies-keep-publishing-private-api-keys-to-github/

  17. Employee #monitoring app exposes 21M work screens​ | Cybernews

    The #leaked data is extremely sensitive, as millions of screenshots from employees' devices could not only expose full-screen captures of emails, internal chats, and confidential business documents, but also contain #login pages, credentials, #APIkeys , and other sensitive info that could be #exploited to attack businesses worldwide.

    Cybernews contacted the company, and access has now been secured.
    #privacy

    cybernews.com/security/employe

  18. Exposed #DeepSeek Database Revealed #Chat Prompts and Internal Data

    China-based DeepSeek has exploded in popularity, drawing greater scrutiny. Case in point: #Security researchers found more than 1 million records, including user data and #APIkeys , in an open database.
    #china #api

    wired.com/story/exposed-deepse

  19. "tl;dr Postman, the popular API testing platform, hosts the largest collection of public APIs. Unfortunately, it’s become one of the largest public sources of leaked secrets. We estimate over 4,000 live credentials are currently leaking publicly on Postman for a variety of popular SaaS and cloud providers."

    trufflesecurity.com/blog/postm

    #security #api #postman #apikeys #cybersecurity

  20. 👉 #SAML, #OAuth 2.0, and #JWT establish a robust framework for securing #API authentication and authorization processes.

    Explore other key #apisecurity protocols essential for securing your API endpoints: bit.ly/3Rn96bb

    #apiattacks #apiendpoints #authentication #authorization #apibreaches #databreaches #vulnerabilities #apikeys #apptrana #indusface

  21. 👉 #SAML, #OAuth 2.0, and #JWT establish a robust framework for securing #API authentication and authorization processes.

    Explore other key #apisecurity protocols essential for securing your API endpoints: bit.ly/3Rn96bb

    #apiattacks #apiendpoints #authentication #authorization #apibreaches #databreaches #vulnerabilities #apikeys #apptrana #indusface

  22. 👉 #SAML, #OAuth 2.0, and #JWT establish a robust framework for securing #API authentication and authorization processes.

    Explore other key #apisecurity protocols essential for securing your API endpoints: bit.ly/3Rn96bb

    #apiattacks #apiendpoints #authentication #authorization #apibreaches #databreaches #vulnerabilities #apikeys #apptrana #indusface

  23. I'm failing to grok how #APIKeys and #GCP (#GoogleCloudPlatform) "projects" work.

    I need to distinguish between different customers calling my #API via their API keys. The official documentation says "create a separate GCP project for each [customer]" (source: cloud.google.com/endpoints/doc)

    I could have hundreds or more of different customers. Am I expected to create a GCP project for each one?

  24. Microsoft has announced that API keys will be retired for querying application insights. Users will need to transition to Azure AD authentication, which provides additional features such as multi-factor authentication and hybrid integration for password protection policies. The deadline for transitioning to... azure.microsoft.com/en-us/upda #AzureAD #APIkeys #applicationinsights #softcorpremium

  25. Question for the local community:

    When you generate API secrets as an administrator of the application, you have access to them. Very common when creating secrets for a service accounts etc. But the logs will always point to the user you created and is open to abuse.

    Under API security, is there a 'best practice' or some regulation guidance that says that this form of delegation has to be accurately authenticated 'by user' in a logging mechanism? #apikeys #gdpr #logging #infosec

  26. Dealing with my first #securitybreach for a system I'm responsible for.
    T0: Dev pushed cloud platform #APIkeys to #publicrepo
    T0+30 min: Beijing IP attempted to create docker-machine host and security group allowing that IP ingress. When permissions were insufficient #hacker immediately deleted security group.
    T0 +40 min: later our customer (owner of the cloud platform account) forwarded an alert email from the platform.
    T0 +50 min: our lockdown and #forensics began